G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.,respondents.Sobrevias, Diaz, Haudini & Bodegon Law Offices for petitioner.Tan, Manzano & Velez Law Offices for private respondent.R E S O L U T I O NNARVASA,C.J.:Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmarias) specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff (hereafter simply APL), and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27, 1988. On that date APL presented its first witness whose testimony was completed on November 12, 1988. The case was reset to May 3, 1989 for reception of the testimony of two (2) more witnesses in APL's behalf.At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons . . . ."The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of which APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting informationinter aliaof the mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained.By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL, disposing as follows:ACCORDINGLY, the motion to take testimonies of plaintiff's Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) is hereby GRANTED. The Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces is hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition. Compliance with the Rules on the taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under Sections 25-29 of Rule 24, Rules of Court is enjoined.Let this Order be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 4 dated April 6, 1987.The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, butonly upon written interrogatoriesso as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on the following grounds: (1) authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state; (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4) depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens."By Order dated July 5, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. In the same Order, APL was directed "to take the necessary steps to implement the order authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce additional evidence by deposition."Dasmarias instituted a special civil action ofcertiorariin the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just described. Said Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain thestatus quoand to prevent the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner."After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division) rendered judgment on September 23, 1992 denying Dasmarias petition forcertiorariand upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmarias sought reconsideration of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992.Once again Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's Decision of September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.Dasmarias ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of their oral examination in open Court considering that:a) the taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial;b) no urgent or compelling reason has been shown to justify the departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;"2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair situation in allowing private respondent, a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge;" and3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . . (APL's) witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions."Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. Section 12, Rule 24 provides as follows:Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient, on application and notice, and on such terms and with such directions as are just and appropriate. Officers may be designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and letters rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here name the country)."A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria,J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed" (Feria,J.,op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph,viz.:xxx xxx xxx3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of ______, 19__, to take the testimony of (here name the witness or witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in which the testimony is to be taken), before _________________ (name of officer), wasreturned unexecutedby __________________ on the ground that ____________, all of which more fully appears from the certificate of said __________ to said commission and made a part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show commission is inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis supplied).In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the petition for review oncertiorari) aprima facieshowing not rebutted by petitioner.It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No. 4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign Affairs directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department of Foreign Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;" this, "in the interest of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the commission on various grounds.The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is "inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge."Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or isout of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24,supra, emphasis supplied) is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754).The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the condition that the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant (Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.One other word. In its Order of July 5, 1991 denying Dasmarias motion for reconsideration of the earlier order dated March 15, 1991 (allowing the taking of deposition by commission) one of the reasons adduced by the Regional Trial Court for the denial was that the motion had been "filed out of time." Evidently, the Trial Court reached this conclusion because, as the record discloses, the motion for reconsideration was filed by Dasmarias on June 25, 1991, twenty-five (25) days after notice (on May 20, 1991) of the Order of March 15, 1991 sought to be reconsidered. Denial of the motion on such a ground is incorrect. In the first place, it appears that there was a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, ending on June 25, 1991 which was however not acted on or granted by the Court. More importantly, the order sought to be reconsidered is aninterlocutoryorder, in respect of which there is no provision of law fixing the time within which reconsideration thereof should be sought.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for review oncertiorari. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO,Petitioners,vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPERLAS-BERNABE,J.:The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners seek to nullify and set aside the February 19, 2008 Decision1and November 28, 2008 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99383, which reversed the September 12, 2006 Order3issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of the prosecutions motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos, Cambodia.Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447. The Information4dated September 24, 2003, later amended5on September 14, 2004, reads:"That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following manner, to wit: all said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less."Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition,7the MeTC granted8the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied,9prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari10before the RTC.On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order dated March 5, 2006,12the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition alleging that I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT INFRINGED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO A PUBLIC TRIAL IN ALLOWING THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEPOSITION TAKING OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO CONFRONT THE SAID WITNESS FACE TO FACE.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDICIAL LEGISLATION COMMITTED BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN APPLYING THE RULES ON DEPOSITION-TAKING IN CIVIL CASES TO CRIMINAL CASES.IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OVERLOOKING THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE SIMILARLY COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.We rule in favor of petitioners.The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.13This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.14It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15explicitly states that "x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)16The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before anyPhilippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.17But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.18(Underscoring supplied)Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra19where we further declared that While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.20(Underscoring supplied)It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of WitnessesThe CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of theConstitution provides as follows:Section 14. (1) x x x(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo,21the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus:"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x"22(Underscoring supplied)1wphi1The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.23The Court explained in People v. Seneris24that the constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility."25As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination,"26it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington,27the US Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement, thus:Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's right to confront witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined." (Underscoring supplied)The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant CaseThe CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb28that the taking of an unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.29But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not similar.1wphi1The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense.30In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other party.Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and deposition.31Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEAssociate justice

G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19,petitioners,vs.RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE,respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated August 15, 2001 and its Resolution2dated March 12, 2002. The CA decision set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25, 20003granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras (Concepcions) motion to take deposition, and dated November 3, 20004denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged withEstafa Through Falsification of Public Documentbefore the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,5arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.6Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.7On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved.8On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.9This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action forcertioraribefore the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the appellate court to date.10On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition.11He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.12The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age.13After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.14Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a special civil action forcertioraribefore the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.15On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision16favorable to the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and November 3, 2000 orders of the courta quoare hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition that may have been taken on the authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.SO ORDERED.17At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.18In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA added that the rationale of theRulesin requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.19Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.II.WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES" IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL CASEA QUOCONSTITUTES A WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.20It is undisputed that in their petition forcertioraribefore the CA, respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.21However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.22In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in the interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to file its Comment on the petition forcertiorari. Thus, the People was given the opportunity to refute the respondents arguments.Instructive is the Courts pronouncement inCommissioner Domingo v. Scheer23in this wise:There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.24Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite the procedural defect.On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case, we rule in the negative.It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge.25This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face.26It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.27Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.28This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,291330and 15,31Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:Section 15.Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.The contention does not persuade.The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be madebefore the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of theRulesthat the same be made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the case is pending."32Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated.33When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.34Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of theRules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551, areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, JJ.,concur.

[G.R. No. 118438.December 4, 1998]ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,vs.COURT OF APPEALSand CHERRY VALLEY FARMS LIMITED,respondents.D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO,J.:ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. assails in this petition the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Cherry Valley Farms Limited based on the implied admissions of petitioner.On 14 October 1986 respondent Cherry Valley Farms Limited (CHERRY VALLEY), a foreign company based in England, filed against petitioner Allied Agri-Business Development Co. Inc. (ALLIED) a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for collection of sum of money alleging, among others that: (a) CHERRY VALLEY is a foreign corporation with principal office at Rothwell, Lincoln, England; (b) on 1 September 1982 up to 16 February 1983, or for a period of less than six (6) months, petitioner ALLIED purchased in ten (10) separate orders and received from respondent CHERRY VALLEY several duck hatching eggs and ducklings which in value totaled 51,245.12; (c) ALLIED did not pay the total purchase price of 51,245.12 despite repeated demands evidenced by a letter of Solicitor Braithwaite of England in behalf of CHERRY VALLEY; (d) instead of paying its obligation, ALLIED through its president wrote CHERRY VALLEY on 17 July 1985 inviting the latter to be a stockholder in a new corporation to be formed by ALLIED, which invitation however was rejected by CHERRY VALLEY on 26 September 1985; and, (e) ALLIED's president Ricardo Quintos expressly acknowledged through a letter of 8 October 1985 the obligation of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY.The complaint also prayed that ALLIED be made to pay the sum of 51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, plus legal interest from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, and twenty percent (20%) of the total amount being claimed from petitioner as attorneys fees; and, to pay the costs of suit.On 27 February 1986 ALLIED filed an answer[1]denying the material allegations of the complaint and contended that:(a) private respondent CHERRY VALLEY lacked the legal capacity to sue; (b) theletter of Quintos to CHERRY VALLEY was never authorized by the board of petitioner ALLIED, thus any admissionmade in that letter could not bind ALLIED; (c) the alleged amount of 51,245.12 did not represent the true and real obligation, if any, of petitioner; (d) to the best of the knowledge of ALLIED, not all ducks and ducklings covered and represented by CHERRY VALLEYs invoices were actually ordered by the former; and, (e) private respondent had no cause of action against petitioner.On 19 July 1988, CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIEDs counsel a Request for Admission[2]dated 15 July 1988 worded as follows:1.That the chairman of the board of directors and president of your corporation is Mr. Ricardo V. Quintos;2.That out of the 3,000,000 subscribed shares of stock, 1,496,000 shares is (sic) owned by Mr. Ricardo Quintos and 1,432,000 shares is(sic) also owned by his wife, Agnes dela Torre;3.That for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September 1982, your corporation ordered and received from CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings with a total value of 51,245.12 as reflected on CHERRY VALLEY invoices issued to you;4.That you received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from Mr. P.R.C. Braithwaite, solicitor of CHERRY VALLEY, demanding settlement of your unpaid account of 52,245.12 for the above-stated purchases;5.That instead of paying your obligation to CHERRY VALLEY, Mr. Ricardo Quintos, in his capacity as president of your corporation, sent a letter to CHERRY VALLEY dated 17 July 1985 proposing the setting up of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of your proposal;6.That you received a letter dated 26 September 1985 from Mr. J. Cross, Director and Secretary of CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of your proposal;7.That Mr. Ricardo Quintos in a letter dated 8 October 1985 admitted your indebtedness in the sum of English Sterling Pounds 51,245.12.It is further requested that said sworn admission be made within 10 days from receipt of this request.ALLIED filed itsComments/Objections[3]alleging that:(a) the admissions requested were matters which the private respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not answer; and, (b) the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up of petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not having been pleaded in the complaint.In its Reply[4]toComments/Objections to Request for Admission, CHERRY VALLEY maintained that there was no need on its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for admission, for these pertained to incidents personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner alone.Thereafter, on 2 August 1998, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion with the trial court to resolve the objections of ALLIED to the request for admission.On 11 August 1988 the trial court issued an Order[5]disregarding ALLIEDsComments/Objections to Request for Admissionin view of its non-compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED to answer the request for admission within ten (10) days from receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters contained in the request would be deemed admitted.ALLIED moved to reconsider the order; however, on 8 November 1988 the lower court denied[6]ALLIEDs motion for reconsideration and directed the latter to answer the request for admission within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the order.ALLIED failed to submit a sworn answer to the request for admission within the additional period of five (5) days granted by the trial court.Hence, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion for summary judgment[7]alleging that there was already an implied admission on the matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.On 23 October 1990, the trial court rendered judgment[8]against petitioner:(a) Ordering defendant to payplaintiff the sum of -51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this complaint until fully paid; and, (b) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff ten percent (10%) of the total amount due from defendant by way of attorneys fees since no protracted trial was held in this case, plus cost of suit.ALLIED appealed to the Court of Appeals.On 6 September 1994 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[9]affirming the summary judgment rendered by the trial court with the modification that ALLIED should pay the monetary award to CHERRY VALLEY in Philippine currency and that the award of attorneys fees and costs of suit be deleted.Hence, the instant petition by ALLIED alleging that serious errors were committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming the summary judgment of the trial court; that the complaint should have been instantly dismissed on the ground of lack of personality to sue on the part of respondent CHERRY VALLEY; that the summary judgment was tantamount to a denial of ALLIEDs right to due process for not requiring CHERRY VALLEY to produce its own witness; and, that the admission requested were matters which CHERRY VALLEY had the burden to prove during the trial.The petition must fail.We cannot sustain the allegation that respondent CHERRY VALLEY being an unlicensed foreign corporation lacked the legal capacity to institute the suit in the trial court for the recovery of money claims from petitioner.In fact, petitioner is estopped from challenging or questioning the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it.[10]The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue or failure of a foreign corporation to acquire a local license was never intended to favor domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms and then repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to do business in this country.[11]Petitioner cannot also successfully argue that its failure to answer the request for admission did not result in its admission of the matters stated in the request.Section 1 ofRule 26 of the Rules of Court provides:SECTION 1.Request for admission. - At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.[12]Upon service of request for admission, the party served may do any of the following acts:(a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested.[13]The records show that although petitioner filed with the trial court its comments and objections to the request for admission served on it by private respondent, the trial court disregarded the objections and directed petitioner after denying its motion for reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5) days from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the matters of which the admission was requested wouldbe deemed admitted.Petitioner failed to submit the required answer within the period.The matter set forth in the request were therefore deemed admitted by petitioner, i.e., (a) that for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September 1982, petitioner ordered and received from respondent CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings amounting to 51,245.12; (b) that petitioner received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from private respondents lawyer demanding payment of the amount of the purchases; (c) that instead of paying the obligation to respondent CHERRY VALLEY, petitioners president Ricardo Quintos sent a letter to the former proposing the establishment of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY as one of the stockholders; (d) that the proposal was refused by the Director of CHERRY VALLEY; and, (e) that petitioners president Ricardo Quintos admitted the indebtedness of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY in the sum of English Sterling Pounds 51,245.12.The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon the party seeking the admission.[14]Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted.Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.[15]This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that there were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations of the complaint were not disputed was correctlygranted by the trial court.It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a partys failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material issue of fact exists.[16]By its failure to answer the other partys request for admission, petitioner has admitted all the material facts necessary for judgment against itself.[17]WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1994 whichAFFIRMED the trial court in "ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of 51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this complaint until fully paid;" and "ordering defendant to pay plaintiff ten percent (10%) of the total amount due from defendant by way of attorney's fees since no protacted trial was held in this case plus cost of suit," with the modification that "Allied shall pay the monetary award of attorney's fees and costs of suit be deleted," is AFFIRMED.Costs against herein petitioner Allied Agri-Business Development Co., Inc.SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),Vitug, Panganiban,andQuisumbing, JJ.,concur

[G.R. No. 132577.August 17, 1999]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Challenged in this petition for review oncertiorariis the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 entitled Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita Tolentino, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, People of the Philippines and Lauro Vizconde which set aside the order of respondent judge therein denying herein respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webbs request to take the depositions of five (5) citizens and residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be.The factual and procedural antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide entitled People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al. presently pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition[1]praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the following:1.]Steven BucherActing Chief, Records Services BranchU.S. Department of JusticeImmigration and Naturalization Service425 Eye Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20536U.S.A.2.]Debora FarmerRecords Operations, Office of Records U.S.,Department of JusticeImmigration and Naturalization Service,Washington D.C., U.S.A.3.]Jaci AlstonDepartment of Motor Vehicle, Sacramento, California, U.S.A.4.]Ami Smalley, Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, California, U.S.A.5.]John Pavlisin210 South Glasell, City of Orange, California, 92666, U.S.A.before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly material and indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that:SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:(a)Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness;(b)The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;(c)The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:(1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the province and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;(d)If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may introduce any other parts. (italics supplied).The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that:1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction.[2]In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.[3]A motion for reconsideration[4]thereto on the grounds that:1.] The 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions, and 2.] Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions in foreign countries before a consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, was likewise denied by the trial court in an order dated July 25, 1997.[5]Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition forcertiorari[6]naming as respondents therein the Presiding Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, the People and private complainant Lauro Vizconde.In the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45399, respondent Webb argued that:1.] The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.] Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.] He has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will violate his constitutional right to due process.Commenting[7]on the petition, the People contended that the questioned orders of the Presiding Judge are well within the sphere of her judicial discretion and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that if at all, they may be considered merely as errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal in due time because:a.] The motion failed to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; b.] The conditional examination must be conducted before an inferior court; and c.] The examination of the witnesses must be done in open court.In his Comment,[8]private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition contending that:1.]The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner [now herein respondent] Webbs motion to take testimony by oral deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration dated 23 June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of Court.a.]The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure finds no application in criminal actions such as the case at bar.b.]The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure only provides for conditional examination of witnessesbeforetrial but not during trial.c.]The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside of Philippine jurisdiction.2.]The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Webbs motion to take testimony by oral deposition considering that the proposed deposition tends only to further establish the admissibility of documentary exhibits already admitted in evidence by the public respondent.On February 6, 1998, the Fourth Division[9]of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,[10]the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The orders of respondent judge dated 11 June 1997 (Annex A of the Petition) and 25 July 1997 (Annex B of the Petition) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.It is hereby ordered that the deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN before the proper consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be:(a)Mr. Steven Bucher;(b)Ms. Deborah Farmer;(c)Mr. Jaci Alston;(d)Ms. Ami Smalley; and(e)Mr. John Pavlisin.SO ORDERED.From the foregoing, the People forthwith elevated its cause to this Court by way of the instant petition dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration for the following reasons:1.] The rule that the petitioner should first file a motion for reconsideration applies to the special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and there is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order[11]such as the present appeal bycertiorari; 2.] Section 4, Rule 45 in requiring a petition for review oncertiorariwhich indicates that when a motion for new trial or reconsideration,if any,was filed implies that petitioner need not file a motion for reconsideration; 3.] The questions being raised before the Court are the same as those which were squarely raised before the Court of Appeals;[12]4.] The issues being raised here are purely legal;[13]5.] There is an urgent need to resolve the issues considering that the trial of the accused in the criminal case is about to end; and, 6.] The nature of this case requires a speedy and prompt disposition of the issues involved.[14]What are challenged before this Court are interlocutory orders and not a final judgment.The respondent has filed his Comment[15]which We treat as an Answer.The petitioner, in turn, filed a Reply.[16]The petition is ripe for decision.In urging this Tribunal to exercise its power of review over the assailed decision of the Appellate Court, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error IIN RULING THAT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.IIIN RULING THAT THE DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN BEFORE A CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINES WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES RESIDE OR ARE OFFICIALLY STATIONED.IIIIN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT.which can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court.In setting aside the order of the trial judge, the Appellate Courts Fourth Division reasoned,inter alia,thus:Settled is the rule that the whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.Thus, as the Supreme Court has ruled in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General and reiterated in subsequent cases:x x x The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which give the opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice.It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it.The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action.It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the courts powers by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole.The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice.Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties.It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.It does not constitute the thing itself which the courts are always striving to secure the litigants.It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.In other words, it is a means to an end.It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments.When it loses the character of the one and takes on the other [,] the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.[17]In the light of the foregoing judicial precedent, this Court finds that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take the deposition of the witnesses for petitioner.While petitioner had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which is found under the general classification of Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its application to the other proceedings, provided the same is not contrary to the specific rules provided therein.Indeed, the Rules of Court is to be viewed and construed as a whole, and if the Supreme Court had compartmentalized the same into four divisions, it was, as petitioner had claimed, for the purpose of organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure, specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis--vis Section 1, Rule 23 would reveal no inconsistency so as to exclude the application of the latter rule in criminal proceedings.Section 4, Rule 119 refers to the conditional examination of witnesses for the accusedbeforetrial, while Section 1, Ru