Risk & RSS: A Summary.

Anthony Taylor – Stockholm, Sweden: [email protected]

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Anthony Taylor

December 2014

Risk and Rampage School Shootings

A comparative study of extreme risk in schools

(Summary)

Geographical focus:

Finland

Sweden


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Contents

Front Page 1 Contents 2 Summary Introduction 3 Study Title and Study Abstract 4 Sixty-five brief facts and findings of the study 5 – 12 Appendix 1: Threats in Sweden 13 - 14 Appendix 2: Rampage School Shooting in Sweden 15 – 18 Appendix 3: Perceived Character traits and Actions of Students 19 – 20


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Summary Introduction I produced this summary for professionals and non-professionals that have an interest in protecting people in schools and communities where schools exist. It is also for any nation who together with a school and its community will often suffer the physical and emotional impact of that rare and extreme event - a school shooting*. The contents of this summary are taken from my dissertation, which concluded a three-year Masters degree that focused on risk, crisis and disaster management. In November 2014 the University of Leicester, England awarded the author a Masters degree in Emergency Planning Management. My dissertation was a study of risk, the perception of and the communication of risk from personnel in schools across three countries: England, Finland and Sweden; I also approached experts in Swedish agencies that support schools. The geographical focus of my study was Finland and Sweden; the reasons why I chose this region are explained in the study abstract on page 4. To assist me I used the rare and complex Rampage School Shooting (RSS) phenomena as an indicator - a guide, which allowed to measure and compare the forms of risk under scrutiny. My study revealed that experts in Finland and Sweden already had knowledge of RSS. In Finland agencies routinely shared that knowledge with schools, in Sweden they did not. The reasons why the sharing protocols in Finland and Sweden differ are briefly revealed in this summary, as are sixty-five numbered facts, which are supported by the three appendices. The underlining recommendations and message in my study was that whilst more research is needed, I strongly suggested that knowledge of RSS if acquired is best shared with all concerned particularly with schools. I also suggested that shared knowledge of this kind will increase the ability of educators, support staff and others to identify and help vulnerable students in schools particularly those that possess or have a growing propensity for extreme violence.

* In June 2014 Skolverket, The Swedish National Agency for Education announced a future programme focused on educating schools in preventative measures surrounding the school-shooting phenomenon.1

Rampage school shootings are of concern worldwide. This study looked into the potential of these events happening in Finland and Sweden and used the UK as a yardstick to measure Sweden and Finland's preparedness against. The study has a good deal of significance (Leicester University, England 2014).2

1 http://t.sr.se/1kc34Qm

2 Examiner comments: Leicester University, England (2014)

http://t.sr.se/1kc34Qm


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Study Title High Risk in Scandinavia: A comparative study of perception and communication of risk in Finnish and Swedish schools and agencies supporting schools.

Study Abstract

This study focuses on the discourses of risk between teachers, support staff, deputy principals and principals in schools located in Finland and Sweden – two nations with opposing experiences of Rampage School Shootings (RSS). Finland has experienced two RSS in the last decade: one in 2007 and the other in 2008. The financial costs of these incidents, and the various physical and mental traumas caused, were considerable and far reaching. Two national inquiries followed resulting in recommendations of closer integration between schools and agencies that support school. 3 Sweden has never experienced a modern-day RSS. Risk perception and risk communication in Finnish and Swedish schools would therefore assumingly be different.

The focus of this research is to examine in what ways the perception and communication of risk in schools in Finland and Sweden differ in the approaches to RSS prevention and preparedness.

In chapter one the rationale of the study and the discourses of risk are

defined. Chapter two examines the RSS phenomenon. Chapter three presents the literature review. In chapter four I describe the chosen methodology: a comparative triangulated study based on interviews and online questionnaires completed by participants in schools in England, Finland and Sweden. Chapter five is devoted to the findings and the analysis of this study, and chapter six provides conclusions as well as recommendations focused on the discourses of risk in schools and agencies supporting schools.

This study posits that there are differences of risk perception present in both countries, which is reflected in the methods of risk communication used. Agencies such as Skolverket in Sweden routinely share knowledge with schools about fair and equal treatment. However, schools are not routinely included in expert findings of how to prepare for extreme violence in schools. In Finland however, the experience of dealing with RSS has brought about closer collaboration between all parties, which include schools. This suggests that agency and school integration in Sweden is less formed than in Finland.

3 Investigation Commission (2009) ‘Jokela School Shooting on 7 November 2007’, Report of the Investigation Commission, Ministry of Justice, Finland,

Serial No: 2009: 1. Investigation Commission (2010) ‘Kauhajoki School Shooting on 23 September 2008’ – Report of the Investigation Commission, Ministry of Justice, Finland, Serial No: 39/2010.


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Sixty-five brief facts and findings of the study: Here I present sixty-five brief facts and the findings of my study; the contents of which are not conclusive and further research is needed. I recommend that future research must be focused at all agencies that support schools. In schools research should focus on all aspects of student welfare and student support, the reporting mechanisms and communication procedures used by all personnel at all levels in the school. The sixty-five facts are presented in three headings: An overview of the study: 1 - 19 An overview of discovered facts: 20 - 42 An overview of views & perceptions of participants in the study: 43 - 65.

An overview of the study

1. I completed my study with a limited budget and within a limited timeframe. At times various university academics provided invaluable advice, without their assistance the end result would not have been possible.4

2. I analysed the terms hazard and risk - both were shown to be inter-

connected essentially you cannot have one without the other. Risk is the consequence of a hazard that creates the possibility to cause loss or harm to people and the environment in which people live and work. It was shown that the presence of risk is continuous and risk is ‘culturally constructed’. Essentially, risk means different things to different people and as such ‘everyone will never agree about risk’.5

3. I analysed the term perception – it was shown that perception is an

innate cognitive ability specific to humans. Perception is ‘multidimensional’. Similar to risk, perception is difficult to define; perception has no singular meaning. That said perception is driven and formed heavily by ‘attitudes’ that are created by the continual presence of ‘social, cultural and political’ factors.6

4 Dr T.R. Higgins, Leicester University, England, Dr J. Nell, Stockholm University, Sweden and Dr J. Buscall, Moondog Marketing & Media AB, Sweden.

5 Adams, J. (1995: xi, 9, 215) (5

th ed) Risk, Abingdon, Oxen, UCL Press.

6 Pidgeon, N., Hood, C., Jones, D., Turner, B. and Gibson, R. C (1992: 89-90) ‘Risk Perception’, in The Royal Society Report (1992) (7th ed) Risk: Analysis,

Perception and Management, London: Royal Society.


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4. I analysed the term risk communication – similar to risk and perception it was shown that risk communication is difficult to define. Whilst the absence of risk communication prevents effective risk management, it was widely recognised that organisations should be committed to a communication policy that is ‘honest, timely, open, accurate and consistent’, and is often reviewed through training.7

5. I analysed the term Rampage School Shooting (RSS). Whilst rare it was shown that RSS is now a global phenomenon and ‘there is nothing spontaneous about an RSS. For the purposes of the study RSS was defined as:

Taking place on a school-related public stage before an audience;

involving multiple victims, some of whom are shot simply for their symbolic significance or at random; and involving one or more shooters who are students or former students of the school.8

6. When considering the above RSS definition, the school shooting of sixteen 5-6 year old children and one adult in 1996 at Dunblane, Scotland would not meet the RSS definition because the killer, Thomas Hamilton, was never a student of that school. That said much was learnt from that tragedy, which brought about many legal and procedural changes throughout the United Kingdom just as all school shootings have in the countries where they have occurred.9

7. The three countries involved in the comparative study were England,

Finland and Sweden. The geographical focus was directed at Finland and Sweden, the rationale is explained in the study abstract and here in-part within these facts.

8. In November 2013 I made initial contact with twenty schools in various

towns and cities in each country - first by normal post, then email; follow up telephone calls to selected schools were made in January 2014.

9. Not all schools replied, however schools from all three countries were

represented in the study. 10. Universities were not included however the findings will be of interest to those educational sites. 11. Students in schools were not contacted in this study. 12. The study focused on adult participants in schools - teachers, support

staff, deputy principals and principals.

7 Bonner, A. (2010: xi) An Ounce of Prevention, Alberta, Canada: Sextant.

8 Newman, K. S., Fox, C., Harding, D., Mehta, T. and Roth, W. (2005: 21) Rampage the Social Roots of School Shootings, New York: Basic Books.

9 Cullen (LORD), W. D. (1996: 4.3) ‘The Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary School on 13 March 1996’, The stationary Office, ISBN 010-

133862 7: October.


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13. Participants in four Swedish agencies that support schools and communities were also contacted then met.

14. Each school participant completed their own online questionnaire that

was specific for their role and language choice – English, Finnish and Swedish.

15. Each participant questionnaires contained fourteen questions; each

question was connected to the participant and various aspects of the school operations. Sections for free text replies were also present.

16. Questionnaires mirrored each other, e.g. a teacher in England was asked the same questions as teachers in Finland and Sweden. 17. Upon completion questionnaires were submitted and analysed via a newly constructed website: http://proficiosecurity.se/ 18. I met four participants (experts) between October 2013 and January

2014. Each expert represented a Swedish agency that directly or indirectly supports Swedish schools.

19. The Swedish agencies were:

National Crime Prevention Council Brottsförebyggande rådet (Brå)

Civil Contingencies Agency

Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap (MSB) The Police

Polisen The National Agency for Education

Skolverket.

An overview of discovered facts

20. The study revealed that at various times between, 2009 - 2013 the four

Swedish agencies named above (No 19) had proactively, independently and together as experts researched and shared their conclusions of the hazards and risks associated with RSS or the occurrence of extreme violence in a Swedish school.10

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Interviews with representative of: Brottsförebyggande Råde (Brå); The Swedish National Agency for Education (Skolverket); Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap - Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and The Police (Polisen).

http://proficiosecurity.se/


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21. I discovered that at the time of writing (January 2014) all four Swedish agencies did not routinely share their knowledge and findings with schools.

22. I concluded that in Sweden this lack of sharing, of not including other

non-experts meant that experts in Sweden had adopted the deficit model of risk communication. A model of this kind is known to be a one-way approach to risk communication. Essentially the expert way is the only way and the opinions or involvement of non-experts in the risk debate is irrelevant. That said experts will, if required, share their knowledge with non-experts by publishing their selected and edited research. In this study I discovered that three of the four agencies had published and placed in the public domain their research of safety in schools.

23. Access to the full extent of research made by each agency named was

not possible and was therefore not discovered.

24. I discovered that the research of experts in Swedish agencies had generated media attention in Sweden. This in turn had produced other expert and non-expert views of the RSS phenomenon and the preparedness or lack of preparedness of the Swedish authorities.

26. In 2012 the Swedish police researched RSS and reviewed its own operational procedures when responding to an incident of that kind. 27. In 2013 the Swedish police provided new training and operational tactics for their ‘blue light’ police officers who may be called to a school shooting. 28. At the time of writing (January 2014) I discovered no evidence of any

preventative work delivered to schools by the Swedish police or other Swedish agency that focused on the preventative measures of a school shooting.

Whilst more research would be needed to confirm or deny this finding I

discovered that the police in Växjö, Sweden had proactively reached out to agencies and schools. Whilst not focused on preventing school shootings per se the regular forum, which is police led allows schools direct contact to relevant agencies in that region.

29. At the time of writing (January 2014) access to strategic information was understandably limited in the Swedish police. Therefore no strategies were discovered at a strategic level that focused on the

preventative measures of a school shooting - e.g. intelligence gathering/sharing technologies.


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(29) Continued: More research would be needed to discover the full extent, if any, of the strategic preparedness and recovery protocols of all agencies that

would be involved in the prevention and response to an RSS. 30. At the time of writing (January 2014) the depth and level of local and

strategic telecommunications, Information Technology (IT) and Command & Control measures of the Swedish police and other Swedish first and second response agencies was not discovered.

Communication capabilities and their resilience are a critical factor when dealing with an RSS. Further research is required in order to

discover the full extent and presence of an integrated communication capability.

31. I discovered that schools in Sweden had experienced threats of a

school shooting. Threats of this kind normally occurred in the days/weeks after an actual RSS in the world. See Appendix 1.

32. In 2012 MSB considered the possibility of ten national risks occurring

in Sweden; a school shooting was one of those risks, which MSB considered was a ‘high level of likelihood’.11

33. At the time of this study many Swedish experts and non-experts

believed that an RSS had not occurred in Sweden; this is not the case. MSB had made a brief reference to an incident that occurred 4th March 1961 at Kungälv, Sweden. This incident I investigated and the circumstances I discovered met the criteria of a modern RSS: See Appendix 2.

12 34. I proposed that because globalisation in 1961 was not present this RSS

was considered a localised incident that appears only to have been of interest to the local and national Swedish media.13

35. I suggested that had the 1961 incident occurred today within hours the

images of that event would have been seen by billions of people; such is the power of modern media.

Whilst the study was not focused on the media per se, I made a tentative investigation of the media strategies in place within the agencies named in this study. I concluded that further research would be needed to discover what media control measures agencies have for extreme events that match the magnitude of an RSS.

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MSB (2012: 20-21; 40-41) 12

MSB (2012: 25) 13

Expressen (4th March 1961); Dagens Nyheter (4th March 1961); Aftonbladet (4th March 1961) and Göteborgs Posten (5th March 1961)


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36. Finland has experienced two RSS within eleven months of each other (2007 & 2008). During both incidents the agencies dealing with the media and the media themselves were criticised.14

37. Prior to the first RSS in Finland threats connected to a school shooting

and directed at Finnish schools were minimal. 38. Following the first RSS in Finland (September 2007) and eighteen

months thereafter (April 2009) 225 threats were directed at Finnish schools.15

39. In Finland threats of this kind produced ‘indirect victims’ of a school

shooting and heightened the fear of a repeat RSS.16

40. I discovered that the emotional trauma and impact felt by people either

directly or indirectly involved in Finland 2007 and 2008 RSS will last for many years to come.17

41. The financial costs of both Finnish RSS cannot be fully calculated.18

42. At a local and national level the impact and presence of both Finnish

RSS brought about new laws and advances in technology. Closer collaboration has been formed between experts in agencies and non-experts, schools and communities. I concluded that in Finland the sociological risk communication model was present; meaning there was a presence of an expert and non-expert collaborative sharing and managing of information, and a collective knowledge and understanding of societal risks.

An overview of views and perceptions of participants in the study:

43. I discovered that in all three countries teachers and support staff in

schools had a greater fear of extreme violence occurring in their school.

44. Deputy principals/principals in schools in all three countries have a fear

factor that is far less than teachers and support staff.

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Investigation Commission (2009: 75, 157) & (2010: 126); Larkin (2009: 1321-2) and Hawdon et al. (2009: 29). 15

Investigation Commission (2009: 44) & (2010: 44-45) 16

Investigation Commission (2010: 44) 17

Investigation Commission (2009: 43) 18

Investigation Commission (2009: 44) & (2010: 44-45)


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45. All three countries have a national requirement for the police to have regular and positive contact with schools.

46. The teachers in schools in all three countries had less contact with their

community police officer than support staff in schools. 47. Deputy principals/principals in schools had the most contact with their

community police officer. 48. All deputy principals/principals provided mixed opinions, mostly

negative of the quality of service provided by their community police officer.

Students were not contacted in this study. An area for future research would be to gather student views of their designated community police officer. Those views could be easily measured and compared against the views of school adult personnel.

49. Most teachers and support staff that replied stated they were aware of

their student care systems and of the procedures connected to them. 50. Teachers and support staff in all three countries had a mixed

understanding and a working knowledge of how to implement and use their student care systems.

51. Nearly half of all teachers and support staff that replied stated they

were not fully supported either emotionally or professionally during incidents of conflict.

52. Teachers and support staff in schools wanted more focused training on how to deal with conflict and reporting systems in their school.

53. Deputy principals/principals believed that conflict support for colleagues

had been offered and had been sufficient.

54. Deputy principals/principals in schools in all three countries considered sufficient conflict training and knowledge of reporting student care systems had been given, and were adequate and they were not aware more was needed.

55. Most teachers and support staff felt that they were not bullied in school. 56. I discovered a small group of participants in Finland and Sweden had

been bullied. 57. Most deputy principals/principals had no knowledge of their colleagues

feeling that they were being bullied.


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58. Teachers and support staff recognised in their students many of the thirty character traits and actions listed in their questionnaire: See Appendix 3.

59. Deputy principals/principals had a mixed knowledge of students that

possessed many of the thirty character traits and actions listed in the questionnaire.

60. Teachers and support staff in schools knew of a student(s) that

possessed or displayed what can be considered as the most extreme character traits and actions listed in the questionnaire.

61. All deputy principals/principals had no knowledge of any student that

possessed or displayed what can be considered as the most extreme character traits and actions listed in the questionnaire.

62. Deputy principals/principals that replied are not meeting their legal

obligations in relation to implementing all policies listed in this study:

i. Student Action Plan (Åtgärdsprogram) ii. Fair and Equal Action Plan (Likabehandlingsplan) iii. Crisis Plan iv. Threat Assessment v. Risk Assessment

63. Only one school in Sweden that replied had a threat assessment in

place, which undermines the suggested best practice that ‘a good school climate is an essential pre-requisite for threat assessment’.19

64. All schools in Finland had a threat assessment in place. 65. The Fair and Equal Treatment Plan was the only plan to be present in

all schools that replied.

19

Estrada, F., Granath, S., Shannon, D. and Törnqvist, N. (2009; 10) ‘Serious Violence at Schools’, English Summary of Brå Report 2009:6, The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande Rådet, Brå),


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Appendix 1: Threats in Sweden

Stockholm – Two days after the 2007 Finland RSS

http://www.thelocal.se/20071109/9055

Västerås – Two days after the 2008 Finland RSS





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Lund – One day after the 2009 RSS in Germany


Stockholm – Six days after the 2010 Ohio US RSS & reference made to the Finland RSS

9th March 2010

http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=103&artikel=3508582


http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=103&artikel=3508582


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Appendix 2: Rampage School Shooting - Saturday 4th March 1961 I considered the incident at Kungälv, Sweden a unique and interesting event. Regardless of the distant time-frame I created an opportunity to discover the circumstances of this RSS and what followed. My brief and tentative investigation discovered the following:

The incident appears only to have been of interest to the local and national Swedish media and within a week their reporting had

reduced considerably The questions asked and facts discovered by the media of that

period mirror a modern RSS One person was shot and died at a school related event (disco) Multiple shots were fired Many students were injured The killer was a male and a student of the school who:

o Targeted people and shot at random

o Had a fascination for weapons

o Bought a handgun illegally o Often displayed unusual behaviour o Had a fascination for dressing and behaving as a cowboy o Had often been teased and excluded o Had made threats of violence before the school shooting.

Unlike modern RSS killers who often commit suicide at the scene

this killer left the disco and later surrendered himself to the authorities. When convicted he was detained in prison. My research did not extend to discovering the whereabouts of this person, whether he remains in prison or if he has been released

Under the freedom of information act I have requested the criminal

investigation file and court notes of this incident in order to discover what present and future lessons can be learnt from this past event.


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Appendix 3: Perceived character traits and actions of students

The rationale of presenting a list of thirty character traits and actions of students emanated from the clinical observations of many experts reviewed in the study, which included Langman (2009) and Newman et al. (2005).20

Bartol and Bartol (2011: 238, 242) also observe that ‘dangerousness is used primarily in conjunction with violent behaviour’, and ‘overall, the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour, but even past behaviour will not necessarily be repeated’. However Bartol and Bartol suggest that ‘the more frequent the behaviour has occurred in a variety of situations, the more accurate will be the predictions’.21 When considering the 1961 RSS in Sweden the student responsible for that incident displayed several of the character traits and actions listed in appendix 3. They included: unable to make friends, fascinated by violence and sudden and violent behaviour. If access would have been possible to school, police and court records it is highly likely that other characters traits and actions listed in appendix 3 would have emerged.

The findings shown in appendix 3 below revealed that of the deputy principals/principals who replied their perceived reality of vulnerable students did not fully match that of teachers and support staff. One reason for this disparity may be that teachers and support staff are two groups that mostly interact with students, whilst deputy principals/principals do not. This alternative view and knowledge of students suggested that the communication links connecting school groups were weak and that vital information was not being shared. Teachers and support staff identified the following character traits and actions in one or more students at their particular school that:

Produces art work that is disturbing

Likes to control people and

Is fascinated by violence.

Deputy principals/principals indicated that they had no knowledge of students with the above character traits and actions. A deeper review also revealed that several deputy principals/principals had a reduced awareness of other vulnerable students in their school that had displayed many of the other 27 character traits and actions listed. All three groups were in agreement in this study; none had met any student that is ‘scary’ or ‘likes to hurt animals’.

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Langman, P. (2009) Why Kids Kill: Inside the Minds of School Shooters, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Newman, K. S., Fox, C., Harding, D., Mehta, T. and Roth, W. (2005) Rampage the Social Roots of School Shootings, New York: Basic Books. 21 Bartol, C.R. and Bartol, A.M. (2011) (9

th ed) Criminal Behaviour: A Psychological Approach, New York: Prentice Hall.


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No Observed character traits and actions

of a student All Deputy

principal/principals All Teachers All Support Staff

1 Sudden & aggressive verbal outbursts 5 13 3

2 Writings that are disturbing 2 3 3

3 Demeans the opposite sex 4 11 2

4 Unable to make friends 2 14 4

5 Art work that is disturbing 0 6 1

6 Displays a superior demeanour 3 15 2

7 Constant aggression 3 6 1

8 High achiever 6 19 3

9 Regularly fails to hand in assignments 5 26 5

10 Distant or withdrawn 4 16 3

11 Unresponsive to discipline 2 15 3

12 Uses illegal drugs 2 4 2

13 Sudden and violent behavior 3 7 2

14 Likes to control people 0 6 3

15 Drinks alcohol 3 5 3

16 Often depressed 4 12 6

17 Aggressive to other students 4 9 1

18 Anti-social 4 16 4

19 Poor attendance 6 24 7

20 Likes to injure animals 0 0 0

21 Hostile to authority 2 9 2

22 Uses foul language 6 21 4

23 Fascinated by violence 0 5 2

24 Intimidating 3 3 0

25 Anxious 4 16 3

26 Scary 0 0 0

27 Has learning difficulties 5 23 4

28 Lacks empathy 3 11 2

29 Unpredictable moods 4 16 5

30 Selfish 4 17 2

Risk & RSS: A Summary.

Education

Transcript of Risk & RSS: A Summary.