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Contested Development Working Paper Series

Department of Geography,

King’s College London

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Year 2016 Paper #72

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Risk Root Cause Analysis Paper for PEARL

(Preparing for Extreme And Rare events in coastaL

regions project):

The Case of Genova, Italy

Dr. Anna Scolobig

ETH-Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

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Risk root cause analysis:

the Genova case study (Italy)

Paper for the PEARL project Work Package 1- Testing the Risk Root

Cause Analysis Framework

Author: Anna Scolobig, Dr. Contact: anna.scolobig@usys.ethz.ch

Contributor: Carolina Maestri

Please do not circulate it without authors´ consent.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.................................................................................................................. 4

2. Background to the Genova case study ................................................................. 5

2.1 Past events ........................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 The 2011 and 2014 flash floods ................................................................................... 7

3. Research design: testing the PEARL RRCA Framework ............................. 11

4. Risk and root causes analysis .............................................................................. 13

4.1 Physical pathway ............................................................................................................. 13 4.1.1 Increase of extreme events ................................................................................................13 4.1.2 Inadequate urban drainage and concrete-covered streams ................................14 4.1.3 Cascade effects on energy production, water quality and agriculture ............14

4.2 Socio-economic pathway .............................................................................................. 15 4.2.1 Social vulnerability ................................................................................................................15 4.2.2 Excessive urbanisation ........................................................................................................16 4.2.3 Funding for risk mitigation and project implementation......................................19 4.2.4 Past criteria for funding allocation .................................................................................23 4.2.5 The footprint of economic crisis ......................................................................................24 4.2.6 The implementation of austerity measures at the local level ..............................25

4.3 Governance pathway ..................................................................................................... 26 4.3.1 The perverse effects of legal trials and overregulation ..........................................26 4.3.2 Human resources constraints ...........................................................................................27 4.3.3 The mismatch between the political and disaster risk cycles .............................28 4.3.4 Official and unofficial on-line communication flows ...............................................29

4.4 Perceptions and values ................................................................................................. 30 4.4.1 The clash between the structural and non structural paradigm ........................31 4.4.2 Aware and prepared? ...........................................................................................................32 4.4.3 Community participation and empowerment ...........................................................33

5. Discussion................................................................................................................... 34

5.1 Risk drivers, root causes and causal loop analysis ............................................. 34

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5.2 Methodological considerations for the next research phases ........................ 36 5.3 New ideas from and for practitioners ...................................................................... 38

References .......................................................................................................................... 39

Annex ................................................................................................................................... 40

Project disclaimer

This research forms part of the PEARL project, or Preparing for Extreme and Rare Events in

Coastal Regions. This is an EC funded project taking place from 2014-2018, co-ordinated by

the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, The Netherlands but involving many partner

organisations across Europe. The aim is to support the development of strategies for coastal

flood management using a multi-disciplinary approach. Findings from the project will inform

a guidebook for flood management practitioners in the EU and beyond. More information

about PEARL can be found here: http://www.pearl-fp7.eu/about-pearl/. In PEARL work

package 1, researchers at King’s College London and the University of Stuttgart lead a team of

social scientists who are undertaking studies of the economic, social and institutional causes

of risk and disasters in a number of EU and international case studies. The aim is to better

understand: i) the social causation of small scale but high local impact disaster events in

coastal regions; ii) the causes and impacts of risk (for affected groups or individuals through

the lens of a specific event or events). The findings will inform a number of publications as

well as the development of holistic risk assessment models within PEARL.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank all the colleagues and persons who provided professional advice and

collaboration in the UK, Greece, Germany and Italy. I especially thank Prof. Mark Pelling, for

giving me the opportunity to work in a highly motivated interdisciplinary and international

research team on a very interesting case study: Genova. I also thank Carolina Maestri at ETH

Zurich, Switzerland - where I also work - for collecting the data about the funding for risk

mitigation and for the long discussions on how to disentangle the complexity of the Italian

economic and legal system for flood risk management. My gratitude goes also to Alessandra

Marchese (GISIG Genova) and Prof. Giorgio Roth (University of Genova) for their suggestions,

for sharing their profound knowledge about Genova and for helping me to kick-start the

interview process. Last but not least, I am especially thankful to the anonymous interviewees

in Genova who devoted their precious time (even in the days after the first event causing

damages in the “2015 season”) to the discussions about Genova and the Bisagno river.

Without them, this research work would not have been possible. Unfortunately I regret that

the limited time available did not allow me to better understand many local issues and

dynamics as I wished to. For sure I understood that Genova is a hub of professional risk and

emergency practitioners and researchers very much dedicated to and passionate about their

jobs. I dedicate this work to them, to their exemplary commitment and passion.

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1. Introduction

Genova (approx. 600,000 inhabitants) is situated in North West Italy, in the Liguria

region, facing the Tyrrhenian sea. It is the sixth largest city in Italy and its

administrative limits cover a land area of 243.6 km2 (94 sq mi). Genova is the capital

of Liguria Region and the largest seaport in Italy. It is one of the major economic

centres of the country and part of the Milano-Torino and Genova industrial district.

The town’s position, between the sea and a ring of steep mountains, is particularly

exposed to severe storms and flooding.

More exactly, the town is exposed to several risks: flash floods (FF), pluvial floods (PF),

combinations of floods (CoF – rivers + sewer networks), sea level change, coastal

floods including estuarial floods (CF). Extreme events including heavy precipitation

(HP) and cyclones (C) also represent a threat.

In the past 50 years there has been a progressive increase in intensity of flood events,

including an increase in rainfall rates and the number of floods (Faccini et al. 2015).

Some areas of the town experienced one flood event per year between 2010 and 2014

(see section 2). Risk awareness among the local population grew exponentially

especially in the areas that experienced repeated events. At the same time national,

regional and local authorities responded proactively to these events, adopted new

emergency and climate adaptation plans and other measures that will be described

in this report. Civil society also responded proactively with the creation of several

NGOs whose activities are focused on emergency management, risk mitigation or

weather forecasts.

Yet, notwithstanding these efforts, the Bisagno river still remains a major danger and

risk source for Genova. What makes the situation particularly critical is that most of

its surface, especially in the town center, is covered by concrete, after a project

developed at the beginning of the XX Century. The same technique has been used to

cover about 30 other streams crossing the town.

At present the town is severely paying the consequences of past risk mitigation

decisions. The estimated costs of making the Bisagno river area safer are extremely

high, approximately 350 million euros. This estimate does not include the other rivers

and streams crossing the town (e.g. Fereggiano, Sturla, Nervi, etc.). Yet, not only the

high costs but several other different causes have contributed to generate a risk

mitigation stalemate in Genova in the past decade: the needed structural risk

mitigation measures have not been built thus exposing the population to an even

higher risk.

This report aims at describing the root causes of this stalemate and, more generally,

of flood risk and vulnerability in Genova, with a focus on the relations between social,

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economic, legal, technical and institutional factors. From a theoretical viewpoint, the

starting assumption is that there is a need to better understand the root causes of risk

and disasters by focusing on the (under-researched) economic, social and institutional

aspects and their interactions rather than solely on the technical aspects. Therefore

the main aim is to disentangle the complexity of the social causation of small scale but

high local impact disaster events. More precisely this document reports on the testing

of the PEARL risk and root causes analysis framework (RCCA) (Fraser et al. 2014). RCCA

identifies the drivers of hazard, exposure and vulnerability related to physical, socio-

economic and governance processes. Section 2 presents the background to the

Genova case study, while Section 3 describes the research design and provides more

information about the RCCA framework. Sections 4-5 discuss the key results of the

root causes analysis.

2. Background to the Genova case study

2.1 Past events

Genova’s modern history has been deeply marked by disasters where floods, flash floods and

landslides have been of great concern for the authorities involved in risk and emergency

management as well as for residents. This history is constellated by a number of serious

floods, flash floods and landslides with damaging impacts. From 1945 on, there have been

serious events every 10-12 years. Some of them are considered particularly damaging

(Particularly the ones in 1945, 1960, 1970, 1992-1993 and 2011-2014). Table 1 presents a

detailed chronology of the major floods in Genova and the Liguria region.

Tab. 1 Events in Genova’s flood history

Events in Genova’s flood history

Year: 589, 1222, 1404, 1407,1414,1416,1420,1452,1592,1780,1787,1790,1822,1832, 1835 (66 mm in one hour/no major damage), 1842 (247 mm rain),1872,1885, 1889, 1892,1907,1908,1926,1945,1951,1952,1970 (400 mm rain in 24 hours), 1975, 1977 (500 mm)

Most recent events: 1992: 282 mm in 12 hours 1993: 300 mm 1994: tornado 1995 to 2000: High precipitations every year 2002: Lavagna valley and Genova 2005: high precipitation in Genova 2006: Genova (250 mm in 12 hours, several events with high precipitations) 2007: Recco town and Genova (Nervi stream flood) 2008-2009: high precipitation in Genova 2010: Genova (1 event btw 100-300 mm; 220 mm in the second event; several other intense precipitations), Sestri Ponente, Varazze 10.2011: Val di Vara and Cinqueterre 11.2011: Genova-Val Bisagno 10.2014: Genova

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11.2014: Lavagna, Leivi, San Colombano and Chiavari 09. 2015: Genova

Source Faccini et al. 2015; Rossi 2014 A detailed description of each event is beyond the purpose of this report, where the focus will

be on the 2011 and 2014 events (see Section 2.2).

Box 1. Brief history of risk mitigation decisions in Genova Risk mitigation decisions have always been a critical issue in Genova. The area surrounding the Bisagno river is one of the most dangerous: decisions of what to do to improve safety levels and how have dominated the local technical and political debate since the beginning of the XX Century. Fig. 1 - The Bisagno river and its tributaries (source GISIG Genova)

Indeed on the basis of a project designed in 1909 the final part of the river has been covered with concrete. It took ten years, 1928-1938, to build the structural risk mitigation works to cover the river and made the area safer, but unfortunately only in the short term (Rossi 2014). The roofing/coverage/soil seeding guaranteed high safety standards for that time. In the following years, the same technique has been used to cover 28 out of the total 88 other streams and long rivers (88 include only the streams that are longer than 1 km) that cross the town.

However after thirty years from the construction of the roofing/coverage, the area became dangerous again because of increased urbanisation and many other factors (see section 3). The flood that hit Genova in 1970 considerably worsened the situation and represented a wake up call for local authorities. On the 7-8 October 1970, the rivers Polcevera, leiro and Bisagno flooded causing 44 casualties, 2000 evacuees and 185 homeless. In some areas of the town 950 mm of rain were measured, corresponding to 90% of annual average values.

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Afterwards risk reduction in the Bisagno area became again a political priority, even

if the trade-offs between safety and urban development remained a critical issue.

Especially in the case of the establishment of building constraints in floodplain areas,

the local authorities had (and still have) to evaluate the relative importance of

individual freedom and private property rights on the one hand, and public safety on

the other. Conflicts have been harsh especially among decision makers and other

stakeholders with interests in economic and urban development.

At the same time the alternatives for making the Bisagno area (including its tributaries) safer started to dominate the public and political debate. Three alternatives were discussed:

Changes to the river main course Deviation of a part of the discharge streaming under the culvert toward a

tunnel directly discharging into the sea Destruction of the roofing/coverage

Not only the technical but also the political debate became very heated. In the following years resources were devoted primarily to the maintenance of already existing protection works and the discussion about alternatives continues. In the Nineties, thanks to the funding for the world football championship held in Genova (and in many other Italian towns), several projects to improve vehicle circulation and transport were implemented. This implied a reinforcing of existing protection works covering the rivers.

2.2 The 2011 and 2014 flash floods

The RCCA analysis presented in the following sections focuses on the events in

November 2011 and October 2014.

The socio-economic dynamics of the two floods are strongly inter-related. Indeed at

the town level, the event in 2014 represented an amplification of the social, technical,

economic and environmental issues that emerged after the 2011 event.

4 November 2011

A flash flood hit the Liguria region, with the most serious consequences in Genova.

The city saw 500 mm of water in 24 hours. The Bisagno and Fereggiano (a tributary of

Bisagno) streams flooded; the Sturla, Scrivia and Entella rivers burst their banks. The

event caused 6 casualties (all woman, among which 2 children). More than 1000

people were displaced. In 1970 another event (900 mm rain in 24 hours) caused 44

casualties, exactly in the same area.

At the time of writing (2015) the mayor in 2011 and four officers, including the head

of the municipal civil protection agency, are on trial. The accusation concerns

inadequate emergency management: the key issues are the failure to close public

schools and control car circulation. The defendants of the relatives of the victims

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argue that this is the reason the casualties occured and charge the five with an

accusation of manslaughter.

The police closed the most dangerous street one hour before the casualties happened

(on the same street). Afterwards the police corps left the area because their own life

was endangered. As an unwanted consequence, the police alarm remained de-facto

unheard. As reported by the then head of the local police force to a newspaper

journalist: “We received the phone call of the inspector at 12.15. He told us that the

river in via Fereggiano flooded. At that point I told my colleagues to inform inhabitants

to reach the second or third floor of their houses. The inspector told us that if they

did not do it already, they would have been dead. At that point I realized that we

completely lost control of the situation.” (www.primocanale.it) This interview excerpt

provides some insights on the difficulties and complexity of managing an emergency

caused by a flash flood.

Fig. 2 - Floods in Genova (on-line pictures)

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7-9 October 2014

In 2014 parts of the city saw 700 mm of rain fall in 72 hours, not far short of the

average rainfall of an entire year. The event caused 1 casualty, 3 wounded residents,

200 residents were displaced and the estimated damages were 500 million Euros.

Other sources (ANSA and Polaris website) estimate damages of 350 million Euros, 100

for commercial activities and 250 to households.

The Bisagno, Fereggiano and Sturla streams flooded. Water reached the peak level of

1.8 m in some areas and caused serious damage to the ground floor of most of the

buildings. Genova remained without electricity for several hours.

In this case the authorities had failed to predict the huge volume of rain which fell in

the space of a few hours and the alert was not officially given.

After the 2014 event, residents have protested against: i) administrative inertia and

the lack of action to make Genova secure after the 2011 event; ii) missed alarm. The

most contested issue concerns the delays in reinforcing the banks of the Bisagno river,

the biggest in Genova. 35 million euros set aside for protection works in 2010 had not

been spent because of a legal dispute (ricorso al TAR) and bureaucratic issues.

(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/12/us-italy-flood-

idUSKCN0I00G620141012)

The Genova public prosecutor's office opened a probe after the 2014 event into a

possible man-made disaster stemming from incomplete or lacking public works that

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were supposed to have shored up the city's flood defences. Investigators are looking

into flood prevention measures, riverbed maintenance, the city's civil protection plan,

and administrators' actions. Also because of the numerous events from 2011 on, the

2014 flood raised enormous public and media attention not only at the local but also

at the national level, including extensive press coverage.

After the event, the Italian premier Matteo Renzi commented as follows: “There is a

need to open new building construction sites in Genova. It is critical to overcome the

logic of trials and reciprocal corruption accusations which make risk reduction more

profitable for lawyers than for citizens. We are correcting these distorted mechanisms

by enacting new legislation such as the new law design to improve Public

Administration. We need to better coordinate civil protection with a major role at the

central level as the new constitutional reform will guarantee. These new laws and

decrees have already a name: Un-block Italy, Public Administration reform,

constitutional reform, justice reform, building construction sites for the “Mission unit”

(unita’ di missione) in order for Italy to be as we all want it to be (Il Sole 24 ore 12 oct

2014).” The Environment Minister released the following declaration to the Italian

national press agency (Ansa): “Several mistakes have been done in Genova in the past

but now the time has come to take over responsibility and we are committed to solve

the problems related to hydrogeological risk in this region.” (oct. 2014) The

institutional, legislative and policy changes described by the Italian premier and

Environment Ministry will be described in more detail in the following sections.

These two events open a window to better understand the root causes of flood risk and vulnerability and the complexity of the social, economic and institutional causation of these small scale but high local impact disaster events.

3. Research design: testing the PEARL RRCA Framework

The first research phase consisted of a desk study and documentary analysis of key documents

about flood risk in Genova and the Liguria region. The aim was to provide a description of i)

the institutional, political and legal framework for flood risk governance in Genova; ii) the risk

mitigation history; iii) a preliminary analysis of root causes and drivers of hazard, exposure

and vulnerability. The desk study included the collection and analysis of relevant documents,

such as newspapers articles, laws, technical reports from the regional, provincial and

municipal authorities, urban, river basin and emergency plans, climate adaptation plans,

research reports, scientific articles, grey literature and books. There is a vast literature

available in Italian about floods and flood history in Genova. Moreover because of the

increased frequency of flash floods events in recent years, the case received has received

extensive press coverage. More than 150 newspaper articles have been found online

reporting on the 2011/2014 events and/or risk mitigation and emergency management in

Genova between 2010 and 2015.

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The second research phase consisted of 17 semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were

selected based on their status, role or experience, deep knowledge of the subject under

investigation and/or the relevant social context. They mostly included officers of various

agencies dealing with risk management at municipal, provincial and regional level (e.g. urban

planning units, environment agencies, authorities in charge of river basin plans), civil

protection managers and officers, members of the center for early warning, politicians, local

researchers and University professors, members of environmental/civil protection NGOs and

voluntary groups or associations.

The focus of the interviews was the collection of data on interviewees’ views on i) the risk and

the recent events, ii) the economic, social and institutional causes of flood hazard, risk and

vulnerability, and iii) the actions undertaken to reduce risk, including e.g. mapping, risk and

emergency planning, structural measures and defences, warning systems, training,

educational and raising awareness initiatives, etc. Moreover one of the key aims of the

research was to test the PEARL risk and root causes analysis framework in order to identify

the drivers of hazard, exposure and vulnerability related to physical, socio-economic and

governance processes. Figure 1 reports the RRCA framework presented by Fraser et al. (2014)

in PEARL deliverable 1.1.

Fig. 3 Proposed RRCA framework (Fraser et al. 2014)

For the fieldwork also the following thematic grid (presented in PEARL Del. 1.1 and reproduced

here below) was used as a guideline to cross-check that relevant topics for the PEARL RRCA

framework were addressed during the interviews.

Tab. 2 Thematic grid (Fraser et al. 2014)

Category of root causes

Pathway Temporal expression

Manifestation for Genova

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Drivers of hazard/exposure/vulnerability

Physical Historic

Contemporary

Future

Socio-economic Historic

Contemporary

Future

Governance Historic

Contemporary

Future

The interview protocol was revised and changed several times during the research in order to

improve the questions and respond to PEARL partners’ needs. The list of interviewees and

the final version of the interview protocol is reproduced in Annex I. Each interview lasted

about one, one and a half and sometimes even two hours. They were audio-taped, transcribed

and summarised in Italian before translation of the key excerpts in English.

More precisely, the information collected was analysed by identifying recurrent themes, key

concepts and analytical categories grounded in the RCCA Framework. In the following we will

use extracts from the interviews (translated from Italian to English) to illustrate the points of

agreement and contention and provide supporting evidence for stakeholder arguments.

4. Risk and root causes analysis

RCCA is a framework to analyse the root causes of increased danger, risk and vulnerability.

The RRCA Framework identifies four pathways for which analysis is to be undertaken of root

causes, drivers and conditions of endangerment: physical, socio-economic, governance

pathways, perceptions and values (see section 4). In this section we will comment on them

separately, by identifying the key drivers of hazard, exposure and vulnerability as emerging

from the desk study and interviewees’ results.

4.1 Physical pathway

4.1.1 Increase of extreme events

In Genova there has been a progressive increase in the intensity of flood events in

the past 50 years, including an increase in rainfall rates and the number of floods

(Faccini et al. 2015). The geo-hydrological risk, determined by the result of hazard and

vulnerability, is progressively raised both due to the increase of climate variation, but

also by other factors such as urban development etc. (see section 4.2.2)

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• Genova represents an exceptional case for Italy in terms of its susceptibility to flash

floods. Two physical factors in particular contribute to increased flood risk on the

territory: a high probability of “cellule temporalesche rigeneranti”(called water

bombs) causing intense precipitation and steep mountains which make flash floods

harder to predict and faster to propagate. (int.7)

• As reported by an interviewee “extreme and exceptional events similar to the ones in

2011 and 2014 are becoming more and more ‘standard’ events. On the one side,

global warming is worsening the situation. On the other side, urbanisation is

increasing risk exposure enormously: more people, buildings and infrastructures are

now at risk.” (int. 5) Yet, it is also important to keep in mind that most of the river

basins are relatively small (15 km2 or so) and that intense rain and flash floods can

affect one neighbourhood of the town and leave the next one untouched (int. 8).

4.1.2 Inadequate urban drainage and concrete-covered streams

• One of the key problems (amplified by extreme events and urbanisation trends) is

inadequate urban drainage. This includes the inability of the system to cope with

larger rainfall events, due to inadequate channel capacity. Due to historical reasons

and (sometimes) inadequate past urban planning decisions, streets are narrow,

restricting the amplification of storm water channels.

• Another problem is related to the concrete-covered streams which indirectly affect

urban drainage too. At the beginning of the XX Century the concrete-covered

rivers/streams guaranteed high safety standards for that time, even if now many

interviewees lament - retrospectively - that this generated higher levels of

vulnerability. The same technique has been used to cover 28 out of the total 88 other

streams and long rivers (88 include only the streams that are longer than 1 km) that

cross the town. “One of the critical problems is that water cannot be absorbed by the

soil anymore. Genova soil is completely waterproof! ” (int.5)

4.1.3 Cascade effects on energy production, water quality and agriculture

In the future it is expected that climate change will cause not only more frequent

heavy rainfall events (as described above see 4.1.1) but also more frequent drought

periods. One of the major expected consequences is the worsening of water quality

from riverine intakes. Moreover less water is expected to be available for drinking

purposes. (Prepared Enabling EC project; http://www.prepared-fp7.eu/prepared-

home2).

Therefore in the future, less water is expected to be available for alternative usage

such as hydro-power production. In the long term this can cause an increase in the

water and energy prices, thus affecting the local economy. Moreover previous

research in the area revealed that the fear of future water scarcity is causing over-

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conservative behaviours among water managers (http://www.prepared-

fp7.eu/prepared-genoa-italy).

Another example of cascade effects between weather events and the economy is that

the extreme events in 2014 have resulted in a poor year for the wine industry and

farming in the area. In the north, the grape harvest fell by as much as 20 percent.

Production fell 17 percent compared with 2013, making it the worst year since 1950.

http://floodlist.com/europe/severe-weather-leaves-2-dead-northern-italy

4.2 Socio-economic pathway

4.2.1 Social vulnerability

Liguria sets a record among Italian regions: it is 1st place per average age, per %

inhabitants > 64 years old and per old-age index. 27% of Genova inhabitants are over

64 years (vs. 20% for national statistics - Italy).

http://www.urbistat.it/AdminStat/en/it/demografia/eta/genova/10/3

Yet, even if age is not the only predictor of increased social vulnerability, emergency

managers (int. 5 and 9) maintain that it can affect significantly the person’s ability to

prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters. They report to be seriously

worried about their capabilities to provide help to all the elderly in need during an

event (int. 5, 8, 9). Even if they maintain that it is clear that age alone does not make

a person vulnerable, this can significantly affect the response capacity. The oldest old

(85+) and chronically ill or disabled worry emergency managers the most. At the same

time some elderly people know the town very well and have proved to be resilient in

many occasions.

Based on their experience, emergency managers are also particularly worried about

other socially vulnerable groups such as immigrants and woman (int. 9). Yet the

problem is that it is very difficult to target these groups for raising awareness or

preparedness campaigns. “Our strategy is rather to target existing local associations

or interests groups with the aim to help them to improve their self protection skills.”

(int. 9)

Demographic trends and especially the population risk exposure need also to be

taken into account with respect to the RRCA analysis. In the region Liguria, 19% of the

inhabitants (n=304'303) are exposed to flood risk (ISPRA 2014; total inhabitants:

1'565'127). Only two other Italian regions, Toscana and Emilia Romagna, have higher

percentages of inhabitants exposed to flood risk than Liguria (respectively 45% and

29%, ISPRA 2014).

Genova’s population rose from about 240,000 inhabitants (1861) to a maximum of

850,000 in the early ´70s. This represented the highest peak and even if the

urbanisation of the hills still continued in the 80s and 90s (Faccini at al. 2015), the

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population decreased. At present the population is about 600,000 inhab. (592,995 ;

2014 Census, ISTAT 2015). Yet, as reported by the municipal authorities in charge of

emergency management: “We should not forget that we have 115,000 residents at

high risk in Genova. As an emergency manager I will never be able to know enough

about the individual vulnerability of 115,000 residents” (int. 5) A final factor affecting

residents’ vulnerability is that many houses actually act as river/stream banks.

Residents living on the ground floor in high risky areas are especially endangered (int.

5). “Some neighborhoods (e.g. Borgo Incrociati) have been flooded each year in the

past 4 years.” (int.9) Even if these households have developed self-protection

strategies to increase their resilience, the level of post-traumatic stress and related

disorders is high.

4.2.2 Excessive urbanisation

Excessive urbanisation can be a serious problem affecting river basins and alluvial

plains. There was a widespread agreement among interviewees on the fact that the

excessive urbanisation in the past was and still is a major risk driver in Genova (int.

1,2,3,4,5,9,15,16,17). Most of the interviewees actually mentioned it as the primary

risk driver: “more than 100 streams have been covered with concrete, streets or

buildings in Genova. This is the main root cause of risk and vulnerability in the town”

(int.9, similar statements int. 4, 7, 10).

Urbanisation caused enormous changes in the area. Historical data derived from

detailed maps at the end of the XIX century (1878) reveal that the urbanised area was

4%, forest and trees 86%, (mostly vineyards), pasture and grazing 2%, other 8%. In the

year 2000 the urbanised area was 19% (15%increase), forest and trees 15% (50%

decrease) (Rossi 2014). Tab. 3 summarises the main changes in land use in the past

two centuries (source Rossi 2014).

Tab. 3 Changes in land use in the past two centuries (source Rossi 2014; percentage values)

1800 1878 1930 1980 2000

Urbanised area 6 4 14 18 19

Forest and trees 84 86 73 18 15

Olive tree 6 44 43

Pasture and grazing land 3 2

Other (cultivation vineyards)

7 8 8 20 23

Fig. 4 - Changes in land use in the past two centuries (source Rossi 2014, own elaboration)

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In Genova buildings have increased from 65,000 to 305,000 from 1861 to today

(Faccini 2015). Especially after the Second World War and in the Seventies

urbanisation grew exponentially. The key drivers of urbanisation were industrial and

economic growth/development in the whole area and especially in the harbour of

Genova which is, as recalled above (sec. 1), one of the biggest of Italy.

As reported by an interviewee: “A visible example of urbanisation trends is the bridge

nearby Brignole train station: historical pictures show that the bridge had twenty

arcades when it was built. Nowadays only four arcades are left. The room for the river

has been considerably reduced, part of it has been covered and in the Seventies floods

started again to endanger the whole area”. (int. 4)

Many interviewees also stress the difficulty of decisions which imply a trade-off

between urban development and safety, especially in areas apparently fit for

residential and economic development (int.2,3,4,5). “Buildings were permitted in

certain areas, knowing that protection works would have only partially reduced risk

levels. The problem is that this generates wrong expectations in entrepreneurs. After

these decisions, local authorities can never come back.(…) Urban, river basin and civil

protection plans are hardly coordinated. (…) In an area with a 200 return period flood,

a commercial centre was built. By playing with words such as risk and danger, people

wrongly understood that the risk was reduced but this was the case only for the

danger. Another problem is that - even if everyone knows that river basin plans prevail

over urban plans - the reality is sometimes different.” (int.2) The difficult coexistence

of building constraints with urban development plans is not at all new and it has been

identified also by many other researchers (e.g. Burby and French 1981). Also to be

mentioned are the internal contradictions in planning. For example Pidgeon (2005) in

his research in the Haute Savoie Region (France) shows that development plans

include areas which are simultaneously designated at high risk and declared fit for

industrial development.

18

Box 2. Flood risk governance, spatial planning tools and responsibilities

Flood risk governance in Genova is grounded on the administrative structure

of Italy which is divided into regions (20), provinces (now under reform and

soon to be entirely removed) and municipalities (8,104). Government services

at different levels are structured to coordinate their operations and resources

with non-governmental actors, through a mixed top-down, bottom-up

organizational system for disaster risk management (OECD 2009).

The Liguria Region -as all the other Italian regions- also has legislative powers

for natural risk and emergency management. Systematic assessment of flood

hazard, risk and vulnerability is performed by the River Basin Authority (l.

183/1989). The Authority produces basin plans, hazard and risk maps and

advice on prevention and mitigation measures. The basin plans (PAI: Piani per

l’Assetto Idrogeologico) comprise areas at high risk according to return periods

that are compatible with those indicated in the EC “Flood Directive”

(2007/60/EC). The evaluation of flood risk is conducted at the level of each

hydro-graphic district. Special Plans (Piani Straordinari) include areas exposed

to higher risks, as resulting from historical data, on-site evaluations and

hazard/risk assessment.

In the broader context of spatial planning, the River Basin Plans (together

with park and landscape plans) are considered sectorial plans whose guidance

has to be included in the planning at regional, provincial and municipal level.

More detailed hazard and risk maps may be produced by regional, provincial

or municipal authorities on demand. The hydro-geological risk assessment is

also aided by further data specifically produced by the Regional Agencies for

the Environment, the National Research Council, and the different units

(“Functional Centres”) of the National Department of Civil Protection or

research centres of universities, following specific requests (Galderisi and

Ceudach 2009; Galderisi and Menoni 2007;al., 2006, De Marchi et al., 2007,

Scolobig, 2010).

In 2009 the province of Genoa prepared a Climate change adaptation action

plan, which is now in its implementation phase. A multidisciplinary team

including officers from different local authorities (architects, agronomists,

hydrologists, naturalists, geologists, physicists) is working on the

implementation of several pilot projects including: green infrastructures along

streams; environmental transformation at the level of provincial land use units;

toolkit (called ADAPTO) for vulnerability assessment; use of land management

criteria in planning in order to reach the climate adaptation targets;

participatory community resilience exercises. Each planned action is achieved

through a process including launch, development, agreement, implementation,

assessment and update (GRaBS assessment tool) (Climate change adaptation

action plan 2009).

• Finally some interviewees (e.g. 8,9) report that, as a result of urbanisation and

industrialisation, the land outside the town has been progressively abandoned. The

presence of people on this land, which once was ensured by different conditions and

living styles, led to a higher control and monitoring of the risky areas. For example, a

wood which is less controlled results in missing water canalisations and the poor

19

cleaning of the streams’ and rivers’ bed: both of them are considered causes of

increased risk and/or vulnerability .

4.2.3 Funding for risk mitigation and project implementation

Many interviewees (int. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11) maintain that one of the root causes of

increased risk and vulnerability in Genova is the “risk mitigation stalemate”, i.e. the

fact that structural protection defences have not been built and flood risk remains

extremely high. “The most serious problem as regards flood risk management in

Genova is the risk mitigation stalemate. Notwithstanding the funding allocated for

building structural mitigation works, little has been done to mitigate risk, even after

events which caused several casualties.” (int. 16, 17)

“The fact that rivers and streams have been covered with concrete in the past makes

the projects for the maintenance and renewal of structural risk mitigation measures

in Genova extremely difficult and expensive” (int. 7)

An interviewee working for regional authorities estimates that “the funding necessary

to guarantee enhanced safety for the main source of danger in Genova - i.e. the

Bisagno river – is approximately 350 million euros. Of those, approximately 35 million

in national funding has been already used for risk mitigation interventions, 70 has

already been transferred, 260 still has to be allocated. There are plans to allocate the

remaining 260 million. (…)” (int. 11)

Disaster risk reduction financing in Italy has never been an easy topic and the situation

in Genova reflects a national trend of inadequate funding for risk mitigation, as

explained in Box 4.

Box 4. Disaster risk reduction financing in Italy Between 1944 and 2012 the overall costs for natural disasters in Italy have been

estimated to total approximately 242.5 billion Euros (Rapporto Ance-Cresme). Only in

the last two decades (1990-2010) the overall costs have been estimated to come to

approximately 100 billion Euros (Monti and Chiaves 2006). Every year the Italian

Government spends on average 3.5-4 billion Euros to indemnify damages caused by

catastrophic events (EEA 2004). “The average of 3.5-4 –reports Prof. Seno in a

newspaper interview- is not that meaningful. Indeed the damage nowadays is much

higher than it was in the past, especially before the 50s, because the territory is highly

urbanised and the values of the buildings considerably increased. The same is true for

the development of infrastructures and services.”

A relevant share of the State’s yearly budget is devoted to restoring damage incurred

as a result of catastrophes. In the past, State funding has been inspired by provisions

aimed at covering emergency situations connected to specific unexpected disastrous

events, so that ad hoc provisions were enacted which varied consistently in time and

were characterised by being discretional.

20

The roots of this “emergency culture” - which is fostering a vicious cycle of risk

mitigation interventions undertaken only in the aftermath of a disaster - have to be

found in the history of the Italian disaster risk management system. More precisely the

Italian government intervenes directly during emergencies by providing ex post

financial aid and enacting ad hoc measures. Almost no private insurance scheme is

available for covering natural disaster damage and so far State indemnification has

been always guaranteed. Recently, there have been some legal proposals (law decree

59, 2012) for the introduction of an obligatory private insurance system for those

living or owning properties in high risk areas (Corriere della Sera 7/06/2012). In most

cases, State indemnification of disaster losses follows a special procedure which is

much faster than routine risk management procedures. Whenever a natural

catastrophe involves a given area, the Regional government proposes the declaration

of a state of emergency for that particular area, which may involve the territory of a

town, of a province or of an entire region according to the extent of the disaster (Monti

and Chiaves, 2006). The Cabinet of Ministries must approve the proposal for the state

of emergency to be officially declared. Approval opens the way to governmental

interventions. Usually, the President of the Region establishes an ad hoc commission

( “Commissariato per l’emergenza” and nominates a temporary commissioner) to

undertake the evaluation of damages, and to fund and monitor reconstruction works.

The Department of Civil Protection acts as an intermediary and technical expert body

throughout the process and has a leading role in the reconstruction phase.

The ad hoc commissions are meant to be temporary but in several cases, due to the

nature of the risk mitigation projects to be implemented, they work for several years

after the event and become new actors in the already complex institutional framework

of disaster risk management.

At the same time, the enactment of special laws and provisions indemnifying the

owners of properties affected by single disasters generated a form of reliance on the

Government by Italian citizens, who know they may always count on the state for

recovery, which is one of the reasons why private insurance covering natural disasters

has never fully developed in Italy (Monti and Chiaves 2006: 171).

Returning to Genova and to online available datasets, from 1999 to 2013, the overall

allocated funding for hydrogeological risk mitigation in the Liguria region has been

116.3 million Euros, of which 39.5 was for Genova and 76.8 million euros for the other

towns of the region respectively

(http://www.rendis.isprambiente.it/rendisweb/geo.jsp?id_reg=07, own elaboration)

Fig. 5 presents a summary of the funding allocated per year. The data, downloaded

from the archive of the Italian institute for environmental protection

(http://www.rendis.isprambiente.it/rendisweb/), show that before 2010 very little

funding was made available for Genova. However, as we will describe in the following,

even if some funding was allocated in 2010, legal controversies stopped the initiation

of the building construction sites.

21

Fig. 5 - Allocated national funding for hydrogeological risk mitigation in Genova and other municipalities

of the Liguria region (Data source: Italian Institute for Environmental Protection; own elaboration)

Notwithstanding the allocated funding (Fig. 5), the number of on-going building construction

sites for hydrogeological risk mitigation works in the Liguria region in the year 2014 is the

second lowest among the twenty Italian regions (Italia sicura 2015). As shown in Fig. 7, Liguria

has only 9 building construction sites (vs. e.g. 192 in the region Emilia Romagna) The funding

is also low in comparison with other regions (37'835'000 euros vs. e.g. 135'720'000 in the

region Toscana) (Fig. 6) (Italia sicura 2015).

Fig. 6 - Percentage of areas at hydrogeological risk in each region; Liguria in red (source: ISPRA 2014; own elaboration)

Fig. 7 - On-going building construction sites for hydrogeological risk mitigation in the 20 Italian regions – year 2014; Liguria in red, 9 building construction sites (Data source: Italia sicura 2015; own elaboration)

22

Fig. 8 - Funding for open building construction sites for hydrogeological risk mitigation in the 20 Italian regions - year 2014; Liguria in red, approx. 35 million Euros (Data source: Italia sicura 2015; own elaboration)

However, the funding described above does not include some additional funds

allocated autonomously by the municipality of Genova (40 million Euros; Italia Sicura

2015) nor the funds allocated by the province nor by ad-hoc post event National Civil

protection interventions nor European funding (online dataset not available).

A problematic aspect in the opinion of several interviewees (int. 2,3, 11), is that there

are no databases available providing an overview of funding allocated by the

numerous authorities and agencies contributing to mitigate risk in Genova in the past

decades. Moreover existing data and datasets are hardly comparable (different time

series, different agencies, etc.), especially for analysing long term trends. Most of the

interviewees agree that such an overview would be useful: “There is not a transparent

system that allows to have an overview of funding provided by different authorities

acting at different levels, in different phases of the disaster risk cycle ”. (int. 2)

It is not an easy task to build such a database for several reasons:

i) as mentioned above, so far the funding for risk mitigation was allocated by

different authorities acting at different levels, from European to national,

regional, provincial and municipal one and working in different sectors, such

as urban planning-technical offices, environmental agencies, civil protection.

The civil protection ad-hoc discretional and post event provisions often

allowed to start protection works much faster than routine provisions: “if we

23

compare what funded by emergency-ad hoc post event interventions vs.

ordinary funding we can estimate a 10:2 ratio.”

ii) another reason is institutional change especially with respect to

responsibility allocation for funding distribution. The national authorities in

charge of funding risk mitigation changed through time. Funding for risk

mitigation has also been provided by national authorities such as the Ministry

of Infrastructure, Environment and by regional authorities in charge of

Environmental protection. Therefore building a comprehensive dataset with

a specific focus on funding received at the local level (not e.g. funding

allocated at the national level) requires huge efforts.

Finally a problematic aspect reported by interviewees is that the process from funding

request, to allocation, actual transfer, risk mitigation project design and realisation is

often far too long (int. 4, 9, 11). Even when funds are transferred, the implementation

of approved projects takes much more than initially planned. An emblematic example

is the MOSE (stands for Experimental Electro-mechanic module) project to protect

Venezia from floods. The project was finalised in 1992, construction works started in

2002 and is still ongoing at the time of this writing (2015). The MOSE example reflects

a trend in many other Italian regions and towns (e.g. Camaldoli, Isola del Giglio,

Caserta, Porto Empedocle, Porto Azzurro, Sarno, Nocera Inferiore, Seveso see

Salvaggiulo 2014; Tozzi 2014). In the year 2009-2010 the state-region agreement

identified 3395 very urgent measures to reduce the impact of natural disasters: after

4 years 78% of these measures have still not been implemented (La Stampa

11.10.2014)

Interviewees at the national level (int. 12,13,14) confirm that the situation depicted

for Genova and Liguria region is representative of many other municipalities and

regions in Italy and add: “The main problem for risk and emergency management in

Italy is funding and monetary resources. We can do any kind of risk analysis and

project design but implementation is the main problem” (int. 13)

4.2.4 Past criteria for funding allocation

There is a shared agreement among interviewees (int. 1,2,11,12,14) that past criteria

for funding allocation at the national level penalised a region like Liguria. Before 2014,

national funding was allocated on the basis of the total number of inhabitants and

surface area of the region. This penalised Liguria which has a low population and

surface area in comparison with other Italian regions. After the new legislation in 2014

a rapid change is expected and more funding should be available for Liguria and

Genova (int. 11, 12, see section x)

“Notwithstanding the high level of risk and population exposure, Liguria used to

receive only 2.5% of the funding allocated for Italian regions (20 in total) to reduce

risk. Indeed the criteria to allocate funding were not risk based because risk maps

24

were not comparable across regions. Thanks to the implementation of the European

Floods Directive (2007/60/EC)1 now we have comparable risk levels for the Italian

regions/ river basin districts. As a result, Genova is expected to receive more than 200

million out of the total 700 million recently allocated by the government for risk

mitigation.” (int.11)

Indeed in the past the methodologies used for producing risk maps were not

homogeneous and risk levels were assessed by using different methodologies. The

comparison was difficult. In 2010 the results of a questionnaire survey on flood risk

management submitted to all the Italian River Basin Authorities by the Institute for

Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) revealed that there is an “un-

homogeneous reality in the evaluation models, in the analysis procedures and in the

choice of the scales. The major differences between the different authorities occur in

the methodologies and use of the model tools for the evaluation of the discharges

and the hydrographs targeted at estimating the extent of the area subject to

flooding.” (Crue-Eranet 2010:9).

The implementation of flood risk management plans required by the European Floods

Directive consistently improved the situation. Now common criteria have been

developed to compare assessments, to set priorities and to justify the decisions about

the allocation of monetary resources for risk mitigation measures in one R4 area (high

risk area) or in the other.

4.2.5 The footprint of economic crisis

The allocation of government funding for public works and infrastructures (which

includes spending for flood risk mitigation measures) decreased as a result of

economic crisis (Ciocca 2015). For example between 2011 and 2013, 6% of the Italian

government funding for public works and infrastructure was cut (opere pubbliche;

ibidem). This dynamic at the national level affected funding for flood risk mitigation

at local level.

“Italy's deep economic crisis, which has seen public spending pared back to the bone

in many areas, has made handling unexpected disasters more difficult but deeper

systemic weaknesses have also been highlighted.(…) Administrative failures under

successive governments, from unregulated building to poorly planned infrastructure

1 The Directive required Member States to first carry out a preliminary flood risk assessment by 2011

to identify areas at risk of flooding. For such areas they would then need to draw up flood risk maps by

2013 and establish flood risk management plans focused on prevention, protection and preparedness by

2015. The Directive applies to inland waters as well as all coastal waters across the whole territory of

the EU. Member States shall take into consideration long term developments, including climate

change, as well as sustainable land use practices in the flood risk management cycle addressed in this

Directive.

25

and bureaucratic inertia have exacerbated the problems.”

(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/12/us-italy-flood-

idUSKCN0I00G620141012)

Yet, there are different opinions on the role played by the crisis. A University professor

reports that the Genova event has provided a justification to promote new

investment in infrastructures. “Risk reduction should not be considered as a cost for

Italy, but rather as a key investment to get over the economic crisis, promote equality

as President Roosvelt did after the crisis in 1929. Roosvelt invested in public

infrastructures to re-start the economy and in in this way he promoted employment

too. The Genova event has for sure provided a new justification to promote new

investment in infrastructures.” (Espresso 2015) Moreover, so this line of argument

goes “if we invest in environment, energy and geosciences we can generate

occupation, contribute to economic recovery, improve the quality of life and safety in

our territory.” (ibidem) In short in this view the economic crisis is considered an

opportunity rather than a barrier for risk reduction.

At the national level the severe events that hit Genova between 2010 and 2015 are

considered as one of the factors driving the ‘Unblock Italy decree´(Decreto Sblocca

Italia; GU n. 262 del 11-11-2014 - Suppl. Ordinario n. 85 ). This law decree, proposed by

the left wing coalition of the Italian premier Matteo Renzi in 2014, aims to free up

billions of euros in funding for infrastructural projects, including new highways,

railways, and major airport renovations, and help the recession-hit economy. As part

of the attempts to exit from the economic crisis, the decree foresees 2943 new urgent

measures to reduce hydrogeological risks in Italian municipalities. To implement these

urgent measures in July 2014 a new governmental “Unit” (Unita’ di Missione contro

il dissesto idrogeologico) was created: since then, more than 200 new building

construction sites for structural protection works have already been initiated

(situation updated to March 2015; italiasicura.governo.it). Among the tasks of the unit

is the provision of an overview of funding provided by different authorities

(int.12,13,15).

4.2.6 The implementation of austerity measures at the local level

The previous section describes how national policies to face the economic crises

actually aimed at providing new opportunities for risk reduction. As the history of

previous economic crises shows, investments in public infrastructures (including

dams, river banks and any kind of structural mitigation measures) tremendously

helped to re-start the economy.

Yet, what happened at the local level with the actual implementation of austerity

measures? Interviewees (int. 3,11,16) report that the implementation of the

European Stability and Growth Pact prevented some municipalities from being able

26

to allocate or spend their budget for risk mitigation (Italy is one of the European

countries that mostly suffered from the pact implementation because it had one of

the highest debt to GDP ratios, 132.1% - only Greece has an higher value of 177%

Eurostat 2015).

Moreover the difficulties in sharing the limited resources available for the public

sector is also often reported as an indirect driver of increased risk and vulnerability

(int. 1,5,11). As reported by an interviewee “in the past years the limited monetary

resources available for the public sector affected risk mitigation very badly. For

example in the regional council, the health sector was always considered a priority in

comparison with the risk sector.”(int. 11) In other words mainstreaming flood risk

mitigation in decision making at the local and regional level proved to be an extremely

difficult task in times of austerity.

4.3 Governance pathway

4.3.1 The perverse effects of legal trials and overregulation

Interviewees primarily attribute the risk mitigation stalemate and delayed funding

transfer to the legal trials and reciprocal corruption accusations among the

companies competing for undertaking a contract/receiving the tender for building

protection works [ricorsi dopo l’assegnazione della gara] (int. 4,11). More precisely,

since the 2011 event there have been three trials (Liguria Tribunal, Lazio tribunal,

State Council tribunal) blocking the building of structural risk mitigation measures.

Yet, the history of risk mitigation in Genova is characterised by several trials.

Especially in the Nineties (when the “Mani pulite” 2 judicial investigation begun)

municipal officials of Genova have been accused of receiving kickbacks for public

works contracts. Even if at a later stage these officials have been proven innocent, this

anti-corruption operation stopped public works for risk mitigation (int. 15).

However the legal trials are a short term cause (cause prossime) of the stalemate in

risk mitigation decisions. Indeed interviewees hypothesise several long-term causes

2 Mani pulite (Italian for "clean hands") was a nationwide Italian judicial investigation into political

corruption held in the 1990s. Mani pulite led to the demise of the so-called First Republic resulting in

the disappearance of many parties. In some accounts, as many as 5000 people have been cited as

suspects. At one point more than half of the members of the Italian Parliament were under indictment.

More than 400 city and town councils were dissolved because of corruption charges. The estimated

value of bribes paid annually in the 1980s by Italian and foreign companies bidding for large

government contracts in Italy reached 4 billion dollars (6.5 trillion lire). The corruption system

uncovered by these investigations was usually referred to as Tangentopoli The term derives from

tangente, which means kickback and in this context refers to kickbacks given for public works

contracts. [from Wikipedia]

27

of this risk mitigation stalemate related to broader governance processes and the

legal/justice system, including:

Perverse effects of over-regulation and anti-corruption measures: there are more

than 1300 norms regulating disaster risk management in Italy (Cellerino 2004). Some

argue that, in the long term, this over-regulation leaded to decisional inertia or

dysfunctional processes. Some examples of legislation with the “perverse effect” of

slowing down risk mitigation decisions are:

i) anti-corruption measures such as the “anti mafia certificate” (a compulsory

certificate necessary to undertake a contract for building protection works);

ii) the rotation of directors in charge to approve public spending, again slowing

down the process (see also Chiellino 2014);

iii) slow procedures (at least 34 months for an environmental impact

assessment).

4.3.2 Human resources constraints

Two apparently contradictory aspects are mentioned as indirect drivers of increased risk and

vulnerability. On the one side the excessive number of authorities involved in disaster risk

management and on the other side the inadequate/limited human resources. Yet on closer

inspection, these two elements are not in contradiction: it seems that there are too many

authorities and, among them, many are suffering human resources and budget constraints.

Interviewees (e.g. int. 13,15) lament an excessive number of authorities involved in

the disaster risk management cycle and risk mitigation (about 3600, Cellerino 2004),

including the local “conferences of the services” (i.e. conferences created in the ’90 in

order to speed up the procedures for approval of decisions about public

infrastructures, thus including protection works. These conferences of the services

usually include more than 25 authorities) (Salvaggiulo 2014). In the case of Genova

the example of numerous authorities providing funding without an overview is

reported several times by interviewees.

Inadequate human resources and lack of personnel in the authorities in charge often

slows down the process of building structural protection measures. In the risk

mitigation sector: “It is difficult to implement new strategies, build datasets or

monitor what has been done when there is not enough personnel to push forward

the implementation of designed projects” (int.11) Emergency managers are facing an

even more difficult situation: “before, during and after an event our team is under

enormous pressure, shifts often last more than 12 hours and we sleep in the

emergency center. With the intensification of events witnessed in the past year, the

pressure on the team is increasing, but the same is not true for the resources

available” (int. 5). A similar situation has been emphasised by those in charge of the

warning system “We do not have enough human resources to be able to monitor and

28

forecast 24 hours (…). One of the problems of the Italian system is that new legislation

and reforms are sometimes launched with very limited resources” (int. 1).

4.3.3 The mismatch between the political and disaster risk cycles

Another governance driver of increased risk and vulnerability in the long term is the

mismatch between the political and disaster risk cycles. Elected representatives and

risk managers often have different priorities , visions, interests concerning disaster

risk reduction. Several interviewees lament that after an event elected

representatives promise to build new protection works, but the time taken between

the project design and finalization is usually too long for these representatives to be

still in power (int.3). In the meantime new elections often change the constellation of

political parties in power and this can negatively affect the project implementation

(int. 2). “Politicians can change their mind quite easily especially when they do not

have a robust enough technical background to understand in details the trade-offs

between alternatives for risk mitigation.” (int.3)

Yet, opinions on the complex relationship between political and technical actors differ

considerably. Another interviewee maintains (int. 14): “Practitioners and technical

officers tend to blame politicians because they do not provide the necessary

monetary resources. I disagree. Also technical officers are responsible for this

mismatch, especially when they are unable to clearly frame the problem and to

provide sustainable options for risk management taking into account economic and

social factors. As a consequence, elected representatives have no reason to prioritise

complex problems without a pragmatic and feasible solution”.

Other types of mismatch are mentioned with respect to the politics of scale between

the national and local level. Indeed actions and policies undertaken at the national

level do not always respond to local needs. Two examples are often provided. First,

the Genova event in 2011 and especially in 2014 catalysed a common reaction by the

Italian national authorities, i.e. more funding for reconstruction, recovery and building

of new protection works. Yet as described in section 4.2, the dynamics at the local

level are extremely complex and even when the funding was available other barriers

combined in generating a risk mitigation stalemate at the local level. Second, the lack

of consistency in the alert procedures among Italian regions. Almost every region has

its own “Functional center” and alert procedures are often not consistent. For

example some Regions have a system based on 2 alert levels, others on 3. At the

national level there is an on-going discussion to improve consistency across different

regional alert systems.

29

4.3.4 Official and unofficial on-line communication flows

Local authorities in Genova reacted and acted proactively to the intensification of

extreme events. Especially since the 2014 event, innovative risk reduction strategies

and communication tools have been developed in order to improve risk awareness,

preparedness and emergency planning. New technologies, including cell phones, web

apps and social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, LinkedIn, Flickr) are

increasingly being used during emergencies and disasters. How, where, when and by

whom these devices are used increasingly become important questions for

practitioners in Genova.

Several examples of existing online tools are reported during interviews: social

networks related to the municipality website twitter.com/comunedigenova;

www.facebook.com/Comune.di.Genova; meteo alert

http://segnalazionisms.comune.genova.it. Municipal emergency plans are easily

available online including information for residents on behaviours to enact in case of

a warning. (http://www.comune.genova.it/pages/cosa-fare-caso-allerta-1-alluvione).

A new emergency plan has been put in place in October 2015. Information on hazard

and risk assessment, including maps, are also available online

(http://www.comune.genova.it/pages/mappe-delle-zone-rischio-inondazione).

Multiple online resources are available for residents to find information in case of an

event e.g. website of the Functional centre: www.meteoliguria.it; website of the

municipality www.comune.genova.it)

As reported by local authorities (int.9): “we are now working on several EC funded

projects developing nowcast systems and radars. In parallel we are developing radar

applications in order to issue an alert that reaches mobile phones when the person is

in the endangered area.” Yet, notwithstanding the advances and new developments

there are still some open issues and challenges related to the use of social media.

Weather forecasts attract a number of comments and reflections during the

interviews.

“Local agencies providing official weather forecasts constantly update data online.

However providing data is not enough. Data need to be interpreted and

communicated. This is the most problematic issue” (int. 13) for several reasons:

First, “(…) there is a long list of private/commercial weather websites (90%) driven by economic profit: this means that the higher the number of ‘clicks on their websites, the higher the profit. Their main aim is to “make the news” to have better online exposure. Social media and newspapers are typically their target. Yet, the critical issue is that they are not accountable for the truthfulness of the provided information. As a result of this legislative gap, they often deliver alarmist forecasts to make profit. Yet, residents do not often distinguish the subtle difference between official and un-official weather forecasts. Recently there have been several cases of completely wrong forecasts provided by these private actors. This decreases confidence in the

30

forecast reliability of the whole system, thus including also the forecasts provided by official authorities.” (int.9)

Second, ““because of social media and the development of online tools, the

population has the wrong idea that the local government can reach everyone

everywhere. This reinforces the already existing wrong attitude of transferring

responsibility for safety and protection to the agencies in charge. Yet, these agencies

do not have enough human resources to guarantee 24 hour coverage on twitter,

facebook and all other social media. However this is the only possible option with

social media: you can never let it go.” (int. 1) Yet, verifying, monitoring and sorting

through the large amount of data emerging from social media can be overwhelming.

Third, “communicating the results of complex weather forecast models and related

uncertainties in an effective way is far from simple. Also, in the Italian system, those

in charge of the weather forecasts are not in charge of communicating with the public.

The mayor and regional civil protection officers are in charge of emergency

communication and issuing the warning. Yet, in the present system there are several

cognitive gaps in the communication chain for example between weather analysts

and mayors - who often do not have expert knowledge on weather forecasts- and

between mayors and residents. This means that it is very difficult to know what

message to deliver, to whom and when. Let’s take an example: the Liguria region is

divided in 5 alert zones and bulletins are produced for each one of them. The zones

are characterised by a certain territorial dimension and similarities in weather

patterns. Yet, in some cases a medium level of alert can cause much worst

consequences than a high one. This means that an isolated extreme event/flash flood

occurring in case of medium alert levels (orange code) may cause much worst

consequences than heavy rainfalls generating a high level of alert (red code). These

isolated extreme events are very difficult to forecast, also because the size of our river

basins is relatively small (average 15 km2, but many basins are 1 km2). [Now the

system is changing and we will adopt a three level alert system (yellow, orange and

red, not only orange and red as it was before]. Yet, these events are also the most

dangerous and damaging ones because in an hour they can cause serious damages

and even casualties. In these cases there is absolutely no time to inform the

population. The only successful strategy is to invest in the development of social

capacities and self protection skills.” (int. 9)

4.4 Perceptions and values

The response to the multiple extreme events that hit Genova in the past few years,

can tell us much not only about the risk and emergency management system, but also

about this town, the sense of place and feeling of belonging of its inhabitants. These

natural disasters test the social fabric to its limits and draw on the deepest social,

cultural and economic reserves of individuals, communities and institutions.

National, regional and local authorities responded very proactively to these events,

adopted new emergency and climate adaptation plans and several other new

31

structural and non-structural measures to reduce risk and increase preparedness.

Post-event ad hoc recovery strategies were implemented. Also the civil society

responded proactively with the creation of several NGOs working on emergency

management, risk mitigation or weather forecasts (int. 16, 17).

At the same time the town experienced social tensions and sometimes even conflicts

especially after the 2011 event and the related casualties. Afterwards, the emergency

and risk management system in Genova catalyzed a lot of attention in the national

and local press. Some local NGOs, voluntary organisations and committees lamented

a lack of river maintenance and of investments in protection works (int. 16,17). The

multiple (partially still on-going) legal trials between local authorities and citizens,

local authorities and private construction enterprises and among local authorities

themselves were and still are causing tensions.

Among the root causes of these tensions, different opinions and perceptions about

risk, priorities for risk mitigation and emergency management definitely play a role.

These opinions differ consistently depending on interviewees’ values, interests,

professional belonging and many other factors. During the interviews, two themes

emerged as particularly relevant in shaping the way interviewees frame and think

about the risk, thus providing insights on challenges that risk and emergency

managers face in Genova: the clash between the structural and non structural

paradigm and the awareness/preparedness/resilience of local population.

4.4.1 The clash between the structural and non structural paradigm

• Opinions diverge considerably about preferences for structural and non structural risk

mitigation measures. As summarized by an interviewee: “There are solutions, which

can be structural protection works or non structural (advanced monitoring and

warning systems). Both require huge investments. These investments can be

retrieved in the medium and long term, but this awareness seems to be completely

absent in Italy. It is a problem of attitude: we (i.e. Italians) are against expensive

projects –also because we suspect that the funding will be used in the wrong way

because of corruption etc. Moreover we tend to forget the benefits in the long term.

The timeframe to think about environmental protection should be at least 10 years

long, but the political vision in Italy is much shorter (i.e. politicians simply want to be

re-elected).” (int. 7)

• One the one side several interviewees agree that structural mitigation works and

improvement of safety along the streams is a key priority (int. 2,4,11), see section x.

• Others have completely different views: “It is important to acknowledge past failures

in risk mitigation attempts. The lack of funding transfer shows that the structural

measure paradigm is unsustainable and does not work. The deep economic crisis

32

affecting the country definitely worsened the situation.” (int. 13) Or:“ Actions should

logically be grounded on lessons learnt from the past rather than support an

unrealistic hope to mitigate the risk by means of structural measures and new

projects. Moreover structural protection measures are not always useful. Sometimes

environmental side effects are very relevant. The population has to learn how to live

with risk and increasing preparedness levels is absolutely priority. The little funding

available should be devoted to warning systems and non-structural risk mitigation

measures. The regional functional centers for forecasts and the systems for

emergency management should be reinforced.” (int.10) Or: “You can not really

compare structural and non structural protection measures because the costs are

completely different. The costs to make the Bisagno area safer are not comparable

with the costs to improve and maintain the warning system: the latter is considerably

cheaper.” (int.1)

• Yet, even if it seems obvious that an integration of structural and non-structural

measures is the way forward, decisions about how to share resources between the

two seem to be much less obvious.

4.4.2 Aware and prepared?

Emergency managers report that the event in 1992 was crucial in the local history and

awareness of floods because afterwards precipitation and floods have become much more

frequent and intense. Yet the question is whether risk awareness and preparedness increased

among the local population as a result of repeated flash flood experiences.

Box 3. Emergency management in Genova The key actor for emergency management in Genova is the Civil Protection Functional Centre (Centro Funzionale Meteo-Idrologico di Protezione Civile della Regione Liguria) acting under the ARPAL agency. This is a forecasting and monitoring service (supplemented by the National Functional Centre in Roma) which is dedicated to the provision and surveillance of hydrological and other risks. The centre monitors and analyses, with a multi risk approach, data of critical situations. The functional centre works closely together with the Competence Centres providing scientific evidence to support decision making. The warning systems for hydrogeological risks in Liguria is based on hydrological and not

pluviometric thresholds, as in other Italian regions.

Some emergency managers in Genova maintain that residents tend to underestimate

and minimize flood risk (int. 5). “There is still not a high level of risk awareness even if

the frequency of events changed considerably in the past years” (int. 5). They

maintain that notwithstanding the numerous events, risk awareness is still scarce

among residents and this causes many problems not only in relation to risk and

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emergency communication, but also in relation to decisions about land use planning

and risk zoning. In their opinion risk under-estimation is due to a number of reasons:

scarce knowledge of hydro-geological phenomena and of the uncertainty related to

weather forecast models, risk denial, over-confidence in civil protection services,

prevalence of economic over safety interests, scarce knowledge of individual and

household preparedness measures, over-reliance in protection works and lack of

awareness of residual risk (int. 8, 9). Moreover they maintain that more time is

needed to really increase risk awareness.

Interviewees belonging to local NGOs and voluntary organisations have a different

opinion. They maintain that residents are aware of the risk but do not know what to

do to get better prepared. They trust protection works and warning systems and are

expecting local authorities to build protection measures to increase safety levels as

soon as possible.

In turn emergency managers maintain that “emergency management is an illusion. It

is wrong to think that fire brigades, civil protection managers etc. can really manage

an emergency especially in case of extreme and more and more frequent events, as

we have been experiencing in the past few years. Emergency managers can provide

support in the most critical areas but they are not able to help all those in need during

an emergency. The only alternative is the hyper-informed and hyper-aware citizen.

This person is aware that he/she can never have total safety and that there will be

always a residual risk to deal with.(…) We should not forget that we have 115,000

residents at high risk in Genova. As an emergency manager I will never be able to

know enough about individual vulnerability”. (int. 5)

4.4.3 Community participation and empowerment

Systematic experiences of participation are taking place all over the Liguria region as

a result of the implementation of the 2000/60/CE Directive. The River Basin

Authorities are in charge of consulting all the relevant stakeholders before the

finalisation of the river basin plan. The interviewees report that these experiences of

participation are extremely different with regard to the identification and selection of

the stakeholders, the organisation and length of the process, etc. depending also on

the single initiatives undertaken by the basin authorities and their interactions or

previous relationships with other authorities (at the regional, provincial and municipal

level).

As reported by an interviewee: “Our experiences concerning public participation are

very different and depend on a number of factors among which the context plays a

crucial role. At the municipal level everything depends on the local authorities, their

willingness to implement effective participatory processes for risk management

decisions and also on the population size and attitudes. (…) For example participatory

practices seem to work better in municipalities between 700 and 1000 inhabitants.

There the local authorities have been able to identify, inform and work with almost

34

all inhabitants in the most risky areas. In Genova it is much more difficult to enact

similar processes because of the number of inhabitants and the different social fabric.

You can reasonably expect to have a much lower level of social capital in Genova

compared to smaller villages. Therefore participation can only take place at the higher

level, i.e. with stakeholders representing organisations, authorities, associations.

However these processes do to have the same results in terms of increased risk

awareness and preparedness.” (int. 9)

In summary even if it seems clear that people centred and participatory approaches

need to be developed to increase risk awareness and preparedness, several questions

about tools, methods, sampling etc. still remain open.

5. Discussion

The testing of the PEARL risk and root causes analysis framework in the Genova case allowed

researchers to identify several drivers of hazard, exposure and vulnerability related to

physical, socio-economic and governance pathways. This section summarises and discusses

some of the key findings.

5.1 Risk drivers, root causes and causal loop analysis

Table 4 (see PEARL Del. 1.1, Fraser et al. 2014) summarises the key results presented in the

previous sections on the historic, contemporary and future drivers related to the categories

of root causes.

Tab. 4 Thematic guide for the PEARL RRCA approach: manifestation for Genova

Category of root causes

Pathway Temporal expression

Manifestation for Genova

Drivers of hazard

Physical Historic Steep mountains making prediction harder and causing intense precipitation; erosion altering natural protection

Contemporary Increased intensity of flood and flash flood events

Future More frequent drought period and more frequent heavy rainfall; climate change and extreme events

Socio-economic

Historic Human intervention, e.g. excessive urbanisation, harbour, industrial activities, drainage, sewerage systems, narrow streets

Contemporary Inadequate channe[l capacity; concrete-covered streams; waterproof soil

Future As above but worsened by human induced climate change ; worsening of water quality with consequences on e.g. hydropower production and harvest

Governance Historic na

Contemporary na

Future na

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Drivers of exposure

Physical Historic Intense agricultural practices and reduction of forest/wood areas; lack of or inadequacy of protection works

Contemporary Protection works and risk mitigation stalemate

Future As above

Socio-economic

Historic Urbanization, demographic growth (until 1970), lack of harmonization between urban and risk planning, culture of post-event ad-hoc funding and interventions, criteria for funding distribution penalising the region, lack of homogeneous and comparable criteria to assess risk levels in different regions

Contemporary Urbanization in areas protected by structural measures (but not 100% safe), lack of dataset/overview of allocated and transferred funding

Future As above and lack of harmonization between urban and risk planning

Governance Historic

Contemporary Inadequate/lack of human resources; excessive number of authorities; complex bureaucratic procedures and legal trials

Future Challenges posed by online communication flows, social media management and private weather forecast services

Drivers of

vulnerability

Physical Historic Inadequate water canalization, poor cleaning of streams’ and rivers’ beds

Contemporary As above

Future (Expected lack) of household investment in private protection measures

Socio-economic

Historic People feel protected by defenses/protection works, expect high degree of safety

Contemporary Lack of alignment between economic/urban planning and development and risk maps, Inadequate human resources (lack of personnel)

Future Population ageing, immigration, gender and place of residence as main social vulnerability drivers

Governance Historic Since the late 1990s decentralization of powers to regional and local authorities did not imply more funding at local level

Contemporary Legal conflicts blocking the use of (already) limited monetary resources as well as project implementation; too much responsibility at local level/too little capacities and resources; anti-corruption measures slowing down the system; excessive number of authorities

Future

Here below the most critical root causes of risk/ causal loops identified thanks to the desk study and the interviews are presented:

1. A long term root cause of risk in Genova is definitely excessive urbanization. Over

time, the rate of buildings along and over watercourses in Genova increased

significantly putting more lives and property at risk from potential flooding. The

increase in urbanized areas corresponded to a decrease in the land for forest.

Concrete-covered streams, inadequate urban drainage, narrow streets, and houses

acting as river banks worsened the situation. Moreover the well known conflict

36

between the guarantee of safety standards and urban/economic development seems

particularly relevant in Genova.

2. There have been extreme delays in enforcing planned structural protection works to

increase safety in the area surrounding the Bisagno river. These delays caused a risk

mitigation stalemate. The lack of action in implementing risk mitigation measures is

primarily attributed to delays in the transfer of the funding, which is –in turn- mostly

due to the legal conflicts related to the permits to build protection works. However

most interviewees agree that this is the short term cause of the stalemate.

3. A number of long term causes of this risk mitigation stalemate emerged, e.g. past

criteria for distribution of risk mitigation funding penalising the region; legal trials; a

dysfunctional legal system including more than 1300 norms regulating disaster risk

management in Italy; anti-corruption legislation having the perverse effect of slowing

down risk mitigation decisions; human and economic resource constraints especially

at the municipal level; mismatches between the political and disaster risk cycles;

excessive number of authorities involved in decision making processes; difficulties in

mainstreaming flood risk mitigation in regional policies. Yet, recent events in Genova

(especially 2014) also served as a catalyst for policy change at the national level. After

these events several actions have been undertaken in order to change risk reduction

policies: i) a new governmental “Unit” aimed at reducing hydrogeological risk (Unita’

di Missione contro il dissesto idrogeologico) was created; ii) the criteria for

distributing funding for risk mitigation among Italian regions changed (from number

of inhabitants/region size to risk levels, now comparable thanks to implementation of

European Flood Directive) (Regione Liguria 2014) iii) the “Unblock Italy decree”

(Decreto Sblocca Italia) which foresees new urgent measures to reduce

hydrogeological risks in Italian municipalities.

4. Another causal loop involves emergency management. Because of new technologies and the Internet, the distinction between official and un-official forecasts is sometimes blurry. This situation may cause a worrying decrease of trust in the authorities in charge of providing forecasts.

5.2 Methodological considerations for the next research phases

The analysis of the non technical aspects of risk management, including the risk drivers

affecting impact and outcomes and a root causes analysis proved to be a useful framework to

analyse the (often under-researched) social, economic and governance dimensions of risk.

In order to improve the RCCA framework in the next phases of PEARL, this section provides

some inputs based on the operationalization of RCCA and on the difficulties encountered

during the fieldwork.

37

First, it was difficult for the interviewees (and for the researcher performing the

interviews as well) to distinguish between the socio-economic and governance

drivers of exposure vs. vulnerability. The same is not true for the physical drivers,

also because of the technical nature of concepts such as hazard, exposure and

vulnerability. Therefore, to avoid conceptual misunderstandings and overlaps, it is

suggested that the distinction between hazard, exposure and vulnerability is not

made, at least with respect to the governance and socio-economic

dimension/pathways. Especially the distinction between the governance drivers of

exposure and vulnerability proved problematic.

Second, the distinction between the descriptive and normative/prescriptive

dimension in RCCA is not always clear. For example there are laws, statistics and

economic data available for the allocation of funding for risk mitigation, but there are

different opinions on what drove economic vulnerability to flood risk in Genova in the

past 30 years. An analysis focused on root causes leaves limited space (excluding the

background at the beginning) for description of these aspects. RCCA analysis is mostly

based on interviewees’ opinions about the drivers and root causes of risk. These

opinions can significantly differ, depending on the interviewees, their perspectives,

interests, values and responsibilities concerning flood risk management. Therefore it

is very important that the researcher acknowledges and is aware that the opinions of

certain stakeholders’ groups (e.g. those working for the agencies in charge of risk and

emergency management vs. residents) are not neutral and reflect a distinct

perception of what risk is and how it should be reduced. Therefore dealing with

stakeholders “perceptions and values” in a separate section, as suggested in the RCCA

methodology in Del. 1.1, can be misleading because the entire RCCA analysis is based

on perceptions and values.

Third, and partially related to the previous point, the distinction between issues

pertaining to the socio-economic, governance, perception and values dimensions is

also not always easy to trace. An example: the risk context in Genova highlighted a

very complex interaction between governance and social issues that makes very

difficult to separate these topics. Economic, governance and socio-economic

processes are very often strongly interlinked and it is difficult to separate them. For

example: the fact that legal controversies stopped the transfer of monetary resources

to build risk mitigation measures could be part of the economic or governance

pathway. Or: a wood which is less controlled results in missing water canalisations

and the poor cleaning of the streams’ and rivers’ bed: is this part of the physical or

socio-economic pathway or both?

Fourth, the distinction between contemporary and future drivers proved also

sometimes difficult, especially considering that results were mostly based on

qualitative interviews. Therefore asking interviewees to imagine e.g. “future

governance vulnerability drivers” proved sometimes difficult (and also had to be

explained e.g. to a member of a local NGO, without expert knowledge on

vulnerability).

38

In conclusion the RCCA framework proved extremely useful to identify drivers of risk and root

causes that usually do not emerge with other methodologies such as risk analysis, hazard, risk

and vulnerability assessment or even social vulnerability assessment, etc. It provided an

overview of critical issues for risk reduction in Genova, by allowing us to identify long and

short term drivers using a multi and interdisciplinary approach. In particular, the distinction

between short and long term causes of risk proved effective as a dimension for analysing

“historical /deeply rooted” vs. “contemporary/recent” risk issues and problems. The former

prove more difficult to change than the latter.

5.3 New ideas from and for practitioners

The purpose of this final section is to review the concepts, ideas, tools and approaches

discussed with practitioners and interviewees throughout the fieldwork and highlight some

new ideas for incorporating the results of RCCA into research and practice. Much progress has

been made toward reducing risk and building resilience in Genova, but much remains to be

done.

Interviewees mention several new ideas to be developed in the research and or practice

sector, such as:

1. social vulnerability mapping. Individual and household vulnerability maps are under

development thanks to questionnaire surveys that local authorities will administer in

2015. The results are expected to better inform emergency management (in parallel

with the implementation of the new municipal emergency plan, also to be enacted in

2015). This approach will provide measured indicators. Yet several interviewees agree

that it should be combined with a participatory approach aimed at supporting

community self-empowerment to generate change. Schools and local NGOs and

association are the best starting point to start this process.

2. development of personalised/individual emergency plans. These plans should

include not only the development of a smart phone application to issue an alert, but

also give residents the opportunity to know what to do and where to go depending

on where they live and work (and ideally where they are during and after the disaster).

Yet, key challenges are to clearly identify the residents’ preferences concerning

information provision: who should provide, what information to whom and when. The

understanding of the on-line and off-line official communication flows seems a

particularly delicate issue. Some EC funded projects (EURAMET) are already working

on developing innovative tools and apply them to the case of Genova.

3. overview of funding for disaster risk reduction. Funding for risk mitigation has been

allocated by different authorities acting at different levels, from European to national,

regional, provincial and municipal levels and working in different sectors, such as

urban planning-technical offices, environmental agencies, civil protection. A dataset

providing an overview is missing.

39

References

Burby R., French S. (1981) “Coping with Floods: the Land Use Management Paradox”,

Journal of the American Planning Association, 47, 3: 289-300.

CRUE-Eranet (2010) CRUE-Snapshot: Highlighting flood related research across

Europe, http://www.crue-eranet.net/

De Marchi B., Scolobig A., Delli Zotti G., Del Zotto M. (2007) Risk construction and

social vulnerability in an Italian Alpine Region, Report T11 - 07 - 12 of

FLOODsite Integrated Project, European Commission 6th Framework

Programme http://www.floodsite.net

Faccini F., Luino A., Sacchini A., Turconi L. (2015) Flash flood events and urban

development in Genoa Italy: lost in translation, in Lollino et al. (eds.)

Engeneering geology for society and territory, Vol. 5, Springer, Switzerland.

Fraser A., Pelling M. (2015) PEARL project Deliverable .1.1.

Galderisi A., Menoni S. (2007) Rischi naturali, Prevenzione e Piano, Urbanistica 134.

Galderisi A., Ceudech A. (2009) La mitigazione del rischio idrogeologico attraverso gli

strumenti ordinari di governo delle trasformazioni urbane: il caso del quartiere

Soccavo a Napoli, in Treu M.C. (ed.) Città, salute, sicurezza – Strumenti di

governo e casi studio – La gestione del rischio, Maggioli Editori: 474-502.

Monti A., Chiaves F. (2006) Italy, in Faure M., Hartliey T. (eds.) (2006), Financial

compensation for victims of catastrophes, Springer, Vienna, 145-194.

OECD, Organisation for Economic Cooperaion and Development (2009) International

futures project on risk management policies, Review of the national Civil

Protection System (Italy), OECD publishing,

http://www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.

Rosso R. (2014) Bisagno. Il fiume nascosto Marsilio, Venezia

Veltri M. (2004) Profili istituzionali e scientifici della difesa del suolo Editoriale Bios,

Cosenza.

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Annex

Stakeholder mapping

Key actors involved in flood risk management in Genova

Interviewee list

Most interviewees agreed only for their organisation to be cited to guarantee anonymity of

the interviews.

Interviewee 1: Regional Civil Protection Functional Center (Warning and Alarm)

Interviewee 2: Regional Coastal Ecosystem & Water Cycle Management Team

Interviewee 3: International Center on Environmental Monitoring

Interviewee 4: University 1 Professor

Interviewee 5: Municipal Civil Protection

Interviewee 6: Municipal Urban Planning Office

Interviewee 7: University 2 Professor

Interviewee 8: Municipal Communication Office

Interviewee 9: Sustainable Education and Citizen Participation Office

Interviewee 10: Flood Protection Voluntary Organisation

Interviewee 11: Regional Environmental Agency

Interviewee 12: Italian Environment Ministry

Interviewee 13: National Civil Protection

Interviewee 14: River Basin Authority Secretary

Interviewee 15: Lawyer specialised in flood risk issues

Interviewee 16: NGO 1 member

RegionallevelNa onallevel

Environment,Interior,and

otherMinistries,CivilProtec onDepartment,MajorriskCommission

Func onalandCompetenceCenters

Civilprotec onservice,firebrigadecorps,forestalcorps,policeandarmedforces,healthservices,technicaldepartmentsandagencies,meteorologicalservice

Professionalordergroupsandprivateconsultants,insurancecompanies,voluntarygroups

ResidentsMayor

Prefect

Provinciallevel

Municipallevel

41

Interviewee 17: NGO 2 member

Interview protocol

Introductory information

The research forms part of the PEARL project, or Preparing for Extreme and Rare Events in

Coastal Regions. This is an EC funded project taking place from 2014-2018, co-ordinated by

the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, The Netherlands but involving many partner

organisations across Europe. The aim is to support the development of strategies for coastal

flood management using a multi-disciplinary approach. Findings from the project will inform

a guidebook for flood management practitioners in the EU and beyond. More information

about PEARL can be found here: http://www.pearl-fp7.eu/about-pearl/

General objectives

Researchers at King’s College London and the University of Stuttgart lead a team of social

scientists who are undertaking a study of the economic, social and institutional causes of

risk and disasters in a number of EU and international case studies. The aim is to better

understand:

the social causation of small scale but high local impact disaster events in coastal

regions;

the causes and impacts of risk (for affected groups or individuals= through the lens

of a specific event or events)

The findings will inform a number of publications as well as the development of holistic risk

assessment models within PEARL. Anna Scolobig is in charge of collecting data for the

Genova case study on behalf of King´s College. The events under study are the 2011 (and

partially 2014) flash floods.

Please note that the protocol here below is a re-elaboration and adaptation of a protocol

provided by King’s College.

Questions

Event

What were understood to be the immediate, proximate causes of the disaster of the

initiating events?

Was the event forecast or predicted?

Was the existing knowledge available and accessible? Were there any decision-makers

who were unaware of the information (or less aware than they might have been)?

How was the risk of this event perceived and understood by all the categories of

stakeholders?

What strategies, laws, policies or measures had been considered to prevent the impact of

the event or reduce its consequences? Were any options rejected? To what extent had

42

strategies, policies or measures actually been implemented and put in place? Were they

effective? How and to what extent?

What was the economic/social status of the community immediately before the event

and how did it change subsequently? Was there any sense of unfairness or discrimination

in the community before, during or after the event? Are there contrasting or conflicting

views?

Causal analysis

What were the critical transitions in recent history (preconditions) that increased and changed the distribution of impact?

How did economic and political status influence the disaster risk? How did culture and societal norms influence the disaster risk?

What were the drivers of disaster prevention/resilience by broad categories: social characteristics, economic activity and livelihoods, levels of investments that reduced risk, institutional and governance structures, environment, infrastructure (critical infrastructure and residential environments), community competence (including prior experience with events, social cohesion, and social networks).

Were there barriers to disaster risk reduction? If yes, what were they?

Risk management

How are you/is your organisation dealing with the risks of floods in Genova and/or Liguria region (depending on the organisation and its mandate)? What kinds of prevention and mitigation measures are at place? What kinds of precautions have been taken to ensure people and buildings? What has been the number one concern and priority in risk management? What will be number one concern and priority in the future?

Does the local administration have the capacity to deal with flood risk? How could this capacity be improved? What do you think are the current constraints in managing flood risk?

Are there regional guidelines for flood risk management? Do you have access to them? Do you apply them? What are your views on the support received from regional and national levels for risk identification, communication and management? Is it adequate? If not then what more needs to be done?

Do you think that the funding for risk management is enough? Is there a fair distribution of funding for structural and non-structural measures/ among towns in the Liguria region/ among Italian regions?

Do you think there are any legal conflicts related to flood risk management? Did recent legislation enacted after the 2011 and 2014 events contribute in changing the situation? If yes, how?

Risk mapping

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How are the basin plans and the watershed plans implemented in practice?

What, in your opinion, is the main purpose of mapping flood risk? How will the maps

translate into policy? What scale is appropriate for what kinds of uses?

Who will make most use of the maps, and what problems might arise?

What do you think about the availability of this data/services? How easy are they to

use/understand? What challenges/problems do you encounter in the use of the maps?

Warning systems and emergency management

Does the local administration have the capacity to deal with emergencies? How could this

capacity be improved? What do you think are the current constraints in managing

emergencies?

Are there regional guidelines and municipal plans for emergency management? What are

your views on the support received from regional and national levels for risk identification,

communication and management? Is it adequate? If not then what more needs to be

done?

Do you think that the funding for emergency management is enough? What have been

the priorities in the past and what will be the priorities for the future? Why?

How do you/your organisation deal with the scientific (but also legal and social)

uncertainty related to the warning system and emergency management?

Do you think that citizens are well prepared? How could they be better prepared? What

is the role played by new technologies and social media in emergency management? How

is it changing? Should responsibility for emergency management be reallocated? How?

Should better communication protocols be prepared? How?

Risk awareness, citizens’ involvement and participation in risk and emergency management

How do you think the locals respond to the risk – has it changed over the years? In what

way has it changed your practice and sense of risk? Do you think that you have a good

information and training on how to deal with the danger of floods?

In your opinion, is the public aware of flood risk? Do you think they trust the public

authorities to protect them against this risk? Are there environmental groups or citizen

groups that advocate for more protection? What is the role of the political parties? What

kinds of conflicts among the stakeholders have arisen?

Are citizens responsible for any aspects of risk mitigation or emergency management?

Should they be? How do they participate in the decision making process?

What role did the European Flood Risk Directive play (if any) in improving stakeholder

engagement in flood risk management?