Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds

1

Paneuropean University

February 15 , 2014

What is the Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds?

Antonia FICOVA

Doctoral Student at Faculty of Economics and Business Paneuropean University, Bratislava

[email protected]

2

Table of Content

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 3

1.1 Structure of the Study .............................................................................................. 3

2 CATEGORIES OF SWFs .................................................................................................. 3

2.1 What are purposes of SWFs?................................................................................... 4

2.2 How big are they? ..................................................................................................... 6

2.3 Newly Established SWFs ......................................................................................... 7

2.4 Where do SWFs invest? ........................................................................................... 7

3 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 8

4 THE OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................... 14

4.1 Methodology ........................................................................................................... 14

5 HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................................ 14

5.1 Testing hypothesis 1 ............................................................................................... 14

5.2 Testing hypothesis 2 ............................................................................................... 16

6 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 17

7 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 18

3

1 INTRODUCTION

overeign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are defined as sovereign-owned or

sovereign-controlled pools of funds that invest in stocks, bonds, real

estate, and other financial instruments. Funds has primarily focused on their unique

ability to merge the most feared elements of the public and private sectors: the power

of private finance and state coerciveness. More to the point, SWFs were not originally

created to establish the perfect blend of state centric coercive power and market

oriented financial acumen, but to solve very real economic policy dilemmas. In other

words, SWFs increased their importance in the global financial system in the last

decade and especially during the financial crisis period.

Nevertheless, their assets under management reached US $5 trillion in 2013

according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute and will grow to at least $10 trillion

by 2015. This amount can be compared to the amount managed by hedge funds and

private equity markets at the end of 2011, under 4 trillion in total. According to the

Preqin for the first time, assets of these sovereign wealth entities have surpassed the

$5tn mark, with total assets estimated at $5.38tn as of October 2013; SWFs have gained

more than $750bn in additional assets since 2012.

1.1 Structure of the Study

The first chapter includes shortly introduction on the subject. Chapter 2

presents categories of SWFs and a few sections. Section 2.1 answer to the question

what are purposes of SWFs, 2.2 we provide background how big are SWFs, and what

is proportion of SWF Investing in each asset class. Chapter 3 is a review of the

literature from authors well versed on this subject. Chapter 4 includes objectives of

the paper, methodology. The main contribution of this paper is contained in Chapter

5, that includes hypothesis. Chapter 6 concludes the paper.

2 CATEGORIES OF SWFs

SWFs may be grouped by Mezzacapo, S. (2009, p.15) in the following

categories:

S

4

1. Stabilisation Funds: countries which are rich in natural resources want to reduce

the impact to their the budget and economy from volatile commodity prices

(usually oil). Otherwise funds build up this assets over the years of ample fiscal

revenues in order to prepare for leaner years.

2. Savings Funds: these funds are mainly intended to share wealth across

generations by transferring non-renewable assets into a diversified portfolio of

(international) financial assets, to provide for future generations. Or other long-

term objectives, for example to prevent the so-called "Dutch disease", it means a

syndrome likely to occur where a large inflow of foreign currency, due to a sharp

surge in prices of commodities exported. After that it is converted into local

currency and spent on domestic non-traded goods, inducing a real exchange rate

appreciation that weakens the competitiveness of the country's exports.

3. Reserve Investment Corporations: established vehicles a separate legal entity

either to reduce the negative cost-of-carry of holding reserves or to pursue

investment policies with higher returns. Often, the assets in such arrangements

are still counted as reserves;

4. Development Funds: these funds provide resources for funding socio-economic

projects, such as allocating for infrastructure;

5. Pension Reserve Funds: having identified pension and/or contingent type

unspecified liabilities on government‟s balance sheet.

2.1 What are purposes of SWFs?

SWFs can be introduced for a number of different reasons and each has

different objectives according to the information from Sovereign Wealth Fund

Institute and Preqin. A number of SWFs are funded through commodity exports and

are set up to provide their countries with a stable level of income in the face of fl

uctuating commodity prices. Other funds funded by natural resources exports are

established with the aim of maximizing returns on the income from exports and

diversifying the economy away from reliance on one source. As a result of these

varying goals, sovereign wealth funds also have widely differing investment policies

and asset allocations. For example, Timor- Leste Petroleum Fund, which manages

5

Timor-Leste‟s petroleum resources for the benefi t of current and future generations,

invests solely in equities and fi xed income, whereas Qatar Investment Authority

invests in a variety of asset classes and regions in order to obtain as much diversifi

cation as possible. Funds can also be established in order to assist in the development

of an economy or specifi c industry sector. For example, Latin American Reserve

Fund aims to improve investment conditions within its member states (Bolivia,

Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and contribute to the

consolidation of the member countries‟ financial policies.

Fig. 1 shows that there has been a substantial increase in the number of

sovereign wealth funds in operation since 2000. Fiftythree percent of sovereign

wealth funds were launched between 2000 and 2009, a substantially higher

proportion than in all previous decades, and there have already been a number of

new sovereign wealth fund launches since 2010. Hydrocarbon-based funds continue

to make up the largest proportion of sovereign wealth funds in terms of both capital

and numbers, as shown in Fig. 2. However, non-commodity funds have closed the

gap since 2012, with these funds now representing 32% of all funds and 48.4% of all

sovereign wealth fund capital.

Figure 1 SWF by year of establishment Figure 2 SWFs by source of capital

Source: Preqin Sovereign Wealth Fund Review 2014, p.3

6

2.2 How big are they?

Preqin data as can be seen in Figure 3 indicates that 63% of SWFs have seen an

increase in assets under management since April 2012. The world‟s largest sovereign

wealth fund, Government Pension Fund – Global in Norway, has continued to grow,

adding more than $185bn in assets over 2012-2013 to reach total assets of $782bn.

Sovereign wealth funds in Asia, in particular, have also seen a rise in assets as

countries in the region look to build up foreign exchange reserves.

If we look at funds by region, The MENA region has a reduced share of total

sovereign wealth fund assets, at 28%, as a result of this increase in aggregate capital

managed by Asia-based sovereign wealth funds. The proportion of capital managed

by Europe-based sovereign wealth funds has shown an increase, from 16% in 2012 to

20% in 2013, largely due to the continued growth of Norway‟s Government Pension

Fund – Global. North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and

Australasia each represent 3% or less of total sovereign wealth fund capital, despite

each of these regions being home to at least 6% of all sovereign wealth funds.

Figure 3 Sovereign Wealth Funds by Assets under Management


7

Figure 4 Sovereign Weath Funds by Region


2.3 Newly Established SWFs

The 2014 Preqin Sovereign Wealth Fund Review profiles 72 SWFs, ten more

than last year‟s edition. Over the past year we have seen some notable sovereign

wealth funds come into existence and begin to make investments; for instance,

Western Australian Future Fund, established in December 2012 with AUD 1bn, is

designed to fund future generations of Western Australians by setting aside and

accumulating a portion of the State‟s revenue from mineral resources. Fundo

Soverano Angolano was initially discussed in 2008, but was finally established in

October 2012. In its most recent investment policy announcement in Q2 2013, Fundo

Soverano Angolano stated its intention to build a diversifi ed portfolio, which would

include investment in equities, bonds, real estate and infrastructure.

2.4 Where do SWFs invest?

Alternative assets, as is highlighted in Figure 5, have become an important

part of the portfolio of many sovereign wealth funds over recent years. Infrastructure

investments are the most commonly used asset by these sovereign bodies,

unsurprising given that many sovereign wealth funds are established in order to

build on and improve the existing infrastructure within their country or region. More

8

to the point, typically these newer sovereign wealth funds will not allocate to

alternative investments, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, for a few

years as they build up their investment teams and accumulate assets; during this

period they tend to focus on investments in traditional funds, and equities and fixed

income securities. Regardless, there has been some significant activity by sovereign

wealth funds in the private equity and hedge fund space over the past 12 months.

Apax VIII closed in June 2013 with €5.8bn in commitments, including investments

from three sovereign wealth funds: China Investment Corporation, GIC and

FutureFund. As well as commitments to the largest funds, sovereign wealth funds

have been active in smaller and more niche vehicles. For example, New Zealand

Superannuation Fund acted as a key investor in the local Pioneer Capital Partners II

vehicle, which opened and closed in 2013. Other sovereign wealth funds have been

particularly active investors over the past 12 months, making a large number of

investments. New Mexico State Investment Council, which has made investments in

at least eight 2013 vintage private equity funds so far in 2013.

Figure 5 Proportion of SWF Investing in each asset class


3 LITERATURE REVIEW

Eva Van der Zee (2012) pointed out that SWFs investment policy could

contribute to a positive change in the conduct of companies that violate human rights

or damage the environment. More to the point, SWFs are different than other

9

institutional investors, because while they act as private actors, they could also be

considered to be state actors. In her article she provided characteristics of SWFs

support the argument that SWFs should invest socially responsible. First, because most

SWFs are established as savings funds for future generations, SWFs should promote

sustainable development and social justice in order to enable the beneficiaries of the

SWFs, the future generations, to reap the fruits of the investments in the future.

Second, SWFs can be considered to be state organs, and because states have the

obligation to respect human rights and to protect the environment, SWFs, being

owned by the state, should, at least, adopt an SRI policy to discharge their

responsibility to promote social justice and impede environmental damage. In sum,

SWFs may adopt a responsible investment policy and have, arguably, even a higher

responsibility to protect human rights and prevent environmental damage than do

private investors.

Ch. Balding (2012, p. 2) described innovations in Sovereign Wealth Fund

Management. He presented that the most original sovereign wealth funds were making

valuable economic policy innovations to prevent inflation and macroeconomic instability. In

other words, funds are being used to distort markets hindering national

development. Viewed in this light, the highest quality “innovations” in sovereign

wealth funds come from some of the oldest funds but are lessons well learned.

If we look at SWFs especially when linking national development objectives it

is necessary to mention following factors: First, a sovereign wealth fund needs a

predictable and dedicated capital source. Dominated primarily by commodity

dependent countries, most sovereign wealth funds simply receive monetized

national natural resource wealth. The ongoing commodity extraction allows the

sovereign wealth fund to build up a capital base based upon the monetization of

existing natural resource wealth.For example, Mongolia which is currently

experiencing a commodity driven boom would be a prime candidate to consider

allocating a portion of their current windfall towards a sovereign wealth fund.

Singapore, a non-commodity based fund, has had to run long term current account

and government surpluses that regularly top a combined 30% of GDP while also

becoming the 12th most indebted country in the world to endow their funds. Second,

10

few SWFs have laid out clear and defined rules for withdrawal of fund capital. The absence

of clear and predictable rules have relegated sovereign wealth funds to little more

than political slush funds. For example, Russia created its first sovereign wealth fund

with clear rules for fund capital accrual when oil surpassed $28 a barrel and strict

limits on withdrawal. However, as oil floated around $100 a barrel, Russian

politicians chafed at the restrictions that allowed their sovereign fund to accrue so

much so fast, growth doubling since 2007 and growing 950% since 2000. Other case is

Norway which limits is non-oil budget deficit to 4% of GDP. Third, a SWFs demand

the highest degree of independence possible while remaining technically a state linked entity.

In other words, Sovereign wealth funds must be profit motivated investors free from

political winds and capriciousness.

He also pointed out that funds can promote national development objectives by

stimulating domestic spillovers. In short, funds occupy a unique position as guardians

of national wealth. Because of this, they can stimulate the development objectives by

stimulating human capital development and external service providers.

A.Cappelen; R. Urheim (2012, p. 2) analyzed in their research paper that there

are two reasons why the increasing size of pension funds and SWFs are important for

intergenerational justice. more to the point, there is a direct link between

intergenerational justice and the size of these funds because these funds represent

private and national savings. On the other hand, future generations benefit from high

savings today because high savings imply less consumption by the current generation and

more investment that will benefit the future generation. They pointed out that the growth

of pension funds and sovereign-wealth funds means that these funds potentially get

more influence as owners, i.e., that their ability to affect the corporations of which

they are owners increases. How these funds use this influence will in turn affect the

development of the world economy. In particular, we shall argue that these funds

will contribute to reducing one important source of intergenerational injustice, which

we might refer to as intergenerational externalities.

Francis In , Raphael Jonghyeon Park, Philip Inyeob Ji and Bong Soo Lee (2013)

examined the behaviour of SWFs with different objectives and whether SWF

investments have a destabilizing effect on the market. Their major findings can be

11

summarized as follows. First, by considering the different styles of SWFs, they found

that SWFs have distinctive behaviours. The CAR analysis shows that stabilization SWF

characteristics improve firm value, while the cross-border investments of reserve funds have

a large negative impact on target firm performance. Possible explanations include

information asymmetry between local and foreign investors and market perceptions

about SWF commitment in possible repercussions of balance of payment risks. It is

also noted that the value of target firms receiving SWF investments during the crisis did

not change from that in normal periods, which suggests that SWFs do not improve firm value

significantly in crisis periods. Second, they found evidence of a destabilizing effect for

SWF investments in general for six-, 12-, and 24-month periods. Third, industrialized

stock markets do not seem less affected by SWF investments than Asian markets and

that SWFs with oil money deliver more destabilizing effects than other SWFs.

Regarding the effects of the recent crisis, in the crisis period we observe a greater tail

risk contribution of SWFs in all categories except for reserve funds. Their results

provide insights to policy makers considering regulation or actions on foreign SWFs.

B. Bortolotti, V. Fotak, W. L. Megginson (2013) examined 1,018 Sovereign

Wealth Fund (SWF) equity investments in publicly traded firms and a control sample

of 5,975 transactions by private-sector financial institutions over 1980-2012. They

found that announcement-period abnormal returns of SWF investments are positive, but

lower than those of comparable private-sector investments by approximately 2.67

percentage points. More to the point, their findings show significant differences

among SWFs which are only partially captured by the short-term market reaction:

firms acquired by passive funds tend to underperform over the following three

years, while positive abnormal returns are associated with actively monitoring SWFs.

They concluded that SWFs‟ corporate governance role tends to affect the value of

target firms.

SWF Classification Approach

W., Daniil (Oct 2013, p.10) developed an SWF classification that encompasses

their common characteristics and investment objectives. We can say that SWF

funding therefore represents the first level of the analysis as can be seen in Figure 6.

12

The second question is whether a country should invest its assets directly or

indirectly. In this context 'indirectly' would mean the use of an SWF while 'direct'

investments could be conducted by any other state-owned company or authority.

Direct investments would be better suited to more opportunistic single engagements.

They are rarely advisable for a large scale of diversified portfolio holdings and state-

of-the-art investment management strategies. An example of a direct investment is

the recent 29% engagement of Qatar Solar, a holding company owned by one of

Qatar's manifold government-backed investment vehicles, in the German solar

technology firm Solarworld.

Figure 6 The classification approach for SWFs based on their investment objectives and strategies

Source: W., Daniil, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Objectives and Asset Allocation Strategies (October 28, 2013).

13

The Manager model

Abdullah Al-Hassan, Michael Papaioannou, Martin Skancke, and Cheng Chih

Sung presented in November 2013, p.10 manager model and the investment

company model. More to the point, they are the two dominant forms of institutional

setup for SWFs. The models are illustrated in Figure 7. In the manager model, the

legal owner of the pool of assets constituting the SWF (usually the ministry of

finance) gives an investment mandate to an asset manager. Within this model, there

are three main sub-categories:

First, the central bank manages the assets under a mandate given by the ministry of

finance (e.g., Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, Botswana, and Chile).

Second, a separate fund management entity, owned by the government, is set up to

manage assets under a mandate given by the ministry of finance, such as the

Government Investment Corporation (GIC) of Singapore. Third, the ministry of

finance gives mandates directly to one or more external (private) fund managers. This

model is generally not recommended, since awarding contracts to external fund

managers is in itself an investment decision that should be carried out at arm•es

length from a political body, and the evaluation, monitoring and termination of

management contracts requires specialized skills more likely to be found in a

dedicated investment organization. In other words, this model is typically employed

when the investment strategy implies more concentrated investments and active

ownership in individual companies (Temasek, Singapore), or the fund has a

development objective in addition to a financial return objective.

Figure 7 Investment Model; Manager Model

Source: Al-Hassan, Abdullah and Papaioannou, Michael G. and Skancke, Martin and Sung, Cheng Chih, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of Governance Structures and Investment Management

(November 2013). IMF Working Paper No. 13/231.

14

4 THE OBJECTIVES

The research objectives of this paper are: 1. Will SWFs play an important role

in international finance in the future? 2. What kind of countries set up SWFs? Either

with low debt or high debt?

4.1 Methodology

The paper is descriptive and uses investigative data. Our research

methodology focuses on two main objectives: first, comprehensiveness of research

and second accuracy of information. We rely on data from Sovereign Wealth Fund

Institute, International Monetary Fund and World Economic Outlook Database.

The methods to be deployed in this paper are qualitative and quantitative

analysis, we also use analytic, statistical methods, regression analysis, moving

average, the „Student‟ t-test.

5 HYPOTHESES

In this section we examine following hypotheses. Data calculations are the best

estimation of author.

5.1 Testing hypothesis 1

We formulate next hypothesis in terms AUM of 74 observed funds, and we

will be using quarterly data from website of Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute.

H0: SWFs will play an important role in international finance in the future.

H1: SWFs will NOT play important role in international finance in the future.

If we look at on moving average, one of the basic tools of technical analysis,

was based on the fact that determining the trend from the graph can be quite difficult

and inaccurate, due to cyclical fluctuations. We used functions of a moving average

for identifing trends and measure the strength of an AUM of SWFs. Moving averages

can be beneficial in setting stop-losses.

15

Table 1: Moving averages

Year Season ID Value y*

Moving average

Central moving average

Coeficient

(y/CMA)

2007 Q1 1

Q2 2

Q3 3

Q4 4 3,209 3,484 3,6165 0,887321996

2008 Q1 5 3,377 3,749 3,867833333 0,873098634

Q2 6 3,866 3,986666667 3,958833333 0,97655033

Q3 7 4,004 3,931 3,887 1,030100334

Q4 8 4,09 3,843 3,805333333 1,074807288

2009 Q1 9 3,699 3,767666667 3,813166667 0,97005988

Q2 10 3,74 3,858666667 3,902333333 0,958400957

Q3 11 3,864 3,946 3,978166667 0,971301688

Q4 12 3,972 4,010333333 4,032333333 0,985037613

2010 Q1 13 4,002 4,054333333 4,113333333 0,972933549

Q2 14 4,057 4,172333333 4,246333333 0,955412513

Q3 15 4,104 4,320333333 4,4165 0,929242613

Q4 16 4,356 4,512666667 4,580166667 0,951057094

2011 Q1 17 4,501 4,647666667 4,69 0,959701493

Q2 18 4,681 4,732333333

Q3 19 4,761

Q4 20 4,755

Source: AUM according to the SWF Institute, last updated October 2012.

*AUM trillion $.

The number of periods for moving average is K=3 constant. A simple moving

average is calculated as the sum of values in a given time period divided by the

number of values.

Figure 8: Moving averages

Figure 8 shows that the

coefficient of correlation is

positive and the coefficient of

determination is R2=0,8327; what

means that 83,3 percent changes

in assets under management of

SWFs can be attributed to changes

(investments) in each future

y = 0,0715x + 3,2808

R2 = 0,8327

$3,00

$3,20

$3,40

$3,60

$3,80

$4,00

$4,20

$4,40

$4,60

$4,80

$5,00

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21

SWFs Moving average Linear trend

16

quarters. In short, we may say that SWF will be bigger in terms Source: Author´s

estimation. AUM than today, more highly liquid, and focus long-term, less sensitive

than for example Hedge Funds, Private Equity.

5.2 Testing hypothesis 2

We formulate next hypothesis in terms debt of countries that set up SWFs. We

observe 25 countries with higher and lower debt as 60 percent of GDP. The optimal

debt is considered 60 percent of GDP. At 0,05 significance level we want to to test the

significance of deviations and value 60.

H0: Countries with low public debt set up SWFs; m=60.

H1: Countries with higher public debt do set up SWFs; m>60.

Indicates significance at the 5% level, =0,05, n=25 and 80 60.

Table 2 Gross debt as percent of GDP /continued on the next page/

Country Gross debt as percent of GDP*

United Arab Emirates 18,49

Norway 55,42

Saudi Arabia 7,09

China 26,88

Kuwait 8,05

Singapore 93,47

Russia 11,68

Qatar 27,85

Australia 22,81

Algeria 10,65

Kazakhstan 12,9

South Korea 32,02

Malaysia 55,12

Azerbaijan 10,67

Ireland 109,27

France 86,81

Chile 10,49

New Zealand 35,31

Canada 84,11

Brazil 64,98

Bahrain 34,15

Oman 4,01

Botswana 15,68

Mexico 42,89

Italy 121,06

AM 40,0744

17

STDV 34,62956325

VAR 1199,206651

TINV for /2 1,710882067←Critical value for one-sided alternative

hypothesis Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2013, data estimates for 2013 * Figures are for gross general government debt, as opposed to net federal debt, gross general government debt includes both intra-government debt and the debt of public entities at the sub-national level.

(1)

We use TINV function that returns the value of t Student's t-distribution as a

function of the probability. The significance level of 0,05 and 24 degrees of freedom,

the inverse one-sided t-distribution is calculated by TINV(2*0,05;24) is 1,71.

In sum, results coming out from Table 2 and formula (1) : t< tcrit → we accept

null hypothesis, -2,87<1,71 and deviation or difference between value m and 80 is

caused by random selection of countries in Table 2, what is not a statistically

significant difference. In sum, we can say that countries mainly with low public debt

usually set up SWFs.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In sum, SWFs have recently drawn a great deal of attention, both in the

popular press and academic research. Some of the attention is based on world

leaders‟ and policy makers‟ discomfort with the unknown, as SWFs often fail to

disclose their investment objectives. However, we can say that SWFs will play

important role in future as a global investors.

Testing hypothesis 1 showed that 83,3 percent changes in assets under

management of SWFs can be attributed to changes (investments) in each future

quarters. Results coming out from testing hypothesis 2 showed difference between

value m and 80 is caused by random selection of countries in Table 2, what is not a

statistically significant difference. In short, we can say that countries mainly with low

public debt usually set up SWFs.

87,22562,34

6007,40

n

s

xt

18

7 REFERENCES

1. Al-Hassan, Abdullah and Papaioannou, Michael G. and Skancke, Martin and

Sung, Cheng Chih, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of Governance

Structures and Investment Management (November 2013). IMF Working

Paper No. 13/231. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365868

2. Balding, Christopher, Innovations in Sovereign Wealth Funds for National

Development (July 27, 2012). Available at SSRN:

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2121005 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2121005

3. Bodie, Zvi and Briere, Marie, Optimal Asset Allocation for Sovereign Wealth

Funds: Theory and Practice (October 24, 2013). Boston U. School of

Management Research Paper No. 2013-11. Available at SSRN:


4. Bortolotti, Bernardo and Fotak, Veljko and Megginson, William L., The

Sovereign Wealth Fund Discount: Evidence from Public Equity Investments

(September 17, 2013). Baffi Center Research Paper No. 2013-140; FEEM

Working Paper No. 22.2009. Available at SSRN:


5. Cappelen, Alexander W. and Urheim, Runa, Pension Funds, Sovereign-Wealth

Funds and Intergenerational Justice (September 27, 2012). NHH Dept. of

Economics Discussion Paper No. 19/2012. Available at SSRN:


6. In, Francis Haeuck and Park, Raphael Jonghyeon and Ji, Philip and Lee, Bong

Soo, Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Stabilize Stock Markets? (August 30, 2013).

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276625 or

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2276625

7. Mezzacapo, S. (2009), "The so-called "Sovereign Wealth Funds": Regulatory

issues, financial stability and prudential supervision", European Economy,

Economic Papers 378:106

8. Van der Zee, Eva, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially Responsible

Investing: Do‟s and Don‟ts (June 13, 2012). European Company Law, Kluwer

Law International, Special Issue on CSR and SRI, 2012, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365868





19

141-150; University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2012-15.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083486 or


9. Wagner, Daniil, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Objectives and Asset

Allocation Strategies (October 28, 2013). Available at SSRN:


10. http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.2.219

11. https://www.preqin.com/item/2014-preqin-sovereign-wealth-fund-

review/1/7594

12. http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/


http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.2.219

https://www.preqin.com/item/2014-preqin-sovereign-wealth-fund-review/1/7594

https://www.preqin.com/item/2014-preqin-sovereign-wealth-fund-review/1/7594

Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds

Economy & Finance

Transcript of Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds