Risk Assessment Manual - Premudasqems.premuda.net/RISK_ASSESSMENT_MANUAL.pdf · Revision / Date...

Premuda

Revision n. 1 01.12.09 Pag.1

RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT

MANUAL

Premuda


Port of Registry International Call Sign Flag IMO Number

THIS MANUAL WILL NEED TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION ON OCCASIONS.

Record of Revisions

Revision / Date Part Additions / Revisions / Deletions 01/01/2008 All Nil 01/12/2009 All Revisions 28/06/2010 p.10 Revisions 31/08/2011 p.4,6,7,12,13,19-21,28-30 Revisions 31/08/2011 43-45 Additions

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CONTENTS

SECTION PART PAGE

A Risk Assessment and Risk Management 4 A1 Introduction 4 A2 Influence Levels 5 A3 Risk Management Policy 6 A4 Responsibility 7 A5 Chain of Responsibility 8 A6 Operational Level 10 A7 Risk Assessment 12 A8 Risk Assessment ashore 12 A9 The Risk Assessment Process 13

B Mariner Risk Management Tool 22

B1 Introduction 22 B2 Risk Assessment 23 B3 Importing/Exporting Data 28

C Example Risk Assessment 31

C1 Launching Lifeboat 31 C2 Heavy Lift Operation 33 C3 Working Aloft Operation 35 C4 Enclosed Space Entry Operation 37 C5 Pressure Test of Lines Operation 39 C6 Hot Work Operation 41

D Mariner Bug and Fixes 43

D1 Error Messages 43

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Sec. A Risk Assessment and Risk Management A1 Introduction

The terms ‘risk management’ and ‘loss control’ are familiar ones within the shipping industry and both have the same meaning. While the former may be more common, the latter is generally associated with US organisations.

Within the present procedures, the term ‘risk management’ will be used unless otherwise stated.

British Standard (BS 4778) defines risk management as:

“… the process whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed risk and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or probability of occurrence”.

An American Loss Control Institute defines loss control management as:

“… the application of professional management skills to the control of loss from the risks of business”.

Both of these definitions are written in simple terms that describe a business philosophy and there is an implicit requirement within those definitions for a structured approach to identifying risk.

Premuda embrace the philosophy behind the “risk assessment based” approach to support the evaluation of all circumstances (routine or non routine operations, emergency situations, adverse environmental conditions, etc.) that can affect safety of human life on board its fleet and environment protection.

In view of above, Premuda has implemented a system for the application of risk assessment throughout the workplace, and the expected outputs are:

• minimisation of risk to employees, the environment and to the property • improvement in operational performance • minimization of costs for the Company

The achievement of these three outputs encompasses the achievement of safety management objectives, which in turn is the achievement of Premuda’s business objectives

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A2 Influence Levels

Within Premuda’s activities, there are a number of levels with associated elements that influence the cause of an accident. These levels and elements are:

• Environmental level Political influence Market influence Societal influence (public concern) Regulatory influence

• Policy level Business policy Company Quality, Health, Safety and Environmental policy Ship design

• Management level Fleet safety management SMS Procedures Ship design change

• Operational level Shipboard procedures Competence Human factors Workplace factors Communications Operational instructions PPE and operational equipment.

The Operational level can also be described as the shipboard level with the elements as factors that can influence an accident in a particular operation.

In many companies, the direction of influence is normally from the top down with the upper of any two levels determining how the lower level functions. Premuda recognise that safety is the responsibility of all levels. As well as contributing to accident prevention, all levels of influence can also contribute to causing accidents to varying degrees.

The Operational level is where the direct cause responsible for the accident, such as unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, can be found.

The Policy and Management level is where the indirect causes responsible for the accident such as human factors and job factors can usually be found, although these affect the operational level.

This has been demonstrated in the case of major accidents where, as a consequence of the enquiry, changes have been made to the Regulatory influence, with associated effects to the Political, Market and Societal influences.

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A3 Risk Management Policy

There is an absolute link between the social well being of seafarers and successful safety management. Poor social and working conditions linked with indifferent shore and/or onboard management leads to low morale, effect on physical and mental health and unsafe acts, the consequences of which are accidents and numerous near misses.

Such an environment is usually associated with failure to drive through a realistic safety management policy linked with a failure to manage human resources. Even progressive safety management policies can often be undermined by the lack of effective human resource management.

Seafarers are the most important resource of Premuda who recognises that the target of a fit, competent and committed crew can only be achieved in combination with an effective human resource management.

A complete risk management policy addresses business strategies as well as quality, health, safety and environmental aspects.

The risk management policy is a statement indicating how Premuda will carry out its business and what the overall company objectives are.

Premuda is addressing the following areas:

• management and development of human resources; • development of a safety culture in order to control risk thereby avoiding accidents and

minimising losses; • maintaining a structured and measurable approach to the identification of risk and

implementation of controls; • ensuring there are meaningful and systematic communications between all levels of the

organisation to ensure that the policy is understood and how it is to be implemented and the commitment of senior management to its implementation;

• processes are in place to monitor objectives and to continually improve the fulfilment of those objectives.

Before starting any work/operation on board (including risk assessment after machinery breakdown, change of system or machinery, etc.) or in office before implementing any substantial change to management or relevant structural changes to the fleet, a risk assessment must be in use (or must be done if it doesn’t already exist), in course of validity ,and checked for compliance with actual conditions.

NOTE: All risk assessments done on board are subject to Shore management review .

Any risk assessment reviewed ashore, if amended, must replace the assessment done on board.

However, Master has the overriding authority to ignore said amendments for the protection of human life, environmental and safety of the ship and her cargo.

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A4 Responsibility SQE Mgr to organize the training of Masters, Ch. Mates, Ch. Eng. and - where possible - also of lower

rank officers on risk assessment technique and for involved Shore Heads of Depts and Superintendents;

to arrange with the support of Company Senior Officers (taking advantage of briefing in Company Offices) the development of “Shipboard key operations” assessments;

to arrange for additional or refresh courses, where needed; to check that at least the involved Heads of Depts. and superintendents have been trained in

risk assessment technique.

Crew Mgr to check that at least Masters, Ch. Eng, Ch. Mates have been trained by Company in risk

assessment technique, prior to their embarkation; to report, after analysis of evaluation report, to SQE Mgr any need for individual training in risk

assessment technique.

Fleet Director/Tech. Mgr/DPA to analyze and act accordingly when vessel issued risk assessment requires further

consideration after superintendent review; to arrange the development of an on board “Machinery criticality” assessment; to ensure that common risk assessments are applied across the fleet.

Superintendents to receive, check and review, if needed, the ship’s report generated by Mariner system

informing vessel; to identify the best developed risk assessment on all vessels for best practice dissemination and

to ask to SQE Dept. to proceed with divulgation; to bring to the attention to the Safety Sup. any new safety issues worth considering since not

covered by common risk assessment.

Safety Superintendent to analyze any safety issue that the Tech. Sup. will bring to his attention; to cooperate with Tech. Sup. to resolve any outstanding safety issue.

Concerned Heads Of Shore Departments to analyze and act accordingly when risk assessment requires further consideration after

Superintendent review.

Master/Chief Eng. to organize (or delegate to trained person) risk assessment process for all the tasks on board in

accordance with the present manual; to record all process using the Mariner system; to report the risk assessment to the concerned Tech. Superintendent; to check that all operations/works posing safety risks are performed only after relevant risk has

been assessed and documented as per present Manual.

Authorized trained crew member to perform the risk assessment, as instructed by Master/Chief Eng., in accordance with trained

received and with present Manual; to record, if delegated by Master/Chief Eng., all process in the Mariner system.

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A5 Chain of Responsibility

Risk Assessments should be sent to company on a regular basis (e.g. twice weekly, weekly or earlier) (See also Ch. A9.7 for more details)

Mariner export files should be emailed to:

[email protected] A valid risk assessment is requested to be available on board prior of any work/operation posing potential hazard is started. Therefore it will be the Master’s care to provide for the cases not already included in the Mariner program (bibliography) or out of date, to arrange a risk assessment process involving the trained persons on board. When the process is completed, the Master/Chief Eng. will export to the vessel Tech. Sup. the files containing the risk assessment, while the entire process will remain recorded in the Mariner program. The process received by Tech. Sup. will be reviewed and properly evaluated. Ship’s personnel will be advised by sending back the reviewed process, duly amended if necessary, as confirmation that process is satisfactory or only with an e-mail confirming that process received and found in order. It will be care of Master/Chief Eng. to insert the amended risk assessment in the Mariner program. The Technical Superintendents will bring any safety issues to the attention of the Safety Superintendent who will oversee the general process. The Technical and Safety Superintendent will work together in order to resolve any outstanding safety issues and allowing the Technical Superintendent to respond directly to each ship. Any items requiring further detailed consideration will be brought directly to the attention of appropriate management: • Fleet Director • Technical Manager • DPA The risk assessment management system also provide an “Office operational framework” that must be used to create an office library and to disseminate to the whole fleet the “best practices” that can emerge during the process of creation/analysis of risk assessment.

The process is summarized in the following flow diagram:

mailto:[email protected]

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Revision n.1 01.12.09 Pag.9

Mariner Chain of Responsibility

Ship 1 Ship 5

Ship 4

Ship 2

Ship 3

[email protected]

Supt. 1

Supt. 5 Supt. 4 Supt. 2

Supt. 3

DPA

Tech. Man.

Fleet Dir.

Mariner Office

Ship 1 Ship 4

Ship 2

Ship 3

Ship 5

Safety Supt.

Supt. 1

Supt. 2

Supt. 3 Supt. 4 Supt. 5

[email protected]

SQE Dept.

[email protected]

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A6 Operational Level It is at this level that the greatest potential business loss impact lies for a Company. Individual/human error can manifest itself in activities such as navigation, maintenance, loading and discharging, all of which can result in harm to people, property or the environment. In major accidents, serious consequences could affect all three. In many cases, an accident is the result of a failure that could unluckily have been foreseen if a structured risk assessment process had been in place. A typical and unfortunately recurring example of this is shipboard personnel being killed during enclosed space operations. Effective risk assessment is an integral part of any safety management system since risk assessment system is designed to protect against the identified hazards and determined risk levels. In order to improve its existing SQEM System, Premuda is including a structured risk assessment process.

A6.1 Risk assessment and the ISM Code SOLAS Chapter IX requires all ships to have a safety management system in place in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code. The Code does not explicitly require risk assessment to be carried out, however, there is a suggested requirement which states: “... the safety management objectives of the Company should:

• provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment; • assess all identified risks to its ships, personnel and the environment and establish

appropriate safeguards; • continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard ships.”

The suggested requirement is in the second bullet point. However, if Premuda was asked how it meets all of the above safety management objectives, risk assessment would provide a satisfactory answer.

Figure 1. Risk management at the shipboard level

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Revision n.1 01.12.09 Pag.11

A6.2 Reactive monitoring Reactive monitoring of shipboard operations is addressed in Clause 9 of the ISM Code – Reports and Analysis of Nonconformities, Accidents and Hazardous Occurrences. These typically include accident and near miss reporting, ill health reporting, equipment failure, defect reporting and post operation checklists and are all triggered after the event. An investigation normally follows with recommendations for corrective and preventative action. What has actually happened is that a hazard has manifested itself and then controls have been put in place to minimise or negate the effects of that hazard. The control can be a procedure, a piece of equipment or training. As described in the sub-title, the process is reactive and an unplanned event has occurred resulting in harm, downtime or business loss. The emphasis is more of cure than prevention.

A6.3 Active monitoring Active monitoring of shipboard operations is addressed in Clause 10 of the ISM Code – Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment, and also by certain parts of Clause 7 – Shipboard Operations. These include occupational health and safety inspections, safety and operational equipment inspections, testing of equipment, safety committee meetings, which are a form of active and reactive monitoring, and pre-operation checklists. The information generated from these inspections, tests or meetings describes the operational situation before an accident and checks the adequacy and integrity of existing controls. If any of the controls are absent or non-conforming, as in a broken handrail or missing step, they are restored to the original condition. It is a method of controlling risks that are already known.

A6.4 Proactive monitoring With both active and reactive monitoring, as shown in Figure 1, there is an intermediate process to go through before controls are implemented or restored, i.e. investigation or inspection followed by corrective action. In some cases it may be a learning curve, in others a drawn out process where nothing new is learnt. Premuda is supporting a strong safety culture to apply risk management principles to controls that have to be implemented or restored as a result of active and reactive monitoring by ensuring that these controls are commensurate with the hazards they are designed to protect against. While active and reactive monitoring of shipboard operations are ongoing shipboard processes, proactive monitoring in the form of risk assessment may not be so common. Referring again to Figure 1, with risk assessment, there is no intermediate process to go through. Controls are identified before an incident or failure occurs. It therefore follows that for Premuda to follow an effective risk management policy, it has to utilise reactive, active and proactive systems for the monitoring of shipboard operations.

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A7 Risk Assessment Risk assessment is the overall process of estimating the magnitude of risk and deciding whether or not the risk is tolerable or acceptable. Its objective is to identify workplace precautions to prevent harm to people, property or the environment at the point of risk. In doing so, it is fulfilling the overall objectives Premuda’s risk management policy. Therefore risk assessment is a function of risk management. Risk will be evaluated by using the qualitative risk assessment technique as in the UK MCA Code of Safe Working Practices.

A7.1 Purpose As stated in the previous section, while the objective of risk assessment is the control of hazards, its purpose is to ensure that a careful examination of shipboard operations is carried out to determine what can cause harm and that any planned or existing controls are adequate. When a risk is evaluated, it is with existing or planned controls in place. Should the evaluation indicate that the risk is too high, then the controls used to evaluate the risk are not adequate and steps should be taken to reduce the level of risk. Such a process is repeated until the risks are acceptable or the operation designated unsafe and not carried out.

A7.2 Risk Risk is the combination of the likelihood of occurrence and the consequences of a specified hazardous event. (Note – hazardous event is another term for accident). A hazard is a source or a situation with a potential for harm in terms of human injury or damage to property, damage to the environment, or a combination of these. Within these procedures the terms harm and damage have been used to mean the same thing, i.e. harm to people, property and the environment.

A8 Risk Assessment Ashore Shore management (with chain of responsibility as per Company Manual), prior to any relevant change, temporary or permanent, to the safety procedure, management system or in case of considerable or structural implementation or change to equipment affecting both shore and vessel, has to carry out a risk assessment. If process is not completed within a set time frame, than the initial risk assessment should be revisited. The process can be recorded on paper format or using the electronic format (Mariner program). According to ISM requirements the Company should also provide to:

• identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations;

• assess all identified risks to its ships, personnel and the environment. The Company in order to comply with above requirements developed two different libraries:

• Key shipboard operation risk assessment library – it is a collection of assessment of key shipboard operations developed by mean of Lloyd Mariner software. The library has been developed by office with the support of Company Senior Officers. Assessments are electronically archived in office.

• Vessel’s machinery criticality assessment – in order to define which equipments on board vessel are to be considered as critical a FMECA analysis of Company vessel’s equipments has been carried out with the support of Class Register RINa. The analysis produced a report where critical machinery are listed according with FMECA analysis.

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• A9 The Risk Assessment Process Before starting with risk assessment a responsible team should be defined. It is suggested that the team includes at least one member certified for Incident Investigation (familiar with analysis techniques). Then the team should must also includes person responsible for the supervision of the operation and any additional member deemed necessary for his skills.

The risk assessment process comprises seven stages: • Inventory of shipboard/unplanned operations • Identify hazards • Identify existing controls • Determine the risk • Decide if risk is tolerable • Implement controls • Review assessments

A9.1 Inventory of Shipboard Operations Before any risk assessments can be carried out, it is important to list and categorise all shipboard operations. Failure to do this will prevent a structured approach to risk assessment and operations that have a high risk factor could be overlooked, or at best, assessed at a late date. Fortunately, Premuda ships already have a well-defined organisational structure and the categorisation of shipboard operations can be by deck, engine, hotel and maybe shore with further subdivisions as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Shipboard operations structure

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A9.2 Identify Hazards The effective identification of hazards is a key factor in meaningful risk assessments and three questions should be asked to assist in the identification process: • is there a source of harm? • who (or what) could be harmed? • how could harm occur? Although already defined, the definition of hazard is worth repeating again here: A hazard is a source or a situation with a potential for harm in terms of human injury or damage to property, damage to the environment, or a combination of these. The important words to focus on in the above definition are ‘source or a situation with a potential for harm’. Quite often when people first carry out risk assessments, there is a tendency to enter the event caused by the hazard rather than the hazard itself. The examples below clarify the difference between the hazard and the hazardous event or accident.

HAZARD EVENT Slippery surface Slipping, causing a minor injury Corroded ladder Rung collapsing causing bruised / cut foot Combustible atmosphere Explosion causing fatalities Toxicity Inhalation causing fatality Darkness Banging head or tripping causing minor injury

Hazard Event In any operation, hazards can fall under the following headings: • unsafe acts • unsafe conditions • human factors • job factors During any operation, hazards may include: • unsafe work practices • inherent dangers of substances • skin/eye contact with harmful substances • inhalation of harmful substances • potential sources of ignition • unfriendly environment, e.g. cold, heat, noise, light, vibration etc. • electromagnetic or radio waves • weather, e.g. storms, fog, lightning etc. • uncharted submerged objects • unsafe surfaces • unguarded work areas • heavy objects • unsecured objects • difficult to handle objects • unguarded electrical systems • equipment reliability • communication problems • lack of training • fatigue

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A9.3 Identify Existing Controls Before the harmful effect of a hazard can be determined, any existing or planned control that may reduce the effect of that hazard has to be taken into account. To make the risk assessment process more structured, it is equally important to identify all the controls that are in place, or planned, which contribute to the safety of the operation. In this way, should an accident occur, then the failing control or controls that led to the direct cause of the accident can be identified and improved upon. If no control was in place for a particular hazard that caused an accident, then a control can be implemented. During any operation, controls can include, inter alia: • implementation of Company procedures, Charterers instructions, port regulations, industry

regulations and guidelines • adequate number of personnel involved • appropriate design and construction • minimum levels of training • weather envelopes, i.e. maximum wind speeds, requirement for good visibility or dry day • protection, detection and mitigation control systems • maintenance • communication/language requirements • use of proper equipment.

A9.4 Determine Risk An important point to note is that the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen concerns itself only with harm to the person. This is typical of occupational health and safety standards that reflect the safety culture from a national perspective. Consequences of accidents, however, are not limited to harm to the person and can result in environmental damage as a result of oil outflow, for example, which is an international issue. In view of this, when determining risk at the shipboard level, those assessing the risk should do so in terms of harm to the person and the environment. The shore based risk management team should carry out determination of risk in terms of harm to property and business loss. Determination of risk is the combination of the likelihood of the hazardous event occurring, resulting in harm, and the severity of the consequences. In establishing the likelihood of harm, the adequacy or failure of existing or planned controls should be considered. Further to this, when establishing the likelihood of harm, we may not have accident data available relating to the shipboard operation being assessed. This can make the establishment of likelihood subjective and the assessor may determine a realistic value by asking the following questions: • do I have personal experience? • do we have group experience? • is there any company experience? • is there any industry experience?

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A9.5 Decide if risk is “Tolerable”

When a risk is described as ‘tolerable’, it is taken to mean that the level of risk has been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), which will be described in more detail in section A6.6. Figure 3 shows the basic qualitative risk assessment table used for estimating risk levels. Some hazards present a risk in more than one category, i.e. harm to the individual and harm to the environment. In such a case, the higher risk ranking should apply. For example, if a risk is ranked trivial in terms of harm to the individual but moderate in terms of harm to the environment then the overall risk ranking is moderate. A good example of this type of hazard would be faulty monitoring equipment on an oily water separator.

Figure 3. Risk Assessment Table After completing the risk assessment, an “Overall Risk Level” will be found. This is the risk level for the entire operation. Guidance on tolerability of this risk level is provided in Figures 4 and 5.

Risk Level Tolerability Trivial (Very Low) Acceptable Tolerable (Low) Tolerable Moderate (Medium) Risks that should be reduced

so that they are tolerable or acceptable Substantial (High)

Intolerable (Very High) Unacceptable

Figure 4. Tolerability Table

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Risk Level Action and Timescale Trivial (Very Low) These risks are considered acceptable. No further action is necessary

other than to ensure that the controls are maintained Tolerable (Low) No additional controls are required unless they can be implemented at

very low cost, in terms of time, money and effort. Actions to further reduce there risks are assigned low priority. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained

Moderate (Medium)

Consideration should be given as to whether the risks can be lowered, where applicable, to a tolerable level, and preferably to an acceptable level, but the costs of additional risk reduction measures should be taken into account. The risk reduction measures should be implemented within a defined time period. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained, particularly if the risk levels are associated with harmful consequences

Substantial (High) Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be implemented urgently within a defined time period and it might be necessary to consider suspending or restricting the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been completed. Considerable resources might have to be allocated to additional control measures. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained particularly if the risk levels are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences

Intolerable (Very High)

These risks are unacceptable. Substantial improvements in risk controls are necessary, so that the risk is reduced to a tolerable or acceptable level. The work activity should be halted until risk controls are implemented that reduces the risk so that it is no longer very high. If it is not possible to reduce risk the work should remain prohibited

NOTE: Where the risk is associated with extremely harmful consequences, further assessment is necessary to increase confidence in the actual likelihood of harm.

Figure 5. Tolerability Guidance Table

An area of concern when carrying out shipboard risk assessments is though the likelihood of a hazardous event due to a specific hazard may be Very Unlikely, the consequence may be Extreme Harm, which gives a High risk level as shown in Figure 3. Although the Action and Timescale plan for a High risk level in Figure 5 suggests that the operation may have to be suspended and considerable resources might have to be allocated, the application of the ALARP principle as reflected in Figure 4 remains the governing factor. A High risk level can be tolerated if a Company has confidence in their procedures and shipboard personnel and has no previous history of accidents or near misses related to the hazard associated with the High risk level, also, that the cost of introduction of additional controls would not significantly reduce the risk level or would be grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained. Probably one of the best examples of this is the hazard ‘gaseous atmosphere’, with explosion being the accident normally associated with it. There seems little option but to select the likelihood of an accident due to the hazard as Very Unlikely, with a consequence of Extreme Harm should

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the accident occur. However, there is no reason why an explosion should occur if the main controls of regular atmosphere testing, ventilation and removing sources of ignition are in place. An entry should be made in the Suggested Controls box of the Control screen, emphasising where existing controls should be implemented thoroughly, or additional controls put in place in the form of extra vigilance and monitoring thus satisfying the requirements of the Action and Timescale plan for High risk. The risk assessment can be re-assessed if required and the High risk level downgraded, or left as it is thereby demonstrating a process with the High risk label visible along with the Suggested Controls.

A9.6 Implement Controls Based on the outcome of a risk assessment, staff should decide where controls need to be improved or implemented and a good basis for this is an action plan. The ALARP principle, as described in the previous section, should be applied in the controls decision making process. As guidance on selecting appropriate controls, the following is an order of priority for negating or minimizing the harmful effects of a hazard: • Remove or eliminate the hazard, i.e., combat the risk at source. This generally applies to

environmental hazards such as noise, heat, cold, dust, smoke etc. • Contain the hazard, i.e., erect guards or barriers. Dedicated locations for harmful or dangerous

substances, such as the requirements for paint lockers. • Use technology to monitor the hazard, i.e. leak and detection systems, gas/oxygen monitoring

equipment, CCTV, weather charts, liquid level alarms etc. • Adapt the individual to the work, i.e., train on the use of equipment or control systems, language

and communication requirements, physical and mental suitability. • Personal protective equipment. This is often viewed as a last resort, i.e., accepting the hazard

as all other control options have been considered. • Emergency response. Should controls fail and the hazard manifest itself into an accident, the

only way to minimise the consequences is the speed and efficiency of emergency response.

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• Re-design, re-equip. In many instances, controls are put in place to protect the individual from the risks in bad design or bad and faulty equipment or machinery. Incident data relating to bad design or machinery should form an input to any new building project risk assessment.

In the above list, more than one option can be implemented if doing so can further reduce risk.

A9.7 Review Without review, there cannot be continual improvement. This includes check of any action plan and review of risk assessments when needed. If there is any significant change in conditions relative to a shipboard operation, then the risk assessment has to be reviewed. Such changes would include different shipboard personnel carrying out an existing operation, change in type of cargo, change of environmental conditions, change in material or change in equipment being used, etc. When reviewing any action plan, the following points should be noted: • all controls, existing or planned, should make the risks tolerable • residual risk should be as low as reasonably practicable • any new hazards created are acceptable • feedback from shipboard personnel on the practicality of any existing or planned controls and

suggestions for improvement. All risk assessments must also be reviewed periodically to ensure all operations are being undertaken in the safest possible manner. The validity period will vary depending on the current overall risk level. Review period established by Company is shown by Figure 6.

Overall Risk Level Review Period

Trivial (Very Low) 6 Months Tolerable (Low ) 3 Months Moderate (Medium) 1 Months Substantial (High) Re-Assess before every operation

Intolerable (Very High) 0 Day (Risk must be reduce before starting operation/work)

Figure 6. Review Period Table

NOTE: The above periods are MAXIMUM validity periods. Any “Permit to Work” operation requires a check of the risk assessment before each operation, irrespective of their risk level, to confirm compliance with risk assessment process (i.e. change in the environmental conditions, crew fatigue, operational parameters etc.). Once the validity period is expired, it is not mandatory to review a risk assessment since the operation to which it is referred won’t be performed again. All risk assessments carried out on board must be reviewed by the vessel Tech. Superintendent upon receipt of export Mariner file from vessel. If the Superintendent consider that the submitted risk assessment requires modifications, then the entire reviewed process will be sent back to the vessel and if agreed, suddenly adopted for future operations. For works or operations with overall risk level “VERY HIGH” no operation/work can starts unless a valid risk assessment (updated and reviewed/approved by Tech. Sup.) is in place. In those case the “Risk Assessment” must be sent immediately after issuing and office is to be contacted for a prompt analysis, in order to give assistance for any further reduction of risks level and to get a final approval/deny decision.

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Master has the overriding authority to ignore such decision for the protection of human life, environmental and safety of the ship and her cargo. For works or operations with overall risk level up to “HIGH” included, it is not necessary for the vessel to wait the review process from shore to start a work, except for routine and non routine planned maintenance of critical equipments and critical alarms, for which an approval must be received form the Tech. Sup. before the equipment is shut down. A9.8 “Risk assessment” company review and “Best Practice” sharing As already mentioned in chapter A5 “Risk Assessments” carried out on board are exported and sent to office on regular basis, by mutual consent of ship and shore.

Upon receipt of e-mail with “Risk Assessment” export file, it must be imported by superintendent and suddenly checked . This kind of check propose to itself different aims:

• to collate and to provide advice in accordance with ship for risks classified substantial (high) or lower

• to provide advice and support in managing and lowering risk to acceptable or tolerable levels when they are classified as Intolerable (very high) by the risk assessment process

• to evaluate the most relevant “Risk Assessments” that can be considered as “best practice” for the whole fleet

When a “Risk Assessment” is considered by the superintendent, eligible to become a “best practice” that should be shared with all vessels, it must be revised and inserted in the “Office Operational Framework” database section as an element of company shared library. Together with that, a communication must be sent to SQE Dept. with the notice to spread the “Best practice” to all vessels.

The spreading of the “Risk Assessment” will be done by SQE Dept. that will review the assessment in its form and will export file as an e-mail attachment to all vessels. The file shall be imported into vessel database and could be used as reference/template.

A9.9 Unplanned occurrence risk assessment In order to limit the impact of possible unplanned event, it has been also defined an “Unplanned occurrence” category into risk assessment management system. Into this category must be recorded risk assessments for the greatest number of possible unplanned occurrence. Starting point to define “unplanned occurrence” to be considered for risk assessments could be safety or security drills, as well as analysis of past incident or failure. Hints can also be taken from bulletins and information disseminated by the company. Validity of unplanned occurrence is not established by Company and can be set at the beginning for 6 months, irrespective of overall risk level. Periodical drills and safety meeting should be considered opportunity to review unplanned occurrence risks assessments. If an unplanned occurrence risks assessments is reviewed in such occasions the assessment date should be updated accordingly. Notice that the final target is to develop a safety culture in order to minimize as possible the impact of all risks, also those determined by unplanned occurrence.

A9.10 Risk Assessment’s management philosophy When a new operation/work is going to be performed a new risk assessment must be carried out before starting any activity. After hazards and controls evaluation, a risk assessment will take place and a validity will be assigned to it. During the validity period, the risk assessment must be checked for correspondence with real operating conditions every time before starting the activity. If a change of condition took place from

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the last performance a reassessment must be done. The reassessment can also be performed voluntarily by the ships before the expiring of validity date. It must be highlighted that the reassessment for operation not carried out is just a possibility/opportunity and a continuous update of assessment, for “not performed” operations is not required. The continuous update can be considered a good option only for routine operations, while is not considered a good practice for occasional or special operations. If an activity, for which a “Risk assessment” already exist, but it is already expired, is going to be performed, it will be necessary to make a new risk assessment as it would be a new operation/work.

EXAMPLE: Entering into a confined space: Before entering, Chief Officer checks that a risk assessment has been performed, is within validity period and that all parameters of risk assessment are unchanged (i.e. environmental condition ): if confirmed, inspection will proceed according to the established safety procedures. If risk assessment is present, but one or more hazards/controls are changed it must be reassessed. If risk assessment is not present or out of date, then a new risk assessment is to be prepared and, if the overall risk level resulted is lower than “very high” (Intolerable), then the entry with the applications of controls can be performed without waiting for the shore support to reduce the overall risk level. If the result of above overall risk assessment is very high, then the assessment must be sent immediately to the Tech. Sup. who will review it and only after approval from Tech. Sup. (receiving the amended process downgraded at least to high (Substantial)) the entry process can be started.

A9.10 Shipboard Key Operation Library It is a collection of risk assessment developed by Company ashore. The list of operation to be assessed was planned and developed by office personnel with the relevant support of Senior officers. The library is always evolving and continuously developed, according with new requirements/needs that frequently come out in shipping market. The tool used for the library development was Lloyd Mariner software.

The library is archived in office in electronic form into Lloyd Mariner database and is to be used as reference to identify most critical operations. In case of need any single element or the complete library can be exported to ship’s database.

A9.11 Machinery Criticality Assessment Analysis In order to identify “equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations”, the Company, with the support of RINa Class Register, proceeded with a deep analysis of all main equipment/machinery installed onboard vessels based on the FMECA based Risk Assessment, regarding the evaluation of consequences in case of failure of any component. The study produced a document that defines the list of those that are to be considered critical machinery/equipments and then to be consequently managed according with dedicated Company policy.

Documentation relative to the study is available ashore in office both in electronic and hard copies. The result of the study is reflected into dedicated Working Instruction available on board and by the assignment of “Critical status“ to PMS components.

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Sec. B Mariner Risk Management Program B1 Introduction The Mariner package consists of a CD-Rom and the Mariner Handbook and is primarily designed as a shipboard tool that allows ships to carry out operational risk assessments with a minimum of external assistance. All the necessary information for the risk assessment process can be found in the Handbook or the Help program. The Mariner application contains a suite of different functions designed to assist Premuda with their SQEMS safety management systems. These are;

• Risk assessment, • Health surveillance; • Environmental management systems; • Incident reporting; • Accident statistic, based on the OCMF Marine Injury Reporting Guidelines.

At this stage, Premuda is using the Risk Assessment function Help gives information on how to use and navigate through the program. The Handbook describes a walk through each of the Mariner functions and advises on how to make best use of these functions and the information generated from them. The Mariner program can be utilised in either of two ways; • As a stand alone program on a ship where information generated by the program can be sent to

recipients by conventional means, or • As an interactive program if Mariner is also installed at the company office. An inbuilt messaging

system allows certain information generated by the program to be exported from the ship by disk or e-mail and imported into the office program, or vice-versa.

Premuda has adopted Mariner as a fully interactive program allowing fully communication between ship and shore.

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B2 Risk Assessment B2.1 General The risk assessment function can be found under each operation in the Mariner Explorer view. This allows a risk assessment to be created, re-assessed or deleted. The date displayed next to the risk assessment is when it was either created or last re-assessed.

The risk assessment is laid out so as to facilitate a flow through from hazard identification through to risk assessment as identified in section A6, The Risk Assessment Process. This section should be referred to for guidance in the completion of risk assessments.

The risk assessment process in the Mariner program is shown by the tabs at the top of each of the dialogs, i.e. Hazards, Controls, Control References and Assess Risk. The dialogs are completed in that order from left to right with Next and Back buttons to assist in the navigation.

B2.2 Hazards This dialog allows for the identification of hazards that exist or may exist in the selected operation. When a risk assessment is completed for the first time, it is unlikely that all the hazards that exist within the selected operation will be identified, unless there is a very experienced group doing the hazard identification. Normally, the more obvious hazards will be entered the first time with others being added or modified at subsequent reviews. The important thing is to enter the hazards that can cause the greatest harm, as they are usually more obvious.

When a new hazard is added, a category has to be selected for it. This is an important selection as it determines whether the hazard is a direct cause or indirect cause of an accident. Personal Factors and Job Factors are indirect causes and Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions are direct causes.

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As more and more risk assessments are completed, the hazard will contain all hazards entered for these operations. They will appear in the Hazard Directory as Selected or Unselected. The Selected hazards are those identified for the operation currently being assessed and the Unselected hazards are those identified in all other assessed operations. As the Hazard Directory fills up, it will assist in the hazard identification process, as users will be able to scroll through all the Unselected hazards to see if they are applicable to the operation currently being assessed. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the hazard identification process is not carried out by only selecting from the Hazard Directory as the real hazards may be overlooked. Fresh thinking is important in hazard identification and must be applied.

B2.3 Controls

The method for entering controls is the same as that for entering hazards, except that the categories for controls are different. The source of the majority of controls will be Premuda’s SQEMS, hence the category will be Procedural. In some cases, ambiguity may exist for the category to be selected, i.e. a control for enclosed space entry is breathing apparatus, which can be either a Procedural or a Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) category. In this case, although required by a procedure, the category PPE would be more appropriate as it will, after a number of assessments have been completed, form a list of all the PPE used in shipboard operations and may need a stricter inspection routine.

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Only current controls that are in place should be entered in this dialog. For example, if there is no anti-collision radar on board, it cannot be entered as a control when carrying out a risk assessment for navigation in restricted visibility. We have a lot of valuable experience on board our ships and a member of the shipboard staff may have seen a control on another ship or in a different company and consider its implementation would be a positive move in reducing risk. In this case, it should be entered under Suggested Controls.

The Suggested Controls dialog can be a valuable source of information to Premuda shore staff in the prevention of harm and the entries should be given careful consideration.

B2.4 Control References This dialog allows the user to enter the reference document that requires a control to be put into place. For the first few assessments, the list of Reference Types will have to be built. After a number of assessments have been completed, this list will be quite comprehensive. Each line of the Reference Type dialog opens up a drop-down list of those that have been entered. The Reference Type only refers to the title of the document or the source requiring a control. The precise chapter and paragraph, with a brief description, is entered under Location. The Location entry can be as brief or detailed as required (maximum 300 characters), but if it is made too brief, the benefit of actually reading the reference material is lost as there is no familiarisation process to acquaint shipboard staff with industry requirements and guidelines.

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Premuda shore staff give guidance on the approach taken to identify Control. More than one reference source can apply to a control and conversely, a single reference source may apply to a number of controls.

The objective is to have a comprehensive list of Control References for the operation being assessed. Although Figure indicates the more obvious ones, there are less obvious ones like Charterer’s Instructions, product safety data sheets, notices fitted during construction and manufacturers instructions.

B2.5 Assess Risk Having completed the Hazards, Controls and Control References dialogs, the next stage is to assess the risk. To facilitate this, click on the Assess button on the left hand side of the dialog.

The first time a risk assessment is carried out, the risk table will appear as the default table. This is a slightly modified risk table as used in the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen and has been adopted by Premuda. The risk labels, or risk levels, with their associated criteria of Likelihood on the left of the table and Consequence along the top of the table. When the Assess Risk dialog is opened, all the selected Hazards will be displayed. A risk label is selected by highlighting a Hazard and then double clicking on an appropriate risk label in the Risk Table. The Likelihood, Consequence and Risk columns will then auto-fill with those selected from the Risk Table.

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A default Action and (assessment date) is written into the Mariner program. When all the hazards have been assessed for risk, the highest hazard ranking will appear in the “Overall Operation Risk” box. The associated Action and “Review By Date” is displayed just underneath.

Although not a compulsory field, i.e. the information will save and close if not completed, the “Review By Date” is a very important part of a structured risk assessment program as it prompts review of the risk assessment.

The Assessment Date is automatically entered when a risk assessment is re-evaluated, i.e. the Reassessment button is activated. If a risk assessment is edited and the changes saved, the Assessment Date will not change. The reason for this is that the Assessment Date should be a date that has been planned and not be affected by minor changes being made or mistakes corrected in the risk assessment. To prompt and advise users, a traffic light system is built into the Explorer by having the document icon coloured, as indicated:

The red, orange and green colour codes appear under the following circumstances; - GREEN - If the Assessment date is before the Review By Date - ORANGE - When a risk assessment is incomplete, i.e. all of the Hazards do not have risk labels selected and/or no Review By Date has been entered. - RED - If the current Date is after the Review By Date.

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B3. Importing / Exporting Data B3.1 General The following reports are available from Mariner as hardcopy print-outs or electronic exports:

• Risk Assessment • List of operations with a completed risk assessment • List of overdue risk assessments

While Mariner does not generate information on how to improve safety and reduce risk, it does contain the means to do so.

B3.2 Best Practice The reports available from Mariner are all possible indicators for action and should be used to assist in a decision making process on how risk can be reduced. One method is by periodically reviewing the reports at a scheduled or extraordinary meeting of the shipboard safety committee. The information contained in risk assessments, especially Suggested Controls can be examined and discussed and recommendations or findings sent to Premuda management. It may sound simple but given time can be quite effective. The “Operation Framework List” could also be used as a quick checklist to avoid duplication of Operations in Mariner database. The “Overdue Risk Assessment List” could be used in office to check if a risk assessment was done or exported to office in correspondence of an operation carried out on board. Apart from the procedures that Premuda have in place, the risk assessment report can be used as a checklist to ensure all controls are in place before commencing a hazardous operation. It can also review the permit to work system.

B3.3 Export Procedure To start with the export process you must go to menu command “File/Export/Operation Risk Assessment” and proceed with following instructions:

1. Select Risk Assessment The following window will be displayed:

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2. Select the level of the Operational Framework at which you want to search for Risk Assessments, by selecting either Operation Type, Operation Group or Operation from the pull-down Framework menu

3. Specify which Operation Type, Operation Group or Operation contains the relevant Risk Assessment by using the pull-down Filter By: menu

4. Select the Risk Assessment you want to export by clicking on the corresponding box in the True column

5. Select the destination of the Risk Assessment

6. Click on Export

B3.4 Import Procedure To start with the import process you must go to menu command “File/I/Operation Risk Assessment” and proceed with following instructions:

1. Select Risk Assessment. The following window will be displayed:

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2. Select the origin of the Risk Assessment The following window will be displayed:

3. Click on Import

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Sec. C Example Risk Assessment C1 Launching Lifeboat Ship Name: Example Premuda Ship

Operation Type: Sample Operations Assessment Date: 14 Aug 2007 Operation Group: Sample Permits to Work Review By Date: 1 Aug 2008 Operation: Launching Lifeboat

Assessment of Risk

No Hazards Cat Likelihood Consequence Risk 1 Darkness UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 2 Passing traffic UC Very Unlikely Extreme High 3 Excess ship speed UC Very Unlikely Extreme High 4 Slippery surfaces UC Likely Slight harm Low

5 Release brake without permission UA Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

6 Leaving harbour pins in UA Very Unlikely Slight harm Very Low

7 Person in lifeboat whilst swung out UA Unlikely Moderate Medium

8 Poor maintenance - Brake winch JF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

9 Poor maintenance - Hook release gear JF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

10 Poor maintenance - Wires JF Very Unlikely Extreme High

11 Engine fails to start JF Very Unlikely Extreme High

12 Untrained crew members PF Very Unlikely Slight harm Very Low

13 Untrained deck officers PF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 14 Communication failure PF Unlikely Moderate Medium

Key: PF = Personal Factors, JF = Job Factors, UA = Unsafe Acts, UC = Unsafe Conditions Overall operational risk: High Actions and Timescales: Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be implemented urgently within a defined time period and it might be necessary to consider suspending or restricting the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been completed. Considerable resources might have to be allocated to additional control measures. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained particularly if the risk levels are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences.

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Controls

No Controls Category 1 Check all know duties Procedural 2 Check lifejackets correctly worn Procedural 3 Hard hat Personal Protective Equipment 4 Safety boots Personal Protective Equipment 5 Gloves Personal Protective Equipment 6 PMS - Brake winch Design/Engineering 7 PMS - Engine Design/Engineering 8 PMS - Falls Design/Engineering 9 PMS - Gripes Design/Engineering 10 PMS - Quick release Design/Engineering

Suggested Controls Control References No Reference Location 1 Company Procedures 2 Flag requirements 3 Code of Safe working Practice (UK MCA)

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C2 Heavy Lift Operation Ship Name: Example Premuda Ship

Operation Type: Sample Operations Assessment Date: 14 Aug 2007 Operation Group: Sample Permits to Work Review By Date: 1 Aug 2008 Operation: Heavy Lift

Assessment of Risk

No Hazards Cat Likelihood Consequence Risk

1 Poor condition - Cargo crane JF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

2 Poor condition - lifting strop JF Unlikely Moderate Medium

3 Use of inappropriate lifting gear UA Unlikely Moderate Medium

4 Excess ship speed UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 5 Excess list or trim UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 6 High wind speeds UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 7 Passing traffic UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 8 Communication failure PF Unlikely Moderate Medium

9 Untrained crew members PF Likely Slight harm Low

10 Untrained deck officers PF Unlikely Moderate Medium

11 Crew member standing under load UA Unlikely Moderate Medium

Key: PF = Personal Factors, JF = Job Factors, UA = Unsafe Acts, UC = Unsafe Conditions Overall operational risk: Medium Actions and Timescales: Consideration should be given as to whether the risks can be lowered, where applicable, to a tolerable level, and preferably to an acceptable level, but the costs of additional risk reduction measures should be taken into account. The risk reduction measures should be implemented within a defined time period. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained, particularly if the risk levels are associated with harmful consequences.

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Controls

No Controls Category 1 Check all know duties Procedural 2 Communications check Procedural 3 Officer of Watch informed Procedural 4 Gloves Personal Protective Equipment 5 Hard hat Personal Protective Equipment 6 Safety boots Personal Protective Equipment 7 PMS - Lifting gear Design/Engineering 8 PMS - Crane Design/Engineering

Suggested Controls Control References No Reference Location 1 Company Procedures

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C3 Working Aloft Operation Ship Name: Example Premuda Ship

Operation Type: Sample Operations Assessment Date: 14 Aug 2007 Operation Group: Sample Permits to Work Review By Date: 1 Aug 2008 Operation: Working Aloft

Assessment of Risk

No Hazards Cat Likelihood Consequence Risk 1 Working at height JF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 2 Slippery surfaces UC Unlikely Moderate Medium 3 Unsecure ladder UC Unlikely Moderate Medium

4 Ships whistle sounding while aloft UA Very Unlikely Slight harm Very Low

5 Rotating radar aerial UC Very Unlikely Slight harm Very Low 6 Radiation JF Very Unlikely Slight harm Very Low 7 Electricity supply JF Unlikely Moderate Medium 8 Falling objects UC Likely Slight harm Low 9 Passing traffic UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 10 Excess ship speed UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 11 High wind speeds UC Unlikely Moderate Medium

Key: PF = Personal Factors, JF = Job Factors, UA = Unsafe Acts, UC = Unsafe Conditions Overall operational risk: Medium Actions and Timescales: Consideration should be given as to whether the risks can be lowered, where applicable, to a tolerable level, and preferably to an acceptable level, but the costs of additional risk reduction measures should be taken into account. The risk reduction measures should be implemented within a defined time period. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained, particularly if the risk levels are associated with harmful consequences.

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Controls

No Controls Category 1 Isolate ships whistle Procedural 2 Isolate radar Procedural 3 Isolate all aerials Procedural 4 Safety notices posted on mast Procedural 5 Isolate electrical equipment Procedural 6 Training - Crew Human Element 7 Training - Officers Human Element 8 Gloves Personal Protective Equipment 9 Hard hat Personal Protective Equipment 10 Safety boots Personal Protective Equipment 11 Safety harness Personal Protective Equipment 12 Arrange work in daylight conditions Procedural 13 Arrange work in good weather conditions Procedural 14 Secure all tools appropriately Procedural 15 Cordon off work area Procedural

Suggested Controls Control References No Reference Location 1 Company Procedures 2 Code of Safe working Practice (UK MCA) 3 ISGOTT

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C4 Enclosed Space Entry Operation Ship Name: Example Premuda Ship

Operation Type: Sample Operations Assessment Date: 14 Aug 2007 Operation Group: Sample Permits to Work Review By Date: 1 Aug 2008 Operation: Enclosed Space Entry

Assessment of Risk

No Hazards Cat Likelihood Consequence Risk 1 Flammable atmosphere UC Very Unlikely Extreme High 2 Toxic atmosphere UC Very Unlikely Extreme High 3 Sludge in tank UC Unlikely Moderate Medium 4 Unauthorised entry UA Very Unlikely Extreme High 5 Heating coils on UC Likely Slight harm Low 6 Darkness UC Unlikely Slight harm Very Low 7 Communication failure PF Unlikely Moderate Medium 8 Untrained deck officers PF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

9 Untrained crew members PF Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

10 Slippery surfaces UC Unlikely Moderate Medium 11 High temperature UC Likely Slight harm Low 12 Fatigue PF Unlikely Slight harm Very Low

Key: PF = Personal Factors, JF = Job Factors, UA = Unsafe Acts, UC = Unsafe Conditions Overall operational risk: High Actions and Timescales: Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be implemented urgently within a defined time period and it might be necessary to consider suspending or restricting the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been completed. Considerable resources might have to be allocated to additional control measures. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained particularly if the risk levels are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences.

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Controls

No Controls Category 1 Permit to work system Procedural 2 Officer of Watch informed Procedural 3 Communications check Procedural 4 Adequate ventilation Procedural 5 Atmosphere testing Procedural 6 Breathing apparatus Personal Protective Equipment 7 Intrinsically safe equipment Design/Engineering

Suggested Controls Control References No Reference Location 1 Company Procedures 2 Flag requirements 3 ISGOTT 4 Code of Safe working Practice (UK MCA)

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C5 Pressure Test of Lines Operation Ship Name: Example Premuda Ship

Operation Type: Sample Operations Assessment Date: 14 Aug 2007 Operation Group: Sample Permits to Work Review By Date: 1 Aug 2008 Operation: Pressure Testing

Assessment of Risk

No Hazards Cat Likelihood Consequence Risk 1 Poor condition - Piping JF Very Unlikely Extreme High 2 Gauges not calibrated JF Very Unlikely Extreme High

3 Crew member not wearing PPE UA Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low

4 Use of hands to detect HP air leaks UA Very Unlikely Extreme High


6 Fatigue PF Unlikely Moderate Medium Key: PF = Personal Factors, JF = Job Factors, UA = Unsafe Acts, UC = Unsafe Conditions Overall operational risk: High Actions and Timescales: Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be implemented urgently within a defined time period and it might be necessary to consider suspending or restricting the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been completed. Considerable resources might have to be allocated to additional control measures. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained particularly if the risk levels are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences. Controls

No Controls Category 1 PMS - Pipework Design/Engineering 2 Equipment calibration Procedural 3 Gas bottle handling procedures Procedural 4 Eye protection Personal Protective Equipment 5 Gloves Personal Protective Equipment 6 Training - Crew Human Element

Suggested Controls Control References No Reference Location

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1 Company Procedures 2 Code of Safe working Practice (UK MCA)

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C6 Hot Work Operation Ship Name: Example Premuda Ship

Operation Type: Sample Operations Assessment Date: 14 Aug 2007 Operation Group: Sample Permits to Work Review By Date: 1 Aug 2008 Operation: Hot Work - Cargo Pumproom

Assessment of Risk

No Hazards Cat Likelihood Consequence Risk 1 Darkness UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low 2 Flammable atmosphere UC Very Unlikely Extreme High 3 Flammable liquids UC Very Unlikely Extreme High 4 Flammable materials UC Very Unlikely Extreme High

5 Unshielded welding flash or spark UC Unlikely Slight harm Very Low

6 High temperature UC Very Unlikely Moderate Very Low


8 Communication failure PF Unlikely Moderate Medium Key: PF = Personal Factors, JF = Job Factors, UA = Unsafe Acts, UC = Unsafe Conditions Overall operational risk: High Actions and Timescales: Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be implemented urgently within a defined time period and it might be necessary to consider suspending or restricting the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been completed. Considerable resources might have to be allocated to additional control measures. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained particularly if the risk levels are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences.

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Controls

No Controls Category 1 Work planning meeting to be held Procedural 2 Adequate ventilation Procedural 3 Tank atmosphere checks carried out Procedural 4 Entry permit issued Procedural 5 Tank washed and gas free Procedural 6 Tanks inerted to <0.08 O2 and <0.02 HC Procedural 7 Work undertaken >500mm from tank deck Procedural 8 Local cleaning undertaken Procedural 9 Interconnecting pipelines flushed Procedural 10 Tank valves isolated Procedural 11 HW Permit approved by Officer in Charge Procedural 12 Fire watch procedures in place Procedural 13 Firefighting equipment available Personal Protective Equipment

Suggested Controls Control References No Reference Location 1 Company Procedures 2 ISGOTT 3 Code of Safe working Practice (UK MCA)

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Sec. D Mariner Bug and Fixes Shore offices involved in risk assessment import process have encountered some error in Lloyd Mariner program ver. 3.4 that can be fix with some simple operation. Here below the errors and relative solutions: D1.1 Error Message: “Object variable or with block variable not set” Cause 1 Lloyd Mariner program not able to create items in normal view operation. Solution 1 Before import, select the ship and expand the risk assessment tree with the command “view/all operation”. Cause 2 The operation type to be imported is an archived one. Archived items are not shown on the tree view because the default selected view is “normal view operations”, other options can be found under the view menu’. one of those selections is the “archived operations”, which filters all operation types that are marked as archived. Solution 2 To solve the problem insert the type manually with same name like the archived one and click ok; the system ask: “… was already been archived, do you want to reactivate this item?”, click yes and the system show the operation type correctly.

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D1.2 Error Message: “Tipi di dati non corrispondenti nell’espressione criterio” The error message is in Italian language because operating systems of office computer’s are Italian version.

Cause 1 The problem is due to wrong regional options on the computer from witch export was done (the correct regional option is “English united states”) Solution 1 Open the risk assessment file sent from the ship as a text file, modify the wrong date month format from Italian to English value and re-import the file. in the example below change the value “Ago” (Italian parameter) with “Aug” (English parameter)

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Risk Assessment Manual - Premudasqems.premuda.net/RISK_ASSESSMENT_MANUAL.pdf · Revision / Date...

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