ROUTEING OF SHIPS, SHIP REPORTING AND RELATED · PDF fileas amended by resolution MSC.111(73)...

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For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

IMO

E

SUB-COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF NAVIGATION 48th session Agenda item 3

NAV 48/3/1 28 March 2002 Original: ENGLISH

ROUTEING OF SHIPS, SHIP REPORTING AND RELATED MATTERS

Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) and Mandatory Ship Reporting Area in the Baltic

(Gulf of Finland)

Submitted by Estonia, Finland and the Russian Federation

SUMMARY

Executive summary:

This document contains a proposal to amend the existing traffic separation schemes in the Gulf of Finland and to establish a new mandatory ship reporting system in the international water area of the Gulf of Finland between traffic separation scheme Off Köpu Peninsula and longitude 26°30'E

Action to be taken: Paragraph 12

Related documents:

Resolution A.284(VIII); NAV 47/13, annex 2; Ships Routeing, seventh edition, 1999; SOLAS chapter V, regulation 10 and 11; Guidelines for Ship Reporting Systems; resolution MSC.43(64) as amended by resolution MSC.111(73) and resolution A.851(20)

Introduction 1 Increased maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland has created a need to further enhance maritime safety in this area. Developing of the existing VTS systems by establishing an integrated traffic surveillance system would substantially improve the safety of navigation and reduce the risk of collision and thereby increase the protection of the marine environment. The objective of this proposal is to improve safety by directing the vessel traffic into traffic separation schemes and by establishing a mandatory ship reporting system as part of the Gulf of Finland VTMIS system. Background 2 The volume of oil carried in the Gulf of Finland has doubled since 1995 and is now over 40 million tons a year. The total volume of seaborne cargo in the Gulf of Finland amounts to 130 million tons. There has also been considerable growth in passenger traffic in the Gulf of Finland, especially between Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn, Estonia. At present there are over 60 crossings a day and the number of passengers has increased to approximately 6 million a year.

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The largest traffic flow is to the oil terminals of Sköldvik in Finland, Muuga in Estonia and Primorsk in Russian Federation. This traffic proceeds in an east-westerly direction and crosses the Helsinki�Tallinn passenger traffic route. The volume of oil products through Primorsk oil harbour is estimated to be 12 million tons a year in the first phase, which started 2001, and will be increased to 45 million tons a year in the third phase. 3 The Gulf of Finland is a relatively shallow sea area with a very vulnerable ecosystem. The risk of vessel and environmental accidents is increased by the converging traffic flows in the middle of the Gulf of Finland where the east-westerly flow of oil and general cargo transports crosses the north-south directed high speed passenger craft and conventional passenger vessel traffic between Helsinki and Tallinn. The growth of oil transports as such also increases the risk of accidents. Especially the risk of oil pollution is considerable. Even the slightest grounding or accident involving single-hull tankers constitutes a severe threat to the marine environment. The role of the Gulf of Finland as a transportation corridor will increase in the next few years. Current surveillance methods and systems will not be sufficient to prevent accidents. Transport volumes are predicted to reach approximately 100 million tons by the year 2005. 4 Finnish Research Centre VTT has made a FSA study of the risks of shipping on the Gulf of Finland which is attached in annex 4. The outcome of the FSA study clearly indicates that the implementation of the proposed routeing, mandatory reporting and radar/AIS-based monitoring systems in the Gulf of Finland is highly recommendable. The operation of the system significantly reduces the risk of collision. The positive effect of the system extends to the control of the consequences of marine accidents. It can provide information for many purposes including search and rescue and the prevention of marine pollution. In addition, during the period of winter, when the Gulf of Finland is partly or totally covered with ice, it provides information to the icebreaker fleet and to the vessel traffic for ensuring the safe and effective navigation in ice. Proposal 5 In order to ensure a safe and efficient traffic flow in the Gulf of Finland, the governments of Estonia, Finland and the Russian Federation propose to amend the recommended routeing system and establish a mandatory ship reporting system for ships of 300 GT and over. 6 It is proposed that two traffic separation schemes in the Gulf of Finland area (resolution A.284 (VIII)) are amended for navigational reasons, as described in annex 1. The amendments are necessitated by the existence of shallows near the traffic flow areas. The amended traffic separation schemes will better ensure the safety of the fully laden, deep draught tankers. 7 The recommendations concerning the navigation in and through the Gulf of Finland Traffic Area and near the Traffic Separation Schemes are expressed in the annex 2. 8 The mandatory ship reporting will be established in the Gulf of Finland, as described in annex 3. It will cover the international water area between traffic separation scheme Off Köpu Peninsula and longitude 26°30'E. The amended traffic separation schemes are located in this area.

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9 During winter, ice restrictions issued by Maritime Administrations regulate the traffic to ports in the Gulf of Finland. Ships are assisted by icebreakers. During severe ice conditions the traffic separation schemes can be declared not valid by a joint decision made by the duly authorized Administrations of Estonia, Finland and the Russian Federation. Mariners will be informed of the cancellation through Notices to Mariners and by VHF broadcasts from the VTS centres. The mandatory ship reporting system will also be in force in severe ice conditions. Thus the VTS centres will co-operate with the national icebreaker services and provide them with information and forward the orders of the icebreakers to merchant vessels. 10 The equipment in the VTS centres will meet the latest standards required. 11 The proposed effective date of the system is 1 July 2004. Action requested of the Sub-Committee 12 The Sub-Committee is requested to consider the proposal of Estonia, Finland and the Russian Federation and to decide as it deems appropriate.

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ANNEX 1

AMENDMENTS TO TWO EXISTING TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES IN THE

GULF OF FINLAND

TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME OFF PORKKALA LIGHTHOUSE Reference chart: FIN 902, 2000 edition. Geodetic datum: The national Finnish geodetic chart-coordinate system (KKJ) WGS84 correction: latitude correction -0,01'

longitude correction is +0,19'. Description of the amended traffic separation scheme a) A separation zone, one mile wide, is centred upon the following geographical points:

1) 59°43'.70 N 024°14'.00 E 2) 59°44'.90 N 024°21'.40 E 3) 59°45'.90 N 024°31'.00 E

b) A traffic lane, one and a half miles wide, is established on each side of the separation

zone. c) A precautionary area is established upon the following geographical points:

1) 59°43'.95 N 024°31'.80 E 2) 59°46'.15 N 024°53'.50 E 3) 59°50'.05 N 024°51'.90 E 4) 59°47'.85 N 024°30'.20 E

d) A separation zone, one mile wide, is centred upon the following geographical points:

1) 59°48'.10 N 024°52'.70 E 2) 59°48'.80 N 025°00'.00 E

e) A traffic lane, one and a half miles wide, is established on each side of the separation

zone. TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME OFF HANKONIEMI PENINSULA Reference chart: FIN 912, 1999 edition. Geodetic datum: The national Finnish geodetic chart-coordinate system (KKJ) WGS84 correction: latitude correction -0,01'

longitude correction is +0,20'. Description of the amended traffic separation scheme c) A separation zone, two miles wide, is centred upon the following geographical points:

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1) 59°24' 50 N, 022°25'.00 E 2) 59°28'.00 N, 022°34'.00 E 3) 59°30'.00 N, 022°45'.00 E

d) A traffic lane, four miles wide, is established on each side of the separation zone. Boarder line point by point in the Gulf of Finland ship reporting area Finland EUREF89

1. 59°36.477' 22°38.074' 2. 59°38.137' 22°51.446' 3. 59°39.413' 23°21.123' 4. 59°47.022' 24°12.365' 5. 59°47.809' 24°19.928' 6. 59°49.024' 24°29.299' 7. 59°53.524' 24°47.122' 8. 59°55.281' 24°55.799' 9. 59°56.606' 25°10.161' 10. 59°55.879' 25°28.276' 11. 59°55.692' 25°34.962' 12. 59°55.920' 25°37.219' 13. 59°58.608' 26° 1.039' 14. 60° 0.844' 26° 4.505' 15. 60° 2.293' 26°11.314' 16. 60° 2.791' 26°17.683' 17. 60° 5.000' 26°30.000'

Russian Federation

1. 60° 5.000' 26°30.000' 2. 59°57.000' 26°30.000'

Estonia 1. 59°56.273' 26°26.110' 2. 59°53.994' 26°09.069' 3. 59°48.894' 26°01.170' 4. 59°49.593' 25°34.569' 5. 59°42.193' 24°28.769' 6. 59°34.592' 23°57.069' 7. 59°28.892' 23°31.169' 8. 59°28.991' 23°11.369' 9. 59°28.191' 23°08.469' 10. 59°27.391' 23°06.369' 11. 59°17.491' 22°43.870' 12. 59°17.691' 22°36.070'

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13. 59°16.190' 22°23.770' 14. 59°14.690' 22°18.370' 15. 59°03.390' 21°50.870' 16. 59°02.100' 21°49.000' 17. 59°10.000' 21°30.000'

Finland 1. 59°36.477' 22°38.074'


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HELSINKI VTS

TALLINN VTS

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ANNEX 2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON NAVIGATION THROUGH THE GULF OF FINLAND TRAFFIC AREA 1 Use of ships routeing system

The Traffic Separation Schemes in the Gulf of Finland has been adopted by IMO and rule 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea applies. Subject to any factors that may adversely affect safe navigation, ships (especially oil and chemical tankers, ships carrying hazardous cargo and deep draught ships) proceeding from the Baltic Sea to the Gulf of Finland and vice versa are strongly recommended to use the traffic separation schemes in the Gulf of Finland. Ships crossing the east-westerly flow of traffic between the traffic separation schemes should cross as nearly as practicable at right angles to the traffic flow. Ships leaving or joining the east-westerly flow of traffic between the traffic separation schemes should do it at as small an angle as practicable to the recommended directions of traffic flow.

2 Crossing traffic

In the ice-free season there is heavy crossing traffic consisting mainly of high-speed craft between Helsinki and Tallinn. This increases the risk of collision in this area. Mariners are reminded that when risk of collision is deemed to exist the rules of the 1972 Collision Regulations fully apply and in particular the rules of part B, sections II and III, of which rules 15 and 19(d) are of specific relevance in the crossing situation.

3 Fishing and recreational sailing activities

Mariners should be aware that concentrations of recreational craft may be encountered between Porkkala, Helsinki and Tallinn in summer and should navigate with caution. Fishing vessels are reminded of the requirements of rule 10(i), and sailing vessels and all other vessels of less than 20 metres in length of the requirements of rule 10(j) of the 1972 Collision Regulations.

4 Pilotage Under national laws pilotage is mandatory in territorial waters.

5 Defects affecting safety Ships having defects affecting operational safety should take appropriate measures to overcome these defects before entering the Gulf of Finland.

6 Mandatory ship reporting system and navigation information service All ships navigating in the Gulf of Finland are required to make use of the mandatory ship reporting system and information broadcasts made and operated by the Governments of Finland, Estonia and Russian Federation, and to keep watch on VHF as appropriate. Note: See section I of part B, Baltic Sea, section I of part G, Mandatory ship reporting systems

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ANNEX 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE MANDATORY SHIP REPORTING SYSTEM IN THE GULF OF FINLAND TRAFFIC AREA A ship reporting system is established in the Gulf of Finland on international waters. 1 Categories of ships required to participate in the system

Ships required to participate in the mandatory ship reporting system: Ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards proceeding to or from ports or passing through the reporting area between ports in the Gulf of Finland, or ships visiting the area. 2 Geographical coverage of the system and the number and edition of the reference

chart used for the delineation of the system The system covers the international waters in the Gulf of Finland between a line drawn from Bengtskär Lh to 59°33,3'N 22°30'E to 59°10'N 21°30'E to Kõpu Peninsula and longitude 026°30'E.

The reference charts are:

Finnish Maritime Administration charts 901 (edition 2000, scale 1:200 000), 902 (edition 2000, scale 1:200 000) and 912 (edition 1999, scale 1:200 000). Geodetic datum is the national geodetic chart-coordinate system (KKJ). WGS84 latitude correction is -0,01' and the longitude correction is +0,19'. Russian charts 22060-INT1213 (edition 2000, scale 1:250000). Geodetic datum of the year 1942 (Pulkovo). For obtaining position in WGS datum such position should be moved 0,12' westward. 22061-INT1214 (edition 1997, scale 1:250000). Geodetic datum of the year 1942 (Pulkovo). For obtaining position in WGS datum such position should be moved 0,13' westward. Estonian charts 502 (edition 2001, scale 1:100 000), 504 (edition 2001, scale 1:100 000), 507 (edition 2001, scale 1:100 000), 509 (edition 2001, scale 1:100 000), 511 (edition 2001, scale 1:100 000). Geodetic datum is WGS84.

The area of the reporting system is covered by hydrographic surveys.

3 Format, content of reports, times and geographical positions for submitting reports, Authority to whom reports should be sent and available services

Reports should be made using VHF voice transmissions. However, ships equipped with AIS (automatic identification system) can fulfill the reporting requirements of the system through the use of universal AIS approved by the Organization. A ship must give a short position report by voice or by AIS when entering the mandatory ship reporting area. The full report may be given by voice or by non-verbal means. A ship may elect, for reasons of commercial confidentiality, to communicate that section of the report which provides information on cargo by non-verbal means prior to entering the ship reporting area. When leaving port, the ship can give the full report to the ship reporting system by voice or by non-verbal means.


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3.1 Format The information given below is derived from the format-type given in paragraph 2 of the appendix to Resolution A.851(20). 3.2 Content A short report by voice or by AIS from a ship to the shore-based authorities should contain the following information:

A Name of the ship, call sign or IMO identification number (or MMSI for transponder reports).

B Date and Time (UTC) C or D Position (expressed in latitude and longitude or bearing to and distance

from a landmark). E and F Course and speed of the ship.

A full report from a ship to the shore-based authorities by voice or by non-verbal means should contain the following information:

I Destination and ETA L Route information. O Vessel's draught. P Hazardous cargo, class and quantity, if applicable. Q or R Breakdown, damage and/or deficiencies affecting the structure, cargo or

equipment of the ship or any other circumstances affecting normal navigation in accordance with the provisions of the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions.

T Contact information of ship's agent or owner U Ship's deadweight tonnage W Total number of persons on board X Miscellanous remarks, iceclass, amount and nature of bunkers if over

5000 tons, navigational status The AIS report shall fulfill the content requirements set out in this paragraph. Note: On receipt of a position message, the system operators will establish the relationship between the ship's position and the information supplied by the position-fixing equipment available to them. Information on course and speed will help operators to identify one ship among a group of ships. This will be achieved automatically if AIS transponder is used.

All VHF-, telephone-, radar-, AIS- and other relevant information will be recorded and the records are stored for 30 days.

3.3 Geographical position for submitting reports Eastbound traffic should make a report to TALLINN TRAFFIC when crossing the line drawn from Bengtskär Lh to 59°33,3'N 22°30'E to 59°10'N 21°30'E to Kõpu Peninsula or when entering the ship reporting area from south.

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Westbound traffic should make a short report to HELSINKI TRAFFIC when crossing longitude 26°30'E or when entering the ship reporting area from north. A full report to the nearest shore station should be made on departure from port. Further reports should be made to the relevant shore station whenever there is a change of navigational status or circumstance, particularly in relation to items Q and R of the reporting format. 1.1.1 Crossing traffic

Reports to the nearest shore station should be made on departure from a port within the coverage area. Recognizing that ferries between Helsinki and Tallinn generally operate according to published schedules, special reporting arrangements can be made on a ship-by-ship basis, subject to the approval of both HELSINKI TRAFFIC and TALLINN TRAFFIC.

Further reports should be made to the relevant shore station whenever there is a change of navigational status or circumstance, particularly in relation to items Q and R of the reporting format.

On the area between Helsinki and Tallinn Lighthouses there is a heavy crossing traffic in summer consisting mostly of high speed craft and recreasional craft. In the area between Porkkala Lighthouse and Naissaar there are recreasional sailing activities in summer.

1.4 Authority The shore-based Authorities are:

Estonia: Estonian Maritime Administration Finland: Finnish Maritime Administration Russian Federation: Russian Maritime Administration The Estonian, Finnish and Russian Authorities monitor shipping within the mandatory ship reporting area of the Gulf of Finland by radar. This does not relieve ship masters of their responsibility for the navigation of their ship.

4 Information to be provided to participating ships and procedures to be followed 4.1 Information provided

Each Authority provides information to shipping about specific and urgent situations which could cause conflicting traffic movements and other information concerning safety of navigation, for instance information about weather, ice, water level, navigational problems or other hazards. Information is broadcast on the following frequencies when necessary or on request.


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Station Frequency Times Additional broadcasts in wintertimes

Tallinn VHF channel XX working channel 81

on request or when needed


Helsinki VHF channel XX working channel 80



St. Petersburg VHF channel XX working channel SS



Information broadcasts will be preceded by an announcement on VHF channel 16 on which channel it will be made. All ships navigating in the area should listen to the announced broadcast. If necessary, individual information can be provided to a ship, particularly in relation to positioning and navigational assistance or local conditions. If a ship needs to anchor due to breakdown or emergency the operator can recommend suitable anchorage in the area. 4.2 Ice routeing in winter During severe ice conditions the traffic separation schemes may be declared not valid. Such a decision is agreed jointly by the National Icebreaking Authorities and communicated to shipping with the daily ice reports. The decision may include all or a named traffic separation scheme. During the period when the Gulf of Finland is covered by ice, ships reporting to the centre, will receive information on the recommended route through the ice and/or are requested to contact the national co-ordinating icebreaker for further instructions. The icebreaker gives the route according to the ice situation to the ships which fulfill the national ice class regulations and which are fit for winter navigation. 4.3 Deviations If a ship participating in the mandatory ship reporting system fails to appear on the radar screen or fails to communicate with the Authority or an emergency is reported, MRCCs or MRSCs in the area are responsible for initiating a search for the ship in accordance with the rules laid down for the search and rescue service, including the involvement of other participating ships known to be in that particular area. 5 Communication required for the system, frequencies on which reports should be

transmitted and information to be reported The radio communications equipment required for the system is that defined in the GMDSS for sea area A1.

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Ships are required to maintain a continuous watch in the area and to report and take any action required by the maritime Authorities to reduce risks: Common call and information channels:

on channel XX call and short report information. on channel 16 call and distress

The full report can be made by voice on VHF radio using the following channels: main reserve

HELSINKI TRAFFIC 80 60 TALLINN TRAFFIC 81 61 ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC SS YY

Ship reports can, alternatively, be made by automatic ship identification transponder conforming to the standards adopted for the Universal AIS Transponder. Confidential information may be transmitted by other means. The language used is English. 6 Relevant rules and regulations in force in the area of the system 6.1 Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are applicable throughout the reporting area. 6.2 Traffic Separation Schemes The Traffic Separation Schemes in the Gulf of Finland has been adopted by IMO and rule 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea applies. 6.3 Pilotage Pilotage is mandatory in national waters under national laws. 6.4 Dangerous and hazardous cargoes Ships carrying dangerous or hazardous cargoes and bound to or from any port within the ship reporting area must comply with the international and national regulations. The ship reporting system does not relieve ships masters of their responsibility to give the nationally required reports and information to customs authorities.

Discharges of oil and ship-generated waste is monitored by the joint Estonian, Finnish and Russian Authorities. Ships causing pollution within the area can be prosecuted and fined.


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7 Shore-based facilities to support operation of the system The joint Estonian, Finnish and Russian Authorities have radar, information processing and retrieval system, radio VHF and Automatic Identification System (AIS) facilities. The frequencies used in AIS�NET are AIS1 and AIS2. 7.1 HELSINKI TRAFFIC 7.1.1 System capability The control centre is situated at the Helsinki VTS in Helsinki. The operator can control, monitor and display the status of all the VTS sensors from the consoles. The VTS centre will at all times be manned by two operators. HELSINKI TRAFFIC maintains a continuous watch on traffic in the Gulf of Finland on channels XX and 16. Operators add reported vessel information to the associated database and can display supporting information on the screen. The system is capable of providing an automatic alarm to identify any track which strays into an unauthorised area. Recording equipment automatically stores information from all tracks, which can either be replayed in the system or from the recorded resource. Records are made by an authorized method that can be used as an evidence. Operators have access to different ship registers and hazardous cargo data. 7.1.2 Radar facilities The surveillance sensors can observe targets of at least 300 gross tons and a minimum height of 10 metres in the given traffic area. 1.1.3 Radio communication facilities

Radiocommunication terminals are sited in the consoles of HELSINKI TRAFFIC operation room. VHF radio transceivers are located at Hanko, Porkkala, Harmaja, Emäsalo and Orrengrund.

The VHF channels used are:

• Channel XX common channel • Channel 80 working channel • Channel 60 reserve channel

1.1.4 AIS facilities

HELSINKI TRAFFIC can continually receive the messages broadcasting by ships fitted with transponders to gain information on their identity and position. This information is displayed as an icon on an electronic chart covering the Gulf of Finland mandatory ship reporting area.

1.1.5 Personnel qualifications and training

HELSINKI TRAFFIC is staffed with personnel trained according to national and international recommendations.

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The training of the personnel comprises an overall study of the navigation safety measures, the relevant international (IMO) and national provisions with respect to safety of navigation. The training also includes thorough real-time simulations in different ship bridge simulators. The trainees are trained as well in navigating ships through the VTS area as servicing shipping from the VTS Centre.

7.2 TALLINN TRAFFIC 7.2.1 System capability The VTS system will be located in the office of the Maritime Administration at Hundipea port, Tallinn. From the consoles the operator can control, monitor and display the status of all VTS sensors. The VTS centre will at all times be manned with two operators. TALLINN TRAFFIC maintains a continuous watch over traffic on the Gulf of Finland on channels XX and 16. Operators add the reported vessel information to the associated database and can display supporting information on screen. The system is capable of providing an automatic alarm to identify any track that strays into the unauthorized area. Recording equipment automatically stores information from all tracks, which can either be replayed on the system or from the recorded resource. Records are made according to an authorized method that can be used as evidence. 7.2.2 Radar facilities The surveillance sensors can observe targets of at least 300 gross tons and a minimum height of 10 metres in the given traffic area. 7.2.3 Radio communication facilities VHF radio transceivers are located at TALLINN TRAFFIC operation room. The VHF channels used are:

• Channel XX common channel • Channel 81 working channel • Channel 61 reserve channel

TALLINN TRAFFIC monitors shipping in the Gulf of Finland by radar, VHF and RDF equipment and with universal AIS shipborne transponders. All the traffic and messages will be stored to the database and displayed on the electronic chart. The messages from AIS transponders, not in accordance with IEC 61993-2 will be filtered out. System uses standard AIS channels and in base stations transponders of MDS origin. 1.1.4 Personnel qualifications and training TALLINN TRAFFIC is staffed with personnel trained according to national and

international recommendations.


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1.3 ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC 1.3.1 System capability

The Centre is situated at VTMIS Centre located in Petrodvorets. The Centre is linked with shore-based VHF station located at island Gogland. VHF range covers the waters close to the border.

ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC maintains a continuous watch on traffic on the Gulf of Finland on channels XX and 16. Operators add reported vessel information to the associated database and can display supporting information on screen. The system is capable of providing an automatic alarm to identify any track, which strays into an unauthorized area. Recording equipment automatically stores information from all tracks, which can either be replayed on the system or from the recorded resource.

1.3.2 Radar facilities

The nearest radar sensor to ship reporting system is placed on island Gogland with antenna height 80 metres above sea level can observe targets at least 300 gross tons at the distances up to 26030�E.

1.3.3 Radio communication facilities

Radio communication terminals are sited in consoles of ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC operation rooms. VHF radio transceivers are located at Gogland.

The VHF channels used are:

• Channel XX common channel • Channel SS working channel • Channel YY reserve channel 1.3.4 AIS facilities St. Petersburg The ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC can monitor ships sailing in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland to the east of 26030� and equipped with universal AIS shipborne stations.

7.3.4 Personnel qualifications and training The ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC is staffed with personnel trained according to national and international recommendations. The training of the personnel comprises an overall study of the navigation safety measures, the relevant international (IMO) and national provisions with respect to safety of navigation. The training also includes thorough real-time simulations.

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8 Information concerning the applicable procedures if the communication facilities of the shore-based Authority fail

The system is designed with sufficient system redundancy to cope with normal equipment failure. 9 Measures to be taken if a ship fails to comply with the requirements of the system The primary objective of the system is to facilitate the exchange of information between the ship station and the shore station and to support safe navigation and the protection of the marine environment. All means will be used to encourage and promote the full participation of ships required to submit reports under SOLAS regulation V/11. If reports are not submitted and the offending ship can be positively identified, then information will be passed to the relevant Flag State Authorities for investigation and possible prosecution in accordance with national legislation.


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SUMMARY OF SHIP REPORTING SYSTEM IN THE GULF OF FINLAND 1) Ships required to participate: Ships of 300 gross tonnage and over are required to participate in the system. 2) Position for submitting reports: The ship reporting area covers the international water area in the Gulf of Finland between a line drawn from Bengtskär Lh to 59°33,3'N 22°30'E to 59°10'N 21°30'E to Kõpu Peninsula and longitude 026°30'E. Reports are to be submitted:

When entering the ship reporting area in the Gulf of Finland. Eastbound traffic to TALLINN TRAFFIC. Westbound traffic to HELSINKI TRAFFIC The report to the nearest of the shore stations on departure from a port within the area limits.

3) Communication: By voice on VHF radio, call on given channel. Call and information TRAFFIC CHANNEL XX main reserve Working channels: HELSINKI TRAFFIC 80 60

TALLINN TRAFFIC 81 61 ST. PETERSBURG TRAFFIC SS YY

Alternatively by automatic ship-identification transponder or using equipment conforming to the standards adopted for the Universal AIS Transponder. Confidential information may be transmitted by non-verbal means. 4) Reporting format: Short position report:

A Name of the ship, call sign or IMO identification number (or MMSI for transponder reports).

B Date and time (UTC) C or D Position (expressed in latitude and longitude or bearing to and distance

from a landmark). E and F Course and speed of the ship.

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Full report:

I Destination and ETA L Route information. O Vessel's draught. P Hazardous cargo, class and quantity, if applicable. Q or R Breakdown, damage and/or deficiencies affecting the structure, cargo or

equipment of the ship or any other circumstances affecting normal navigation in accordance with the provisions of the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions.

U Ship's deadweight tonnage. W Total number of persons on board. X Miscellaneous remarks, ice class, bunkers over 5000 tons, navigational

status. 5) Authority receiving the report:

Estonia: Estonian Maritime Administration Finland: Finnish Maritime Administration Russia: Russian Maritime Administration

6) Winter season: During severe ice conditions the traffic separation schemes may be declared not valid. Such a decision is agreed jointly by the Estonian, Finnish and Russian Authorities and is communicated to shipping in connection with the daily ice reports. When a ship reports to the Traffic Centre, it will receive the preliminary waypoints and the national co-ordinating icebreaker's name and working channel from the operator. The vessel shall contact the national co-ordinating icebreaker for further instructions.


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APPENDIX 1

Radio reports to the Gulf of Finland mandatory ship reporting system

Designator Function Information required Short position report: A Ship Name and call sign or IMO identification B Time Date and time (UTC) C Position Geographical position by two 4 -digit groups; or D Position Name of reporting point E Course East- or west- or north- or south-bound F Speed In knots (2-digit group) Full report: I Destination and ETA Destination and estimated time of arrival L Route information Where the ship is en route O Draught Vessel's maximum draught P Cargo Hazardous cargo, class and quantity Q Deficiencies Brief details of defects or restrictions of manoeuvrability R Pollution Description of pollution or dangerous goods lost

overboard T Owner or agent Contact information of the ship's owner or agent U Tonnage (DWT) Ship's deadweight tonnage W Persons Total number of persons on board X Miscellaneous Miscellaneous remarks, i.e. ice class, bunkers etc.

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ANNEX 4

FSA STUDY OF THE RISKS OF TRAFFIC IN THE GULF OF FINLAND

FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT

1 The implementation of the VTMIS-system for the Gulf of Finland

Executive summary:

This document describes the execution and the results of a FSA study carried out to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed systems introduced in NAV 48/3/1

Action to be taken:

Paper submitted in support of NAV 48/3/1

Related documents:

NAV 48/3/1, MSC/Circ.829, MEPC/Circ.335

2 SUMMARY 2.1 The FSA study reported here has been carried out by VTT Industrial Systems as commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Finnish Maritime Administration. During the study process, VTT Industrial Systems has been co-operating with HUT (Helsinki University of Technology) Ship Laboratory in matters related to winter operations. The results of the study have been adopted by the contracting governments, Estonia, Finland and Russia. 2.2 The aim of this FSA study was to assess the effectiveness of the proposed routeing, monitoring and mandatory reporting systems as measures to improve maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland by reducing the risk of casualties and increasing the protection of the marine environment. The systems proposed for implementation in the Gulf of Finland were assumed to operate, as described in NAV 48/3/1, annex 3. 2.3 The present FSA study was focused on the ship-to-ship collision risk. Based on experience, this represents the dominant risk type for the open sea type of traffic considered in this study. Furthermore, only the risk of oil, chemical or gas tankers colliding with the other types of vessels, or with each other, was included in the present assessment. 2.4 The initial risk assessment described here was carried out in the context of the prevailing traffic projection estimated for the years 2010 to 2015. The estimates for the total number of vessel calls and the relative proportions of different ship types, was extrapolated from the current traffic numbers using the scenarios of the various commercial stakeholders and recent studies carried out for the Gulf of Finland area. 2.5 The risk impacts of two different risk control options (RCO) were of special concern in the present study:

1. 'System1': a mandatory reporting system 2. 'System2': a mandatory reporting system and a radar-based monitoring system

Both options include the proposed amended routeing system for the Gulf of Finland.


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2.6 The risk modelling framework used in the present study was based on the GRACAT software, which estimates collision frequencies based on traffic data including vessel types, route information, predicted traffic intensities, etc., and the interaction of operative functions, the failure of which lead to the realisation of collision hazards. The calculations needed to estimate the collision frequencies were performed using the GRACAT software. 2.7 The cost-benefit performance of the RCOs was assessed in terms of the total return of the investment, and the main uncertainties in the analysis were identified. 2.8 As the consequences of collisions have been measured in monetary terms only, absolute risk criteria, such as the ALARP-principle (As Low As Reasonably Practicable), have not been feasible in judging the relative merits of the decision options �Baseline� (= �do nothing�), �System1� and �System2�. Also, the evaluation of the acceptability of the absolute level of risk represented by the �Baseline�, has been unfeasible in this sense. 2.9 Both risk control options assessed in this study were found to decrease the risk of ship-to-ship collisions, and thus to be capable of improving the safety of shipping and protecting the marine environment in the Gulf of Finland. 2.10 From an economic point of view, the investment in the risk control option �System2� can be recommended, based on the cost-benefit analysis (or mean-variance portfolio analysis, to be more specific). The investment in �System1� is deemed economically unprofitable, as the expected total return is very low for this option. 2.11 The outcome of the FSA study clearly indicates that the implementation of the proposed routeing, mandatory reporting and radar-based monitoring systems in the Gulf of Finland is highly recommendable. The operation of the system significantly reduces the risk of collision. The positive effect of the system extends to the control of the consequences of marine accidents. It can provide information for many purposes including search and rescue and the prevention of marine pollution. In addition, during the period of winter, when the Gulf of Finland is partly or totally covered with ice, it relays information between the icebreaker fleet and the vessel traffic assisting the icebreaker fleet in ensuring the safe and effective navigation in ice. 3 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 3.1 The establishment of new, and the development of the existing oil terminals in Russia and Estonia will significantly increase the amount of oil transported across the Gulf of Finland. The new harbour constructions will enable transportation via larger tankers. The growth in freight transportation and passenger traffic will further increase the density of vessel traffic in the gulf area. The passenger and recreational boat traffic intersecting tanker routes, especially in the area between Helsinki and Tallinn, is seen as a risk to safety of navigation and as a potential threat to the marine environment. The present estimations suggest that the total amount of traffic in terms of harbour calls will increase by 50 percent within the next ten years (VTT Industrial Systems, 2002b). 3.2 The main concern that has been expressed is the risk of collisions between different types of vessels and the environmental damage due to subsequent oil spills. The risk with respect to groundings is considered less significant as groundings are seen as highly improbable in the open sea area where the main increase of traffic is foreseen as occurring. The depth of the international water area of the Gulf of Finland exceeds the maximum draft with which a vessel can navigate trough the entrances to the Baltic Sea.

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3.3 In order to avoid the projected potential increase in marine casualties and marine pollution in the Gulf of Finland in the coming years due to the increasing amount of the traffic, the Maritime Administrations of Finland, Russia and Estonia have planned new risk control measures for the gulf area. In the first phase, a VTMIS (Vessel Traffic Management and Information Services) system - consisting of a ship routeing system and a mandatory ship reporting system effective in the international sea area of the Gulf of Finland - has been planned for implementation as a joint effort of the three nations. The new VTMIS system will supplement the present national VTS systems, which are effective only in the corresponding national sea areas. 3.4 The objective of the present study was to systematically assess the effectiveness of the VTMIS system as a risk control measure for the Gulf of Finland before the proposal for VTMIS implementation is passed on to the IMO decision making process. For this purpose, this Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) study was commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Traffic and Communications together with the Finnish Maritime Administration. 3.5 Two risk control options (RCO's) were defined at the outset of the FSA. The RCO's were named as 'System1' and 'System2'. The risk control options are combinations of three basic components: the amended routeing system (NAV 48/3/1, annex 1), mandatory reporting system (NAV 48/3/1, annex 3) and the radar-based traffic monitoring system. The first component, the routeing system, is a part of both RCO's. 3.6 The first risk control option, 'System1' includes the new routeing system and the mandatory reporting system proposed for the international waters of Gulf of Finland. As this option does not include the radar-based traffic monitoring system, short position reports must be given more frequently than described in NAV 48/3/1, Annex 3. In this option position reports also include an additional item, an estimated time of arrival (ETA) to the next reporting point. This is to ensure that the system can keep track of the ships in the area. ETA information gives a point of reference for the ships� location between reporting points if for some reason, for example in emergency situations, no contact could be established with the ship. A short position report is always submitted before entering a traffic separation zone or when entering or leaving the reporting area to national waters. 3.7 Risk control option 'System2' includes the new routeing system, the mandatory reporting system and the radar-based traffic monitoring system. In this option the identification of vessels will be achieved automatically if AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponder is used. The mandatory reporting system operates according to the procedures defined in NAV 48/3/1, annex 3. The operation of 'System2' is considered equal to a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operation, as defined in IMO resolution A.857(20). 3.8 The economic feasibility of implementing any of the above risk control options was the prime assessment problem motivating the FSA study. There is a cost to be prevented in every averted collision of vessels that lead to an oil spill. How much is it worth paying for? This is the underlying question related to the economic feasibility of the implementation of the two system options. 3.9 For the purposes of the present FSA study, the relevant vessel types that were considered in the assessment were limited to three different types: tankers, passenger ships and others. Each of these vessel types was further divided into two size groups, i.e., large and small. The following vessel categories, as shown in Table 1, were defined for the assessment. The ship type


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descriptions and the dimensions indicated for the different vessel categories in Table 1 represent the pre-set category definitions as implemented in the GRACAT software, which was used for the collision risk calculations. Table 1 Vessel category definitions used in the risk assessment Tankers: Acronym: ship type: oil tanker small: 20-30 (1000 ton) L= 169.5 m, B= 24.8 m, T= 9.75 m SA20 large: 80-100 (1000 ton) L= 241.0 m, B= 40.0 m, T= 14.0 m SA100 Passenger ships: ship type: passenger small 1.5-2 (1000 ton) L= 50.0 m, B= 9.5 m, T= 2.4 m MAs large 80-100 (1000 ton) L= 176.6 m, B= 29.0 m, T=6.3 m MAb Others: ship type: container small 3-5 (1000 ton) L= 94.4 m, B= 15.5 m, T= 5.6 m Os large 10-20 (1000 ton) L= 189.0 m, B= 32.2 m, T=7.75 m Ob (All given sizes in tonnes are dead weight tonnes, L= length, B= breadth, T= draught) 3.10 The ship type 'oil tanker' was applied to include all tankers regardless of whether they carry oil, chemicals or gas. The ship type 'passenger ships large' was applied to include, in addition to cruise ships and passenger ferries, all roro-passenger ships. The �small passenger ship� group was applied to represent high-speed crafts. Finally, the ship type 'container' was applied to all other vessels. The container ship was found as the best ship type choice for the purposes of the present study to represent the general cargo, dry bulk cargo, roro, container and other vessel types carrying neither passengers nor hazardous cargo. 4 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 4.1 The Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) has recently performed a review of the national preparedness to prevent environmental damages in the Finnish waters and in the vicinity. In the research report (SYKE, 1999) the traffic flow and the risk of damage caused by oil spills are estimated for the Gulf of Finland for the period 2005 to 2010. As the oil spill, with its destructive effect on the nature, is one of the main fears with respect to the area, the report makes a good reference on the matter. 4.2 All available accident statistics were examined in the effort to assess the baseline frequencies for marine accidents in the Gulf of Finland. The most comprehensive statistics cover the years 1962 to1997. Unfortunately, most of the data concerns only Finnish territorial waters, while in this study, the interest is in the Gulf of Finland and its international waters. Statistics of the coastal area are not suitable for describing the accident frequencies for the whole Gulf of Finland. The studies concerning the whole Baltic Sea region and the statistics of the Baltic traffic appear also to apply better to the Gulf of Finland.

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4.3 The Helsinki Commission - Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) carried out a survey on oil transport in the Baltic in 1995 (HELCOM, 1995). The study was updated in 1997 to 1998 in order to estimate the trends in oil transports in the near future. In these HELCOM studies, the oil spill risk due to vessel collisions and groundings in the Baltic has been evaluated. The latest study regarding the year 1997 implies that the statistical risk of oil spills had more than doubled since 1995. The transport volume had doubled equally. A possible duplication of the oil transport volume between the year 1997 (35 million tons) and the year 2010 (70-80 million tons) could double the risk of oil spills correspondingly. The predicted oil spill frequency for the Baltic around the year 2010 would thus be 2,5 spill events per year, with an average oil spill quantity of 200-300 tons. 4.4 Based on the investigation of the historical records of maritime casualties, the number of serious accidents on the international waters of the Gulf of Finland is very low. The database of the relevant recorded casualties was found to be too sparse to form a sufficient basis for a statistically valid analysis. In addition, when comparing casualty probabilities calculated from international casualty statistics with the number of casualties actually occurred in the Gulf of Finland, it became obvious that the probabilities based on the international statistics are not representative of this area. The number of casualties recorded in the Gulf of Finland during the last 20 years is substantially smaller than the number implied by the internationally based probability estimates. Consequently, expert interviews and expert judgement sessions turned out to play an important role in the present FSA study, both as the source for credible accident scenarios and for the estimates of hazard frequencies and probabilities. 5 METHOD OF WORK 5.1 This FSA study has been carried out by VTT Industrial Systems as commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Finnish Maritime Administration. During the study process, VTT Industrial Systems has been co-operating with HUT (Helsinki University of Technology) Ship Laboratory as for the matters related to winter traffic in ice conditions. 5.2 The study was performed by a study team consisting of six experts from three different research units of VTT Industrial Systems and four experts from the Helsinki University of Technology. The core study team has a good knowledge and several years of experience relevant to the present FSA study. In particular, the members of the study team have a wide-ranging knowledge on ship technology, shipping, winter navigation, FSA methodology and risk assessment, as well as on the three lateral intercommunication between the coastal states of the Gulf of Finland, i.e., Finland, Russia and Estonia. 5.3 The work was presented to the representatives of the Russian, Estonian and Finnish delegations in two meetings, the first held in Tallinn in February 8th, 2002 and the second in Helsinki in March 21st, 2002. In these meetings the approach and the results of the FSA study were reviewed and accepted. 5.4 Expert interviews and expert group sessions have been utilised in the study, when appropriate, to complement the knowledge and experience of the core project team. In particular, the practical and operational aspects of sea transportation have been the focus of these sessions. For example, two expert group sessions were organised for the Hazard Identification step. Fourteen experts attended the first session called together to consider the collision related hazards


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in the open water conditions. Similarly, nine experts attended the second session focusing on hazards in the winter traffic in ice conditions. In addition, one specialist meeting with four experts was arranged to estimate the probability of human errors in specific operative situations and conditions related to the Collision Fault Trees as described in section 6.2.5. 5.5 The FSA study commenced in August 2001 and was completed in March 2002. This paper summarises the final results from the study. A more comprehensive description of the study and its results is provided in the final VTT study report (VTT Industrial Systems, 2002a). 6 DESCRIPTION OF THE RESULTS 6.1 STEP 1 - HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 6.1.1 During the Hazard Identification phase, a number of different sources were used to collect a comprehensive set of hazard descriptions related to collisions between different vessel types in the Gulf of Finland. The set of sources used included: a literature search, interviews of experts with different backgrounds, and structured expert group sessions. 6.1.2 An expert group session was held, where fifteen experts were asked to identify and describe hazard/accident scenarios leading to collisions between different vessel types. Special focus was put on the initiating events, i.e., the causes of the ship-to-ship collision scenarios. The experts consulted represented different relevant areas of expertise: risk assessment techniques, casualty investigation, the human element, the applicable rules and regulations, the technical, operational and organisational field of shipping and consequence assessment. 6.1.3 In the group session, the experts were networked by a Group Decision Support System (GDSS) and facilitated by the members of the FSA study team. The networked GDSS allowed for anonymous idea generation, commenting and significance scoring. 6.1.4 The support system was found to achieve the acceptance and confidence of the experts. Its feasibility and value were especially demonstrated by the way it facilitated expert participation, expert interaction, and complete documentation of the individual opinions. 6.1.5 The expert group session produced a total of around fifty different collision risk scenarios. The identified scenarios were ranked by expert voting. 6.1.6 The entire output of the identification phase was reviewed by the FSA study team and re-organised to reflect the content and structure of the risk scenarios more systematically. The scenarios were grouped according to their relevance with respect to technical, communicative, human and external factors. This grouping guided the development of the risk model in step 2 of the FSA, especially regarding the relevant functions related to the causation factor (see next section). 6.2 STEP 2 - RISK ASSESSMENT 6.2.1 Similar to Step 1 � Hazard Identification, the risk assessment was focused on the ship-to-ship collision risk. In particular, only the risk of oil, chemical or gas tankers colliding with passenger vessels, freight vessels, or with each other, was investigated in the present assessment. The collision risk was estimated with respect to the three decision options: �Baseline2010� (=�do nothing�), �System1�, and �System2�, as described in section 3.5.

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6.2.2 The risk-modelling framework applied in the present study is outlined in Appendix 1. Firstly, the latent collision frequency is calculated given the traffic data. The latent frequency represents the amount of theoretically possible collision situations per unit time assuming �blind navigation�. The expected frequency of a collision type is then obtained by multiplying the latent collision frequency with the expected value of the causation factor related to the collision type. The expected frequency of a collision type is the measure of risk used in the present study. 6.2.3 The causation factor represents the capability of the vessels to notice the presence of the dangerous encounter situation in time and to react by carrying out the sufficient actions to avoid collision. The causation factor depends on several functions related to traffic perception, communication and avoidance actions. It also depends on external factors such as the vessel types involved in the collision, weather conditions, physical manoeuvre options, etc. 6.2.4 In order to obtain the values for the causation factor for the purposes of the present study, the causation factor was modelled by the Fault Tree technique. The Collision Fault Tree used to estimate the expected value of the causation factor is given in Appendix 2. The underlying dynamics of the functions related to the causation factor were decomposed into two phases: functions related to escalation and functions related to evasive action (critical collision hazard). Especially, the functions, or more specifically, the functional failures related to the escalation were structured in more detail, as the impacts of the pre-defined risk control measures are realised in this phase. 6.2.5 The probability values of the basic events of the Collision Fault Tree were elicited from four experts separately for each of the decision options �Baseline2010�(=�do nothing�), �System1� and �System2�. The experts consulted had experience of different types of vessels, including passenger ship, high speed passenger craft, RoPax and tanker vessels. The experts expressed their estimates in the form of minimal and maximal values, which where interpreted as the 0.05- and 0.95-percentile points associated with a lognormal probability distribution. The potential error induced by using an improper probability distribution function was considered insignificant compared to other uncertainties in the present analysis. 6.2.6 The vessel types were found to influence the estimation of the causation factor in such a way that if a small vessel is subject to a collision hazard in bad weather (wave r.m.s exceeding 5 m) the evasive action will fail and a collision is realised. The outcome of a collision hazard involving only large vessel types, is unaffected by the weather. This assumption is based on the fact, that the shape of the Gulf of Finland restricts high waves to a narrow angle coming from the Baltic proper. Moreover, the maximum height that waves can grow is limited by wave refraction. The U-shaped bottom of the Gulf of Finland refracts long waves towards the south and north coasts, and prevents waves with significant wave height over 4 meters from arriving into the inner gulf sea area (FIMR, 2000). Table 2 shows the collision types considered in the present assessment and the associated expected value of the causation factor as determined based on the Collision Fault Tree.


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Table 2. Collision types and the corresponding expected values of the causation factor. Causation Factor

�Baseline2010�

Vessel Type SA100 SA20 MA (MAs+MAb)

Os Ob

SA100 2.17E-3 2.84E-3 2.17E-3 2.84E-3 2.17E-3 SA20 2.84E-3 2.84E-3 2.84E-3 2.84E-3 Causation Factor

�SystemS1�


Os Ob

SA100 2.25E-3 2.63E-3 2.25E-3 2.63E-3 2.25E-3 SA20 2.63E-3 2.63E-3 2.63E-3 2.63E-3 Causation Factor

�System2�


Os Ob

SA100 5.10E-4 6.00E-4 5.10E-4 6.00E-4 5.10E-4 SA20 6.00E-4 6.00E-4 6.00E-4 6.00E-4

6.2.7 The actual calculations to estimate the collision risk were performed using the frequency module of the GRACAT software. GRACAT (Grounding and Collision Analysis Toolbox) is a prototype software developed by the Technical University of Denmark (ISESO, 2000). The software has been validated in case studies by the developers. 6.2.8 With respect to ship-to-ship collision situations, the GRACAT software examines separately three different collision scenarios, namely:

1. Head-on collision, in which two vessels collide on a straight leg of a fairway as a result of two-way traffic on the fairway.

2. Intersection collision, in which two vessels moving in an opposite direction on the

same fairway collide on a turn of the fairway as a result of one of the vessels neglecting or missing the turn (error of omission) and thus coming into contact with the other vessel.

3. Crossing collision, in which two vessels using different fairways collide at the

fairway crossing. In addition, the collision scenario between a vessel following a particular traffic lane and another vessel joining the same lane was considered in the present assessment separately where applicable. 6.2.9 Calculation of the collision frequencies is based on careful specification of the operational environment of the ship traffic considered. The ship routes and fairways relevant for the present study were specified for the risk calculations as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The fairways are defined by waypoints using true values of latitudes and longitudes. The proposed new traffic separation system was taken into account in the fairway specifications for the 'System1' and 'System2' risk control options.

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Figure 1 Route specifications for the risk calculations: the �Baseline� situation.

Figure 2 Route specifications for the risk calculations: �System1� and �System2� risk control options. 6.2.10 The prevailing traffic image extrapolated for the Gulf of Finland for the years 2010 to 2015 was used as the basis for estimating the annual numbers of vessel calls for the different types of vessels on the various routes and the corresponding fairways. The same traffic projection was used in the risk calculations for the baseline situation and for the two system options.


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6.2.11 The spatial distribution of the traffic widthwise across the fairways, that is, the statistical deviation of ships off the mid-fairway, was specified for each fairway leg based on the information on the available traffic lane width as measured from the nautical charts and on expert judgements of the study team. The risk calculation program used, assumes the normal distribution for characterising the spread of vessels off the mid-fairway line. Specification of the traffic distribution for a particular leg thus consisted of defining the representative mean and standard deviation values for the distribution. The influence of the separation zones in restricting the spread of vessels on the traffic lanes was accounted, in particular, regarding the 'System1' and 'System2' options. 6.2.12 The risk of head-on collisions between vessels using one of the two main traffic lanes and other vessels heading to the opposite direction using the other main traffic lane or the coastal fairway was also considered in the present assessment. The estimated risk however turned out to be only marginal as compared to the estimated overall risk of collisions for the same vessels. 6.2.13 The results of the collision risk calculations performed for the baseline situation and the two system options are listed in Table 3. The results represent the estimates of the expected yearly frequencies of collisions including oil, chemical or gas tankers. The standard deviations related to the estimates are of the same magnitude. Table 3. The expected collision frequencies of the pre-defined collision types including oil, chemical or gas tankers. The unit is ship-to-ship collisions per year, with the tanker acting as either the striking or the struck vessel in the collision.

Collision scenarios �Baseline2010� �System1� �System2� SA100: - collisions overall 1/ 0.35247 0.32213 0.07349 O (Os+Ob) 0.18896 0.17713 0.04041 MA (MAs+MAb) 0.13343 0.12063 0.02752 SA20 0.02720 0.02192 0.00500 SA100 0.00288 0.00245 0.00056 SA20: - collisions overall 2/ 1.73235 1.47757 0.33709 O (Os+Ob) 1.09029 0.89670 0.20457 MA (MAs+MAb) 0.58049 0.52876 0.12063 SA20 0.06157 0.05211 0.01189

1/ Includes collisions with passenger vessels, freight vessels (type �Other�) and tankers. 2/ Includes collisions with passenger vessels, freight vessels (type �Other�) and small tankers. 6.2.14 The estimates of the collision frequencies for the �Baseline2010� and the �System1� are rather high. This is partly explained by the conservative estimates of the input and risk model parameters. Thus the estimates of the expected collision frequencies are upward-biased. 6.2.15 The relative risk impact of the options is, however, less sensitive to systematic bias in the case of offset errors. Thus, the cost-benefit estimates for the decision options are more realistic than the estimates of the expected collision frequencies shown in Table 3. See chapter 6.4. 6.2.16 Based on the results shown in Table 3 it is obvious that the �System1� does not provide a feasible solution for improved risk control. The reason for the poor performance of the 'System1' option is due to the fact that the causation factor values obtained by the expert judgement and used in the risk calculations turned out to be very close or even higher for 'System1' as compared

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to 'Baseline2010'. This is due to the basic event REMA (Restricted manoeuvre options in critical situation) in the Collision Fault Tree (APPENDIX 2 page 1), the probability estimate of, which is crucially high for the �System1�-option. 6.2.17 The linkage of the Collision Fault Tree applied in determining the causation factors, and the GRACAT-software used for the collision frequency estimate calculations, do not support an overall Monte Carlo simulation-based uncertainty analysis. A verification of the risk results would rather entail a second expert panel where the experts would be asked to provide new estimates of the probability values of the basic events in the Collision Fault Tree. An indication of verification would be the general tendency of attaining a smaller spread of the consensus estimates of the basic event probabilities in the Collision Fault Tree. 6.2.18 The reduction in the expected collision frequencies as indicated in Table 3 is due to the integrated effect of the amended routeing system and the mandatory reporting and the monitoring systems as implemented in the two risk control options under consideration. In the risk-modelling framework used in the present study the amended routeing system, common to both options, has a direct impact in the latent collision frequency, i.e. the frequency of the theoretically possible collision situations. A more detailed analysis of the results shown in Table 3 reveals a reduction of about 7 percent in the overall latent frequency with respect to the considered collision scenarios due to the amended routeing system. As expected, the most significant improvement is found with respect to the collision scenarios of the small tankers. 6.3 STEP 3 � RISK CONTROL OPTIONS 6.3.1 At the outset of the FSA study, two new risk control options, �System1� and �System2�, where defined. The control options are described in sections 3.5 to 3.7. Thus, the typical brainstorming of risk control options based on the results of the risk assessment was not an issue of the present FSA study. 6.4 STEP 4 � COST BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 6.4.1 In the present study, the �benefit� of implementing the risk control means is measured in terms of the expected reduced societal cost due to decrease in the number of collisions and the associated oil spills after the implementation of either of the RCOs�. 6.4.2 It has to be noted that every collision type is related to a certain average oil spill (VTT Industrial Systems, 2002a). The probabilities of oil leakage in both, either or neither vessel, given that a collision has occurred, are derived from the probability data given in the MEHRA-report (Safetec UK, 1999). The average oil spill volume in each relevant collision type is given in Table 4. In this case, conservative point estimates of the amount of spilled oil have been used.

Table 4. Presumed average oil spill volumes related to the collision types. The unit is tons of oil per

incident. Vessel Type SA100 SA20 MA

(MAs+MAb) SA100 1626,30 893,50 833,45 SA20 175,50 109,85


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6.4.3 The societal cost associated with ship-to-ship collisions are defined here as the sum of the costs related to the overhead cost of the authorities, the cleaning work, and the harm incurred to the environment, where the latter has been estimated by the formula 9,33*amount of oil + 610,7 [k�] (Rytkönen and Sukselainen, 1994). The amount of oil spilled in a collision is dependent on the vessel types involved in the collision, as indicated in Table 4. 6.4.4 The expected reduced societal cost (ERSC) is computed as the difference between the lifecycle baseline cost associated with collisions, i.e., the cost without implementing any new risk control measures, and the lifecycle cost calculated for implemented RCO. The lifecycle of the RCOs was assumed to be 10 years. Table 5 shows the Net Present Value (NPV) of the ERSCs for the RCOs �System1� and �System2�. 6.4.5 It has to be noted that systematic biases in the point estimates of the oil spill volumes are partly cancelled out by the subtractions related to the computations of the ERSCs. Table 5. The NPV of the ERSC after the implementation of the RCOs �System1� and �System2� (in M�) RCO ERSC �System1� 16,5 �System2� 4126,1

6.4.6 The cost calculations related to the implementation of the RCOs �System1� and �System2� are based on cost figures obtained from each of the nationally responsible parties. The costs include the equipment, the installation and the annual operational costs of the system for the Finnish, Estonian and Russian authorities. Table 6 shows the NPV of the life-cycle costs (LCC) of the respective RCO incurred over the expected lifecycle of 10 years for the RCOs. Table 6. The NPV of the LCC of the RCOs �System1� and �System2� (in M�) RCO LCC �System1� 12,8 �System2� 30,5

6.4.7 As the present study is limited to monetary consequences, the risk assessment may be formulated in terms of an investment problem: Which investment option, i.e., RCO, has the largest total return, where total return = amount received/amount invested? As the standard deviations related to the investment options are of the same magnitude, it suffices to compare the RCOs in terms of expected total return (ETR) only (refer to mean-variance portfolio analysis in, e.g., Luenberger (1998)). Table 7 shows the calculated ETRs of the RCOs �System1� and �System2�. For RCOs with the ETR value larger than 1 the economic benefits are expected to exceed the costs of the risk control option implementation and operation. Based on the results shown on Table 7, both RCOs considered here can be found justifiable from a commercial viewpoint alone, however, �System2� is heavily out ranking the �System1� alternative. Table 7. The ETRs of RCOs �System1� and �System2� RCO ETR �System1� 1,16 �System2� 122,1

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6.4.8 The cost data, which has been applied here, is assumed to be relatively accurate and as presentative as the point estimates in the computations. 6.5 STEP 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING 6.5.1 The conclusions presented in this section are based on the results of the conducted FSA study only. Further conclusions and recommendations are formulated from a wider perspective in section 7. 6.5.2 As the consequences of collisions have been measured in monetary terms only, absolute risk criteria, such as the ALARP-principle (Melchers, 2001), have not been feasible here in judging the relative merits of the decision options �Baseline� (= �do nothing�), �System1� and �System2�. In addition, the evaluation of the acceptability of the absolute level of risk represented by the �Baseline�, is unfeasible in this sense. 6.5.3 Both RCOs assessed in this study were found to decrease the risk of ship-to-ship collisions, and thus to be capable to improve the safety of shipping and protection of the marine environment in the Gulf of Finland. 6.5.4 From an economic point of view, the investment in RCO �System2� can be recommended based on the cost-benefit analysis (or mean-variance portfolio analysis, to be more specific). The investment in �System1� is deemed economically unprofitable, as the expected total return is very low for this option. A further assertion of the merits of �System2� would require a more detailed value-at-risk type analysis (Luenberger, 1998) explicitly addressing the uncertainties involved in the investment. This, however, has not been possible within the present study. 6.5.5 In the calculations of the total return related to investment on a particular RCO, the conservative point estimates of oil spill volumes are partly cancelled out. An over-optimistic indication for investing in the RCO �System2� is thus avoided to some extent. Furthermore, as indicated in Table 3, some credible collision types have not been considered at all (i.e., for example, collisions between passenger vessels and between freight vessels). Consequently, benefits in terms of the reduction of societal costs related to these collision types are not accounted for in the present cost benefit analysis. 6.5.6 A consistent uncertainty/sensitivity analysis has not been conducted to reveal the most critical model parameters. This is due to the mixture of the Fault Tree and the GRACAT approaches in the risk-modelling framework. A solid integration of the approaches is a prerequisite for such analyses to be feasible in a consistent manner. It is, however, the belief of the analysts that the main uncertainties in the present study pertain to the expert judgements related to the parameter estimation of the basic events of the Collision Fault Trees. 7 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING 7.1 This FSA study has concentrated on the direct impact of the proposed routeing, mandatory reporting and radar-based monitoring systems for reducing the risk of collision. It views the effect of the systems from an economic point of view, based on the cost-benefit analysis, which proves the investment in the risk control option �System2� recommendable.


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7.2 However effective the risk control option 'System2' may be, it cannot prevent all accidents from happening. Thus it should be emphasised that the effect of the system extends to the control of the consequences of marine accidents. It can provide information for many purposes, including search and rescue and the prevention of marine pollution. The increased amount of unauthorised oil spills in the sensitive sea area of the Gulf of Finland is a serious threat to the marine environment, which has raised public concern. The radar-based monitoring system recording the movements of the vessels enables the identification of offenders and provides a tool for collecting evidence for investigation and possible prosecution. Even the mere existence of a surveillance system reduces bad seamanship among the ships transiting the controlled area. 7.3 The most significant advantage of the 'System2' system during winter, when the Gulf of Finland is partly or totally covered with ice, is that it relays information both from the icebreakers to the vessels and vice versa assisting the icebreakers in organising their activities. The icebreakers receive up-to-date information from the system, for example the positions and ETA's of the vessels, which the icebreaker fleet can utilise to ease their co-ordination of effective and safe operation in ice. The information the system relays from the icebreakers to the ships also assists ships to navigate safely in ice. This is important especially to the ships inexperienced in ice navigation. 7.4 The outcome of the FSA study clearly indicates that the implementation of the proposed routeing, mandatory reporting and radar-based monitoring systems to the Gulf of Finland is highly recommendable.

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APPENDICES Appendix 1. Risk modelling framework Appendix 2. Collision Fault Tree Appendix 3. Skill base used in the FSA -study REFERENCES HELCOM, 1990. Study of the Risk for Accidents and the Related Environmental Hazards from the Transportation of Chemicals by Tankers in the Baltic Sea Area. Baltic Sea Environment Proceedings No. 34. Helsinki Commission 1990. IMO, 1997. Formal Safety Assessment: Interim guidelines for FSA application to the IMO rule-making process. MEPC 40/16. IMO, 1997. Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services. Resolution A.857(20), 1997. ISESO, 2000. User Manual for GRACAT � Grounding and Collision Analysis Toolbox. Document ID I107/I108.00.02.052.006A. 18.12.2000. Jolma, K., 1999. Torjuntavalmius 2005 ja 2010, (in Finnish). Vesivarayksikkö, Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE). Helsinki, 30.3.1999. Kahma K., et al., 2000. Wave statistics from the northern Baltic Sea for passenger ship bow structural design survey. Finnish Institute of Marine Research (FIMR), 2000. Luenberger, D. Investment Science, Oxford University Press, 1998. Melchers, R.E., 2001. On the ALARP approach to risk management. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 71, 201-208. Rytkönen, J., Sukselainen, J. Kustannus-hyöty analyysi Saaristomerelle suunnitellulle meriliikenteen hallinta- ja informaatiojärjeselmälle. VTT Report VALC29 (in Finnish), 1994. Safetec UK Ltd, 1999. Identification of Marine Environmental High Risk Areas (MEHRAs) in the UK. Doc. No.: ST-8639-MI-1-Rev 01. December 1999. VTT Industrial Systems, 2002a. The implementation of the VTMIS-system for the Gulf of Finland. Research report VAL34-013153. VTT Industrial Systems, Espoo, Finland, 2002. VTT Industrial Systems, 2002b. Statistical Analyses of the Baltic Maritime Traffic. Research report VAL34-012344. VTT Industrial Systems, Espoo, Finland, 2002.


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Risk-modelling framefork applied in the FSA -study 'The Implementation of the VTMIS-

system for the Gulf of Finland'.

CT1 CTn

. . .

CF1 CFn. . .

Currentpractice

New routeingsystem +SYSTEM2

New routeingsystem +

SYSTEM1

[number of events / yr]

Risk Control Options

contributing factors

GRACAT

PC

causation probabilityPC

Traffic data(vessel type, route,

volume , etc.)Routeing data

(current/new routeingsystem)

collission type

'SYSTEM1' 'SYSTEM2''Baseline'('do nothing')

latent collissionfrequency λc

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Collision Fault Tree

'Baseline' Page 1 Control of critical situation


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'Baseline' Page 2, Escalation of collision

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'System1' Page 1 Control of critical situation


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'System1' Page 2, Escalation of collision

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'System2' Page 1 Control of critical situation


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'System2' Page 2, Escalation of collision

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Skill base used in the FSA -study 'The Implementation of the VTMIS-system for the Gulf of Finland' FSA -study core team

Saara Hänninen, VTT, Research Scientist, M.Sc.(Tech.), Naval Architect, accident and traffic statistics, ship technology and FSA methodology, Risto Jalonen, HUT, Research Scientist, M.Sc. (Tech.), naval architect, accident and traffic statistics and FSA methodology, Mikko Juva, HUT, Research Assistant, graduate student in naval architecture, ice conditions, risks in ice navigation, Tapio Nyman, VTT, Senior Research Scientist, M.Sc.(Tech.), Naval Architect, casualty investigations, human element, weather statistics, ship technology, winter navigation, cost benefit analyses, Anna Palonen, HUT, Research Assistant, graduate student in naval architecture, winter traffic and accident statistics, Kaj Riska, HUT, Professor of Arctic Marine Technology, D. Sc. (naval architecture), Arctic offshore research, icebreaker operations, risks in ice navigation, winter navigation, technical background of ice rules and ship structures, Tony Rosqvist, VTT, Research Scientist, Lic. Tech., FSA methodology, risk assessments and cost benefit analyses and risk based decision making, Jorma Rytkönen, VTT, Group Manager, Lic. Tech., traffic statistics, environment protection and oil combating, cost benefit analyses, fairway and port design, wind limit definitions, Sanna Sonninen, VTT, Research Scientist, Captain, traffic statistics, maritime traffic and navigation, VTS operations, rules and regulations and human element, Risto Tuominen, VTT, Senior Research Scientist, M.Sc.(Tech.), FSA methodology, risk assessments, expert judgement data, Participation of experts in the expert group sessions Expert group session concerning identification of hazards during open water season:

Mikael Elmgren, Helsinki pilot station, Senior pilot, master mariner Heli Haapasaari, Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Inspector Antti Haapio, Maritime Safety Training Centre, Head of Ship Simulation Unit Risto Haimila, Naval Forces, Commander Sinikka Hartonen, Finnish Maritime Administration, Helsinki VTS, Supervisor Martti Heikkilä, Accident Investigation Board, Chief accident investigator,

maritime accidents Kalervo Jolma Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Senior Inspector Kari Kosonen Finnish Maritime Administration, Senior Inspector Christer Lindberg CHL Consulting Oy, expert in brainstorm methodology, GDSS Mikael Lindholm Silja line Oy, Marine Manager, master mariner Antero Nykänen Fortum Shipping, Head of operational division, master mariner Pelle Nyström Finnish Maritime Administration, Captain of icebreaker Apu Kari Pohjola Finnish Maritime Administration,Chart and Fairway Department,

Fairway designs Aki Salomaa Coast Guard, Sea Rescue operator Participants from the FSA core team: Saara Hänninen, Risto Jalonen, Tapio Nyman, Tony Rosqvist and Sanna Sonninen.


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Expert group session concerning identification of hazards on ice conditions:

Heli Haapasaari, Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Inspector Finnish Sinikka Hartonen, Finnish Maritime Administration, Helsinki VTS, Supervisor VTS Martti Heikkilä, Accident Investigation Board, Chief accident investigator,

maritime accidents Veikko Iire Naval Forces, Naval Inspector Christer Lindberg CHL Consulting Oy, expert in brainstorm methodology, GDSS Pelle Nyströn, Finnish Maritime Administration, Captain of icebreaker Apu Jouko Ruotsalainen, Fortum Shipping, Operative Inspector, master mariner Björn Sjöman, Finnish Maritime Administration, Ice breaker operative manager Jouni Vainio, Finnish Institute of Marine Research, , Physical Oceanography,

Ice Service, Research Scientist Participants from the FSA core team: Mikko Juva, Anna Palonen, Kaj Riska and Tony Rosqvist. Expert group session concerning Collision Fault Tree basic event probability estimations:

Antti Haapio, Maritime Safety Training Centre, Head of Ship Simulation Unit Marko Järvelä, Finnlines Oyj, Cargo Services, m/s Finnhansa, 1st officer, master mariner Petteri Tolvanen, Fortum Shipping, m/t Futura, Chief officer, master mariner Jan Valtonen, Silja Line Oy, HSC Superseacat IV, captain, master mariner Participants from the FSA core team: Tapio Nyman, Tony Rosqvist and Sanna Sonninen.

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ROUTEING OF SHIPS, SHIP REPORTING AND RELATED · PDF fileas amended by resolution MSC.111(73)...

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