REVISTA ROMÂN! DE STATISTIC! SUPLIMENT SUMAR / … · Revista Român• de Statistic• -...

Revista Român� de Statistic� - Supliment nr. 9 / 2016

SUMAR / CONTENTS 9/2016REVISTA ROMÂN! DE STATISTIC! SUPLIMENT

TIPOLOGIA !I NIVELUL UNOR ERORI CAUZATE DE EFECTUL DE SIMPATIE SAU EMPATIE ÎN PRELEVAREA E!ANTIONULUI 3TYPOLOGY AND LEVEL OF A NUMBR OF ERRORS CAUSED BY THE EFFECT OF SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY IN SAMPLING 13Prof. univ. dr. habil. Gheorghe S�VOIUConf. univ. dr. Emil BURTESCULector univ. dr. Marian �AICUEc. Ligian TUDOROIUEc. Adelina-Suzana MARINA

IMPACTUL ABSORB"IEI FONDURILOR EUROPENE ÎN ASIGURAREA MACROSTABILIT�"II 23IMPACT OF EU FUNDS ABSORPTION IN ENSURING MACRO STABILITY 30Prof. univ. dr. Alexandru Manole Dr. Diana DumitrescuDr. Daniel Dumitrescu

ROLUL B�NCILOR ÎN ABSORB"IA FONDURILOR EUROPENE PENTRU MEN"INEREA MACROSTABILIT�"II 36ROLE OF BANKS IN IN EUROPEAN FUNDS ABSORPTIONTO MAINTAIN MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 43Conf. univ. dr. Madalina Anghel Dr. Diana Dumitrescu Dr. Daniel Dumitrescu Drd. Georgiana Nita

CONTRIBU"IA STATELOR MEMBRE LA FINAN"AREA PROIECTELOR EUROPENE 50CONTRIBUTION OF MEMBER STATES TO EUROPEAN FINANCING 57Conf. Univ. Dr. Madalina Anghel Dr. Diana Dumitrescu Dr. Daniel Dumitrescu

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING RISK ANALYSIS MODELS 64Assoc. prof. Madalina Anghel PhD.Assoc. prof. Aurel Diaconu PhD.Marius Popovici PhD. Student

ANALYSIS MODELS FOR THE FINANCIAL RISK 73Prof. Alexandru Manole PhD.Assoc. prof. Madalina Anghel PhD.Emilia Stanciu PhD. StudentAlexandru Badiu PhD. Student

www.revistadestatistica.ro/supliment

Romanian Statistical Review - Supplement nr. 9 / 20162

SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS REGARDING THE ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY RISK 81Prof. Constantin Anghelache PhD.Prof. Alexandru Manole PhD. Assoc. prof. Madalina Anghel PhD.Lecturer Mugurel Popovici PhD.Marius Popovici PhD. Student

THE ANALYSIS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE GDP AND THE GROSS INCOME 88Prof. univ. dr. Constantin ANGHELACHEDrd. Cristina SACAL�

MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION USED TO ANALYSE THE CORELATION BETWEEN GDP AND SOME VARIABLES 94Prof. univ. dr. Constantin Anghelache,

Drd. Cristina Sacal"

Revista Român� de Statistic� - Supliment nr. 9 / 2016 3

Tipologia �i nivelul unor erori cauzate de efectul de simpatie sau empatie în prelevarea

e�antionului

Prof. univ. dr. habil. Gheorghe S�VOIUConf. univ. dr. Emil BURTESCULector univ. dr. Marian �AICUEc. Ligian TUDOROIUEc. Adelina-Suzana MARINA

Rezumat Investigarea opiniilor unor aleg�tori asupra unor teme electorale

mereu în schimbare, cu candida�i apar�inând unor partide politice, dar �i

independen�i, de interes pentru electoratul unui mic ora�, printr-un sondaj

derulat efectiv în decursul anului 2016, al�turi de tema intens dezb�tut�, a

pro� lului candidatului independent poten�ial înving�tor la alegerile locale

au reprezintat sinteza cercet�rii din acest articol, axat pe teoria sondajului

�i mai ales pe erorile cauzate de empatie ale prelev�rilor subievctive sau

semidirijate ale e�antioanelor concrete. Articolul reu�e�te s� sublinieze cat de

mari pot � abaterile de la realitatea electoral�, atunci cand cercet�rile prin

sondaj devin subiective, apelând la grupuri de investigatori din componen�a

echipei de campanie a candida�ilor.

Cuvinte cheie: sondaj electoral, candidat indepent, eroare de

prelevare de tip empatic, pro� l candidat independent.

Introducere Autorii articolului !i-au propus de la bun început s" estimeze op#iuni

$i preferin#e $i ierarhizeze structural o popula%ie electoral", s" solu%ioneze

o problem" de coeren#" !i rigoare $tiin#i& c", corectitudine metodologic",

adaptare în timp real, sintez" în prelucrare $i prezentare, având ca %int"

& nal" identi& carea unor erori speci& ce în prelevarea concret" a e!antionului

cauzate de empatia cu candidatul speci& c" sondajelor realizate de echipe de

campanie ale candida%ilor. Raportul cercet"rii privind opinia unor categorii

diferite de aleg"tori depinde în mod dominant de seriozitatea $i cun$tin#ele

atât ale celor care îl realizeaz" (cu accent pe echipe de campanie), cât !i al

celor c"rora li se adreseaz" (candida%i independen%i) dar !i cititori obi!nui%i

ai raportului, de bagajul statistic $i sociologic de natur" pur informa#ional" al

acestora, de categoriile de întreb"ri, solu#ii $i interpret"ri care de#in cea mai

mare probabilitate de a constitui #inte ale interesului unei comunit"#i statistice


de genul de limbaj !i erori cu care to"i ace#tia sunt obi#nui"i (S$voiu, Burtescu, %aicu 2014).

Elemente metodologice ale unei cercet�ri electorale

În cadrul cercet$rii s-a apelat la teoria sondajului, s-a creat un chestionar, ulterior s-a pilotat s-a desf$!urat activitatea de observare pe unit$&ile selectate concret in e!antion iar la ' nal s-au conturat erorile cu accent pe cele cauzate de efectul de simpatie !i empatie în prelevarea e!antionului Determinarea practic$ a volumului e#antionului prelevat a fost impus$ de nevoia de evalua costurile cercet$rii, dar #i de organizarea practic$ a activi$&ii de culegere a datelor. Mai întâi s-a precizat eroarea limit$ (maxim admisibil$) de reprezentativitate, nivelul de probabilitate cu care se inten"ioneaz$ a ' ob"inu"i indicatorii de sondaj, nivelul c$ruia îi corespunde o anumit$ valoare tabelar$ a argumentului z. În locul dispersiei popula"iei originare, pentru simplitatea calculului s-au valori' cat valorile maxim$ #i minim$ ale popula"iei originare, pentru o variabil$ alternativ$ sau binar$, ob"inând o dispersie maximal$:

1

obtaining a maximum dispersion:

2 = = =

(for an alternative or binary variable, or it will be equal

(1)

(pentru o variabil$ alternativ$ sau binar$ ea va ' egal$ cu 0,25).

Varianta optimist� (sau cu eroare sub 3%)

Determinarea statistic$ s-a realizat pentru z = 2,18 #i a cuanti' cat un volum al e#antionului n1 în func&ie de: N = 10899 locuitori ai orasului; = 0,03; z = 2,18 !i

= 0,25.

n1 = = 1177,5, respectiv 1178 persoane chestionate (2)

1,1881:[0,032 +1,1881/10899]=1,1881:0,001009 =1177,5 ~1178 chestionare pentru 1178 persoane (responden"i). Valorile au fost estimate conform datelor statistice detaliate ale popula"iei ora#ului post recens$mânt. Conform variantei I, volumul e#antionului antecalculat era de 1178 responden"i, structura&i dup$ trei categorii distincte de variabile ca în tabelul nr. 1


Structura dup� gen, vârst� �i statut ocupa�ional a e�antionului

Tabel nr. 1

Explica!ii Num�r %

GenB rba!i 548 46,5Femei 630 53,5Vârst�18-30 217 16,5631-60 780 59,54>60 313 23,89Statut ocupa!ionalPatron" 9 0,69Salaria!i 631 48,17Pensionari 428 32,67#omeri 50 3,82Casnice 110 8,40Studen!i 82 6,26Total" 1178 100,0

" Sursa:"Calculele"autorilor"pe"baza"structurilor"reale"ale"popula$iei"ora%ului

Varianta pesimist� (sau cu eroare mai mare �i cu o popula�ie mai realist�)

" Determinarea"statistic "se"realizeaz "pentru"z"="1,90"(eroare"5,74&)"'i"

cuanti*"c "un"volum"al"e'antionului"n1"în"func$ie"de"9900"locuitori"ai"ora%ului"

afectat"de"migra$ie"extern ;" "="0,0574;"z"="1,90"%i" "="0,25"%i"

n1"=" "="[3,61"×"0,25]":"[(0,00329476"+"0,9025:10899)]="

371,08" respectiv" 371" persoane." Conform" variantei" II" volumul" e'antionului"

devine"371"responden!i

Structura dup� gen, vârst� �i statut ocupa�ional a e�antionului

Tabel nr. 2

Explica!ii Num�r %

GenB rba!i 173 46,5Femei 198 53,5Vârst�18-30 62 16,5631-60 202 59,54>60 107 23,89Statut ocupa!ionalPatron" 5 0,69Salaria!i 171 48,17Pensionari 146 32,67#omeri 22 3,82Casnice 14 8,40Studen!i 13 6,26Total" 371 100,0

" Sursa:"Calculele"autorilor"pe"baza"structurilor"reale"ale"popula$iei"ora%ului


Procedura de detaliere a structurilor popula!iei aleg"torilor în vederea

stabilirii corecte a cotelor a condus la determinarea mai multor straturi de

aleg"tori conform variabilelor studiate ce au fost recalculate în volumul

e#antionului la nivel de cercetare în cele dou" variante pentru uzul oric"rui

operator de interviu.

Datele au fost culese cu ajutorul unui chestionar (Anexa 1), prin

intermediul unui grup de cinci operatori de interviu a$ a!i în teren (valori% când

echipa de campanie electoral" a candidatului independent), care au folosit o

metod" de investigare în direct sau �fa�� în fa��cu aleg"torii poten!iali sau

popula!ia cu drept de vot (peste 18 ani). Pa�ii evalu�rii volumului e�antionului au fost cei clasici: a) stabilirea obiectivelor #i resurselor necesare cercet"rii

prin sondaj (detalierea scopurilor, metodelor #i a unei schi!e de buget aferente);

precizat modul de utilizare a rezultatelor cercet"rii selective #i nivelul de

încredere poten!ial al estim"rii parametrilor; c); delimitarea popula!iei totale

în timp (de% nind temporal unit"!ile statistice simple (respondentul) în spa!iu

(arealul geogra% c al ora#ului ), organizatoric (delimitarea func!ional": tipul

de respondent care accept"/ nu accept" chestionarul #i autoinvestiga!ia

prin voluntariat) #i chiar structural (delimitarea intern" a subpopula!iilor)

d); veri% carea omogenit"!ii popula!iei totale, care a indus #i primele efecte

tehnice, popula!ia omogen" impunând un sondaj simplu aleator, un sondaj

prelevat aleator prin pas mecanic de num"rare (preferat ca num"r impar 7)

sub constrângerea timpului #i accesului unit"!ilor simple (responden!i sau

locuitori); e); actualizarea bazei de sondaj sau e#antionare (lista gospod"riilor

#i a locuitorilor) #i anticiparea absen!ei la vot în valori absolute #i relative

(circa 40 din total &), iar realitatea a in% rmat ponderea evaluat" (majorând-o

c"tre 50&); f); dup" determinarea m"rimii e#antionului, s-au stabilit tehnicile

de e#antionare (extrac!ie) #i procedurile de calcul ale estimatorilor, extragerea

#i al"turarea e#antionului (prelevarea eantionului a decurs sub impactul

calit"'ii candidatului de independent sau nea% liat la un partid politic, *i de*i

reperele statistice spa!iale la debutul cercet"rii impuneau un e*antion extins

(1178 de responden'i), la % nal au decis îns" motiva'iile de ordin % nanciar sau

cerin!ele de oportunitate-cost ale cercet"rii care au scos în eviden!" necesitatea

de a limita volumul e#antionului la o prelevare de informa!ii restrâns" (371);

g) s-au stabilit clar variabilele, structura planului observ"rii, metodele de

ob!inere a datelor (interviu direct prin operator de teren #i având ca suport

de înregistrare un chestionar testat #i pilotat anterior) dup" de% nitivarea

elabor"rii formularelor #i tip"rirea acestora); h) prelucrarea datelor % nale

structurând diferit setul de întreb"ri 1-3 #i 4-8 #i a ales procedeele de

veri% care a semni% ca!iei estimatorilor #i tehnica de inferen!iere ( extindere)

a rezultatelor e#antionului la nivelul popula!iei totale cu precizia determinat"


de nivelul pragului de semni! ca"ie (estimarea parametrilor); i) analiza datelor,

interpretarea erorilor (cu accent pe cele de prelevare concret# a e$antionului),

realizarea $i interpretarea tabelelor %i gra! celor %i formularea unor concluzii

ale cercet#rii. Chestionarul cercet#rii a cuprins 8 întreb#ri, toate cu r#spuns în

general închis respectiv precodi! cat dar %i cu posibilitatea de a identi! ca alte

cerin"e ale votan"ilor de la viitorul primar ales. Conform tematicii barometrului

de opinie al locuitorilor ora%ului s-au urm#rit:

Date prealabile de identi! care de! nite de variabile de! nitorii: gen,

vârst# %i statut ocupa"ional;

1-2. Exprimare tran%ant# a încrederii sau neîncrederii prin op"iunea la

viitoarele alegeri locale (participare sau neparticipare la vot);

3. Op"iunea pentru un candidat independent sau pentru un partid

politic;

4-8. Pro! lul unui candidat independent conform a%tept#rilor

aleg#torilor din ora%ul .

Rezultate �i discu�ii De$i volumul pesimist de e$antionare constituit din 371 putea !

realizat constituind o variant# teoretic# relativ acceptabil# pentru nivelul ! nal

al cercet#rii (eroare de maxim 5,74& a opiniilor generale), volumul ! nal al

e%antionului prelevat efectiv (in' uen*at de echipa de campanie a candidatului

independent) a fost mult mai mic decât varianta a II-a chiar, respectiv de numai

305 responden"i. Rata de nonr#spuns a devenit în acest moment la 17,8& $i

a afectat semni! cativ rezultatele cercet#rii, majorând eroarea cercet#rii (R =

305: 371= 82,2& ) la un nivel ce o plaseaz# într-un interval mult mai larg dac#

se ia în seam# subiectivitatea echipei de campanie în alegerea responden*ilor

$i nerespectarea pasului mecanic propus de 7, ajungând la eroare cuprins#

în intervalul 15-18&. Cauzele sunt multiple, de la suprapunerea mai multor

investiga"ii electorale simultane în în aceea%i perioad#, pân# la impactul unor

erori structurale de volum mare, dar cea mai important# r#mâne eroare de

simpatie sau empatie a prelev#rii concrete a e$antionului prin pas mecanic

sau itinerariu (nerespectat integral de echipa de campanie care a atras evident

majoritar sus*in#tori ai candidatului independent.


Stabilirea cotelor (abaterilor structurale) pentru gen, grupa de vârst� �i

statut ocupa�ional

Tabel nr. 3

E�antion

programat E�antion prelevat

Abatere structural� �i

coe! cient speci! c (c.a.s.) per

variabil�

Explica�ii Num�r % Num�r % %Gen c.a.s. = 10,6/2= 5,3B rba!i 548 46,5 158 51,80 "5,3Femei 630 53,5 147 48,20 -5,3Vârst� c.a.s. = 29,42/3 = 9,81*18-29 198 16,8 45 14,75 -2,0530-59 640 54,3 127 41,64 -12,6660"si"peste 340 28,9 133 43,61 14,71Statut ocupa�ional c.a.s. = 21,56/6= 3,59Patron/Asocia!i 14 1,2 15 4,92 3,72Salaria!i 544 46,2 110 36,07 -10,13Pensionari 463 39,3 140 45,90 6,6#omeri 70 5,9 16 5,25 -0,65Casnice 45 3,8 12 3,93 0,13Studen!i/elevi 42 3,6 12 3,93 0,33Total 1178 100,0 305 Media c.a.s = 6,23

Sursa:"Calculele"autorilor"pe"baza"structurilor"reale"ale"popula$iei"ora%ului*Not :"eroarea"maxim "efectiv "de"la"structura"programat "a"popula!iei"se"apropie"de"10&.

" Detalierea" metodei" de" cercetare" 'i" în" special" a" tehnicilor" de"e'antionare" nu" a" fost" respectat " a%a" cum"a" fost" deja" descris " cu" precizarea"c ,"("ind"vorba"de"opinii" 'i" ierarhizarea"unui" candidat," tehnica"de"prelevare"a" e'antionului" a" fost" afectat " de" inerente" erori" de" simpatie" %i" empatie" din"cauza"echipei"de"operatori"de" interviu" )membrii" %i" ai" echipei"de" campanie+"care" de%i" se" credeau" independen$i" sus$inând" un" candidat" independent," în"mod" evident" erau" " subiectivi" într-o" mare" propor$ie" )nerespectând" pe" cote"structura" general " a" popula!iei" ora'ului" a%a" cum" se" observa" din" tabelul" 3+."În"ceea"ce"prive'te"selectarea"practic "a"celor"intervieva!i"aceasta"trebuia"s "se"realizeze"prin"pas"mecanic"de"num rare")7+"sau"prin"itinerariu"cu"pas"de"7"precizat"riguros"metodologic"în"zonele"de"impact"parcuri"publice,"biblioteci,"magazine" de" cartier," hipermarketuri," cinematografe," dar" cei" cinci" operatori"de"interviu"cu"toate"c "au"acoperit"cartierele"ora'ului"au"reu%it"prin"imaginea"de$inut "de"("delitate"cu"un"candidat"independent"s "genereze"non-r spunsuri"sus$in torilor"de"candida$i"din"partide"politice"%i"au"atras"ca"responden$i"mai"mul$i" sus$in tori" ai" candida$ilor" independen$i" sau"dintre" cei"nemul$umi$i" de"acitivtatea" partidelor" politice."Aceasta" explic " o" rat " de" non-r spuns" mult"mai"mare"decât" aceea"anticipat "care"a"diminuat" e'antionul"prelevat" la"305"responden!i"din"371"cât"fusese"stabilit"în"varianta"pesimist ")în"acest"moment"se"pare"c "circa"55"-"57,8&""din"locuitorii"cu"drept"de"vot"nu"vor"participa"la"


alegeri dar exist! "anse ca un candidat independent s! modi# ce u"or cota de participare plasând-o la 48 ± 3% .

Prezentarea sintetic� a principalelor informa�ii ale cercet�rii

Ierarhia unui candidat independent "i a primelor cinci partide în alegeri este descris! în întrebarea I3 unde s-au realizat dou! prelucr!ri "i analize distincte: în raport cu prima op$iune "i în leg!tur! cu o valoare mai pu$in volatil!: scorul mediu rezultat din toate op$iunile ierarhizate. Pro# lul este relevat de r!spunsurile dominante date la întreb!rile I4-I8 "i structurate dup! gen, grup! de vârst! "i statut ocupa$ional în paginile anexei 2 de o manier! detaliat!. Se disting urm!toarele concluzii majore: 1. Pozi$ia "i dinamica unui candidat la prim!rie independent de"i situat! pe locul II în ierarhia primei op$iuni a aleg!torilor locali putea s! ofere o solu$ie cu "anse de realizare în viitorul imediat pentru locuitorii ora"ului (posibil! poten$ial dintr-un unic tur dac! se g!seau oamenii cu imaginea adecvat! acestor op$iuni &i mai ales dac! nu existau erori mari de nonr!spuns &i de simpatie sau empatie). În preferin$ele exprimate de responden$i în conformitate numai cu prima op$iune de vot "i cu o eroare maxim! de 15 %, locul I este descris de un candidat liberal (PNL) cu o pondere acoperit! printr-o valoare de 43 %, urmat de un candidat independent cu 38% (f!r! diferen$e mari la nivel de gen, dar cu accente liberale conturate ca dominante pe grupa de vârst! 60 + "i implicit pensionari).

Pozi�ia unui candidat la prim�rie independent (exprimat� de

responden�i în conformitate numai cu prima op�iune de vot)

Figura 1

PSD

16%

PNL

43%

Independent

38%

Fără răspuns1%

ALDE2%

2. În preferin$ele exprimate de respondent în conformitate cu toate op$iunile de vot (construit! pe baza unui scor mediu) "i cu o eroare maxim!


de 15-20 %, pe locul I !i II se a" # la egalitate un candidat independent !i unul liberal (PNL) cu o pondere acoperit# printr-o valoare de 26% iar cumulate 52% (acest tip de abordare arat# c# exist# !anse reale în combina$ia candidat la primar independent !i candida$i la consilieri PNL), urma$i de un candidat PSD cu numai 17%.

Pozi�ia unui candidat la prim�rie independent (exprimate de

responden�i în conformitate cu toate op�iunile de vot �i construit� pe

baza unui scor mediu)

Figura 2

ALDE11%

UNPR

10%

PMP

10%

PNL

26%

PSD

17%

Independent

26%

3. Un candidat independent la alegerile pentru postul de primar ar trebui s# de$in# urm#toarele trei caracteristici importante pentru aleg#tori

Cu experien$# în administra$ie 37%Ceea ce vorbe!te !i face 24%S# apar$in# ora!ului (s-a n#scut/locuie!te aici) 22%

4. Un viitor primar al ora!ului în opinia a 50% dintre responden$i sau aleg#tori se impune s# & fost anterior un om de afaceri care a creat locuri de munc#. 5. În acela!i timp, un viitor primar trebuie s# & e un bun p#rinte într-o familie tradi'ional# (34%) !i s# respecte grupul social din care face parte (33%) 6. Realizarea obiectivelor propuse !i raportarea periodic# a stadiului activit#$ilor prim#riei (implicit obiective !i programe) c#tre aleg#tori de o manier# stabil# relational par s# & e alte trei cerin$e dominante ale aleg#torului din ora!ul investigat 7. Principala problem# a locuitorilor ora!ului ce se impune ca prioritate în programul viitorului primar al localit#$ii este legat# de pre$urile mari la ap# !i canalizare (43%) !i lipsa unor investitori adev#ra$i capabili s# creeze locuri de munc# (19%). 8. Pensionarii !i în general cei care compun grupa de vârst# de 60 de ani !i peste constituie împreun# dominanta structural# a aproape tuturor


tendin elor! cu! un! comportament! u"or! atipic! comparativ! cu! restul! #rii,! dar!explicabil!ca!tradi ii!liberale!ale!locuitorilor!ora"ului.

Concluzii

! Neexistând! alte! cercet#ri! similare! cu! aceasta! axate! pe! candida$i!independen$i!%i!realizate!de!sus$in#tori!ai!acestora,!nu!se!pot!realiza!confrunt#ri!"i!nici!compara ii!cu!cercet#ri!similare!sau!din!acela"i!domeniu,!inadecvarea!"i! incompletitudinea! bazei! de! sondaj! vorbind! de! la! sine! despre! erorile! %i!di&!cult#$ile!cercet#rii!"i!conferind!o!e&!cien #!redus#!acesteia!"i,!bineîn eles,!un!caracter!de!pionierat,!cu!accent!ope!evaluarea!erorilor!cauzate!de!simpatie!%i!empatie.! Simplitatea! ierarhiei!&!nale!aduce!cu! sine!concluziile!cercet#rii! care!devin! astfel! o! dovad#! a! aceleia"i! originalit# i! intrinseci! metodologiei,! dar!"i! a! erorilor! de! abordare! practic#! a! prelev#rii! e%antionului! în! acela"i! timp,!interpretarea!rezultatelor!&!ind!deloc!facil#,!ci!di&!cil#!iar!gra&!cele!structurale!"i!axate!pe!bare!ca!vectori!de!apreciere!a!decalajelor!între!op iuni!nu!mai!au!calitatea!de!suport!vizual!pentru!constat#rile!logice!&!nale!ci!subliniaz#!doar!dimensiunea!abaterilor.!În!&!nal!a!fost!ales!candidatul!PNL!cu!peste!60'!din!op$iunile!electoratului!ceea!ce!arat#!c#!nivelul!erorilor!cercet#rii!cauzate!de!empatie!%i!simpatie!cu!candidatul!independent!au!fost!chiar!mai!mari!decât!s-a!calculat!ini$ial,!iar!candidatul!independent!s-a!situat!sub!15'!ca!rezultat!&!nal! Cercetarea!descris#!nu!mai!poate!&!!de&!nit#!ca!riguros!statistic#!prin!nerespectarea!prelv#rii!e%antionului!în!teren!%i!prin!inducerea!fals#!a!simpatiei!fa$#!de!un!anumit!tip!de!candidat.!!!

Bibliogra! e

! 1.!Porojan,!D.,!(1993),!Statistica �i teoria sondajului,!Ed.!*ansa!SRL,!Bucure"ti.! 2.! S#voiu,! G.,! (2007),! Statistica.Un mod �tiin!i" c de gândire,! Ed.! Universitar#,!Bucure"ti.! 3.!S#voiu,!G.,!(2010),!Gândirea statistic# aplicat#,!Ed.Universitar#,Bucure"ti.! 4.!S#voiu,!G.,!Burtescu,!E.,!+aicu,!M.!(2014).!Statistical!Delimitation!of!the!Pro&!le!of!Local!Elections!Candidate!Elections!Candidate�An!Applied!Statistics!Research,!Romanian!Statistical!Review!-!Supplement!no.!7,!pp.!115-123. 5.! S#voiu,!G.,!/udanov,!M.,!Vladu,!M.,! (2012).! Pro&!le!Method! -!An!Example! of!Multidisciplinary! Applied! Method,! Econophysics,! Sociophysics! 8! Other! Multidisciplinary!Sciences!Journal!(ESMSJ),!Vol.!2(2):!36-44.!! 6.!S#voiu,!G.,!Manea!C.,! and!Simoni,!S.,! (200;).!The!Demographic,!Sociological!and! Geographical! Pro&!le.! The! Role! of! the! Pro&!le! Method! in! Contemporary! Management,!Proceedings! of! The! 14th! international! conference! the! Knowledge-Based! Organization,!Military!Sciences!Security!And!Defence,!Conference,!200;,!Sibiu,!Nicolae!B#lcescu!Academy!Publishing!House,!Sibiu,!200;,!pages!1;5-199.! 7.!!Trebici,!V.,!(19;5),!Mica enciclopedie de statistic#,!Ed.!"tiin i&!c#!"i!enciclopedic#,!Bucure"ti.!


ANEXA NR.1

15

ANEXA NR.1CHESTIONAR COD FORMULARDATE DE IDENTIFICAREGRUPA DE VARSTA :GEN: M F 18-29 30-59 60Patron sau asociat

Conform opiniei dvs., x fiecare întrebare: DA 2. NU 2. NEHOTÂRÂT 3.“x

-DA 1. NU 2.

3. Daca mâine aIndependent Loc�. PMP Loc �.PSD Loc�. UNPR Loc�.PNL Loc�. ALDE Loc�.ordine de la 1 la 6 acoperind toate variantele, în

_______________________________________________________________________________din punct de vedere administrativ, conform opiniei dvs.?1. Absolvent de studii superioare (practicate) 4.2. 5.

- 3. 6.7.

_______________________________________________________________________ economic, conform opiniei dvs.?1. Lipsit de datorii economice 4.2. 5.3. A formulat o po 6.

7.

iniei dvs.?1. 4.2. 5.3. 6.

7.

pentru care a fost ales1.

mandatului4.

-lcomunice public

2. 5.

3. Depunerea unei demisii în alb pentru nerespectarea termenelor principalelor

6.

7.

?1. Lipsa investitorilor/crea 5.2. 6.3. 7.

sme 4. 8.9.


TYPOLOGY AND LEVEL OF A NUMBR OF ERRORS CAUSED BY THE EFFECT OF

SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY IN SAMPLING

Professor habil. Gheorghe S!VOIU, PhD. Senior lecturer Emil BURTESCU, PhD. Lecturer Marian "AICU, PhD. Ec. Ligian TUDOROIU, Ec. Adelina-Suzana MARINA

Abstract Investigation of voters� opinions concerning always changing electoral

issues, with candidates belonging to political parties, and also independent

candidates of interest to voters in a small town, which was effectively conducted

in the year 2016, alongside of the intensely debated theme of the pro� le of an

independent candidate, a potential winner in local elections � that was the

synthesis of the research presented in this article, focused on the survey theory, and

especially on empathy-caused errors in subjctive or half-guided manner of taking

concrete samples. The article manages to emphasize how large can deviations

from electoral reality be when sample surveys become subjective, calling on

groups of investigators who are part of the candidates� campaign team.

Keywords: election poll, independent candidate, sampling error of an

empathetic type, independent candidate pro! le.

Introduction The authors� proposed aim was, as de! ned from the very outset, to

assess a set of options and preferences and make a structural hierarchy of an

election polling population, to solve a problem of consistency and scienti! c

rigor, of methodological accuracy, adjustment in real time, synthesis in

processing and presentation, with the ! nal purpose of identifying a number

of speci! c errors in concrete sample taking caused by candidate empathy

speci! c to surveys conducted by the candidates� campaign teams. The

research report on the opinion of different categories of voters dominantly

depends on the seriousness and the knowledge and skills of both those who

conduct it (focusing on campaign teams), and those whom it addresses

(independent candidates), but also the ordinary readers of the report, on their

purely informational statistical and sociological knowledge, on the categories

of questions, solutions and interpretations that are most likely to be targets of

the interest of a statistical community, on the type of language and errors that

all of the above are accustomed to (S"voiu, Burtescu, #aicu 2014).


Methodology elements of an election survey research

In this research the survey theory was made use of, a questionnaire

was created, subsequently it was piloted, the observation was conducted on the

units selected concretely in the sample, and in the end the errors were outlined,

with emphasis on those caused by the effect of sympathy and empathy during

the sampling.

The practical determination of the size of the sample taken was

required by the need to assess the costs of the research, and also by the

practical arrangements for, and the conducting of data collection. First the

representativeness limit error (the maximum allowable error) was established,

and then the probability with which the survey indicators were intended

to be obtained, the value to which a speci! c table value of the argument z

corresponds. Instead of the initial population dispersion, for simplicity of

calculation the maximum and minimum values of the initial population were

made use of, for an alternative or a binary variable, obtaining a maximum

dispersion:

1

obtaining a maximum dispersion:

2 = = =

(for an alternative or binary variable, or it will be equal

(1)

(for an alternative or binary variable, or it will be equal to 0.25).

Optimistic scenario (or error below 3%)

The statistical determination was done for z = 2.18, and a volume of

the sample n1 was quantitated in accordance with: N = 10,899 city residents;

= 0.03; z = 2.18 and = 0.25.

n1 = = 1,177.5, i.e. 1,178 people surveyed (2)

1.1881:[0.032 +1.1881/10899]=1.1881:0.001009 = 1,177.5 ~1,178

questionnaires for 1,178 people (respondents). The values were estimated in

keeping with the detailed post-census statistical data of the town population.

According to variant I, the pre-calculated sample size should have been 1,178

respondents, structured by three distinct categories of variables, as described

in table no. 1


The structure of the sample by gender, age and employment status

Table no. 1

Explanations Number %GenderMen 548 46.5Women 630 53.5Age18-30 217 16.5631-60 780 59.54>60 313 23.89Occupational statusEmployers 9 0.69Employees 631 48.17Pensioners 428 32.67Unemployed 50 3.82Home activity 110 8.40Students 82 6.26Total 1,178 100.0

Source: Authors� calculations based on real structures of the town�s population

Pessimistic scenario (or version with a bigger error and a more

realistic population)

The statistical determination is done for z = 1.90 (5.74% error) and it quanti! ed a sample volume n1 in keeping with: 9,900 town residents affected

by external migration; = 0.0574 z = 1.90 and = 0.25

n1 = = [3.61 × 0.25] : [(0.00329476 + 0.9025:10899)] =

371.08, i.e. 371 people surveyed. According to variant II the sample volume

becomes 371 respondents.

Structure of sample by gender, age and occupational status

Table no. 2

Explanations Number %GenderMen 173 46.5Women 198 53.5Age18-30 62 16.5631-60 202 59.54>60 107 23.89Occupational statusEmployers 5 0.69Employees 171 48.17Pensioners 146 32.67Unemployed 22 3.82Home activity 14 8,40Students 13 6,26Total 371 100,0



The procedure of detailing the voter population�s structures in order

to accurately determine the quotas led to establishing several layers of voters

according to the variables studied, which were recalculated in the sample

volume at a research level in the two versions for use by any interviewer.

The data were collected using a questionnaire (v. Appendix 1),

through a group of ! ve interviewers who were in the ! eld (making use of

the independent candidate�s campaign team), and used a method of direct or

�face-to-face� investigation with potential voters, or the voting population

(aged above 18 years). The steps of the evaluation of the sample volume were

the classic ones: a) setting the goals and establishing the resources needed

by the survey (detailing the goals, the methods and a related budget draft);

b) stating the manner of using the results of selective and the potential

con! dence level of parameter assessment; c) demarcation of the total

population in time (by de! ning in temporal terms the simple statistical units �

the respondent �, in space � the geographic area of the town), organizationally

(functional delimitation: the type of respondent who accepts / does not accept

the questionnaire and self-investigation through volunteering), and even

structurally (internal demarcation of the subpopulations); d) checking the

homogeneity of total population, which also induced the ! rst technical effects,

as the homogeneous population requires a simple random survey, a survey

sampled randomly by mechanic counting step (preferably as an odd number

7) under the constraint of time and access of simple units (respondents or

residents); e) updating the survey basis or sampling (the list of households and

residents) and anticipating ballot absence in absolute and relative terms (cca

40% of total), and the reality refuted the share assessed (increasing it to 50%); f) after determining the sample size, the sampling techniques (extraction) and the procedures for calculating estimators were established, as well as the extraction and adjoining the sample (taking the samples took place under the impact of the quality of the independent candidate, or the person not af! liated

with a political party, and, even though the spatial statistical landmarks at the

beginning of the research required an expanded sample (1,178 respondents),

what, however, ! nally decided the ! gure were the ! nancial motivations or

the opportunity-to-cost requirements of the research, which highlighted the

need to limit the sample size to a restricted information sampling (371); g) the

variables were clearly established, as well as the structure of the observation

plan, the data acquisition methods (direct interview through a ! eld operator

and, as the recording support, a questionnaire previously tested and piloted)

after ! nalizing the drafting and printing of the forms); h) processing the

! nal data, by structuring the set of questions 1-3 and 4-8 differently, and

choosing the veri! cation methods for the signi! cance of the estimators


and the inferential (extending) technique of the sample results for the total

population with an accuracy determined by the level of signi! cance (estimate

of parameters); i) data analysis, interpretation of errors (focusing on the errors

of actual sampling for the group), the production and interpretation of tables

and graphs and drawing some conclusions for the research.

The research questionnaire included 8 questions, all having in general

a closed, i.e. pre-coded response, yet also with the possibility of identifying

other demands of the voters for the future elected mayor.In keeping with the

theme of the town residents barometer of opinion the following issues were

considered:

Preliminary identi! cation data de! ned by de! ning variables: gender,

age and employment status;

1-2. Unambiguous expression of trust or mistrust through the

option for the approaching local elections (participation or non-

participation in the ballot);

3. Option for an independent candidate or a political party;

4-8. Pro! le of an independent candidate as expected by the voters in

the city/town.

Results and discussion

Although the pessimistic sampling volume consisting of 371 items

could have been made by constituting a relatively acceptable theoretical

variant for the ! nal level of the research (maximum error of 5.74% of the

general opinions), the ! nal volume of the sample actually taken (in" uenced

by the campaign team of the independent candidate) was much lower than

even the variant II, i.e. only 305 respondents. The non-response rate became

17.8% at that time, and signi! cantly affected the research results, increasing

the research error (R = 305: 371 = 82.2%), at a level that places it within

a much wider range if one considers the campaign team�s subjectivity in

choosing the respondents and the failure to observe the proposed mechanical

step of 7, reaching an error in the range 15-18%. The reasons are numerous

and manifold, from the overlapping of several election investigative surveys

simultaneously over the same period, to the impact of structural errors of high

volume, but the most important is still the error of sympathy or empathy in

concretely taking the sample by mechanical step or itinerary (which was not

fully observed by the campaign team, who obviously attracted a majority of

supporters of the independent candidate).


Setting the quotas (structural deviations) for gender, age group and

employment status

Table no. 3

Sample planned Sample taken

Structural deviaion

and speci! c coef! cient

(c.a.s.) per variable

Explanations Number % Number % %Gender c.a.s. = 10.6/2= 5.3Men 548 46.5 158 51.80 5.3Women 630 53.5 147 48.20 -5.3Age c.a.s. = 29.42/3 = 9.81*18-29 198 16.8 45 14.75 -2.0530-59 640 54.3 127 41.64 -12.6660 and over 340 28.9 133 43.61 14.71Employment status c.a.s. = 21.56/6= 3.59

Employer/Associates 14 1.2 15 4.92 3.72Employees 544 46.2 110 36.07 -10.13Pensioners 463 39.3 140 45.90 6.6Unemployed 70 5.9 16 5.25 -0.65Home activity 45 3.8 12 3.93 0.13

Students/young pupils 42 3.6 12 3.93 0.33

Total 1178 100.0 305 Average c.a.s = 6.23


*Note: The maximum effective error in the planned structure of the population is close to 10%.

Detailing the investigative method, and mainly the sampling techniques, was not respected as it has already been described, and we have to mention that, when it comes to opinions and ranking a candidate, the technique of conducting the sampling was affected by inherent errors of sympathy and empathy because of the team of interviewers (also members and the campaign team), who, although believing themselves independents supporting an independent candidate, were obviously subjective to a large proportion (not observing, in terms of quotas, the general structure of the town population, as seen from table 3). Regarding the practical selection of the respondents, it should have been done by mechanical counting step (7) or through an itinerary with a 7 step, rigorously stated in areas of impact, public parks, libraries, convenience stores, hypermarkets, cinemas, but the ! ve interviewers, although

covering the town neighborhoods, managed, by their image of ! delity towards

an independent candidate, to generate non-answers with he supporters of

candidates supported by political parties, and attracted as respondents more

supporters of independent candidates, or from the number of those dissatis! ed

with the activity of he political parties. This explains a non-response rate much

higher than that predicted, which reduced the sample taken to 305 of the 371

respondents that had been established in the pessimistic variant (at the moment

it seems that about 55�57.8% of the voting resident will not participate in the


elections, but there are chances that an independent candidate could slightly

alter the participation rate, placing it at 48 ± 3%

Summary of the main information provided by the research

The hierarchy of an independent candidate and the ! rst ! ve parties

in the elections is described in question I3, where two distinct processings

and analyses were conducted: relative to the ! rst option and in connection

with a less volatile value: the average score resulting from all options ranked.

The pro! le is revealed by the dominant responses to the questions I4-I8, and

structured by gender, age group and occupational status in the pages of Annex

2 in a detailed manner. The following major ! ndings stand out:

1. The position and dynamics of an independent mayoral candidate,

although situated on the second place in the hierarchy of the ! rst option of local

voters, could offer a solution likely to be achieved in the immediate future for

the town inhabitants (potentially possible in a single round if the people with

an image appropriate to those options, and especially if there were no big errors

of non-response and sympathy or empathy).

In the preferences expressed by respondents in accordance only

with the ! rst option of voting and with a maximum error of 15%, place I is

described by a candidate for the Liberal Party (PNL) with a share covered by

a value of 43%, followed by an independent candidate with 38% (without high

gender differences, yet with liberal accents as outlined dominant for age group

60+, and implicitly retired people).

The position of an independent mayoral candidate (expressed in

accordance only with the ! rst option of voting)

Figure 1

PSD

16%

PNL

43%

Independent

38%

No answer1%

ALDE2%

2. In the preferences expressed by respondents in accordance with

all voting options (constructed on a mean score), and with a maximum error

of 15-20%, in ranks I and II an independent candidate and liberal (PNL)


one are tied, with a share covered by a value of 26%, and aggregated 52% (this approach shows that there are real opportunities in the combination independent mayoral candidate and candidates for councilors PNL), followed by an SDP candidate with only 17%.

The position of an independent mayoral candidate (expressed in

accordance with all voting options and constructed on a mean score)

Figure 2

ALDE11%

UNPR

10%

PMP

10%

PNL

26%

PSD

17%

Independent

26%

3. An independent candidate in the election for mayor should have three characteristic traits that are important for voters

experience in administration & management 37%a person of his/her word 24%belongs to the city (was born / lives there) 22%

4. A future mayor of the town should, in the opinion of 50% of respondents or voters, have previously been a businessman who created jobs. 5. Moreover, a future mayor should be a good parent in a traditional family (34%) and respect the social group to which he/she belongs (33%). 6. Achieving the goals he/she set, and regular reporting of activities in the Town Hall stage (implicitly, targets and programs) to the voters in a relationally stable manner, seem to be another three dominant requirements of the voter in the town surveyed. 7. The main problem of the residents, which ranks high as a priority in the future Mayor�s programme has to do with high water and sanitation prices (43%) and the lack of real investors, who should be able to create jobs (19%). 8. The pensioners, and generally the people who represent the 60 years and above age group, takn together, constitute the structural dominant of almost all trends, with a slightly atypical behaviour compared to the rest of the country, which can however be explained through the liberal traditions of the town residents.


Conclusions

With no other research similar to this one, focused on independent

candidates and conducted by their adherents, confrontations or comparisons

with similar surveys, or surveys in the same ! eld cannot be achieved, as the

inadequacy and incompleteness of the survey base speak for themselves about

the errors and dif! culties of the research, and thus lending it low ef! ciency

and, of course, a pioneering nature, focusing on the evaluation of the errors

caused by sympathy and empathy.

The simplicity of the ! nal hierarchy brings along the conclusions to

the research, which thus represents evidence to the same originality intrinsic to

the methodology, and also to the errors of the practical approach to sampling.

Similarly, interpreting the results is by nu means easy, but rather dif! cult,

and the structural graphics focused on bars as vectors for assessment of gaps

between the options do not have the quality of a visual support for the ! nal

logical ! ndings, but they only stress the size of the deviations. Finally the

Liberal candidate was elected, with over 60% of the options of the electorate, which shows that the level of research errors caused by empathy and sympathy with the independent candidate was even greater than calculated, and the independent candidate was below 15% in the ! nal results.

The research as described can no longer be de! ned as rigorously

statistical through its failure to observe the actual ! eld sampling and by falsely

inducing liking for a particular type of candidate.

References

1. Porojan, D., (1993), Statistica �i teoria sondajului, Ed. "ansa SRL, Bucure#ti. 2. S$voiu, G., (2007), Statistica.Un mod �tiin!i" c de gândire, Ed. Universitar$, Bucure#ti. 3. S$voiu, G., (2010), Gândirea statistic# aplicat#, Ed.Universitar$,Bucure#ti. 4. S$voiu, G., Burtescu, E., &aicu, M. (2014). Statistical Delimitation of the Pro! le of Local Elections Candidate Elections Candidate�An Applied Statistics Research, Romanian Statistical Review - Supplement no. 7, pp. 115-123. 5. S$voiu, G., 'udanov, M., Vladu, M., (2012). Pro! le Method - An Example of Multidisciplinary Applied Method, Econophysics, Sociophysics * Other Multidisciplinary Sciences Journal (ESMSJ), Vol. 2(2): 36-44. 6. S$voiu, G., Manea C., and Simoni, S., (2008). The Demographic, Sociological and Geographical Pro! le. The Role of the Pro! le Method in Contemporary Management, Proceedings of The 14th international conference the Knowledge-Based Organization, Military Sciences Security And Defence, Conference, 2008, Sibiu, Nicolae B$lcescu Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 2008, pages 185-199. 7. Trebici, V., (1985), Mica enciclopedie de statistic#, Ed. #tiin+i! c$ #i enciclopedic$, Bucure#ti.


APPENDIX NO. 1

8

APPENDIX NO. 1QUESTIONNAIRE FORM CODEIDENTIFICATION DATA AGE GROUP :GENDER: M F 18-29 30-59 60 and overOCCUPATIONAL STATUS Employer or associate Employee UnemployedStudent, young pupil Domestic PensionerAccording to your opinion, mark with one "x" the answer you chose for each question:1. If local elections were held tomorrow woud you go to the ballot?

YES 1. NO 2. UNDECIDED 3.

Answer this question only if you marked with an "x" question 1 for NO or UNDECIDED 2. Would an independent candidate in your town change your opinion and make you cast your vote?

YES 1. NO 2.Note: All respondents who answered NO to question 1, or NO to question 2 no longer participate in the survey3. If elections were held tomorrow for mayor, which would be the order of your first six options?

Independent Rank... PMP Rank...PSD Rank... UNPR Rank...PNL Rank... ALDE Rank...Note: In the column for Rank..., the dots will be replaced with a figure from 1 to 6 covering all variants, depending on the respondent’s option.

_______________________________________________________________________________4. How should an independent candidate in the election for mayor be in terms of administrative and management skills, in your opinion?New in administration 1. University degree (applied in practice) 4.Experienced in administration 2. Educated man speaking for everybody to understand 5.Part of the town (was born / lives here) 3. A person of his/her word 6.

Other (details): 7.

_______________________________________________________________________5. How should an independent candidate in the election for mayor be in economic terms, in your opinion?Manager of a public institution 1. Having no economic debts 4.Businessman who created jobs 2. Achieved a local development project 5.Having an above-average income 3. Formulated a (coherent) local economic policy 6.

Other (details): 7.

6. How should an independent candidate in the election for mayor be in social terms, in your opinion?A good parent in a traditional family 1. To have held a public or socially important office 4.A good neighbour 2. To respect the social group they belong to 5.To make donations from their earnings 3. To be respected by the social group they belong to 6.

Other (details): 7.

7. What are your major expectations from an independent candidate for mayor?To pursue the objectives of the electoral program that he/she was elected for

1. To not appear in the position as a person indicted by DNA or ANI four years during his/her mandate.

4.

To draw an annual activity report and make it public 2. To attract major investments in infrastructure 5.Be stable in his/her relationships with the voters (communication not deteriorated)

3. Submission of a blank resignation for breach of the terms of the three main points of his/her program

6.

Other (details): 7.

8. What is the main problem of the town’s inhabitants that a responsible mayor can solve, according to you?High prices for water and sanitation 1. Lack of investitors/job generators 5.High taxes on homes and land 2. Large number of stray dogs 6.No car parking fee-exemption 3. Lack of communication with the citizens 7.Abuse in car wheel clamping 4. Excessive debt of the local budget 8.

Other (details): 9.


Impactul absorb�iei fondurilor europene în asigurarea macrostabilit��ii

Prof. univ. dr. Alexandru Manole

Dr. Diana Dumitrescu

Dr. Daniel Dumitrescu

Abstract

Ini�iativa de la Viena are ca scop asigurarea ca procesul de dezintermediere s� � e unul controlat �i de succes, pentru a minimiza riscurile sistemice ale Europei emergente. Înt�rirea cooper�rii între ��rile de origine �i ��rile gazd� pentru a evalua mai bine poten�ialele riscuri sistemice ce pot ap�rea în ��rile gazd� a fost un alt punct important al agendei � nanciare �i reprezint� un subiect în continu� dezvoltare �i perfec�ionare. Unul din obiectivele Ini�iativei de la Viena const� în men�inerea de c�tre institu�iile de credit din ��rile mai dezvoltate ale Uniunii Europene a unor niveluri de expunere � nanciar� în ��rile Europei emergente. Îndeplinirea acestor angajamente de expunere este, cu toate acestea, costisitoare în absen�a unor oportunit��i de investi�ii reale în ��rile gazd�. O mai bun� absorb�ie a fondurilor Uniunii Europene de c�tre autorit��ile na�ionale, precum �i implicarea mai activ� a institu�iilor � nanciar � bancare în selectarea, pre� nan�area �i co� nan�area proiectelor din fonduri structurale ar putea realiza oportunit��i de afaceri pentru institu�iile de credit, pentru a facilita îndeplinirea angajamentelor lor de expunere �i, astfel, s� permit� revigorarea economic� a ��rilor gazd�. Cuvinte cheie: macroprudentialiate, instrumente � nanciare, ab-sorbtie, institutii � nanciare, loan

Introducere !i Literature Review

�Ini!iativa de la Viena� are ca scop asigurarea stabilit"&ii sectorului

$ nanciar � bancar în Europa Central", de Est %i Sud � Est. Acest forum de

colaborare reune%te actori interna&ionali reprezentan&i ai sectorului public %i

privat pentru a lua decizii de comun accord în domeniul stabilit"&ii $ nanciare.

Crearea %i dezvolatea Vienna Innitiative a fost posibil" prin concursul B"ncii

Europene de Investi&ii, Comisiei Europene, Fondul Monetar Interna&ional %i

Banca Mondial".

Lansat în ianuarie 2009, Ini!iativa ajutat la implementarea m"surilor

de criz" pentru a asigura viabilitatea pe termen scurt a sectorului bancar din

regiune. Eforturile grupului de lucru s-au concentrate pe evitarea retragerilor

de $ nan&are din regiune de c"tre gruburile $ nanciar � bancare interna&ionale.


În parallel, Banca European! pentru Reconstruc"ie #i Dezvoltare, Banca European! de Investi"ii #i Banca Mondial! au asigurat un $ ux de creditare

pozitiv pentru economiile din regiune vizat!. Anghelache, Anghel, Manole and Lilea (2016) prezint! o serie de aspecte ale activit!"ii bancare. De Haas, Korniyenko, Pivovarsky and Tsankova

(2015) se preocup! de corela"ia dintre proprietatea asupra b!ncilor, Ini"iativa

de la Viena #i cre#terea creditului. Pistor studiaz! rolul Ini"iativei de la Viena

în governan"a pie"elor % nanciare. Studiul lui Kokkinakis (2016) subliniaz!

efectul Ini"iativei asupra comportamentului unor institu"ii % nanciare europene

#i mondiale. Bratu #i Oprean (2012) descriu unele caracteristici ale acestei

ini"iative. Anghelache (2015) analizeaz! contextul economic al României,

inclusiv sectorul % nanciar.

Semni� ca�ia Ini�iativei de la Viena în asigurarea cadrului cooper�rii

macropruden�iale

Dup! ce efectele crizei % nanciare au fost diminuate, eforturile

grupului de lucru s-au concentrate pe coordonarea ac"iunilor pe termen lung

astfel încât s! pot! % comb!tute pe termen mediu #i lung reapari"ia riscurilor

sistemice. Acest nou mod de lucru s-a formalizat prin lansarea în Ianuarie

2012 a �Ini"iativei de la Vienna 2.0�.

Obiectivele Ini�iativei Viena 2.0 sunt:

- Evitarea reducerii gradului de îndatorare dezordonat (prin ie#iri

necontrolate de capital din "!rile vizate);

- Crearea unui cadru de colaborare pentru chestiunile de stabilitate

% nanciar! transfrontalier!;

- Asigurarea ca ac&iunile de politic! (în special în domeniul de

supravegherii) sunt luate în interesul colectiv.

Ini"iativa de la Vienna este un cadru formal de protejare a stabilit!&ii

% nanciare a Europei emergente. Ini"iativa #i-a demnonstrat utilitatea în

tumultul primului val al crizei % nanciare globale în ianuarie 2009, reunind

toate p!r&ile interesate publice 'i private relevante din sectorul % nanciar �

bancar al Uniunii Europene cu sucursale active în Europa emergent #i care

de&in o mare parte din sectorul % nanicar - bancar în regiune sau de&in o parte

semni% cativ! a titlurilor de stat.

Ini&iativa a oferit un forum pentru luare a deciziilor 'i de coordonare

care au ajutat la prevenirea unei crize bancare sistemice în regiune 'i a asigurat

ca $ uxul de credit s! % e neîntrrupt #i s! alimenteze economia real! în timpul

crizei. Ini"iativa a urm!rit în principal ca politicile na"ionale necoordonate

la nivelul Uniunii Europene s! nu afecteze stabilitatea % nanciar! a regiunii,

reu#ind s! controleze (deleveraging-ul - dezintermedierea) repatrierea brusc!


i! masiv"! a! fondurilor! #!nanciare! transmise! în! anii! pre-criz"! de! grupurile!#!nanciare! interna$ionale! c"tre! sucursalele! din! $"rile! Europei! emergente!(inclusive!România). Viena 2.0 - spre!sfâr itul!anului!2011,!noi!semne!ale!crizei!#!nanciare!s-au! f"cut! vizibile! în! Europa,! criza! creditelor! i! problema! r"scump"r"rilor!datoriilor.!În!plus,!au!devenit!evidente!o!serie!de!lacune!serioase!în!coordonarea!reglement"rii!pie$elor!#!nanciare!între!$"rile!de!origine! i!$"rile!gazd"!a!liniliilor!de!#!nan$"re.!Astfel!au!ap"rut!riscuri!sistemice!ce!au!în!vedere!sucursale!ale!unor!b"nci!interna$ionale!cu!sediu!în!alt"!$ar"!a!Uniunii!Europene,!pentru!care!modalitatea!pre-criz"!de!supraveghere!doar!de!c"tre!autorit"$ile!din!statul!de!origine!nu!este!su#!cient"!în!momentul!de!fa$"!pentru!a!asigura!o!protec$ie!în!fa$a!unui!eventual!risc!sistemic.! Re%!ectând!aceste!condi&ii,!Viena!2.0!urm"re'te!s"!asigure!c"!procesul!de! dezintermediere! este! unul! controlat! i! de! success,! astfel! încât! s"! reduc"!la!minimum!riscurile!sistemice!din!Europa!emergent.!Se!urm"re te!ca!$"rile!de! origine! a! capitalului! s"! coopereze! mai! strâns! cu! &"rile! gazd"! pentru! a!putea! evalua!mai! bine! poten&ialele! riscuri! sistemice! ce! pot! ap"rea! în! &"rile!gazd".!Autorit"&ile!#!scale!ar!trebui,!de!asemenea,!s"!#!e!implicate!mai!direct!în!coordonarea! $ar"!de!origine!�! $ar"!gazd".!Activitatea! în!cadrul! Ini&iativei!de!la!Viena!2.0!urm"re'te!ob$inerea!de!rezultate!practice!prin!monitorizarea,!raportarea! procesului! de! dezintermediere! -! deleveraging! prin! crearea! unor!structuri!temporare!în!care!factorii!de!decizie!din!sectorul!public!'i!privat!s"!realizeze!schimburi!de!experien&"!'i!s"!discute!m"surile!adecvate!de!urmat.!! La!ini&iativa!Viena!2.0!din!Martie!2012,!s-a!dezb"tut!un!set!de!principii!pentru!cooperarea!autorit"$ilor!de!supraveghere!#!nanciar"!din!$"rile!de!origine! i! $"rile! gazd".!Aceste! principia! au! fost! dezvoltate! pe!baza! experien$elor! i!consult"rilor! anterioare! Ini$iativei,! astfel! încât,! în! present! aceste! principia!vin!s"!asigure!o!baz"!de!colaborare!bilateral"!între!statele!member!implicate,!complementare!reuniunilor!forurilor!Europen!în!domeniu!cum!ar!#!!CERS.! Ini&iativa!Viena!2.0!este!condus"!de!un!comitet!director,!prezidat!de!Marek!Belka,!pre'edintele!B"ncii!Na&ionale!a!Poloniei.!BERD,!BEI,!Comisia!European",!Fondul!Monetar!Interna&ional,!'i!Banca!Mondial"!au!jucat!un!rol-cheie!în!crearea!'i!dezvoltarea!în!continuare!a!Ini&iativei!de!la!Viena.! Ini&iativa!a! fost!un!exemplu!de! success!de!dezvoltare!a!unor! rela$ii!de!colaborare!între!!sectorul!public!'i!cel!privat,!deoarece!reune'te!to$i!actorii!#!nanciari! importan$i! ai!Uniunii!Europene!cu!expunere! i! sucursale!bancare!în! $"rile! Europei! Emergente,! acestea! includ! institu&iile! majore! #!nanciare!interna&ionale,!precum!'i!cele!mai!importante!institu&ii!europene,!autorit"&ile!de!reglementare!#!nanciar"! i!#!scal!din!&ara!de!origine! i!$ara!gazd".!! Obiectivele!principale!ini&iale!ale!Ini&iativei!au!fost:


- Prevenire dezintermedierii la scar! larg! "i retragerea necoordonat! a grupurilor bancare transfrontaliere din regiune, care ar # putut declan$a crize bancare sistemice nu numai în %!rile individuale, ci în întreaga regiune;

- Asigurarea c! grupurile bancare-mam! î"i men%in expunerea lor în Europa emergent $i recapitalizeaz! # lialele "i sucursalele lor din aceste &!ri;

- Asigurarea c! pachetele na%ionale de sprijin ale grupurilor bancare transfrontaliere au avut efecte bene# ce "i în &!rile gazd!.

- Realizarea consensului între membrii Ini&iativei cu privire la punerea în aplicare aprincipiilor de baz! pentru gestionare a crizelor în regiune.

În m!sura în care riscurile sistemice în Europa emergent! au început s! se atenueze, Ini&iativa de la Vienna "i-a mutat aten&ia spre problemele critice la nivel de regiune "i la politicile care ar face sectoarele # nanciare din Europa emergent! mai rezistente pe termen lung, la "ocurile sistemice identi# cate în cadrul reuniunilor forumul Ini%iativei. În acest sens grupuri de lucru (GL) au fost formate având în componen&! reprezentan%i ai b!ncilor-mam!, autorit!%ile de reglementare, b!ncile centrale, ministerele de # nan%e, institu%iilor europene $i institu&ii # nanciare interna&ionale. 23 ianuarie de 2009 - Prima intalnire �Ini%iativa de la Viena� (VI) a avut loc la Ministerul Austriac de Finan%e sub pre$edin%ia domnului T. Wieser, cu participarea b!ncilor centrale $i ministerelor de # nan%e din mai multe %!ri ale Europei Centrale $i de Est, %!ri-cheie avansate ale UE, autorit!%ile de supraveghere din &!rile de origine ale b!ncilor transfrontaliere, $i IFI (FMI, BERD, BEI, Banca Mondial!, IFC). La aceast! întîlnire, reprezentantul BERD, E. Berglof a introdus conceptul unei platforme de ac%iuni colective între sectorul public $i cel privat etichetat �Viena Club�. S-a convenit ca FMI s! elaboreze principiile de partajarea poverii # nanciare între autorit!%ile din &!rile de origine, autorit!&ile din &!rile gazd! $i b!ncile transfrontaliere. 17 mar 2009 - A doua intalnire �Ini%iativa de la Viena�, a avut loc în Joint Vienna Institute, sub pre$edin%ia domnului T. Wieser. FMI (David Hardy, seful diviziei) prezint! o distribu%ie a normelor de partajare a sarcinilor între autorit!%ile de origine $i din %ara gazd!, care sunt în mare parte de acord cu privire la modul de utilizare în timpul crizei. 24 septembrie 2009 - Prima intalnire complete a Forumului Ini%iativei de la Viena, la Bruxelles, sub pre$edin%ia lui John Berrigan, director Direc&ia General! a ECOFIN. Reuniunea face bilan%ul progreselor realizate pân! la acel moment $i discut!, pentru prima dat!, posibilitatea relax!rii reducerii gradului de îndatorare în viitor - primul semnal de dep!rtare de faza de risc sistemic.


Participan i:!17!grupuri"!nanciar!�!bancare!mame,!autorit# ile!de!supraveghere!

din!$#rile!de!origine!%i!gazd#!%i!autorit# ile!"!scale,!FMI,!CE,!BERD,!BEI,!BM,!

BCE!%i!CEBS!!(Committee!of!European!Banking!Supervisors).

! Martie!17/18!2010!-!A!doua!întâlnire!complete!a!Ini iativei!de!la!Viena!

din!Atena!a!marcat!momentul!realiz#rii!unui!bilan !al!activipp.!t#$ii!de!pân#!

acum!&i!semnaleaz#!o!deplasare!din!faza!de!risc!sistemic!(în!timp!ce!cadrul!

r#mâne! în! vigoare! pentru! o! utilizare! viitoare! %i! pentru! #rile! selectate);! %i!

discut#!despre!modul!de!utilizare!a!cadrului!de!ac iune!colectiv#!a!Ini iativei!

de!la!Viena!dincolo!de!gestionare!a!crizelor.!Pentru!a!testa!utilitatea!cadrului!

pentru!discu ii!politice,!dou#!grupuri!de!lucru!au!fost!stabilite!cu!subiecte!de!

relevan #!urgent#!pentru!p#r ile!interesate:!cea!cu!privire!la!dezvoltarea!local#!a!

monedelor!locale!&i!dezvoltarea!pie$ei!de!capital!%i!cea!pe!absorb ia!fondurilor!

europene.!La!aceast#!reuniune!au!participat!20!de!grupuri!bancare,!autorit# ile!

de!supraveghere!din!$#rile!lor!de!origine!%i!$#rile!gazd#!%i!autorit# ile!"!scale,!

FMI,!CE,!BERD,!BEI,!BM,!BCE,!CEBS.

! Martie!17/18!2011!�!a!treia!întâlnire!a!Forumului!complet!al!Ini iativei!

de!la!Viena,!s-a!$inut!la!Bruxelles,!pentru!a!lua!în!considerare!recomand#rile!

celor!dou#!grupuri!de!lucru!(monedele!locale!%i!dezvoltarea!pie ei!de!capital!

%i! de!ABSORB'IE!A! FONDURILOR! UE)! %i! decide! cu! privire! la! viitorul!

Ini iativei!de!la!Viena.!

! Martie! 24/25!2011! -!Abordarea! Ini iativei! de! la!Viena! este! adus#! la!

discu iile!din!zona!euro!de!c#tre!Consiliul!European!cu!privire!la!noul!Sistemului!

Monetar!European!(SME).!Ini iativa!de!la!Viena!este!citat#!ca!o!abordare!pentru!

implicarea!sectorului!privat:!�Dac�, pe baza unei analize de sustenabilitate, se

concluzioneaz� c� un program de ajustare macroeconomic� poate restabili

datoria public� pe o traiectorie sustenabil�, bene� ciarul stat membru va lua ini�iative destinate încuraj�rii principalilor investitori priva�i pentru a men�ine expunerea lor (de exemplu, o abordare �de la Viena Ini�iativa�). �

Concluzii

! P#r ile!interesate!au!apreciat!c#!ac$iunile!recomandate!au!avut!succes!

în! gestionarea! crizelor! %i! cadrul! s#u! ar! trebui! s#! "!e! conservat! ca! urmare! a!

posibilit#$ii!de!reapari$ie!a!riscurilor!r#mase.!Activitatea!principal!a!Ini$iativei!

de!la!Vienna!ar!ar!trebui!s#!"!e!mutat!pentru!a!acoperi!problemele!de!prevenire!

a!crizelor,!care!bene"!ciaz#!de!compozi ia!sa!din!sectorul!public-privat!unic,!

pe!baza!modelului!din!primele!dou#!grupuri!de! lucru.!Dou#!noi!grupuri!de!

lucru!sunt!constituite,!unul!cu!privire!la!implica iile!noilor!reglement#ri!Basel!

III! pentru! Europa! emergent#;! %i! cel#lalt! cu! privire! la! gestionarea! activelor!

neperformante.!


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IMPACT OF EU FUNDS ABSORPTION IN ENSURING MACRO STABILITY

Professor Alexandru Manole, PhD

Diana Dumitrescu, PhD

Dumitrescu Daniel, PhD

Abstract

Vienna Initiative aims to ensure that the process of deleveraging to be controlled and successful one, to minimize systemic risks of emerging Euro-pe. Strengthening cooperation between countries of origin and host countries to better assess potential systemic risks that may arise in the host countries was another focal point of discussion is the topic of � nancial and in continuous

development and improvement. One of the objectives of the Vienna Initiative

involves keeping by credit institutions in more developed countries of the Eu-

ropean Union to levels of � nancial exposure in emerging European countries.

Ful� lling these commitments exposure is, however, expensive in the absence of

real investment opportunities in host countries. Better absorption of EU funds

by national authorities, and the active involvement of � nancial institutions -

bank selection, pre-� nancing and co-� nancing of structural funds could realize

business opportunities for credit institutions to facilitate the ful� llment of their

commitments exposure and thus allow economic recovery of the host countries.

Key words: macroprudentiality, � nancial instruments, absorption,

Financial institutions, credit

Introduction. Literature review

Vienna Initiative � aims at ensuring the stability of the ! nancial sector - banking in Central, Eastern and South - Eastern Europe. This collabo-rative forum brings together representatives of international actors public and private sector to make decisions by mutual agreement on ! nancial stability. Creating and Advances in Vienna Initiative contest was made possible by the European Investment Bank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Launched in January 2009, the Initiative helped implement crisis measures in the short term to ensure sustainability of the banking sector in the region. Working group�s efforts were concentrated on avoiding withdrawals of funding in the region by ! nancial grub rile - international banking. In parallel, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank and the World Bank provided credit " ow positive for the economies of

the region concerned.


Anghelache, Anghel, Manole and Lilea (2016) present a series of aspects of banking activity. De Haas, Korniyenko, Pivovarsky and Tsankova (2015) develop on the connection between bank ownership, Vienna Initiative and the increase of credit. Pistor studies the role of the Vienna Initiative in ! nancial markets governance. Kokkinakis (2016) outlines the effect of the Initiative on the behavior of some european and global ! nancial institutions. Bratu and Oprean (2012) describe some characteristics of this initiative. Anghelache (2015) analyzes the economic context of Romania, including the ! nancial sector.

Signi� cance of the Vienna Initiative in creating macro-prudential fra-

mework for cooperation

After the ! nancial crisis have been reduced, the working group �s efforts were concentrated on long-term coordination of actions so that POTA be tackled in the medium and long recurrence of systemic risks. This new way of working was formalized in January 2012 with the launch of the � Vienna Initiative 2.0�. Vienna 2.0 Initiative objectives are : - Avoiding disorderly deleveraging (by uncontrolled out" ow of

capital from the countries concerned);

- Establish a collaborative framework for cross-border ! nancial

stability issues ;

- Ensuring that policy actions ( particularly in the area of supervision)

are taken in the collective interest .

Vienna Initiative is a formal framework to protect the ! nancial sta-

bility of emerging Europe. The initiative has demonstrated utility in the tur-

moil of the ! rst wave of the global ! nancial crisis in January 2009, bringing

together all stakeholders Public and Private relevant ! nancial sector - the EU

banking with subsidiaries active in Emerging Europe and who hold much

of the JEL - bank in the region or have a signi! cant portion of government

securities.

The initiative provided a forum for decision-making and coordina-

tion that helped prevent a systemic banking crisis in the region and assured

" ow of credit to the real economy and fuel during the crisis. Initiative aimed

mainly national policies coordinated at EU level does not affect the ! nancial

stability of the region, managing to control (deleveraging site - disintermedi-

ation) repatriation sudden and massive ! nancial funds sent during pre-crisis

international ! nancial groups to branches emerging European countries (in-

cluding Romania).


Vienna 2.0 - the end of 2011, new signs of the ! nancial crisis made themselves visible in Europe, the credit crisis and the problem of debt redemptions. Furthermore, it became obvious some serious gaps in the coordination of ! nancial market regulation between countries of origin and host countries funding. Thus arose systemic risks that consider branches of international banks with headquarters in another EU country for which mo-dality pre-crisis surveillance only by the authorities of the country of origin is not suf! cient at present to ensure protection against a potential systemic risk. Re" ecting these conditions, Vienna 2.0 aims to ensure that deleve-

raging is controlled and successful, so as to minimize systemic risks emerging

in Europe. It is intended that the countries of origin of capital to cooperate

more closely with host countries to better assess potential systemic risks that

may arise in the host countries. The tax authorities should also be more di-

rectly involved in coordinating country of origin - the host country. Activity

within the Vienna Initiative 2.0 aims to obtain practical results through moni-

toring, reporting deleveraging - deleveraging by creating temporary structures

in which decision makers from public and private sector to exchange experi-

ences and discuss appropriate steps forward.

At Vienna 2.0 initiative in March 2012, was debated a set of prin-

ciples for cooperation of ! nancial supervision in countries of origin and host

countries. These principalities were developed based on experiences and pre-

vious consultations Initiative so that, at present these Principia come to pro-

vide a basis for bilateral cooperation between the member states involved,

additional meetings relevant European fora such as the ESRB.

Vienna 2.0 initiative is led by a steering committee chaired by Ma-

rek Belka, NBP president. EBRD, EIB, European Commission, International

Monetary Fund and the World Bank have played a key role in the creation and

further development of the Vienna Initiative.

The initiative was an example of successful development of coope-

ration relations between the public and private sectors, as it brings together all

! nancial actors leading the European Union with exposure and bank branches

in countries Emerging Europe, these include major institutions international

! nancial and most important European institutions, ! scal and ! nancial regu-

latory authorities of the country of origin and the host country.

Initial main objectives of the initiative were:

- Prevention widespread deleveraging and withdrawal uncoordina-

ted border banking groups in the region that could trigger syste-

mic banking crisis not only in individual countries but throughout

the region;


- Ensure that the parent banking groups maintain their exposure in emerging Europe and recapitalize their subsidiaries and branches in these countries;

- Ensuring that national support packages of cross-border banking groups had bene! cial effects in the host countries.

- Consensus among members of the Initiative on the implementati-on principal basic crisis management in the region.

To the extent that systemic risk in emerging Europe have started to moderate, Initiative Vienna and moved his attention to the critical issues at re-gional level and policies that would make ! nancial sectors in emerging Euro-pe stronger long-term shocks systemic Initiative forum identi! ed at meetings. In this respect working groups (WG) were formed comprising representatives from parent banks, regulators, central banks, ! nance ministries, European in-stitutions and international ! nancial institutions. Lucar history of the Vienna Initiative: January 23, 2009 - The ! rst meeting �Vienna Initiative� (VI) held at the Austrian Ministry of Finance under the chairmanship of Mr. T. Wieser, involving central banks and ! nance ministries of several countries of Central and Eastern Europe, key advanced EU countries, the supervisory authorities of the countries of origin of cross-border banks and IFIs (IMF, EBRD, EIB, World Bank, IFC). At this meeting, the EBRD, E. Berglof introduced the concept of a platform for collective action between public and private labeled �Vienna Club�. It was agreed that the IMF should develop principles for sharing the ! nancial burden between the countries of origin and host country authorities of cross-border banks. March 17, 2009 - The second meeting �Vienna Initiative�, held in the Joint Vienna Institute, under the chairmanship of Mr. T. Wieser. IMF (David Hardy, head) shows a distribution of burden-sharing rules between the home and host country are largely agree on how to use the crisis. September 24, 2009 - The ! rst full meeting of the Vienna Initiative Forum in Brussels under the chairmanship of John Berrigan, Director General Department of ECOFIN. The meeting takes stock of progress made up to that point and discuss for the ! rst time, the possibility of easing deleveraging in the future - away from the ! rst phase signal of systemic risk. Participants: 17 ! nancial group - mothers banking supervisory authorities of the home and host countries and tax authorities, EC, IMF, EBRD, EIB, WB, ECB and CEBS (Committee of European Banking Supervisors). March 17/18, 2010 - The second meeting of the Vienna Initiative fully in Athens marked the moment to evaluating the work so far and signals


a shift from the phase of systemic risk (while the remain in effect for future use and for selected countries); and discusses how to use the framework of collective action of the Vienna Initiative beyond crisis management. To test the usefulness of the framework for political discussions, two working groups were established with urgent issues of relevance to stakeholders: one on the development of local currencies and local capital market development and the absorption of the European funds. At this meeting attended by 20 ban-king groups, supervisors in their countries of origin and host countries and tax authorities, EC, IMF, EBRD, EIB, World Bank, ECB, CEBS. 17/18 March 2011 - a full third meeting of the Forum of the Vien-na Initiative, was held in Brussels to consider the recommendations of the two working groups (local currencies and capital market development and EU funds) and decide on the future of the Vienna Initiative. March 24/25, 2011 - Addressing the Vienna Initiative is brought to the discussions in the eurozone by the European Council on the new Euro-pean Monetary System (EMS). Vienna Initiative is cited as an approach for private sector involvement: �If, based on an analysis of sustainability, it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment program can restore public debt on a sustainable path, the bene! ciary Member State will take initiatives to encourage the main private investors to maintain their exposure (eg a �Vienna Initiative�).

Conclusions

Stakeholders felt that the recommended actions were successful in crisis management and its framework should be preserved due to the possi-bility of recurrence of the remaining risks. The main activity of the Vienna Initiative it should be moved to cover issues of crisis prevention, bene! ting from its composition unique public-private sector based on the model of the ! rst two working groups. Two new working groups are formed, one on the implications of the new regulations Basel III for emerging Europe; and the other on the management of bad assets.

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Rolul b�ncilor în absorb�ia fondurilor europene pentru men�inerea macrostabilit��ii

Conf. univ. dr. Madalina Anghel



Drd. Georgiana Nita

Abstract

Unul din obiectivele Ini�iativei de la Viena consta în men�inerea de c�tre institu�iile de credit din ��rile mai dezvoltate ale Uniunii Europene a unor niveluri de expunere � nanciar� în ��rile care fac obiectul ini�iativei (Europa emergent). Îndeplinirea acestor angajamente de expunere este, cu toate acestea, costisitoare în lipsa oportunit��ilor de investi�ii în ��rile gazd�. O mai bun� absorb�ie a fondurilor UE de c�tre autorit��ile na�ionale, precum �i implicarea mai activ� a b�ncilor în selectarea, de pre� nan�are �i co-� nan�area proiectelor din fonduri structurale ar putea crea noi oportunit��i de afaceri pentru institu�iile de credit, pentru a facilita îndeplinirea angajamentelor lor de expunere �i, astfel, s� contribuie la revigora economic� a ��rilor gazd�. Cuvinte cheie: angajamente, expunere, absorb�ie, fonduri, stabilitate

Introducere. Literature review

De!i exist" o mare varia#ie între statele membre, absorb#ia fondurilor UE este în general dezam"gitoare !i în special acest lucru în România. În România, la nivelul anului 2011 doar 13 la suta din fondurile disponibile în cadrul perspectivelor $ nanciare 2007-2013 au fost pl"tite pân" în present, iar în anul 2015, absorb%ia se ridic" la 50&. Dac" s-ar sc"dea avansurile în numerar, care sunt transferate în mod independent de evaluare sau de implementare a proiectului, raportul de absorb#ie este chiar mai mic de 3 la suta fata de 9 la suta pentru noile state membre, în medie comparabil" cu performan#ele vechilor state membre. Exist" multe motive pentru absorb#ia slab" a fondurilor UE în unele noi state membre, în mare parte legate de adoptarea recent" a acquis-ului comunitar. Experien#a !i cele mai bune practici din unele state membre ale UE pot oferi unele lec#ii valoroase. Astfel, s-a eviden%iat un rol potential semni$ cativ pe care b"ncile l-ar putea avea în selectarea, punerea în aplicare !i $ nan#area proiectelor în conformitate cu reglement"rile UE privind fondurile structurale.


Anghelache, Anghel, Diaconu, Badiu !i Ni"# (2016) studiaz# absorb"ia fondurilor comunitare prin intermediul unor modele de analiz#. Zaman !i Georgescu (2014) analizeaz# provoc#rile care in$ uen"eaz# sectorul credit#rii bancare. Anghelache, Soare !i Dumitrescu (2016) prezint# modelul unei platforme software dedicat# proiectelor % nan"ate din fonduri europene nerambursabile. Popa (2014) studiaz# absorb"ia fondurilor europene în România, pe baz# de date statistice. Berica (2011) descrie rolul b#ncilor comerciale române!ti în atragerea de fonduri structurale. Paul (2011) se preocup# de diversi% carea surselor de % nan"are pentru economia româneasc#, inclusiv rolul fondurilor europene. Marzinotto (2011) se concentreaz# pe utilitatea fondurilor europene în redresarea economic# post-criz#.

Metodologie �i date

În func&ie de Programul Opera&ional, posibilit#&ile de creditare ar putea % semni% cative, în cazul în care ar putea % asigurat# o mai bun# absorb&ie a fondurilor UE. Ca un exemplu, presupunând o rat# de co% nan&are de 25 la sut# din absorb&ia anual# a Programului Opera&ional Competitivit#&ii Economice din România, de creditare suplimentare în valoare de aproximativ 100 de milioane de euro ar putea % generate pe an sau 0,25 la sut# cre'tere a creditului în plus pe an (pentru toate fondurile structurale: 830 milioane EUR sau 1,7 la sut# cre'tere a creditului suplimentar). Astfel se eviden"ieaz# un rol important nu numai în % nan&area proiectelor, în cazul în care o scrisoare de confort ar putea % de ajutor, dar, de asemenea, în faza de evaluare pe baza criteriilor elaborate în comun cu Autoritatea de Management, precum 'i în monitorizarea proiectelor. Instrumente % nanciare inovatoare, ar putea % folosite pentru a mobiliza fondurile structurale. Unele dintre aceste propuneri de&in poten&ial imediat; altele ar putea avea nevoie s# % e introduse în proiecte pilot individuale, în timp ce propunerile ample mai pot necesita o rearanjare, în contextul urm#toarei perioade bugetare. �Revizuirea bugetului UE este un pas important spre cre�terea

efectului de pârghie al bugetului UE. Noi forme de � nan�are pentru investi�ii

au fost dezvoltate în perioada de programare 2007- 2013, treccandu-se de

la � nan�areatradi�ional� pe baz� de subven�ii la modalit��i inovatoare de

a combina subven�ii �i împrumuturi.� Comisia UE: Investi&iile în viitorul Europei - Al cincilea raport pe tem# economic#, social# 'i coeziunea teritorial#, noiembrie 2010. Fondurile structurale ale UE � al doilea instrument bugetar al UE ca !i importan"#, au fost insu% cient utilizate in multe noi state membre ale UE, în timp ce activitatea de creditare a stagnat sau s-a recuperat lent. O mai bun# utilizare a fondurilor structurale poate % cheia pentru stimularea investi&iilor


publice !i private, consolidarea productivit"#ii în sectoarele care sunt esen#iale pentru competitivitate !i cre!tere în timp ce, în timp ce b"ncile ofer" co-$ nan#are !i pre-$ nan#are acestor oportunit"#i considerabile pentru sectorul $ nanciar privat. Actorii $ nanciari priva%i pot contribui la mobilizarea fondurilor nerambursabile UE, prin expertiza lor în sectorul corporatist local !i în curs de c"utare a unor concepte antreprenoriale inovatoare !i instrumente $ nanciare. Cuplat cu e$ cien#a lor în evaluarea proiectului !i monitorizare, b"ncile comerciale pot aduce dinamismul necesar pentru industrie !i servicii locale. Grupuri bancare active la nivel mondial au o prezen#" puternic" în Europa Central" !i de Est. Sucursalele !i $ lialele b"ncilor str"ine au o cot" de pia#" de aproximativ 75& în totalul activelor sistemului bancar din Ungaria !i Letonia !i aproape de 90 la suta din România. Toate cele trei state membre ale UE au primit sprijin din partea comunit"#ii $ nanciare interna#ionale. Sub coordonarea Vienna Initiative 2, b"ncile-mam" sunt invitae s" men#in" angajamentul fa#" de aceste #"ri, ca parte a acordului între p"r#ile interesate în efortul de stabilizare macropruden%iale. UE, FMI, Banca Mondial", BEI !i BERD au oferit balan#ei de sprijin pl"#i !i alte $ nan#"ri de urgen#" în timpul crizei, în timp ce autorit"#ile na#ionale s-au angajat s" ia m"surile bugetare, monetare !i structurale necesare pentru a aduce înapoi economiile pe o baz" solid". Angajamentul b"ncilor-mam" este, în esen#" dublu: în primul rând, $ lialele din #"rile gazd" au men#inut rezerve de capital adecvate !i în al doilea rând, $ ecare grup bancar a men#inut un anumit nivel de expunere. Cu aceste angajamente voluntare, s-a putut evita o dezintermediere haotic" ce ar $ dus la o între%ire a crizei $ nanciare.

Angajamente expunere

Sursa: Comisia European"


În general, b!ncile mama "i-au îndeplinit angajamentele de expunere, dar au subliniat c! într-o economie în sc!dere cu cererea de credite în sc!dere, o parte din lichiditatea lor existent în # lialele lor a r!mas neutilizat! în lipsa oportunit!$ilor de investi$ii. Într-adev!r, cre"terea creditului este înc! sc!zut! în România %i în jurul valorii de zero în Ungaria "i r!mâne negativ! în Letonia. Cre"terea nevoilor de # nan$are ale guvernului nu a reprezentat decât par$ial un r!spuns satisf!c!tor la cererea de oportunitati de investitii. Prin urmare, o provocare-cheie pentru a merge mai departe a constat în revigorarea economic! "i cre"terea cererii de credit din partea sectorul privat. Fondurile structurale ale UE pot juca un rol important în stimularea economiilor pentru o redresare sus$inut!. Acest lucru ar putea # bene# c pentru b!nci, în c!utare de oportunit!$i de investi$ii în dou! moduri. În primul rând, b!ncile pot pro# ta de o redresare a investi$iilor "i de cre"tere, care în cele din urm! va duce la cre"terea cererii pentru creditele în toate sectoarele. În al doilea rând, la nivel microeconomic, b!ncile pot contribui în mod direct la # nan$area proiectelor eligibile pentru fonduri UE. Exist! trei obiective din politica de coeziune anterioar!: convergen&!, competitivitatea regiunilor %i for&a de munc! ocupat!, precum "i cooperarea teritorial!. UE a pus la dispozi$ie 178 miliarde de euro pentru noilor state membre în perioada 2007-2013 (circa 19 la sut! din total PIB pe 2010, a se vedea tabelul 1) în conformitate cu trei instrumente principale: � Fondul European de Dezvoltare Regional! (FEDR), care # nan$eaz!: (i) investi$ii în companii (în special IMM-uri) pentru a crea locuri de munc! durabile; (ii) infrastructura legat! de activit!&i de CDI, ITC , energie, transport, mediu ;(iii) instrumentele # nanciare (fonduri de risc de capital, fonduri de dezvoltare local!, etc.) pentru a sprijini dezvoltarea local! %i cea regional precum "i pentru a încuraja cooperarea dintre regiuni %i ora% (iv) asisten$a tehnic!. � Fondul Social European (FSE), care urm!re"te s! îmbun!t!$easc! ocuparea for$ei de munc! prin sprijinirea de ac$iuni în urm!toarele domenii: (i) adaptarea muncitorilor "i a întreprinderilor prin programe de înv!$are pe tot parcursul vie$ii "i a organiza$iilor inovatoare; (ii) accesul la locuri de munc! pentru solicitan$ii de locuri de munc!, "omeri, femei "i migran$ii; (iii) integrarea social! a persoanelor dezavantajate "i combaterea discrimin!rii pe pia$a muncii "i (iv) consolidarea capitalului uman prin reforma sistemelor de educa$ie. � Fondul de Coeziune (FC) care este destinat statelor membre care au un venit na&ional brut per cap de locuitor sub 90' din media comunitar! (aceasta include to&i cei zece membri noi) "i # nan$eaz! activit!$i în urm!toarele categorii: (i) re$elele de transport trans-europene "i (ii) mediu, inclusiv energia regenerabil!, feroviar "i transportul public.


În total, aceste trei fonduri reprezint! aproximativ 35 la sut! din bugetul UE. Cele zece noi state membre au primit putin peste jumatate (51 la suta) din fondurile disponibile în cadrul acestor trei fonduri. Statele membre au de$ nit

programele opera#ionale la începutul perioadei bugetare. Aceste programe opera#ionale stabilesc priorit!#i na#ionale $i pot acoperi una sau mai multe activit!#i, care acoper! de multe ori mai multe regiuni dintr-o #ar! $i bazându-se pe mai multe fonduri.

Fondurile structurale puse la dispozi�ia statelor membre nou intrate,

comparativ cu UE 2010 Fonduri

StructuraleBn EUR % GDP % din Total Bn EUR % GDP Bn EUR % GDP

Bulgaria 6,9 19,3 3,8 1,0 2,9 1,1 3,0Republica Ceh!

26,7 18,3 15,0 3,8 2,6 4,0 2,6

Estonia 3,5 25 1,9 0,5 3,5 0,5 3,6Cipru 0,6 3,4 0,4 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,3Letonia 4,6 27,7 2,6 0,7 3,9 0,7 4,2Lituania 4,6 27,7 2,6 0,7 3,8 1,1 2,9Ungaria 25,3 26,2 14,2 3,6 3,8 3,8 3,8Malta 0,9 14,5 0,5 0,1 2,1 0,1 2,0Polonia 67,3 19,0 37,8 9,4 2,7 10 2,7Romania 19,7 16,0 11,0 3,1 2,5 3,3 2,5Slovenia 4,2 11,7 2,4 0,6 1,7 0,6 1,7Slovacia 11,6 17,6 6,5 1,7 2,5 1,8 2,5Total 178,1 19,0 100,0 25,6 2,7 27,1 2,7

Alte fonduriDezvoltare rural!

37,6 4,0 5,6 0,6 5,5 0,6

Pescuit 1,4 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,0Toate fondurile

217,0 23,2 31,4 3,4 32,8 3,3

Buget EU Bn EUR % GDP % din Total Bn EUR % GDP Bn EUR % GDP

Total 975,8 8,0 100,0 141,0 1,2 143,0 1,1Fonduri structurale

346,1 2,8 35,5 49,4 0,4 50,6 0,4

Dezvoltare rural!

96,4 0,8 9,9 14,4 0,1 14,4 0,1

Pescuit 4,3 0,0 0,4 0,6 0,0 0,7 0,0Toate fondurile

446,8 3,7 45,8 64,4 0,5 65,7 0,5

Sursa: Comisia European!

În plus fa#! de fondurile structurale special concepute pentru încurajarea cre&terii &i a convergen'ei Bugetul Financiar Multianual 2007 �


2013 a prev!zut, de asemenea, Fondul European Agricol pentru Dezvoltare Rural! (FEADR) $i Fondul european pentru pescuit (FEP), în care noile state membre au putea bene# cia de 37.5 miliarde EUR $i 1,4 miliarde.

Concluzii

Fondurile structurale ale UE necesit! co-# nan$are na$ional! pentru a putea # implementate. Ratele de co# nan$are UE în cadrul fondurilor structurale "i de coeziune sunt modulate în func$ie de nivelul relativ de dezvoltare a statului membru sprijinit, pe baza obiectivului politicii de coeziune "i a fondului în care este oferit sprijinul. Pentru statele membre al c!ror PIB a fost de sub 85 la suta din media UE în perioada 2001 - 2003, # nan$area grant de la FEDR, FSE "i FC este la un maxim de 85 la suta din costurile de investi$ii eligibile ale unui proiect. Pentru statele membre mai dezvoltate, ratele de co# nan$are UE variaz! mai ales în intervalul de la 50 la 85 la sut[.

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ROLE OF BANKS IN IN EUROPEAN FUNDS ABSORPTIONTO MAINTAIN

MACROECONOMIC STABILITY

Conf. univ. dr. Madalina Anghel



Drd. Georgiana Nita

Abstract

One of the objectives of the Vienna Initiative consists in maintain-ing the credit institutions in more developed countries of the European Union�s � nancial exposure levels in countries covered by the initiative (emerging Eu-

rope). Ful� lling these commitments exposure is, however, without costly in-

vestment opportunities in host countries. A better absorption of EU funds by

national authorities, as well as active involvement of banks in the selection,

pre-� nancing and co - � nancing from the structural funds could create new

business opportunities for credit institutions to facilitate the ful� lment of their

commitments exposure and thus contribute to revive the economy of the host

countries.

Key words: engagements, exposure, absorption, funds, stability

Introduction. Literature review

Although there is great variation between Member States, EU funds absorption is generally disappointing and especially so in Romania. In Romania, in 2011 only 13 percent of the funds available under the 2007-2013 ! nancial perspectives were paid by date, and in 2015, the absorption amounts to 50%. If you would fall cash advances that are transferred independent evaluation or project implementation, absorption ratio is even lower than 3 percent vs. 9 percent for the new Member States on average comparable to the performance of old member states. There are many reasons for poor absorption of EU funds in some new Member States, mostly related to the recent adoption of the acquis com-munitarian. Experience and best practice in some EU member states may pro-vide some valuable lessons. Thus, it revealed a potentially signi! cant role that banks might have in the selection, implementation and ! nancing of projects in line with EU regulations on the Structural Funds. Anghelache, Anghel, Diaconu, Badiu and Ni"# (2016) study the absorption of community funds through the application of analysis models.


Zaman and Georgescu (2014) analyze the challenges that in! uence the

banking lending sector. Anghelache, Soare and Dumitrescu (2016) present the

model of a software platform dedicated to projects funded from European

non-reimbursable funds. Popa (2014) studies the absorption of European

funds in Romania, based on statistic data. Berica (2011) describes the role of

commercial banks of Romania in attracting structural funds. Paul (2011) is

preoccupied with the diversi" cation of " nancing sources for the Romanian

economy, including the role of European funds. Marzinotto (2011) focuses on

the utility of European funds in post-crisis recovery.

Research methodology and data

Depending on the Operational Programme, lending possibilities

could be signi" cant if it could be provided better absorption of EU funds. As

an example, assuming a " nancing rate of 25 percent of annual absorptions

Economic Competitiveness Operational Programme in Romania, lending ad-

ditional amount of approximately 100 million could be generated per year or

0.25 percent increase extra credit per year (for all structural funds: EUR 830

million or 1.7 percent increase in credit available). This highlights an impor-

tant role not only in providing funding, where a comfort letter could be help-

ful, but also the assessment phase based on criteria developed jointly with the

Managing and monitoring projects. Innovative " nancial instruments could be

used to mobilize structural funds. Some of these proposals have the potential

immediately; others may need to be placed in individual pilot projects, while

proposals may require extensive rearrangement in the forthcoming budget pe-

riod.

The EU budget review is an important step towards increasing the

leverage of the EU budget. New forms of " nance for investment have been

developed in the programming period 2007- 2013, up from traditional " nance

and based subsidies innovative ways to combine grants and loans. � EU Com-

mission: Investing in Europe�s future - Fifth Report on the theme of economic,

social and territorial cohesion, in November 2010.

EU Structural Funds - second instrument of EU budget in impor-

tance, have been underutilized in many new EU Member States, while lending

stagnated or has recovered slowly. A better use of structural funds may be key

to boosting public and private investment, enhancing productivity in sectors

that are essential for competitiveness and growth while, while banks provide

co-" nancing and pre-" nancing these signi" cant opportunities for the " nancial

sector private.

Private " nancial actors can help mobilize EU grants through their

expertise in the corporate sector and emerging local search business concepts


and innovative ! nancial instruments. Coupled with their ef! ciency in project evaluation and monitoring, commercial banks can provide the dynamism for industry and local services. Globally active banking groups have a strong presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks have a market share of approximately 75% in total banking assets in Hungary and Latvia and almost 90 percent of Romania. All three EU Member States have received support from the international ! nancial community. Under the coordination of the Vienna Initiative 2 parent banks are invitations to maintain commitment to these countries as part of the agreement between stakeholders in efforts to stabilize the macro-prudential. EU, IMF, World Bank, EIB and EBRD have provided balance support payments and other emergency ! nancing during the crisis, while national authorities have committed to take the necessary budget-ary, monetary and structural required to bring savings on a solid foundation. The commitment of parent banks is essentially twofold: ! rstly, subsidiaries in host countries have maintained adequate capital reserves and secondly, each banking group maintained a certain level of exposure. With these voluntary commitments, it was able to avoid a chaotic deleveraging that would lead to a ! nancial crisis.

Commitments exposure

Source: European Commission

In general, banks have ful! lled their commitments mother of expo-sure, but stressed that in an economy with declining loan demand shrinking, some of their existing liquidity in subsidiaries remained idle in the absence of investment opportunities. Indeed, credit growth is still low in Romania and around zero in Hungary and Latvia remains negative. Increasing ! nancing needs of the government represented only partially satisfactory response to the demand for investment opportunities. Therefore, a key challenge to go on


was the economic recovery and increased demand for credit from the private sector. EU structural funds can play an important role in stimulating the economy for a sustained recovery. This could be bene! cial to banks in search of investment opportunities in two ways. First, banks can take advantage of a recovery in investment and growth, which ultimately will lead to increased demand for loans in all sectors. Secondly, at the microeconomic level, banks can directly contribute to the funding of projects eligible for EU funding. There are three objectives of cohesion policy Previous: conver-gence, regional competitiveness and employment busy and territorial coop-eration. The EU has made available 178 billion for the new Member States in 2007-2013 (about 19 percent of total GDP in 2010, see Table 1) in accordance with three main tools: � European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) ! nances: (i) in-vestments in companies (in particular SMEs) to create sustainable jobs; (Ii) R & D activities related infrastructure, ICT, energy, transport, environment;

(iii) ! nancial instruments (capital risk funds, local development funds, etc.) to support local and regional development and to foster cooperation between regions and cities (iv) technical assistance. � European Social Fund (ESF), which aims to improve employment by supporting actions in the following areas: (i) the adaptation of workers and enterprises through programs of lifelong learning and innovative organi-zations; (Ii) access to jobs for applicants for jobs, unemployed, women and migrants; (Iii) social integration of disadvantaged people and combating dis-crimination in the labor market and (iv) strengthening human capital by re-forming education systems. � Cohesion Fund (CF) is for the Member States with a GNI per capita below 90 % of the Community average (this includes the ten new mem-bers) and ! nance activities in the following categories: ( i) transmission trans -European and (ii ) environment, including renewable energy , rail and public transport. In total, these three funds account for about 35 percent of the EU budget. The ten new Member States received just over half (51 percent) of the funds available under these three Funds. Member States have de! ned the operational programs at the beginning of the budget period. These operational programs and establishing national priorities may cover one or more activi-ties, often covering more regions of a country and relying on more funding.


Structural funds available to Member States new entrants

compared to the EU 2010

Structural funds Bn EUR % GDP % din Total Bn EUR % GDP Bn EUR % GDPBulgaria 6,9 19,3 3,8 1,0 2,9 1,1 3,0Czech Republic 26,7 18,3 15,0 3,8 2,6 4,0 2,6Estonia 3,5 25 1,9 0,5 3,5 0,5 3,6Cyprus 0,6 3,4 0,4 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,3Latvia 4,6 27,7 2,6 0,7 3,9 0,7 4,2Lithuania 4,6 27,7 2,6 0,7 3,8 1,1 2,9Hungary 25,3 26,2 14,2 3,6 3,8 3,8 3,8Malta 0,9 14,5 0,5 0,1 2,1 0,1 2,0Poland 67,3 19,0 37,8 9,4 2,7 10 2,7Romania 19,7 16,0 11,0 3,1 2,5 3,3 2,5Slovenia 4,2 11,7 2,4 0,6 1,7 0,6 1,7Slovakia 11,6 17,6 6,5 1,7 2,5 1,8 2,5Total 178,1 19,0 100,0 25,6 2,7 27,1 2,7

Other fundsRural development 37,6 4,0 5,6 0,6 5,5 0,6

Fishing 1,4 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,0All funds 217,0 23,2 31,4 3,4 32,8 3,3EU Budget Bn EUR % GDP % din Total Bn EUR % GDP Bn EUR % GDP

Total 975,8 8,0 100,0 141,0 1,2 143,0 1,1Structural funds 346,1 2,8 35,5 49,4 0,4 50,6 0,4

Rural development 96,4 0,8 9,9 14,4 0,1 14,4 0,1Fishing 4,3 0,0 0,4 0,6 0,0 0,7 0,0All funds 446,8 3,7 45,8 64,4 0,5 65,7 0,5

In addition to the Structural Funds speci! cally designed to promote growth and convergence. Budget Multiannual Financial Framework 2007 - 2013 provided also the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Fisheries Fund (EFF), the new Member States bene! t from EUR 37.5 billion and 1.4 billion.

Conclusions

EU structural funds require national co-! nancing to be implemented. EU co-! nancing rates under the Structural Funds and the Cohesion vary depending on the relative level of development of the Member State support based on the objective of cohesion policy and fund the support is provided. For Member States whose GDP was below 85 percent of the EU average in the period 2001-2003, grant funding from the ERDF, ESF and CF is a maximum of 85 percent of eligible investment costs of a project.


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