IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. SC13-665District Court Case No. 1D12-2638

Lower Case No. 2011-CA-2412

ROBERT MICHAEL ARDIS

Petitioner,

v.

PENSACOLA STATE COLLEGE

Respondents,

PETITIONER'S AMENDED JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF

On Review from the District Court ofAppeal,First District, State ofFlorida

ROBERT MICHAEL ARDIS4133 AQUA VISTA DRIVEPENSACOLA, FL 32504850-454-5418

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage No.

TableofCitations....................................................... ......2

Statement of the Case and Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

JurisdictionalStatement.................................................... ....9

Argument

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE ARPIL 4, 2013DECISION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

REASONS TO EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

The Decision of the First District in Pensacola State College ExpresslyConstrues a Provision of the State or Federal Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

The Decision ofthe District Court in Pensacola State College Expressly Affectsa Class ofConstitutional or State Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Decision in Pensacola State College Expressly and Directly Conflicts on SameQuestionofLaw........................................................13

The Decision of the District Court in Pensacola State College Expressly andDirectly Conflicts with a Decision of Another District Court of Appeal and theSupreme Court on the Same Issue ofLaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CONCLUSION. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

TABLE OF CITATITIONS

Constitutional and Statutory Authorities Pane No.

U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.5......................................................11

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U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Article I, Section 2 of the Fla. Const. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Article I, Section 9 of the Fla. Const. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Fla. Const. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9, 11, 12, 13

Article IX of the Fla. Const. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

9U.S.C.A....................................................................15

9 U.S.C.A. § 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .9, 10

9 U.S.C.A. § 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

FloridaStatutes§59.06.................................................. .......6

Florida Statutes §59.29. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Florida Statutes § 682.13(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Florida Statutes § 682.13(1)(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Florida Statutes §1000.21(3)(t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Appellate Rules and Other Authorities Page No.

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11

Fla. R. App. P 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11, 13

Florida Administrative Code, Rule: 6A-14.0411. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7, 12

Anstead, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ofFlorida, 29 Nova L. Rev. at513-515 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 126. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

8 Fla, Pl, & Pr. Forms § 59:4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Decisional Law Page No.

Altchiler v. State Dept. ofProfessional Regulation, Div. ofProfessions, Bd OfDenistry,442 So,2d 349 (Fla.App. 1 ,Dist., 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Apartment Inv. andMgmt. Co. v. Flamingo/South Beach 1 Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 2012WL 832828 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Ardis v. Pensacola State College, No. 1D12-2638(Fla. 1st DCA April 4, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16

Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

C Squared Const., Inc. v. ConsolidatedBldg. Corp.862 So. 2d 767, (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). . . . . .15

Chancey v. Chancey, 880 So. 2d 1281, 2nd DCA(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Charbonneau v. Morse Operations, Inc., 727 So.2d 1017 Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1999 . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Schwalier, 901 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . 11

First Options ofChicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,514 U.S. 938, 115 S.Ct. 1920,131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FordMotor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9, 14

Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Hall v. State, 752 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Hardee v. State, 534 So.2d 706, 708 n.* (Fla. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Hulsey v. Ownes, 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Kincaid v. World Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla.1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 10

Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Martinez v. Fraredas So. 2d 489, 3rd DCA (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Murray v. Regier, 872 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Powertel v. Bexley,743 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Price v. State, 995 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Russell v. Florida, 129 S.Ct. 272 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Schnurmacher Holding, Inc v. Noriega 542 So. 2d 1327 1328 (Fla. 1989) . . . . . . . . .8, 12, 13, 14

Schreiber v. Rowe, 814 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Sorren v Kumble, 578 So,2d 836, Fla.App.3.Dist.,1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Spiegel v. University ofSouth Florida, 555 So.2d 428,Fla.App.2.Dist.,1989, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Texton v. Hancock, 359 So.2d 895, Fla.App.1.Dist.,1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 15

Ullah v. State, 679 So.2d 1242 (Fla.. 5th DCA 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..16

Woods-Hoskins-Young Co. v. Taylor Development Co., 98 Fla. 156, 122 So.224, 225 (1929). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Yates v. St. Johns Beach Development Co., 122 Fla. 141, 165 So. 384, 385 (1935) . . . . . . . . . . . 6

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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The Petitioner would begin this jurisdictional briefwith the following quotation from this

Honorable Court, written nearly eighty years ago, and which still resonates to this day. "The

appellate courts have a broadpower to make dispositions thatjustice may require." Yates v. St.

Johns Beach Development Co., 122 Fla. 141, 165 So. 384, 385 (1935). This Court's jurisdiction

is required to resolve broad legal issues and public policy questions as set forth below)

The decision of the First District Court in Ardis v. Pensacola State College 1D12-2638

(Fla. 1" DCA April 4, 2013), attached as Exhibit A, generally sets forth the case and facts.

Wherein the facts are not self-evident, the Petitioner will specify the particulars necessitating the

review ofthis Court.2 The Petitioner will do his best to comport this jurisdictional brief in a

manner suitable for the review of this Court. From the beginning, the Petitioner would inform the

Court that he is not an attorney, but rather, an academic, and would request some latitude from

the Court if this brief is not perfect. The Petitioner will do his utmost to convey as much detail as

possible to this Honorable Court. However, the page limitations ofthe jurisdictional will not

allow him to include everything. Therefore, the Petitioner respectfully requests leave of the

1 Florida Statutes § 59.06 Matters reviewable on appeal.-(1) WHAT MAY BE ASSIGNEDAS ERROR.-All judgments and orders made in any action wherein the trial court: (a) Mayallow or refuse to allow any motion: 1. For a new trial or rehearing, 2. For leave to amendpleadings, 3. For leave to file new or additional pleadings, 4. To amend the record, or 5.For continuance of the action; or (b) Shall sustain or overrule any motion to dismiss the actionmay be assigned as error upon any appeal from the final judgment or order in the action. Theappellate court shall hear and determine the matter so assigned under like rules as in otheractions.2 Pro se pleadings should be liberally construed see Chancey v. Chancey, 880 So. 2d 1281, 2"dDCA(2004) and Martinez v. Fraxedas So. 2d 489, 3d DCA (1996). Pleadings in this case arebeing filed by Petitioner in propria persona, wherein pleadings are to be considered withoutregard to technicalities. Propria, pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards ofperfection as practicing lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459(11th Cir1990), also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995).

Court to be allowed to supplement the jurisdictional brief for the full review of the Court before

the Court makes its decision to invoke or postpone its discretionary jurisdiction.

The Petitioner respectfully requests and prays that this Court invokes its discretionary

jurisdiction for the following reasons. First, this case turns on the constitutional property rights

ofa tenured professor3 in the Florida Community College System. The Petitioner was wrongfully

terminated, the arbitration proceedings were irrevocably tainted, and the decision of the First

District conflicts with decisional law regarding such matters * Second, this case concerns an

arbitration proceeding that was not executed pursuant to the parties' contract(CBA), therefore, it

fails upon the precepts ofcontract law5 and conflicts with decisional law regarding such

matters.'As cited in 4 Am. Jur. 2dAlternative Dispute Resolution §126, the arbitrator was not

selected pursuant to the parties' contract, thus conferring no authority upon her 7 Third, as

evidenced in its Order of April 4, 2013, the District Court permitted the Appellee to plead

matters outside the Record on Appeal which unfairly prejudiced the Petitioner and conflicts with

decisional law regarding such matters. Reversible error is apparent on its face and this Court

3 Florida Administrative Code, Rule: 6A-14.0411, Issuance of Continuing Contracts* Texton v. Hancock, 359 So.2d 895, Fla.App.1.Dist.,1978, A tenured teacher acquires a valuableproperty right in her expectation of continued employment. See also Spiegel v. University ofSouth Florida, 555 So.2d 428,Fla.App.2.Dist.,1989, Tenure is a protected property rightU.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.5 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,514 U.S. 938, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985(1995); Powertel v. Bexley,743 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).64 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 126, Arbitrators must be selected pursuantto the method provided in the arbitration agreement. A selection that is not authorized by thecontract, or by a statute that has been effectively incorporated into the contract, confers noauthority on the person selected. Thus, courts do not hesitate to vacate an arbitration awardwhere the arbitrators were not selected according to the contract-specified method.(R, 1011)emphasis added)It should be noted that as the real party in interest, the Petitioner, had no role in the selection of

arbitrator Renovitch and attempted to object to her appointment, but was ignored. Such actionswarrant this Court's discretionary jurisdiction.

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should invoke its discretionary jurisdiction and permit further discussion and argument of these

issues.H. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The termination ofPetitioner Ardis from his position as a tenured professor at Pensacola

State College was unconstitutional and this Court should invoke its discretionary jurisdiction and

Order Briefs from the parties 8 Petitioner Ardis is to be afforded a valuable property right in the

expectation of his continued employment as a tenured professor and the decision of the First

District negates such property rights.'

Furthermore, the decision of the First District is inconsistent with the holding of this

Court in Schnurmacher Holding, Inc v. Noriega 542 So. 2d 1327 1328 (Fla. 1989) in that the

issues bringing forth this jurisdictional brief concern arbitration proceedings. As to be further

argued below, the arbitration contract(R, 438) was ignored by the First District in its April 4,

2013 Order and such actions are wholly inconsistent with the precepts ofcontract law.1° Not only

does the decision conflict with this Court's precedent in Noriega, but it also conflicts with

Federal Law, to be discussed in the Question Presented."

In its decision ofApril 4, 2013, the First District confirms it accepted the pleading of the

Appellee/Respondent submitted to the Court on March 25, 2013. Florida Courts have

8 The Petitioner had an exemplary work record at Pensacola State College, with not so much aseven a verbal warning, before the unjustified termination that brings forth this jurisdictionalbrief. See (R, 43) and (R, 1497)9 Please see Florida Statutes §1000.21(3)(t) and Florida Constitution, Article IX1° 8 Fla, Pl, & Pr. Forms § 59:4, If an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to theFlorida Arbitration Code provides a method for the appointment ofarbitrators or an umpire, th.gtmethod must be followed. (R, 1014) (emphasis added) See also (R, 438) and (R, 312)" Florida Statutes § 59.29 Amendment of appellate proceedings -The appellate court may, atany time, in the furtherance of justice, upon such terms as may be just, permit appellateproceedings to be amended.

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consistently adhered to the rule that appellate review is limited to the record. As this Court

explained long ago in Woods-Hoskins-Young Company v. Taylor Development Company, that

"[an] appellate court is necessarily confined to a review of the proceedings ofthe trial court"

and that " [t]he record ofthe trial court is the only legal evidence ofsuch proceedings."" It

follows from these basic propositions that a reviewing court may not consider a matter that is

outside the record. This is precisely what the First District did by admitting the March 25, 2013

pleading of the Appellee into the Record in these matters and this warrants the discretionary

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.

III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a decision ofa district

court of appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court or

another district court ofappeal on the same point of law. Art. V, § 3(b)(3) Fla. Const;

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(ii). Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iii), Fla. R. App. P.

9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv). In Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981), this Court

explained that a discussion ofthe applicable legal principles supplies a sufficient basis for a

petition for conflict review, and that it is not necessary to identify conflicting district court or

Supreme Court decisions in order to create an express conflict under § 3(b)(3).

IV. ARGUMENT

QUESTION PRESENTED

If a method for selecting an arbitrator exists, pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining

agreement, is such a method required pursuant to 9 U.S.C.A. § 5," or may parties other than the

Woods-Hoskins-Young Co. v. Taylor Development Co., 98 Fla. 156, 122 So. 224, 225(1929).

real party in interest "select" an arbitrator in a manner than is wholly inconsistent with the

parties' contractual method and the policies and procedures ofthe Federal Mediation and

Conciliation Service derived from 9 U.S.C.A. § 2," Title II of the Labor Management Relations

Act of 1947 (Pub L. 80-101) as amended?

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE APRIL 4,2013 DECISION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

This Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a decision of a district court of appeal

which expressly and directly conflicts with a decision ofthis Court or another district court of

appeal. Art. V. § 3(b)(3) Fla. Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv). "The constitutional

standard is whether the decision of the District Court on itsface collides with aprior decision of

this Court or another District Court on the same point oflaw so as to create an inconsistency or

conflict among the precedents."Kincaid v. World Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla.1963). As to

be demonstrated below, this standard is met in Ardis v. Pensacola State College. As clearly

evidenced in the First District's April 4, 2013 Order, it was that decision, and not the decision of

February 14, 2013, that resulted in the mandate ofApril 4, 2013.

REASONS TO EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

The Petitioner seeks the review of this Honorable Court to avert a miscarriage ofjustice.

Once the Court accepts jurisdiction, to resolve a conflict, it has the authority to address

appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; (emphasisadded)" 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 provides: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contractevidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafterarising out ofsuch contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or anypartthereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out ofsuch a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save uponsuch grounds as exist at law or in equityfor the revocation ofany contract.(emphasis added)

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all issues properly raised in the lower court. Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642 (Fla.) cert. den.

Russell v. Florida, 129 S.Ct. 272 (2008). Once the Supreme Court has jurisdiction based on a

conflict ofdecisions, this Court may address, in its discretion, other issues properly raised and

argued before the Court15 even though such other issues are not bases for jurisdiction;" the Court

may exercise its jurisdiction to decide all the issues necessary to a full and final resolution of the

case." This Court should exercise its discretion in favor ofaccepting the instant case, because it

involves issues ofgreat public importance. Specifically it involves issues related to statutory

arbitration proceedings; contract law; a tenured college professor's constitutional property rights

related to academic tenure; and improper citation to matters outside the appellate record by the

Appellee/Respondent.

A. The Decision ofthe First District in Pensacola State College Expressly Construes aProvision ofthe State or Federal Constitution

Under both article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Fla. Const. and Fla. R. App. P.

9.030(a)(2)(A)(ii), this Court has jurisdiction to review decisions ofa district court that expressly

construes a provision ofthe state or federal constitution. The Petitioner's constitutional property

rights", as a tenured college professor, are at issue and this Court should invoke its discretionary

jurisdiction and Order Briefs in this cause. The fundamental precepts of contract lawl' m a

issue and this Court should invoke its discretionaryjurisdiction on this point as well. To

Price v, State, 995 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2008); Murray v. Regier, 872 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2002);Schreiber v. Rowe, 814 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2002).

Price v. State, 995 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2008).Hall v. State, 752 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2000).

isUnited States Constitution, Amendments V and XIV and Fla. Const. Article I, Section 2 andArticle I, Section 9 .19Please see Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Schwalier, 901 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2005)(citing Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2003)); Gunderson, 31 Fla.L. Weekly D2339.

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summarize this issue, the Petitioner is a tenured college professor with constitutionally

protected property rights. The decision of the First District ignored those property rights and

deprived the Petitioner of that which he is guaranteed. This is an issue that affects tens of

thousands ofFloridians and their families and this Court should invoke its discretionary

jurisdiction since so many Floridians are impacted by such a decision.

B. The Decision ofthe District Court in Pensacola State College Expressly Affects a ClassofConstitutional or State Officers;

Under both article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Fla. Const. and Fla. R. App. P

9.030(a)(2)(A)(iii), this Court has jurisdiction to review decisions ofa district court ofappeal

that expressly affects a class ofconstitutional officers. As a tenured college professor, under both

Florida law and Federal law, the Petitioner has a constitutional right to the expectation ofhis

continued employment in that position. Please see Florida Administrative Code, Rule: 6A-

14.0411, Issuance ofContinuing Contracts. The decision of the First District negates the

property rights of the Petitioner and ignores the contractual requirements ofthe selection of an

arbitrator. The Petitioner respectfully avers that such actions are untenable and conflict with

this Court's ruling in Schnurmacher Holding, Inc v. Noriega 542 So. 2d 1327 1328 (Fla. 1989),

specifically that portion ofthis Court's ruling regarding the "operative documents" as same

relate to arbitration proceedings.20

The Petitioner acquiesces that this case is complicated by the presence ofconstitutional

issues; arbitration issues; contract issues; and record issues. However, any one of these issues

raises the threshold of reversible error warranting the invoking of this Court's discretionary

jurisdiction. When combined the level of reversible error, and public policy violations, is

20 Please see Florida Statutes § 682.13(1)(c)

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undeniable and this Court should invoke its discretionary jurisdiction, based upon the totality of

error, and Order Briefs from the parties.

C. The Decision in Pensacola State College Expressly and Directly Conflicts on SameQuestion ofLaw;

For judicial brevity the Petitioner would aver that this section ofthe jurisdictional brief is

adequately covered in the following section.

D. The Decision ofthe District Court in Pensacola State College Expressly and DirectlyConflicts with a Decision ofAnother District Court ofAppeal and the Supreme Courton the Same Issue ofLaw;

Under both article V, section 3 (b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Fla. R. App.P. 9.030

(a)(2)(A)(iv), this Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of a district court ofappeal that

expressly and directly conflict with a decision ofanother district or this Court on the same

question of law. One type of express" and direct conflict that has been recognized by this Court

is misapplication of this Court's precedent. See Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.

2003) (invoking jurisdiction over a case that misapplied a previous decision of the Court);

Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2002) (accepting jurisdiction over "a decision from

the Third District Court that misapplies this Court's [prior] holding"). The decision of the First

District expressly and directly conflicts with Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d

1327, 1328 (Fla.1989) by misapplying that decision and holding that the "operative documents"

related to the selection ofan arbitrator, do not constitute reversible error. As a result, the Order of

the First District in Pensacola State College and this Court's opinion in Schnurmacher Holding,

In Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980), the Supreme Court defined the term"expressly" by its ordinary dictionary meaning: "in an express manner." The dictionary meaningof the term "express" as set forth in the Jenkins opinion is: "to represent in words" or "to giveexpression to."

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Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327,1328 (Fla. 1989), are hopelessly irreconcilable. The Noriega

decision does not stand alone in conflict with the First District's decision in Ardis v Pensacola

State College, indeed, there are a myriad ofdecisional law conflicts to be addressed more

completely below. This Court has conflict jurisdiction, since the decision of the First District

goes into depth and addresses the issue of reversible error and is much more than a per curiam

affirmance." The conflict is demonstrated by the majority statement regarding the issue of

reversible error" that is apparent on the face of the opinion," but it is not necessary that the

district court explicitly note the conflict." The conflicts presented by this jurisdictional brief are

conflicts with decisional law of this Supreme Court, other District Courts of Appeal, and, indeed,

with the very District Court from which this jurisdictional brief originates.26 The decision of the

First District in Ardis v. Pensacola State College, directly conflicts with the following decisional

law:Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327,1328 (Fla. 1989)[I]t is well settled that "the award ofarbitrators in statutory arbitration proceedings cannotbe set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts, if theaward is within the scope of the submission, and the arbitrators are not guilty of theacts of misconduct set forth in the statute, the award operates as a final and conclusivejudgment."(emphasis supplied)"

See Anstead, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ofFlorida, 29 Nova L. Rev.at 513-515 (2005).

See id. at 513.Hardee v. State, 534 So.2d 706, 708 n.* (Fla. 1988).Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981).See Anstead, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida, 29 Nova L.

Rev. at 513-515 (2005).The parties' contract specifies a method for the selection of the arbitrator(R, 438), such

method was not followed, this was admitted by the Appellee,(R,312) yet the First District electedto ignore this fact which conflicts with SchnurmacherHolding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327,1328 (Fla. 1989). Specifically, the "operative documents" provision ofNoriega. Please also seeCharbonneau v. Morse Operations, Inc., 727 So.2d 1017 Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1999

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Apartment Inv. and Mgmt. Co. v. Flamingo/South Beach 1 Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,2012 WL 832828 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).Arbitration agreements are governed by general contract law, and courts must discernthe intent of the parties from the language used in their agreement.2s (emphasis added)

C Squared Const., Inc. v. Consolidated Bldg. Corp.862 So. 2d 767, (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)A party to an arbitration proceeding was concerned about the bias of an arbitrator andfiled a petition to enjoin the American Arbitration Association from proceeding with thearbitration. The trial court apparently was persuaded and entered an injunction. Theappellate court issued a writ of prohibition finding that the trial court lacked jurisdictionto enjoin the arbitration. Any quarrels with the arbitrator were to be addressed in amotion to vacate the award at the end. (emphasis supplied)"

Sorren v Kumble, 578 So,2d 836, Fla.App.3.Dist.,1991For purposes of federal and state statutes providing for setting aside ofarbitration awardon theory that award was procured by ,,undue means "undue means" refers to suchmatters as ex parte communications or undisclosed relationships between arbitratorand one of contestants and does not cover circumstance where evidence is offered toarbitration panel during ts proceedings. West F. S.A. s 682.13(1)(a); 9 U.S.C.A as 10,10(a) (emphasis added)

Texton v. Hancock. 359 So.2d 895 Fla.App.,1978 .Where fmding that tenured college psychology instructor had tried to intimidatewitnesses from testifying against her had no predicate in charges filed against her,such finding, in absence of notice, could not be a lawful basis for herdischarge.(emphasis added)

Altchiler v. State Dept. ofProfessional Regulation, Div. ofProfessions, Bd. Of Denistry,442 So,2d 349 (Fla.App. 1 ,Dist., 1983)

2s The parties' contract contains a specific method for the selection of an arbitrator(R, 438). Suchmethod was not followed, thereby violating the contract, and the Appellate Court's decision inAprtment Inv. andMgmt. Co. v. Flamingo/SouthBeach 1 Condominium Ass'n, Inc2 For the same issues raised in footnote 21, and the undisclosed relationships between thearbitrator and the attorneys for the Appellee, the Petitioner sought to have the award vacated.Yet, the First District chose to ignore these facts.* The Petitioner did not learn of the extensive relationships between the arbitrator and theattorneys for the Appellee until after arbitration had concluded. The extensive relationshipstotaled over fifty (50) years of undisclosed relationships. In the case of the arbitrator, and thelead attorney for the Appellee, they served together as two of the three commissioners onPERC(R, 314). The First District chose to ignore these relationships which conflicts with Sorrenv Kumble, 578 So,2d 836, Fla.App.3.Dist.,1991.

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That an appellate court may not consider matters outside the record is so elementalthat there is no excuse for any attorney to attempt to bring such matters before thecourt.(emphasis provided)"

Ullah v. State, 679 So.2d 1242 (Fla.. 5th DCA 1996)Appellate court may not consider matters outside record: When party refers tomatters outside appellate record in its brief, it is proper for court to strike brief.(emphasisprovided)

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner is sincerely appreciative to this Honorable Court for its careful review of

these important matters. If this Court fmds it needs additional information for clarification

purposes, the Petitioner respectfully avails himself to the service ofthe Court, the Petitioner

avails himself to the Court.

As evidenced by their March 25, 2013 pleading, and other such examples contained

above, the Respondents have not been forthright in these proceedings. The Petitioner would

respectfully request that this Court hold these matters in abeyance and postpone the jurisdictional

question until the Petitioner can respond to the Appellee/Respondent's jurisdictional brief. The

Petitioner respectfully requests such latitude since he is not an attorney and is self-represented.

The Appellee/Respondents have a team of lawyers at their disposal which puts the Petitioner at a

distinct disadvantage warranting rebuttal.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court invoke its

discretionary jurisdiction to review the First District Court ofAppeal's decision in Ardis v.

Pensacola State College, No. 1D12-2638 (Fla. 1st DCA April 4, 2013).

" The March 25, 2013 pleading of the Appellee presented matters to the First District that wereclearly outside the Record. Notwithstanding this fact, the First District allowed such a pleadingand refused to allow the Petitioner to reply. The Appellee's attorneys have a demonstratedpattern of such behavior as evidenced by the Record in the instant case. Please see (R, 1166) (R,1179) (R, 1181-1183)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing, and its attachments,

were served on this 24* day ofMay 2013 to the attorneys for the Appellee/Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this jurisdiction brief complies with the provisions

contained in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedures.

/s/RobertMichaelArdisRobert Michael Ardis, Petitioner4133 Aqua Vista DrivePensacola, FL 32504850-454-5418

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