Risk Assessment and Process Safety Management · 2019-04-15 · Risk Assessment and Process Safety...

Risk Assessment Risk Assessment and and

Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management

CSChE PSM Award PresentationCSChE PSM Award Presentation

Presented by Presented by Ertugrul AlpErtugrul Alp, Ph.D., P.Eng., Ph.D., P.Eng.

October 29, 2007October 29, 20075757thth Chemical Engineering ConferenceChemical Engineering Conference

Edmonton, AlbertaEdmonton, Alberta

ALP & ASSOCIATES IncorporatedChange Agents in Risk Management, Specialists in Risk Assessment87 Topham Crescent, Richmond Hill, Ontario, L4C 9E9, CanadaTel: 905-508-2595, Fax: 905-508-2679E-mail:[email protected]@rogers.com, Website: www. ALPwww. ALP--RISK.caRISK.ca

1alp/ea.CSChE PSM Award Presentation.2007-10-28ALP & ASSOCIATES

Who We AreWho We AreCanadian consulting company, founded in 1999 Canadian consulting company, founded in 1999 Principal Consultant: Dr. Ertugrul Alp, P.Eng.Principal Consultant: Dr. Ertugrul Alp, P.Eng.

Over twentyOver twenty--five years experience serving the chemical, resource, energy, five years experience serving the chemical, resource, energy, transportation, and steel industries, developers, and governmenttransportation, and steel industries, developers, and government clients. clients. Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering, University of Waterloo (1978)Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering, University of Waterloo (1978)

Experience:Experience:Westinghouse Canada, Atomic Power Division, Manager, Analysis anWestinghouse Canada, Atomic Power Division, Manager, Analysis and Modellingd ModellingConcord Environmental (later Concord Environmental (later BovarBovar Environmental), Principal, Manager, Air Environmental), Principal, Manager, Air Quality and Risk AssessmentQuality and Risk AssessmentArthur D. Little, Associate Director, Safety and Risk Practice LArthur D. Little, Associate Director, Safety and Risk Practice Leader in Canadaeader in Canada

Chair: MIACC Risk Assessment Expert Committee, 1994Chair: MIACC Risk Assessment Expert Committee, 1994--19991999Member: MIACC Committees on Land Use Planning, and Pipelines (19Member: MIACC Committees on Land Use Planning, and Pipelines (199393--1998)1998)Member: CSA Risk Management Standard Technical CommitteeMember: CSA Risk Management Standard Technical CommitteeMember: CCPA/CSChE Process Safety Management Committee (1999Member: CCPA/CSChE Process Safety Management Committee (1999--……))Past Chair: CSChE PSM DivisionPast Chair: CSChE PSM DivisionPast Chair: CSChE PSM Division Risk Assessment Expert CommitteePast Chair: CSChE PSM Division Risk Assessment Expert CommitteeMember: Canadian Advisory Committee for developing the new ISOMember: Canadian Advisory Committee for developing the new ISO--31000 31000 Risk Management StandardRisk Management StandardRecipient of 2007 CSChE PSM AwardRecipient of 2007 CSChE PSM Award


Sample Client ListSample Client ListAbitibiAbitibi--ConsolidatedConsolidatedAlberta Alberta EnvirofuelsEnvirofuelsAT PlasticsAT PlasticsBC HydroBC HydroCamecoCamecoCanadian NationalCanadian NationalCanadian Pacific RailwayCanadian Pacific RailwayCanexus/ NexenCanexus/ NexenCrompton CorporationCrompton CorporationCytec CanadaCytec CanadaÇÇayeliayeli BakBakıır r İşİşletmeleriletmeleriDofascoDofascoEmshihEmshih DevelopmentsDevelopmentsETI CanadaETI CanadaGazGaz MetropolitainMetropolitainIndustrial Accident Prevention Industrial Accident Prevention

AssociationAssociationImperial OilImperial OilInmet MiningInmet MiningNalco CanadaNalco Canada

NorandaNoranda FalconbridgeFalconbridgeNorth Atlantic RefiningNorth Atlantic RefiningOntario Ministry of Consumer Ontario Ministry of Consumer

and Business Servicesand Business ServicesOntario Ministry of Ontario Ministry of

EnvironmentEnvironmentOntario Ministry of HealthOntario Ministry of HealthOntario Ministry of LabourOntario Ministry of LabourOntario Ministry of Natural Ontario Ministry of Natural

ResourcesResourcesOntario Power Generation Ontario Power Generation

(through SENES)(through SENES)Orica/ Orica CanadaOrica/ Orica CanadaPetroPetro--CanadaCanadaShell CanadaShell CanadaSuncorSuncorTalisman EnergyTalisman EnergyTransCanada CorporationTransCanada CorporationTransport CanadaTransport CanadaTUPRAG MiningTUPRAG Mining


Chemical Process Risk Assessment EntailsChemical Process Risk Assessment Entails……

Study of unintentional releases, fires, explosions at petrochemiStudy of unintentional releases, fires, explosions at petrochemical cal plants, pipelines, etc., in terms of their causes, consequences,plants, pipelines, etc., in terms of their causes, consequences, and and likelihoods, in short, the likelihoods, in short, the risksrisks

Propane BLEVE and fireballPropane BLEVE and fireballCyclohexane release and VCECyclohexane release and VCEHH22S releaseS release

Why do these studies?Why do these studies?……

Amine overhead drum

Butane and propane storage


FlixboroughFlixborough, 1974 , 1974 –– Was not the first, or the lastWas not the first, or the last……


Bhopal, 1894 Bhopal, 1894 –– 20 years later, still making headlines20 years later, still making headlines

In The Economist, In The Economist, of all places dedicated to PSM and Risk Management !!!of all places dedicated to PSM and Risk Management !!!


Toulouse, 2001 Toulouse, 2001 –– Shock to the European PSM LegislationShock to the European PSM Legislation

Calls for Calls for ““Risk RemovalRisk Removal”” !!!!!!““Risk Management is not sufficientRisk Management is not sufficient”” !!!!!!

Ammonium Nitrate Explosion in Toulouse – France 21 September 2001


Missouri 2002

ThereThere’’s always something to s always something to learn!learn!

Lake Wabamun2005

Oakville 2003


BP Texas City, 2005

Buncefield Oil Storage Depot 2005


So,So,…… why do we do these risk studies?....why do we do these risk studies?....

So that we can understand the causes, consequences and So that we can understand the causes, consequences and likelihoods, the likelihoods, the risks risks ……

And why understand all this?And why understand all this?

So that we can So that we can managemanage these risksthese risks

““Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management”” entails the things we do for entails the things we do for managing the risks of chemical processesmanaging the risks of chemical processes


OutlineOutlinePSM as part of Risk ManagementPSM as part of Risk Management

Some HistorySome HistoryRisk FundamentalsRisk Fundamentals

Components of RiskComponents of RiskAnalysis Analysis –– Ranking Ranking –– Evaluation Evaluation –– AssessmentAssessmentQuantification of Risk Quantification of Risk –– RiskRisk Parameters for Measuring Risk Parameters for Measuring Risk –– RiskRisk MetricsMetricsPresentation of Risk and Ranking/Evaluation ToolsPresentation of Risk and Ranking/Evaluation Tools

Risk and Risk Density Contours, Risk Maps, Risk ProfilesRisk and Risk Density Contours, Risk Maps, Risk Profiles

Risk Analysis ToolsRisk Analysis ToolsCSChE Guidelines, Some HistoryCSChE Guidelines, Some History

Use of PSM Risk Assessments, Some Challenges Use of PSM Risk Assessments, Some Challenges Land Use Risk Assessments, Some HistoryLand Use Risk Assessments, Some HistoryFurther thoughts on PSM Risk MetricsFurther thoughts on PSM Risk MetricsImportance of Importance of ““Understanding of the physical systemUnderstanding of the physical system”” and and ““Organizational CultureOrganizational Culture””Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions


PSM and Risk ReceptorsPSM and Risk Receptors““Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management”” entails the things we do for managing entails the things we do for managing the risks of chemical processesthe risks of chemical processes

More specifically, PSM is what an operator* of a chemical procesMore specifically, PSM is what an operator* of a chemical process s does to ensure the process runs and delivers its products withoudoes to ensure the process runs and delivers its products without t unplanned interruptions, unplanned interruptions, includingincluding those that couldthose that could

Kill or injure people, and/or Kill or injure people, and/or Damage Damage

the environment, the environment, physical systems, physical systems, reputation, reputation, societal/regulator goodwill, societal/regulator goodwill, market sharemarket share

*Operator: organization, and the individuals in the organization*Operator: organization, and the individuals in the organization

People, environment, physical systems, reputation, etc. are People, environment, physical systems, reputation, etc. are ““Risk ReceptorsRisk Receptors””

Note that PSM focus, while sharing many of its goals and methodsNote that PSM focus, while sharing many of its goals and methods, is , is distinctly different from Occupational Safety and Health Managemdistinctly different from Occupational Safety and Health Managementent


PSM as Part of Risk ManagementPSM as Part of Risk Management

Any organization makes efforts to manage its risksAny organization makes efforts to manage its risksChemical process riskChemical process riskTechnological riskTechnological riskMarket riskMarket riskPolitical riskPolitical risk……

PSM focus is chemical process riskPSM focus is chemical process riskPSM is therefore part of the broader risk management efforts of PSM is therefore part of the broader risk management efforts of an an organization that runs a chemical processorganization that runs a chemical process


Management of Chemical Process Risks Management of Chemical Process Risks Elements of PSM Elements of PSM (e.g., US OSHA PSM Regulations 1992, CCPA/ACC (e.g., US OSHA PSM Regulations 1992, CCPA/ACC Responsible Care 1985/6, MIACC 1990s, CSChE 2002)Responsible Care 1985/6, MIACC 1990s, CSChE 2002)1.1. Employee Participation Employee Participation 2.2. Process Safety InformationProcess Safety Information

Hazards Information for Hazardous Chemicals UsedHazards Information for Hazardous Chemicals UsedProcess Technology InformationProcess Technology InformationProcess Equipment InformationProcess Equipment Information

3.3. Process Hazards Analysis (also termed Process Hazards Analysis (also termed ““risk analysisrisk analysis””))4.4. Operating ProceduresOperating Procedures5.5. Training Training 6.6. Contractors Contractors 7.7. PrePre--Startup Safety Review Startup Safety Review 8.8. Mechanical IntegrityMechanical Integrity9.9. Hot Work PermitHot Work Permit10.10. Management of ChangeManagement of Change11.11. Incident InvestigationIncident Investigation12.12. Emergency Planning and ResponseEmergency Planning and Response13.13. Compliance AuditsCompliance Audits14.14. Trade SecretsTrade Secrets

CSChE, 2002


Development of PSM Principles and Tools in CanadaDevelopment of PSM Principles and Tools in CanadaThe initial PSM efforts in the 1980s and 1990s stressed the The initial PSM efforts in the 1980s and 1990s stressed the importance individual PSM elements.importance individual PSM elements.

Earlier this decade, the emphasis turned to management systems fEarlier this decade, the emphasis turned to management systems for or PSM (CCPA, ACC, 2005).PSM (CCPA, ACC, 2005).

In Canada, Responsible Care Guidelines were developed by CCPA In Canada, Responsible Care Guidelines were developed by CCPA in the late 1980s as a response to Bhopal (1984)in the late 1980s as a response to Bhopal (1984)

Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC) PSM Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC) PSM Committee produced the first two editions of the Committee produced the first two editions of the ““PSM GuidelinesPSM Guidelines””and the and the ““Site SelfSite Self--assessment Toolassessment Tool”” (1999)(1999)

The Process Safety Management (PSM) Division was formed as a The Process Safety Management (PSM) Division was formed as a subject division of the Canadian Society for Chemical Engineerinsubject division of the Canadian Society for Chemical Engineering g (CSChE) October 14, 2000.(CSChE) October 14, 2000.

Products of the PSM Division (so far)Products of the PSM Division (so far)Process Safety Management Guidelines, 3Process Safety Management Guidelines, 3rdrd ed., 2002ed., 2002Managing the Health & Safety Impacts of Organizational Change, Managing the Health & Safety Impacts of Organizational Change, 2002.2002.Guidelines for Site Risk Communication, 2005Guidelines for Site Risk Communication, 2005Risk Assessment Risk Assessment –– Recommended PracticesRecommended Practices for Municipalities and for Municipalities and Industry, CSChE 2005Industry, CSChE 2005 (more on this later)(more on this later)


Management of Chemical Process Risks (2)Management of Chemical Process Risks (2)

Other than PSM, what else do we do to control chemical process Other than PSM, what else do we do to control chemical process risks?risks?

Emergency Management Emergency Management Operator and community togetherOperator and community togetherWhat the operator does for EM is usually considered as part of iWhat the operator does for EM is usually considered as part of its PSM ts PSM effortsefforts““More on that some other day!More on that some other day!””

Land Use Planning Land Use Planning Often, community alone! (planners, politicians, and emergency Often, community alone! (planners, politicians, and emergency responders) responders) More on this later in the presentationMore on this later in the presentation


One can look at risk from different perspectives:One can look at risk from different perspectives:

facility riskfacility riskchemical riskchemical risktransportation risktransportation risknature risknature riskproject riskproject riskmarket riskmarket riskpolitical riskpolitical riskcurrency riskcurrency risk......

integrated riskintegrated riskfinancial riskfinancial riskenterprise riskenterprise risk

Risk ConceptsRisk Concepts

Risk “Source” Perspective (“where undesirable events

can occur”)

Risk “Source” Perspective (“where undesirable events

can occur”)Risk “Receptor”

Perspective (“ those who can be impacted”)

Risk “Receptor”Perspective (“ those

who can be impacted”)

“Integrated”perspective

“Integrated”perspective

$$$$$$

publicpublicemployeesemployeescommunitycommunityproductionproductionpropertypropertyreputationreputationenvironmentenvironmentelected representativeselected representativescustomerscustomersShareholdersShareholders……


Risk and Decision MakingRisk and Decision Making

The concept of risk includes six components:The concept of risk includes six components:Benefits of an activity that we undertake (or wish to undertake)Benefits of an activity that we undertake (or wish to undertake)Hazard inherent in that activity, which is otherwise deemed Hazard inherent in that activity, which is otherwise deemed beneficialbeneficialAn undesirable event, which brings out the hazardAn undesirable event, which brings out the hazardAdverse consequence of the undesirable eventAdverse consequence of the undesirable eventUncertainty of whether the undesirable event will happen or Uncertainty of whether the undesirable event will happen or not (likelihood/ probability/ frequency) not (likelihood/ probability/ frequency) Perception about the combination of the abovePerception about the combination of the above

We base our decisions on perception.We base our decisions on perception.

Accurate understanding of the inherent hazards, the undesirable Accurate understanding of the inherent hazards, the undesirable events that can occur, and their consequences and likelihood, wievents that can occur, and their consequences and likelihood, will ll lead to:lead to:

more balanced perceptions;more balanced perceptions;and hence to:and hence to:

better decisions in better decisions in ““managing the risks of that activitymanaging the risks of that activity””


““Understanding the inherent hazards, the undesirable events, and Understanding the inherent hazards, the undesirable events, and their consequences and likelihoodtheir consequences and likelihood”” is:is:

Risk Analysis Risk Analysis Risk = f[hazard, event, consequence, frequency] = Risk = f[hazard, event, consequence, frequency] = CChehe x x ffheCheC

““Making judgments about the importance of the undesirable events Making judgments about the importance of the undesirable events (perception component; by taking into account the benefits of th(perception component; by taking into account the benefits of the e activity, costs of the activity, risks of the activity, benefitsactivity, costs of the activity, risks of the activity, benefits of risk control of risk control measures, costs of risk control measures)measures, costs of risk control measures)”” is:is:

Risk EvaluationRisk Evaluation

““Risk AnalysisRisk Analysis””, together with , together with ““Risk EvaluationRisk Evaluation””, ,

is termed is termed ““Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment”” (CSA Definition)(CSA Definition)

Risk assessment is then a tool for PSM decision making, in: Risk assessment is then a tool for PSM decision making, in: designing and constructing new facilities/ operations, and designing and constructing new facilities/ operations, and improving existing facilities/ operationsimproving existing facilities/ operations

by considering costs and benefits of risk control measures.by considering costs and benefits of risk control measures.

Risk and Decision MakingRisk and Decision Making


Definition of Risk Definition of Risk ––Causes and Controls (Layers of Protection)Causes and Controls (Layers of Protection)

“InherentHazards”

Undesirable event

Consequences

ExampleToxicity of material - Spill - Loss of life/ property,in storage tank Environmental damage,

Damage to reputation of facility owners/ emergency responders/ regulators

Risk

Likelihood of Consequences

Causes

Layers of Protection (Prevention)

Layers of Protection (Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, Recovery)

The likelihoods depend on the number and quality

of Layers of Protection

Likelihood of Event


Quantifying RiskQuantifying Risk

Undesirable eventUndesirable eventAn event which has the potential for causing adverse effects on An event which has the potential for causing adverse effects on people, people, property/production or the environmentproperty/production or the environmentAn event (or condition) that can result in reputational or materAn event (or condition) that can result in reputational or material financial ial financial loss or prevent the organization from achieving its business objloss or prevent the organization from achieving its business objectivesectives

If more than one type or a range of consequences are possible, tIf more than one type or a range of consequences are possible, then hen total risktotal risk due to an due to an ““undesirable eventundesirable event”” is calculated by:is calculated by:

Risk from undesirable event = Risk from undesirable event = ΣΣkk ΣΣii ((ConsequenceConsequencei,ki,k of undesirable event of undesirable event

x Likelihood of x Likelihood of ConsequenceConsequencei,ki,k of that event)of that event)k = receptor type, k = receptor type, e.g., people safety, environment, production, e.g., people safety, environment, production, reputationreputationi = consequence level, e.g., i = consequence level, e.g., small, medium, large, extremesmall, medium, large, extreme

Here, Here, ““riskrisk”” is the is the residual riskresidual risk with a with a given set of controlsgiven set of controls..

Total risk from a chemical process (or facility) is the sum of tTotal risk from a chemical process (or facility) is the sum of the risk he risk from all events that can take place in that facility.from all events that can take place in that facility.

Risk from facility = Risk from facility = ΣΣee RRee


Parameters for Measuring Risk Parameters for Measuring Risk –– RiskRisk MetricsMetrics

Four fundamental parametersFour fundamental parameters1.1. Risk to a Risk to a single individual receptorsingle individual receptor of a given type of risk receptor of a given type of risk receptor

(e.g., people) exposed to a given risk source (e.g., chemical fa(e.g., people) exposed to a given risk source (e.g., chemical facility)cility)Individual risk (considers ability to escape/take cover, and/or Individual risk (considers ability to escape/take cover, and/or fractional fractional time of exposure to the risk source)time of exposure to the risk source)Geographical risk (assumes no escape/take cover, and exposure 10Geographical risk (assumes no escape/take cover, and exposure 100% 0% of the time)of the time)

2.2. Risk to Risk to all individual receptorsall individual receptors of a given type of risk receptor of a given type of risk receptor exposed to a given risk source (exposed to a given risk source (““group riskgroup risk””))

Societal risk (considers ability to escape/take cover, and/or frSocietal risk (considers ability to escape/take cover, and/or fractional actional time of exposure to the risk source)time of exposure to the risk source)Aggregate risk (assumes no escape/take cover, and exposure 100% Aggregate risk (assumes no escape/take cover, and exposure 100% of of the time)the time)Societal or aggregate risk Societal or aggregate risk intensity/densityintensity/density (risk per unit (risk per unit length/area/volume length/area/volume of risk sourceof risk source oror exposed to the risk sourceexposed to the risk source))


Parameters for Measuring Risk Parameters for Measuring Risk –– Risk MetricsRisk Metrics3.3. ValueValue--normalized risknormalized risk

Average aggregate risk per unit of value exposed to the risk souAverage aggregate risk per unit of value exposed to the risk source rce (e.g., aggregate risk per worker(e.g., aggregate risk per worker--year)year)

4.4. Excess aggregate riskExcess aggregate riskDeviation of risk due to a risk source, from its Deviation of risk due to a risk source, from its ““fair sharefair share””Fair share: average aggregate risk per risk sourceFair share: average aggregate risk per risk source

Used since 2001 by Alp & Associates for governments and Used since 2001 by Alp & Associates for governments and industryindustry

Reference:Reference:


Presentation of Risk Presentation of Risk –– Individual/ Geographical RiskIndividual/ Geographical Risk

Risk TransectsRisk Transects

Risk Contours Risk Contours on a geographical mapon a geographical map

Annual Individual RiskPipeline (30", 1440 psig)

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

-600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600

Distance from Pipeline (m)

Ann

ual i

ndiv

idua

l ris

k Total

CompleteRuptureHole

Leak

A full QRA is A full QRA is the required the required analysis analysis approach for approach for this type of this type of applicationapplication


Risk Acceptability Criteria for LandRisk Acceptability Criteria for Land--use Planning (Proposed; use Planning (Proposed; extension of MIACC, 1995)extension of MIACC, 1995)

Allowable Land UsesAllowable Land Uses

Risksource

No other land use

Manufacturing, warehouses, open space(parkland,

golf courses, etc.)

Low density commercial buildings/ offices,

low-density residential

All other uses (high-density residential, office towers, etc.)excluding sensitive

institutions

100 in a million(10-4)



Annual Individual RiskAnnual Individual Risk(chance of fatality per year)(chance of fatality per year)

Sensitive institutions (hospitals,

nursing homes, schools, transport

hubs, etc.)

0.3 in a million(0.3 x 10-6)

Use of Individual Risk Information for Land UseUse of Individual Risk Information for Land Use


Implications of Land Use Risk on PSMImplications of Land Use Risk on PSM

Typically, if a risk assessment shows that the facility risk doeTypically, if a risk assessment shows that the facility risk does not s not meet riskmeet risk--based land use planning criteria, then either based land use planning criteria, then either

A new land use development around an existing risk source does nA new land use development around an existing risk source does not ot take place take place

Who pays? Who pays? oror

The facility (existing or proposed) will be forced to consider The facility (existing or proposed) will be forced to consider additional PSMadditional PSM--type risk control measures type risk control measures

Again, who pays?!Again, who pays?!

Too often, land use development around an existing facility goesToo often, land use development around an existing facility goesunchecked until it is too late, and the facility is forced to inunchecked until it is too late, and the facility is forced to invest in vest in additional PSMadditional PSM--type risk controltype risk control

Again often, future potential facility expansion is not considerAgain often, future potential facility expansion is not considered in ed in a risk assessment while evaluating a new development proposala risk assessment while evaluating a new development proposal

Once a new development decision is made based on risk of the Once a new development decision is made based on risk of the existing facility, future growth of industry is restricted and/oexisting facility, future growth of industry is restricted and/or further r further PSM requirements need to be imposed on the operator if future PSM requirements need to be imposed on the operator if future expansion is attemptedexpansion is attempted


Presentation of Risk Presentation of Risk –– Societal/ Aggregate RiskSocietal/ Aggregate RiskRisk Map (frequency distribution or Risk Map (frequency distribution or fNfN))

Focus: Single event risk to exposed Focus: Single event risk to exposed group (societal/aggregate risk)group (societal/aggregate risk)Also termed a Also termed a ““risk matrixrisk matrix””This is a tool for categorizing and This is a tool for categorizing and ranking different event types of concernranking different event types of concernNotNot a good tool for risk evaluation a good tool for risk evaluation against absolute criteria (more on this against absolute criteria (more on this later)later)

Risk Profile (complementary cumulative Risk Profile (complementary cumulative frequency distribution or FN)frequency distribution or FN)

Focus: Overall facility risk to exposed Focus: Overall facility risk to exposed group (societal/aggregate risk)group (societal/aggregate risk)Good tool for risk acceptability Good tool for risk acceptability evaluation against absolute criteria evaluation against absolute criteria ––but only for point sources of risk such but only for point sources of risk such as chemical plants, as chemical plants, notnot for line sources for line sources such as pipelinessuch as pipelinesNotNot useful for risk categorizing and useful for risk categorizing and ranking different event typesranking different event types

F

Consequence N Freq

uenc

y of

Eve

nts

with

C

onse

quen

ce L

arge

r Th

an o

r Equ

al T

o N

Intolerable Region

As Low As Practicable Region

Tolerable Region

Facility Societal Risk Curve

Risk Profile and Risk Profile and Risk EvaluationRisk Evaluation

Risk Map and Risk Map and Risk RankingRisk Ranking

Consequence N

f

Freq

uenc

y f

Individual Event Types

1 2 3 4

1

2

3

4 HHHMM

ML

L

LVLVL

VL

VL

VLVLVL


Example risk evaluation matrix Example risk evaluation matrix –– separate risk receptorsseparate risk receptors

Action PriorityU Immediate action5 Action in one week4 Action in one month3 Action in six months2 Action in a year1 Monitor

Risk Level


Risk Analysis Techniques for Estimating Risk Analysis Techniques for Estimating Event Societal/Aggregate RiskEvent Societal/Aggregate Risk

Qualitative techniques in conjunction with a risk matrix for risQualitative techniques in conjunction with a risk matrix for risk k categorization/rankingcategorization/ranking

Identify events and develop knowledge/experienceIdentify events and develop knowledge/experience--based estimates based estimates of consequence and likelihoodof consequence and likelihood

Screening Level Risk AssessmentScreening Level Risk AssessmentHAZOPHAZOPFMEAFMEA

SemiSemi--quantitative techniques in conjunction with a risk matrix for quantitative techniques in conjunction with a risk matrix for risk categorization/rankingrisk categorization/ranking

Starting with events identified using a qualitative technique, dStarting with events identified using a qualitative technique, develop evelop quantified estimates of likelihood; combine with quantified estimates of likelihood; combine with knowledge/experienceknowledge/experience--based estimates of consequencebased estimates of consequence

LOPALOPAFault treesFault treesEvent treesEvent trees

Quantitative techniques in conjunction with a risk matrix for riQuantitative techniques in conjunction with a risk matrix for risk sk categorization/ rankingcategorization/ ranking

Starting with events identified using a qualitative technique, dStarting with events identified using a qualitative technique, develop evelop quantified estimates of consequence and likelihoodquantified estimates of consequence and likelihood


Use of Societal/Aggregate Risk Information in PSMUse of Societal/Aggregate Risk Information in PSM

Use a risk map to show events in their respective risk matrix ceUse a risk map to show events in their respective risk matrix cellslls

Risk Map and Risk Map and Risk RankingRisk Ranking

Consequence N

f

Freq

uenc

y f

Individual Event Types

HHHMM

ML

L

LVLVL

VL

VL

VLVLVL

This provides a ranking of the This provides a ranking of the importance of different events, importance of different events, and risk controls and risk controls Very useful for prioritizing PSMVery useful for prioritizing PSM--type risk controls in an operating type risk controls in an operating plant or during designplant or during design


Use of Aggregate Risk Information in PSM (2)Use of Aggregate Risk Information in PSM (2)

Two possible concerns with the use of risk matricesTwo possible concerns with the use of risk matrices

1.1. While use of a standardized risk matrix across an organization iWhile use of a standardized risk matrix across an organization is s desirable for evaluation of risk acceptability, problems of desirable for evaluation of risk acceptability, problems of scalability arise when it is applied on a facility or organizatiscalability arise when it is applied on a facility or organizationon--wide basiswide basis

Consider a risk matrix which says a fire resulting in $1000 damaConsider a risk matrix which says a fire resulting in $1000 damage is ge is in the acceptable range if its likelihood is 10in the acceptable range if its likelihood is 10--22 per year.per year.Consider application of this criterion to a single gasoline statConsider application of this criterion to a single gasoline station.ion.

It is OK to have such a fire with a frequency of 1/100 per year It is OK to have such a fire with a frequency of 1/100 per year in that in that single gas station.single gas station.

Now apply the same criterion to 100 gas stations.Now apply the same criterion to 100 gas stations.It is OK to have such a fire with a frequency of 1/100 per year It is OK to have such a fire with a frequency of 1/100 per year in all the in all the gas stations.gas stations.This implies that each gas station is limited to an allowable frThis implies that each gas station is limited to an allowable frequency of equency of 1/100/100 = 1/10,000 per year for such a fire.1/100/100 = 1/10,000 per year for such a fire.Is this consistent with the intent of the risk matrix?Is this consistent with the intent of the risk matrix?

The same difficulty applies when standard risk matrices are usedThe same difficulty applies when standard risk matrices are used for for individual pieces of equipment during design individual pieces of equipment during design HAZOPsHAZOPs and and LOPAsLOPAs..How is the industry responding to this challenge?How is the industry responding to this challenge?



Two possible concerns (2)Two possible concerns (2)

2.2. Use of a risk matrix is open to abuseUse of a risk matrix is open to abuseOne could quite legitimately (without violating any mathematicalOne could quite legitimately (without violating any mathematicalrules) combine different types of events together, or refine therules) combine different types of events together, or refine their ir definitions to create separate event types, to make the picture definitions to create separate event types, to make the picture look look catastrophically bad or very rosy.catastrophically bad or very rosy.Consider a facility manager who is under pressure to cut Consider a facility manager who is under pressure to cut maintenance budgets and he/she does not want tomaintenance budgets and he/she does not want to

A risk analysis identifies hundreds of different types of eventsA risk analysis identifies hundreds of different types of events of various of various causes in different areas of the facility, and ranks them using causes in different areas of the facility, and ranks them using the the company matrixcompany matrixThe manager plots them on a risk map, that shows that all the evThe manager plots them on a risk map, that shows that all the events ents comfortably fall in the comfortably fall in the ““acceptableacceptable”” risk zone, i.e., there is room for risk zone, i.e., there is room for cutting budgetscutting budgetsThe manager combines events that are of a similar nature (e.g., The manager combines events that are of a similar nature (e.g., pump pump leaks with fires) from all areas of the plant; this reduces the leaks with fires) from all areas of the plant; this reduces the number of number of events on the risk map, but increases the likelihood of each, thevents on the risk map, but increases the likelihood of each, thus us pushing some of these new events into the pushing some of these new events into the ““unaccaptableunaccaptable riskrisk”” zonezone

Good excuse to show that he/she should not cut budgets, but Good excuse to show that he/she should not cut budgets, but actually needs more budget to bring the risk to acceptable levelactually needs more budget to bring the risk to acceptable levelss

How is the industry responding to this challenge?How is the industry responding to this challenge?



Two possible concerns (3)Two possible concerns (3)

2.2. Use of a risk matrix is open to abuse (continued 2)Use of a risk matrix is open to abuse (continued 2)The reverse (e.g., defining new events by splitting each originaThe reverse (e.g., defining new events by splitting each original l event into its causes) is available for a manager who wants to cevent into its causes) is available for a manager who wants to collect ollect brownie points (albeit probably only temporarily, but who knows,brownie points (albeit probably only temporarily, but who knows,he/she might get promoted before the bottom falls out!)he/she might get promoted before the bottom falls out!)

Again, how is the industry responding to this challenge?Again, how is the industry responding to this challenge?


A Partial Solution to the Risk Matrix ChallengesA Partial Solution to the Risk Matrix Challenges

Use FN plots (as opposed to the Use FN plots (as opposed to the fNfN plots, which risk maps are)plots, which risk maps are)Due to the cumulative nature of the information, the type of abuDue to the cumulative nature of the information, the type of abuse se that is possible with risk maps/risk matrices is not possible withat is possible with risk maps/risk matrices is not possible with FN th FN plotsplotsRequires development of corporate FN criteria Requires development of corporate FN criteria

FN plots do not solve the scalability problemFN plots do not solve the scalability problemMeaningless for line sources of risk, such as pipelinesMeaningless for line sources of risk, such as pipelines

Good reference: Alp & Zelensky, 1996Good reference: Alp & Zelensky, 1996


Example OffExample Off--Site Societal Risk Guidelines for Land UseSite Societal Risk Guidelines for Land Use

Unfortunately, applicable only to point sources (e.g., chemical Unfortunately, applicable only to point sources (e.g., chemical plants, but not pipelines)plants, but not pipelines)

1 10 100 1000 1000010-8

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Example Corporate Aggregate Risk GuidelinesExample Corporate Aggregate Risk Guidelines

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Use of PSM Risk Assessments for Corporate Use of PSM Risk Assessments for Corporate DecisionDecision--Making & Board OversightMaking & Board Oversight

Risk assessments that are routinely done for PSM purposes are Risk assessments that are routinely done for PSM purposes are for purposes of operationalfor purposes of operational--level decisionslevel decisions

They focus on potential causes of events to develop appropriate They focus on potential causes of events to develop appropriate prevention measuresprevention measures

The events that are identified are categorized using a corporateThe events that are identified are categorized using a corporaterisk matrix, and the results are typically presented on risk maprisk matrix, and the results are typically presented on risk mapss

Typically, the likelihood ranking is done for each cause/consequTypically, the likelihood ranking is done for each cause/consequence ence pairpair

This level of segregation is too detailed for corporate level This level of segregation is too detailed for corporate level decision makingdecision making

Aggregation of cause/consequence pairs, and possibly of events Aggregation of cause/consequence pairs, and possibly of events with like consequences, is needed to see the corporate picturewith like consequences, is needed to see the corporate picture

It is difficult to decide where to stop the aggregation to get aIt is difficult to decide where to stop the aggregation to get a good good picture of the corporate exposurepicture of the corporate exposure

Use of FN diagrams can address this problem, and should be Use of FN diagrams can address this problem, and should be used for corporate decision makingused for corporate decision making


Presentation of Societal/Aggregate Risk Intensity/Density: Presentation of Societal/Aggregate Risk Intensity/Density: OperatorOperator’’s (risk source) Perspectives (risk source) Perspective

Example: Societal risk Example: Societal risk (created by the risk (created by the risk source) per unit length source) per unit length of rail corridorof rail corridor

Reference: Reference:


Presentation of Societal/Aggregate Risk Intensity/Density: Presentation of Societal/Aggregate Risk Intensity/Density: Risk Receptor PerspectiveRisk Receptor Perspective

Example: Societal risk per unit area exposed to the risk sourceExample: Societal risk per unit area exposed to the risk sourceReference: Dutch methodology, 2005Reference: Dutch methodology, 2005


Available Canadian Guidance for Risk AssessmentAvailable Canadian Guidance for Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment Risk Assessment –– Recommended Practices for Municipalities and Industry, CSChE Recommended Practices for Municipalities and Industry, CSChE 20052005

http://psm.chemeng.ca/Products/Risk_Assessment_Recommended_Practhttp://psm.chemeng.ca/Products/Risk_Assessment_Recommended_Practices_0406292.pdfices_0406292.pdfGood overview of risk assessment techniques (qualitative/quantitGood overview of risk assessment techniques (qualitative/quantitative, consequence, ative, consequence, frequency, risk) frequency, risk) Developed in the late 1990s by MIACC; does not include informatiDeveloped in the late 1990s by MIACC; does not include information on LOPA, SIL, SVAon on LOPA, SIL, SVADescribes the stateDescribes the state--ofof--thethe--art QRA approach, in particular to support Land Use Planningart QRA approach, in particular to support Land Use Planning

Alp, E and Zelensky, MJ (1996) J Loss Alp, E and Zelensky, MJ (1996) J Loss PrevPrev in the Process Industries, pp. 135in the Process Industries, pp. 135--145145A primary reference of the above CSChE A primary reference of the above CSChE ““Recommended PracticesRecommended Practices””Describes the fundamental equations for risk quantificationDescribes the fundamental equations for risk quantification

Also describes the scalability problem with FNAlso describes the scalability problem with FN


Risk Assessment for Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for Land Use Planning –– Historical Historical Development in Canada Development in Canada –– And the FutureAnd the Future

RiskRisk--based land use planning first received attention by MIACC based land use planning first received attention by MIACC (Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada) after Bhopal(Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada) after Bhopal

““RiskRisk--based Land Use Planning based Land Use Planning GuidelinesGuidelines””, 1995, 1995No updates yet, proposed extension for sensitive receptorsNo updates yet, proposed extension for sensitive receptorsHas current validityHas current validity

““Hazardous Substances Risk Assessment: A Hazardous Substances Risk Assessment: A MiniGuideMiniGuide for for Municipalities and IndustryMunicipalities and Industry””, 1994, 1994

Based on Based on ““Risk Assessment Guidelines for Municipalities and Risk Assessment Guidelines for Municipalities and Industries Industries –– An An Initial Screening ToolInitial Screening Tool””, 1997 (although this is the , 1997 (although this is the publication date, its development goes back to 1993)publication date, its development goes back to 1993)Which, in turn, is based on the 1988 Dutch GuideWhich, in turn, is based on the 1988 Dutch GuideAll three are considered outAll three are considered out--ofof--datedate

The QRA methodology described in The QRA methodology described in ““An An Initial Screening ToolInitial Screening Tool””has been superseded by has been superseded by ““Risk Assessment Risk Assessment –– Recommended Recommended PracticesPractices for Municipalities and Industryfor Municipalities and Industry””, CSChE 2005, CSChE 2005

An update of the An update of the MiniGuideMiniGuide is planned based on the is planned based on the ““Recommended PracticesRecommended Practices””


Further Thoughts on Risk MetricsFurther Thoughts on Risk Metrics

Recall: OSHA Injury Frequency Rate and Injury Severity RateRecall: OSHA Injury Frequency Rate and Injury Severity RateThese are normalized on a These are normalized on a ““per 200,000 worked hourper 200,000 worked hour”” basis, i.e., basis, i.e., per 100 workerper 100 worker--yearsyearsThe frequency rate is not very useful (it is just an incident coThe frequency rate is not very useful (it is just an incident count, unt, without reflecting how bad each incident is)without reflecting how bad each incident is)The severity rate measure is a valueThe severity rate measure is a value--normalized risk, focusing on normalized risk, focusing on worker injury onlyworker injury only

Average aggregate risk Average aggregate risk of injury of injury per unit of value (worker) exposed to per unit of value (worker) exposed to the risk source (e.g., aggregate risk of injury per workerthe risk source (e.g., aggregate risk of injury per worker--year)year)


Further Thoughts on Risk Metrics (2)Further Thoughts on Risk Metrics (2)

New proposals for PSM metrics (CCPS, 2007)New proposals for PSM metrics (CCPS, 2007)PSM incident frequency rate (again not very useful, it is just aPSM incident frequency rate (again not very useful, it is just a count)count)PSM incident severity ratePSM incident severity rateBoth are normalized on a Both are normalized on a ““per 200,000 worked hourper 200,000 worked hour”” basis, i.e., per basis, i.e., per 100 worker100 worker--yearsyearsThe PSM incident severity rate is also a valueThe PSM incident severity rate is also a value--normalized risk, normalized risk, focusing on PSM incidentsfocusing on PSM incidents

This is a step in the right directionThis is a step in the right direction

It is suggested that the excess aggregate risk parameter be alsoIt is suggested that the excess aggregate risk parameter be alsoexplored as a PSM metricexplored as a PSM metric


How to make it work:How to make it work:

Requirements for SuccessRequirements for Success


The stakeholderThe stakeholder--centered integrated risk centered integrated risk management approach: Meeting the needs of management approach: Meeting the needs of stakeholdersstakeholders

Key BusinessKey BusinessProcessesProcesses

ResourcesResources OrganizationOrganization

Improves Improves stakeholder stakeholder satisfaction and satisfaction and balancebalance……

…… by improving critical by improving critical business processes business processes ……

…… and aligning resources and aligning resources and organizational and organizational characteristicscharacteristics

RRCC

EEOO= CC

EE

Stakeholders:EmployeesContractorsOwnersCommunityEnvironmentRegulators

Requirements for Success Requirements for Success ……

1. Understand Stakeholder 1. Understand Stakeholder NeedsNeeds

2. Design Business 2. Design Business Processes to meet Processes to meet those needsthose needs

3. Build the 3. Build the Resources Resources and the and the Organization Organization to carry out the Business Processesto carry out the Business Processes


Requirements for Success Requirements for Success ……in Achieving Superior PSM Performancein Achieving Superior PSM Performance……

RiskRisk--based Decisionbased Decision--MakingMaking

Stakeholders

Resources

Processes

Organization

SS

In this context, In this context, ““integrationintegration”” means:means:

Consideration of all stakeholdersConsideration of all stakeholders’’ needs, and the needs, and the exposures to potential hazards, in an integrated manner,exposures to potential hazards, in an integrated manner,

Integration of risk management processes into dayIntegration of risk management processes into day--toto--day and strategic decision making, day and strategic decision making,

Integration of risk management responsibilities into the Integration of risk management responsibilities into the line management structure, andline management structure, and

Integration of riskIntegration of risk--based thinking into the design of based thinking into the design of physical assets, allocation of budgets, and training of physical assets, allocation of budgets, and training of human resourceshuman resources

so that the needs of the stakeholders can be balanced in the so that the needs of the stakeholders can be balanced in the long run.long run.

““IntegrationIntegration””


1.1. Executive management Executive management (top(top--down) down) commitment to riskcommitment to risk--based based decision making for balancing the needs of the stakeholdersdecision making for balancing the needs of the stakeholders((““safetysafety”” cultureculture)),,

2.2. (Bottom(Bottom--up) up) Awareness throughout the ranks about their Awareness throughout the ranks about their riskriskmanagement responsibilities and accountabilitiesmanagement responsibilities and accountabilities ((““safetysafety””cultureculture)),,

3.3. A line organization structure conducive to effective A line organization structure conducive to effective communication and cooperation,communication and cooperation, with risk management with risk management responsibilities built into the performance criteria of all persresponsibilities built into the performance criteria of all personnel onnel ((““safetysafety”” cultureculture),),

4.4. A A riskrisk management process model that is understood by all,management process model that is understood by all, ……

Requirements for Success Requirements for Success ……in Achieving Superior PSM Performancein Achieving Superior PSM Performance……


Requirements for Success Requirements for Success …… (continued)(continued)

5.5. Availability of integrated riskAvailability of integrated risk assessment and cost/benefit assessment and cost/benefit analysis tools of various sophisticationanalysis tools of various sophistication,, which can be used as which can be used as suitable during the daily or strategic decision making process suitable during the daily or strategic decision making process (these tools are used to (these tools are used to understandunderstand the level of risk using the level of risk using appropriate risk metrics, and to evaluate suitability of controlappropriate risk metrics, and to evaluate suitability of controlactions),actions),

6.6. Appropriate risk control strategies (PSM),Appropriate risk control strategies (PSM),

7.7. Sufficient Sufficient human human andand physical resources, physical resources,

8.8. A common A common riskrisk management management standardstandard that reflects the values of that reflects the values of the the organizationorganization and the requirements that are asked of it.and the requirements that are asked of it.


Importance of Understanding the RiskImportance of Understanding the RiskThe physical systemThe physical systemInherent HazardsInherent HazardsPossible Undesirable EventsPossible Undesirable EventsTheir Possible ConsequencesTheir Possible ConsequencesTheir LikelihoodTheir Likelihood


BuncefieldBuncefield Oil Oil Storage DepotStorage Depot

December 11, 2005 December 11, 2005

Overfilling of Gasoline Overfilling of Gasoline Storage Tank, Spill into Storage Tank, Spill into Dyke, Generation of Heavy Dyke, Generation of Heavy Gas Vapour Cloud, Vapour Gas Vapour Cloud, Vapour Cloud Explosion and Tank Cloud Explosion and Tank FiresFires

Until this event, the UK HSE Until this event, the UK HSE worst case scenario for worst case scenario for such storage tanks was a such storage tanks was a tank fire!tank fire!

A similar explosion had A similar explosion had occurred in France in 1991!occurred in France in 1991!


BuncefieldBuncefield Incident Investigation Incident Investigation –– 33rdrd Progress ReportProgress ReportMay 2006May 2006

Vapour generation Vapour generation mechanismmechanism

Evaporation of the Evaporation of the lighter components lighter components (e.g., butanes, (e.g., butanes, pentanes, hexanes)pentanes, hexanes)

Approximate Approximate extent of the extent of the vapour cloudvapour cloud

Up to 2 m Up to 2 m heightheight


Importance of Importance of ““Organizational CultureOrganizational Culture””

Importance of Using the Right Risk MetricsImportance of Using the Right Risk Metrics

Importance of Management of Change Importance of Management of Change (including Organizational Change)(including Organizational Change)


BP Texas City Refinery Explosion BP Texas City Refinery Explosion –– US CSB ReportUS CSB ReportEvent: Event: RaffinateRaffinate splitter tower overfilled with splitter tower overfilled with liquid, overfilling the blowdown drum; liquid liquid, overfilling the blowdown drum; liquid released from open vent stack (not connected released from open vent stack (not connected to a flare system)to a flare system)

Many Many ““technical findingstechnical findings””, e.g.,, e.g.,The tower level indicator showed that it was The tower level indicator showed that it was declining while it was actually overfilling;declining while it was actually overfilling;The redundant high level alarm did not activate;The redundant high level alarm did not activate;etc.etc.

9 9 ““organizational findingsorganizational findings””, e.g.,, e.g.,Cost cuttingCost cutting, failure to invest and , failure to invest and production production pressurespressures from BP Group executive managers from BP Group executive managers impaired process safety performance;impaired process safety performance;BP BP BoardBoard of Directors did not provide effective of Directors did not provide effective oversightoversight ……;;Reliance on the Reliance on the low OSHA recordable injury low OSHA recordable injury rate as a safety indicatorrate as a safety indicator failed to provide a failed to provide a true picture of process safety performance and true picture of process safety performance and the health of the the health of the safety culturesafety culture;;......BP Texas City did not effectively assess BP Texas City did not effectively assess changes involving people, policies and the changes involving people, policies and the organization that could impact process safetyorganization that could impact process safety


BP Texas City Refinery Explosion BP Texas City Refinery Explosion –– US CSB Report (2)US CSB Report (2)

Most fatalities and injuries occurred in portable trailers/ builMost fatalities and injuries occurred in portable trailers/ buildingsdingsMost were contractors, not essential in the startMost were contractors, not essential in the start--up operation of the up operation of the area plant unitsarea plant units


BP Texas City Refinery Explosion BP Texas City Refinery Explosion –– US CSB Report (3)US CSB Report (3)

Recommendations related to:Recommendations related to:Safety CultureSafety CultureTrailer Trailer SitingSiting

API to develop new guidelines to ensure that occupied API to develop new guidelines to ensure that occupied trailers and trailers and similar temporary structuressimilar temporary structures are placed safely away from hazardous are placed safely away from hazardous areas of process plantsareas of process plantsThe new API 753 Guidelines on The new API 753 Guidelines on ““Management of Hazards Associated Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildingswith Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings”” was developed and was developed and published in December 2006 (draft) and June 2007 (final)published in December 2006 (draft) and June 2007 (final)

Blowdown Drum and StackBlowdown Drum and StackAPI to revise API to revise ““Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure Relieving and Relieving and DepressuringDepressuring Systems,Systems,”” to identify the hazards of this to identify the hazards of this equipment, to address the need to adequately size disposal drumsequipment, to address the need to adequately size disposal drums, and , and to urge the use of inherently safer alternatives such as flare sto urge the use of inherently safer alternatives such as flare systemsystemsAPI 521 5API 521 5thth edition was published in January 2007edition was published in January 2007


BP Texas City Refinery Explosion BP Texas City Refinery Explosion –– Baker Report Baker Report

Report of the BP Independent Refineries Safety Review PanelReport of the BP Independent Refineries Safety Review Panel

10 Recommendations:10 Recommendations:Process Safety LeadershipProcess Safety LeadershipIntegrated and Comprehensive PSMIntegrated and Comprehensive PSMProcess Safety Knowledge and Process Safety Knowledge and ExpertiseExpertiseProcess Safety CultureProcess Safety CultureClearly Defined Expectations and Clearly Defined Expectations and Accountability for Process SafetyAccountability for Process SafetySupport for Line ManagementSupport for Line ManagementLeading and Lagging Performance Leading and Lagging Performance Indicators for Process SafetyIndicators for Process SafetyProcess Safety AuditingProcess Safety AuditingBoard MonitoringBoard MonitoringIndustry LeaderIndustry Leader


Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions


Summary and ConclusionsSummary and Conclusions

Process Safety Management is a significant component Process Safety Management is a significant component of the broader Risk Management efforts of an of the broader Risk Management efforts of an organization that operates chemical processes.organization that operates chemical processes.

Within PSM, risk analysis provides an objective basis for Within PSM, risk analysis provides an objective basis for comparing various hazards, alternatives and risk control comparing various hazards, alternatives and risk control measures (i.e., PSM, EM, land use planning). measures (i.e., PSM, EM, land use planning).

There are Canadian CSChE guidelines on available risk There are Canadian CSChE guidelines on available risk assessment techniques, CSChE PSM guidelines and land use assessment techniques, CSChE PSM guidelines and land use planning guidelinesplanning guidelines


Summary and Conclusions (2)Summary and Conclusions (2)

We have several risk parameters We have several risk parameters –– PSM metrics PSM metrics –– to to demonstrate and track level of risk.demonstrate and track level of risk.

Individual/geographical riskIndividual/geographical riskSocietal/aggregate risk and risk intensitySocietal/aggregate risk and risk intensityValueValue--normalized risknormalized riskExcess aggregate riskExcess aggregate risk

Risk matrices are very commonly used for categorizing Risk matrices are very commonly used for categorizing societal/aggregate risk for purposes of ranking and risk societal/aggregate risk for purposes of ranking and risk acceptability evaluationacceptability evaluation

However, there are challenges in their proper use as risk However, there are challenges in their proper use as risk evaluation tools in facility level applications and corporate evaluation tools in facility level applications and corporate level decision making (abuse potential and scalability)level decision making (abuse potential and scalability)

Risk matrices (Risk matrices (fNfN) should be used in conjunction with risk ) should be used in conjunction with risk profiles (FN) to partially address these challenges (abuse profiles (FN) to partially address these challenges (abuse potential)potential)


It is essential to understand the physical system and It is essential to understand the physical system and its chemistryits chemistry

No amount of risk assessment will save you unless this No amount of risk assessment will save you unless this prerequisite is in place.prerequisite is in place.

Importance of culture in achieving PSM success Importance of culture in achieving PSM success cannot be overemphasized.cannot be overemphasized.


THANK YOU!THANK YOU!

Risk Assessment and Process Safety Management · 2019-04-15 · Risk Assessment and Process Safety...

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Transcript of Risk Assessment and Process Safety Management · 2019-04-15 · Risk Assessment and Process Safety...