Risk coping in swidden livelihoods and the potential of REDD+ in Laos

Grace Wong, Carl Salk, Cornelia Hett, Shintia Arwida, Tracy Farrell

IUFRO Beijing, 24 October 2016

Laos: Changing from a socialist state …

… to a socialist market economy…

Land use policies and discourses have evolved with changing times…

• Nation-building and integration (1970s-1980s)- Internal resettlement for cultural integration – moving from the uplands- Move from failed agricultural collectivism (Soviet support) to “New Economic

Mechanism” of market transformation (access to international finance and investors)• Stopping “chain of degradation” (since 1990)

- Eradicating, stabilizing and slash and burn farming by 2020- Land and Forest allocation – forest zoning and limiting areas for “rotational farming”- Protected area system

• Turning land into capital (since 1997)- National Land titling – encourage investments into market-oriented land uses- Identifying “empty space” for development – allocation of swidden land to (mainly

foreign) companies for concessions; aggregating remote villages closer to infrastructure- Decentralization of power over land decisions to provincial administrations

Lestrelin et al. 2012

…but objectives with swidden have remained same …

“Settlements and permanent job creation achieved through concentration at boundary areas and priority areas […] which made many families in the area shifted from slash and burn rice cultivation into commercial production using their local potential […] with provision of technical-scientific methods to address poverty issues through progressive development of the villages, the development of priorities areas and establishment of new towns.”

Achievement of 2011-2015 NSEDPGovernment of Lao PDR, 2016

Research objectives and methods

Research questions: What risks do smallholders in a swidden landscape face and how do they

cope? How will they respond to REDD+ incentives that constrain land and forest

use? Can incentives play a role in supporting livelihoods?Mixed methods:1. Mapping and analyzing land use and land cover patterns 2. Village level focus group discussions (6) and household surveys on livelihoods, risks and

coping strategies (204) 3. Field-framed games (12) to assess smallholders’ response to, and preference for forest-

based incentives.Study site: Phonxai district, Luangprabang province

Land use/cover in Phonxai district, Luangprabang

Analysis by Cornelia Hett and Sandra Eckert, CDE; Landsat scenes 128/46, 129/46; 2013

Land use/ land cover % of area Phonxai

Forest 58.9

Young fallow* 27.0

Old fallow* 8.2

Bare/burnt field for swidden 5.2

Paddy 0.3

Flooded paddy or young rubber/teak

0.4

Commune Village Ethnicities Utilities (electricity)

Resettlement history Conservation forests

Site 1: Villages are most distant from markets, shallower basin, rapid transitions though development of focal area, multiple development project interventions, large resettlement.

Phontong Phontong Khmu (60%), Lao (25%); Hmong (15%)

2010 Consolidated in 1972, 1990

Decreasing

Phontong Bouakkham Khmu (100%) - Consolidated in 1975, 1976, 1978; resettled in 2013

Yes

Site 2: Villages in highest elevation, most forested. Houaykhing Houaykhing Khmu (57%), Hmong

(43%)2014 Resettled in 1962;

consolidated in 2003Yes

Houaykhing Houayha Hmong (90%), Khmu (10%)

- Consolidated in 1975 Yes

Site 3: Villages closest to markets, year round road access, teak plantations.Sopchia Sopchia Lao (55%), Khmu (44%),

Hmong (1%)- Village split in 2001 Yes

Sopchia Houaychia Khmu (100%) - Consolidated in 1983, 2001

n/a

Swidden landscape in Phonxai

Swidden livelihoods in Phonxai

17%

28%

17%

24%

1%

14%

Food crops (mostly swidden) Livestock Cash crops WagesRemittances Forest products

Wong et al., in prep

Crop loss (drought/floods)

Crop disease/pest

Livestock loss

Market impacts

Death/illness in HH

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Most common livelihood shocks

Harvest more forest products

Use cash savings

Sell assets

Do extra casual labor

Assistance from friends/relatives

Assistance from community /religious orgs

Reduce household spending/consumption

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Coping Strategies

Wong et al., in prep

Swidden livelihoods in Phonxai

High level of community reciprocity

From the household surveys: Approx. 75% of HH receive regular support (mostly food) from

relatives and friends in village and neighboring villages. Kinship ties were emphasized as important in labor pooling for swidden.

82.5% of HH also provide support to others both on regular basis and when in need

But these are ineffective when shocks are largely covariate

Can REDD+ support swidden livelihoods?Can swidden support REDD+?

How to incentivize reduced forest clearing when complete elimination of deforestation is not possible or desirable within local context? How could REDD+ incentives be structured for swidden farmers in Phonxai? What happens when programs end?

Design of a flexible swidden-REDD+ game with different payment mechanisms Payouts/ production value:

• Increase with cultivation of plots cleared from forests• Decrease with reduced ecosystem services from forests• Depend on random weather

Salk, Lopez and Wong (2016)

Game structure

24 rounds in 3 stages• Stage 1: no treatment• Stage 2: 1 of 3 possible treatments

- Individual payments- Group bonus- Insurance

• Stage 3: no treatment

Hypothesis

Cul

tivat

ion

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3(Pre-Treatment) (Treatment) (Post-Treatment)

Trea

tmen

tE

ffect

Last

ing

Effe

ct

Results of the field-based swidden/REDD+ games

Treatments

Individual bonus:• 200 point payout if ≤3 patches of forest cultivated

Group bonus:• 200 points if ≤24 total patches of forest cultivated by group

Insurance:• Guaranteed payout equal to good rain if ≤3 patches of forest

cultivated by individual

Cha

nge

in c

ultiv

atio

n

-4-3

-2-1

01

Group Individual InsuranceBonus Bonus

a * a, b * b

Treatment Effect

Salk, Lopez and Wong (2016)

Lasting EffectC

hang

e in

cul

tivat

ion

-4-3

-2-1

01

Group Individual InsuranceBonus Bonus

a . a a

Salk, Lopez and Wong (2016)

Results and Conclusions As an effective performance-based incentive: Group payment > individual

payment > insurance. Lasting effects are minimal though the group payment shows some

promise. There does not appear to be crowding out effects. No impact of insurance – possible reasons include lack of familiarity with

insurance schemes (none exist in the region) and treatment is too complicated for local understanding

Swidden farmers can be active/effective contributors to goals of reducing deforestation and forest degradation

Design of REDD+ incentives needs to be tailored to local contexts There has to be policy space for integrating swidden within the national

REDD+ agenda

Thank you!

Email: g.wong@cgiar.org