Risk and Insurance
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Transcript of Risk and Insurance
Gambles
An action with more than one possibleoutcome, such that with each outcomethere is an associated probability of thatoutcome occurring. If the outcomes aregood (G) and bad (B), denote theassociated probabilities by pG and pB
Payoffs and Utilities
With each outcome is associated a “payoff”which can be expressed in terms of money: $cGand $cB
With each payoff is associated a “utility”, u(c):u(cG) is the utility in the good situation u(cB) isthe utility in the bad situation. We assume thatutility increases with payoff
Note: a payoff is different from the utility from thepayoff
Expected Return and Utility
• Expected Return: The expected returnfrom the gamble is: ER=pGcG+pBcB
• Expected Utility: The expected utilityfrom the gamble is: EU=pGu(cG)+pBu(cB)
Note: The return expected from a gambleis different from the utility expected fromthe gamble
Facing a Gamble
You are faced with a gamble:
If you accept the gamble you will, inexchange for $W (the amount “staked”),receive CG with probability pG and CB withprobability pB
If you reject the gamble you will keep your$W
You have to decide whether or not toaccept the gamble?
Expected Utility Rule
• If you accept the gamble, your expectedutility is EU=pGu(cG)+pBu(cB)
• If you reject the gamble, your (certain)utility is u(W)
• The expected utility rule requires you tocompare EU and u(W) and:
accept if EU>u(W)
reject if EU<u(W)
indifferent if EU=u(W)
Certainty Equivalent
• How much should the stake be to makeyou indifferent between accepting andrejecting the gamble?
• Or what value of W will equate:
U(W) = EU=pGu(cG)+pBu(cB)
• Suppose W* solves the above equation
• Then W* is known as the certaintyequivalent of the gamble
• it expresses the worth of the gamble: $W*
Choice Using Certainty Equivalent
If the certainty equivalent is W* and W isthe stake, you will:
1. Accept the gamble if W < W*
2. Reject the gamble if W > W*
3. Indifferent to the gamble if W = W*
Risk Premium
• The risk premium associated with agamble is the maximum amount a personis prepared to pay to avoid the gamble
RP = ER - CE
An Example
Suppose you have to pay $2 to enter acompetition. The prize is $19 and the probabilityof winning is 1/3. You have a utility functionu(x)=log x and your current wealth is $10.
What is the certainty equivalent of thiscompetition?
What is the risk premium?Should you enter the competition?
Answer:I
1/3 2 /3
1 2log(10 2 19) log(10 2)
3 3
1 2log(27) log(8)
3 3
log(27 ) log(8 )
log(3) log(4)
log(12) 12
EU
CE
The gamble is worth $12 to him. But, if he rejects thegamble, he has only $10. So, he will accept thegamble.
Answer:II
The expected wealth from the lottery is:
1 2(10 2 19) (10 2)
3 3
1 2 127 8 14
3 3 3
1 1So, 14 12 2
3 3
ER
RP
Attitudes to Risk
• Intuitively, whether someone accepts agamble or not depends on his attitude torisk
• Again intuitively, we would accept“adventurous” persons to accept gamblesthat more “cautious” persons would reject
• To make these concepts more precise wedefine three broad attitudes to risk
Three Attitudes to Risk
• The Risk Averse Person
• The Risk Neutral Person
• The Risk Loving Person
• To define these attitudes, we use theconcept of a fair gamble
• In essence, a fair gamble allows youreceive the same amount of moneythrough two distinct ways:
• Gambling or not gambling
A Fair Gamble
• A fair gamble is one in which the sum thatis bet (W) is equal to the expected return:W = ER = pGcG+pBcB
• You are offered a gamble in which you betW=$500 and receive:
• $250 with pB = 0.5 or $750 with pG= 0.5
• ER=$500=W: fair gamble
An Unfair Gamble
• An unfair gamble is one in which the sumthat is bet (W) is different (usually less)from the expected return: W < ER =pGcG+pBcB
• You are offered a gamble in which you betW=$500 and receive:
• $250 with pB = 0.6 or $750 with pG= 0.4
• ER=$450<W: unfair gamble
Attitudes to Risk and Fair Gambles
• A risk averse person will never accept afair gamble
• A risk loving person will always accept afair gamble
• A risk neutral person will be indifferenttowards a fair gamble
What Does This Mean?
• Given the choice between earning thesame amount of money through a gambleor through certainty
The risk averse person will opt forcertainty
The risk loving person will opt for thegamble
The risk neutral person will be indifferent
Diminishing Marginal Utility
• Why does the risk averse person reject thefair gamble?
• Answer: because her marginal utility ofmoney diminishes
Example
• Your wealth is $10. I toss a coin and offer you $1if it is heads and take $1 from you if it is tails
• This is a fair gamble: 0.511+0.59=10, but youreject it
• Because, your gain in utility from another $1 isless than your loss in utility from losing $1
• Your MU diminishes, you are risk averse
• Conversely, if you are risk averse, your MUdiminishes
c
u(c)
u(250)
u(750)
250 750500
EUu(500)
A risk averse person / with diminishing MU / with a concave utilityfunction will reject a fair gamble
400
The certainty equivalent of the gamble is $400; the risk premium is $100
c
u(c)
u(250)
u(750)
250 750500
u(500)
=EU
A risk neutral person / with constant MU / with a linear utility functionwill be indifferent between accepting/rejecting a fair gamble
400
The certainty equivalent of the gamble is $500; the risk premium is $0
c
u(c)
u(250)
u(750)
250 750500
EU
u(500)
A risk loving person / with increasing MU / with a convex utility functionwill accept a fair gamble
600
The certainty equivalent of the gamble is $600; the risk premium is -$100
Contingent Commodities
• With contingent commodities, the nature ofthe commodity depends upon thecontingency:
A house before a storm is a different goodafter a storm
A car before an accident is a differentgood after an accident
A holiday in sunshine is a different goodfrom a holiday during which it rains
Trade in Contingent Markets
• The risk of a gamble is the difference between the payoff inthe good state (CG) and that in the bad state (CB): Risk = CG-CB
• When we buy insurance we try to reduce risk by tradingbetween two contingent states: “good” and “bad”
• We do this by buying wealth in the bad state and paying for itfrom wealth in the good state
• The rate at which we can make this exchange depends on thepremium $ (per $ of insurance bought) charged by theinsurance company
• $(1-) of additional CB can be bought by giving up $ of CG
• So $1 of additional CB can be bought by giving up (/1-) ofCG
The Insurance Budget Line
CG
CB
No Insurance point: Z=0
450 line: CG = CB or full insurance
The slope of the budgetline is -/(1-): asinsurance gets cheaper,the BL becomes flatter
GC
BC
Z is amount of insuranceCG = CG- Z < CG
CB =CB- Z + Z =CB + (1-)Z > CB
The Contingent ConsumptionIndifference Curves
CG
CB
On each curve, different combinations of CG and CB givethe same level of Expected Utility: pGU(CG) + pBU(CB)
Higher EU on blackcurve than on red
Equilibrium in the InsuranceMarket
CG
CB
Given the terms offered by theinsurance company, consumermaximises EU at point A
A: equilibrium point
X: no insurance point
CG
CB
CG*
CB*
Z = CB*-CB is amount of
insurance bought
Different Types of Equilibrium inthe Insurance Market
CG
CB
Given, the terms offered by the insurance company, consumer maximisesEU at point X or at Y or at some point in between X and Y
X: no insurance equilibrium, Z=0,insurance “too expensive”
CG
CB
CG*
CG*
Y: full insurance equilibrium,insurance “cheap”
Condition for Equilibrium
• Indifference Curve should be tangential tobudget line
• This means that the slope of indifference curveequals slope of budget line
• Slope of indifference curve is marginal rate ofsubstitution:
how much of wealth in the good state you areprepared to give up to get another $ of wealthin the bad state and still be on the same IC
• Slope of budget line is rate of exchange: how much of wealth in the good state you have
to give up to get another $ of wealth in the badstate
An Actuarially Fair Premium
• An actuarially fair premium is one whichis equal to the probability of the adversecontingency: = pB
• When the premium is actuarially fair:
u(CB)=u(CG)
• So, under diminishing marginal utility:
CB= CG
• Implying full insurance