Right of Accession Case Digests

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 1

1 PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF

LANDS) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN

TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA

TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO

FACTS

Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina

Tancinco Imperial, and Mario C. Tancinco (herein

respondents) are the registered owners of a parcel of

land, which is a fishpond property and covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. In 1973, they

applied for the registration of three lots (Labeled as 1-

PSU-131892 2-PSU-131892, AND 3-PSU-131892,

respectively), which are adjacent to their fishpond

property, under their name before the Court of First

Instance of Bulacan. Evidence would reveal that the said

lots are surrounded by dikes and are under river waters,

which are approximately two (2) meters deep. In 1974,

the Director of Lands opposed the respondents’

application for registration. In 1975, and upon the

recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the

trial court, respondents withdrew their application for

registration on the third lot. In 1976, the trial court

granted the application for registration of the remaining

two (2) lots, stating that said lots are accretions to the

fishpond property owned by the respondents.

Aggrieved, Bureau of Lands elevated the case to the

Supreme Court averring that there was no accretion to

speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code

because “what actually happened is that the private

respondents simply transferred their dikes further

down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and this, if

there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and

artificial, and not the result of the gradual and

imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the

rivers”.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lots adjacent to the fishpond

property of private respondents, which are the subject

matter of this dispute, are accretions within the purview

of Article 457 of the New Civil Code?

HELD

No. The two lots adjacent to private respondents’

fishpond property are not accretions under Article 457

for they are not made through the effects of the current

of river waters.

As provided for under Article 457:

“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers

belong the accretion which they gradually receive

from the effects of the current of waters.” (Emphasis

mine.)

The Honorable Court held that the above-quoted

provision requires the concurrence of three (3)

requisites namely:

(1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) That such deposit be made through the effects

of the current of water; and

(3) That the land where accretion takes place is

adjacent to the banks of the rivers.

According to the Court “the reason behind the law giving

the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion

deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger

of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.

If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and

other evils produced by the destructive force of the

waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates

are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of

easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which

may prejudice the owners thereof should be

compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of

Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does

not acquire the additions to his land caused by special

works expressly intended or designed to bring about

accretion.

In this case, the Supreme Court agrees with the

submission of the Bureau of Lands that the alleged

accretions were man-made and not the exclusive result

of the currents of the Meycauayan and Bocaue river

waters. Evidence supports the conclusion that

respondents built dikes surrounding their property for

reclamation purposes and NOT to protect such from the

destructive force of the river waters. Ergo, according to

the court, the only conclusion that may be deduced is

that the alleged alluvial deposits came about only

because of the transfer of dikes towards the river.

The purported accretion was in reality an

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 2


encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river

bed by reclamation1

Premises considered, the Court held that said lots may

not be open to registration under the Land Registration

Act for they are classified as property of public domain

under paragraph 1 of Article 420 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move

back the dikes of their fishponds to their original

location and return the disputed property to the river to

which it belongs.

SO ORDERED.

1 The conversion of wasteland into land suitable for use of habitation

or cultivation (Wordweb)

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 3


FRANCISCO DEPRA VS. AGUSTIN DUMLAO

FACTS

Francisco Depra, the petitioner in this case is the owner

of a land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title

No. T3087, known as Lot No 685, located in the

Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, and has a land area of

8,870 sq. meters. On the other hand, private respondent

Agustin Dumlao owns an a lot adjoining that of Depra’s,

known as Lot 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq.

meters. In 1972, when Dumlao constructed his house on

his lot, his kitchen had encroached on an area of 34 sq.

meters of Depra’s property. After Depra’s mother found

out of the same during a relocation survey in the same

year, she filed an action for Unlawful Detainer in 1973

against Dumlao with the Municipal Trial Court of

Dumagans. This complaint was later on amended in

order to include Francisco Depra as a party plaintiff.

After trial, the Municipal Court held that the Dumlao is a

“builder in good faith” under Article 448 of the New Civil

Code. Applying said provision of law, the Municipal

Court ordered a “forced lease” between the Depra and

Dumlao over the disputed area – the 34 sq. meter

encroachment upon Depra’s lot. Neither of the parties

appealed against the said judgment until the latter had

become final and executory. Also, Depra did not accept

payment of rentals in lieu of the ordered forced lease so

that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal

Court.

In 1974, Depra filed a complaint for Quieting of Title

against Dumlao before the then Court of Instance (CFI)

of Iloilo. The complaint involved the same 34-sq. meter

lot. In lieu of Depra’s refusal to either appropriate the

kitchen (improvement) built upon the 34 sq. meter

portion after payment of indemnification to Dumlao or

sell said portion of the land to the latter, CFI rendered a

decision that granted Depra the possess of the disputed

area and have the kitchen built thereon removed.

Aggrieved, Dumlao filed a petition before the Honorable

Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Depra may take possession of the

disputed lot area and have the kitchen thereon removed.

HELD

No. Depra may not resort to the remotion or the

removal of the kitchen built over the 34 sq. meter

portion without exercising any of the options provided

from him under Article 448 of the New Civil Code.

Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides:

“The owner of the land on which anything has been

built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right

to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,

after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles

546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to

pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the

proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be

obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more

than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall

pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not

choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper

indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the

lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the

terms thereof.”

Applying the aforementioned provision of law, the

Honorable Supreme Court in this case ruled:

“Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the

option either to pay for the encroaching part of

DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square

meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay

for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell

the encroached part of his land, as he had manifested

before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is

not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.

However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the

Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First Instance. It was

thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA

is "entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed

portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the

kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only

when, after having chosen to sell his encroached land,

DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. In this case,

DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the

land, but DEPRA refused to sell.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a

land owned by another, is entitled to retain the

possession of the land until he is paid the value of his

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 4


building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The

owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option,

under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the

building or to sell his land to the owner of the building.

But he cannot as respondents here did refuse both to

pay for the building and to sell the land and compel

the owner of the building to remove it from the land

where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only

when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other

party fails to pay for the same.

We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad

compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their

buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-

respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay

for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void,

for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be

executed and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361

(now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil

Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).”

(Emphases mine.)

The Honorable Court went on in explaining the rationale

behind and the fairness of the rule laid down in Article

448. Thus:

“Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good

faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and

it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the

improvements without causing injustice to the owner of

the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a

state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just

solution by giving the owner of the land the option to

acquire the improvements after payment of the proper

indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for

the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is

the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the

option, because his right is older, and because, by the

principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of

the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs.

Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R.

No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et

al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco,

[C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050).”

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby

set aside, and this case is hereby ordered remanded to

the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings

consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as

follows:

1. The trial Court shall determine

a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter

area of land;

b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the

building of the kitchen;

c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said

area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason

thereof, and

d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably

more than that of the kitchen built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by

competent evidence, the Regional, Trial Court shall

render judgment, as follows:

a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen

(15) days within which to exercise his option under the

law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the

kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the

amount of tile expenses spent by DUMLAO f or the

building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus

value") which the said area of 34 square meters may

have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO

to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be

respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in

accordance with the option thus exercised by written

notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid

by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice

of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in

favor of the party entitled to receive it;

b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA

exercises the option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price

of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because,

as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is

considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO

shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and

to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of

DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties

shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such

notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms

of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of

such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is

reached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen

(15) days from and after the termination of the said

period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of

the lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed

by the Court shall not be less than Ten Pesos (P10.00)

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 5


per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each

calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not

be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of

the judgment, considering the long period of time since

1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The

rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent

(10%) for the second year of the forced lease. DUMLAO

shall not make any further constructions or

improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the

two-year period, or upon default by DUMLAO in the

payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months,

DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to

recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by

DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein

provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for

payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute

evidence of whether or not compliance was made within

the period fixed by the Court.

c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount

computed at Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month as

reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's

land for the period counted from 1952, the year

DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to the

commencement date of the forced lease referred to in

the preceding paragraph;

d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its

Precision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the

party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due

to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall

be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement

of payment of the amount due and for compliance with

such other acts as may be required by the prestation

due the obligee.

No costs,

SO ORDERED.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 6


TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER

SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO UY

FACTS

Tecngas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation (herein

petitioner) is a corporation which happens to be the

registered owner of a certain parcel of land located in

Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and is

known as LOT 4351-A of Lot 4531 of the Cadastral

Survey of Paranaque. In 1970, Tecnogas purchased said

land, together with the buildings and wall built thereon,

from Pariz Industries, Inc. Meanwhile, Eduardo Uy

(herein private respondent) is the owner of a piece of

land, known as LOT 4351-B of the same Cadastral

Survey, and one which is adjacent to that of Tecnogas’

lot. Uy purchased LOT 4351-B from a certain Enrile

Antonio in 1970. A year after such purchase, Uy bought

another lot that also adjoins Tecnogas’ lot from a certain

Miguel Rodriguez.

In 1971, Eduardo Uy, after purchasing his second lot,

hired a surveyor to survey all his newly acquired lots.

This is when he discovered that a portion of his land,

with an area of 770 square meters, was occupied by the

buildings and wall owned by Tecnogas. Having been

apprised of the same, Tecnogas offered to buy the

portion of land encroached. However, Uy declined such

offer. In 1980, Eduardo Uy caused the digging of a canal

over Tecnogas’ wall, a portion of which collapsed.

Tecnogas filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint

compelling Eduardo Uy to sell to the former the 770-

sq.meter of encroached portion of the latter’s lot. The

collapse of Tecnogas’ wall, however, let to the filing of a

supplemental complaint against Uy, as well as a

separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief. With

regard to the civil case filed, the Trial Court ordered

Eduardo Uy to sell to Tecnogas the portion of land

occupied by portions of the latter’s buildings and wall.

Appeal was made by Uy to the Court of Appeals, which

rendered a decision setting aside and reversing that of

the Trial Court’s and requiring the removal of the

structures and surrounding walls over the encroached

area of Uy’s lot. According to the respondent appellate

court, Tecnogas was a “builder in bad faith”. Aggrived,

Tecnogas’ interposed a petition before the Honorable

Supreme Court.

Tecnogas avers, among other things, that the

encroached land be sold to it since the first option given

to the landowner under Article 448 of the New Civil

Code is not absolute “because an exception thereto, once

it would be impractical for the landowner to choose to

exercise the first alternative, i.e. buy that portion of the

house standing on his land, for the whole building might

be rendered useless. The workable solution is for him

[landowner] to select the second alternative, namely to

sell to the builder that part of his land on which

constructed a portion of the house.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether or not Article 448 of the New Civil

Code may apply in this case since Tecnogas is

not the builder of the offending structures but

merely possesses them as a buyer (and thus,

successor-in-interest of Pariz Industries, Inc.)

(2) And if so, whether or not Tecnogas is a builder

in bad faith; and

(3) Whether or not Tecnogas may compel Uy to sell

the encroached area of the latter’s lot;

HELD

(1) The Honorable Supreme Court held that this

case falls within the purview of Article 448 of

the New Civil Code, notwithstanding the fact

that Tecnogas was not the builder of the

offending structures. The Court appreciated the

fact that records do not reveal clearly who

actually built the buildings and wall. However,

it may be well assumed that Pariz Industries,

Inc, Tecnogas’ predecessor-in-interest did so. So

much so that when Tecnogas acquired LOT

4351-B, together with the buildings and wall

built thereon, from Pariz Industries, Inc.,

petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the

latter’s shoes in regard to all the rights of

ownership over the immovable sold. Such right

includes the right to compel Eduardo Uy to

exercise either of the two options provided

under Article 448.

(2) As mentioned above, it is assumed that Pariz

Industries Inc. was the one that built the

buildings and wall on LOT 4351-B, so much so

that when Tecnogas bought such lot and

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 7


improvements thereon, the latter is deemed to

have stepped in to the shoes of the former.

According to the Court, nothing on record

would reveal that the offending structures were

not built in good faith. Hence, Paris Industries is

presumed to have built such structures in good

faith. In addition, on the part of Tecnogas, there

is no clear showing that it was aware of the

encroachment in question. In fact, evidence

would point to such lack of awareness by the

petitioner. Even Eduardo Uy was not aware of

the intrusion until 1971 when the survey of his

two lots was done. And finally, upon being

apprised of the said encroachment, Tecnogas

even offered to buy the area occupied. All these

considered, the Court gave credence to the good

faith on the part of Tecnogas.

(3) However, even though the application of Article

448 is in order, the Honorable Court held that

Tecnogas cannot compel Eduardo Uy to sell the

land to the former, for the right to choose

between the options laid down in the said

provision of law is given only to the landowner.

Hence, the Supreme Court held in the case of

Depra vs. Dumlao, speaking through Madame

Justice Melencio-Herrera, “It is the owner of

the land who is authorized to exercise the

option, because his right is older, and

because, by the principle of accession, he is

entitled to the ownership of the accessory

thing.” (Emphasis mine.)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and the

Amended Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In

accordance with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, this case

is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,

Branch 117, for further proceedings consistent with

Articles 448 and 546 43 of the Civil Code, as follows:

The trial court shall determine:

a) the present fair price of private respondent's 520

square-meter area of land;

b) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said

area of 520 square meters may have acquired by reason

of the existence of the portion of the building on the

area;

c) the fair market value of the encroaching portion of

the building; and

d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably

more than the fair market value of the portion of the

building thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by

competent evidence, the regional trial court shall render

judgment as follows:

a) The private respondent shall be granted a period of

fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option

under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to

appropriate the portion of the building as his own by

paying to petitioner its fair market value, or to oblige

petitioner to pay the price of said area. The amounts to

be respectively paid by petitioner and private

respondent, in accordance with the option thus

exercised by written notice of the other party and to the

court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15)

days from such notice of the option by tendering the

amount to the trial court in favor of the party entitled to

receive it;

b) If private respondent exercises the option to oblige

petitioner to pay the price of the land but the latter

rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial

court, the value of the land is considerably more than

that of the portion of the building, petitioner shall give

written notice of such rejection to private respondent

and to the trial court within fifteen (15) days from

notice of private respondent's option to sell the land. In

that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen

(15) days from such notice of rejection within which to

agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the trial

court formal written notice of the agreement and its

provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the

trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the

termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall

then fix the terms of the lease provided that the monthly

rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than two

thousand pesos (P2,000.00) per month, payable within

the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The

period for the forced lease shall not be more than two

(2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment,

considering the long period of time since 1970 that

petitioner has occupied the subject area. The rental thus

fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the

second year of the forced lease. Petitioner shall not

make any further constructions or improvements on the

building. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or

upon default by petitioner in the payment of rentals for

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 8


two (2) consecutive months, private respondent shall be

entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his

land, and to have the portion of the building removed by

petitioner or at latter's expense. The rentals herein

provided shall be tendered by petitioner to the trial

court for payment to private respondent, and such

tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not

compliance was made within the period fixed by the

said court.

c) In any event, petitioner shall pay private respondent

an amount computed at two thousand pesos

(P2,000.00) per month as reasonable compensation for

the occupancy of private respondent's land for the

period counted from October 4, 1979, up to the date

private respondent serves notice of its option to

appropriate the encroaching structures, otherwise up to

the actual transfer of ownership to petitioner or, in case

a forced lease has to be imposed, up to the

commencement date of the forced lease referred to in

the preceding paragraph;

d) The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its

decision shall be non-extendible, and upon failure of the

party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due

to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall

be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement

of payment of the amount due and for compliance with

such other acts as may be required by the prestation

due the obligee.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 9


LEONOR GRANA AND JULIETA TORALBA vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and

JARDENIO SANCHEZ

FACTS

Records reveal that the 87 square meter parcel of

land, which is the subject of dispute in this case, is

included as part of the 295-square meter lot belonging

to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon by virtue of a

cadastral survey conducted in 1909 by the Bureau of

Lands in Butuan, Agusan. Such land was registered

under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138)

issued in favor of Bongato and Botcon in 1923. In 1933,

this lot was purchased by spouses Marcos Bongato and

Eusebia More, and was inherited by their children (who

are half-siblings), Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez,

upon their death. On this lot, a portion of the

petitioners’ house was constructed.

On the other hand, petitioners Grana and Torralba

assert their claim over the disputed lot as successors-in-

interest of one Isidaria Trillo.According to the

petitioners, the lands in Butuan were subsequently

resurveyed due to the presence of overlapping

boundaries. By virtue of this resurvey, the petitioners

claim that the disputed lot is included in the property of

one Isidaria Trillo, which was designated as Lot no. 310.

Since Trillo is petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, they

now assert their claim of ownership over the land.

However, the records of this case reveal that the

petitioners did not present proof to support the

existence of said resurvey. Noteworthy as well is the fact

that by virtue of the alleged subsequent resurvey, the lot

claimed to be part of the lot of the petitioners’

predessor-in-interest has an area of only 65 square

meters, which is different from the 87-square meter lot

supported by the Torrens Title held by the private

respondents.

Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez filed a complaint

against Lenor Grana and Julieta Torralba for the

recovery of the 87 square meter residential land before

the Regional Trial Court of Butuan. The Trial Court held

that Bongato and Sanchez were the lawful owners of the

land in controversy and ordered Grana and Torralba to

vacate and deliver to former the land. The Trial Court

also ordered Grana and Torralba to pay a monthly rental

of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they

actually vacate the same, plus attorney’s fees and costs.

Aggrieved, Grana and Torralba elevated the case to the

Court of Appeals. Consequently, the appellate court

affirmed the decision of the RTC, with the only

modification that the award of attorney’s fees be

deleted. It also held that while the petitioners do not

have a legal and valid claim over the disputed lot,

they were builders in good faith. With that,

petitioners interposed the present petition before the

Honorable Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the rule under Article 448 of the New

Civil Code may be applied to this case.

HELD

Yes. The Honorable Court ruled that private

respondents, as the owners of the land, may choose to

either (1) appropriate the portion of petitioners’ house,

which was constructed on the portion of their land,

upon payment of the proper indemnity to the former; or

(2) sell to that portion of the land encroached upon by

the petitioners’ house.

However, in this case, the Court saw that choosing the

first option under Article 448 may be impractical. Thus:

“It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical

for respondents to choose to exercise the first

alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing

on their land, for in that event the whole building might

be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it

would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that

part of their land on which was constructed a portion of

the latter's house.”2

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is

modified in the sense that respondents are hereby

directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision

2 Note that in the Tecnogas case supra, the same opinion was quoted and

used as an argument by petitioner Tecnogas in order to support its position to compel the sale of the encroached portion of Eduardo Uy’s lot. The Supreme Court in said case ruled that the “workable solution” enunciated in Grana and Torralba vs. Court of Appeals may be applied only to the latter case.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN 10


their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners'

house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion

of their land and petitioners are unwilling or unable to

buy, then they must vacate the same and must pay

reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time

respondents made their choice up to the time they

actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the

eland is considerably more than the value of the

improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the

land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the

terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin

is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms

thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00

monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of

the lease or until the curt fixes such terms.

So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.

Right of Accession Case Digests

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Transcript of Right of Accession Case Digests