RILEY v. CALIFORNIA 2473 · 6. Arrest O63.4(1), 71.1(2.1) Custodial arrest of a suspect based on...

2473RILEY v. CALIFORNIACite as 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)

F.3d 137, 146–147 (C.A.2 2013); Kirschb-aum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243,256 (C.A.5 2008); White, supra, at 992;Quan, supra, at 881–882, and n. 8; Lan-fear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267,1282 (C.A.11 2012). To the extent that theSixth Circuit denied dismissal based on thetheory that the duty of prudence requiredpetitioners to sell the ESOP’s holdings ofFifth Third stock, its denial of dismissalwas erroneous.

Second, where a complaint faults fiducia-ries for failing to decide, on the basis ofthe inside information, to refrain frommaking additional stock purchases or forfailing to disclose that information to thepublic so that the stock would no longer beovervalued, additional considerations arise.The courts should consider the extent towhich an ERISA-based obligation either torefrain on the basis of inside informationfrom making a planned trade or to discloseinside information to the public could con-flict with the complex insider trading andcorporate disclosure requirements imposedby the federal securities laws or with theobjectives of those laws. Cf. 29 U.S.C.§ 1144(d) (‘‘Nothing in this subchapter[which includes § 1104] shall be construedto alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair,or supersede any law of the United StatesTTT or any rule or regulation issued underany such law’’); Black & Decker DisabilityPlan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831, 123 S.Ct.1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) (‘‘AlthoughCongress ‘expect[ed]’ courts would develop‘a federal common law of rights and obli-gations under ERISA-regulated plans,’ thescope of permissible judicial innovation isnarrower in areas where other federal ac-tors are engaged’’ (quoting Pilot Life Ins.Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56, 107 S.Ct.1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); citation omit-ted)); Varity Corp., 516 U.S., at 506, 116S.Ct. 1065 (reserving the question ‘‘wheth-er ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciaryduty to disclose truthful information on

their own initiative, or in response to em-ployee inquiries’’). The U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commission has not advisedus of its views on these matters, and webelieve those views may well be relevant.

Third, lower courts faced with suchclaims should also consider whether thecomplaint has plausibly alleged that a pru-dent fiduciary in the defendant’s positioncould not have concluded that stoppingpurchases—which the market might takeas a sign that insider fiduciaries viewedthe employer’s stock as a bad invest-ment—or publicly disclosing negative in-formation would do more harm than goodto the fund by causing a drop in the stockprice and a concomitant drop in the valueof the stock already held by the fund.

* * *

We leave it to the courts below to applythe foregoing to the complaint in this casein the first instance. The judgment of theCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit isvacated and the case is remanded for fur-ther proceedings consistent with this opin-ion.

It is so ordered.

,

David Leon RILEY, Petitioner

v.

CALIFORNIA.

United States, Petitioner

v.

Brima Wurie.Nos. 13–132, 13–212.

Argued April 29, 2014.

Decided June 25, 2014.

Background: In two cases consolidatedfor appeal, first defendant was convicted

2474 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTER

by a jury in the Superior Court, San DiegoCounty, Laura W. Halgren, J., of variouscrimes related to drive-by shooting, and heappealed based on his challenge to evi-dence found during police officers’ war-rantless search of data stored on his cellphone. The California Court of Appeal,2013 WL 475242, affirmed. Second defen-dant was charged with drug- and weapon-related crimes, and the United States Dis-trict Court for the District of Massachu-setts, Stearns, J., 612 F.Supp.2d 104, de-nied his motion to suppress evidence foundduring warrantless search of data storedon his cell phone, and defendant appealed.The United States Court of Appeals forthe First Circuit, Stahl, Circuit Judge, 728F.3d 1, reversed. Certiorari was granted.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Chief Jus-tice Roberts, held that:

(1) interest in protecting officers’ safetydid not justify dispensing with warrantrequirement for searches of cell phonedata, and

(2) interest in preventing destruction ofevidence did not justify dispensingwith warrant requirement for searchesof cell phone data.

Judgment of California Court of Appealreversed and remanded, and judgment ofFirst Circuit affirmed.

Justice Alito concurred in part and con-curred in the judgment in separate opin-ion.

1. Searches and Seizures O23Ultimate touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment is reasonableness. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.

2. Searches and Seizures O24Where a search is undertaken by law

enforcement officials to discover evidenceof criminal wrongdoing, reasonablenessgenerally requires the obtaining of a judi-cial warrant, so as to ensure that the infer-

ences to support a search are drawn by aneutral and detached magistrate, insteadof being judged by the officer engaged inthe often competitive enterprise of ferret-ing out crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

3. Searches and Seizures O24

In the absence of a warrant, a searchis reasonable only if it falls within a specif-ic exception to the warrant requirement.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

4. Arrest O71.1(6)

When an arrest is made, it is reason-able for the arresting officer to search theperson arrested in order to remove anyweapons that the latter might seek to usein order to resist arrest or effect his es-cape. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

5. Arrest O71.1(1)

Authority to search a person incidentto a lawful custodial arrest, while basedupon the need to disarm and to discoverevidence, does not depend on what a courtmay later decide was the probability in aparticular arrest situation that weapons orevidence would in fact be found upon theperson of the suspect. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

6. Arrest O63.4(1), 71.1(2.1)

Custodial arrest of a suspect based onprobable cause is a reasonable intrusionunder the Fourth Amendment; that intru-sion being lawful, a search incident to thearrest requires no additional justification.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

7. Arrest O71.1(5)

Under the search incident to arrestexception to the warrant requirement, po-lice may search the vehicle’s passengercompartment when it is reasonable to be-lieve evidence relevant to the crime ofarrest might be found in the vehicle.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.


8. Searches and Seizures O24

Generally, to determine whether toexempt a given type of search from thewarrant requirement, courts must assess,on the one hand, the degree to which itintrudes upon an individual’s privacy and,on the other, the degree to which it isneeded for the promotion of legitimategovernmental interests. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

9. Arrest O71.1(6)Under search incident to arrest excep-

tion, interest in protecting police officers’safety did not justify dispensing with war-rant requirement before officers couldsearch digital data on arrestees’ cellphones; although officers remained free toexamine physical aspects of phone to en-sure that it could not be used as weapon,digital data stored on phones could notitself be used as weapon to harm officersor to effectuate arrestees’ escape, and, toextent dangers to officers could be impli-cated in particular cases, those dangerscould be addressed through considerationof, for example, exception for exigent cir-cumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.


tion, interest in preventing destruction ofevidence did not justify dispensing withwarrant requirement before officers couldsearch digital data on arrestees’ cellphones; officers expressed concerns aboutpossibility of remote wiping of data or ofencryption of data when phones ‘‘locked,’’but those broad concerns were distinctfrom concern over arrestees concealing ordestroying evidence within their reach, asthese concerns involved acts by third par-ties or normal operation of phones’ securi-ty features, officers had some technologiesavailable to them to counteract these con-cerns, and remaining issues could be ad-dressed in particular cases by responding

in targeted manner to urgent threats ofremote wiping or by disabling phones’locking mechanism in order to securecrime scene. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

11. Arrest O71.1(1)

Search incident to arrest exception tothe warrant requirement rests not only onthe heightened government interests atstake in a volatile arrest situation, but alsoon the arrestee’s reduced privacy interestsupon being taken into police custody.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

12. Arrest O71.1(4.1)

Not every search is acceptable solelybecause a person is in custody; to thecontrary, when privacy-related concernsare weighty enough, a search may requirea warrant, notwithstanding the diminishedexpectations of privacy of the arrestee.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

13. Arrest O71.1(6)

Under search incident to arrest ex-ception, privacy concerns with data storedon arrestees’ cell phones dwarfed thoseinvolved with physical objects, and thusextending conclusion that inspection ofphysical objects worked no substantial ad-ditional intrusion on privacy beyond arrestitself to include police officers’ search ofcell phone data was unwarranted; cellphones differed from other physical ob-jects both quantitatively and qualitatively,given phones’ immense storage capacity,collection in one place of many distincttypes of private information, and ability toconvey more information than previouslypossible, and phones also presented issuethat they can access information notstored on phones themselves, which infor-mation government conceded was not cov-ered by this exception. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.


14. Arrest O71.1(6)

Extending standard of Arizona v.Gant, which allowed warrantless searchesin vehicle context whenever police officershad reasonable belief that vehicle con-tained evidence of crime of arrest, to offi-cers’ search of digital data stored on arres-tees’ cell phones was unwarranted undersearch incident to arrest exception to war-rant requirement; Gant relied on circum-stances unique to vehicle context, specifi-cally reduced expectation of privacy andheightened law enforcement needs, but cellphone searches bore neither of those con-cerns, and Gant standard, which generallyprotected against searches for evidence ofpast crimes and restricted broad searchesresulting from minor crimes, would pro-vide no practical limit on cell phonesearches, given broad, historical informa-tion stored on phones. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.


tion to warrant requirement, proposed rulerestricting scope of police officers’ war-rantless searches of cell phones to thoseareas of phone in which officers reasonablybelieved that information relevant to crimeof arrest, arrestee’s identity, or officersafety would be discovered would imposeno meaningful constraints on officers, sincethose categories would sweep in great dealof information, and officers would not al-ways be able to discern in advance whatinformation would be found where.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

16. Arrest O71.1(6)Proposed rule permitting police offi-

cers to conduct warrantless searches ofcall logs on arrestees’ cell phones was un-warranted under search incident to arrestexception to warrant requirement, sincethose logs would typically contain not onlyphone numbers, but also identifying infor-

mation that arrestee might have added,such as labels for incoming calls. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.

17. Arrest O71.1(6)Proposed rule permitting police offi-

cers to conduct warrantless search of ar-restees’ cell phone data if they could haveobtained same information from pre-digitalcounterpart was unwarranted undersearch incident to arrest exception to war-rant requirement; fact that pre-digitalsearch could have turned up a few photo-graphs in arrestee’s wallet or paper bankstatement kept in pocket did not justifysearch of potentially thousands of photo-graphs and extensive bank records, rulewould permit officers to search range ofinformation contained on cell phone, eventhough people would be unlikely to carrysuch information in physical form, and rulewould force courts to engage in complexline-drawing exercise to determine digitalto pre-digital analogues. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

18. Searches and Seizures O42.1Exigent circumstances exception to

the warrant requirement applies when theexigencies of the situation, such as theneed to prevent the imminent destructionof evidence in individual cases, to pursue afleeing suspect, and to assist persons whoare seriously injured or are threatenedwith imminent injury, make the needs oflaw enforcement so compelling that a war-rantless search is objectively reasonableunder the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.

19. Arrest O71.1(1) Searches and Seizures O42.1

Unlike the search incident to arrestexception to the warrant requirement, theexigent circumstances exception requires acourt to examine whether an emergencyjustified a warrantless search in each par-ticular case. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.


Syllabus *

In No. 13–132, petitioner Riley wasstopped for a traffic violation, which even-tually led to his arrest on weaponscharges. An officer searching Riley inci-dent to the arrest seized a cell phone fromRiley’s pants pocket. The officer accessedinformation on the phone and noticed therepeated use of a term associated with astreet gang. At the police station twohours later, a detective specializing ingangs further examined the phone’s digitalcontents. Based in part on photographsand videos that the detective found, theState charged Riley in connection with ashooting that had occurred a few weeksearlier and sought an enhanced sentencebased on Riley’s gang membership. Rileymoved to suppress all evidence that thepolice had obtained from his cell phone.The trial court denied the motion, andRiley was convicted. The California Courtof Appeal affirmed.

In No. 13–212, respondent Wurie wasarrested after police observed him partici-pate in an apparent drug sale. At thepolice station, the officers seized a cellphone from Wurie’s person and noticedthat the phone was receiving multiple callsfrom a source identified as ‘‘my house’’ onits external screen. The officers openedthe phone, accessed its call log, determinedthe number associated with the ‘‘myhouse’’ label, and traced that number towhat they suspected was Wurie’s apart-ment. They secured a search warrant andfound drugs, a firearm and ammunition,and cash in the ensuing search. Wuriewas then charged with drug and firearmoffenses. He moved to suppress the evi-dence obtained from the search of theapartment. The District Court denied themotion, and Wurie was convicted. The

First Circuit reversed the denial of themotion to suppress and vacated the rele-vant convictions.

Held : The police generally may not,without a warrant, search digital informa-tion on a cell phone seized from an individ-ual who has been arrested. Pp. 2482 –2495.

(a) A warrantless search is reasonableonly if it falls within a specific exception tothe Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-ment. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d865. The well-established exception at is-sue here applies when a warrantlesssearch is conducted incident to a lawfularrest.

Three related precedents govern theextent to which officers may search prop-erty found on or near an arrestee. Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034,23 L.Ed.2d 685, requires that a searchincident to arrest be limited to the areawithin the arrestee’s immediate control,where it is justified by the interests inofficer safety and in preventing evidencedestruction. In United States v. Robin-son, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d427, the Court applied the Chimel analysisto a search of a cigarette pack found onthe arrestee’s person. It held that therisks identified in Chimel are present in allcustodial arrests, 414 U.S., at 235, 94 S.Ct.494, even when there is no specific concernabout the loss of evidence or the threat toofficers in a particular case, id., at 236, 94S.Ct. 494. The trilogy concludes with Ari-zona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710,173 L.Ed.2d 485, which permits searchesof a car where the arrestee is unsecuredand within reaching distance of the passen-ger compartment, or where it is reasonableto believe that evidence of the crime of

* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinionof the Court but has been prepared by theReporter of Decisions for the convenience of

the reader. See United States v. Detroit Tim-ber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct.282, 50 L.Ed. 499.


arrest might be found in the vehicle, id., at343, 94 S.Ct. 494. Pp. 2482 – 2484.

(b) The Court declines to extend Rob-inson ’s categorical rule to searches ofdata stored on cell phones. Absent moreprecise guidance from the founding era,the Court generally determines whether toexempt a given type of search from thewarrant requirement ‘‘by assessing, on theone hand, the degree to which it intrudesupon an individual’s privacy and, on theother, the degree to which it is needed forthe promotion of legitimate governmentalinterests.’’ Wyoming v. Houghton, 526U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d408. That balance of interests supportedthe search incident to arrest exception inRobinson. But a search of digital infor-mation on a cell phone does not further thegovernment interests identified in Chimel,and implicates substantially greater indi-vidual privacy interests than a brief physi-cal search. Pp. 2484 – 2491.

(1) The digital data stored on cellphones does not present either Chimelrisk. Pp. 2485 – 2488.

(i) Digital data stored on a cell phonecannot itself be used as a weapon to harman arresting officer or to effectuate thearrestee’s escape. Officers may examinethe phone’s physical aspects to ensure thatit will not be used as a weapon, but thedata on the phone can endanger no one.To the extent that a search of cell phonedata might warn officers of an impendingdanger, e.g., that the arrestee’s confeder-ates are headed to the scene, such a con-cern is better addressed through consider-ation of case-specific exceptions to thewarrant requirement, such as exigent cir-cumstances. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Peni-tentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–299,87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782. Pp. 2485 –2486.

(ii) The United States and Californiaraise concerns about the destruction of

evidence, arguing that, even if the cellphone is physically secure, information onthe cell phone remains vulnerable to re-mote wiping and data encryption. As aninitial matter, those broad concerns aredistinct from Chimel ’s focus on a defen-dant who responds to arrest by trying toconceal or destroy evidence within hisreach. The briefing also gives little indica-tion that either problem is prevalent orthat the opportunity to perform a searchincident to arrest would be an effectivesolution. And, at least as to remote wip-ing, law enforcement currently has sometechnologies of its own for combatting theloss of evidence. Finally, law enforce-ment’s remaining concerns in a particularcase might be addressed by responding ina targeted manner to urgent threats ofremote wiping, see Missouri v. McNeely,569 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185L.Ed.2d 696, or by taking action to disablea phone’s locking mechanism in order tosecure the scene, see Illinois v. McArthur,531 U.S. 326, 331–333, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148L.Ed.2d 838. Pp. 2486 – 2488.

(2) A conclusion that inspecting thecontents of an arrestee’s pockets works nosubstantial additional intrusion on privacybeyond the arrest itself may make senseas applied to physical items, but moresubstantial privacy interests are at stakewhen digital data is involved. Pp. 2488 –2491.

(i) Cell phones differ in both a quanti-tative and a qualitative sense from otherobjects that might be carried on an arres-tee’s person. Notably, modern cell phoneshave an immense storage capacity. Beforecell phones, a search of a person was limit-ed by physical realities and generally con-stituted only a narrow intrusion on priva-cy. But cell phones can store millions ofpages of text, thousands of pictures, orhundreds of videos. This has several in-terrelated privacy consequences. First, a


cell phone collects in one place many dis-tinct types of information that reveal muchmore in combination than any isolated rec-ord. Second, the phone’s capacity allowseven just one type of information to conveyfar more than previously possible. Third,data on the phone can date back for years.In addition, an element of pervasivenesscharacterizes cell phones but not physicalrecords. A decade ago officers might haveoccasionally stumbled across a highly per-sonal item such as a diary, but today manyof the more than 90% of American adultswho own cell phones keep on their persona digital record of nearly every aspect oftheir lives. Pp. 2489 – 2491.

(ii) The scope of the privacy interestsat stake is further complicated by the factthat the data viewed on many modern cellphones may in fact be stored on a remoteserver. Thus, a search may extend wellbeyond papers and effects in the physicalproximity of an arrestee, a concern thatthe United States recognizes but cannotdefinitively foreclose. P. 2491.

(c) Fallback options offered by theUnited States and California are flawedand contravene this Court’s general pref-erence to provide clear guidance to lawenforcement through categorical rules.See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,705, n. 19, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340.One possible rule is to import the Gantstandard from the vehicle context and al-low a warrantless search of an arrestee’scell phone whenever it is reasonable tobelieve that the phone contains evidence ofthe crime of arrest. That proposal is notappropriate in this context, and wouldprove no practical limit at all when itcomes to cell phone searches. Anotherpossible rule is to restrict the scope of acell phone search to information relevantto the crime, the arrestee’s identity, orofficer safety. That proposal would againimpose few meaningful constraints on offi-cers. Finally, California suggests an ana-

logue rule, under which officers couldsearch cell phone data if they could haveobtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart. That proposal wouldallow law enforcement to search a broadrange of items contained on a phone eventhough people would be unlikely to carrysuch a variety of information in physicalform, and would launch courts on a diffi-cult line-drawing expedition to determinewhich digital files are comparable to physi-cal records. Pp. 2491 – 2493.

(d) It is true that this decision willhave some impact on the ability of lawenforcement to combat crime. But theCourt’s holding is not that the informationon a cell phone is immune from search; itis that a warrant is generally requiredbefore a search. The warrant require-ment is an important component of theCourt’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,and warrants may be obtained with in-creasing efficiency. In addition, althoughthe search incident to arrest exceptiondoes not apply to cell phones, the contin-ued availability of the exigent circum-stances exception may give law enforce-ment a justification for a warrantlesssearch in particular cases. Pp. 2493 –2494.

No. 13–132, reversed and remanded;No. 13–212, 728 F.3d 1, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C.J., delivered the opinionof the Court, in which SCALIA,KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG,BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN,JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinionconcurring in part and concurring in thejudgment.

Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, for Pe-titioner Riley.

Edward C. Dumont, San Diego, CA, forRespondent California.


Michael R. Dreeben, for the UnitedStates as amicus curiae, by special leave ofthe Court, supporting the Respondent.

Patrick Morgan Ford, Law Office ofPatrick Morgan Ford, San Diego, CA,Donald B. Ayer, Jones Day, Washington,DC, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Counsel of Record,Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Liti-gation Clinic, Stanford, CA, for PetitionerRiley.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General ofCalifornia, Edward C. Dumont, SolicitorGeneral, Dane R. Gillette, Chief AssistantAttorney General, Julie L. Garland, SeniorAssistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oet-ting, Craig J. Konnoth, Deputy SolicitorsGeneral, Christine M. Levingston Berg-man, Counsel of Record, Deputy AttorneyGeneral, State of California Department ofJustice, San Diego, CA, for RespondentCalifornia.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General,Counsel of Record, Department of Justice,Washington, DC, for the United States.

Judith H. Mizner, Counsel of Record,Federal Defender Office, for RespondentWurie.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General,Counsel of Record, Mythili Raman, ActingAssistant Attorney General, Michael R.Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, JohnF. Bash, Assistant to the Solicitor General,Robert A. Parker, Michael A. Rotker, At-torneys, Department of Justice, Washing-ton, DC, for the United States.

For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:

2014 WL 1616435 (Reply.Brief)

2014 WL 1348466 (Resp.Brief)

2014 WL 844599 (Pet.Brief)

2014 WL 1616437 (Reply.Brief)

2014 WL 1348467 (Resp.Brief)

2014 WL 828012 (Pet.Brief)

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered theopinion of the Court.

These two cases raise a common ques-tion: whether the police may, without awarrant, search digital information on acell phone seized from an individual whohas been arrested.

I

A

In the first case, petitioner David Rileywas stopped by a police officer for drivingwith expired registration tags. In thecourse of the stop, the officer also learnedthat Riley’s license had been suspended.The officer impounded Riley’s car, pursu-ant to department policy, and another offi-cer conducted an inventory search of thecar. Riley was arrested for possession ofconcealed and loaded firearms when thatsearch turned up two handguns under thecar’s hood. See Cal.Penal Code Ann.§§ 12025(a)(1), 12031(a)(1) (West 2009).

An officer searched Riley incident to thearrest and found items associated with the‘‘Bloods’’ street gang. He also seized acell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. Ac-cording to Riley’s uncontradicted asser-tion, the phone was a ‘‘smart phone,’’ a cellphone with a broad range of other func-tions based on advanced computing capa-bility, large storage capacity, and Internetconnectivity. The officer accessed infor-mation on the phone and noticed that somewords (presumably in text messages or acontacts list) were preceded by the letters‘‘CK’’—a label that, he believed, stood for‘‘Crip Killers,’’ a slang term for membersof the Bloods gang.

At the police station about two hoursafter the arrest, a detective specializing ingangs further examined the contents ofthe phone. The detective testified that he‘‘went through’’ Riley’s phone ‘‘looking forevidence, because TTT gang members will


often video themselves with guns or takepictures of themselves with the guns.’’App. in No. 13–132, p. 20. Although therewas ‘‘a lot of stuff’’ on the phone, particu-lar files that ‘‘caught [the detective’s] eye’’included videos of young men sparringwhile someone yelled encouragement usingthe moniker ‘‘Blood.’’ Id., at 11–13. Thepolice also found photographs of Rileystanding in front of a car they suspectedhad been involved in a shooting a fewweeks earlier.

Riley was ultimately charged, in connec-tion with that earlier shooting, with firingat an occupied vehicle, assault with a sem-iautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.The State alleged that Riley had commit-ted those crimes for the benefit of a crimi-nal street gang, an aggravating factor thatcarries an enhanced sentence. CompareCal.Penal Code Ann. § 246 (2008) with§ 186.22(b)(4)(B) (2014). Prior to trial, Ri-ley moved to suppress all evidence that thepolice had obtained from his cell phone.He contended that the searches of hisphone violated the Fourth Amendment,because they had been performed withouta warrant and were not otherwise justifiedby exigent circumstances. The trial courtrejected that argument. App. in No. 13–132, at 24, 26. At Riley’s trial, policeofficers testified about the photographsand videos found on the phone, and someof the photographs were admitted into evi-dence. Riley was convicted on all threecounts and received an enhanced sentenceof 15 years to life in prison.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed.No. D059840 (Cal. App., Feb. 8, 2013),App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13–132, pp.1a–23a. The court relied on the CaliforniaSupreme Court’s decision in People v.Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 105,244 P.3d 501 (2011), which held that theFourth Amendment permits a warrantlesssearch of cell phone data incident to an

arrest, so long as the cell phone was imme-diately associated with the arrestee’s per-son. See id., at 93, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 105,244 P.3d, at 505–506.

The California Supreme Court deniedRiley’s petition for review, App. to Pet. forCert. in No. 13–132, at 24a, and we grant-ed certiorari, 571 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 94,181 L.Ed.2d 23 (2014).

B

In the second case, a police officer per-forming routine surveillance observed re-spondent Brima Wurie make an apparentdrug sale from a car. Officers subsequent-ly arrested Wurie and took him to thepolice station. At the station, the officersseized two cell phones from Wurie’s per-son. The one at issue here was a ‘‘flipphone,’’ a kind of phone that is flippedopen for use and that generally has asmaller range of features than a smartphone. Five to ten minutes after arrivingat the station, the officers noticed that thephone was repeatedly receiving calls froma source identified as ‘‘my house’’ on thephone’s external screen. A few minuteslater, they opened the phone and saw aphotograph of a woman and a baby set asthe phone’s wallpaper. They pressed onebutton on the phone to access its call log,then another button to determine thephone number associated with the ‘‘myhouse’’ label. They next used an onlinephone directory to trace that phone num-ber to an apartment building.

When the officers went to the building,they saw Wurie’s name on a mailbox andobserved through a window a woman whoresembled the woman in the photographon Wurie’s phone. They secured theapartment while obtaining a search war-rant and, upon later executing the war-rant, found and seized 215 grams of crackcocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, afirearm and ammunition, and cash.


Wurie was charged with distributingcrack cocaine, possessing crack cocainewith intent to distribute, and being a felonin possession of a firearm and ammunition.See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a). He moved to suppress the evi-dence obtained from the search of theapartment, arguing that it was the fruit ofan unconstitutional search of his cellphone. The District Court denied the mo-tion. 612 F.Supp.2d 104 (Mass.2009).Wurie was convicted on all three countsand sentenced to 262 months in prison.

A divided panel of the First Circuit re-versed the denial of Wurie’s motion tosuppress and vacated Wurie’s convictionsfor possession with intent to distribute andpossession of a firearm as a felon. 728F.3d 1 (2013). The court held that cellphones are distinct from other physicalpossessions that may be searched incidentto arrest without a warrant, because of theamount of personal data cell phones con-tain and the negligible threat they pose tolaw enforcement interests. See id., at 8–11.

We granted certiorari. 571 U.S. ––––,134 S.Ct. 999, 187 L.Ed.2d 848 (2014).

II

The Fourth Amendment provides:‘‘The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, andeffects, against unreasonable searchesand seizures, shall not be violated, andno Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-ble cause, supported by Oath or affirma-tion, and particularly describing theplace to be searched, and the persons orthings to be seized.’’

[1–3] As the text makes clear, ‘‘theultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amend-ment is ‘reasonableness.’ ’’ Brigham Cityv. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943,164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Our cases havedetermined that ‘‘[w]here a search is un-

dertaken by law enforcement officials todiscover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,TTT reasonableness generally requires theobtaining of a judicial warrant.’’ VernoniaSchool Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564(1995). Such a warrant ensures that theinferences to support a search are ‘‘drawnby a neutral and detached magistrate in-stead of being judged by the officer en-gaged in the often competitive enterpriseof ferreting out crime.’’ Johnson v. Unit-ed States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92L.Ed. 436 (1948). In the absence of awarrant, a search is reasonable only if itfalls within a specific exception to the war-rant requirement. See Kentucky v. King,563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856–1857, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011).

The two cases before us concern thereasonableness of a warrantless search in-cident to a lawful arrest. In 1914, thisCourt first acknowledged in dictum ‘‘theright on the part of the Government, al-ways recognized under English and Ameri-can law, to search the person of the ac-cused when legally arrested to discoverand seize the fruits or evidences of crime.’’Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392,34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. Since thattime, it has been well accepted that such asearch constitutes an exception to the war-rant requirement. Indeed, the label ‘‘ex-ception’’ is something of a misnomer in thiscontext, as warrantless searches incidentto arrest occur with far greater frequencythan searches conducted pursuant to awarrant. See 3 W. LaFave, Search andSeizure § 5.2(b), p. 132, and n. 15 (5th ed.2012).

Although the existence of the exceptionfor such searches has been recognized fora century, its scope has been debated fornearly as long. See Arizona v. Gant, 556U.S. 332, 350, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d


485 (2009) (noting the exception’s ‘‘check-ered history’’). That debate has focusedon the extent to which officers may searchproperty found on or near the arrestee.Three related precedents set forth therules governing such searches:

The first, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969),laid the groundwork for most of the exist-ing search incident to arrest doctrine. Po-lice officers in that case arrested Chimelinside his home and proceeded to searchhis entire three-bedroom house, includingthe attic and garage. In particular rooms,they also looked through the contents ofdrawers. Id., at 753–754, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

[4] The Court crafted the followingrule for assessing the reasonableness of asearch incident to arrest:

‘‘When an arrest is made, it is reason-able for the arresting officer to searchthe person arrested in order to removeany weapons that the latter might seekto use in order to resist arrest or effecthis escape. Otherwise, the officer’ssafety might well be endangered, andthe arrest itself frustrated. In addition,it is entirely reasonable for the arrestingofficer to search for and seize any evi-dence on the arrestee’s person in orderto prevent its concealment or destruc-tionTTTT There is ample justification,therefore, for a search of the arrestee’sperson and the area ‘within his immedi-ate control’—construing that phrase tomean the area from within which hemight gain possession of a weapon ordestructible evidence.’’ Id., at 762–763,89 S.Ct. 2034.

The extensive warrantless search of Chi-mel’s home did not fit within this excep-tion, because it was not needed to protectofficer safety or to preserve evidence. Id.,at 763, 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

Four years later, in United States v.Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38

L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Court applied theChimel analysis in the context of a searchof the arrestee’s person. A police officerhad arrested Robinson for driving with arevoked license. The officer conducted apatdown search and felt an object that hecould not identify in Robinson’s coat pock-et. He removed the object, which turnedout to be a crumpled cigarette package,and opened it. Inside were 14 capsules ofheroin. Id., at 220, 223, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

[5, 6] The Court of Appeals concludedthat the search was unreasonable becauseRobinson was unlikely to have evidence ofthe crime of arrest on his person, andbecause it believed that extracting the cig-arette package and opening it could not bejustified as part of a protective search forweapons. This Court reversed, rejectingthe notion that ‘‘case-by-case adjudication’’was required to determine ‘‘whether or notthere was present one of the reasons sup-porting the authority for a search of theperson incident to a lawful arrest.’’ Id., at235, 89 S.Ct. 2034. As the Court ex-plained, ‘‘[t]he authority to search the per-son incident to a lawful custodial arrest,while based upon the need to disarm andto discover evidence, does not depend onwhat a court may later decide was theprobability in a particular arrest situationthat weapons or evidence would in fact befound upon the person of the suspect.’’Ibid. Instead, a ‘‘custodial arrest of a sus-pect based on probable cause is a reason-able intrusion under the Fourth Amend-ment; that intrusion being lawful, a searchincident to the arrest requires no addition-al justification.’’ Ibid.

The Court thus concluded that thesearch of Robinson was reasonable eventhough there was no concern about theloss of evidence, and the arresting officerhad no specific concern that Robinsonmight be armed. Id., at 236, 89 S.Ct. 2034.


In doing so, the Court did not draw a linebetween a search of Robinson’s person anda further examination of the cigarette packfound during that search. It merely notedthat, ‘‘[h]aving in the course of a lawfulsearch come upon the crumpled package ofcigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to in-spect it.’’ Ibid. A few years later, theCourt clarified that this exception was lim-ited to ‘‘personal property TTT immediatelyassociated with the person of the arres-tee.’’ United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977)(200–pound, locked footlocker could not besearched incident to arrest), abrogated onother grounds by California v. Acevedo,500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d619 (1991).

[7] The search incident to arrest trilo-gy concludes with Gant, which analyzedsearches of an arrestee’s vehicle. Gant,like Robinson, recognized that the Chimelconcerns for officer safety and evidencepreservation underlie the search incidentto arrest exception. See 556 U.S., at 338,129 S.Ct. 1710. As a result, the Courtconcluded that Chimel could authorize po-lice to search a vehicle ‘‘only when thearrestee is unsecured and within reachingdistance of the passenger compartment atthe time of the search.’’ 556 U.S., at 343,129 S.Ct. 1710. Gant added, however, anindependent exception for a warrantlesssearch of a vehicle’s passenger compart-ment ‘‘when it is ‘reasonable to believeevidence relevant to the crime of arrestmight be found in the vehicle.’ ’’ Ibid.(quoting Thornton v. United States, 541U.S. 615, 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d905 (2004) (SCALIA, J., concurring injudgment)). That exception stems notfrom Chimel, the Court explained, butfrom ‘‘circumstances unique to the vehiclecontext.’’ 556 U.S., at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710.

III

These cases require us to decide howthe search incident to arrest doctrine ap-plies to modern cell phones, which are nowsuch a pervasive and insistent part of dailylife that the proverbial visitor from Marsmight conclude they were an importantfeature of human anatomy. A smartphone of the sort taken from Riley wasunheard of ten years ago; a significantmajority of American adults now own suchphones. See A. Smith, Pew ResearchCenter, Smartphone Ownership—2013 Up-date (June 5, 2013). Even less sophisticat-ed phones like Wurie’s, which have alreadyfaded in popularity since Wurie was ar-rested in 2007, have been around for lessthan 15 years. Both phones are based ontechnology nearly inconceivable just a fewdecades ago, when Chimel and Robinsonwere decided.

[8] Absent more precise guidance fromthe founding era, we generally determinewhether to exempt a given type of searchfrom the warrant requirement ‘‘by assess-ing, on the one hand, the degree to whichit intrudes upon an individual’s privacyand, on the other, the degree to which it isneeded for the promotion of legitimategovernmental interests.’’ Wyoming v.Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct.1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). Such a bal-ancing of interests supported the searchincident to arrest exception in Robinson,and a mechanical application of Robinsonmight well support the warrantlesssearches at issue here.

But while Robinson ’s categorical rulestrikes the appropriate balance in the con-text of physical objects, neither of its ra-tionales has much force with respect todigital content on cell phones. On thegovernment interest side, Robinson con-cluded that the two risks identified inChimel—harm to officers and destructionof evidence—are present in all custodial


arrests. There are no comparable riskswhen the search is of digital data. Inaddition, Robinson regarded any privacyinterests retained by an individual afterarrest as significantly diminished by thefact of the arrest itself. Cell phones,however, place vast quantities of personalinformation literally in the hands of indi-viduals. A search of the information on acell phone bears little resemblance to thetype of brief physical search considered inRobinson.

We therefore decline to extend Robin-son to searches of data on cell phones, andhold instead that officers must generallysecure a warrant before conducting such asearch.

A

We first consider each Chimel concernin turn. In doing so, we do not overlookRobinson ’s admonition that searches of aperson incident to arrest, ‘‘while basedupon the need to disarm and to discoverevidence,’’ are reasonable regardless of‘‘the probability in a particular arrest situ-ation that weapons or evidence would infact be found.’’ 414 U.S., at 235, 94 S.Ct.467. Rather than requiring the ‘‘case-by-case adjudication’’ that Robinson rejected,ibid., we ask instead whether applicationof the search incident to arrest doctrine tothis particular category of effects would‘‘untether the rule from the justificationsunderlying the Chimel exception,’’ Gant,supra, at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710. See alsoKnowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119, 119S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (declin-ing to extend Robinson to the issuance ofcitations, ‘‘a situation where the concernfor officer safety is not present to thesame extent and the concern for destruc-tion or loss of evidence is not present atall’’).

1

[9] Digital data stored on a cell phonecannot itself be used as a weapon to harman arresting officer or to effectuate thearrestee’s escape. Law enforcement offi-cers remain free to examine the physicalaspects of a phone to ensure that it will notbe used as a weapon—say, to determinewhether there is a razor blade hidden be-tween the phone and its case. Once anofficer has secured a phone and eliminatedany potential physical threats, however,data on the phone can endanger no one.

Perhaps the same might have beensaid of the cigarette pack seized fromRobinson’s pocket. Once an officergained control of the pack, it was unlikelythat Robinson could have accessed thepack’s contents. But unknown physicalobjects may always pose risks, no matterhow slight, during the tense atmosphereof a custodial arrest. The officer in Rob-inson testified that he could not identifythe objects in the cigarette pack butknew they were not cigarettes. See 414U.S., at 223, 236, n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 467. Giv-en that, a further search was a reason-able protective measure. No such un-knowns exist with respect to digital data.As the First Circuit explained, the offi-cers who searched Wurie’s cell phone‘‘knew exactly what they would findtherein: data. They also knew that thedata could not harm them.’’ 728 F.3d, at10.

The United States and California bothsuggest that a search of cell phone datamight help ensure officer safety in moreindirect ways, for example by alerting offi-cers that confederates of the arrestee areheaded to the scene. There is undoubted-ly a strong government interest in warningofficers about such possibilities, but nei-ther the United States nor California of-fers evidence to suggest that their con-cerns are based on actual experience. The


proposed consideration would also repre-sent a broadening of Chimel ’s concernthat an arrestee himself might grab aweapon and use it against an officer ‘‘toresist arrest or effect his escape.’’ 395U.S., at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034. And any suchthreats from outside the arrest scene donot ‘‘lurk[ ] in all custodial arrests.’’ Chad-wick, 433 U.S., at 14–15, 97 S.Ct. 2476.Accordingly, the interest in protecting offi-cer safety does not justify dispensing withthe warrant requirement across the board.To the extent dangers to arresting officersmay be implicated in a particular way in aparticular case, they are better addressedthrough consideration of case-specific ex-ceptions to the warrant requirement, suchas the one for exigent circumstances. See,e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,387 U.S. 294, 298–299, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (‘‘The Fourth Amend-ment does not require police officers todelay in the course of an investigation if todo so would gravely endanger their livesor the lives of others.’’).

2

The United States and California focusprimarily on the second Chimel rationale:preventing the destruction of evidence.

[10] Both Riley and Wurie concedethat officers could have seized and securedtheir cell phones to prevent destruction ofevidence while seeking a warrant. SeeBrief for Petitioner in No. 13–132, p. 20;Brief for Respondent in No. 13–212, p. 41.That is a sensible concession. See Illinoisv. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331–333, 121S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001); Chad-wick, supra, at 13, and n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2476.And once law enforcement officers havesecured a cell phone, there is no longerany risk that the arrestee himself will beable to delete incriminating data from thephone.

The United States and California arguethat information on a cell phone may nev-

ertheless be vulnerable to two types ofevidence destruction unique to digitaldata—remote wiping and data encryption.Remote wiping occurs when a phone, con-nected to a wireless network, receives asignal that erases stored data. This canhappen when a third party sends a re-mote signal or when a phone is prepro-grammed to delete data upon entering orleaving certain geographic areas (so-called‘‘geofencing’’). See Dept. of Commerce,National Institute of Standards and Tech-nology, R. Ayers, S. Brothers, & W. Jan-sen, Guidelines on Mobile Device Foren-sics (Draft) 29, 31 (SP 800–101 Rev. 1,Sept. 2013) (hereinafter Ayers). Encryp-tion is a security feature that some mod-ern cell phones use in addition to pass-word protection. When such phones lock,data becomes protected by sophisticatedencryption that renders a phone all but‘‘unbreakable’’ unless police know thepassword. Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae in No. 13–132, p. 11.

As an initial matter, these broader con-cerns about the loss of evidence are dis-tinct from Chimel ’s focus on a defendantwho responds to arrest by trying to con-ceal or destroy evidence within his reach.See 395 U.S., at 763–764, 89 S.Ct. 2034.With respect to remote wiping, the Gov-ernment’s primary concern turns on theactions of third parties who are not pres-ent at the scene of arrest. And data en-cryption is even further afield. There, theGovernment focuses on the ordinary oper-ation of a phone’s security features, apartfrom any active attempt by a defendant orhis associates to conceal or destroy evi-dence upon arrest.

We have also been given little reason tobelieve that either problem is prevalent.The briefing reveals only a couple of anec-dotal examples of remote wiping triggeredby an arrest. See Brief for Association ofState Criminal Investigative Agencies et


al. as Amici Curiae in No. 13–132, pp. 9–10; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 13–132,p. 48. Similarly, the opportunities for offi-cers to search a password-protected phonebefore data becomes encrypted are quitelimited. Law enforcement officers arevery unlikely to come upon such a phone inan unlocked state because most phoneslock at the touch of a button or, as adefault, after some very short period ofinactivity. See, e.g., iPhone User Guidefor iOS 7.1 Software 10 (2014) (default lockafter about one minute). This may explainwhy the encryption argument was notmade until the merits stage in this Court,and has never been considered by theCourts of Appeals.

Moreover, in situations in which an ar-rest might trigger a remote-wipe attemptor an officer discovers an unlocked phone,it is not clear that the ability to conduct awarrantless search would make much of adifference. The need to effect the arrest,secure the scene, and tend to other press-ing matters means that law enforcementofficers may well not be able to turn theirattention to a cell phone right away. SeeTr. of Oral Arg. in No. 13–132, at 50; seealso Brief for United States as AmicusCuriae in No. 13–132, at 19. Cell phonedata would be vulnerable to remote wipingfrom the time an individual anticipates ar-rest to the time any eventual search of thephone is completed, which might be at thestation house hours later. Likewise, anofficer who seizes a phone in an unlockedstate might not be able to begin his searchin the short time remaining before thephone locks and data becomes encrypted.

In any event, as to remote wiping, lawenforcement is not without specific meansto address the threat. Remote wiping canbe fully prevented by disconnecting aphone from the network. There are atleast two simple ways to do this: First,law enforcement officers can turn the

phone off or remove its battery. Second,if they are concerned about encryption orother potential problems, they can leave aphone powered on and place it in an enclo-sure that isolates the phone from radiowaves. See Ayers 30–31. Such devicesare commonly called ‘‘Faraday bags,’’ afterthe English scientist Michael Faraday.They are essentially sandwich bags madeof aluminum foil: cheap, lightweight, andeasy to use. See Brief for Criminal LawProfessors as Amici Curiae 9. They maynot be a complete answer to the problem,see Ayers 32, but at least for now theyprovide a reasonable response. In fact, anumber of law enforcement agenciesaround the country already encourage theuse of Faraday bags. See, e.g., Dept. ofJustice, National Institute of Justice, Elec-tronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guidefor First Responders 14, 32 (2d ed. Apr.2008); Brief for Criminal Law Professorsas Amici Curiae 4–6.

To the extent that law enforcement stillhas specific concerns about the potentialloss of evidence in a particular case, thereremain more targeted ways to addressthose concerns. If ‘‘the police are trulyconfronted with a ‘now or never’ situa-tion,’’—for example, circumstances sug-gesting that a defendant’s phone will bethe target of an imminent remote-wipeattempt—they may be able to rely on exi-gent circumstances to search the phoneimmediately. Missouri v. McNeely, 569U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561–1562,185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (quoting Roaden v.Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505, 93 S.Ct. 2796,37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973); some internal quo-tation marks omitted). Or, if officers hap-pen to seize a phone in an unlocked state,they may be able to disable a phone’sautomatic-lock feature in order to preventthe phone from locking and encryptingdata. See App. to Reply Brief in No. 13–132, p. 3a (diagramming the few necessarysteps). Such a preventive measure could


be analyzed under the principles set forthin our decision in McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,121 S.Ct. 946, which approved officers’ rea-sonable steps to secure a scene to preserveevidence while they awaited a warrant.See id., at 331–333, 121 S.Ct. 946.

B

[11] The search incident to arrest ex-ception rests not only on the heightenedgovernment interests at stake in a volatilearrest situation, but also on an arrestee’sreduced privacy interests upon being tak-en into police custody. Robinson focusedprimarily on the first of those rationales.But it also quoted with approval then-Judge Cardozo’s account of the historicalbasis for the search incident to arrest ex-ception: ‘‘Search of the person becomeslawful when grounds for arrest and accusa-tion have been discovered, and the law isin the act of subjecting the body of theaccused to its physical dominion.’’ 414U.S., at 232, 94 S.Ct. 467 (quoting Peoplev. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197, 142 N.E.583, 584 (1923)); see also 414 U.S., at 237,94 S.Ct. 467 (Powell, J., concurring) (‘‘anindividual lawfully subjected to a custodialarrest retains no significant FourthAmendment interest in the privacy of hisperson’’). Put simply, a patdown of Robin-son’s clothing and an inspection of thecigarette pack found in his pocket consti-tuted only minor additional intrusions com-pared to the substantial government au-thority exercised in taking Robinson intocustody. See Chadwick, 433 U.S., at 16, n.10, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (searches of a person arejustified in part by ‘‘reduced expectationsof privacy caused by the arrest’’).

[12] The fact that an arrestee has di-minished privacy interests does not meanthat the Fourth Amendment falls out ofthe picture entirely. Not every search ‘‘isacceptable solely because a person is incustody.’’ Maryland v. King, 569 U.S.

––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1979, 186L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). To the contrary, when‘‘privacy-related concerns are weightyenough’’ a ‘‘search may require a warrant,notwithstanding the diminished expecta-tions of privacy of the arrestee.’’ Ibid.One such example, of course, is Chimel.Chimel refused to ‘‘characteriz[e] the inva-sion of privacy that results from a top-to-bottom search of a man’s house as ‘mi-nor.’ ’’ 395 U.S., at 766–767, n. 12, 89 S.Ct.2034. Because a search of the arrestee’sentire house was a substantial invasionbeyond the arrest itself, the Court conclud-ed that a warrant was required.

Robinson is the only decision from thisCourt applying Chimel to a search of thecontents of an item found on an arrestee’sperson. In an earlier case, this Court hadapproved a search of a zipper bag carriedby an arrestee, but the Court analyzedonly the validity of the arrest itself. SeeDraper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,310–311, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327(1959). Lower courts applying Robinsonand Chimel, however, have approvedsearches of a variety of personal itemscarried by an arrestee. See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123,1128 (C.A.5 1987) (billfold and addressbook); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d1374, 1383–1384 (C.A.11 1982) (wallet);United States v. Lee, 501 F.2d 890, 892(C.A.D.C.1974) (purse).

[13] The United States asserts that asearch of all data stored on a cell phone is‘‘materially indistinguishable’’ fromsearches of these sorts of physical items.Brief for United States in No. 13–212, p.26. That is like saying a ride on horse-back is materially indistinguishable from aflight to the moon. Both are ways ofgetting from point A to point B, but littleelse justifies lumping them together.Modern cell phones, as a category, impli-cate privacy concerns far beyond those


implicated by the search of a cigarettepack, a wallet, or a purse. A conclusionthat inspecting the contents of an arres-tee’s pockets works no substantial addi-tional intrusion on privacy beyond the ar-rest itself may make sense as applied tophysical items, but any extension of thatreasoning to digital data has to rest on itsown bottom.

1

Cell phones differ in both a quantitativeand a qualitative sense from other objectsthat might be kept on an arrestee’s person.The term ‘‘cell phone’’ is itself misleadingshorthand; many of these devices are infact minicomputers that also happen tohave the capacity to be used as a tele-phone. They could just as easily be calledcameras, video players, rolodexes, calen-dars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, al-bums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.

One of the most notable distinguishingfeatures of modern cell phones is theirimmense storage capacity. Before cellphones, a search of a person was limitedby physical realities and tended as a gen-eral matter to constitute only a narrowintrusion on privacy. See Kerr, Foreword:Accounting for Technological Change, 36Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 404–405(2013). Most people cannot lug aroundevery piece of mail they have received forthe past several months, every picturethey have taken, or every book or articlethey have read—nor would they have anyreason to attempt to do so. And if theydid, they would have to drag behind thema trunk of the sort held to require a searchwarrant in Chadwick, supra, rather than acontainer the size of the cigarette packagein Robinson.

But the possible intrusion on privacy isnot physically limited in the same way

when it comes to cell phones. The currenttop-selling smart phone has a standardcapacity of 16 gigabytes (and is availablewith up to 64 gigabytes). Sixteen giga-bytes translates to millions of pages oftext, thousands of pictures, or hundreds ofvideos. See Kerr, supra, at 404; Brief forCenter for Democracy & Technology et al.as Amici Curiae 7–8. Cell phones couplethat capacity with the ability to store manydifferent types of information: Even themost basic phones that sell for less than$20 might hold photographs, picture mes-sages, text messages, Internet browsinghistory, a calendar, a thousand-entryphone book, and so on. See id., at 30;United States v. Flores–Lopez, 670 F.3d803, 806 (C.A.7 2012). We expect that thegulf between physical practicability and di-gital capacity will only continue to widen inthe future.

The storage capacity of cell phones hasseveral interrelated consequences for pri-vacy. First, a cell phone collects in oneplace many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bankstatement, a video—that reveal much morein combination than any isolated record.Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows evenjust one type of information to convey farmore than previously possible. The sumof an individual’s private life can be recon-structed through a thousand photographslabeled with dates, locations, and descrip-tions; the same cannot be said of a photo-graph or two of loved ones tucked into awallet. Third, the data on a phone candate back to the purchase of the phone, oreven earlier. A person might carry in hispocket a slip of paper reminding him tocall Mr. Jones; he would not carry a rec-ord of all his communications with Mr.Jones for the past several months, aswould routinely be kept on a phone.1

1. Because the United States and California agree that these cases involve searches inci-


Finally, there is an element of pervasive-ness that characterizes cell phones but notphysical records. Prior to the digital age,people did not typically carry a cache ofsensitive personal information with themas they went about their day. Now it isthe person who is not carrying a cellphone, with all that it contains, who is theexception. According to one poll, nearlythree-quarters of smart phone users re-port being within five feet of their phonesmost of the time, with 12% admitting thatthey even use their phones in the shower.See Harris Interactive, 2013 Mobile Con-sumer Habits Study (June 2013). A dec-ade ago police officers searching an arres-tee might have occasionally stumbledacross a highly personal item such as adiary. See, e.g., United States v. Franken-berry, 387 F.2d 337 (C.A.2 1967) (per cu-riam ). But those discoveries were likelyto be few and far between. Today, bycontrast, it is no exaggeration to say thatmany of the more than 90% of Americanadults who own a cell phone keep on theirperson a digital record of nearly everyaspect of their lives—from the mundane tothe intimate. See Ontario v. Quon, 560U.S. 746, 760, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L.Ed.2d216 (2010). Allowing the police to scruti-nize such records on a routine basis isquite different from allowing them tosearch a personal item or two in the occa-sional case.

Although the data stored on a cell phoneis distinguished from physical records byquantity alone, certain types of data arealso qualitatively different. An Internetsearch and browsing history, for example,can be found on an Internet-enabled phoneand could reveal an individual’s privateinterests or concerns—perhaps a searchfor certain symptoms of disease, coupled

with frequent visits to WebMD. Data on acell phone can also reveal where a personhas been. Historic location information isa standard feature on many smart phonesand can reconstruct someone’s specificmovements down to the minute, not onlyaround town but also within a particularbuilding. See United States v. Jones, 565U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955, 181L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (SOTOMAYOR, J.,concurring) (‘‘GPS monitoring generates aprecise, comprehensive record of a per-son’s public movements that reflects awealth of detail about her familial, political,professional, religious, and sexual associa-tions.’’).

Mobile application software on a cellphone, or ‘‘apps,’’ offer a range of tools formanaging detailed information about allaspects of a person’s life. There are appsfor Democratic Party news and RepublicanParty news; apps for alcohol, drug, andgambling addictions; apps for sharingprayer requests; apps for tracking preg-nancy symptoms; apps for planning yourbudget; apps for every conceivable hobbyor pastime; apps for improving your ro-mantic life. There are popular apps forbuying or selling just about anything, andthe records of such transactions may beaccessible on the phone indefinitely.There are over a million apps available ineach of the two major app stores; thephrase ‘‘there’s an app for that’’ is nowpart of the popular lexicon. The averagesmart phone user has installed 33 apps,which together can form a revealing mon-tage of the user’s life. See Brief for Elec-tronic Privacy Information Center as Ami-cus Curiae in No. 13–132, p. 9.

In 1926, Learned Hand observed (in anopinion later quoted in Chimel ) that it is‘‘a totally different thing to search a man’s

dent to arrest, these cases do not implicatethe question whether the collection or inspec-tion of aggregated digital information

amounts to a search under other circum-stances.


pockets and use against him what theycontain, from ransacking his house for ev-erything which may incriminate him.’’United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d202, 203 (C.A.2). If his pockets contain acell phone, however, that is no longer true.Indeed, a cell phone search would typicallyexpose to the government far more thanthe most exhaustive search of a house: Aphone not only contains in digital formmany sensitive records previously found inthe home; it also contains a broad array ofprivate information never found in a homein any form—unless the phone is.

2

To further complicate the scope of theprivacy interests at stake, the data a userviews on many modern cell phones maynot in fact be stored on the device itself.Treating a cell phone as a container whosecontents may be searched incident to anarrest is a bit strained as an initial matter.See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460,n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)(describing a ‘‘container’’ as ‘‘any objectcapable of holding another object’’). Butthe analogy crumbles entirely when a cellphone is used to access data located else-where, at the tap of a screen. That iswhat cell phones, with increasing frequen-cy, are designed to do by taking advantageof ‘‘cloud computing.’’ Cloud computing isthe capacity of Internet-connected devicesto display data stored on remote serversrather than on the device itself. Cellphone users often may not know whetherparticular information is stored on the de-vice or in the cloud, and it generally makeslittle difference. See Brief for ElectronicPrivacy Information Center in No. 13–132,at 12–14, 20. Moreover, the same type ofdata may be stored locally on the devicefor one user and in the cloud for another.

The United States concedes that thesearch incident to arrest exception maynot be stretched to cover a search of files

accessed remotely—that is, a search offiles stored in the cloud. See Brief forUnited States in No. 13–212, at 43–44.Such a search would be like finding a keyin a suspect’s pocket and arguing that itallowed law enforcement to unlock andsearch a house. But officers searching aphone’s data would not typically knowwhether the information they are viewingwas stored locally at the time of the arrestor has been pulled from the cloud.

Although the Government recognizesthe problem, its proposed solutions areunclear. It suggests that officers coulddisconnect a phone from the network be-fore searching the device—the very solu-tion whose feasibility it contested with re-spect to the threat of remote wiping.Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 13–132, at50–51, with Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 13–212,pp. 13–14. Alternatively, the Governmentproposes that law enforcement agencies‘‘develop protocols to address’’ concernsraised by cloud computing. Reply Brief inNo. 13–212, pp. 14–15. Probably a goodidea, but the Founders did not fight arevolution to gain the right to governmentagency protocols. The possibility that asearch might extend well beyond papersand effects in the physical proximity of anarrestee is yet another reason that theprivacy interests here dwarf those in Rob-inson.

C

Apart from their arguments for a directextension of Robinson, the United Statesand California offer various fallback op-tions for permitting warrantless cell phonesearches under certain circumstances.Each of the proposals is flawed and con-travenes our general preference to provideclear guidance to law enforcement throughcategorical rules. ‘‘[I]f police are to haveworkable rules, the balancing of the com-peting interests TTT ‘must in large part be


done on a categorical basis—not in an adhoc, case-by-case fashion by individual po-lice officers.’ ’’ Michigan v. Summers, 452U.S. 692, 705, n. 19, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v.New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219–220, 99 S.Ct.2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (White, J.,concurring)).

[14] The United States first proposesthat the Gant standard be imported fromthe vehicle context, allowing a warrantlesssearch of an arrestee’s cell phone whenev-er it is reasonable to believe that thephone contains evidence of the crime ofarrest. But Gant relied on ‘‘circumstancesunique to the vehicle context’’ to endorse asearch solely for the purpose of gatheringevidence. 556 U.S., at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710.Justice SCALIA’s Thornton opinion, onwhich Gant was based, explained thatthose unique circumstances are ‘‘a reducedexpectation of privacy’’ and ‘‘heightenedlaw enforcement needs’’ when it comes tomotor vehicles. 541 U.S., at 631, 124 S.Ct.2127; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526U.S., at 303–304, 119 S.Ct. 1297. For rea-sons that we have explained, cell phonesearches bear neither of those characteris-tics.

At any rate, a Gant standard wouldprove no practical limit at all when itcomes to cell phone searches. In the vehi-cle context, Gant generally protectsagainst searches for evidence of pastcrimes. See 3 W. LaFave, Search andSeizure § 7.1(d), at 709, and n. 191. In thecell phone context, however, it is reason-able to expect that incriminating informa-tion will be found on a phone regardless ofwhen the crime occurred. Similarly, in thevehicle context Gant restricts broadsearches resulting from minor crimes suchas traffic violations. See id., § 7.1(d), at713, and n. 204. That would not necessari-ly be true for cell phones. It would be aparticularly inexperienced or unimagina-

tive law enforcement officer who could notcome up with several reasons to supposeevidence of just about any crime could befound on a cell phone. Even an individualpulled over for something as basic asspeeding might well have locational datadispositive of guilt on his phone. An indi-vidual pulled over for reckless drivingmight have evidence on the phone thatshows whether he was texting while driv-ing. The sources of potential pertinentinformation are virtually unlimited, so ap-plying the Gant standard to cell phoneswould in effect give ‘‘police officers unbri-dled discretion to rummage at will amonga person’s private effects.’’ 556 U.S., at345, 129 S.Ct. 1710.

[15] The United States also proposes arule that would restrict the scope of a cellphone search to those areas of the phonewhere an officer reasonably believes thatinformation relevant to the crime, the ar-restee’s identity, or officer safety will bediscovered. See Brief for United States inNo. 13–212, at 51–53. This approachwould again impose few meaningful con-straints on officers. The proposed catego-ries would sweep in a great deal of infor-mation, and officers would not always beable to discern in advance what informa-tion would be found where.

[16] We also reject the United States’final suggestion that officers should alwaysbe able to search a phone’s call log, as theydid in Wurie’s case. The Government re-lies on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), whichheld that no warrant was required to use apen register at telephone company premis-es to identify numbers dialed by a particu-lar caller. The Court in that case, howev-er, concluded that the use of a pen registerwas not a ‘‘search’’ at all under the FourthAmendment. See id., at 745–746, 99 S.Ct.2577. There is no dispute here that theofficers engaged in a search of Wurie’s cell


phone. Moreover, call logs typically con-tain more than just phone numbers; theyinclude any identifying information that anindividual might add, such as the label ‘‘myhouse’’ in Wurie’s case.

[17] Finally, at oral argument Califor-nia suggested a different limiting principle,under which officers could search cellphone data if they could have obtained thesame information from a pre-digital coun-terpart. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 13–132, at 38–43; see also Flores–Lopez, 670F.3d, at 807 (‘‘If police are entitled to opena pocket diary to copy the owner’s ad-dress, they should be entitled to turn on acell phone to learn its number.’’). But thefact that a search in the pre-digital eracould have turned up a photograph or twoin a wallet does not justify a search ofthousands of photos in a digital gallery.The fact that someone could have tucked apaper bank statement in a pocket does notjustify a search of every bank statementfrom the last five years. And to makematters worse, such an analogue testwould allow law enforcement to search arange of items contained on a phone, eventhough people would be unlikely to carrysuch a variety of information in physicalform. In Riley’s case, for example, it isimplausible that he would have strolledaround with video tapes, photo albums,and an address book all crammed into hispockets. But because each of those itemshas a pre-digital analogue, police underCalifornia’s proposal would be able tosearch a phone for all of those items—asignificant diminution of privacy.

In addition, an analogue test wouldlaunch courts on a difficult line-drawingexpedition to determine which digital filesare comparable to physical records. Is ane-mail equivalent to a letter? Is a voice-mail equivalent to a phone message slip?It is not clear how officers could makethese kinds of decisions before conducting

a search, or how courts would apply theproposed rule after the fact. An analoguetest would ‘‘keep defendants and judgesguessing for years to come.’’ Sykes v.United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131S.Ct. 2267, 2287, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011)(SCALIA, J., dissenting) (discussing theCourt’s analogue test under the ArmedCareer Criminal Act).

IV

We cannot deny that our decision todaywill have an impact on the ability of lawenforcement to combat crime. Cell phoneshave become important tools in facilitatingcoordination and communication amongmembers of criminal enterprises, and canprovide valuable incriminating informationabout dangerous criminals. Privacy comesat a cost.

Our holding, of course, is not that theinformation on a cell phone is immunefrom search; it is instead that a warrant isgenerally required before such a search,even when a cell phone is seized incidentto arrest. Our cases have historically rec-ognized that the warrant requirement is‘‘an important working part of our machin-ery of government,’’ not merely ‘‘an incon-venience to be somehow ‘weighed’ againstthe claims of police efficiency.’’ Coolidgev. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481, 91S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Recenttechnological advances similar to those dis-cussed here have, in addition, made theprocess of obtaining a warrant itself moreefficient. See McNeely, 569 U.S., at ––––,133 S.Ct., at 1561–1563; id., at ––––, 133S.Ct., at 1573 (ROBERTS, C.J., concurringin part and dissenting in part) (describingjurisdiction where ‘‘police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads[and] judges have signed such warrantsand e-mailed them back to officers in lessthan 15 minutes’’).


[18] Moreover, even though the searchincident to arrest exception does not applyto cell phones, other case-specific excep-tions may still justify a warrantless searchof a particular phone. ‘‘One well-recog-nized exception applies when ‘ ‘‘the exigen-cies of the situation’’ make the needs oflaw enforcement so compelling that [a]warrantless search is objectively reason-able under the Fourth Amendment.’ ’’Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S., at ––––, 131S.Ct., at 1856 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona,437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). Such exigenciescould include the need to prevent the im-minent destruction of evidence in individu-al cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and toassist persons who are seriously injured orare threatened with imminent injury. 563U.S., at ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1849. In Chad-wick, for example, the Court held that theexception for searches incident to arrestdid not justify a search of the trunk atissue, but noted that ‘‘if officers have rea-son to believe that luggage contains someimmediately dangerous instrumentality,such as explosives, it would be foolhardy totransport it to the station house withoutopening the luggage.’’ 433 U.S., at 15, n.9, 97 S.Ct. 2476.

[19] In light of the availability of theexigent circumstances exception, there isno reason to believe that law enforcementofficers will not be able to address some ofthe more extreme hypotheticals that havebeen suggested: a suspect texting an ac-complice who, it is feared, is preparing todetonate a bomb, or a child abductor whomay have information about the child’slocation on his cell phone. The defendantshere recognize—indeed, they stress—that

such fact-specific threats may justify awarrantless search of cell phone data. SeeReply Brief in No. 13–132, at 8–9; Brieffor Respondent in No. 13–212, at 30, 41.The critical point is that, unlike the searchincident to arrest exception, the exigentcircumstances exception requires a courtto examine whether an emergency justifieda warrantless search in each particularcase. See McNeely, supra, at ––––, 133S.Ct., at 1559.2

* * *

Our cases have recognized that theFourth Amendment was the founding gen-eration’s response to the reviled ‘‘generalwarrants’’ and ‘‘writs of assistance’’ of thecolonial era, which allowed British officersto rummage through homes in an unre-strained search for evidence of criminalactivity. Opposition to such searches wasin fact one of the driving forces behind theRevolution itself. In 1761, the patriotJames Otis delivered a speech in Bostondenouncing the use of writs of assistance.A young John Adams was there, and hewould later write that ‘‘[e]very man of acrowded audience appeared to me to goaway, as I did, ready to take arms againstwrits of assistance.’’ 10 Works of JohnAdams 247–248 (C. Adams ed. 1856). Ac-cording to Adams, Otis’s speech was ‘‘thefirst scene of the first act of opposition tothe arbitrary claims of Great Britain.Then and there the child Independencewas born.’’ Id., at 248 (quoted in Boyd v.United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625, 6 S.Ct.524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886)).

Modern cell phones are not just anothertechnological convenience. With all theycontain and all they may reveal, they hold

2. In Wurie’s case, for example, the dissentingFirst Circuit judge argued that exigent cir-cumstances could have justified a search ofWurie’s phone. See 728 F.3d 1, 17 (2013)(opinion of Howard, J.) (discussing the re-peated unanswered calls from ‘‘my house,’’

the suspected location of a drug stash). Butthe majority concluded that the Governmenthad not made an exigent circumstances argu-ment. See id., at 1. The Government ac-knowledges the same in this Court. See Brieffor United States in No. 13–212, p. 28, n. 8.


for many Americans ‘‘the privacies of life,’’Boyd, supra, at 630, 6 S.Ct. 524. The factthat technology now allows an individual tocarry such information in his hand doesnot make the information any less worthyof the protection for which the Foundersfought. Our answer to the question ofwhat police must do before searching a cellphone seized incident to an arrest is ac-cordingly simple—get a warrant.

We reverse the judgment of the Califor-nia Court of Appeal in No. 13–132 andremand the case for further proceedingsnot inconsistent with this opinion. We af-firm the judgment of the First Circuit inNo. 13–212.

It is so ordered.

Justice ALITO, concurring in part andconcurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that law enforce-ment officers, in conducting a lawfulsearch incident to arrest, must generallyobtain a warrant before searching informa-tion stored or accessible on a cell phone. Iwrite separately to address two points.

I

A

First, I am not convinced at this timethat the ancient rule on searches incidentto arrest is based exclusively (or even pri-marily) on the need to protect the safety ofarresting officers and the need to preventthe destruction of evidence. Cf. ante, at2484. This rule antedates the adoption ofthe Fourth Amendment by at least a cen-tury. See T. Clancy, The Fourth Amend-ment: Its History and Interpretation 340(2008); T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitu-tional Interpretation 28 (1969); Amar,Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107Harv. L. Rev. 757, 764 (1994). In Weeks v.United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct.341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), we held that the

Fourth Amendment did not disturb thisrule. See also Taylor, supra, at 45;Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Crimi-nal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 401(1995) (‘‘The power to search incident toarrest—a search of the arrested suspect’sperson TTT—was well established in themid-eighteenth century, and nothing in TTT

the Fourth Amendment changed that’’).And neither in Weeks nor in any of theauthorities discussing the old common-lawrule have I found any suggestion that itwas based exclusively or primarily on theneed to protect arresting officers or toprevent the destruction of evidence.

On the contrary, when pre-Weeks au-thorities discussed the basis for the rule,what was mentioned was the need to ob-tain probative evidence. For example, an1839 case stated that ‘‘it is clear, and be-yond doubt, that TTT constables TTT areentitled, upon a lawful arrest by them ofone charged with treason or felony, to takeand detain property found in his posses-sion which will form material evidence inhis prosecution for that crime.’’ See Dil-lon v. O’Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245,249–251 (1887) (citing Regina, v. Frost, 9Car. & P. 129, 173 Eng. Rep. 771). Thecourt noted that the origins of that rule‘‘deriv[e] from the interest which the Statehas in a person guilty (or reasonably be-lieved to be guilty) of a crime beingbrought to justice, and in a prosecution,once commenced, being determined in duecourse of law.’’ 16 Cox Crim. Cas., at 249–250. See also Holker v. Hennessey, 141Mo. 527, 537–540, 42 S.W. 1090, 1093(1897).

Two 19th-century treatises that thisCourt has previously cited in connectionwith the origin of the search-incident-to-arrest rule, see Weeks, supra, at 392, 34S.Ct. 341, suggest the same rationale. SeeF. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Prac-tice § 60, p. 45 (8th ed. 1880) (‘‘Those


arresting a defendant are bound to takefrom his person any articles which may beof use as proof in the trial of the offensewith which the defendant is charged’’); J.Bishop, Criminal Procedure §§ 210–212, p.127 (2d ed. 1872) (if an arresting officerfinds ‘‘about the prisoner’s person, or oth-erwise in his possession, either goods ormoneys which there is reason to believeare connected with the supposed crime asits fruits, or as the instruments with whichit was committed, or as directly furnishingevidence relating to the transaction, hemay take the same, and hold them to bedisposed of as the court may direct’’).

What ultimately convinces me that therule is not closely linked to the need forofficer safety and evidence preservation isthat these rationales fail to explain therule’s well-recognized scope. It has longbeen accepted that written items found onthe person of an arrestee may be exam-ined and used at trial.* But once theseitems are taken away from an arrestee(something that obviously must be donebefore the items are read), there is no riskthat the arrestee will destroy them. Noris there any risk that leaving these items

unread will endanger the arresting offi-cers.

The idea that officer safety and thepreservation of evidence are the sole rea-sons for allowing a warrantless search inci-dent to arrest appears to derive from theCourt’s reasoning in Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685(1969), a case that involved the lawfulnessof a search of the scene of an arrest, notthe person of an arrestee. As I haveexplained, Chimel ’s reasoning is question-able, see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,361–363, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485(2009) (ALITO, J., dissenting), and I thinkit is a mistake to allow that reasoning toaffect cases like these that concern thesearch of the person of arrestees.

B

Despite my view on the point discussedabove, I agree that we should not mechani-cally apply the rule used in the predigitalera to the search of a cell phone. Manycell phones now in use are capable ofstoring and accessing a quantity of infor-mation, some highly personal, that no per-son would ever have had on his person inhard-copy form. This calls for a new bal-

* Cf. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 799–802,and n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484(1971) (diary); Marron v. United States, 275U.S. 192, 193, 198–199, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed.231 (1927) (ledger and bills); Gouled v. Unit-ed States, 255 U.S. 298, 309, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65L.Ed. 647 (1921), overruled on other grounds,Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.294, 300–301, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782(1967) (papers); see United States v. Rodri-guez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (C.A.7 1993) (addressbook); United States v. Armendariz–Mata, 949F.2d 151, 153 (C.A.5 1991) (notebook); Unit-ed States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341 (C.A.71989) (wallet); United States v. Richardson,764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (C.A.11 1985) (walletand papers); United States v. Watson, 669F.2d 1374, 1383–1384 (C.A.11 1982) (docu-ments found in a wallet); United States v.Castro, 596 F.2d 674, 677 (C.A.5 1979), cert.denied, 444 U.S. 963, 100 S.Ct. 448, 62

L.Ed.2d 375 (1979) (paper found in a pocket);United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1267–1268 (C.A.7 1975) (three notebooks and meet-ing minutes); Bozel v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d585, 587 (C.A.10 1942) (papers, circulars, ad-vertising matter, ‘‘memoranda containing var-ious names and addresses’’); United States v.Park Avenue Pharmacy, 56 F.2d 753, 755(C.A.2 1932) (‘‘numerous prescriptionsblanks’’ and a check book). See also 3 W.LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(c), p. 144(5th ed. 2012) (‘‘Lower courts, in applyingRobinson, have deemed evidentiary searchesof an arrested person to be virtually unlimit-ed’’); W. Cuddihy, Fourth Amendment: Ori-gins and Original Meaning 847–848 (1990) (inthe pre-Constitution colonial era, ‘‘[a]nyonearrested could expect that not only his surfaceclothing but his body, luggage, and saddle-bags would be searched’’).


ancing of law enforcement and privacy in-terests.

The Court strikes this balance in favorof privacy interests with respect to all cellphones and all information found in them,and this approach leads to anomalies. Forexample, the Court’s broad holding favorsinformation in digital form over informa-tion in hard-copy form. Suppose that twosuspects are arrested. Suspect numberone has in his pocket a monthly bill for hisland-line phone, and the bill lists an in-criminating call to a long-distance number.He also has in his a wallet a few snapshots,and one of these is incriminating. Suspectnumber two has in his pocket a cell phone,the call log of which shows a call to thesame incriminating number. In addition, anumber of photos are stored in the memo-ry of the cell phone, and one of these isincriminating. Under established law, thepolice may seize and examine the phonebill and the snapshots in the wallet withoutobtaining a warrant, but under the Court’sholding today, the information stored inthe cell phone is out.

While the Court’s approach leads toanomalies, I do not see a workable alterna-tive. Law enforcement officers need clearrules regarding searches incident to ar-rest, and it would take many cases andmany years for the courts to develop morenuanced rules. And during that time, thenature of the electronic devices that ordi-nary Americans carry on their personswould continue to change.

II

This brings me to my second point.While I agree with the holding of theCourt, I would reconsider the questionpresented here if either Congress or statelegislatures, after assessing the legitimateneeds of law enforcement and the privacyinterests of cell phone owners, enact legis-lation that draws reasonable distinctions

based on categories of information or per-haps other variables.

The regulation of electronic surveillanceprovides an instructive example. Afterthis Court held that electronic surveillanceconstitutes a search even when no proper-ty interest is invaded, see Katz v. UnitedStates, 389 U.S. 347, 353–359, 88 S.Ct. 507,19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), Congress respond-ed by enacting Title III of the OmnibusCrime Control and Safe Streets Act of1968, 82 Stat. 211. See also 18 U.S.C.§ 2510 et seq. Since that time, electronicsurveillance has been governed primarily,not by decisions of this Court, but by thestatute, which authorizes but imposes de-tailed restrictions on electronic surveil-lance. See ibid.

Modern cell phones are of great valuefor both lawful and unlawful purposes.They can be used in committing manyserious crimes, and they present new anddifficult law enforcement problems. SeeBrief for United States in No. 13–212, pp.2–3. At the same time, because of the rolethat these devices have come to play incontemporary life, searching their contentsimplicates very sensitive privacy intereststhat this Court is poorly positioned to un-derstand and evaluate. Many forms ofmodern technology are making it easierand easier for both government and pri-vate entities to amass a wealth of informa-tion about the lives of ordinary Americans,and at the same time, many ordinaryAmericans are choosing to make publicmuch information that was seldom re-vealed to outsiders just a few decades ago.

In light of these developments, it wouldbe very unfortunate if privacy protection inthe 21st century were left primarily to thefederal courts using the blunt instrumentof the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures,elected by the people, are in a better posi-tion than we are to assess and respond tothe changes that have already occurred


and those that almost certainly will takeplace in the future.

,

AMERICAN BROADCASTINGCOMPANIES, INC., et al.,

Petitioners

v.

AEREO, INC., fka Bamboom Labs, Inc.No. 13–461.

Argued April 22, 2014.

Decided June 25, 2014.

Background: Holders of copyrights tobroadcast television programs broughtcopyright infringement action against pro-vider that sold subscribers broadcast tele-vision programming streamed over the In-ternet from small antennas housed in acentral warehouse. The United States Dis-trict Court for the Southern District ofNew York, Alison J. Nathan, J., 874F.Supp.2d 373, denied plaintiffs’ motion forpreliminary injunction, and they appealed.The United States Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit, Droney, Circuit Judge,712 F.3d 676, affirmed, and certiorari wasgranted.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, JusticeBreyer, held that:

(1) provider ‘‘performed’’ copyrightedworks within meaning of the CopyrightAct, and

(2) provider performed the works ‘‘public-ly’’ within meaning of the Act’s trans-mit clause.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion inwhich Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

1. Copyrights and Intellectual PropertyO36

Under amended provision of theCopyright Act stating that to ‘‘perform’’ anaudiovisual work means ‘‘to show its im-ages in any sequence or to make thesounds accompanying it audible,’’ both thebroadcaster and the viewer of a televisionprogram ‘‘perform,’’ because they bothshow the program’s images and make au-dible the program’s sounds. 17 U.S.C.A.§ 106(4).

2. Copyrights and Intellectual PropertyO67.1

Provider that sold subscribers broad-cast television programming streamedover the Internet from small antennashoused in a central warehouse ‘‘per-formed’’ copyrighted works within mean-ing of the Copyright Act; although theprovider’s system remained inert until asubscriber indicated that he or she wantedto watch a program and may have emulat-ed equipment a viewer could use at home,it allowed subscribers to watch programsalmost as they were being broadcast. 17U.S.C.A. § 106(4).

See publication Words and Phras-es for other judicial constructionsand definitions.

3. Copyrights and Intellectual PropertyO57

A copy shop that provides its patronswith a library card is not directly liablewhenever a patron uses the shop’s ma-chines to ‘‘reproduce’’ copyrighted materi-als found in that library. 17 U.S.C.A.§ 106(1).

4. Copyrights and Intellectual PropertyO67.1

Provider that sold subscribers broad-cast television programming streamedover the Internet from small antennashoused in a central warehouse performed

RILEY v. CALIFORNIA 2473 · 6. Arrest O63.4(1), 71.1(2.1) Custodial arrest of a suspect based on...

Documents

Transcript of RILEY v. CALIFORNIA 2473 · 6. Arrest O63.4(1), 71.1(2.1) Custodial arrest of a suspect based on...