RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) 77.2.1.
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USS WEST VIRGINIA BB 48 .
SERIAL 0666 1 NOVEMBER 1944
U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA - REPORT OF FIRE SUPPOR~ LEYTE ISLAND OPERAT ION - 18 TO 24 OCTOBER 1944,
COVERS BOMBARDMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS BY TASK FORCE 78 IN SAN RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) IN TASK UNIT 77.2.1.
.-- '-.' .-'~:.' '_ -:-." .~'r7~'···:\:·-~:·f~"'·":;'.~':;".~~;",~.. :- ..... , .. -: ...---., .-. --. . . ..'
' f'"
- .' . -
(1) Commander Battleship Division FOUR. (2) Commander Battleship Division THIEE (Commander
BattleIJne) • (3) Commaooer Cruiser Division FOUR (Officer in Tactical
Command) (Commander Task Group 77.2). (5) Commcnder in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
". :
'.; 'S'
Enclosures: /(A) Chronologica.l Record of Events. -:·.....{B) Comments by Conun:mding and Gunnery Officers. _/(C) Statistical Record of Hires. '.
(D tSchedule for Bombardment. //
I 1. '---Enclosures references.
__.fi/7lY<-~ H. V. WILEY. ~.
'. " .
19 October 1944.
0600 - Steammg into LEYTE Gulf. Numerous contacts have been reported during the night, all proving to be friendly.
0610 - .Streamed paravanes. 0700 - Approximately 18 miles from bombardment station.' 0746 - Launched planes for gunne~observation.
Weather not clear, but visibility good. Ceiling about 5000 feet. 0007 - GENERAL QUARTERS sounded. 0818 - Ship reported to be m ccndition ~BRAJ all battle stations manned
and ready. About 8 miles ·from bombardment station. Speed 10 knots. ",: ; :090'7 - en bombardment station, all engines stopped.
0910 - Commenced firing, both Main and Sero ndary Battries. Target for Nain· Battery was the Tacloban Air .Strip. Target for Secondary Battery was a road intersection south of the Tacloban Air Strip. Distance to target about 7500 yards. liain Battery using HC reduced charge ammunition and Seconda~ Ba.tte~ using Ail. Conunon 11k 18 Fuse. Firing to port. Target areas were shifted approximately every half hour. Heavy concentrated fire was directed at the i'ibite Beach Area, as a message vms received stating that enemy defenses were very deep in that area and needed some special attentiori. No enemy
. " aircraft sighted • '. '."~ . . ~ ~ :" 1100 - Air strike in progress over target area• ~ .r ,~J::'
11~0 - Gunfire from Jap positions onwbite Beach failing around UDT boats • '. /11 -: ~ . 1207 - Eleven Jap bombers and 12 fighters reported to south of us, distance ..~..:.. ..... ::
about 70 miles. _ Escort carrier planes broke up this format jon and '..:
the Japs turned back. 1212 - Air fl ash RED. 1214 - Air flash BLUE. 1215 - Planes recovered, refueled, and sent back to gunnery observation
stations. 1215 - Three casualties from OOT boat were brought aboard. for medical
attention. . - Three sixteen inch salvos directed at DIO Island, from which eneruy
gunfire was observed. Direct hits. 1500 - UDT's going in to vfuite Beach. 1553 - Air contacts reported mtermittently. 1600 - Ceased firing. Planes recovered. 1600 - Underway · to move out of the San Pedro Bay area. To rendezvous · ..lith
........ Task Group 77.2 U.S.S. IiELI..ES as screen. .
278 rounds of 16" and 1586 rounds of 511 /38 were expended. in the bombardment.
1900 - Unidentified contacts reported.
During the night several contacts made, ill proving friendly or -- false.
This is a day·S OSStl
• r
I
I '~ , '
~O October 1944.
)100 - Proceeding im~ide Leyte Gulf to bombardment station. )545 - CUe type 1I0SCARII attacked nnd ~s fired on. J6l3 - Opened fire on an enemy plane, identified as a I!VALIl, bearing 060
o T." "
No hits. . . ~ " 0642 Launched planes for gunnery observation •
)700 - On bomba:rdmentstation. COlilI:lencedbombardment '"lith Main and Secondary . Batteries. Target White Beach Area.
'ljOO - Ceased firing. :.000 - Troops began landmg on ~ibite and Red Beaches, with little opposition.
Standing by for ca.:u fire • .L831 - Air flash RED, Smoke screen being laid dovm jn Southern area. 1845 - Opened fire on enemy plane. No hits scored. Type "Unidentified. lI •
'..". ' ,
.'. ~ .
Gunnery Officer's COnJrlents and Recommendations on :the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944.
1. PREPARATION.
It was difficult for the gunnery departr.lent ,to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information. There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers. All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted. personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day, and drills ,
. ; .. '.rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire. Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used,.
2. CONDUCT OF THl; BOI.iBAHnlENT.
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand, the schedule .. ; . .
.' . . . of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries. All firing was indirect method, except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
" the vicinity of White Beach. ' Main battery plot maintained its own ship's . ' ....
. '- : track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar. Secondary plot received data from
C • I.C. for the computo r setup and control of fire. Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency. For area coverage, a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire. ·' The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target. i,'hen a IINo chnnge, No changeII spot was received, plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned, or the plaries spotters designated. a new target b;j" grid coordinates or spot from last fdll. .:.:- .. of shot.
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day, therefore the . .. . annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets. '!he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J.. de.y is attached. It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down" nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the :interruptions by air strikes. The ranges of the [,ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep b.elow a 1000 foot ma.x:imum ordinate. All assigned areas were covered, but due to interruptions 'beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used. ResuJt s observed were g06d,
•.• '1
(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter, this ship~tood . by, but was not called on for call fire.
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. , ::
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..... . . ... ..
. '": -.
:.
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each' ship be given: (1) One ot @ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts; (2) '!hat some consideration be given to ,elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas.
(c) In, assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete, thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of ground:ing valuable ships. In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the dis covery of severalunch'lrted shoals. Furthonnore , one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary. The lead;, fathometer, 2nd bearing checks were used continuously. Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals. However, l{ariquit datquit light was left unlighted. It was used many times :in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable. It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemy•
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
....... - . __.. - , •. .. . _- - .... . . . _--_..._----_._ .__.. _,--_ ._ .. - .. ... ...... __. . " _ ...-.,.,~. ... _ . . . ._ .. .... - _..
USS WEST VIRGINIA BB 48 .
SERIAL 0666 1 NOVEMBER 1944
U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA - REPORT OF FIRE SUPPOR~ LEYTE ISLAND OPERAT ION - 18 TO 24 OCTOBER 1944,
COVERS BOMBARDMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS BY TASK FORCE 78 IN SAN RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) IN TASK UNIT 77.2.1.
.-- '-.' .-'~:.' '_ -:-." .~'r7~'···:\:·-~:·f~"'·":;'.~':;".~~;",~.. :- ..... , .. -: ...---., .-. --. . . ..'
' f'"
- .' . -
(1) Commander Battleship Division FOUR. (2) Commander Battleship Division THIEE (Commander
BattleIJne) • (3) Commaooer Cruiser Division FOUR (Officer in Tactical
Command) (Commander Task Group 77.2). (5) Commcnder in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
". :
'.; 'S'
Enclosures: /(A) Chronologica.l Record of Events. -:·.....{B) Comments by Conun:mding and Gunnery Officers. _/(C) Statistical Record of Hires. '.
(D tSchedule for Bombardment. //
I 1. '---Enclosures references.
__.fi/7lY<-~ H. V. WILEY. ~.
'. " .
19 October 1944.
0600 - Steammg into LEYTE Gulf. Numerous contacts have been reported during the night, all proving to be friendly.
0610 - .Streamed paravanes. 0700 - Approximately 18 miles from bombardment station.' 0746 - Launched planes for gunne~observation.
Weather not clear, but visibility good. Ceiling about 5000 feet. 0007 - GENERAL QUARTERS sounded. 0818 - Ship reported to be m ccndition ~BRAJ all battle stations manned
and ready. About 8 miles ·from bombardment station. Speed 10 knots. ",: ; :090'7 - en bombardment station, all engines stopped.
0910 - Commenced firing, both Main and Sero ndary Battries. Target for Nain· Battery was the Tacloban Air .Strip. Target for Secondary Battery was a road intersection south of the Tacloban Air Strip. Distance to target about 7500 yards. liain Battery using HC reduced charge ammunition and Seconda~ Ba.tte~ using Ail. Conunon 11k 18 Fuse. Firing to port. Target areas were shifted approximately every half hour. Heavy concentrated fire was directed at the i'ibite Beach Area, as a message vms received stating that enemy defenses were very deep in that area and needed some special attentiori. No enemy
. " aircraft sighted • '. '."~ . . ~ ~ :" 1100 - Air strike in progress over target area• ~ .r ,~J::'
11~0 - Gunfire from Jap positions onwbite Beach failing around UDT boats • '. /11 -: ~ . 1207 - Eleven Jap bombers and 12 fighters reported to south of us, distance ..~..:.. ..... ::
about 70 miles. _ Escort carrier planes broke up this format jon and '..:
the Japs turned back. 1212 - Air fl ash RED. 1214 - Air flash BLUE. 1215 - Planes recovered, refueled, and sent back to gunnery observation
stations. 1215 - Three casualties from OOT boat were brought aboard. for medical
attention. . - Three sixteen inch salvos directed at DIO Island, from which eneruy
gunfire was observed. Direct hits. 1500 - UDT's going in to vfuite Beach. 1553 - Air contacts reported mtermittently. 1600 - Ceased firing. Planes recovered. 1600 - Underway · to move out of the San Pedro Bay area. To rendezvous · ..lith
........ Task Group 77.2 U.S.S. IiELI..ES as screen. .
278 rounds of 16" and 1586 rounds of 511 /38 were expended. in the bombardment.
1900 - Unidentified contacts reported.
During the night several contacts made, ill proving friendly or -- false.
This is a day·S OSStl
• r
I
I '~ , '
~O October 1944.
)100 - Proceeding im~ide Leyte Gulf to bombardment station. )545 - CUe type 1I0SCARII attacked nnd ~s fired on. J6l3 - Opened fire on an enemy plane, identified as a I!VALIl, bearing 060
o T." "
No hits. . . ~ " 0642 Launched planes for gunnery observation •
)700 - On bomba:rdmentstation. COlilI:lencedbombardment '"lith Main and Secondary . Batteries. Target White Beach Area.
'ljOO - Ceased firing. :.000 - Troops began landmg on ~ibite and Red Beaches, with little opposition.
Standing by for ca.:u fire • .L831 - Air flash RED, Smoke screen being laid dovm jn Southern area. 1845 - Opened fire on enemy plane. No hits scored. Type "Unidentified. lI •
'..". ' ,
.'. ~ .
Gunnery Officer's COnJrlents and Recommendations on :the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944.
1. PREPARATION.
It was difficult for the gunnery departr.lent ,to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information. There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers. All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted. personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day, and drills ,
. ; .. '.rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire. Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used,.
2. CONDUCT OF THl; BOI.iBAHnlENT.
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand, the schedule .. ; . .
.' . . . of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries. All firing was indirect method, except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
" the vicinity of White Beach. ' Main battery plot maintained its own ship's . ' ....
. '- : track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar. Secondary plot received data from
C • I.C. for the computo r setup and control of fire. Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency. For area coverage, a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire. ·' The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target. i,'hen a IINo chnnge, No changeII spot was received, plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned, or the plaries spotters designated. a new target b;j" grid coordinates or spot from last fdll. .:.:- .. of shot.
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day, therefore the . .. . annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets. '!he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J.. de.y is attached. It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down" nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the :interruptions by air strikes. The ranges of the [,ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep b.elow a 1000 foot ma.x:imum ordinate. All assigned areas were covered, but due to interruptions 'beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used. ResuJt s observed were g06d,
•.• '1
(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter, this ship~tood . by, but was not called on for call fire.
--
' " . . ...
. , ::
, "
, "
.. .. ... ...
..... . . ... ..
. '": -.
:.
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each' ship be given: (1) One ot @ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts; (2) '!hat some consideration be given to ,elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas.
(c) In, assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete, thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of ground:ing valuable ships. In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the dis covery of severalunch'lrted shoals. Furthonnore , one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary. The lead;, fathometer, 2nd bearing checks were used continuously. Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals. However, l{ariquit datquit light was left unlighted. It was used many times :in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable. It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemy•
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
