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ROOTING FOR AMERICA’S TEAM:

PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASEBALL AND BOXING AS INSTITUTIONS OF

DOMESTIC MOBILIZATION DURING THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Justin Harrison Levin

AN HONORS THESIS

in

History

Presented to the Faculty of the

Department of History of the University of Pennsylvania

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honors

2014

Kathy Peiss, Honors Seminar Director

Amy C. Offner, Thesis Advisor

_______________________________

Thomas M. Safley

Undergraduate Chair, Department of History



""

To Brian and Jonny, for instilling a love of politics and sports in me



"""

“Athletes…are among the best-cared-for creatures in the history of the planet, beneficiaries of the best nutrition, the latest technologies, the finest medical care, theylive at the very pinnacle of American innovation and abundance, which inspires anextraordinary thought— send them to fight the war! Send them just as they are thismoment, well rested, suited up, psyched for brutal combat, send the entire NFL! Attack

with all our bears and raiders, our ferocious redskins, our jets, eagles, falcons, chiefs, patriots, cowboys— how could a bunch of skinny hajjis in man-skirts and sandals stand achance against these all-Americans? Resistance is futile, oh Arab foes. Surrender nowand save yourself a world of hurt, for our mighty football players cannot be stopped, theyare so huge, so strong, so fearsomely ripped that mere bombs and bullets bounce off their bones of steel. Submit, lest our awesome NFL show you straight to the flaming gates ofhell!”

“But why, please, do they play the national anthem before games anyway? The DallasCowboys and the Chicago Bears, these are two privately owned corporations, these theircontractual employees taking the field. As well play the national anthem at the top of

every commercial, before every board meeting, with every deposit and withdrawal youmake at the bank!”

— United States Army Private Billy Lynn



"#

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for my family, particularly my mother, for encouraging me to write

this thesis in the first place. Throughout elementary and middle school, she would

continually tell me, “In our house, extra-credit isn’t optional, it’s required.” When I asked

for advice regarding taking on a potentially masochistic, optional, honors thesis, she

simply repeated her oft-heard refrain. I would also like to thank my girlfriend Whitney,

who was there for me to bounce ideas off of, came up with my title, and was instrumental

in helping me form my research questions.

I am indebted to Brian Richards, Museum Curator for the New York Yankees, for

teaching me that sports and history are not mutually exclusive. Gaining research

experience while interning for the Yankees was essential as I embarked upon this thesis.Learning about Micky Mantle, how he was constantly booed and criticized for being draft

ineligible, was this project’s inspiration.

I could not have written this thesis without the support and guidance of my

Faculty Advisor, Dr. Amy Offner, and the Honors Director, Dr. Kathy Peiss. I am

thankful to Professor Offner, for her willingness to take on my project before she had

even began working at Penn. Though I proudly hold the distinction as Professor Offner’s

inaugural advisee, throughout the entire process she advised me as if she were a seasonedveteran. I greatly appreciate the close reading and useful annotations on multiple drafts of

my thesis. Professor Peiss challenged me from our first class meeting in January 2013. I

entered the seminar with a general proposal, and due to Professor Peiss’ much-needed

input, I ended with a solid research plan. Professor Peiss has also been an incredibly

perceptive and thoughtful second reader.

Lastly, I would like to thank the Penn Department of History for its generosity

with regard to research funding. Without it, my thesis would have lacked critical

information related to the USO, which I discovered while researching at the National

Archives.



#

Table of Contents

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………ii

Epigraph…………………………………………………………………………………..iii

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………….iv

Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………….v

Glossary of Acronyms……………………………………………………………………vi

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter 1…………………………………………………………………………………..6“The American War Game”

Chapter 2…………………………………………………………………………………23

“Where Soldiers and Veterans Are, Baseball Will Be”

Chapter 3…………………………………………………………………………………40“Man I Ain’t Got No Quarrel With Them Vietcong”

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….59

Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………...63



#"

Glossary of Acronyms

AFL American Football League

IAC Illinois Athletic Commission

MLB Major League Baseball

NFL National Football League

NOI Nation of Islam

NYSAC New York State Athletic Commission

SDS Students for a Democratic Society

SNCC Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

USO United Service Organizations

WBA World Boxing Association

WBC World Boxing Council



$

Introduction

On January 14th, 1968, a crowd of 75,000 applauded as the Grambling State

University band performed the national anthem.1 United States Air Force planes flew

overhead. Spectators cheered as Vince Lombardi, a former employee of West Point, led

his uniformed men onto the field. This nationalistic pep-rally, staged at the height of the

Vietnam War, was not a government event, but Super Bowl II. At a time when 20,000

U.S. troops had already died in Vietnam, the professional football leagues supported the

war effort and used the Super Bowl to express unconditional patriotism, nationalism, and

jingoism. 2

That 54% of the country opposed the war in January 1968 was irrelevant; 50

million fans were nevertheless subjected to a “heavy helping of patriotic hoo-ha.”3

While professional sports are rarely thought of as an aspect of domestic war

mobilization, during the Vietnam era, sporting institutions had clear and directed pro-war

agendas. Professional football, baseball, and boxing, the three most popular professional

sports of the era, acted independently and without explicit direction from any federal

authority. Football and baseball engaged in gratuitous expressions of jingoism and all

three sports strove to silence political dissent.

During the Vietnam War, domestic mobilization was considerably more limited

than it had been in earlier periods. The government did not ask civilians to collect

aluminum, volunteer for the Red Cross, or ration food items as it had done during World

War II. Rather, President Lyndon Johnson implored the “sincere and patriotic Americans

1 Mal Florence, “Packers Win (Naturally) but Not by Landside,” Los Angeles Times, January 15, 1968, B1.2 “Statistical Information about Fatal Causalities of the Vietnam War,” National Archives, accessed August2013, http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html. The NFL-AFL

merger was complete at this time so there were two separate leagues.3 “Public Opinion and the Vietnam War,” Digital History, accessed August 1, 2013,

http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/learning_history/vietnam/vietnam_pubopinion.cfm, and David Zirin,

What’s My Name, Fool?:Sports and Resistance in the United States, (Chicago: Haymarket Books), 150.



%

who harbor doubts about sustaining” the war in Vietnam to remember their true

American values—freedom, self-determination, and political independence—and rethink

their stance on the war.4 Fundamentally, to the Johnson Administration, the Vietnam War

was necessary because the rise of communism in the Third World threatened the sanctity

of American values. Accordingly, reminding Americans of these values was central to the

effort to mobilize the country in support of the war. Sporting institutions answered

Johnson’s call, using their status as highly respected and heavily publicized organizations

to mobilize the American public.

This analysis is at the intersection of two distinct historiographies: the

historiography of sport and the historiography of the Vietnam War. The study of sports as

it relates to politics, war, and social change is a young field, dating to the late 1970s and

early 1980s. Conversely, while the literature on the Vietnam War and domestic politics is

well developed, the clear intersection between sports and the war has received no

attention from historians.

The literature on sports and society began with works by Allen Guttmann and

Benjamin Rader, published in 1978 and 1983 respectively.5 Both works argued that the

growth of modern sports reflected the pursuit of excellence in industrialized society.

Guttmann, for example, argued that equal opportunity to compete, specialization of roles,

rationalization, and bureaucratic organization, all tenets of industrialization, similarly

became tenets of modern American sport. As they solely focus on the impact

industrialization had on sports, these early works are only tangentially related to my

4 “Speech on Vietnam (September 29, 1967)- Lyndon Baines Johnson,” Miller Center, accessed November

2013, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4041.5 Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sport (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1978), and Benjamin G. Rader, American Sports: From the Age of Folk Games to the Age of

Televised Sports (New Jersey: Simon and Schuster, 1983).



&

study. However, as these works were the first to treat sports organizations as institutions,

rather than as a collection of diverse individuals, they created the model that I employ

when examining professional football, baseball, and boxing. Building on these early

analyses, more recent works have focused on how the behavior of athletes themselves

related to social developments. In works published in the early 2000s, David Zang and

David Zirin both argue that though professional sports have historically been a source of

conservatism, athletes themselves have contested conservative values.6 While this

resistance itself is of some interest to me, the way sports organizations responded to

resistance is most critical to my identification of the leagues’ institutional agendas during

the Vietnam era.

While literature regarding professional football and boxing during the Vietnam

War is non-existent, political scientist Robert Elias has addressed the intersection

between baseball and war.7 In his 2009 work, Elias argued that throughout American

history, organized baseball has supported United States foreign policy. While the

Vietnam chapter in this work has informed my analysis of professional baseball, the

implications of our examinations are entirely different. Ellis examined baseball’s history

from the American Revolution through the War on Terror, suggesting that there has been

un unchanging pattern of support for U.S. foreign policy. By contrast, I show how

leagues activities changed during the Vietnam era. Regarding football, even potentially

supplemental works such as Jeff Davis’ landmark biography of National Football League

commissioner Pete Rozelle surprisingly do not consider the Vietnam War at all.

6 David Zirin, What’s My Name, Fool?:Sports and Resistance in the United States (Chicago: Haymarket

Books, 2005), David Zang, Sports Wars: Athletes in the Age of Aquarius (Fayetteville: University of

Arkansas Press, 2001).7 Robert Elias, The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S Foreign Policy And Promoted the

American Way Abroad (New York: The New Press, 2010), 198.



'

Concerning boxing, while the literature on Muhammad Ali is developed, it is surprisingly

silent on the boxing establishment’s policies and behavior.

The historiography of the Vietnam War’s impact on American society has failed

to address professional sports. While this historiography examines the development of

social movements and the effects on the American working class, it has consistently

neglected to examine the role of sports leagues. Works by Robert Buzzanco and Christian

Appy are representative of this literature and its faults with regard to professional sports.

Buzzanco considers the home front in its entirety and was incredibly useful for me as it

provided a general historical narrative from which I contextualized my sports-related

findings. 8 Yet Buzzanco’s work is silent on the role of professional sports in mobilizing

the nation. Additionally, though it did not directly impact my analysis, Christian Appy’s

oral history of the Vietnam War, which examined the conflict from the testimonies of

more than 100 individuals, informed me on how decisive and contested the war was.9 It

gave me a true and much needed appreciation for the exceptionality of the war in

Vietnam. Despite the plethora of testimonials, Appy did not consider the perspective of

key professional sports organizations or personalities.

Chapter 1 explores the culture of martial masculinity shared by the military and

professional football. It argues that the violent culture of the game helps explain the

league officials’ identification with the war effort. Organized football supported the

Vietnam War through the Super Bowl, nationalistic policies, collaborations with the

Department of Defense, and the empowerment of hawkish individuals. Additionally, the

8 Robert Buzzanco, Vietnam and The Transformation of American Life (Malden, MA: Blackwell

Publishers, 1999)..9 Christian G Appy, Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered From All Sides (New York: Penguin Books,

2004).



(

football establishment worked to silence dissent within the sport and present the game as

unequivocally behind the war. Unlike football, the game of baseball was not inherently

warlike. Nevertheless, because of professional football’s surging popularity, the baseball

establishment chose to move the sport behind the war in an effort to replicate the NFL’s

recent success. As Chapter 2 explores, the leagues selected a former General to become

commissioner, worked with the United Service Organizations, criticized the antiwar

movement, and strove to hide dissent. Finally, Chapter 3 argues that the boxing

establishment exhibited its support for the war by silencing dissent. Boxing’s jingoism

was exemplified by Muhammad Ali’s punitive treatment and banishment from the ring.

Former Monday Night Football commentator and renowned sports journalist,

Howard Cosell, once said, “rule number one of jockocracy was that sports and politics

could never mix.”10

If this is in fact the first rule of “jockocracy,” it has been honored in

the breach: professional sports has mixed with politics, and society as a whole for that

matter, since the beginning of professional play in the United States. Historically, this

link has been particularly evident during wartime, where sporting events have been

outlets for nationalistic and patriotic expression. During the Vietnam War, professional

sports leagues acted as vehicles of domestic mobilization in the face of mounting

opposition to the war.

10 David Zirin, A People’s History of Sports in the United States (New York: The New Press, 2008), xi.



)

Chapter 1— “The American War Game”

In 1965, beloved Baltimore Colts quarterback Johnny Unitas deemed football “the

closest thing you can get to all-out war.”1 Though Unitas was one of the game’s All-

American heroes, the idea that football and war were related was not novel and was

enunciated by many of football’s prominent critics. In the October 1965 cover story for

Esquire Magazine, journalist Thomas Morgan wrote a chilling piece on football titled

“The American War Game.”2 In discussing the connection between football and war,

Morgan argued that football’s “metaphoric relationship to war goes beyond strategic

analogies and deathly symbolism to the game itself…Football is a game played on

a…basis that not only sanctions violence but requires it on every play. It is…pseudo

war.3 In Morgan’s analysis, the violence of the game made football “a continuation of

war by other means.”4 As football was “a continuation of war by other means,” then war

can equally be considered a continuation of football by other means. The resonance

between football and war inspired the NFL’s pro-war policies and agendas during the

Vietnam Era and explains how football became integrated into this widening American

crisis.

While football could be characterized as the “American War Game” throughout

the sport’s history, several factors gave this status added meaning during the war in

Vietnam.5 Due to football being a symbol “for…fighting itself,” during America’s earlier

wars, the game was severally weakened by the war effort.

6

During World War I and II,

1 Thomas B, Morgan, “The American War Game,” Esquire Magazine, October 1965, 71.2 Morgan, “War Game,” 72.3 Ibid.4 Morgan, “War Game,” 148.5 Morgan, “War Game,” 71.6 Ibid.



*

collegiate football, which was far more popular than professional football, suffered as

most able-bodied players enlisted or were drafted. Indicative of college football’s decline,

the service teams that sprung up in boot camps as soldiers were preparing for deployment

constantly dominated collegiate teams in exhibition matches. Interestingly, professional

football was not popular because collegiate football was used “as a training ground for

soldiers and officers,” not as a training ground for the NFL. 7 Regarding the professional

game, according to the Pro Football Hall of Fame, “since the founding of the National

Football League in 1920, the league and its players have answered America’s call during

times of national crisis and military conflicts.”

8

While the war effort did not cripple the

NFL, rival leagues folded during World War II and the NFL was profoundly affected. For

example, “due to the manpower shortage created by World War II… in 1943, the

Philadelphia [Eagles] and Pittsburgh [Steelers] franchises combined. The team was

called…the Steagles.”9

Conversely, the sport was at its peak popularity during the Vietnam era.

Additionally, while organized football was divided into the upstart American Football

League and the established NFL at the beginning of the decade, in 1967 they merged to

create one powerful league. As the leader of this consolidated football establishment, Pete

Rozelle, who himself served in the Navy during World War II, ensured that the league

supported the Vietnam War and silenced internal dissent.

7 Michael Oriard, “Flag Football: How the NFL became the American War Game ,” Slate, November 17,2009, accessed August 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2009/11/flag_football.html.8 “Football and America,” Pro Football Hall of Fame, accessed August 2013,

http://www.profootballhof.com/history/general/war/vietnam/page3.aspx.9 “Eagles,” Pro Football Hall of Fame, accessed January 2014,

http://www.profootballhof.com/history/team.aspx?FRANCHISE_ID=24.



+

Professional football culture, which pervaded American society, normalized

violence and translated the brutal experience of war into entertainment. When comparing

baseball to football, Robert Elias asserted that unlike the national pastime, “by the 1970s

few…could refute claims that football and aggression in Southeast Asia were linked.”10

Commenting on the militaristic aspects of the game, St. Louis Cardinals Linebacker and

Vietnam dissenter Dave Meggyesy wrote:

There was the whole militaristic aura surrounding pro football, not only inthe obvious things like football stars visiting troops in Vietnam, but in thelanguage of the game--‘throwing the bomb,’ being a ‘field general,’ etc.,and in the unthinking obligation to ‘duty’ required of the players. It is no

accident that…the most repressive political regime in the history of thisnation is ruled by a football-freak, Richard M. Nixon.11

In this powerful condemnation of football, Meggyesy draws attention to the implicit

aspects of the game that undoubtedly relate to war in the abstract but during this era were

directly associated with Vietnam. Like Meggyesy, counterculture movements understood

the relationship between football and warmongering. Meggyesy proclaimed, “when

society changes…football will be obsolete.”

12

Similarly, a feeling that, “we won’t have

more war if we don’t have those kind of games,” was common within the antiwar

movement.13 As historian Robert Buzzanco asserted, “during that decade, the foundations

of American life were challenged and often rocked to their core,” and football did not

escape this attack.14 However, football was especially dangerous because in addition to

being representative of traditional American culture, the nature of the game desensitized

10 Robert Elias, The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S Foreign Policy And Promoted the

American Way Abroad (New York: The New Press, 2010), 203.11 Dave Meggyesy, Out of Their League (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 2010), 174.12 Meggyesy, Out of Their League, 253.13Statement by unnamed Vietnam protestor to Dave Meggyesy, interview by Dick Cavett, The Dick Cavett

Show, ABC, August 3, 1970.14 Robert Buzzanco, Vietnam and The Transformation of American Life (Malden, MA: Blackwell

Publishers, 1999) 234.



,

the American public to the ills of war. Thus, from the perspective of the antiwar

movement, the game itself was responsible for helping to make an unjust war possible in

the United States.

Despite the frequent attacks by counterculture movements, it is initially unclear if

football actually made the nation more receptive to the war in Vietnam. Polling data

indicates that the nation was never overwhelmingly in support of the war, thus seemingly

absolving football of any blame. Indeed from May 1967 onward, more than 50% of the

country opposed the war. 15 However, when examining the pollster’s techniques,

football’s role becomes much more apparent. Gallup, the pollster, measured support for

the war in an indirect manner, and asked Americans, “in view of developments since we

entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to

fight in Vietnam?"16

If a respondent answered “yes…the U.S. made a mistake sending

troops to fight in Vietnam” this was considered as a response against the war. However,

this polling was flawed because it did not consider the existence of individuals who

believed that the initial intervention was a mistake but held that the war must go on until

a decisive American victory. While this distinction may seem minimal, its importance is

evident when considering the emphasis on winning within the collective American

psyche. In his 1969 book titled The Jocks, sportswriter Leonard Schecter observed

American society and noted, “we play our games, or watch them contested, with the same

tenacious ferocity with which we fight a war in Vietnam and with little reason or sense.

We are taught from the cradle that we have never lost a war and that winning is

15 “Public Opinion and the Vietnam War,” Digital History, accessed August 1, 2013,

http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/learning_history/vietnam/vietnam_pubopinion.cfm.16 Ibid.



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everything…and losing is nothing.17 In particular, football, where legendary coach, Vince

Lombardi, promoted the dictum, “winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing,” was

responsible for fostering this mindset.18 Thus, according to Schecter’s analysis, while

there were many Americans who would readily admit that the war in Vietnam was a

mistake, football had conditioned the American public to believe that—mistake or not—

anything less than complete victory in Vietnam was unacceptable. Indeed, when applying

Schecter’s theory to Nixon’s 1968 campaign guarantee of ending the war in Vietnam, it is

clear why the presidential hopeful did not promise to immediately withdraw the troops

but rather pledged that, “we shall have an honorable end to the war in Vietnam.”

19

In creating the Super Bowl in 1967, Rozelle and the football establishment had

the opportunity to display their values on the grandest stage.20 Rozelle admitted that from

Super Bowl I onward, there “was a conscious effort on our part to bring the element of

patriotism into the Super Bowl.”21 These efforts were successful and according to

Meggyesy, “there was this jingoistic, super patriotic, use of football, particularly during

the Super Bowl to sell the war in Vietnam.”22 Indeed, according to the Department of

Defense, “The NFL-military Super Bowl partnership stems from the first Air Force

flyover in 1968, over Miami’s Orange Bowl for Super Bowl II.”23

Additionally, during

17 David Zirin, A People’s History of Sports in the United States (New York: The New Press, 2008), 184.18 Marshall Smith, “The Miracle Maker of Green Bay, Wis.” Life Magazine, December 7, 1962, 52.

19 “1968 Nixon vs. Humphrey vs. Wallace,” Museum of the Moving Image, accessed November 2013,http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1968/Vietnam.20 As football historian Michael Oriard noted, the fact that the Super Bowl is completely organized by the

league itself, signals that it is the unadulterated expression of the league’s values, which makes its emphasis

on nationalism and militarism all the more revealing.21 Ira Berkow, “Once Again, It’s the Star-Spangled Super Bowl,” New York Times, January 27, 1991, S6.22 Dave Zirin, “David Meggyesy: The Edge of Sports Interview,” Edge of Sports, January 1, 2004, accessed

September 2013.23 Michael J Carden, “NFL, Military Continue Super Bowl Traditions,” U.S. Department of Defense,

January 29, 2009, accessed September 2013.



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Super Bowl III in 1969, “America Thanks” was the halftime show’s theme, and the show

consisted of the Florida A&M band performing patriotic ballads.24

Most fascinating though was the halftime show of Super Bowl IV in 1970, which

consisted of a “re-creation of the Battle of New Orleans.”25 While the Battle of New

Orleans was ultimately irrelevant to the outcome of the War of 1812, the decisive

American victory became a nationalist symbol in antebellum America. During the

reenactment, “cannons were blasted, smoke spread through Tulane Stadium, and while

many coughed and rubbed their eyes, men with muskets in old British and American

uniforms were falling in mock death on the football field.”

26

While reenacting any battle

would have demonstrated the league’s support of the military, the fact that Rozelle

decided to showcase this battle in particular is revealing. By 1970, the Vietnam War had

largely divided the country and the lack of military progress disenchanted many

Americans. Vietnam clearly needed its own Battle of New Orleans, an event that would

unite the nation and produce a mass feeling of nationalistic pride. As no such event had

occurred in Southeast Asia, Rozelle had the original battle staged in front of an audience

of 46 million in order to function as a viable substitute for actual military victory.

Rozelle also demonstrated the sport’s support for the Vietnam War by instituting

new policies related to the national anthem during the 1969 season. While playing the

Star-Spangled Banner had been standard practice at NFL games since World War II,

there was no formal league policy on how players must conduct themselves during the

anthem. Despite the lack of formalized policy, when players failed to act in a satisfactory

24 “Super Bowl Entertainment,” National Football League, accessed September 2013,

http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/history/entertainment.25 “Scalpers Soaked as Rains Pass,” New York Times, January 12, 1970, 52.26 Berkow, “Star-Spangled Super Bowl,” S6.



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manner during the national anthem, they were punished accordingly. For example, during

the 1968 season, Rozelle censured Detroit Lions Wide Receiver Phil Odle for simply

failing to sing the Star-Spangled Banner during a nationally televised game.”27 In order

to clarify the league’s position, in 1969 “Rozelle’s office issued a general order that all

players on NFL teams stand at attention during the anthem, the starters on the field with

their helmets neatly under their arms, the reserves in the same posture along the bench.”28

Additionally, the commissioner issued orders against “talking, nervous footwork, gum

chewing and shoulder-pad slamming during The Banner .”29 In response to the new

policy, speaking on behalf of his fellow players, Los Angeles Rams tackle Merlin Olson

emphasized, “sometimes football players look a little preoccupied. They do have certain

anxieties and want things to get under way. But people shouldn’t take that for disrespect

or lack of attention [to the national anthem]. It’s really not.”30

While the obvious

implication of the new rule was that players needed to be told to act patriotically, Olson

wanted to stress that players’ inattentiveness during the anthem was wholly unrelated to

their love for America. While it is unclear if Olson was speaking truthfully, the fact that

he felt compelled to clarify the rule indicates the high level of sensitivity surrounding the

national anthem.

While the policy itself was clearly nationalistic in its intent, details regarding its

implementation also demonstrated the football establishment’s unconditional patriotism.

With the Minnesota Vikings set to play the Kansas City Chiefs in Super Bowl IV, it was

27 “National Central ,” Sports Illustrated , September 21, 1970, accessed August 2013,

http://www.si.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1084084/index.htm.28 Dwight Chapin, “To Play, or Not to Play Anthem: That Is Question,” Los Angeles Times, January 9,

1972, C1.29 J. D. Reed, “Gallantly Screaming ,” Sports Illustrated , January 3, 1977, accessed August 2013,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1091921/index.htm.30 Chapin, “Anthem,” C1.



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reported “not only will the Vikings be ready for the Chiefs but also for the National

Anthem…the squad had National Anthem drills.”31 Vikings guard Milt Sunde, who was

also in the National Guard, “taught the players how to line up evenly on the field, to stand

at attention and how not to wiggle or scratch.”32 Meggyesy’s fate after he refused to

comply with the policy was indicative of the consequences a player faced if he did not act

in accordance with Rozelle’s edict. In his 1970 football autobiography Out Of Their

League Meggyesy recalled:

I’d thought a lot about this and decided that saluting the flag wasridiculous. Every time I even looked at it, I saw only a symbol of

repression so I decided to protest. My original idea was to pull a TommySmith by raising my right fist in the air and bowing my head…I was awarethat if my protest was too obvious I would be severely fined. When the National Anthem started I stepped out of line and began kicking the dirtand holding my helmet down in front of me with my two hands. My headwas bowed and I was spitting on the ground and moving from side to sidescuffling the ground with my shoes.

33

Along with other antiwar activity, Meggyesy’s weekly protest against the anthem

eventually led to his benching midway through the 1969 season. As evidenced by the

Vikings’ emphasis on the anthem and by the repercussions Meggyesy faced, Rozelle’s

anthem directive was not simply an extraneous part of his program but an important

policy that would be strongly enforced. Rozelle took the anthem so seriously that

sportswriter Jim Murray mocked the commissioner and joked that Rozelle’s next step

would be to adopt a policy of rewarding “the team that picked its nose least during the

National Anthem” with a victory in the event of a tie.

31 William Wallace, “Coach Of Vikings Cites Foes’ Depth,” New York Times, January 9, 1970, 25.32 Ibid.33 Meggyesy, Out of Their League, 246. After winning the gold medal in the 200-meter dash at the 1968

Olympic Games in Mexico City, as a sign of protest against American policies, Tommy Smith gave the

black power salute during the playing of the national anthem.



$'

The NFL used USO tours as a method of demonstrating their support for the war

to a national audience. According to the Pro Football Hall of Fame, “in 1965, NFL

Commissioner Pete Rozelle, looking for a way to demonstrate the league's support for

America's fighting forces, conceived the idea of sending NFL players to Vietnam on

‘goodwill tours.’”34 The groups were “sponsored jointly by the USO, the Commissioner

of Football, Pete Rozelle, and the Department of Defense.”35 Co-sponsoring a USO tour

was extremely rare and the NFL was the first sports-related entity to do so. In 1971, the

programs for the NFL tours stated that “the NFL was the first sports organization, back in

1966, to send a group to Vietnam and they intend to continue to send groups for as long

as needed.”36 While the rising death toll and lack of military progress disenchanted the

American public with the war—only 28% of the country still supported the war by

1971—the NFL continued to publicize it longstanding involvement with pride.37

Additionally in a 1970 letter from Bill Granholm, a member of the commissioner’s

office, to Wilbur W. Evans, the Staff Entertainment Director at the Special Services

Offices, Granholm commented, “there have been some fine articles in the papers

concerning our trips.”38 Granholm’s mindfulness of press coverage of the tours, a factor

completely separate from morale boosting, combined with his constant requests for

photographs taken of players with soldiers for the purpose of distribution to the press,

reveals the league’s true agenda. Also, despite being a relatively anonymous league

34 “Football and America.”35 “1969 Pro-Football Unit #1,” 1969, RG 0472, Entry# P 191, Container #9, The National Archives,

College Park, MD.36 1971 NFL United NO.2. 1971, RG 0472, Entry# P 191, Container #26, The National Archives, CollegePark, MD.37 “Public Opinion and the Vietnam War.”38 Letter from Bill Granholm to Wilbur Evans, 1970, RG 0472, Entry# P 181, Container #18, The National

Archives, College Park, MD.



$(

executive with little to add to a morale boosting mission, the fact that Granholm joined

players on multiple tours to Vietnam, is in itself evidence of the pro-war culture held

within the league office.

The vast majority of football players returned from the league sponsored USO

tours expressing patriotic fervor, which further served the league’s pro-war agenda. As

sportswriter Jim Barniak proclaimed, “athletes fresh from those State Department junkets

through rice paddies generally drench the home folks in patriotism.”39 When Washington

Redskins star linebacker, Sam Huff, returned from the inaugural tour in 1966, he

asserted, “We (the United States) are not only fighting a war in Vietnam; we are building

a nation from the ground up, constructing schools and other buildings, teaching self

government, and teaching these people to protect themselves.”40 Huff’s words refer to

the United States’ nation building programs that coincided with the war. However, as

historian Michael Latham noted, nation building programs like the Strategic-Hamlet

Program were destructive campaigns of forced population resettlement. The contrast

between Latham’s dark description of families resettled at gunpoint and Huff’s ignorant

praise reveals the propaganda value of athletes returning from the USO tours. 41

Even as the war became increasingly controversial, football players returning

from Vietnam were nearly unanimous in their support. After returning from Vietnam in

1970, another Redskins star linebacker, Chris Hanburger, reminded the disenchanted

public that the war was still worthwhile. Hanburger recalled, “one injured soldier told me,

39 Norm Still A Dove, 1970, RG 0472, Entry# P 181, Container #18, The National Archives, College Park,MD.40 Dave Brady, “Violent Word of Huff Doesn’t Rival Vietnam,” The Washington Post, February 3, 1966,

C3.41 Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the

Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 181.



$)

‘I hate this place (Vietnam) but the job has to be done, and we (the Americans) are the

only ones who can do it the right way.’”42 Throughout the duration of the war, Rozelle

and football establishment encouraged players to discuss their experience on the tours as

long as they portrayed the war in a positive manner.

Outside of the USO context, the football establishment also supported and

rewarded individuals who expressed conservative and nationalistic ideologies. Two

notable examples of this phenomenon are Green Bay Packers and Washington Redskins

head coach Vince Lombardi and Buffalo Bills quarterback Jack Kemp. Lombardi, who is

forever memorialized as the namesake of the trophy awarded to the Super Bowl

champion, was known for his nationalistic ideology. Indeed, Lombardi often cited his

formative experience as an assistant coach at the United States Military Academy as

enormously influential to his later career. Emblematic of Lombardi’s ideology, during a

1968 game against the Baltimore Colts, he mandated that the team present all 50,861 fans

with American flags and that Lambeau Stadium “be decked out in red, white, and blue

bunting.”43 Prior to the 1970 season, as coach of the Redskins, when asked about dissent

and the counterculture movement, Lombardi asserted, “I don’t know what all this

revolution stuff is about. I just know I don’t like to hear such talk. You will not hear any

member of the…Redskins talking this way…I have not run into any disciplinary

problems on the Redskins—and that includes the matter of long hair.”44 When he died

42 Dave Brady, “Hanburger Admits Boss Tough, Vietnam Worse,” The Washington Post, February 19,

1970, F1.43 “Packers Are Down to Their Last Out,” The Washington Post, December 5, 1968, K6.44 Cooper Rollow, “Dissent but Don’t Destroy: Lombardi,” Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1970, B1.



$*

suddenly in September 1970, Lombardi’s obituary was not titled Lombardi: A Coach or

Lombardi: A NFL Legend, but rather Lombardi: A Patriot.45

Kemp, the Bills quarterback, was a firm anti-communist and strongly believed in

the Vietnam War. Humorously, during the 1964 season, “a rumor swept Buffalo that Bills

running back Cookie Gilchrist was getting fewer carries because quarterback Jack Kemp,

a staunch Republican, refused to hand the ball off to an unabashed lefty.”46 In March

1970, the congressional seat represented by Buffalo became vacant, and at 35 years old,

Kemp decided to retire from football and run for Congress. When Kemp espoused the

league’s conservative values on the campaign trail, Rozelle publicly gave him the

league’s endorsement and supported the congressional hopeful by speaking at campaign

events.47 While no data exists prior to 1985, Rozelle financially supported many of

Kemp’s campaigns after that point.48

In 1980, after 20 years on the job, Rozelle admitted,

“I’m not as close to the players as I used to be”, and that “his close friends today include

people like…Kemp, and, in a way, these are still the players to Rozelle. The ones

who…don't venerate Vince Lombardi are impostors.”49 Though by 1980, conservative

heroes Kemp and Lombardi had long been out of football, to Rozelle they still

represented the standard for the ideal player and coach.

Organized football took steps to silence dissent against the Vietnam War within

the sport. While most football players returned from USO tours in strong support of the

45 Bob Addie, “Lombardi: A Patriot,” The Washington Post, September 4, 1970, D5.46 Mark Bechtel, “Jack Kemp 1935-2009 ,” Sports Illustrated , May 11, 2009, accessed August 2013,http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1155323/index.htm.47 Pat Ryan, “The Making of A Quarterback 1970 ,” Sports Illustrated , December 7, 1970, accessed August

2013, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1084379/index.htm.48 “Pete Rozelle Political Donations,” Newsmeat, accessed October 2013,

http://www.newsmeat.com/sports_political_donations/Pete_Rozelle.php.49 Frank Deford, “2:00 Welcome Commissioner Pete Rozelle & Wife Carrie ,” Sports Illustrated , January

21, 1980, accessed August 2013,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1120311/index.htm



$+

war, New York Jets star quarterback Joe Namath returned more critical than ever. Prior to

visiting Southeast Asia in the winter of 1969, Namath, “sporting a Fu Manchu mustache,”

and “donning pantyhose for a commercial” was already football’s “symbol of rebellious

youth in the 1960's.”50 Though he had never publicly discussed the war prior to his

involvement with the USO, after the tour he proclaimed, “more than anything else, that

trip really makes you annoyed at the war and makes you wonder what the hell we’re

doing there.”51

This opposition to the war put Namath under scrutiny from the NFL and almost

ended his career. After he returned from the USO tour and commented on the war,

Rozelle informed the quarterback that if he wished to remain in the league, he must sell

his part ownership in “Bachelors III, an east side Manhattan restaurant and cocktail

lounge…because it is said to be frequented by ‘undesirables.”’52

While the restaurant had

nothing to do with Namath’s football career, in this era of low salaries and a weak

players’ union, Rozelle had virtually limitless control over the players. Rozelle’s edict

was simply a form of public chastisement as a result of the star quarterback’s criticism of

the war. Namath temporarily retired “as a matter of principle,” but after discussions with

Rozelle he eventually sold his stake in the restaurant and continued playing. Notably,

after the incident Namath refused to discuss the war and “carefully avoided political

involvement.”53 Despite an invitation, Namath refused to appear at a 1972 rally for

antiwar presidential candidate George McGovern and “spurned alliances with politicians

50 Gerald Eskenazi,“Make an Apology, Namath Suggests; No, Johnson Replies,” New York Times, August

1, 1977, B7.51 Dave Anderson, “Vietnam Victims Gain Namath’s Salute,” New York Times, February 16, 1969, S2.52George Strickler, “Namath Quits Football ‘On Principle’,” Chicago Tribune, June 7, 1969, 1.53 Dave Anderson, “Political Football,” New York Times, July 1, 1973, 160.



$,

in Alabama, Florida, and New York.”54 Even more stunning, in order to retain his career,

by 1972, Namath had completely morphed into a conformist and when asked about the

national anthem, he replied, “I like it played…Every time I hear it before a game, it

reminds me of where we are in the world, in life. I kind of thank God that we’re in this

country.”55 Namath made the necessary calculation and realized that in order to remain

one of the game’s biggest stars, he had no choice but to acquiesce to Rozelle’s agenda.

Cardinals linebacker Dave Meggyesy was football’s most explicit and politically

active Vietnam dissenter. As Meggyesy wrote in his 1970 memoir, during the 1967

offseason after he had spoken at two antiwar meetings at Southern Illinois University,

“Stormy Bidwell, the Cardinals’ president, called me and asked me to meet him at his

office at the stadium concerning something he refused to discuss on the phone.”56

Bidwell had heard about the linebacker’s presence at antiwar meetings and while he

reluctantly respected Meggyesy’s right to protest the war, he forbade him from joining

antiwar groups such as Students for a Democratic Society. Additionally, prior to the 1968

Democratic National Convention, Meggyesy wrote a petition for Cardinals players who

supported antiwar candidate Eugene McCarthy to sign. The petition read:

Because of the critical state of the Democratic Party and the nation, we professional athletes feel compelled to announce our support of SenatorEugene J. McCarthy as the Democratic nominee for President of theUnited States. As professional football players and concerned young men,we have became aware of the need in this country for Senator McCarthy’s positive and progressive policies concerning the Vietnam War…If we areto salvage the concept and practice of the democratic process and alsoinclude the disaffected generation of young people, Senator McCarthy’snomination is imperative.57

54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Meggyesy, Out of Their League, 189.57 Meggyesy, Out of Their League, 224.



%-

While he adamantly disagreed with the petition, Bidwell permitted Meggyesy to circulate

it amongst teammates–17 signed it– as long as it was only forwarded to the Missouri

delegates at the convention, not to newspapers. As evidenced by these incidents, Bidwell

permitted players to privately protest the war.

However, when Meggyesy began protesting the war in a more overt and public

manner, Bidwell responded much more harshly. In 1969, which was incidentally

Meggyesy’s last season playing professional football, an episode erupted regarding the

accidental publication of an antiwar petition signed by 37 Cardinals. Meggyesy had given

a copy of the petition to an associate who ignored Meggyesy’s request to keep it

confidential, and forwarded it to the Businessmen’s Committee to End the War. Realizing

its potential, the committee released it to the press. During a practice in October, when

the players were notified that the petition would be made public the next day, Coach

Charley Winner told Meggyesy, “Listen, I don’t want you to practice today. I want you to

get a hold of that petition as soon as you can.”58 Meggyesy stopped the petition’s

publication, but Winner warned the team, “anybody who is involved in further political

organizing will be dealt with by the head coach.”59 After Meggyesy gave an interview in

which he denounced the war, the team finally had enough and he was benched. Whether

Meggyesy was forced out of the league or retired on his own terms is unclear, but the

critical point is by the end of the 1969 season an ardent Vietnam protester and

professional football could no longer coexist.60

58 Meggyesy, Out of Their League, 252.59 Ibid.60 In his memoir Meggyesy writes that he retired on his own terms. However, given that he was he was

never offered another professional contract, the circumstances of his retirement are ambiguous.



%$

While Meggyesy stands out as the NFL’s most prominent Vietnam dissenter,

opposition to the Vietnam War was widespread within the NFL locker-room. According

to Meggyesy’s account, only 13 players out of the 50 he asked refused to sign the petition

calling for the war in Vietnam to end. Whether it was because of a league gag order, fear

of being cut, or simply due to institutional culture, out of the 37 Cardinals players who

opposed the war in Vietnam, 36 stayed silent. The general sense of a crisis of authority

and changing social order that defined the 1960s explains why the league was so

concerned with dissent and repressed it vehemently. On the impact of the war on

American life, Buzzanco asserted, “youth culture, music, sex, film, and other media—

indeed the very politics of culture—all changed markedly because of the war and its

attendant movements” and football’s silence of dissent was its method of attempting to

insulate itself from this greater social change.61

That this dissent was never publicized is

a testament to organized football’s comprehensive effort to portray their sport as behind

the war and remain above the chaos of the era.

Just months after ground combat in Vietnam had ended, in August 1973 Rozelle

was honored for his and the NFL’s contribution to the war effort. The Veterans of

Foreign Wars, “the official nonprofit service organization for USA military veterans,”

awarded the Americanism Gold Medal to Rozelle.62 The Americanism award was

“awarded to an individual for outstanding contributions to American principles.”63 While

“contributions to American principles” is a broad criterion, considering that VFW was a

congressionally sponsored military organization, they defined American principles as

61 Buzzanco, Vietnam, 234.62 “About Us,” Veterans of Foreign Wars, accessed September 2013, http://www.vfw.org/Common/About-

Us/; and , “Rozelle Will Not Act On Thomas Incident,” New York Times August 22, 1973, F5.63 “Section 9; Awards & Citations,” Veterans of Foreign Wars, accessed September 2013,

https://www.vfw.org/oms/Leadership/01_CommandersManual/PDF%20Sections/Sec9.pdf.



%%

unconditional support for the war. Indeed, the VFW was honoring Rozelle’s nationalism

and jingoism. In their view, the fact that he directed organized football’s institutional

support for the war while most of the country opposed the war in Vietnam was a

tremendous achievement and worthy of recognition.

The game of football may have inherently promoted war and militarism, but the

Vietnam War provoked the football establishment to consciously support the war effort.

While the development of the Super Bowl, policies regarding the national anthem, and

treatment of dissenters explains how organized football supported the war in Vietnam, it

is football’s status as the “American war game” that presents a logical rationale for

why.64 Unlike, professional baseball and boxing, which would remain safe from

countercultural attacks, football’s overt association with war and violence, made it a

natural target. And though the ground war in Vietnam ended in 1973 this “continuation of

war by other means” remains ongoing.65

64 Morgan, “War Game,” 71.65 Morgan, “War Game,” 148.



%&

Chapter 2 — “Where Soldiers and Veterans Are, Baseball Will Be”

When Ford Frick, the commissioner of baseball, decided to retire in 1965, the

sport was at a crossroads. Despite being the traditional national pastime, by the middle of

the decade, professional football had surpassed baseball as the most popular American

sport. As Robert Elias noted, during the Vietnam era, it was football, not baseball, that

“best fit this combative mode and the nation’s increasing escalation of the Vietnam

War.”1 Indeed, emblematic of baseball’s “declining grip on officials and on Americans

generally…President Johnson ended [the] perfunctory visits to Washington’s Griffith

Stadium.”2

The owners were aware of baseball’s precarious position and confronting the

challenges of professional football was at the forefront of their mind when selecting a

new commissioner. While baseball could never match football’s inherent violence, it was

possible to emulate its programmatic support for the war in Vietnam. As a method of

maintaining significance in the wake of professional football’s surging popularity, the

baseball establishment made the strategic decision to empower military leadership,

overtly support the war in Vietnam, and silence internal dissent.

Baseball’s owners looked for an individual with strong military connections to

replace outgoing commissioner Ford Frick. John Fetzer and John Galbreath, owners of

the Detroit Tigers and Pittsburgh Pirates respectively, and leaders of the screening

committee, were charged with the task of evaluating a list of 156 nominees for

commissioner.

3

Once the list of 156 nominees was narrowed down to seven by October

1 Robert Elias, The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S Foreign Policy And Promoted the

American Way Abroad (New York: The New Press, 2010), 198.2 Ibid.3 Jim Enright, “Eckert, Baseball’s New Boss, Has Standout Military Record,” The Sporting News,

November 27, 1965, 13.



%'

1965, three of the remaining individuals had held military leadership positions. They

were Stephen Ailes, former Secretary of the Army, Eugene Zuckert, former Secretary of

the Air Force, and General Curtis Lemay, retired Air Force Chief of Staff.4 The other four

nominees on the shortlist all held leadership positions within organized baseball and as

such all of the “outside” candidates had a strong connection to the United States military.

Perhaps most indicative of the search committee’s priorities was the fact that Sargent

Shriver, former director of the Peace Corps, head of the Office of Economic Opportunity,

and one of the original 156 nominees, was not considered for the short list while General

LeMay, a man who infamously called for the United States to drop a nuclear bomb on

Vietnam, made the list.5 In the end, though, the owners opted to select retired Air Force

General William “Spike” Eckert. Due to his relative anonymity, the sports media quickly

dubbed baseball’s new commander-in-chief the “unknown soldier.”6

While football had long been associated with war, Eckert attempted to

manufacture a similar association between war and baseball. Though Eckert was a

stranger to the game, Elias suggested, “if baseball was lagging as the national pastime,

then the military connection might provide a patriotic boost.”7 According to a Sports

Illustrated article reviewing Eckert’s first three months as commissioner, the author

commented that Eckert “learns fast” and that “he has been partially brainwashed into

believing that baseball is a holy calling—he thinks now it should be exported as an

instrument of international goodwill.”8 Just as America’s involvement with the war in

4 “Seven Candidates Still in Race For Post of Commissioner,” The Sporting News, November 6, 1965, 6.5 Elias, “Empire,” 198.6 John Underwood, “Progress Report On The Unknown Solider,” Sports Illustrated , April 04, 1966,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1078364/index.htm.7 Ibid and Elias , Empire , 199.8 Ibid.



%(

Vietnam began escalating with the introduction of ground troops in 1965, Eckert

explicitly brought the sport closer to the war. In an interview with sportswriter Dick

Young, Eckert asserted, “in Vietnam you want excellence in fighting units…and it’s

measured statistically like batting averages, and you get awards just like in baseball.”9

Additionally, in December 1966, under Eckert’s direction, the American League held its

end of season event at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.”10 The patients, many of

whom were Vietnam veterans, were promised, “Where soldiers and veterans are, baseball

will be.”11

Eckert also supported the war effort in Vietnam with his actions. In October 1966,

Eckert followed professional football’s lead and initiated baseball’s first collaboration

with the Department of Defense. He created a USO “handshaking” tour to Vietnam,

which featured baseball’s personalities. This inaugural tour and the subsequent ones were

met with great praise, the only criticism being that baseball did not get “the publicity it

deserved.”12 In 1967, Eckert was honored for the success and impact of tours and

“received a meritorious award from the Air Force.”13 At the ceremony Representative L.

Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, declared, “I think the

choice of Gen. Eckert as baseball commissioner was an extremely fortunate one.”14

As

Eckert moved the national pastime in support of the war, his ascendance to the

commissionership was indeed fortunate for Rivers and his hawkish colleagues. In

addition to the USO tours to Southeast Asia, Eckert ordered player visits to the

9 Elias, Empire, 199.10 “Walter Reed GIs Premier New American League Film,” The Sporting New December 31, 1966, 41.11 Ibid.12 Max Nichols, “Eckert Learns Quickly, Says Ex-Foe Griffith,” The Sporting News, January 28, 1967, 22.13 Bob Addie, “Eckert Honored for Aid to Morale in Vietnam,” The Sporting News, November 18, 1967,

32.14 Ibid.



%)

Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Mexico, the Virgin Islands and other Latin American

countries in order to cement baseball at the center of “people-to-people international

relations” within the Cold War framework.15 Due to its potential to become communist,

President Kennedy famously dubbed Latin America, “the most dangerous area in the

world,” and Eckert used his sport in an attempt to prevent the region from turning read.

Thus to Eckert, baseball was much more than a game, but a means to spread American

values abroad and ultimately prevent the rise of communism in the Third World.

Eckert and the baseball establishment instituted new policies regarding the

playing of the national anthem. After playing a non-traditional version of the national

anthem at the 1968 World Series, musician Jose Feliciano was demonized. 16 Both

organized baseball and its fans made clear that the display of the growing counterculture

movement was not welcome within the sport. In the aftermath of the Feliciano fiasco,

“MLB then mandated that teams only play conservative versions of the national

anthem.”17 Additionally, while most teams had previously only played the national

anthem sporadically throughout the season, during the Vietnam era, it became a daily

ritual at all baseball games. In 1967, President of the Chicago Cubs John Holland

proclaimed, “because of the situation in Vietnam…we feel that the time now has come to

do [the national anthem] daily.”18 While the Cubs previously reserved the Star-Spangled

Banner for holidays and special occasions, the team, like many others, changed its policy

to support the country, troops, and war by playing it on a daily basis. However, to some,

the overplaying of the national anthem had its disadvantages. In 1972, Kansas City

15 William D. Eckert, “Eckert Offers ’67 Progress Report,” The Sporting News, January 16, 1968, 34.16 Barbara Stanton, “Fans Irate Over ‘Desecrated’ Anthem ,” The Sporting News, October 19, 1968, 1317 Elias, Empire, 205.18 “Bruins Install an Organ—To Play National Anthem,” The Sporting News, February 18, 1967, 32.



%*

Royals owner Ewing Kauffmann announced that he was deeply offended by the lack of

respect the anthem received and reasoned that playing it less would force the crowd to

give the anthem and flag the proper respect it deserved. Consequently, the Royals revised

their policy and “the anthem would not be played, except on Sundays and special

occasions.”19 After abiding by this new policy for a month, Kaufmann changed his mind

and decided it was important to daily demonstrate the sport’s nationalism. 20 Kaufmann

demanded that the anthem would not be subjected to dissent or protest and clarified,

“when the song begins, every fan, every stadium worker, every vender will stop and face

the colors, and that silence will reign throughout the stadium.”

21

In effect, at least in

Kansas City, those who identified with the antiwar movement were no longer invited to

attend a baseball game.

Just three years into his tenure as commissioner, in 1968, Eckert was fired.

Baseball again began searching for a new image and leader. While the Vietnam War was

extremely unpopular by this time, Eckert’s dismissal was not related to his pro-war

stance. In fact, the owners who were most critical of Eckert, such as Calvin Griffith, cited

Eckert’s moving the sport to support the war in Vietnam as his sole accomplishment.22

In replacing the “unknown soldier,” baseball turned to a true baseball insider Bowie

Kuhn, who had served as National League counsel and been involved in baseball for

years. While Kuhn also had military experience, serving in the Navy during World War

II, he and Eckert could not have been more different.23 While Eckert had been uninvolved

19 “Royals Rstore National Anthem,” The Sporting News, July 8, 1972, 26.20 Ibid and Elias, Empire, 206.21 Ibid.22 Nichols, “Eckert Learns Quickly, Says Ex-Foe Griffith.”23 Leonard Koppett, “Bowie Kuhn, Wall St. Lawyer, Named Commissioner Pro Tem of Baseball ,” New

York Times, February 5, 1968, 29.



%+

in the sport and had not even attended a baseball game in the decades leading up to his

appointment, Kuhn was an avid fan and at age 42, the youngest commissioner in the

game’s history. Coming of age during the end of the Great Depression and World War II

deeply influenced Kuhn’s worldview and fostered his belief in American exceptionalism

and excellence. Despite being the most unusual commissioner in the history of the sport,

like his predecessors, Kuhn would surely “wave an American flag.”24

Like Eckert, Kuhn made the USO tours a top priority. Early in his

commissionership, Kuhn called the USO “one of our most valuable associations” and

promised “we will become even more involved with the USO in the future.”

25

Kuhn

himself even joined a group of star players on a tour in early 1970 and formed a personal

bond with Wilbur Evans, the Staff Entertainment Director at the Special Services Offices.

After the tour, Kuhn wrote Evans asking for any photographs that documented Kuhn and

the players’ experience in Vietnam.26 The circulation of images of players interacting

with troops had the dual outcome of softening the image of the war zone while

simultaneously presenting organized baseball as fulfilling its patriotic duty.

During the continued escalation that occurred in Vietnam in President Richard

Nixon’s first term, Kuhn aligned himself with the president.27

In 1969, with the All-Star

game located at RFK Stadium in Washington D.C, Kuhn and Nixon arranged for the

White House to be open to four hundred professional baseball players. At the event,

Kuhn presented the embattled president with a plaque that labeled him the “greatest team

24 William Leggett, “The Big Leagues Select A Fan,” Sports Illustrated , February 17, 1969,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1082091/index.htm.25 “MLB Centennial Showcase,” 1969, RG 0472, Entry# P 191, Container #16, The National Archives,

College Park, MD.26 “Letter from Bowie Kuhn to Wilbur Evans,” 1969, RG 0472, Entry# P 191, Container #16, The National

Archives, College Park, MD.27 Elias, Empire, 207.



%,

member,” a title the antiwar movement contested. 28 Capitalizing on his relationship with

organized baseball, and eager for positive war-related press, Nixon urged owners to

honor former Vietnam prisoners of war at games. While Kuhn did not have control over

individual team’s game-day ceremonies, he acquiesced to the president and decided to

“give all returning Vietnam prisoners of war a lifetime baseball pass.”29 The choice to

give these lifetime passes to returning prisoners of war was unprecedented. This same

gesture was not extended to those who had been held as prisoners during World War II or

the Korean War.30

On October 15, 1969, antiwar protestors organized the national moratorium, a

nation-wide protest, to end the war in Vietnam. With more than two million people

involved across the country, “this peace moratorium is believed to have been the largest

demonstration in U.S. history.31

In conjunction with the demonstration, in a highly

controversial move, New York City’s Mayor John Lindsay declared a day of mourning in

the city and mandated all flags be flown at half-staff. Coincidently, that same day, game

four of the World Series was scheduled in Queens between the New York Mets and

Baltimore Orioles. In defiance of Mayor Lindsay’s proclamation, “by direction of

Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, the flags at Shea Stadium were flown at full-staff.”32

Kuhn’s

decision indicated that his definition of supporting the troops was limited to faithful

expressions of patriotism and jingoism. Kuhn was unwilling to support the troops by

recognizing their sacrifice and acknowledging the human cost of this war. Kuhn’s failure

28 Ibid.29 Stephen Hausmann, “Other Pows Deserving,” The Sporting News, March 10, 1973, 8.30 Ibid.31 “1969: Millions march in US Vietnam Moratorium,” BBC, accessed August 2, 2013,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/15/newsid_2533000/2533131.stm.32 “Game Four Slants,” The Sporting News, November 1, 1969, 6.



&-

to mourn the 48,746 troops who had been killed up to that point, a decision made in

consultation with “interested parties, including military personnel,” indicates that for

organized baseball, supporting the troops was no more than a euphemism for supporting

the war.33

After visiting Vietnam, many players who had never given the war much thought

returned as patriotic warriors ready to publicly defend the war and its goals. Upon

returning from Vietnam, Chicago Cubs legend Ernie Banks had a renewed sense of the

war’s purpose and lambasted the domestic antiwar movement. Banks proclaimed that

compared to the GIs he met in Vietnam, “many young people in the States are virtually

shiftless.”34 Banks went on to assert that in the United States, “you see a lot of young

people complaining, who hang out in the streets and don’t want to work.”35 This negative

portrayal of the antiwar movement greatly differed from historian Robert Buzzanco’s

scholarly depiction. Buzzanco asserted that yes, the counterculture movements did

complain—“they often rejected traditional politics or the establishment culture”—but

they certainly worked as well.36 The movements tirelessly worked to “create new

organizations, institutions, and cultural relationships.”37 They were active and certainly

did more than lazily hang out in the streets. By characterizing the antiwar movement in

this way, Banks attempted to undermine the movement’s credibility.

33 Ibid and. “Statistical Information about Fatal Causalities of the Vietnam War,” National Archives,

Accessed August 2013, http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html.34 Stan Isle, “Vietnam Soldiers Cheer Banks, No. 1 Morale Booster,” The Sporting News, December 14,1968, 31.35 Ibid.36 Robert Buzzanco, Vietnam and The Transformation of American Life (Malden, MA: Blackwell

Publishers, 1999), 7.37 Ibid.



&$

When Pete Rose returned from visiting Vietnam in 1967, he promoted established

notions of “masculine heroism.”38 He praised the troops and declared, “most of them are

boys of nineteen or twenty but, believe me, they’re men.”39 Rose drew a distinction

between these clean-cut soldiers and the fake men he and other traditionalists saw

“growing their hair long, piercing their ears, and experimenting sexually.”40 In his book

Imperial Brotherhood historian Robert Dean asserted that high-level Cold War policy

makers deliberately attempted to preserve traditional conceptions of masculinity and what

it meant to be a man. Dean noted how President Johnson

repeatedly used the Texas Rangers as examples of the way ‘manly’ menreacted to the external threats facing their community or nation.41 [Teddy]Roosevelt’s Rough Rider narrative also shaped Johnson’s conceptions ofmasculinity, patriotism, and U.S. imperial destiny. The ‘western’ and‘frontier’ manliness and heroism Roosevelt celebrated in his own quest for political power and recognition offered Johnson an opportunity to reshapethe story of imperial masculine leadership to his political ends.

42

Rose’s comments indicate that Johnson’s thought influenced discourse on a popular level

in fighting the domestic war against the antiwar and counterculture movements.

Organized baseball encouraged its players to engage in demonstrations in support

of the Vietnam War. A chilling example of this occurred when New York Yankees

rookie John Ellis, who was serving in the Connecticut National Guard, was sent to

confront an antiwar protest at Yale. After disbanding the protest, he was asked if he

would ever fire at demonstrators. Ellis replied, “I think I would have to find myself in a

38 Elias, Empire, 203.39 Earl Lawson, “Pete’s Praise Has No Limit When It Comes to GI Spirit,” The Sporting News, December

2, 1967, 47.40 Elias, Empire, 203.41 Texas Rangers as in the Cavalry Unit during the Civil War, not the baseball franchise. Interestingly, in

order to pay homage to these “manly men” of the past, in 1972, the Washington Senators relocated to

Arlington, Texas and became the Texas Rangers.42 Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst:

University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 49.



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spot similar to that in which the fellows at Kent State did.”43 The event that Ellis referred

to occurred on May 4, 1970: “after students, standing hundreds of yards away, threw

rocks and bottles at the Reservists, several soldiers opened fire, killing four and

wounding 13 others.”44 While the Kent State Massacre was widely viewed as an abuse of

force and power, the baseball establishment praised Ellis for his controversial comment.

Baseball executives declared that Ellis might “belong to the Age of Aquarius, but he

retains the commonsense of the Age of Normalcy, when colleges housed scholars, not

revolutionaries.”45 As it was pro-war, Ellis’ highly provocative statement had no

repercussions on his budding career and he would go on to play 13 productive seasons of

professional baseball. Similarly, in 1968, an antiwar protester attempted to stop an army

induction ceremony at Tiger Stadium. Detroit Tigers catcher Bill Freehan observed the

situation and “clamped a rigid armlock on the protester until the police arrived.”46

Although the protester was a 22-year-old ex-Marine, baseball seemed to forget all of its

rhetoric about supporting the troops, and lauded Freehan for his decisive action. While

the actions and attitudes of these players were no more indicative of baseball’s

institutional attitudes than the actions and attitudes of dissenting players, baseball’s

positive response to players who demonstrated support for the war is revealing.

When responding to internal dissenters, an entirely different set of rules applied.

As in professional football, during this era there was no free agency, no multi-year

contracts, and an ineffective players’ association. The baseball establishment thus had

tremendous control over players that it used to silence dissent.

43 Jim Ogle, “Ellis Helps Cool It at Yale Demonstration,” The Sporting News, May 23, 1970, 20.44 Buzzanco, Vietnam, 106.45 Ogle, “Ellis,” 20.46 “Freehan Rescues Tiger Official Attacker,” The Sporting News, July 13, 1968, 33.



&&

Pitcher Jim Bouton’s treatment after he published his journal from his 1969

baseball season with the Seattle Pilots and Houston Astros exemplified what happened to

those bold enough to speak out. Titled Ball Four , and published in 1970, the book

exposed many of baseball’s innermost secrets. A review written just after Bouton

published his diary proclaimed, “Bouton has written the funniest, frankest book yet about

the species ballplayer saty-riaticus.”47 Within baseball though, most were not amused

with Bouton’s exposé and labeled him “irreverent,” a “betrayer of secrets,” a “clubhouse

lawyer,” and condemned him for not caring “whom he converts into enemies.”48 While

the book’s primary focus was “the complex, at times charming and often infantile

relationships that make up a typical baseball team,” the pitcher also discussed the war in

Vietnam.49 Bouton revealed his own feelings about the war when he wrote, “I realized

how old I’m getting when I heard that one of [my] fan-club members was in Vietnam. It

just doesn’t seem right that a member of my fan club should be fighting in Vietnam. Or

that anyone should be.”50 Additionally, unlike many of his peers, Bouton praised the

antiwar movement and youth movements in general. In reference to visiting Berkeley’s

campus when Bouton’s team was in the Bay Area playing the Oakland Athletics, he

wrote:

Gary [Bell, a teammate] and I are really the crazy ones. I mean we’reconcerned about getting the Oakland Athletics out. We’re concerned aboutmaking money in real estate, and about ourselves and our families. Thesekids, though, are genuinely concerned about what’s going on around them.They’re concerned about Vietnam, poor people, black people. They’reconcerned about the way things are and they’re trying to change them... So

47 Rex Lardner, “The Oddball With the Knuckleball,” New York Times, July 26, 1970.48 Ibid.49 David Zirin, A People’s History of Sports in the United States (New York: The New Press, 2008), 190.50 Jim Bouton, Ball Four (Toronto: Madison Books, 1984), 119.



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they wear long hair and sandals and have dirty feet. I can understand why.It’s a badge, a sign they are different from people who don’t care.51

Bouton went on to charge that players were only permitted to express their beliefs

if they supported the war. He claimed that the primary reason the Yankees released him

after the 1968 season was that he did not obey team rules regarding communication with

reporters. According to Yankees’ rules, “you could talk about the war in Vietnam, only

you had to say, ‘look at those crazy kids marching in the street. Why don’t they take a

bath?’…If you said these things, no one would accuse you of talking politics because you

were right.”52 However, “if you said things like, ‘we’ve got no right to be in Vietnam,’

then you shouldn’t be talking about things like that because you were wrong.”53

Additionally Bouton asserted, “if the choice for a pinch hitter or relief pitcher was

between a long-haired guy and a short-haired guy, the [latter] would get into the game.”54

Bouton’s revelations suggest that baseball was insistent on portraying its players in

support of the war. In an interview given after the book was published, Bouton told Time

Magazine, “fans are fed a constant stream of bull about these clean-cut, All-America

guys.”55

While Kuhn and his cohorts rationalized this effort by stating a need to avoid

controversy, in 1970, a time when 74% of the country opposed the military intervention

in Vietnam, a statement in support of the war was certainly just as controversial, if not

more so, than a comment against.56 Thus, baseball’s policy was not about avoiding

51 Bouton, Ball Four , 145.52 Bouton, Ball Four , 84.53 Ibid.54 Elias, Empire, 353.55 “Inside Baseball,” Time Magazine, June 16, 1970,

http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2081/ehost/detail?vid=5&sid=60e0d3d4-ebad-4ffe-ab41-

b3670666789b%40sessionmgr12&hid=11&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=

53803140.56 “Public Opinion and the Vietnam War.”



&(

controversy, it was about making it appear that no traces of the antiwar movement existed

in the sport.

Shortly after the book was published, Bouton was punished for exposing

baseball’s innermost secrets. A fuming Commissioner Kuhn summoned Bouton to his

office and declared that he “had done the game a grave disservice.”57 Kuhn also warned

the startled pitcher “not to write another word about baseball as long as he remained an

active player.”58 Kuhn even attempted to persuade Bouton to sign a statement saying

“the book was a bunch of lies.”59 After his meeting with Kuhn, reality set in and Bouton

reflected, “I figure I've cut my career short by at least three years. If you're a marginal

player who's done what I've done, you've got a fine chance to be cut from the squad… I

expect to be punched out one of these days. It's just a matter of time, I suppose.”60 As it

turned out, Bouton was optimistic in his estimation. He was forced into early retirement

when the Houston Astros demoted him before the 1970 season even ended. This decision

was not performance related: once his reputation was restored, Bouton successfully

returned to the major leagues in the 1978 season. If he was good enough to pitch when he

was 39, then Bouton certainly should have had a place in the major leagues when he was

31. His off-the-field conduct determined that it was not to be.

After his banishment, Bouton reflected on baseball’s visceral reaction to his book.

He theorized, “I think baseball… felt the need to be patriotic, to be on the side of

America and might, supporting wars no matter what, and so that conservative bent, to

57 “Inside Baseball,” Time Magazine, June 16, 1970,

http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2081/ehost/detail?vid=5&sid=60e0d3d4-ebad-4ffe-ab41- b3670666789b%40sessionmgr12&hid=11&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=

53803140.58 Ibid.59 Bouton, Ball Four , 408.60“Insider Baseball.”



&)

have a break from their ranks: this was a little too much for them.”61 Baseball was able to

maintain this pro-war, patriotic image by forcing players to act a certain way and

shunning any individual like Bouton, who had the courage to speak his mind. As a result

of his dissent, Bouton was taunted by his fellow players and routinely questioned if he

“was working for Ho Chi Minh.”62 Bouton became the protagonist of a cautionary tale

directed at every baseball player.

While Bouton’s journal made him baseball’s biggest threat, there were other

prominent dissenters within the sport. Born in Los Angeles in 1945, Dock Ellis was

definitely of the “Age of Aquarius.” Ellis identified with the antiwar movement and

counterculture. This is best demonstrated by his admission that when he threw a no-hitter

on June 12,1970, a rare achievement for any pitcher, he was under the influence of

LSD.63

When asked about the war, Ellis calmly responded to the reporters, “I don’t want

to answer questions about Vietnam. I don’t want to get political.”64 By political, Ellis was

actually referring to league politics. He knew the consequences of speaking out against

the war and did not want to damage his career. After returning from a USO tour, army

public officials attempted to pressure Ellis to go on television with what the pitcher called

“some bullshit” about Vietnam. Not wanting to become a cog in baseball’s propaganda

machine, Ellis threatened to discuss “the black market and drugs he saw on his visit” in

order to ensure the appearance never took place.65 While Ellis was prudent enough to

61 Zirin, History of Sports,191.62 Ibid.63 Patrick Hruby, “The Long Strange Trip of Dock Ellis: Meet The Man Behind Baseball’s Most

Psychedelic Myth,” ESPN, 2012, http://espn.go.com/espn/print?id=8289757&type=story.64 Ron Briley, “Baseball and Dissent: The Vietnam Experience,” Nine: Journal of Baseball History and

Culture 17-1 (2008): 54-69.65 Elias, “Empire,” 204.



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self-censor, he steadfastly refused to promote the war on the baseball establishment’s

behalf.

Similarly, New York Mets star pitcher Tom Seaver was pressured to refrain from

expressing his dissenting views. A military veteran, Seaver was wholeheartedly against

the Vietnam War. Prior to the 1969 World Series he declared:

If the Mets can win the World Series, then we can get out of Vietnam…Ithink it’s perfectly ridiculous what we’re doing about the Vietnamsituation. It’s absurd! When the Series is over, I’m going to have a talkwith Ted Kennedy, convey some of my ideas to him and then take an ad inthe paper. I feel very strongly about this.66

This was the same World Series that occurred during the national moratorium and as such

tensions were running high and the baseball establishment considered Seaver’s

statements abhorrent. During the game that Commissioner Kuhn mandated Shea

Stadium’s flags be flown at full-staff, fate would have it that Seaver would pitch. In

celebration of the pitcher, Moratorium Day protestors distributed pamphlets with

Seaver’s picture and his antiwar sentiments. This angered Seaver, who had not authorized

it. While his stardom prevented the league from treating Seaver like Bouton manner—his

high value as a player gave him the ability to more freely dissent—due to pressure he

softened his critique of the war. His promised advertisement did not protest the war but

“merely asked people to pray for peace.”67

In 1971, Seaver’s career was nearly damaged by the revelation of harsh antiwar

comments. Former Met Ron Swoboda, who went through a bitter divorce from the team,

recounted an incident when the Mets “got this call from one of President Nixon’s

66 Steven Travers, The 1969 Miracle Mets: The Improbable Story of the World’s Greatest Underdog Team

(Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2009), 131.67 Elias, Empire, 205.



&+

secretaries in the White House asking us to visit some wounded vets from Vietnam.”68

All of the players except for Seaver consented and he allegedly retorted, “to hell with

Nixon.”69 While Seaver’s popularity allowed him to denounce the war cautiously, he

knew that such a blunt denunciation of the hawkish president was too much even for

him.. Thus, despite the fact that Seaver’s criticism was in line with his stated political

beliefs, the pitcher was compelled to refute Swoboda’s story and assert, “I have no

recollection of the incident.”70 For Seaver, such self-censorship was necessary to ensure

that he did not face repercussions from the baseball establishment.

Even in 1973, with the ground war in Vietnam finally over, baseball provided

Nixon with a platform to celebrate the withdrawal of American forces. As Nixon

perpetuated and escalated the war during his entire first term, he bore some responsibility

for the 21,194 troops that were killed during that period.71

It is ironic that he celebrated

ending the unwinnable war when he could have stopped it four years earlier. In April

1973, the California Angels honored both a recently freed prisoner of war and Nixon

himself.72

Baseball also provided the country with a method of recasting the awful legacy of

the Vietnam experience. In June 1973, the New York Mets held a “stirring” program,

which featured the Merchant Marine Academy band, military color guards, and the

world’s largest American flag; all in celebration of the supposed military victory in

Vietnam. 73 Regardless of the fact that this military victory was completely fictional,

68 Jack Lang, “Ex-Met Swoboda Lays the Cleaver to Seaver,” The Sporting News, April 24, 1971, 13.69 Ibid.70 Ibid.71 Statistical Information about Fatal Causalities of the Vietnam War,”72 “Kansas City at California,” The Sporting News, April 21, 1973, 26.73 Jack Lang, “Stirring Mets’ Program for Pows,” The Sporting News, June 30, 1973, 31..



&,

despite the thousands of lives lost and the general futility of the war, organized baseball

was complicit in a thinly veiled attempt to create a positive narrative around the Vietnam

War. Rather than admit its role in supporting the catastrophic war in Vietnam, baseball

attempted to create a more useable past.

In light of the scandalous status attached to the war in Vietnam in American

memory, Commissioner Kuhn would later claim, “there was no comprehensive support

of the war effort through anything baseball did.”74 Despite this denial, it is clear that

there was in fact a “comprehensive support of the war effort.”. As a method of coping

with football’s rise and learning from that sport’s success, baseball hired a military

leader, developed a pro-war agenda, and silenced internal dissent. Though baseball did

not share football’s resonance with militarism and war, the baseball establishment felt it

had to support the war. And so it did.

74 Elias, Empire, 203.



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Chapter 3 — “Man I Ain’t Got No Quarrel With Them Vietcong”

On September 5, 1960, after two weeks of grueling competition, 18-year-old light

heavyweight Cassius Marcellus Clay Jr. made his country proud. Standing alone atop the

podium at the magnificent Roman Palazzo della Sport, the young boxer could not help

but smile. An Italian orchestra just performed a marvelous version of the Star Spangled

Banner , the American flag hung from the cathedral’s ceiling, and Clay had defeated a

more experienced and heavily favored fighter to win a gold medal, becoming an Olympic

champion. While Clay had obviously won for himself, he made it clear that he had also

won for the United States. When he returned home, he was seen “wandering around

Times Square in New York in his pullover uniform with the U.S.A. lettered across his

chest.”1 Clay was a proud American and Americans were proud of Clay. Within seven

years, however, everything changed. In 1964, Clay converted to the Nation of Islam, an

African American religious movement, and took the name Muhammad Ali. 2 Two years

later, Ali became a pariah, exiled for speaking and acting against the Vietnam War. Due

to political influences, organized boxing was a jingoistic and unconditionally patriotic

institution that did not tolerate dissent even by the sport’s best. Ali’s treatment exposed a

clear pro-war ideology among boxing officials.

In February 1964, Ali won boxing’s most prestigious prize, the heavyweight

championship of the world. Despite being a tremendous underdog, Ali defeated reigning

champion Sonny Liston in a six-round technical knockout. Ali sensed the enormity of his

1Arthur Daley, “Day of Decision,” New York Times, April 28, 1967, 47.2 Clay changed his named to Muhammad Ali in February 1964. When discussing him before this period I

will use his birth name and when discussing him after I will use his chosen name. However, many

journalists quoted throughout this chapter defied the boxer’s wishes and continued to call him Clay long

after 1964. As I have not altered any source material both names appear throughout the chapter but do

indeed refer to the same man.



'$

victory and began shouting, “I am the greatest! I am the greatest! I’m the king of the

world! I’ve upset the world! Give me justice!”3 Ali never wore a mask and was always

outspoken. Ali was not afraid to admit that he was different from the African American

champions who came before him. He was not Joe Louis or Sugar Ray Robinson, who

after the attack on Pearl Harbor, voluntarily enlisted in the Army, participated in morale

boosting tours, and fought in military charity bouts over the duration of World War II.

Ali called these men “Uncle Toms” and pledged to be a different kind of champion.4 He

asserted, “people are always telling me what a good example I could set for my own

people…I’ve heard…how come I couldn’t be like Joe Louis and Sugar Ray. Well,

they’re gone now, and the black man’s condition is just the same, ain’t it? We’re still

catching hell.”5 Ali was determined to be different.

The morning after Ali defeated Sonny Liston, he announced that he had converted

to Islam and was a follower of Elijah Muhammad, leader of the Nation of Islam. Mike

Wallace’s denigrating 1959 special report on the NOI, poetically titled “The Hate that

Hate Produced,” described the NOI as, “a group of Negro dissenters,” who were “taking

to street-corner step ladders, church pulpits, sports arenas, and ballroom platforms across

the United States, to preach a gospel of hate that would set off a federal investigation if it

were preached by Southern whites.”6 While the NOI was labeled a black supremacist hate

group by “city officials, state agencies, white liberals, and sober-minded Negroes,” for

3 Thomas Hauser, Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006),78.4 Larry Schwartz, “More Info on Joe Louis,” ESPN Classic, November 19, 2003, accessed September 28,

2013, http://espn.go.com/classic/s/louisjoeadd.html5 Hauser, Ali, 103.6 “The Hate that Hate Produced, Transcript,” Columbia University, accessed November 2013,

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ccbh/mxp/pdf/071659hthp-transcript.pdf



'%

Ali, it meant something entirely different.7 Responding to criticism of the NOI, Ali

retorted, “I believe in Allah and in peace…. People brand us as a hate group…. That is

not true…Followers of Allah are the sweetest people in the world…. All they want to do

is live in peace.”8 Boxing officials, fellow fighters, and the press continued to refer to Ali

as Clay, denying the legitimacy of Ali’s religious conversion. However, Muslim or

Christian, Clay or Ali, after the conversion the boxing establishment conceded Ali’s right

to pursue whichever faith he pleased and that it was ultimately unrelated to his profession

as a professional boxer. After converting to Islam, Ali successfully defended his title

twice and faced no opposition from the boxing establishment in doing so. Formal

repression came only after he started talking about the war in Vietnam.

While the story of Ali’s dissent and resistance against the United States

government is well documented and among the most well known stories in the history of

American sport, his struggle against the boxing establishment is often ignored. From

1966 until 1971, Ali faced intense discrimination from within organized boxing that went

far beyond punishments imposed by the government. It was the boxing establishment, not

the government, that exiled Ali from the ring and stripped him of his rightfully owned

title due to his stance on the war in Vietnam. By exploring this previously disregarded

element of Ali’s story, I am contributing to one of the most well known narratives in

American sport.

Unlike baseball and football, which both had centralized professional

organizations, boxing’s leadership was decentralized. There were two private governing

bodies: the more reputable World Boxing Association established in 1921 and the

7 Ibid.8 Hauser, Ali, 82.



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younger World Boxing Council established in 1963. While the WBA was the only private

domestic boxing institution, the WBC, based in Mexico, was created to ensure that a

world champion was truly recognized by the world. Thus, both groups had the authority

to recognize world champions and did not always act in sync with each other. In addition

to these two organizations, 48 states had their own athletic commissions, which also had

the ability to recognize champions. While most state commissions yielded this

recognition power to the WBA, the New York State Athletic Commission, the most

influential and respected of the boxing commissions, often acted independently. The

states that were not a part of the WBA were often in reciprocity agreements with

NYSAC, which caused the WBA and NYSAC to become rival institutions whose

recognitions bore equal weight. In addition to the recognition power, each state had the

distinct responsibility of providing a fighter with a license to fight in that state.

Fragmentation existed within organized boxing because of the existence of these

multiple authorities. Ali’s 1967 fight with Ernie Terrell exemplified the deep divisions

that existed and how the boxing authorities often disagreed with each other. Prior to his

fight with Ali, “New York turned down Terrell when he applied for a license …implying

that it was not yet satisfied that he had dissociated himself from alleged mobster

connections.”9 While New York would not allow Terrell to fight there, on February 3,

1966, “Terrell applied to the Illinois Athletic Commission and was granted a license

in…less than 30 seconds.” 10 In this case the IAC was more accommodating because

Chicago wanted “desperately to reclaim its place as a big-fight town, and nothing

9 “Scorecard,” Sports Illustrated , February 14, 1966,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1078180/index/index.htm10 Ibid.



''

nowhere is as big as a heavyweight championship fight.”11 While the fight received

approval in Chicago, there was disagreement on which fighter was the champion and

which was the challenger. After Ali became the heavyweight champion in 1964 he lost

WBA recognition because “under W.B.A. rules Clay could not be recognized as

champion because he signed for a rematch for his first fight with Sonny Liston.”12

Despite Ali’s being the universally recognized champion and still recognized by the

WBC and NYSAC, the WBA considered Terrell as its champion. Thus, while the boxing

establishment was the WBA, WBC, NYSAC, and the other less influential state

commissions, these entities rarely acted in a united manner and the multiple powers that

governed the sport were clearly divided.

Despite this fragmentation, the entire boxing establishment was fundamentally

political. Famed sports journalist and friend of Ali, Howard Cosell, noted, “the truth

about boxing commissions [is] they’re nothing but a bunch of politically appointed

hacks.”13 Though they were supposedly autonomous, the fact that governors appointed

state commissioners made the commissions innately subservient to political and

governmental institutions. Though the WBA was a private body, as it depended on

cooperation from its member commissions in licensing fighters and recognizing

champions, it too was politicalized.

During the 1960s, organized boxing supported the Vietnam War. But while the

centralized football and baseball establishments had the ability to enact coherent pro-war

policies, eliminating dissent was the basic strategy of the decentralized boxing

establishment.

11 Ibid.12 “Las Vegas Bout Upheld,” New York Times, November 1, 1965, 64.13 Hauser, Ali, 174.



'(

On February 25, 1966, just a few weeks after the IAC proved its tolerance with

Terrell, Ali found himself in front of the same commission. The champion arrived with a

piece of tape covering his mouth, symbolic of the circumstance of the proceeding. Ali

was there to repent for something he had said earlier in the month. Due to the “Army’s

minimum intelligence standards” being lowered, Clay was reclassified from 1-Y,

meaning “not qualified under current standards” to 1-A, meaning draft eligible.14

According to New York Times reporter Robert Lipsyte, who was with Ali when he

learned about his reclassification:

The telephone started ringing; Associated Press, United PressInternational…As the afternoon went by, Ali got more and more agitatedand the questions from reporters kept coming….He was going crazy and itwent on like that for I don’t know how many hours. Finally after the tenthcall—“What do you think about the Vietcong?”—Ali exploded. “Man, Iain’t got no quarrel with them Vietcong,” And bang. There it was. Thatwas the headline. That was what the media wanted.

15

As Lipsyte indicated, the whole situation put Ali under tremendous stress, and it was only

when he began to break down that he uttered his infamous, initial commentary on the

Vietnam War. As David Zirin notes, it is critical to remember that when Ali commented

on the Vietcong, “the antiwar movement was in its infancy and most of the country still

stood behind the war. Life magazine’s cover read, ‘Vietnam the War Worth Winning,’ the

song ‘Ballad of the Green Berets” was climbing the charts, and standing against this

seemingly insurmountable tide was Ali.” 16

When Ali was called before the IAC, it was to determine whether he would be

allowed to fight Terrell after his remarks. Illinois’ Governor Otto Kerner had labeled

14Hauser, Ali, 143. He had failed the Army’s mental aptitude test and thus prior to the regulations being

changed did not qualify for service.15 Hauser, Ali, 144-145.16 David Zirin, A People’s History of Sports in the United States (New York: The New Press, 2008), 141-

142.



')

Ali’s statement “unpatriotic and disgusting,” and IAC Chairman Joe Triner noted that if

Ali formally apologized to the commission, the fight would continue as planned.17

However, Ali told the commission:

I’m not here to make a showdown plea or apologize the way the press saidI would…I came here because certain people would be hurt financiallyover what I said, and you people were put on the spot before yourgovernor and other authorities…. I don’t have to apologize; I’m not incourt.18

Ali also “said he was sorry if he had hurt the mothers of boys in Vietnam” and “that he

was sorry he talked to newspapermen.”19 By refusing, “in a stormy session before the

athletic commission, to retract his statements” Ali shocked the commission. This was not

the “apology hearing” they had imagined.20

Ironically, the state commission known for its relative leniency was the first

organization to exile Ali based on his opinion of the Vietnam War. In a 2-1 ruling, the

commission determined to revoke Ali’s license to fight in the state of Illinois based on a

violation of Paragraph 43 of the commission’s rules. That section states, “it shall be

within the province of the commission to refuse a license to or to suspend or revoke the

license of any contestant… who is guilty of ungentlemanly conduct or actions detrimental

to the sport of boxing.”21

The IAC considered political dissent to be ungentlemanly

conduct and behavior detrimental to boxing. Reflecting on the political pressures

involved in the ruling, Sports Illustrated columnist William Furlong noted that the IAC

was clearly “a less than august body suddenly caught up in the swirling crosscurrents of

17 “Clay Plans to Apologize in Chicago for Remarks About Draft Classification,” New York Times,

February 22, 1966, 17.18 Hauser, Ali, 146.19 Robert Lipsyte, “Clay-Terrell Fight for Title Shifted to Louisville for Match 29,” New York Times,

March 1, 1966, 30.20 Ibid.21 “Clay Arrives for ‘Apology’ Hearing,” Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1966, C1.



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subtleties concerning morality, legality and political expediency, not to mention 200%

old-fashioned patriotism.”22 Barring Ali because he engaged in political dissent against

the war in Vietnam clarified the commission’s support of the war.

Compared to Terrell’s lenient treatment by the IAC, Ali’s expulsion revealed the

IAC’s biases. Exemplified by the Terrell situation, the “IAC traditionally, enthusiastically

showered licenses on practically everybody in sight, without asking any embarrassing

questions or…taking a look at the state laws.”23 As it did not threaten the IAC’s jingoistic

values, the commission ignored Terrell’s proven association with organized crime rather

than calling it “ungentlemanly conduct” or “behavior detrimental to the sport of

boxing.”24 Though the initial purpose of the rule was to combat boxing’s long history of

fixed fights, mob connections, and general seediness, an actual criminal in Terrell was

favored over a political dissenter.

The IAC’s decision, and precedent it set, made it virtually impossible for Ali to

fight in the United States. From October 29, 1960, until Ali’s comments surrounding the

war, he had only fought one bout outside of the United States. It is no coincidence that

after the IAC prohibited the Chicago fight, Ali was forced to take his next three fights

outside his home country. Both the Kentucky and Pennsylvania State Athletic

Commissions refused to allow the Ali-Terrell fight and it was moved to Toronto. One of

Ali’s promoters, Robert Arum asserted, Toronto “is a good place...but the proper place

was a major United States City. Some kind of mass hysteria was triggered that effectively

22 William Furlong, “The Wind That Blew in Chicago” Sports Illustrated , March 7, 1966,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1078261/index.htm.23 Ibid.24 “Clay Arrives for ‘Apology’ Hearing.”



'+

ran the fight out of the country.”25

Though the Ali-Terrell fight would take place abroad, several boxing

commissions acted to undermine the title bout. In California the commission “urged its

licensed promoters to avoid any association with the…. championship fight.”26 The

commission cited Ali’s “extremely unpatriotic and selfish statements” as the reason

behind this action.27 Similarly, “the Massachusetts Boxing Commission sent a telegram

to Gov. John A. Volpe and the leaders of the Legislature, urging a ban on…broadcasting

the fight.”28 When this tactic failed, citing “Clay’s unpatriotic attitude” as his reasoning,

commission chairman Edward Urbec pressured Sam Silverman, the licensee for the

Boston showing, not to show the fight. According to Ali biographer Thomas Hauser,

pressure applied by many of the commissions caused “many of the theatres originally

interested in the…telecast [to] withdraw from the promotion.”29

Those decisions

diminished the financial incentive to go forward with the fight.30 According to Arum,

“Ali looked like dead merchandise in the United States…the only way we figured to

make money was to have him fight overseas.”31 Seeing that the fight would not draw

revenue, Terrell dropped out of the bout, and Ali and Terrell did not fight until February

1967. After Toronto, Ali retained his prized heavyweight championship but had to

schedule his next fights in England and Germany.

After three fights abroad, the backlash against Ali was finally quieting, but the

boxing establishment still had not forgiven its star. As Hauser asserted, “ in November of

25 Robert Lipsyte, “Ring Body Meets Today on Switch,” New York Times, March 3, 1966, 38.26 Robert Lipsyte, “Coast Backs Boycott,” New York Times, March 10, 1966, 37.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Hauser, Ali, 147.30 Ibid.31 Hauser, Ali, 152.



',

1966….with interest in Ali running high, the champion readied for his next opponent—

Cleveland ‘Big Cat’ Williams.”32 35,460 people, the largest crowd ever for an indoor

boxing match, attended the fight, which took place at the Astrodome in Houston, and Ali

cruised to victory in his American homecoming.33 Twelve weeks later, Ali finally fought

and defeated Terrell, also in Houston. As the universally recognized heavyweight

champion by the WBA, WBC, and NYSAC, it was clear that Ali was by far the best in

the sport. However, the same day that the WBA formally recognized Ali as the world

heavyweight champion, it “declined to name him—or anyone else—for the Boxer of the

Year Award.”

34

In explaining the decision, WBA ratings chairman Arch Hindman

explained, “there was no boxer who could be considered outstanding both in and out of

the ring during the past year,”35 undoubtedly referring to Ali’s Vietcong comments.

April 28, 1967, was supposed to be the date of Ali’s induction into the Army and

the champion used the occasion to protest the war. In the prior weeks, the boxer asserted

“he would not step forward to take the traditional Army oath of induction” and “would

remain motionless when the inductees were ordered to take a single step forward as a

signal of their assent to induction.”36 Moreover, in accordance with his religious beliefs

which forbade him from participating in war in any capacity, Ali “rejected any idea of

serving as a non-combatant.”37 Instead, Ali stressed:

It would be no trouble for me to go into the Armed Services, boxingexhibitions in Vietnam or traveling the country at the expense of theGovernment or living the easy life and not having to get out in the mudand fight and shoot. If it wasn’t against my conscience to do it, I would

32 Hauser, Ali, 158.33 Ibid.34 “WBA Again Recognizes Cassius Clay But Not as the Fighter of the Year,” Washington Post, February

13, 1966, D2.35 Ibid.36 “Clay Says He Will Not Step Forward to be Inducted on April 28,” New York Times, April 21, 1967, 29.37 Ibid.



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easily do it…I wouldn’t go through all of this and lose the millions that Igave up and my image with the American public… I would say iscompletely dead and ruined…I wouldn’t jeopardize my life walking thestreets of the South and all of America with no bodyguard if I wasn’tsincere.38

Ali knew that the consequences for refusing induction were heavy: a $10,000 fine and up

to a five-year jail sentence, which was likely given his notoriety. As expected, Ali refused

induction and stated, “I have searched my conscience and I find I cannot be true to my

belief…by accepting such a call.”39 While Ali had of course committed a felony, there

was no immediate government action. United States Attorney Morton Susman clarified,

“it will take at least 30 days for Clay to be indicted and it probably will be another year

and half before he could be sent to prison since there will be undoubtedly be appeals

through the courts.”40

Despite the government’s reluctance to prosecute Ali, boxing organizations acted

immediately and independently. The NYSAC acted first. In a statement issued just hours

after Ali’s decision became public, Edwin B. Dooley, chairman of the NYSAC,

announced it had “unanimously decided to suspend [Clay’s] boxing license indefinitely

and to withdrawal recognition of him as world heavyweight champion.41 Dooley

rationalized the commission’s punitive measure by stating, “Clay’s refusal to enter the

service is regarded by the commission to be detrimental to the best interests of boxing.”42

According to NYSAC’s press secretary, Marvin Kohn, “the governor didn’t exert any

pressure in the matter. It was the three commissioners acting on their own.”43 Similarly,

38 Hauser, Ali, 154-155.39 Robert Lipsyte, “Clay Refuses Army Oath; Stripped of Boxing Crown,” New York Times, April 29, 1967,1.40 Ibid.41 Thomas Rodgers, “New York Lifts Crown in Swift Move,” New York Times, April 29, 1967, 12.42 Ibid.43 Hauser, Ali, 173.



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the WBA, which had historically disagreed with the NYSAC on a variety of issues, did

not hesitate to discipline Ali. Robert Evans, president of the WBA, declared, “I feel that

Muhammad Ali has defied the laws of the United States regarding selective service. His

action today leaves me no alternative.”44 There was a clear alternative: to let the

American judicial process determine Ali’s guilt or innocence and only then render

judgment on the champion. Due to agreements that bound nearly every state commission

to either the WBA or NYSAC, every state followed suit and “the title Ali had worked for

throughout his life was gone.”45 The WBC did not revoke its recognition of Ali until

1969, but the recognition of a young, foreign organization was meaningless on its own. In

response to the loss of his title, Ali proudly declared:

I have the world heavyweight title not because it was given to me…but because I won it in the ring through my own boxing ability. Those whowant to take it…not only do me a disservice but actually disgracethemselves. I am certain that sports fans and fair-minded peoplethroughout America would never accept such a title-holder.46

After Ali had his title taken from him, he attempted to reclaim it. The WBA

allowed Ali an informal appeal, but simply used the procedure to demonstrate their

support of the war and disdain for Ali. Ali’s attorney, Hayden Covington asked the WBA

executive committee to “use a sense of fair play” and reinstate Ali as champion.47

Rebuffing the association’s argument that Ali’s championship was suspended on the

grounds that he allegedly committed a felony, not because he opposed the war,

Covington pleaded that “Clay’s title be restored on the grounds that he has not been

44 Rodgers, “New York Lifts Crown,” 12.45 Hauser, Ali, 172.46 Lipsyte, “Clay Refuses Army Oath,” 1.47 “W.B.A. Refuses to Reinstate Clay as Champ,” Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1967, C10.



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convicted of criminal charges.”48 Yet in a prepared statement, written before the appeal

took place, the WBA announced, “the executive committee finds the actions of Cassius

Clay (Muhammad Ali) to be detrimental to the best interest of boxing.”49 The WBA then

organized a tournament between the new top eight fighters in order to crown a new

champion. Ali was still undefeated and in his prime.

In attempting to reclaim recognition from the NYSAC, Ali enlisted the support of

some of the most prominent civil rights and civil liberties groups in the country: the

NYCLU and NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Due to its status as a state sponsored

institution, Ali’s appeal against the NYSAC is representative of the black freedom

struggle that defined the decade. And the fact that boxing organizations were in public

combat with major civil rights and civil liberties groups shows that the latter considered

the conflict over Ali as an issue of national political importance, not a frivolous concern

to sports aficionados. A week after NYSAC rendered its judgment on Ali, Aryeh Neier,

Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, charged NYSAC with

committing an “unprecedented and unprincipled” action in stripping Ali of his world

heavyweight boxing championship.50 In depriving Ali of his rightly earned title, Neier

perceptively noted, “the commission has added the criterion of political and social

conformity to the time-honored test of physical proficiency.”51 Claiming that the NYSAC

“deprived Ali of a valuable property right without due process of law,” 52 Neier held that

NYSAC acted illegally. Dooley, the NYSAC chairman, retorted that they revoked Ali’s

license and title not because he violated the United States Selective Service statue, but

48 “WBA Rejects Clay’s Appeal,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 1967, B7.49 Ibid.50 “…And to Complete the Report,” Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1967, G2.51 “State Officials Assailed on Clay,” New York Tines, May 4, 1967, 46.52 “…And to Complete the Report,” G2.



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because by refusing to answer the call of his country, he dishonored a much higher law.53

Dooley’s ideology was so obvious that the New York Amsterdam News, an African

American newspaper, mockingly labeled Dooley as the “Yankee Doodle Dandy

Chairman.”54 Regarding a potential appeal, Dooley condescended to Ali and affirmed “he

expected to grant Clay a hearing just to please him.”55 Ali and Neier thus knew an appeal

would be futile and decided to challenge the NYSAC through other channels.

In October 1969, with the help of Neier’s organization and the NAACP Legal

Defense Fund, Ali finally launched a lawsuit against the NYSAC. He alleged the

commission “transgressed various provisions of the Federal Constitution in holding that

his conviction and sentence for refusal to service in the armed forces justified refusal of a

license to fight in the prize ring.”56 Rather than immediately challenge NYSAC in the

courts in 1967, Ali initially appealed to the federal government for conscientious objector

status. If he were a conscientious objector, then his decision to refuse induction would be

declared legal and the NYSAC would naturally reinstate him. While Ali was initially

convicted for criminally refusing induction and sentenced to five years in prison by a

Texas District Court in June 1967, by the summer of 1969, multiple courts had affirmed

this verdict. While Ali was appealing this latest judgment, based on the case’s history it

seemed unlikely that a court would ever rule that his decision to refuse induction was

lawful. By fall 1969, Ali understood the time was right to allege that NYSAC acted

improperly regardless of the status of his pending conviction. On December 24, 1969, in

line with Ali’s countless judicial losses, Judge Marvin Frankel ruled in favor of the

53 Ibid54 “Article 4,” New York Amsterdam News, May 27, 1967, 35.55 Robert Lipsyte, “Clay’s Shadow Lurks Everywhere,” New York Times, May 10, 1967, 81.56 Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Comm'n of N.Y., 308 F. Supp. 11, (S.D.N.Y. 1969)



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NYSAC.

While Judge Frankel ruled against Ali, his verdict instructed Ali’s legal team on

how to proceed. Judge Frankel reasoned, “the state commission…has express statutory

power to make felony conviction grounds for refusing, suspending, or revoking a

license”.57 The Judge referenced other areas where felons were excluded, such as voting

and practicing medicine, and insisted that Ali would only have a case if this exclusionary

power were applied unevenly. As such, Ali’s legal team began researching and what they

found was shocking. In NYSAC’s records, they found

at least 244 instances in recent years where it has granted, renewed orreinstated boxing licenses to applicants who have been convicted of one ormore felonies, misdemeanors or military offenses involving moralturpitude. Some 94 felons thus licensed include persons convicted for suchanti-social activities as second degree murder, burglary, armed robbery,extortion, grand larceny, rape, sodomy, aggravated assault and battery,embezzlement, arson and receiving stolen property. The misdemeanorconvictions, 135 in number, were for such offenses as petty larceny, possession of narcotics, attempted rape, assault and battery, fraud,impairing the morals of a minor, possession of burglar's tools, possessionof dangerous weapons, carrying concealed weapons, automobile theft and

promotion of gambling. The 15 military offenses include convictions ordishonorable discharges for desertion from the Armed Forces of theUnited States, assault upon an officer, burglary and larceny.

58

Based on these new findings, Ali amended his initially broad complaint against

the NYSAC and charged the commission with acting “arbitrarily, capriciously and

invidiously” in refusing to renew his professional boxer's license.59 As the trial unfolded,

it was discovered that in addition to granting licenses to 244 criminals in the past, other

than Ali, there were no “instances where licenses [were] denied by the Commission

57 Ibid.58 Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Comm'n of N.Y., 316 F. Supp. 1246,1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)59 Ibid.



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because of an applicant's conviction.”60 The commission did not even try to act covertly

and granted licenses to 35 felons and misdemeanants in 1968 and 1969, subsequent to the

suspension of Ali’s.61 Perhaps more than anything else, this information reveals the

commission’s true pro-war ideology. Murderers, rapists, and other criminals of a far

greater degree had been, and continued to be, allowed to box in New York while Ali was

not.

The difference between Ali and the 244 men who had been allowed to box was

simple; he was the heavyweight champion of the world and publicly opposed the

Vietnam War while they were not and did not. While these criminals were not prominent

enough to publicly offend the NYSAC’s nationalism and jingoism, Ali was. Labeling the

prosecution’s newfound evidence startling, Walter Mansfield, the presiding judge, ruled

that the NYSAC had committed “deliberate and arbitrary discrimination…in the exercise

of regulatory power,” and thus acted unconstitutionally.62 As such, in September 1970,

Judge Mansfield concluding his opinion by stating, “the harm to Ali cannot be measured

in damages. Accordingly his motion is granted and the defendants are enjoined from

denying him a license to box because of his conviction for refusal to serve in the Armed

Forces of the United States.”63

Judge Mansfield, who was appointed to the bench by

President Johnson and served in the Marine Corps during World War II, was able to

identify Dooley and the commission’s true objectives.

Though he finally had his legal victory, Ali’s immediate boxing future remained

uncertain. Dooley was reluctant to accept the court order and warned, “we will see if

60 Ibid.61 Ibid.62 Ibid.63 Ibid.



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there are any grounds for appeal.”64 The commission grudgingly conceded to Judge

Mansfield’s opinion. After a three and half year unlawful suspension, Ali was granted a

license to box in the State of New York. However the commission, still unsympathetic

towards Ali, noted that he “would not be automatically reinstated as champion.”65 They

insisted that Ali had left boxing on his own accord and “we can’t give him back

something that he gave up.”66

While the NYSAC was forced to grant a license to Ali, the WBA refused to fully

recognize Ali’s return and kept him out of their rankings. Ali’s relicensing in New York,

combined with the fact that Georgia did not have its own state athletic commission, made

Atlanta the site for Ali’s return. Despite an emotional victory against Jerry Quarry in

Ali’s first fight in over three years, “a WBA spokesman said the organization has no

plans to put Ali back in the rankings.”67

The WBA rated Quarry as the world’s third best

heavyweight boxer, and despite being defeated, he remained there while Ali remained

unranked. Similarly, despite defeating the WBA’s second best boxer in his next fight, Ali

again remained unranked. WBA President Bill Brennan confirmed it was no accident that

Ali was being left out and stated he was “opposed to any recognition of Clay

whatsoever.”68

Having defeated the WBA’s second and third ranked fighters in his first two

contests, Ali only had one man left to fight in order to complete his remarkable

comeback. Recognized as heavyweight champion of the world by the WBA, NYSAC,

and WBC, Joe Frazier was expected to be the most difficult opponent of Ali’s career.

64 Craig Whitney, “3-Year Ring Ban Declared Unfair,” New York Times, September 15, 1970, 56.65 “State Will Grant Clay Ring License,” New York Times, September 18, 1970, 52.66 Ibid.67 “Ali’s Victory Won’t Rate in WBA Rankings,” Washington Post, October 31, 1970, D3.68 “WBA Picks Foreman,” Chicago Daily Defender, September 13, 1971, 30.



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Dubbed the fight of the century, it featured two undefeated fighters: Frazier, the

universally recognized champion, and Ali, still the lineal champion.69 Despite the fact

that both fighters were African American, one’s rooting interest in this fight told a great

deal about their values. Prior to the fight, Ali declared, “any black person who’s for Joe

Frazier is a traitor…The only people rooting for Joe Frazier are white people in suits,

Alabama sheriffs, and members of the Ku Klux Klan.”70 While Ali was being hyperbolic,

the white establishment, including organized boxing, strongly supported Frazier while

young people, who were against the Vietnam War and for the Civil Rights Movements,

as well as African Americans, strongly supported Ali. It was draft-dodger Ali versus

patriotic Joe. In the end, the boxing establishment had its victory. Considering the

numerous non-boxing defeats Ali had suffered over the previous four years, it was fitting

that in March 1971, Ali finally suffered his first professional boxing defeat.

Despite losing after fighting Frazier so closely, Ali clearly remained one of the

top fighters in the world. Nevertheless, the WBA continued to ignore him. Finally in May

1971, the WBA announced it had “decided to withhold its ring rating of Muhammad Ali

until after the Supreme Court has rendered its decision on Ali’s legal status concerning

his draft case.”71

In a surprising and unanimous decision delivered by the Supreme Court,

citing a technicality, they reversed Ali’s conviction.72 When asked to comment, WBA

President Brennan stated, “My recommendation to the ratings committee will be that we

put Mr. Clay back in the No. 1 challenger slot.”73 However, Brennan also noted that

69 Lineal meaning he had defeated the previous champion and had never been beaten himself.70 David Zirin, Muhammad Ali Handbook (London: MQ Publications, 2007), 224.

71 “WBA Stalls on Ali’s Rating, Ignores Foster,” Pittsburgh Courier, May 22, 1971, 16.72 The technicality being that the Draft Board never specified why Ali was not worthy of conscientious

objector status.73 “WBA Chief Urges Ali be Ranked No. 1 Challenger for Title,” Los Angles Times, June 29, 1971, D5.



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“there would be absolutely no apologies…I have no apologies to offer anyone.”74 Though

the WBA shunned Ali for four years, even after NYSAC was forced to reinstate him,

Brennan saw no need to apologize. While the highest court in the land had exonerated

Ali, and by 1971 only 28% of the country still supported the war, Ali never received any

apology from either the WBA or NYSAC.75

Prior to Ali’s decision to refuse induction, Arthur Daley of the New York Times

wrote, “there’s a tragic feeling here at what is about to happen to Cassius… because he’s

the heavyweight champion and therefore the world’s best fighter, his refusal to fight for

his country gets disproportionate emphasis and may produce ensuing ground swells of

unpredictable potency.”76 Daley was prophetic. Ali’s opposition to the war emboldened

the growing antiwar movement. According to Julian Bond, a prominent civil rights

activist with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee during the 1960s, “when

Ali refused to take that symbolic step forward everyone knew about it moments later.

You could hear people talking about it on street corners. It was on everybody’s lips.

People who had never thought about the war—black and white—began to think it

through because of Ali.”77 This is why the boxing establishment punished Ali so strongly

after he commented on the war and refused induction. They knew the power of Ali’s

voice, and would not allow his dissenting attitude to taint their politicized sport.

74 Ibid.75 “Public Opinion and the Vietnam War,” Digital History, accessed August 1, 2013,

http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/learning_history/vietnam/vietnam_pubopinion.cfm.76 Daley, “Day of Decision,”47.77 Zirin, History of Sports 148.



(,

Conclusion

Sunday October 7, 2001 was a perfect day for football in Philadelphia and 65,000

fans were in attendance to watch the Arizona Cardinals take on the Philadelphia Eagles at

Veterans Stadium. Kickoff was scheduled to take place at one, but it did not. Instead,

President Bush appeared on the jumbotron and announced that the United States military

had began attacking Afghanistan, that the War on Terror had begun.1 The crowd

immediately exploded in chants of “U-S-A, U-S-A.” Considering that professional sports

have continued to be an essential aspect of domestic mobilization, it is only fitting that

this war was announced “just as many people were sitting down in front of their

television sets for their weekly dose of gridiron glory.”2

Just as the Vietnam experience tainted professional sports and transformed them

into little more than thinly veiled “militaristic pep-rallies,” the same has occurred during

America’s current war.3 Describing the experience of attending a contemporary

professional sports game, journalist David Zirin wrote, “a typical pro sports game

includes F-14 bombers buzzing the stadium, multiple national anthems, everything but a

mandatory loyalty oath and bombs bursting in air (although the fireworks come close).”4

While parallels are often made between the Vietnam War and the War on Terror, the

identical usage of professional sports as mechanism for selling each war is an important

connection.

1 Mike Fish, “An American Tragedy: Pat Tillman Timeline,” ESPN The Magazine, accessed November

2013, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?id=2517567. 2 R.W. Apple Jr., “Home Front: Edgy Sunday, Nagging Uncertainty About Consequences,” New York

Times, October 8, 2001, A1.3 David Zirin, What’s My Name, Fool: Sports and Resistance in the United States (Chicago:

Haymarket Books, 2005), 138.4 Zirin, Fool , 129.



)-

Similarly to the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, the Bush Administration

recognized the potential of sports as a medium for garnering support for the War on

Terror. Such can be seen through the story of Pat Tillman, NFL player turned Army

Ranger. When Tillman decided to enlist in the United States Army in 2002, the Pentagon

was ecstatic and asked him to appear in Army videos and posters. 5 However, Tillman

steadfastly refused to participate in the administration’s propaganda campaign, and his

story quickly “faded into the next news cycle.”6 On April 22, 2004, Pat Tillman died.

While Tillman’s family and the American public were told that he died in combat, the

Pentagon and Oval Office knew the truth, that he had been killed by friendly fire. The

government’s deceptive message was designed to make Tillman’s death heroic; as Zirin

argued, “Pat died for the noble cause of PR.”7 The Bush administration used Tillman to

sell the war until 2007, when the truth about his death was finally exposed.

The various sporting establishments have strongly supported the War on Terror.

Indeed, Irving Berlin’s “God Bless America” is now universally played alongside “Take

Me out to the Ballgame” during the seventh-inning stretch at baseball games and NFL

teams don camouflage gear each November. Dissent is virtually non-existent within

professional sports and dissenters face reprisals from team owners and league officials.

When the rare case of dissent does occur, athletes are treated no differently than Dave

Meggyesy or Jim Bouton were treated. In 2004, Toronto Blue Jays first baseman Carlos

Delgado gained notoriety for repeatedly staying in the dugout during “God Bless

America.” In an interview Delgado explained his reasoning: he opposed the war in Iraq,

5 David Zirin, A People’s History of Sports in the United States (New York: The New Press, 2008), 2546 Ibid.7 Zirin, Sports, 155.



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calling it “the stupidest war ever.”8 After being traded to the New York Mets in 2005, and

meeting with his new team’s management, Delgado ruefully stated, “the Mets have a

policy that everybody should stand for ‘God Bless America’ and I will be there. I will not

cause any distractions to the ball club.... Just call me Employee Number 21."9 The Mets

ownership issued its own statement, declaring, “he’s going to have his own personal

views, which he's going to keep to himself.”10

* * *The fact that professional sports continue to act as instruments of domestic

mobilization illuminates the importance of what happened during the Vietnam

War. During World War II, like many organizations, professional sports contributed to

the active American home front. Even as diminished products and at a financial loss due

to vast manpower shortages, during World War II, sports leagues strove to remain

operational to provide “for the relaxation of the people in times of stress and worry.”11

Once the Vietnam War began escalating in 1965, it was clear that the robust home front

of the Second World War would not be replicated. Even most supporters of the war were

not going to grow Victory Gardens or outwardly act on their hawkish convictions. Yet,

the professional football, baseball, and boxing establishments did act on their pro-war

convictions and publicly supported the war in Vietnam. In professional football and

baseball, support for the war was demonstrated through the pro-war expressions and

demonstrations of the majority of league officers, team owners, and marquee players. In

all three sports this endemic support manifested itself through the punitive treatment of

8 David Zirin, “The Silencing of Carlos Delgado,” The Nation, December 7, 2005, accessed November

2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/silencing-carlos-delgado.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 “Football and America: World War II,” Pro Football Hall of Fame, accessed February 2013,

http://www.profootballhof.com/history/general/war/worldwar2/.



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dissenters. As the glaring exception to the relatively silent home front, professional sports

must be considered as a part of the domestic history of the Vietnam War.

Thus, though sports have always had some relationship with war, what was once

novel during Vietnam has become the norm in the present day. By failing to fully

recognize the extent in which professional sports and the war were intertwined, during

the Vietnam era, sports fans allowed their games to become co-opted by establishment

and conservative political forces. Rather than learn this history, sports fans have ignored

it. And during the War on Terror, another war with a quiet home front, professional

sports once again played its part.

Commenting on the relationship between sports and politics, David Zirin astutely

asserted, “we can pretend sports isn’t political just as well as we can pretend there is no

such thing as gravity.”12

But then Zirin continued, “If we sit back and let political

messages be pumped through…it will be the death of us.”13 Considering the 58,220

American soldiers who tragically lost their lives in Vietnam, in many respects, this death

has already occurred.14

12 Zirin, Sports, 268.13 Ibid.14 “Statistical Information about Fatal Causalities of the Vietnam War,” National Archives, accessed

August 2013, http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html. The NFL-

AFL merger was complete at this time so there were two separate leagues.



)&

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