Role of

EXTERNAL STATE& NON-STATE ACTORSin creating challenges to internal security

UpdatedValueAdditionMaterial2020

INTERNAL SECURITY www.visionias.in

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1.Introduction...................................................................................................................3

1.1ChallengesposedbyExternalStateActors....................................................................41.2ChallengesposedbyNon-Stateactors.............................................................................5

2. Terrorism.......................................................................................................................62.1Frameworkforde�iningTerrorism...............................................................................62.2Classi�icationofTerrorism................................................................................................72.2.1Stateterrorism.....................................................................................................................72.2.2Statesponsoredterrorism..............................................................................................82.2.3ViolentNon-StateTerrorism.........................................................................................8

2.3HistoryofTerrorisminIndia.............................................................................102.3.1Jammu&Kashmir.............................................................................................................102.3.2Punjab....................................................................................................................................102.3.3GrowthofHinterlandTerrorisminIndia...............................................................10

2.4KeyIssues.................................................................................................................112.4.1TerrorismintheAgeofTechnology..........................................................................112.4.2TerrorFinancing...............................................................................................................112.4.3UrbanTerrorism...............................................................................................................122.4.4Lone-WolfAttacks...........................................................................................................132.4.5UseofTerrorasaforeignpolicyinstrumentbyExternalStates.................142.4.6ThechallengeofISandAl-QaedainIndia.............................................................15

2.5India'sCounterTerrorismStrategy.................................................................162.5.1India'spreparednessagainstterrorism.................................................................17

2.6Stepstakenbythegovernment........................................................................182.6.1Enablingastronglegislationframework..............................................................182.6.2Institutionalframeworktotackleterrorism........................................................182.6.3CombatingTerrorFinance...........................................................................................182.6.4India'sInvolvementattheUN....................................................................................19

2.7VariousGlobalActionsforcounteringTerrorism......................................20

2.8Whatmoreneedstobedone.............................................................................212.8.1Strengtheningthetechnologyframeworktodealwithextremism............212.8.2A360-degreeapproach................................................................................................212.8.3EarlypreventionandDe-Radicalisation.................................................................222.8.4Strengtheningtheroleofthepoliceforce..............................................................22

3.VisionIASMainsPreviousYears'Questions...................................................23

4.UPSCMainsPreviousYears'Questions .....................................................................  32

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Giventhelargepopulation,diversityofgroupsandidentitiesandshrinkingshare of resources, con�licts are bound to rise in the society. When thedemocratic institutionsand the state structure fails to fully resolve thesecon�lictsinapeacefulmanner,violenceerupts. ,Thehostileexternalforcestakingadvantageofthissituationthroughsubversivepropaganda,furtherhighlightthesecon�licts.Theygive toworsenmaterialandpoliticalsupportthissenseofgrievancetosuchanextentthatasmallminorityarewillingtobecometoolsintheirhandstounderminethestabilityandsecurityofthenation.

According to some experts, India does not face an external threat in theconventionalsense,but .onlyinternalsecuritythreatsfromexternalsourcesTheseexternalsources,consistofbothstateandnon-stateactors,combinedwith those anti-state forces within India, have made the situation moreintricate.All over theworld, few countries areplaced in anunfavourable,troubledanduncertainsecurityenvironmentasIndiais.Externalsourcesofthreats to India's internal security spring from almost all countries of itsneighbourhood.

India'sinternalsecurityproblemsareamanifestationofinternalweaknessesand external attempts at waging a proxy war. Inadequate socio-economicdevelopment,apathytowardsthegenuinegrievancesofthepeople,politicalbrinkmanship amongst other reasons, has created internal contradictions,whichhave ledtodecadesof internalstrife.Similarly,anumberof internalsecuritychallengesfacedtodayarefueledandcontrolledfromPakistan.Thepresence of hostile neighbours allows the internal con�licts to get externalsupport,which includesmoney,armsandsanctuaries.Thevested interestsexploittheseconditionstopursuetheirownschema.

1.INTRODUCTION

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Pakistan

Historically,Chinahasprovided�inancialsupport,armsandsanctuariestoNaga,MizoandMeiteiextremiststofuelinstabilityinIndia'sinternalsecurity.

China

The�loodingofthecountrywithcounterfeitsisalsoawayofweakeningtheeconomy.Therefore,thenon-stateactorsoperatingfromPakistanaretheproxiesofthestate,functioningunderaclearcharterofstatepolicy.

TheissuesinJammuandKashmirandTerrorisminthehinterlandareadirectmanifestationofPakistan'sin�luence.ItispartofPakistan'sstatepolicytobleedIndiathroughathousandcuts,givenitsobviousdisadvantagesontheconventionalwar�ightingfront.

Thereisnodoubtthatnoneofthesocallednon-stateactorslikethe couldLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)haveoperatedwithimpunitywithouttheactivefunding,logisticalandmilitarysupportofPakistan.

ThecloselinkagesoftheISIandproxygroupsarewelldocumentedasistheirdirectinvolvementinattackslike26/11.ThesegroupsaimtonotonlycreateinstabilityinstateslikeJ&K,theyalsohavealargeraimofdestabilisingthecountry.Thisisdonethroughsporadicterroriststrikes,whichspreadsterrorandpanic.

The isessentiallytheemploymentofaproxyelement,whichgivestheuseofnon-stateactorsstateofPakistana .degreeofdeniability

1.1.ChallengesposedbyExternalStateActors

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CHALLENGESPOSEDBYEXTERNALSTATEACTORS

CHALLENGESPOSEDBYNON-STATEACTORS

DrugCartelsHumanTraf�icking

IssuesposedbyNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisations

TransnationalandMultinationalCorporations

ThreatsposedbyPakistan

ThreatsposedbyChinaandotherneighbours

LeftWingExtremism

Insurgency/EthnicGroupViolence

Terrorism

Overviewofthechallengesposedbyexternalstateandnon-stateactorsintheinternalsecurity.

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1.2ChallengesposedbyNon-Stateactors

DrugTraf�icking: GoldenTriangleProximitytothelargestproducersofheroinandhashish-theandGoldenCrescent (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) -hasmade India'sbordervulnerable todrugtraf�icking.Traf�ickingofdrugstakesplaceoverwhelminglythroughlandbordersfollowedbyseaandairroutes

Human traf�icking in India, although illegal under Indian law, remains aHumanTraf�icking:signi�icantproblem.Peoplearefrequentlyillegallytraf�ickedthroughIndiaforthepurposesofcommercialsexualexploitationandforced/bondedlabour.Althoughnoreliablestudyofforcedandbonded labour has been completed,NGOs estimate this problemaffects 20 to 65millionIndians.

Left-WingExtremism:Itisoneofthemajorsecuritythreatsfacedbythenation,whichpreventsdevelopmentalprocessesintheleastdevelopedregionsofthecountryandmisguidethepeoplethroughitspropaganda.

Insurgency in theNortheast: Inter-tribalcon�licts,unemployedyouth, illegalmigration fromacrosstheborderhasprovidedabreedinggroundfornon-stateactorstoruninsurgencylikeanindustryintheregion.

Terrorism:SouthAsiaTerrorismPortalhaslisted180terroristgroupsthathaveoperatedwithinIndiaoverthelast20years,manyofthemco-listedastransnationalterrornetworksoperatinginorfromtheneighboringSouth-AsiancountriessuchasBangladesh,NepalandPakistan.

CivilSocietyOrganisations:Seriouschargesofmisuseandmisappropriationoffundsreceivedasgrants-in-aidfromgovernments,foreigndonorsandtheirinvolvementinrilingupdiscontentmentin the local communities against developmental projects has raised questions on theseorganisationsworkingasforeignpolicytoolofforeigngovernments

Thetrans-borderrelocationhasbeenthecauseofsocialandeconomicinsecurityforthelocalcommunities,whichhasofteneruptedincommunalviolence.

TheissueofillegalmigrationhasbeenthesourceofcommunalandethnictensioninIndia,resultinginlargescaledemographicchangesintheNorth-Eastregion.

Whilethereisnoevidenceofdirectstateinvolvementinthiscase,itisitsinactivitytoresolvetheissuethatisconcerning.

Bangladesh

Note:The challengesassociatedwith Insurgency inNorth-East and Jammu&Kashmir, LeftWingExtremism,drugandhumantraf�ickinghavebeendiscussedindetailinseparateSecuritydocuments.ThisparticulardocumentdelvesintothedetailsofTerrorismandtheroleplayedbyStateandNon-Stateactorsinit.

ChinahasitsinterestsintheNorth-EastaswellasLeft-WingextremisminIndia,andusesitsasaleveragetobrewinternalsecuritychallengesintheIndia.

ChinahasbuiltarelationshipofconvenienceandanallianceofopportunismbetweenChinaandIndianmilitantgroups.Forexample,theMaoistmovementgotitsphilosophical,moral,�inancialandintellectualsupportfromChina.

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The titledUNGeneralAssemblyResolution49/60 "MeasurestoEliminateInternationalTerrorism,"containsaprovisiondescribingterrorismas:“Criminalactsintendedorcalculatedtoprovokeastateofterrorinthegeneralpublic,agroupofpersonsorparticularpersonsforpoliticalpurposesareinanycircumstanceunjusti�iable,whatevertheconsiderationsofapolitical,philosophical,ideological,racial,ethnic,religiousoranyothernaturethatmaybeinvokedtojustifythem.”

Althoughthereisnocurrentagreementregardingauniversallegalde�initionoftheterm,therehasbeensomedebateaboutthepossibleexistenceofan,atleastpartial,customaryde�initionofterrorism.Alongwithterrorandintimidation,therearemanyfactorsoftenconsideredcrucialtodelineatingwhenactionstakenbyagrouporanindividualconstituteterrorismornot.These includebutarenotfactorslimitedtoviolence,harm,andthreats;randomnessorindiscriminateviolence;politicalmotivation;thetargetingofcivilians,non-combatantsandso-calledinnocents;anddeliberateattemptstopublicizetheactsofterror.

Thedif�icultyinde�ining“terrorism”isinagreeingonabasisfordeterminingwhentheuseofviolence(directedatwhom,bywhom,forwhatends)islegitimate;therefore,themodernde�initionofterrorismisinherentlycontroversial.Theuseofviolencefortheachievementofpoliticalendsiscommontostateand non-state groups. The majority of de�initions in use has been written by agencies directlyassociatedwithgovernment,andissystematicallybiasedtoexcludegovernmentsfromthede�inition.

Criticsaccuse theUnitedStatesof terrorismforbackingnotonly the Israelioccupation,butotherrepressiveregimeswillingtoterrorizetheirowncitizenstomaintainpower.PalestinianmilitantscallIsrael terrorist,KurdishmilitantscallTurkeyterroristandthenation-statescall themilitantswhoopposetheirregimes“terrorists”.Like“beauty”,“terrorism”isintheeyeofthebeholder.Oneman'sfreedom�ighterisanotherman'sterrorist.Hence,thedif�icultyinde�iningTerrorism.

2.1Frameworkforde�iningTerrorismWhile the consensus on a universal de�inition of terrorism is dif�icult to bring about, there is anagreementonsomeofitsfeatures.Terrorismisaviolentphenomenon:

Eventuallyseekstoacquireunchallenged andcapture byimposingasocialcontrol politicalpowerdiscretegovernanceorder.

Whichiscomposedof setofexpressionsandbehaviors:(i)emotional(anger,hatred,heterogeneousfear), (ii)culturalandmoral(revenge,self-righteousness),(iii) instrumentalpolitics(coercion,power projection, competition, exclusion of unfriendly section of the society and elites), (iv)religious (exclusiveness, exclusion through apostatization and othering), (v) ideological(revolutionaryjihad,deviance,de�iance),(vi)criminal(organizedcrime);

Whichbyfollowingaprotean entailingcivilians,lawenforcementpersonneltargetingphilosophyandcombatantsalike,thatoperationalizesinaperformativemannerthroughvariablemeansormethods;

Whichatitsrootisessentiallya thattransitionsintoanoffensivetacticreactivecommunicativeactwhenequippedwithanevolveddoctrine;

That develops incrementally deriving from , i.e. exogenous and endogenouscontextual factorsstimuliaswellasreactionsbythestateandsociety.Thesestimuliandreactionsbyvarioussourcesproducecontextswhichprovidethemotivationandrationaljusti�icationforitsperpetuation.

2.TERRORISM

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2.2Classi�icationofTerrorism

TerroractivitiesinvolveeitherIndianorforeigncitizens.Infact,mostofthedomesticterrorismtodayhaslinkageswithforeignagencies.TransnationalJihadisTerrorism,sponsoredbyexternalagenciesandothercountriestoachievetheirgeo-strategicobjectives,currentlyposesthemajorthreattothecountry.

TerrorisminIndia,accordingtotheHomeMinistry,posesasigni�icantthreattothestate.TerrorisminIndiaareofbasicallytwotypesi.e.sponsoredby .Externalexternalagenciesanddomestic(internal)terrorism emerge from neighboring countries and Internal terrorism emulates from religious orcommunalviolenceandNaxalites–Maoistinsurgency.

“State terrorism” is as controversial a concept as that of terrorism itself. Terrorism is often,thoughnotalways,de�inedintermsoffourcharacteristics:(1)thethreatoruseofviolence;(2)apolitical objective; the desire to change the status quo; (3) the intention to spread fear bycommittingspectacularpublicacts;(4)theintentionaltargetingofcivilians.Thislastelement--targetinginnocentcivilians—isproblematicwhenonetriestodistinguishstateterrorismfromotherformsofstateviolence.

De�inedasactsofterrorismconductedbygovernmentsorterrorismcarriedoutdirectlyby,orencouragedandfundedby,anestablishedgovernmentofastate(country)orterrorismpracticedby a government against its ownpeople or in support of international terrorism. ExamplesincludetherecentkillingofSaudijournalistJamalKhashoggiintheSaudiconsulateinIstanbulallegedlybySaudigovernmentagents;anex-RussianspyandhisdaughterpoisonedwithanerveagentinSalisbury,apparentlybyRussianintelligenceagents,etc.

2.2.1Stateterrorism

MOTIVATION REVENGE, ANGER, JIHAD, SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS,EXCLUSIVENESS

INTENT AND PLANNING RATIONALITY, FLEXIBILITY

POLITICSCOERCION, POWER PURSUITS, COMPETITION, EX-

CLUSION, CRIMINALIZED VIOLENCE, DIFFERENTIATEDVICTIMIZATION, CHALLENGE/DEVIANCE

TARGETS & TACTICS/METHODSINSTRUMENTALITY, EXCLUSION, HATRED, SOCIAL

CONTROL, VICTIM & LARGETING VARIABILITY, FEAR,INTIMIDATION

PUBLIC STATEMENTS PROPAGANDA, JUSTIFICATION & BRANDING

ANALYTIC VARIABLE THEMES OR OPERATIONAL EXPRESSION

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2.2.2Statesponsoredterrorism:

Intimidatedgovernments

Ideologicallysupportiveregimes

Generallyfacilitativesupporters

DirectSupportinincidentsbygovernments

Of�icialParticipation

Inthistypeofterrorism,thegovernmentsupportsarmywhichisengagedinviolenceactivities.Basedonthegeneral towardsterrorists,theycanbecategoriseddegreeofgovernmentsupportandattitudeinto:

Inthecontemporaryperiod,thestatesthatsupportterrorismandinsurgentgroupsarenowprimarilymotivatedbygeopoliticsratherthanideology,ethnicaf�inityorreligioussentiment.

Pakistan appears to be in the general facilitativestage. It usually involves governments permittingterroriststoestablishsafehousesandtrainontheirsoil, general government training of umbrellaguerilla bands which have terrorist appendages,large �inancial contributions to these bands, andarmsprovisiontoorlaxsupervisionofthirdpartyarmstransfertothesegroups

2.2.3ViolentNon-StateTerrorism

Itiscarriedoutbynon-statearmedactorsornon-statearmedgroups(NSAGs),thatarewhollyorpartlyindependentofstategovernmentsandwhichthreatenoruseviolencetoachievetheirgoals.

ViolentNon-StateActors(VNSAs)varywidelyintheirgoals,size,andmethods.Theymayincludenarcotics cartels, popular liberation movements, religious and ideological organizations,corporations (e.g. private military contractors), self-defence militia, and paramilitary groupsestablishedbystategovernmentstofurthertheirinterests.

WhilesomeVNSAsopposegovernments,othersarealliedtothem.SomeVNSAsareorganizedasparamilitarygroups,adoptingmethodsandstructuresimilartothoseofstatearmedforces.Othersmaybeinformallystructuredanduseviolenceinotherways,suchaskidnapping,usingimprovisedexplosivedevices,orhackingintocomputersystems.

Basedonthedifferent usedbytheterroristtoachievetheirgoals, terrorismcanalsobestrategiesclassi�iedintothefollowingtypes:

Where terrorist organizations act asconvenientinstrumentstospreadtheideologyoftheState

-MILITARYSUPPORT

-FINANCIALSUPPORTTooperateandgrowintheirterritory.For instance, in the case of Iran andPakistan.

Typesofsupportprovidedbyastatetoterroristgroups:

The state supplies the terroristorganizationwithweapons,providesmilitary training, organizes coursesforthem,etc.

-IDEOLOGICALSUPPORT

Unlawfulattacksandthreatsofattacksagainstcomputers,networks,andtheinformationstoredthereinwhendonetointimidateorcoerceagovernmentoritspeopleinfurtheranceofpoliticalorsocialobjectives.Itisanunconventionalmethodofterrorism

Incyberterrorism,byusinginformationtechnologywouldradicallyinterrupttheserviceswhichareconnectedwithinternet.Forexample,cyberterroristscanhackintonetworkshousingforgettingcritical�inancialinformationordisablenetworkedemergencysystems.

Cyber-Terrorism

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TheyfocuseitheronthecreationofaseparateStateorontheelevationofthestatusofoneethnicgroupoverothers.TamilNationalistgroupsinSriLankaandinsurgentgroupsinNorthEastIndiaareexamples

Ethno-NationalistTerrorism

Aterroristassaultonanuclearresearchcentreornuclearpowerplantcanbecauseofthereleaseofnuclearmaterial.Theconsequencesofanattackonanuclearresearchcentreornuclearpowerplantcouldequalorexceedtheeffectsofthe1986ChernobyldisasterinUSSR

Nuclearterrorismmeansdifferenttypeofuseofnuclearmaterialbytheterrorists.Itincludesattackingnuclearfacilities,preparingnuclearweaponsorpurchasingnuclearweapons,or�indingwaystoscatterradioactivematerials.

NuclearTerrorism

IdeologyOrientedTerrorism(RightandLeftWingTerrorism)

Left-wingextremists,universallyknownasMaoistsandNaxalites,wanttoremovethecapitalistgovernmentandtoestablishcommunistorsocialistbasedgovernment.Theywanttoattacktheestablishedsysteminordertoremoveclassdistinction

TheaimofRightwingterroriststooverthrowgovernmentandtoestablishanationalistorfascistgovernment.Thepersonsincludeinthistypeofterrorismarefascistskinheads,hooligans,youthsympathizersandintellectualswhodeemthatthegovernmentmustsendforeigners,outofcountry,forprotectingitsoriginalcitizens.

Theattemptbynarcoticstraf�ickerstoin�luencethepoliciesoftheGovernmentbysystematicthreatorusebyviolence

Narco-Terrorism

Bio-Terrorism

Anthrax

Biologicaltoxinsareusedtohurtandfrighteninnocentcitizens,inthenameofapoliticalorothercause.TheU.S.CenterforDiseaseControlhascategorizedtheviruses,bacteriaandtoxinsthatcouldbeusedinanattackTheyare:

SmallpoxThePlagueBotulism

Tularemia

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TherootsofinsurgencyinJammu&Kashmircanbetracedtothelaterpartofthe1940swhenPakistanattacked Indiawith a view to capture Jammu&Kashmir. Ever since therehas been a sectionofpopulationwhichbelievesinsecessionfromIndia.Thesegroupsaidedandabettedfromacrosstheborderhaveoftenindulgedinterroristactivities.The andemergenceriseofIslamistfundamentalismofAl-QaedahasaddedanotherdimensiontotheinsurgencyinJammu&Kashmir.

2.3.1Jammu&Kashmir

Thequestfora manifesteditself,afterPartition,intheirdemandforaseparateseparateSikhidentityStateinIndia.EvenaftertheformationofaseparateStateofPunjab,somerelatedissuesremainedunresolvedsuchasdemand forChandigarhas theState capital, sharingof riverwatersetc.Thesituation was further aggravated when terrorist elements demanded secession in the form of'Khalistan'.

2.3.2Punjab

2.3.3GrowthofHinterlandTerrorisminIndia

Afterfailingintwoconventionalwars,Pakistanadoptedthepathofsub-conventional/proxywarwiththemottoof'bleedingIndiawithathousandcuts'.

1970-80

TheseedsofpresentterrorismweresownintheKhalistanmovementinthe1980s,whichaimedatcreatingabuffersovereignstatebetweenIndiaandJammu&Kashmir.

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) was formed with the motive to liberate IndianMuslimsfromtheWesternin�luenceandmakethemfollowthepathofIslam.TheyadoptedaveryradicalpostureandweresubsequentlybannedunderUnlawfulActivitiesPreventionActin2001.

AfterPunjab,PakistantargetedKashmirinthelate1980s,bytappingintotheanti-IndiasentientoftheseparatistsectionsoftheKashmiripopulation.TerrorisminKashmirisbasicallyoperatedbyPoKbasedterroristorganisationscreated,trained,inspiredanddirectedbytheISI.

1980-90

AftertheAyodhyaincidentin1992,therewasasubsequentriseinreactionaryactivitiesalloverthecountry,providingaripeopportunityfortheISItofurtheritsobjectiveofspreadingterrorismandcommunalisminIndia.

1990-2000

IndianMujahideenwas formed to project to theworld that terrorism in India is purely anindigenousdevelopment,borneoutoftheill-treatmentmetedouttotheMuslims.ThiswastorefuteIndia'spositionthatterrorisminIndiasponsoredfromacrosstheborder.

TherehavebeenconstanteffortsbytheISItoexploitthecommunalfaultlinesinoursocietyandensure that the Muslim community remains vulnerable to mobilisation, recruitment andradicalisation.

RiseinthereactionaryrightwingextremistactivitiesintheformofbombblastsinMalegaon,AjmerSharifDargah,Samjhautaexpressetc.andthesubsequentallegedimplicationofinnocentMuslimyouthgaveanotherboosttotheradicalisationofMuslimyouthbytheterrorout�its.

2000onwards

2.3HistoryofTerrorisminIndia

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2.4.1TerrorismintheAgeofTechnologyThemodernterrorismisinstantaneousandunpredictable, a global threat that hit itstargets, but at same time hits a wideaudience due to use of technology.Terrorists have been using cyberspace to�indresources,makepropagandaactivitiesandfromwhichitispossibletolaunchtheattacksagainstenemieseverywhereintheworld.

Social media is an essential element ofmodern terrorism; these powerfulplatformsallowterroriststocommunicate,to make propaganda and recruit newsympathizersatthesametimemaintaininganonymitytotheuser.

Howtechnologyisbeingusedinpropagatingextremism?

Execution:Internetcommunicationsmayalsobeusedasameanstocoordinatetheexecutionofphysicalactsofterrorism.

Planning: Technology also facilitates the preparation of terror activities thoroughcommunication channels, both within and between the terror out�its located in differentgeographies.

Financing:Onlinepaymentfacilitiesofferedthroughdedicatedwebsitesorcommunicationsplatformsmake it easy to transfer funds electronically between parties. Financial supportprovidedtoseeminglylegitimateorganizations,suchascharities,mayalsobedivertedforillicitpurposes.

Training:Instructionalmaterialarebeingmadeavailablewithuseoftechnologywhichimpartstrainingandfacilitateonlinecounter-intelligenceandhackingactivities.

Cyber-attacks: These attacks are typically intended to disrupt the proper functioning oftargets,suchascomputersystems,serversorunderlyinginfrastructure.

Propaganda:Itgenerallytakestheformofmultimediacommunicationsprovidingideologicalorpractical instruction,explanations, justi�icationsorpromotionof terroristactivities. It isbeingusedforpromotionofviolence,recruitment,incitementandradicalization.

2.4.2TerrorFinancingTerroristactivitiesinmostcasesrequiresubstantial�inancialsupport.Infact,Terrorism�inance(TF) lifebloodofterrorism,canbetermedasthe oneofthemostimportantfactorssustainingitscontinuingthreat,bothfromwithinandwithout.Theyusethefollowingmethodstoraisefundingforterrorists'activities:

SendingaMessage

Themediabroadcastingthenewsaboutthe

terroract

Thekeyaudiences

discussingthenewsabouttheterroract

Thekeyaudiencespressuringonthe

authorities

Theauthoritiesconcessiontoterrorists

Terroristscommittingaterroract

irclC e n Oo fi t Ta ec ri rn ou rism mmo

C

BroadcastingtheMessage

DecodingtheMessage

TransmittingtheMessage

GettingtheMessageand

GivingFeedback

2.4KeyIssues

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Terroristorganizationsalsotakerecoursetobulkcashsmugglinganduseofinformalchannelsoftransferofmoney(likehawala).

Defrauding�inancialinstitutionsandthepublicatlarge.

Fundingcouldalsobesourcedevenfromtheproceedsoflawfulactivities.Supportersofamilitantideology couldwellmake �inancial contributions to terroristorganizations from theirknownsources of income. Such contributions could also be made to some non-pro�it or charitableinstitutionsactingasafrontforterroristorganizations,knowinglyorun-knowingly.

Byresortingtoorworkinginconcertwithcartelsinvolvedindrugtraf�icking,narcoticstradeetc.–withouthavingtoresorttomoney-launderingperse.

Fundingcouldalsoinvolvecounterfeitingofcurrency,currencysmugglingetc.

Terroristsgetsfundsbyinvolvinginillegaloperations

Internationalorganizedcrimemakesuseofawiderangeofmethodsandnetworkingtotransferfundswithaviewtolaundertheproceedsofcrime.

Raise Move Store SpendPLACEMENT LAYERING INTEGRATION

FundingAccess

FundingSources

LegitimateandIllicit

FundingMethodsFormalandInformal

Facilitationvs.Detection

FundingStreamsMay

Variations

$25toMillions$$$

$$ThousandstoManyThousands$$

$$HundredstoThousands$$

ToOrganization

ToOperations

ToOperatives

Figure1:Funding:Sources/Methods/Access

2.4.3UrbanTerrorismUrbanterrorismistheuseofterrorismincitiesandotherurbanareas,targetingtheurbanpopulace.UrbanterrorisminSouthAsiaisarelativelynewphenomenon.Inrecentyears,terroristsarevisiblymovingawayfromactivitiesneartheborderstothecitiesandtowns.

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2.4.4Lone-WolfAttacks

EasyTargets-Densityofbuiltenvironmentinurbanagglomerationsandurbanmasstransportinfrastructureresultinmassgatheringmakingthemeasytargetstomaximizetheimpactofterroristattacks.

ScopeforAnonymity-Unlikeinruralareas,inhabitantsincitiesandtownsaremoreheterogeneous,whichprovidesmorescopeforanonymitymakingsuicidebombingsextremelydif�iculttodetectorpreventintime.

Availabilityoffacilities-Logisticalsupportlikearms,publictransportetc.arereadilyavailableinurbanareas.

EasierRecruitment-becauseitisthecitythatnurturesdissidenceingeneral.

Attackingcredibilityofthegovernment-byattackinghighpro�ilesymbolic targets tomakeapoint that ifagovernment fails to protect high value targets, it isobviousthatitmaynotbeinapositiontoprotectthenormalones.

Protectionfromindiscriminatecounterterrorismoperations-duetovastcollateraldamage.

Lessdemandingoperations-intermsofbrutephysicalstrengthandendurancethanrequiredinmountainousorrural terrain.Andtheyalsodonotneedsophisticated long-rangeweaponstoin�lictthedesireddamage.

Easyspreadoffear-Sinceterrorismis'propagandabythedeed',theattention-seekinggoalofterroristsiswellservedintheurbanenvironmentwheretheimmediateaudienceisgreatestandwhererepresentativesoftheprintandelectronicmediaarereadilyavailableandquiteeagertoreport.Suchcoveragealsomagni�iesthefeargeneratingcapabilitiesofterroristacts.

Vulnerabilitiesduetointernet-Increasingavailabilityofpersonaldatahasmadeindividualsvulnerabletoterrorism.Suchinformationcanbeusedforthepurposeofradicalisationortargetingfortheactsofviolence.

Reasonsforincreaseinsuchattacks

A"lonewolf"isapersonwho ,outsideofanycommandpreparesandcommitsviolentactsalonestructureandwithoutmaterialassistancefromanygroup.

VolatileneighborhoodofIndiaactingasterrorhotbeds,fastgrowingpopulationespeciallyyouthwithaccesstomassmediaandsocialmedia,heavyconcentrationofpeopleinpublicareaswithlimitedsecurityandinadequatecapacitiesoflocalpoliceincreaseIndia'svulnerabilitytolonewolfattacks.

Itisanef�icientwayofspreadingterrorinhard-to-accessplacesfororganisedterroristgroups.ProminentrecentexamplesacrosstheglobeincludeBostonmarathonbombingof2013,Sydneyhostagecrisisof2014,recentattacksinNewYorkandLondonwherevehicleswereusedtorunoverandkillanumberofpeople.

RecentexamplesofUrbanTerrorinIndiaandneighboringcountries

Indiahasbeenawitnesstoseveralurbanterrorattackssuchasthe1993Bombaybombings,1998Coimbatorebombings,2000terroristattackonRedFort,2001IndianParliamentattack,2005Delhibombings,2008Bangaloreserialblastsand2008Mumbaiattacks.

InBangladesh,in2016,anunprecedentedattackonDhakaHoleyArtisanBakeryinGulshancityresultedinthedeathof29peopleincluding17foreigners.PakistanisteemingwithurbanterrorismwiththeregionsofKarachi,PeshawarandQuettabeinghottargets.

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HowevervariousotherfactorstendtoposechallengesingrowthoflonewolfattacksinIndia:

Indianshavenotdisplayedthepsychologicalwillingnesstoundertakehighriskattacks.

TheabsenceofpastexamplesoflonewolfattacksinIndiainculcatesthefearoftheunknowninthemindsofpotentialvolunteers.

Unlike in the USwhere sophisticatedweapons can be easily bought by ordinary citizens,gainingaccesstosuchweaponryinIndiaisdif�icult.

2.4.5UseofTerrorasaforeignpolicyinstrumentbyExternalStates

DeepStateisabodyofpeople,typicallyin�luentialmembersofgovernmentagenciesorthemilitary,believed to be involved in the secretmanipulation or control of government policy. Deep State inPakistanhasnurturedIslamicRadicalGroups(Mujahideens)asstrategicassetstobeusedagainstitsadversaries.

Thisstrategywas increasinglyadoptedafter thesuccessofUS-fundedMujahideens inAfghanistanagainstUSSR.Thereareprimarilythreetypesofsuchgroups

OneswhoactagainstAfghanistan-e.g.Al-QaedaandTaliban

OneswhoactagainstIndia-e.g.Lashkar-e-taiba,Jaish-e-Mohammed

ThePakistaniTaliban(Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan)-thisgrouphasbecomerogueand�ightingagainstthePakistaniestablishmentitself.

On26thFebruary,theIndianAirforcehitatrainingcampofthegroupinBalakot,Pakistan.

ThismarkedachangeinIndianresponse,asitwasa onnon-military,pre-emptive strikenon-civiliantargetto�ightterror.

On14thFebruary,2019-avehicleboundsuicideattackledtodeathof40CRPFpersonnelinPulwama,JammuandKashmir.

Itwasamaturedecisiontoachievethetarget,aswellas,preventanyescalationtowardswar

ThelinkstothisattackwereagaintracedtoPakistanbasedterrorgroupJaish-e-Mohammed.

ChangeinIndianApproachtoPakistanbasedterrorgroups

Pakistanhaslargelyremainedindenialmodeandhastakenshamactionsonterroristassetsinordertoavoidinternationalpressure.SomescholarsbelievethatthesegroupshavegrownsopowerfulnowthatthePakistaniStatelacksthecapacitytodealwiththemmilitarily.

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IssuesindealingwithPakistan'sterrorinfrastructure

The ,thatithasbecomeincurable.IfnuclearweaponscomeintheillnessofitsDeepStaterunsodeephandsofTerrorgroups,itmaybecomeadangerforinternationalpeace.

Ithasbeendif�iculttocompletelyisolatePakistanintheinternationalcommunityforlongtime,becauseithas-

TheorgansofPakistanistate,beittheExecutiveortheJudiciaryortheCivilSociety-havebeenovershadowedbyitsdeepstate.Wheneverinthepast,anyoftheotherorganstriedtostand,theyhavebeencrippledbythedeepstate.

LargepopulationNuclearCapabilitiesIslamicnationsbackingPakistan

2.4.6ThechallengeofISandAl-QaedainIndiaIslamicstatepreviouslyknownastheIslamicstateofIraqandSyria(ISIS), isaterrorgroupwhichenvisages toestablishan “IslamicstatebasedonSharia lawor IslamicCaliphate”. IS'sAmaqNewsAgencyhasannounceditsnewprovinceinIndia,thatitcalled“WilayahofHind”,butdidnotelaborateonthebranch'sgeographicalremit.

Inthepast,IShadvowedtoconvertIndiaintoKhurasanState,ahistoricnameforaregionthatcoversAfghanistan,Pakistan,partsofIndia,andothersurroundingcountries.

WhyIslamicStateisachallengeforIndia?

Involvement of other state actors- such asPakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI),whichcan provide a well-established intelligence andlogisticnetwork, inasymbioticrelationship.TheNIAreportedin2014,therecruitmentofmorethan300 Indian youths by Pakistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban(TTP),whichhadjoinedhandswithISIS.

suchasISlosingterritorialgroundinotherareas-MiddleEasttoUS-ledforces,nowISisseekingtostrengtheningitsglobalaf�iliations.SuchastrategywashighlightedbyISISchiefAbuBakral-Baghdadiinthepast.Atthesametime,ISISviewsIndiaasapotential hotbed for radicalization due to thedemographicstructure.

Efforts of radicalization- The IS have publishedrecruitingmaterialsinHindi,Urdu,TamilandotherlanguagesspokeninIndia.In2015,itreleasedane-booktospreaditspropagandaandmakingdirectreferencetoIndianPrimeMinisteraccusinghimofspreading communal disharmony. So far( as of2019), India has had some 82 active cases ofinvestigations on individuals suspected ofengaginginpro-ISISactivities.

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AlQaedareleasedmaidenvideoonKashmir

EventhoughAlQaeda-hasbeenactiveintheIndiansubcontinent(Al-Qaeda intheIndianSubcontinent (AQIS)was foundedin2014),ithaslargelybeenunabletocarryout large-scale attacks and struggled toattractsupportoutsideofPakistan.

Reasonsforthenew-foundinterestofAlQaidainIndia:

The of Al Qaeda isaging leadershipstruggling to compete with the IS foryoungradicalizedrecruits.AsISremainmajorlyinvolvedinWestAsia,itsuitstotheAlQaeda'sstrategyto“invest”intheEast.

Another reason is due to the fact thatIndia has substantially increased itsengagementwithAfghanistan since thefalloftheTalibangovernment.So,India'sgrowingin�luencemaydeterAlQaeda'sreemergencetopowerinAfghanistan

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Astrategyfor�ightingterrorinIndiahastobeevolvedintheoverallcontextofanationalsecuritystrategy.Totacklethemenaceofterrorism,amulti-prongedapproachisneeded.

2.5India'sCounterTerrorismStrategy

Administrationneed tobe responsive to the legitimategrievancesofpeople so that theseareredressedpromptlyandcannotbeexploitedbyterroristgroups.

InternationalCooperationbecomescrucialasterrorismisaglobalthreatandcannotbehandledbynationsactinginsilos.Activeparticipationinbilateral,regionalandmultilateralforumsformsacrucialpartofIndia'sstrategyagainstterrorism.

Socio-economicdevelopmentisaprioritysothatvulnerablesectionsofsocietydonotfallpreytothepropagandaofterroristspromisingthemwealthandequity.

Strongmeasuresarerequiredtodealwithcriminalelementsbutwithrespectforhumanrights.

Dealingwiththemenaceofterrorismwouldrequireacomprehensivestrategywithinvolvementofdifferentstakeholders–theGovernment,politicalparties,securityagencies,civilsocietyandmedia.Thenecessaryelementsofsuchastrategyarelistedbelow:

Providingtheappropriatelegalframework:Theordinarylawsofthelandmaynotbeadequatetobookaterrorist.Thismayrequirespeciallawsandeffectiveenforcementmechanisms,butwithsuf�icientsafeguardstopreventitsmisuse.

Counteringthesubversiveactivitiesofterrorists:Governmentmustgiveprioritytodefeatingpoliticalsubversions(e.g.byterroristsandMaoists).Theemphasisshouldbeoncivilasopposedtomilitarymeasurestocounterterrorismandinsurgency.

Building capacity:The capacity building exercise should extend to the intelligence gatheringmachinery,securityagencies,civiladministrationandthesocietyatlarge.

Goodgovernanceandsocioeconomicdevelopment:Thiswouldnecessitatehighprioritybeinggiven to development work and its actual implementation on the ground for which a clean,corruption-freeandaccountableadministrationatalllevelsisanimperativenecessity.

UnionGovernmentshouldhave intensive interactionswiththeStatesandPoliticalconsensus:UnionTerritorieswhiledrawingupthenationalstrategy,thelatterwouldberequiredtodotheirpartincloseconsultationwiththenodalministryoftheGovernmentofIndia.

Respectforruleoflaw:Governmentalagenciesmustnotbeallowedtotransgresslawevenindealingwithcritical situationscausedby insurgencyor terrorism. Ifanextraordinarysituationcannotbedealtwithbytheexistinglaws,newlawsmaybeenactedsothatlawenforcementagenciesdonotresorttoextra-legalorillegalmethods.

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2.5.1India'spreparednessagainstterrorism

ThestatusofIndia'spreparednessinperformingkeyrolesincounteringterrorismactivitiesisasfollows:

Intelligencegathering

However,vitalinputsandinformationregardingvariousgovernmentdepartmentsandNGOshastobestreamlined.

Presently,thetaskisundertakenbythestatepoliceandtheCentralgovernmentagencies.

NATGRIDandMulti-AgencyCenter(MAC)havebeensetupafter26/11.

TrainingandOperations

ResourcecrunchattheleveloftheStatepoliceactsasabottleneckinupgradingtheirtrainingcapability.

Asofnow,foroperations,IBplaystheroleofthecoordinatorwiththepoliceofdifferentstates,but ifoperationsneedtobecarriedoutsimultaneouslynmanystates,thereisnouni�iedcommand.

Investigation

The remains amajor scopeof improvement in the investigating capabilities of the statepolice.

TheNIAActwasenactedintheaftermathoftheMumbaiterroristattacksof2008.Adecadelater, theActwasamendedwiththeobjectiveofspeedyinvestigationandprosecutionofcertainoffences,includingthosecommittedoutsideIndia.

Widening the ambit of the act and strengthening the role of NIAwouldmake terroristinvestigationsinthecountrymoreef�icientandwouldhelpincreatingagooddatabankofthevariousterroristnetworkoperatinginsideandoutsidethecountry.

Prosecution

The2019NIAamendmentallowedthecentralgovernmenttodesignateSessionsCourtsasSpecialCourtsforthetrialofscheduledoffencesundertheAct.

Rampantdelaysduetoproceduralaspectsinthecriminaljusticesystemactsasabottleneckonthepaceofthetrial.

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2.6Stepstakenbythegovernment

2.6.1Enablingastronglegislationframework.

NIA Act, 2019: The NIA is now empowered to investigate offences related to “(i) humantraf�icking,(ii)offencesrelatedtocounterfeitcurrencyorbanknotes,(iii)manufactureorsaleofprohibitedarms,(iv)cyber-terrorism,and(v)offencesundertheExplosiveSubstancesAct,1908”.

UAPAAct,2019:ParliamentclearedtheUnlawfulActivities(Prevention)AmendmentAct,2019todesignateindividualsasterroristsoncertaingroundsprovidedintheAct.

The Act empowers the Director General of National Investigation Agency (NIA) to grantapprovalofseizureorattachmentofpropertywhenthecaseisinvestigatedbythesaidagency.

TheActempowerstheof�icersoftheNIA,oftherankofInspectororabove,toinvestigatecasesofterrorisminadditiontothoseconductedbytheDSPorACPoraboverankof�icerinthestate.

An hasbeen issued inApril2018 toStates/UnionTerritories.advisoryon terror �inancingGuidelineshavealsobeenissuedinMarch,2019toStates/UnionTerritoriesforinvestigationofcasesofhighqualitycounterfeitIndiancurrencynotes.

StrengtheningtheprovisionsintheUnlawfulActivities(Prevention)Act,1967tocombatterror �inancing by criminalizing the production or smuggling or circulation of high qualitycounterfeitIndiancurrencyasaterroristactandenlargethescopeofproceedsofterrorismtoincludeanypropertyintendedtobeusedforterrorism.

ATerrorFundingandFakeCurrency(TFFC)CellhasbeenconstitutedinNationalInvestigationAgency(NIA)toconductfocusedinvestigationofterrorfundingandfakecurrencycases.

The MoU, signed in March, will give NATGRID access to the Crime and Criminal TrackingNetworkandSystems(CCTNS)database,aplatformthatlinksaround14,000policestations.

(NATGRID) has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the National CrimeRecordsBureau(NCRB)toaccessthecentralisedonlinedatabaseonFIRsandstolenvehicles.

2.6.2Institutionalframeworktotackleterrorism

NATGRID:Itseekstobecometheone-stopdestinationforsecurityandintelligenceagenciestoaccessdatabaserelatedtoimmigrationentryandexit,bankingandtelephonedetailsofasuspectona“securedplatform”.

NationalCyberCoordinationCentre(NCCC)hasbeenestablishedasacybersecurityande-surveillanceagencyinIndia.

2.6.3CombatingTerrorFinance

Government has taken various steps to combat terror �inancing in the country,which inter alia,include:

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2.6.4India'sInvolvementattheUNIndiahasprioritisedtheadoptionofanintergovernmentalframeworktocombatterrorism.Indiaintroducedthe in1996thatde�inedComprehensiveConventiononInternationalTerrorism(CCIT)terrorismandenhanced“normativeprocessesfortheprosecutionandextraditionofterrorists.”

Activeparticipationinseveralcounter-terrorismdiscussions,suchas

Supportingcounter-terrorismmechanismsestablishedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolutions,suchasResolution1373establishingtheCounter-TerrorismCommittee,andResolution1540addressingthenon-proliferationofWeaponsofMassDestructiontoterroristorganisations

DraftingaGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategyintheGeneralAssemblyin2006,

ServingasafoundingmembersoftheGlobalCounter-TerrorismForum(GCTF),

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TrainingprogramsareregularlyconductedfortheStatePolicepersonnelonissuesrelatingtocombatingterrorist�inancing.

FakeIndianCurrencyNotes(FICN)networkisoneofthechannelsofterror�inancinginIndia.FICNCoordination Group (FCORD) has been formed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to shareintelligence/informationamongthesecurityagenciesofthestates/centertocountertheproblemofcirculationoffakecurrencynotes.

IntelligenceandsecurityagenciesofCentreandStatesworkintandemtokeepaclosewatchontheelementsinvolvedinterrorfundingactivitiesandtakeactionasperlaw.

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EuropeanUnion'stheEUjudicialcooperationunit,EUROJUST EUROPOLandtheEU'spoliceforce,

Itoutlinescollective,ChristchurchCallToAction:voluntary commitments from governments andonline serviceproviders intended toaddress theissue of violent extremist content online and toprevent abuseof the internet,whilemaintaininginternationalhumanrightlaws.

FinancialActionTaskForce(FATF)andtheGroupof Eight (G8) Counter terrorism Action Group(CTAG)

GlobalInternetForumtoCounterTerrorism(GIFCT)isanindustryledinitiative,workinginclosepartnership with the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) to substantiallydisruptterrorists'abilitytopromoteterrorism,disseminateviolentextremistpropaganda.

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2.7VariousGlobalActionsforcounteringTerrorism

United Nations oversees various conventions that target different aspects of terrorism, includingterrorist�inancing,hijacking,acquiringweaponsofmassdestruction,andhostagetaking,tonameafew.

UNGeneralAssemblyunanimouslyadoptedin2006theGlobalCounterterrorismStrategy(GCT).

The aims to promote better coordination amongRATS (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure)membersoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation onterrorism.IndiaconsidersRATSas(SCO)animportantandeffectiveorganisationin�ightagainstterrorismasitpossessesdataon2,500suicidebombersand69terroristorganizations.

TerroristTravelInitiativewaslaunchedunderauspicesofGlobalCounterterrorismForum(GCTF).

Counter-terrorismImplementationTaskForce(CTITF)-apartnershipofbodiescreatedbyUNin2005, which now includes more than thirty UN entities plus INTERPOL, to streamline andcoordinatecounterterrorismeffortswithintheUN.oUNSCestablishedtheCounterterrorismCommittee(CTC).

TheinitiativewilladevelopsetofgoodpracticeswhichwillreinforcecountriesandorganizationstousebordersecuritytoolsprescribedinUNSCResolution2396tostopterroristtravel.

It will bring together national and localgovernments, law enforcement and borderscreening practitioners, and internationalorganizations to share expertise on how todevelop and implement effective counterterrorismwatchlistingandscreeningtools.

FATFputsPakistanonits“GreyList”

TheFATFplacedPakistanonthegreylistin2018andaskedittoimplementaplanofactiontocurbmoneylaunderingandterror�inancingbytheendof2019,butthe deadline was extended due to theCOVID-19pandemic.

TheGreylist,ontheotherhand,of�iciallyreferred to as 'Jurisdictions UnderIncreasedMonitoring,' constitute thosenationsthatpresentsigni�icantrisksofmoney laundering and terror-�inancingbut which have committed to workingcloselywiththeFATFinthedevelopmentandimplementationofactionplansthataddresstheirde�iciencies.

TheFATFmaintainstwolists–ablacklistandagreylist.Countriesonitsblacklistarethosethatthewatchdogdeemsnon-cooperative in the global effort to curbmoneylaunderingandterror-�inancing.

(Alsodiscussedinthetopicofmoneylaundering)

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Developing a well-operated online intelligence network for intelligence sharing, joint onlineoperationsanddatabaseconvergencetokeepacheckonISIS'sin�luenceontheinternet.

Crossplatformrecruitmentofspecialistsdealingwithsocialmedia,bigdataanalysis,terrorism�inanceandtechnicalintelligence.

2.8.2A360-degreeapproachItisnecessaryforIndiatoeffectchangesinitsinternalsecurityarchitectureandfurtherempoweritsintelligence and investigation agencies for enhanced preparedness, along with some diplomaticmeasurestocounterterrorisminthewholeofthesub-continent.

2.8Whatmoreneedstobedone

2.8.1Strengtheningthetechnologyframeworktodealwithextremism

EnhancingTechnology:Preventtheupload& dissemination of terrorist and violentextremist content, with a mechanism forautomatic identi�ication and immediate &permanentremoval.

Terms of Use: Updating terms of use,communitystandards,codesofconduct,andacceptableusepoliciestoexpresslyprohibitthe distribution of terrorist and violentextremistcontent.

User Reporting of Terrorist and ViolentExtremist Content: Providing easy to usemethods within online platforms andservices for users to report or � laginappropriatecontent.

Transparency Reports: Publishing on aregularbasistransparencyreportsregardingdetectionandremovalofterroristorviolentextremistcontentononlineplatform

Shared Technology Development: Sharet e chno l ogy w i t h o t he r i ndu s t r i e s ,governments,andNGOs,suchasdatasetsandopensourcecontentAIdetectiontools.

Combating Hate & Bigotry: Supportresearch and academic efforts to betterunderstand and attack root causes ofextremism and supporting capability andcapacityofNGOstopromotepluralism

Education: Collaborate with industry,governments, educational institutions, andNGOs to help educate the public aboutterroristandextremistviolentcontentonline&howtoreportit

Crisis Protocols:Creating a crisis protocolforrespondingtoemergingoractiveevents,on anurgent basis, so relevant informationcan be quickly and ef�iciently shared,processed,andacteduponbyallstakeholderswithminimaldelay

RoleofOnlineserviceproviders

RoleofGovernmentandcivilsociety

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In�luential Minority Religious leaders should be roped in to appeal to youth against radicalpropaganda,especiallythosecomingthroughsocialmediaandotherinternetplatforms.

Thegovernmentshouldworkwithsocialgroups,NGOsandstudentbodies,whichcanreachouteasilytothepopulationatlarge,ascomparedtostateinstitutions.

2.8.3EarlypreventionandDe-RadicalisationA comprehensive strategy of early prevention, targeted repression and intervention and involvesgovernmentandnon-governmentalactors.

2.8.4Strengtheningtheroleofthepoliceforce

Enhancingtheirtrainingcapabilitiesandprovidingthemwithmodernequipmentforsurveillance,investigationandoperationsistheneedofthehour

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3.VisionIASMainsPreviousYears'Questions

havenotbeende�inedundertheAct,whichmaybe'terrorism','affectingtheinterestofIndia'

prosecuteoffencesaffectingnationalsecurity,byincorporatingoffencessuchastraf�ickingof

Theexpandedjurisdictioncoversmatters(suchasoffencesundertheExplosivesAct)whichare

jurisdiction.

The ofscheduledoffencesmaybeproneto ,whichcanexpandedscope misusebygovernmentcategorizethemasactsofterrorism.Thisisespeciallydangerouswhentheterms/phraseslike

minorsforsexualexploitationetc.,which .maynotberelatedtoterrorism

However,thefollowingobjectionshavebeenraisedagainsttherecentamendments:

NIAtrialsunderSection11and22oftheNIAAct2008.

The ,whichwasenactedtonewamendmenthasdilutedthenatureandoperationoftheAct

Theamendmentenablesthecentralgovernmenttodesignatesessioncourtsasspecialcourtsfor

interpretedto .curbdissent

alsointhedomainofthestategovernmentsleadingtopossibleencroachmentontheir

1.Highlighting the key changesmadeby theNational InvestigationAgency (Amendment)Act,2019,discusstheobjectionsthathavebeenraisedagainstthese.

Approach:

GiveabriefaccountontheNIAAct.

Discusstheobjectionsthathavebeenraisedagainsttheamendments.

Concludeonthebasisoftheabovepoints.

Answer:

EnumeratetheamendmentsmadeintheAct.

The waspassedbytheParliamentamendingtheoriginalActof2008.NIA(Amendment)Bill,2019Followingaretheamendmentsmade:

It .ItcannowexpandedthetypeofoffencesthattheNIAcouldinvestigateandprosecuteinvestigateoffencesrelatedtohumantraf�icking,counterfeitcurrency,manufactureorsaleof

NationalInvestigationAgency(NIA)isacentralagencytocombatterrorisminIndia,establishedunderthe .Ithaswidepowerssuchas,totakesuomotucognisanceNationalInvestigationAct,2008ofterroractivitiesinanypartofIndiaandregisteracase,toenteranystatewithoutpermissionfromthestategovernment,andtoinvestigateandarrestpeople.

prohibitedarms,cyber-terrorism,andoffencesundertheExplosiveSubstancesAct,1908.

TheNIAwillhavethe ,subjectpowertoinvestigatescheduledoffencescommittedoutsideIndiatointernationaltreatiesanddomesticlawsofothercountries.Aspecialcourtwillpresideoversuchcases.

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The provision to designate the existing Sessions Courts as Special Courts will dilute theexclusivityoftheNIAAct.ThesesessionscourtswouldrunonsimilarlinesastheydounderotherCentral Acts, thus of this Act. Also, these courts areeroding the special character alreadyoverburdenedwithpendingcasesandthismovewillfurtherincreasetheirburden.

ThepowertoinvestigatecasesoutsideIndiawouldnotbeusefulwithoutanycooperationandextraditiontreatieswithothercountries.

TheamendmentshavebeenbroughttostrengthentheNationalInvestigationAgency.However,theaforementionedconcernsneedtobeaddressedsothatthereisacoordinatedeffortforthe�ightagainstterrorism.

2.Bringouttheimportanceofinternationalcooperationin�ightingterrorism.Inthiscontext,throwlightonUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategy.Approach:

Brie�lywriteanintroductionaboutterrorismasaglobalthreat.

Bringouttheimportance/needforinternationalcooperationin�ightingterrorism.

ThrowlightonUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategy.

Inthemodernworld,terrorismhasevolvedfromlocaltoatrulyinternationalthreat.AccordingtoGlobal Terrorism Index, 67 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism in 2017.Although,thetotalnumberofdeathsbyterrorismfellby27percentbetween2016and2017,thenumberofterrorist incidents increasedespecially inEurope.Consequently, there isaneedforinternationalcooperationaround�ightingterrorismbecauseofthefollowingfactors:

Answer:

IncapacityofIndividualstatetocontrolterroristthreats:Multilateralinitiativesbolsterstatecapacitytobuildinstitutionsandprogramsthatstrengthenarangeofactivities,frompolicingtocounterradicalizationprograms.

Enormousefforts:Giventhenumberofplayersinvolved,theenormityofthetaskandthelimitedresourcesavailable,effectivecoordinationiscrucial.

Crossborderlinkages:Terroristgroupscanoperatefromeverycorneroftheglobebytakingadvantage of porous borders and interconnected international systems—�inance,communications,andtransitaswellasusingsocialmediaandemergingtechnologies.

Effectivecriminaljusticecooperationamongstatesisnecessarytodenysafehavensandbringtojusticethosewhocommitorattempttocommitterroristcrimes.

Changingandevolvingnatureofterrorism:Itsassociatedmotivations,methodsofattackandchoiceof targetsareoftenevolving. Internationalcooperationcanensureeffectivevigilanceagainst it aswell asdenymisuseof any emerging technology such as arti�icial intelligence,dronesetc.

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Recognizing this need for international cooperation to combat terrorism, the United NationsGeneral Assembly adopted the in 2006. Its objective is toGlobal Counter-Terrorism Strategyenhancenational,regionalandinternationaleffortstocounterterrorism. TheGeneralAssemblyreviewstheStrategyeverytwoyears,accordingtomemberstates'counter-terrorismpriorities.TheGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategyiscomposedof4pillars:

Addressingtheconditionsconducivetothespreadofterrorism.

Preventingandcombatingterrorism.

Ensuringrespectforhumanrightsforallandruleoflawasthefundamentalbasisforthe�ightagainstterrorism.

Building states' capacity topreventandcombat terrorismandstrengthening the roleof theUnitedNationssysteminthisregard.

Mostrecently,aseriesofactionshavebeentakenbytheUNtoincreaseeffectivenessintacklingthechallengesofterrorismandviolentextremism,suchas:

EstablishingtheUNOf�iceofCounter-Terrorism(UNOCT),whichhasbeenamajorreformintheUNcounter-terrorismarchitecture.

UNGlobal Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compactwas signed in 2018 by 36UN entities,INTERPOL,andtheWorldCustomsOrganization.ItisaimedatensuringthattheUnitedNationssystemprovidescoordinatedcapacity-buildingsupporttoMemberStatesinimplementingtheUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategyandotherrelevantresolutionsattheirrequest.

However,deepdivisionsstillremainbetweenmemberstatesonissuessuchastheutilityoftheprevention approach to violent extremism, the identi�ication of the conditions and drivers toradicalization, the important role of civil society in ensuring an effective global strategy.Furthermore, concerns about failure to adequately address the human rights abuses beingcommittedandtheincreasingerosionofinternationalhumanitarianlawinthenameofcombattingterrorismneedtobeaddressedurgently.

Answer:

Internethasbroughtaboutarevolutioninthewaypeopleshareinformationandcollaborate–quickly,effectively,acrossborders,toanalmostlimitlessaudience.Internet,however,isalsobeingexploitedbytheterroristorganizationstocreateanewbrandof'internet-enabled'terrorism.

Bringoutthechallengesandopportunitiespresentedbyinternet.

Brie�lywriteabouttheuseofinternetbyterrorists.

3.Theuseof Internetcreatesbothchallengesandopportunities inthe�ightagainstterrorism.Discuss.Approach:

Concludeonthebasisoftheabovepointsonapositivenote.

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Themultivariateuseof Internet forpropagating terrorismposescorrespondingchallenges forsecurityagenciesworldwide:

Lending Anonymity: Use of internethas decentralized terrorist operations such as training,planningandexecutionofattacks(likelonewolfattacks)whichlendsanonymitytoperpetratorsandleavesbehindnotrace.

DisseminatingPropaganda:Useofinternetbyterroristorganisationstofacilitaterecruitment,promoteradicalization,andinciteviolencethroughvideos,games,andonlinechatroomshasenhancedtheirreach,whichisbecomingincreasinglydif�iculttomoderate.

TransnationalOperations:It isbeingfacilitatedbyinternetwhichhelpsthemevadenationaljurisdictionandprosecution.

IllicitFundRaising:Itisalmostgettingimpossibletoidentifythefundsreceivedthroughshellcompaniesoracomplexwebofonlinetransactions.

Cyber-Terrorism:Useofdigitalplatformsbyterroristscanthreatencriticalinfrastructureslikepower,banking,transportandcommunicationswhichcandestabilizeanentirenation.

Procuringweapons:Itisemergingasasourceofprocuringsophisticatedweaponseasilyandanonymouslyattheclickofabuttonviadarkweb,whicharedif�iculttotrace.

Theuseof internetbyterroristorganizations,alsopresentsopportunitiestogovernmentsandsecurityagenciestocounterthem:

Internetcanbehelpfultodisseminatesoundcounter-narrativestoawide-CounterPropaganda:audience(inmultiplelanguageswithease)aswellasthetargetedgroupswhoarelikelytoberadicalized.

Evidencecollection:Internetcanbeusedtogatherevidenceswhichcanbeusedforprosecution.

Intelligencegathering: Itcanhelpgovernmentsandsecurityagenciestopre-emptattacksbyanalysingtheonlinecommunicationsandactivitiesoftheterrorists.BigDataAnalyticscanalsobeemployedtoproactivelyidentifyanddetersuchattacks.

EffectiveTransnational Co-operation betweenintelligence/securityagencies inreal-timecanamplifytheglobalefforttocounterterrorism.

Theinternetisaprimeexampleofhowtechnologicaladvancementcanprovetobeadouble-edgedsword. A united, global response is the only hope for the international community to defeat'internet-enabled'terrorism.IndiarecentlyjoiningtheChristchurchCalltocounterterrorismandradicalizationonlineincludingsocialmediaisastepintherightdirection.Indiashouldlooktobuilduponsuchinitiatives.

Approach:

GiveabriefbackgroundabouttheincreasedincidenceofurbanterrorattacksinIndiaandtheirconsequence.

4.Urbanterrorismhasbeenontheriseinrecenttimes.Identifythefactorsthatmakeurbancentressusceptibletoterroristattacks.Whatlessonscanbelearntfromthepastattackstoputinplaceeffectivemeasurestocombatit?

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MentionsomeeffectivemeasuresinordertocounterthemenaceofgrowingurbanterrorisminIndia.

Exploringdifferentdimensions,accountforreasonsastowhyurbanenvironmentsofferbetterchoicetoterrorists.

Answer:

In recent times, cities such asMumbai, New York, Paris and London have faced the brunt ofterrorism. This indicates towards a trend of rise in urban terrorism. Following factors can beattributedforthisphenomenon:

Logisticalsupport likearms,medicines, food,andlodgingarereadilyavailable inanaverageurbanarea.

Urbancentreshavebecomeatargetbecausetheyarecentresandsymbolsofpolitical,economicandculturalpower.

Unlikeruralareas,urbanareasoffermorescopeforanonymitywhichenablesthe'terrorist�ishtoswiminurbanwaterseasily'.

Population is not only high in cities, but also diverse, dense and concentrated in certaingeographicalpockets.

Maneuverabilityofterroristsisguaranteedbythepresenceofpublicandprivatetransport.

Terroristgroupsgenerally�inditeasiertorecruitprospectiveterroristsinapredictablemanner.

Urban areas have administrative, economic, and political headquarters with criticalinfrastructure,wheremoredamagecanbeaf�lictedwithrelativeease.

Readyavailabilityofprintandelectronicmediawhosewidecoveragealsomagni�iesthefear-generatingcapabilitiesofterroristacts.

Terror attack on cities undermines India's booming economy and vitiating the investmentclimate.

Largeareasuffersdestructionandcontaminationwherenormallifeisparalysedforseveraldays.

Italsoweakensthefabricofsocialcohesion.

Target Hardening: Terrorists usually choose high-pro�ile soft targets like markets, railwaystationsetc.Targethardeningthroughblastwalls,attack-resistantbollardsandshatter-proofglass is one way to deal with this.Also, surveillance cameras, metal and explosive vapourdetectorsandX-rayscanningmachinesshouldbeinstalledatkeyaccesspoints.

Itisimperativetostrengthenlocalintelligenceforpro-Strengtheningactionableintelligence:activecounter-terroristmeasures.Thismustbeaccompaniedbycommunitypolicing.

Consequencesofurbanterrorism

CombatingUrbanTerrorism

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International cooperation:Governmentmust enter into extensive cooperative arrangementswith friendly countries to maximize the advantages of intelligence sharing, seek trainingassistanceandacquireexpertiseavailablewithcountrieslikeIsraelandtheUnitedStatesetc.

Counter-terroristoperations:NationalSecurityGuard(NSG)mustbeequippedwithstate-of-the-art technology and equipment to enable the commandos to enhance their operationalperformance and minimise their own casualties. Every state should have a NSG-type ofcommandoforcetocounterlethalterrorstrikes.

Trained manpower: Security personnel should be sensitised to spotting and segregatingsuspiciousobjectsthatareleftbehindbesidestrainingtheminrescueandreliefoperations.Cityplanners can also introduce strategies to undermine radicalization by strengthening socialbondsbetweendifferenturbancommunities.

pointsofterroristsandtheirhostlocations–onemayusephysicalmapofIndia

Answer:

5.InwhatwaysdoesthephysiographyofIndiaposeachallengetoitscounter-terrorismefforts?Whatcanbedonetodealwiththesechallenges?

Approach:

Relatethesegeographicalfeatureswiththevulnerabilityoftheseborderstoterrorismandhamperingofcounter-terrorismefforts

Urbanterrorismisaphenomenonthatposesgravethreatatatimewhenmoreandmorepeoplearemoving to cities. The challenge is to safeguard cities against terrorism while ensuring theircosmopolitan,diverseanddynamiccharacter.Thus,amultidimensionalapproach-involvinginter-citycooperationpolice-communityrelationsandintelligence,securityandemergencyresponseservices-istheneedofthehour.

ThephysiographyofIndiaismarkedbydiversefeatures,mostprominentbeingitslonglandandmaritimeborders.Vastcoastline, ruggedterrain,speci�ically forests,and internationalbordershaveeffectivelyaidedterroristgroupsinvariouspartsofIndia.Multiplechallengestocounter-terrorismeffortsemanatefromvariousgeographicalfeaturesandclimaticvariationsdiscussedinthetableaspermarkingsgivenon�igure:

Discussstepsthatcanbetakentoovercomethesebarriers

IdentifyfeaturesofphysiographyofIndiaalongitslandandseaborders,thatbecometheentry

1

45

3 2

Figure:FrontiersofIndia

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Borderregion

(see�igure)Physiography Challengesposedto

counter-terrorismefforts

Beyondsurveillancerange;providespacesforterroriststoingress-attack-exit

Illicitdrugs,armstradeandtraf�icking;freemovementofNEinsurgents

Thicklyforestedregion–hometomanyethniccommunities

Plains,riverinebelts,hillswithhardlyanynaturalobstacles;adverse

climaticconditionssuchas�looding

Himalayanrangeswithsteepruggedslopes

Seasonal�loodsalongGujaratborder;rivercrossingsalongPunjabborder

Shallowsandybeachesanddunes,lagoons,dissectionsbyriversandestuaries,residualhills,rocky

highlands

Patrollingrequiresspecialvehicles,boatsetc.withrelevantlytrained

personnelCoastline

Movementofdrugs,illicittradealongthegaps,shiftingsanddunesmaking

fencingineffective,terroristin�iltration

Heavilypopulatedandcultivatedarea;landacquisitionisdif�icult;repeatedsubmergenceoffencesetc.;illegal

migration/traf�icking

Fakecurrency,openborders,shiftingboundariesduetochangingcourseof

rivers

1

2

3

4

5

Fencingand�loodlighting,withperiodicmaintenance,alongIndia'salllandborders,ashasbeen

SchemesschemessuchastheBorderAreaDevelopmentProgramme,followingstepscanbetakentodealwithphysiographicalchallenges:

donealongPunjabandRajasthan'sinternationalborders.

ConstructionofstrategicborderroadsandBorderOut-postsforbetterpatrolling.

Deploymentofhi-teche-surveillanceequipmentlikeNightVisionDevices,HandheldThermal

Beside these infrastructuralmechanisms,updatingofborderagreementswithallneighbouringnations,toensuresustainablepeace,isindispensable.

Imagers,UnattendedGroundSensorsetc.asproposedunderComprehensiveIntegratedBorder

Specialtrainingsforcoastalsecurityforcesandstatepolicepersonnelinmaritimeactivities.

UAVscanaidthebordersecuritybysurveillingininaccessibleanddif�icultlocations.

ManagementSystem(CIBMS)andimplementingitalongalllandborders.

Mountainranges,riversandstreams,Passesopenevenduringwinters

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whichitseesisagainstPakistan'sinterests.

somegroupsfromUNsanctionscommitteewhichisbeingopposedbyRussia.

ThedelayinmovingaheadwithbanonthenewheadofTalibanorIndia'sLackofglobalconsensus:

Fragmentationisexplainedbythefollowing:

decidedtoremovenamesofsomeTalibanleadersfromUNSanctionscommittee.AttheBRICS

Thisdifferenceisseenineverysphere,including�ightagainstTusslebetweenUSandRussia:

thatkeptIndia'sdesirefortoughstatementson“cross-borderterrorism”fromPakistanatbay.

Fore.g.:whileIndianandAfghanistangovernmentsopposeanynegotiationwithTalibanwhile

Nonetheless,thebilateralaspectinthewholedevelopmentcannotbeignoredeither.

terrorism.

India'sattemptstodesignateindividualsinvolvedinplanningandorchestratingactsofterroronitssoil, such asMasoodAzhar, as a global terrorist underUNSCResolution 1267has been put ontechnicalholdbyChinaInthiscontext, ithasbeenobservedbymanythisrepresentsatrendofconsensusoncombatingterrorismglobally.

InatrilateralmeetinginDecember2016theyhaveEmergingaxisofPakistan-China-Russia:

Answer:

proposedConventionAgainstTerrorism.

formulateaglobalframeworkonterrorism.

governmentinAfghanistan.Thisdiluteswaragainstterrorism.EvenUSAispushingtoremove

Russia,ChinaandPakistanarereadytonegotiatewithcertainfactionsofTaliban.

TowardstheendalsoidentifyhowbilateralimpetuscannotbedeniedinexplainingtheChinese

Thus,itshowsthat,everycountryischoosingitsowntermstopursueitsownobjectives.Thisdilutesthe�ightagainstterrorism,andre�lectsthelargernarrativeoffragmentationofglobalconsensusagainstterrorism.

move.Concludebysuggestingawayforward.

Afghanistan,butoflatemanycountries(likeRussia,China,USetc.)areintalkwithittostabilizethe

Noconsensusonagloballyacceptablede�initionof“terrorism”atUNGeneralAssemblyto

Adichotomyisapparentlydevelopingasterroristswhoaregoodorbad.Goodandbadterrorists:

Though,9/11attackstartedasanoffensiveagainstTalibaninOutreachtowardsTaliban:

ChinaisbuildingCPECwithPakistan,thereforeChinaisblockinganymoveEconomicinterest:

summitinOctoberandtheHeartofAsiaconferenceinDecember,itwastheRussia-Chinacombine

6.China'smovetoblockIndia'sattemptsofdesignatingcertainindividualsasterroristattheUNisnotpurelybilateral,ratheritre�lectsalargertrendoffragmentingglobalconsensusonterrorism.Criticalyanalyse.

Approach:

Intheintroduction,brie�lyexplainIndia'sattempttodesignateindividualssuchasMasoodAzaharasterroristattheUNthrough1267committee.

IdentifyingChina'srole,delineatethefactorsthatcanbecitedastheexampleofalackofconsensusonterrorismglobally.

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ChineseinterestsinPakistananditsdifferenceswithIndiaonborderissues,SouthChinaSeaaswellasIndianOceanregionprovidesgroundforargumenttobemadeforabilateralimpetusbehindChina'sactioninthe1267committee.

Attheglobalstage,MasudAzhar'sbanisapieceinamuchlargerjigsawpuzzleofterrorism.Inthefaceofweakeningglobalconsensus,thatoncehelpeditapplypressureonPakistan,IndianeedstoconcentrateonbilaterallyengagingChinawhilesimultaneouslypushingforwardwithitsattemptatforgingaglobalconsensusonterrorismatmultilateralforumsbyrevitalizinginitiativessuchastheComprehensiveConventiononTerrorism.

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4.UPSCMainsPreviousYears'Questions

3.Terrorismisemergingasacompetitiveindustryoverthelastfewdecades.”Analysetheabovestatement.(2016)

1.Indiangovernmenthasrecentlystrengthenedtheanti-terrorismlawsbyamendingtheunlawfulactivities(Prevention)act(UAPA),1967andtheNIAAct.AnalyzethechangesinthecontextofprevailingsecurityenvironmentwhilediscussingthescopeandreasonsforopposingtheUAPAbyhumanrightsorganizations.(2019)

2.Thescourgeofterrorismisagravechallengetonationalsecurity.Whatsolutionsdoyousuggesttocurbthisgrowingmenace?Whatarethemajorsourcesofterroristfunding?(2017)

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