December 2012 Licensure Examination for Nurses (Tacloban City)
RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) 77.2.1.
6
HypcrW" r FOll ll tbl io ll 1 400 Cypres s Circle Lafayc lt e, CO 80026 -1244 ....... -. __.. -, •. .. . _- - .. .. ... _-- _... _----_._ . __.. _,--_ ._ .. - .. ......... __. . " _ ... ... _ . . . ._ .. .... - _ .. USS WEST VIRGINIA BB 48 . SERIAL 0666 1 NOVEMBER 1944 U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA - REPORT OF FIRE LEYTE ISLAND OPERAT I ON - 18 TO 24 OCTOBER 1944, COVERS BOMBARDMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS BY TASK FORCE 78 IN SAN RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) IN TASK UNIT 77.2.1.
Transcript of RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) 77.2.1.
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HypcrW r FOll ll tbl ioll 1400 Cypress C ircle Lafayc lte CO 80026-1244
- __ - bull _- - _--__----__ __ _--_ _ - __ _ -~ _ _ - _
USS WEST VIRGINIA BB 48
SERIAL 0666 1 NOVEMBER 1944
USS WEST VIRGINIA - REPORT OF FIRE SUPPOR~ LEYTE ISLAND OPERAT ION - 18 TO 24 OCTOBER 1944
COVERS BOMBARDMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS BY TASK FORCE 78 IN SAN RICARDO-pALO-TACLOBAN AREA) IN TASK UNIT 7721
-- - -~ _ -- ~r7~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-~middotf~middot~~~~ - - --- - --
f
BB48Al6-3 USS WEST VIRGINIA (DB48) l0-ts Serial (0666) co Fleet Post Office
- -
From To
Via
shy
Subject
References
San Franci~co California
-----~ 1 November 1944bull bullbull- 1-1
Cornmarrling Officer Commander in Chief United States F1eet shy
(1) Commander Battleship Division FOUR (2) Commander Battleship Division THIEE (Commander
BattleIJne) bull (3) Commaooer Cruiser Division FOUR (Officer in Tactical
Command) (Commander Task Group 772) (5) Commcnder in Chief US Pacific Fleet
USS WEST VIRGINIA - Report of Fire Support LEYTE Is1and Operation - 18 to 24 October 1944
(a) Article 712 US Navy Regulations (b) CincPac Letter 2C1-44 (c) CTG 772 Secret Operation Plan 2-44
S
Enclosures (A) Chronological Record of Events -middotB) Comments by Conunmding and Gunnery Officers _(C) Statistical Record of Hires
(D tSchedule for Bombardment
I 1 ---Enclosures references
are forwarded herewith in compliance -with
__fi7lYlt-~H V WILEY ~
cc Commander in Chief US Fleet (Advance copy) CincPac (Advance copy) ComGen 24th Corps APO 235 San Francisco Calif
- ----~~~4i~ g r-~ - -shy
~ --
CHOONOLCGICAL RECOR) OF EVEt~TS
19 October 1944
0600 - Steammg into LEYTE Gulf Numerous contacts have been reported during the night all proving to be friendly
0610 - Streamed paravanes 0700 - Approximately 18 miles from bombardment station 0746 - Launched planes for gunne~observation
Weather not clear but visibility good Ceiling about 5000 feet 0007 - GENERAL QUARTERS sounded 0818 - Ship reported to be m ccndition ~BRAJ all battle stations manned
and ready About 8 miles middotfrom bombardment station Speed 10 knots 0907 - en bombardment station all engines stopped
0910 - Commenced firing both Main and Sero ndary Battries Target for Nainmiddot Battery was the Tacloban Air Strip Target for Secondary Battery was a road intersection south of the Tacloban Air Strip Distance to target about 7500 yards liain Battery using HC reduced charge ammunition and Seconda~ Batte~ using Ail Conunon 11k 18 Fuse Firing to port Target areas were shifted approximately every half hour Heavy concentrated fire was directed at the iibite Beach Area as a message vms received stating that enemy defenses were very deep in that area and needed some special attentiori No enemy
aircraft sighted bull ~ ~ ~ 1100 - Air strike in progress over target areabull ~ r ~J
11~0 - Gunfire from Jap positions onwbite Beach failing around UDT boats bull 11 - ~ 1207 - Eleven Jap bombers and 12 fighters reported to south of us distance ~
about 70 miles _ Escort carrier planes broke up this format jon and
the Japs turned back 1212 - Air fl ash RED 1214 - Air flash BLUE 1215 - Planes recovered refueled and sent back to gunnery observation
stations 1215 - Three casualties from OOT boat were brought aboard for medical
attention - Three sixteen inch salvos directed at DIO Island from which eneruy
gunfire was observed Direct hits 1500 - UDTs going in to vfuite Beach 1553 - Air contacts reported mtermittently 1600 - Ceased firing Planes recovered 1600 - Underway middot to move out of the San Pedro Bay area To rendezvous middot lith
Task Group 772 USS IiELIES as screen
278 rounds of 16 and 1586 rounds of 511 38 were expended in the bombardment
1900 - Unidentified contacts reported
During the night several contacts made ill proving friendly or --shyfalse
This is a daymiddotS OSStl
bull r
I
I ~
CHRONOLOGICAL RECOID OF EVflJTS
~O October 1944
)100 - Proceeding im~ide Leyte Gulf to bombardment station )545 - CUe type 1I0SCARII attacked nnd ~s fired on J6l3 - Opened fire on an enemy plane identified as a IVALIl bearing 060
oT
No hits ~ 0642 Launched planes for gunnery observation bull
)700 - On bombardmentstation COlilIlencedbombardment lith Main and Secondary Batteries Target White Beach Area
ljOO - Ceased firing 000 - Troops began landmg on ~ibite and Red Beaches with little opposition
Standing by for cau fire bull L831 - Air flash RED Smoke screen being laid dovm jn Southern area 1845 - Opened fire on enemy plane No hits scored Type Unidentified lI bull
i920 - Air is clear 1925 - Anchored in San Pedro Bay
~
ENCLOSURE (A)
Gunnery Officers COnJrlents and Recommendations on the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944
1 PREPARATION
It was difficult for the gunnery departrlent to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day and drills
rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used
2 CONDUCT OF THl BOIiBAHnlENT
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand the schedule
of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries All firing was indirect method except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
the vicinity of White Beach Main battery plot maintained its own ships
- track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar Secondary plot received data from
C bull IC for the computo r setup and control of fire Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency For area coverage a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire middot The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target ihen a IINo chnnge No changeII spot was received plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned or the plaries spotters designated a new target bj grid coordinates or spot from last fdll- of shot
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day therefore the annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J dey is attached It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the interruptions by air strikes The ranges of the [ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep below a 1000 foot maximum ordinate All assigned areas were covered but due to interruptions beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used ResuJt s observed were g06d
bullbull 1
(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter this ship~tood by but was not called on for call fire
3 (a) This was the first bombardmmt of enemy held territory by this vessel and the officers crew am ordnance material performed excellently The men iri magazines and lower handling rOOElS suffered considerably frommiddot the heat and inadequate ventilation Three men in the forward magazines were overcome by the heat and ether fumes and had to be removed Turrets could not be rotated in firing as desired due to (1) The inability of the ship to maneuver in the restricted waters (2) liith both batteries middotfiring at the S~le time at different targets turrets had to be selected to prevent cross fire
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-
shy
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each ship be given (1) One ot ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts (2) hat some consideration be given to elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas
(c) In assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of grounding valuable ships In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the disshycovery of severalunchlrted shoals Furthonnore one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary The lead fathometer 2nd bearing checks were used continuously Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals However lariquitshydatquit light was left unlighted It was used many times in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemybull
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
-- - -~ _ -- ~r7~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-~middotf~middot~~~~ - - --- - --
f
BB48Al6-3 USS WEST VIRGINIA (DB48) l0-ts Serial (0666) co Fleet Post Office
- -
From To
Via
shy
Subject
References
San Franci~co California
-----~ 1 November 1944bull bullbull- 1-1
Cornmarrling Officer Commander in Chief United States F1eet shy
(1) Commander Battleship Division FOUR (2) Commander Battleship Division THIEE (Commander
BattleIJne) bull (3) Commaooer Cruiser Division FOUR (Officer in Tactical
Command) (Commander Task Group 772) (5) Commcnder in Chief US Pacific Fleet
USS WEST VIRGINIA - Report of Fire Support LEYTE Is1and Operation - 18 to 24 October 1944
(a) Article 712 US Navy Regulations (b) CincPac Letter 2C1-44 (c) CTG 772 Secret Operation Plan 2-44
S
Enclosures (A) Chronological Record of Events -middotB) Comments by Conunmding and Gunnery Officers _(C) Statistical Record of Hires
(D tSchedule for Bombardment
I 1 ---Enclosures references
are forwarded herewith in compliance -with
__fi7lYlt-~H V WILEY ~
cc Commander in Chief US Fleet (Advance copy) CincPac (Advance copy) ComGen 24th Corps APO 235 San Francisco Calif
- ----~~~4i~ g r-~ - -shy
~ --
CHOONOLCGICAL RECOR) OF EVEt~TS
19 October 1944
0600 - Steammg into LEYTE Gulf Numerous contacts have been reported during the night all proving to be friendly
0610 - Streamed paravanes 0700 - Approximately 18 miles from bombardment station 0746 - Launched planes for gunne~observation
Weather not clear but visibility good Ceiling about 5000 feet 0007 - GENERAL QUARTERS sounded 0818 - Ship reported to be m ccndition ~BRAJ all battle stations manned
and ready About 8 miles middotfrom bombardment station Speed 10 knots 0907 - en bombardment station all engines stopped
0910 - Commenced firing both Main and Sero ndary Battries Target for Nainmiddot Battery was the Tacloban Air Strip Target for Secondary Battery was a road intersection south of the Tacloban Air Strip Distance to target about 7500 yards liain Battery using HC reduced charge ammunition and Seconda~ Batte~ using Ail Conunon 11k 18 Fuse Firing to port Target areas were shifted approximately every half hour Heavy concentrated fire was directed at the iibite Beach Area as a message vms received stating that enemy defenses were very deep in that area and needed some special attentiori No enemy
aircraft sighted bull ~ ~ ~ 1100 - Air strike in progress over target areabull ~ r ~J
11~0 - Gunfire from Jap positions onwbite Beach failing around UDT boats bull 11 - ~ 1207 - Eleven Jap bombers and 12 fighters reported to south of us distance ~
about 70 miles _ Escort carrier planes broke up this format jon and
the Japs turned back 1212 - Air fl ash RED 1214 - Air flash BLUE 1215 - Planes recovered refueled and sent back to gunnery observation
stations 1215 - Three casualties from OOT boat were brought aboard for medical
attention - Three sixteen inch salvos directed at DIO Island from which eneruy
gunfire was observed Direct hits 1500 - UDTs going in to vfuite Beach 1553 - Air contacts reported mtermittently 1600 - Ceased firing Planes recovered 1600 - Underway middot to move out of the San Pedro Bay area To rendezvous middot lith
Task Group 772 USS IiELIES as screen
278 rounds of 16 and 1586 rounds of 511 38 were expended in the bombardment
1900 - Unidentified contacts reported
During the night several contacts made ill proving friendly or --shyfalse
This is a daymiddotS OSStl
bull r
I
I ~
CHRONOLOGICAL RECOID OF EVflJTS
~O October 1944
)100 - Proceeding im~ide Leyte Gulf to bombardment station )545 - CUe type 1I0SCARII attacked nnd ~s fired on J6l3 - Opened fire on an enemy plane identified as a IVALIl bearing 060
oT
No hits ~ 0642 Launched planes for gunnery observation bull
)700 - On bombardmentstation COlilIlencedbombardment lith Main and Secondary Batteries Target White Beach Area
ljOO - Ceased firing 000 - Troops began landmg on ~ibite and Red Beaches with little opposition
Standing by for cau fire bull L831 - Air flash RED Smoke screen being laid dovm jn Southern area 1845 - Opened fire on enemy plane No hits scored Type Unidentified lI bull
i920 - Air is clear 1925 - Anchored in San Pedro Bay
~
ENCLOSURE (A)
Gunnery Officers COnJrlents and Recommendations on the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944
1 PREPARATION
It was difficult for the gunnery departrlent to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day and drills
rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used
2 CONDUCT OF THl BOIiBAHnlENT
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand the schedule
of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries All firing was indirect method except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
the vicinity of White Beach Main battery plot maintained its own ships
- track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar Secondary plot received data from
C bull IC for the computo r setup and control of fire Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency For area coverage a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire middot The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target ihen a IINo chnnge No changeII spot was received plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned or the plaries spotters designated a new target bj grid coordinates or spot from last fdll- of shot
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day therefore the annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J dey is attached It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the interruptions by air strikes The ranges of the [ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep below a 1000 foot maximum ordinate All assigned areas were covered but due to interruptions beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used ResuJt s observed were g06d
bullbull 1
(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter this ship~tood by but was not called on for call fire
3 (a) This was the first bombardmmt of enemy held territory by this vessel and the officers crew am ordnance material performed excellently The men iri magazines and lower handling rOOElS suffered considerably frommiddot the heat and inadequate ventilation Three men in the forward magazines were overcome by the heat and ether fumes and had to be removed Turrets could not be rotated in firing as desired due to (1) The inability of the ship to maneuver in the restricted waters (2) liith both batteries middotfiring at the S~le time at different targets turrets had to be selected to prevent cross fire
--
-
shy
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each ship be given (1) One ot ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts (2) hat some consideration be given to elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas
(c) In assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of grounding valuable ships In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the disshycovery of severalunchlrted shoals Furthonnore one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary The lead fathometer 2nd bearing checks were used continuously Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals However lariquitshydatquit light was left unlighted It was used many times in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemybull
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
~ --
CHOONOLCGICAL RECOR) OF EVEt~TS
19 October 1944
0600 - Steammg into LEYTE Gulf Numerous contacts have been reported during the night all proving to be friendly
0610 - Streamed paravanes 0700 - Approximately 18 miles from bombardment station 0746 - Launched planes for gunne~observation
Weather not clear but visibility good Ceiling about 5000 feet 0007 - GENERAL QUARTERS sounded 0818 - Ship reported to be m ccndition ~BRAJ all battle stations manned
and ready About 8 miles middotfrom bombardment station Speed 10 knots 0907 - en bombardment station all engines stopped
0910 - Commenced firing both Main and Sero ndary Battries Target for Nainmiddot Battery was the Tacloban Air Strip Target for Secondary Battery was a road intersection south of the Tacloban Air Strip Distance to target about 7500 yards liain Battery using HC reduced charge ammunition and Seconda~ Batte~ using Ail Conunon 11k 18 Fuse Firing to port Target areas were shifted approximately every half hour Heavy concentrated fire was directed at the iibite Beach Area as a message vms received stating that enemy defenses were very deep in that area and needed some special attentiori No enemy
aircraft sighted bull ~ ~ ~ 1100 - Air strike in progress over target areabull ~ r ~J
11~0 - Gunfire from Jap positions onwbite Beach failing around UDT boats bull 11 - ~ 1207 - Eleven Jap bombers and 12 fighters reported to south of us distance ~
about 70 miles _ Escort carrier planes broke up this format jon and
the Japs turned back 1212 - Air fl ash RED 1214 - Air flash BLUE 1215 - Planes recovered refueled and sent back to gunnery observation
stations 1215 - Three casualties from OOT boat were brought aboard for medical
attention - Three sixteen inch salvos directed at DIO Island from which eneruy
gunfire was observed Direct hits 1500 - UDTs going in to vfuite Beach 1553 - Air contacts reported mtermittently 1600 - Ceased firing Planes recovered 1600 - Underway middot to move out of the San Pedro Bay area To rendezvous middot lith
Task Group 772 USS IiELIES as screen
278 rounds of 16 and 1586 rounds of 511 38 were expended in the bombardment
1900 - Unidentified contacts reported
During the night several contacts made ill proving friendly or --shyfalse
This is a daymiddotS OSStl
bull r
I
I ~
CHRONOLOGICAL RECOID OF EVflJTS
~O October 1944
)100 - Proceeding im~ide Leyte Gulf to bombardment station )545 - CUe type 1I0SCARII attacked nnd ~s fired on J6l3 - Opened fire on an enemy plane identified as a IVALIl bearing 060
oT
No hits ~ 0642 Launched planes for gunnery observation bull
)700 - On bombardmentstation COlilIlencedbombardment lith Main and Secondary Batteries Target White Beach Area
ljOO - Ceased firing 000 - Troops began landmg on ~ibite and Red Beaches with little opposition
Standing by for cau fire bull L831 - Air flash RED Smoke screen being laid dovm jn Southern area 1845 - Opened fire on enemy plane No hits scored Type Unidentified lI bull
i920 - Air is clear 1925 - Anchored in San Pedro Bay
~
ENCLOSURE (A)
Gunnery Officers COnJrlents and Recommendations on the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944
1 PREPARATION
It was difficult for the gunnery departrlent to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day and drills
rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used
2 CONDUCT OF THl BOIiBAHnlENT
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand the schedule
of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries All firing was indirect method except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
the vicinity of White Beach Main battery plot maintained its own ships
- track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar Secondary plot received data from
C bull IC for the computo r setup and control of fire Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency For area coverage a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire middot The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target ihen a IINo chnnge No changeII spot was received plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned or the plaries spotters designated a new target bj grid coordinates or spot from last fdll- of shot
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day therefore the annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J dey is attached It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the interruptions by air strikes The ranges of the [ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep below a 1000 foot maximum ordinate All assigned areas were covered but due to interruptions beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used ResuJt s observed were g06d
bullbull 1
(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter this ship~tood by but was not called on for call fire
3 (a) This was the first bombardmmt of enemy held territory by this vessel and the officers crew am ordnance material performed excellently The men iri magazines and lower handling rOOElS suffered considerably frommiddot the heat and inadequate ventilation Three men in the forward magazines were overcome by the heat and ether fumes and had to be removed Turrets could not be rotated in firing as desired due to (1) The inability of the ship to maneuver in the restricted waters (2) liith both batteries middotfiring at the S~le time at different targets turrets had to be selected to prevent cross fire
--
-
shy
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each ship be given (1) One ot ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts (2) hat some consideration be given to elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas
(c) In assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of grounding valuable ships In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the disshycovery of severalunchlrted shoals Furthonnore one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary The lead fathometer 2nd bearing checks were used continuously Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals However lariquitshydatquit light was left unlighted It was used many times in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemybull
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
I ~
CHRONOLOGICAL RECOID OF EVflJTS
~O October 1944
)100 - Proceeding im~ide Leyte Gulf to bombardment station )545 - CUe type 1I0SCARII attacked nnd ~s fired on J6l3 - Opened fire on an enemy plane identified as a IVALIl bearing 060
oT
No hits ~ 0642 Launched planes for gunnery observation bull
)700 - On bombardmentstation COlilIlencedbombardment lith Main and Secondary Batteries Target White Beach Area
ljOO - Ceased firing 000 - Troops began landmg on ~ibite and Red Beaches with little opposition
Standing by for cau fire bull L831 - Air flash RED Smoke screen being laid dovm jn Southern area 1845 - Opened fire on enemy plane No hits scored Type Unidentified lI bull
i920 - Air is clear 1925 - Anchored in San Pedro Bay
~
ENCLOSURE (A)
Gunnery Officers COnJrlents and Recommendations on the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944
1 PREPARATION
It was difficult for the gunnery departrlent to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day and drills
rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used
2 CONDUCT OF THl BOIiBAHnlENT
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand the schedule
of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries All firing was indirect method except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
the vicinity of White Beach Main battery plot maintained its own ships
- track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar Secondary plot received data from
C bull IC for the computo r setup and control of fire Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency For area coverage a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire middot The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target ihen a IINo chnnge No changeII spot was received plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned or the plaries spotters designated a new target bj grid coordinates or spot from last fdll- of shot
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day therefore the annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J dey is attached It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the interruptions by air strikes The ranges of the [ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep below a 1000 foot maximum ordinate All assigned areas were covered but due to interruptions beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used ResuJt s observed were g06d
bullbull 1
(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter this ship~tood by but was not called on for call fire
3 (a) This was the first bombardmmt of enemy held territory by this vessel and the officers crew am ordnance material performed excellently The men iri magazines and lower handling rOOElS suffered considerably frommiddot the heat and inadequate ventilation Three men in the forward magazines were overcome by the heat and ether fumes and had to be removed Turrets could not be rotated in firing as desired due to (1) The inability of the ship to maneuver in the restricted waters (2) liith both batteries middotfiring at the S~le time at different targets turrets had to be selected to prevent cross fire
--
-
shy
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each ship be given (1) One ot ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts (2) hat some consideration be given to elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas
(c) In assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of grounding valuable ships In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the disshycovery of severalunchlrted shoals Furthonnore one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary The lead fathometer 2nd bearing checks were used continuously Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals However lariquitshydatquit light was left unlighted It was used many times in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemybull
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
Gunnery Officers COnJrlents and Recommendations on the Ecnbardment of Leyte Island from 18 to 24 October 1944
1 PREPARATION
It was difficult for the gunnery departrlent to properly prepare for this bombardment due to the inadequate supply df information There were insufficient copies of bombardment and fire support plans and grid charts for th e necessary officers All Officers u I1d a majority of the enlisted personnel were briefed a day ct so before A-2 Day and drills
rere held on the procedure for Gaunter battery fire Radar operators were specially instructed in prominent radar objects to be used
2 CONDUCT OF THl BOIiBAHnlENT
(a) As points of aim could not be determined beforehand the schedule
of fire vms based entirely on indirect fire for both main and secondary batteries All firing was indirect method except for two instances when both main ani secondary batteries fired at Dio Island and a blockhouse in
the vicinity of White Beach Main battery plot maintained its own ships
- track by use of the Uk 8 hlod 2 radar Secondary plot received data from
C bull IC for the computo r setup and control of fire Both main and secondary plots controlled plane spotting communications on a common frequency For area coverage a defiqite point in the numbered grid was selected as a point of am to open fire middot The plane spotters either spotted to this point- or a nearby target ihen a IINo chnnge No changeII spot was received plot then shifted the hiPI to cover knovm targets in the area assigned or the plaries spotters designated a new target bj grid coordinates or spot from last fdll- of shot
(b) The ship did not enter Leyte Gulf on A-2 day therefore the annmmition allowance for this day was assigned to A-I day targets he
statistical record of fires for A-I and J dey is attached It yvas not possible to maintain the time schedule of fire as laid down nor to follow a fixed order of targets due to the interruptions by air strikes The ranges of the [ssigned targets was so great that only the main battery could fire at Vlhite Beach during an air strike and keep below a 1000 foot maximum ordinate All assigned areas were covered but due to interruptions beyond the contro~ of the ship all of the ammunition allowance was not used ResuJt s observed were g06d
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(c) In the call fire phase on A day and thereafter this ship~tood by but was not called on for call fire
3 (a) This was the first bombardmmt of enemy held territory by this vessel and the officers crew am ordnance material performed excellently The men iri magazines and lower handling rOOElS suffered considerably frommiddot the heat and inadequate ventilation Three men in the forward magazines were overcome by the heat and ether fumes and had to be removed Turrets could not be rotated in firing as desired due to (1) The inability of the ship to maneuver in the restricted waters (2) liith both batteries middotfiring at the S~le time at different targets turrets had to be selected to prevent cross fire
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shy
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each ship be given (1) One ot ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts (2) hat some consideration be given to elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas
(c) In assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of grounding valuable ships In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the disshycovery of severalunchlrted shoals Furthonnore one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary The lead fathometer 2nd bearing checks were used continuously Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals However lariquitshydatquit light was left unlighted It was used many times in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemybull
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
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shy
(b) It is reco~ndcd that each ship be given (1) One ot ore additional copies of the operation orders and a minimum of twelve cppiea of ali grid charts (2) hat some consideration be given to elimination of cross-fire between batteries when assigning target areas
(c) In assigning positions for firing in shaLJ-ow water ~rrl in areas where charts and surveys are incomplete thorough consideration must be given to the possibility of grounding valuable ships In San Pedro Bay ships always st-earned at low speeds and proceeded carefully becauso of dangerous shoals very near the assigned bombardment positions end the disshycovery of severalunchlrted shoals Furthonnore one landmark on the chart was discovered to be out of position making very cautious navigation necessary The lead fathometer 2nd bearing checks were used continuously Hydrographic ships did valuable work in buoyirig shoals However lariquitshydatquit light was left unlighted It was used many times in approaching at night and in smoke screens and even a dim light thereon would have been extremely valuable It is thought that the value of the light to our own vessels Vlould have nruch overbalanced any use to the enemybull
ENCLOSJ RE (B)[AT
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