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Revisiting Free Compulsory UniversalBasic Education (FCUBE) in GhanaKwame Akyeampong aa Centre for International Education , University of Sussex ,Brighton, UKPublished online: 12 May 2009.

To cite this article: Kwame Akyeampong (2009) Revisiting Free Compulsory UniversalBasic Education (FCUBE) in Ghana, Comparative Education, 45:2, 175-195, DOI:10.1080/03050060902920534

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Comparative EducationVol. 45, No. 2, May 2009, 175–195

ISSN 0305-0068 print/ISSN 1360-0486 online© 2009 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/03050060902920534http://www.informaworld.com

Revisiting Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE)in Ghana

Kwame Akyeampong*

Centre for International Education, University of Sussex, Brighton, UKTaylor and FrancisCCED_A_392225.sgm10.1080/03050060902920534Comparative Education0305-0068 (print)/1360-0486 (online)Original Article2009Taylor & Francis452000000May 2009KwameAkyeamponga.akyeampong@sussex.ac.uk

When Ghana became independent in 1957 it had one of the most developededucation systems in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Over the next forty years itseducation system expanded to provide places for most, but not all, of its children.Since the education reforms of the late 1980s enrolments have grown steadily; thiscontrasts with some SSA countries with universal free primary education policies,which have experienced short periods of rapid growth. Education reforms inGhana, however, have fallen below expectations. The Free and CompulsoryUniversal Basic Education (FCUBE) programme introduced in 1995 promiseduniversal education by 2005. This paper revisits Ghana’s FCUBE policy for cluesas to why it did not achieve the target goal and especially why poorest householdsseem to have benefited least from it. One disappointment with FCUBE is that itsinput did not go far enough to offset the opportunity costs of schooling for thepoorest households by abolishing all forms of fees and reducing significantly theindirect costs associated with attending school. The incidence of late entry,overage attendance and poor households’ need for child labour also posed afurther threat to the benefits FCUBE promised.

Introduction

The Millennium Development Goals state that by 2015 children everywhere shouldbe able to complete a full course of primary schooling. As 2015 approaches it isbecoming increasingly clear that although developing countries have made progress,there is still more to do to achieve this goal (UNESCO 2007). The one policy strategymany countries have adopted to accelerate progress towards Education for All (EFA)has been the introduction of fee-free education. From 2000 to 2006 alone, 14 devel-oping countries formally abolished tuition fees for primary schools as a strategy toaccelerate progress towards EFA (UNESCO 2007). The result has been a surge inenrolments, although it continues to be the case that getting children from disadvan-taged or marginalised communities to enrol and complete basic education remains achallenge. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) still has about a third of primary school age chil-dren out of school, and the vast majority of them are from poor, rural backgrounds andmostly girls (UNESCO 2007). The issues of poverty and access to education are inter-related since educational deprivation may be caused or influenced by low income,vulnerability and poverty. Educational policies intended to expand access for the poortherefore need good understandings of the socio-economic challenges they face, theopportunity costs associated with school attendance and how these may be addressedthrough targeted policies that motivate and sustain demand. It is also important to

*Email: a.akyeampong@sussex.ac.uk

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176 K. Akyeampong

assess the extent to which policies are genuinely pro-poor, and what implementation,social, economic and/or political constraints may undermine effective uptake by poorand vulnerable groups.

Ghana presents a particularly interesting case of the impact of fee-free universalcompulsory education policy, because unlike other countries which introduced similarpolicies and saw significant rapid increases in enrolments (e.g. Uganda), the policy inGhana produced slower, steadier growth. This may have been partly influenced by thefact that the Free and Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) policy didlittle to eliminate or significantly reduce much of the schooling costs to poor house-holds. In this paper, I use an analysis of changes in the patterns of primary and juniorsecondary attendance to discuss the limited scope and depth of Ghana’s FCUBEpolicy implementation, and identify reasons why progress has been lower thananticipated.

The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews literature to highlightkey issues of educational expansion in developing countries and examines some of thefactors determining household demand for schooling. It is followed by an overview ofGhana’s economic and educational performance prior to the launch of the FCUBEpolicy in 1996. Next is a summary of fee-free policies prior to FCUBE, followed bya discussion of the content of FCUBE and what it set out to achieve. The next sectionuses two large household survey data sets, the Ghana Living Standards Surveys(GLSS) collected in 1997/98 and 2005/06, to assess changes to the structure ofattendance by welfare quintile under FCUBE. Finally, the paper concludes with asummary of key implications for future policy in Ghana.

Key issues from the literature

Compulsory basic education is considered an essential part of basic public services(McMahon and Boediono 1992; Eckstein and Zilcha 1994; Watkins 2000). However,compulsory legislation is not a pre-condition for achieving EFA especially in theabsence of political will to enforce such legislation and the practical difficulties ofimplementation. Based on experiences of countries that had succeeded in achievinghigh enrolments, Mehrotra (1998) concluded that compulsory legislation in itselfcontributed little. Mehrotra (1998) cites the case of India, where high enrolment instates such as Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, and Manipur, had no compulsory legislation,whereas states with such legislation – Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan – hadachieved relatively low enrolment ratios. Little (2008, 60) concludes, after a criticalreview of mass education in Europe and the US, that: ‘compulsory education legisla-tion appears to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the achievement ofearly growth in primary enrolment, and that whether it is necessary for universalachievement … remains open’.

What seems important is the political commitment to implement compulsory legis-lation, and even where this commitment is high, enrolment rates are usually quite low.According to Appleton et al. (1996), it is the collective influence of local authoritiesand peer groups which gives real practical meaning to universal achievement and notstate coercion (e.g. threat of sanctions). Their point, in effect is that, without stronglocal community advocacy and support, such legislation is rendered practically impo-tent. Compulsory legislation often provides the legal framework for governmentaction to supply basic education services more widely and equitably, but that action,especially in poor countries, does not necessarily motivate demand. Demand is more

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Comparative Education 177

a function of household cost-benefit analysis and their assessment of the opportunitycosts.

Studies show that lowering the cost of schooling reduces the wealth bias that char-acterises access to primary education, and in particular, reduces the incidence of cost-related dropouts from primary school (Deininger 2003; de Kemp 2008). But evenwhen costs have been lowered, education could still remain a privilege from which thepoor are excluded (Watkins 2000). Based on evidence from a wide range of countries,Hannum and Buchmann (2005) found that educational expansion policy does notnecessarily narrow educational opportunities between the social strata, not even whenit is accompanied by reforms designed to modify the allocation of education opportu-nities within society. What tends to happen is that groups with high enough social andeconomic capital are more able to make the most of the opportunities educationalexpansion offers, leaving poorer members of society still at a disadvantage. Thosebetter off social groups also benefit from differentiated access to quality schooling.Even when income disparities with regard to access are eliminated or reduced signif-icantly, delayed enrolment, repetition and/or poor attainment can create unevenaccess.

On the whole there is compelling evidence in the literature that reducing consider-ably the costs to parents of sending children to school greatly increases access toprimary schooling (Appleton et al. 1996; Mehrotra 1998; Watkins 2000; Deininger2003; UNESCO 2007; de Kemp 2008). The benefits of attending school are mainlylong-term and accrue mainly to the child, and not immediately and directly to parentswho shoulder the costs. Lowering both the direct and indirect costs reduces the oppor-tunity costs associated with enrolling for both children and their parents. Besides theopportunity costs, households’ determination of risk plays a key part in determiningwhether or not they enrol their children in school. In particular, some poor parentsmay not necessarily see schooling exclusively or primarily as a worthwhile economicinvestment (Boakye et al. 1982; Appleton et al. 1996; Awedoba et al. 2003; Hashim2005) and may respond to fee-free education policy selectively. Thus, for example,whilst some may send their male child to school others would keep their female childat home to support household livelihoods.

Child labour has also been known to exert a strong influence on householddecisions. In situations where the household relies on labour intensive livelihoods forsurvival, the demand for child labour has competed or interfered with schooling (see,Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997; Ye and Canagarajah 2002; GSS 2003). However,child labour and its consequence on school attendance does not occur only in poorhouseholds (see Rolleston in this volume), but especially for poor households,economic and social vulnerability can be the factors which tip decisions againstenrolling some children. In their study of household demand for schooling in Ghana,Awedoba et al. (2003) found that economic shocks and small changes in familycircumstances often made the difference between a child attending school anddropping out temporarily or permanently.

Whilst fee-free education can impact positively on school attendance, a reductionin indirect costs has been found to exert an even stronger influence (Mehrotra 1998;Hashim 2005). Specifically, in environments where ancillary costs such as transport,feeding and school uniforms are increasing, the impact of fee-free education could belimited. High enrolments also increase costs for schools and without the replacementof revenues lost due to the abolition of fees, schools may resort to charging indirectfees, or fees disguised as school improvement levies.

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The existence of a gender gap in schooling in low-income countries is wellestablished in the literature (see Appleton et al. 1996). In general, the barriers to girls’enrolment in schooling have poverty and parental decision-making as a commondenominator (Academy for Education Development 2002). Where affordabilitybecomes an issue and parents feel they have to make the choice of which child toenrol, the tendency has been to favour boys who are believed to generate more ininvestment returns than girls (Herz et al. 1991; Appleton et al. 1996; Avotri 2000). Insome communities, cultural values and stereotyping (i.e. which child is most likely tolook after their parents) have also played an important role in determining whetherhouseholds enrol girls in school (Yeboah 1997).

In summary, household demand for schooling depends on the different ways inwhich they perceive their valuable assets, including human capital, how they assessinvestment risk in education and how they weigh the opportunity costs. Culturalvalues and social norms could also play an important part. Other influences on house-hold decisions include pupils’ chances of passing examinations in order to move upthe educational ladder or whether a school has enough teachers to secure improve-ments in children’s learning achievements (Awedoba et al. 2003). It is also the casethat low enrolment is not necessarily the result of weak demand. In northern Ghana,for example, supply constraints were still substantial until recently. This explainspartly the persistent low enrolment in that part of Ghana.

These issues raised here point to the depth and scope of the challenges that theFCUBE policy faces in creating demand to achieve universal enrolments, or inmoving beyond the plateau of high enrolments to high transition and completion.Before evaluating Ghana’s progress under the FCUBE policy, the next sectiondiscusses the economic and educational conditions that preceded it.

Fall and rise of Ghana’s economy and educational performance

After independence in 1957, Ghana’s economy grew until the early 1970s when itstarted to experience a long period of decline. From 1979 to 1983, total economicoutput declined by 14% and real per capita income fell by 23%. The period betweenthe 1970s to early 1980s saw the index of real monthly earnings in the formal sectordrop from 315 to 62. This caused poverty to spread. By 1983, 40–50% of the urbanpopulation and 63–73% of the rural population lived below the poverty line (WorldBank 1989). The poor economic circumstances adversely affected educational qualityand outcomes as a mass exodus of teachers went into neighbouring Nigeria at thesame time that educational infrastructure and facilities deteriorated for lack of funding(World Bank 2004). In one single year, primary enrolment fell by about 100,000 andstagnated until 1986/87 when it began to increase (see Table 1). From 1980/81 to1987/88, the average growth rate of primary enrolments stood at 1.59%, well belowthe 3% growth rate of the school-age population. The increase to 1,535,505 in 1987/88 only brought total primary enrolments to 1981/82 levels (see Table 1). Governmentspending on education dropped from 6.4% of GDP in 1976 to just 1.5% of much lowerGDP by 1984 (World Bank 1989). As school quality declined, the returns plummeted,causing demand for schooling especially among the poor to fall sharply (Glewwe andIlias 1996). During the 1980s, an additional year of schooling only produced an annualrate of return of just 4 to 6% (Glewwe 1996).

The road to Ghana’s economic recovery began in 1983 when structural adjust-ment reforms strongly supported by the IMF were introduced by the revolutionary

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government of Flt. Lt. Rawlings. Rawlings had come into power promising a greaterdistribution of economic wealth and moved quickly to restructure the educationsystem, seeing it as a means to achieve this objective. The government redistributededucational resources in favour of basic education to fulfil the agenda of makingeducation a right for all children (World Bank 1989). Although structural adjustmentwas controversial, it nevertheless created the conditions for improving the economythat led to increasing investment in basic education. With strong World Bank support,basic education received US$260 million from 1986 to 2002. These investmentsaveraged US$17 million a year, peaking at US$40 million in 1995 (World Bank2004). The reinvestments in basic education were aimed at increasing the proportionof educational resources allocated to a restructured 9-year basic education systemwhich had become the centre of wider education reforms by 1987.

Prior to the 1987 reforms, the structure of Ghana’s education system consisted of6 years primary schooling, 4 years middle, 5 years secondary and 2 years ‘A’ level;totalling 17 years. Significant investment savings were made by reducing this struc-ture to 12 years, consisting this time of 6 years primary and 3 years junior secondaryschooling followed by 3 years senior secondary. To achieve universal education thesavings accrued from down-sizing pre-tertiary education were used to expand schoolplaces to increase intakes and enrolments, with the expectation that enrolments wouldeventually exceed the rate of growth of the school age-population (World Bank 1989).Within twenty years (from 1980 to 2000), the reforms had led to a doubling of thenumber of primary and junior secondary schools in the country. It had also reversedthe decline in enrolments that had come to characterise the 1980s (World Bank 2004).However, this did not produce rapid growth. In fact, enrolment rates progressed littlein the first half of the 1990s (see Figure 1), and it was only after FCUBE had beenlaunched (1995) that more steady growth began.Figure 1. Gross Enrolment Rates1 (1986–2005)Source: World Bank 2004, 151; MOESS 2004, 2006, 2007

Fee-free policies before FCUBE

As the end of colonial rule approached, demand for education increased. Much earlier,in 1945, the government proposed a 10-year education expansion plan aimed atachieving universal primary education within 25 years (i.e. by 1970). Achieving thisgoal was constrained when quality provision was made a key criterion for expandedaccess. The next significant education expansion programme was the 1951 Accelerated

Table 1. Ghana primary enrolments – 1980/81–1987/88.

Year Enrolment Percent change Yearly growth rates

1980/81 1,377,734 – –1981/82 1,533,859 12.03 12.781982/83 1,461,635 −6.12 −5.931983/84 1,452,458 −0.63 −0.631984/85 1,464,624 0.83 0.831985/86 1,325,485 −9.98 −9.501986/87 1,467,074 10.15 10.681987/88 1,535,505 4.56 4.661980/81–1987/88 11.45 1.59

Source: World Bank 1989.

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Development Plan (ADP). This plan aimed to achieve universal primary education(UPE) for all within 15 years (1966). To achieve this goal, the ADP abolished tuitionfees and this action set in motion rapid education expansion (see Table 2) but did notachieve universal enrolment (Akyeampong et al. 2007). Next was the 1961 EducationAct which introduced legislation for compulsory universal primary education to consol-idate the gains of the ADP. Although tuition fees were abolished, households facedcharges for books, stationery and equipment.

These enrolment expansion measures improved access much more in southernGhana than in the north, leaving a gap which has persisted until recently when it isbeginning to narrow, albeit slowly (MOESS 2006, 2007, 2008; see also Rolleston2009, in this issue). The roots of this gap could be traced to colonial educationpolicies which restrained the rapid expansion of schooling in the northern territoriesbecause of concerns that this would lead to the underutilisation of education facilities,because of supply exceeding demand (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh 1975). Quality

Year

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

1986

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Ghana: GER (1986-2005)

GER

Rat

e

Figure 1. Gross Enrolment Rates1 (1986–2005).Source: World Bank 2004, 151; MOESS 2004, 2006, 2007.

Table 2. Achievement of 15 years of educational expansion under the ADP and the 1961Education Act.

1951 1966

Type of school or college No of schools No of students No of schools No of students

Primary 1,083 153,360 8,144 1,137,495Middle 539 66,175 2,277 267,434Secondary 13 5,033 105 42,111

Source: Hayford 1988, 35.

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was imperative for expanded access. In particular, the availability of trained teacherswas made a condition for building new schools, as was the condition that expandedfacilities would be fully utilised to justify the costs (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh1975). This policy disadvantaged low-density population areas, in particular the north-ern regions, and resulted in the reduced supply of schools.

FCUBE – reasserting free education

The next push to deepen the provision of free basic education came with the introduc-tion of new constitutional provisions in 1992. This constitution formulated the policyentitled ‘Basic Education – A Right: Programme for the provision of Free, Compul-sory and Universal Basic Education by the year 2005’ (MOE/GES 2001, 34). Inprinciple, FCUBE policy aimed to eliminate school fees in order to increase thedemand for schooling. The policy-makers argued that the right to education wasunequivocal, and that fees of whatever nature constituted a disincentive to the enjoy-ment of that right. Thus, the invidious existence of indirect costs, such as compulsorylevies on parents, needed controlling to protect rights to basic education.

With financial assistance from the World Bank, FCUBE focused on two mainactivities: on the demand side, investments went to support education policy andmanagement changes with key areas targeted including: increasing instructional time,reducing fees and levies, improving head teachers’ management skills and motivationlevels and improving school supervision. On the supply side, investments focusedprimarily on improving physical infrastructure and increasing the number of schoolplaces through the large-scale construction of additional classrooms and schools(World Bank 2004).

At the heart of FCUBE was the government’s commitment ‘to make schoolingfrom Basic Stage 1 through 9 free and compulsory for all school-age children by theyear 2005 … [and] to improve the quality of the education services offered’ (GOG/MOE 1996, 1).

The compulsory element signalled the determination to put pressure on parents toenrol their children for the full duration of basic education. Parents were threatenedwith fines if they failed to comply, but without an enforcement strategy this simplyamounted to an empty threat (MOE/GES 2001). With lost revenue as a result of theabolition of tuition fees, schools introduced indirect levies. Parents who failed to paysaw their children sent home by head teachers who, in some cases, were underobligation from district authorities to collect the levies or face sanctions (MOE/GES2001). This contributed to confusion over what ‘free education’ actually stood for.The explanation offered by the Ghana Education Service was that:

under FCUBE programme, the government provides free tuition, textbooks and teachingand learning materials and subsidises the cost of exercise books. It also supplementsBasic Education Certificate Education (BECE) fees for both public and privatecandidates … [but] parents … are expected to send all their children of school-going ageto school, feed them and provide them with school uniforms, school bags, stationery andtransport where necessary. (Daily Graphic, Friday, November 17, 2000, 19; emphasisadded)

The effect of schools charging a wide variety of levies (fees) to support schoollearning activities produced situations where resources available to schools dependedon the wealth of surrounding communities, further reinforcing the stratification of

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education (Donge 2003). Poor communities ended up with poor schools. In effect,FCUBE sent confusing signals about free education, left schools with a hole inrevenue for basic school learning inputs, and created conditions that increased the gapin quality provision between urban and rural areas.

These limitations notwithstanding, overall FCUBE produced steady and consistentgrowth in school enrolment. Based on its own survey and GLSS data, the OperationsEvaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank conducted an impact evaluation ofeducation reforms, and concluded that enrolments had risen in all population groups;primary enrolment, in particular, had grown faster among lower income groups(World Bank 2004). In this paper, analysis of primary attendance rates by expenditurebased on welfare quintile using GLSS 4 (1998/99 and GLSS 5 (2005/06) data, showsthat the poorest households have actually fared less well under FCUBE. Our conclu-sion is that the primary school attendance deficit continues to be concentrated amongchildren from the poorest households. The World Bank (2004) calculations werebased on welfare terciles which in effect widen the base of households constituting the‘poor’. However, by disaggregating household data by quintiles those in the poorestincome category are more likely captured.

An examination of primary enrolment by grade in the last 20 years, starting from1987, shows that enrolment increased consistently but the growth failed to translateinto high transitions across the primary cycle (see Figure 2). In fact, promotion fromGrade 1 to the end of Grade 6 has remained fairly similar for various years as thewidth of enrolment by grade in later years illustrates. This has remained largelyunchanged; the Grade 6 to Grade 1 enrolment ratio is approximately 1.5 for 1980 andfor 2005. So whilst enrolment may have improved, partly due to population growth,the school system seems to have been incapable of progressing children efficiently tothe end of the basic education cycle. Later analysis in this paper suggests that lateenrolment and/or repetition might have contributed to a widening of the age-to-gradeprofile in public schools, and could be a contributory factor in poor progressionthrough the grades. It is worth noticing the high enrolment surge in 2005/06 when aschool capitation grant of US$3 per enrolled child was introduced. Capitation is afurther initiative to abolish all forms of fees in basic education and yielded impressiveresults – in 2006, enrolment in Grade 1 increased by an unprecedented 20%, but wasnot sustained in the following years (MOESS 2007, 2008).Figure 2. Evolution of primary enrolment by grade (1980–2005)Source: Akyeampong et al (2007)Capitation may not be enough to increase and sustain high enrolments through intohigher grades because of its low pro-poor credentials. Crucially this policy does notspecifically target the poorest households with a high enough level of capitationinvestment, but instead spreads the investment for all, irrespective of income andwelfare status. To achieve universal education by 2015, indications from the analysisin this paper suggest that the poorest households would have to be the most importanttarget of fee-free education policies.

Revisiting the impact of FCUBE

To achieve a systematic assessment of what contribution FCUBE made to schoolattendance, data from two large household surveys – the Ghana Living StandardSurvey (GLSS) 4 (administered in 1998/99) and GLSS 5 (administered in 2005/06)were analysed. In the surveys attendance referred to the proportion of children whohad ever attended school. From the data it is possible to investigate the pattern ofhousehold demand for schooling based on welfare status. Although the FCUBE policy

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was outlined in 1995, the GLSS 4 data administered in 1998 is used as an approximatebaseline reference for the analysis. The assumption behind this is that the effect of thepolicy would have taken some time to show any appreciable results. Besides, projectsto expand school and classrooms were not completed until 1998/99 (World Bank2004). The GLSS 5 survey coincides with the 2005 target date set by FCUBE toachieve universal primary education. Thus, the two surveys provided useful referencedata points to assess what effect the policy had made on school attendance.

Descriptive evidence on impact by welfare quintiles

The first important observation from Figure 3 is that primary school attendance amongthe poorest (lowest household welfare quintile) has declined whilst in all other groupsit has improved. Secondly, attendance for the primary age group 6–11 dropped (93%to 85%) (see Table 3). In 1998/99, the difference in attendance rates between thebottom and top quintile was 21 percentage points, but by 2005 this gap had widenedto 32 percentage points.Figure 3. Mean attendance rates by Welfare Quintile – 6 to 11 yearsSource: Based on GLSS 4 and 5 dataThe data in Table 3 also show that the urban bias of access to primary educationwas not reduced. Rural attendance stayed in the 80% region against a high urban atten-dance of about 97%. For younger rural girls (6–8 years), the difference in attendancebetween the bottom and top quintile widened – 6% in 1998 to 26%in 2005. In 1998,the poorest six- to eight-year-old girls had slightly better attendance than boys (71%compared to 66% for boys). By 2005, the attendance rate had dropped but the gendergap narrowed (61% compared to 59% for boys) which is consistent with the improv-ing primary gender parity index (0.83 in 2005 to 0.96 in 2007) (MOESS 2008). Atten-dance among rural boys in the bottom quintile also dropped by 7 percentage points,and for urban boys this drop was even greater (27%). The gap between top and bottomwelfare quintiles for older girls and boys also widened, but much more for girls (31%)than for boys (23%).

800,000

700,000

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

-1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

Total Enrolment in P1 (Public & Private) Total Enrolment in P2 (Public & Private) Total Enrolment in P3 (Public & Private)

Total Enrolment in P4 (Public & Private) Total Enrolment in P5 (Public & Private) Total Enrolment in P6 (Public & Private)

Figure 2. Evolution of primary enrolment by grade (1980–2005).Source: Akyeampong et al (2007).

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The attendance gap between the poorest urban households compared to the rich-est also dropped by 13% between the two survey periods. Whilst attendance by thepoorest urban girls dropped by 5%, that for the boys dropped quite substantially(23%). What it suggests is that fewer boys from the poorest urban households areattending school in 2005 than were doing in 1998. Interestingly, there was a biggerdrop in attendance by the urban poor than the rural poor. This is likely to be due tothe trends in Greater Accra (see Rolleston in this volume). Table 4 offers some cluesto these trends. Whereas the mean household education expenditure for the poorestfamilies in rural areas doubled, for the poorest urban family this quadrupled. Anexplanation could be that the auxiliary fees households had to pay under FCUBE,especially transportation and feeding costs, hit the poorest urban households harder.This is because such costs are more likely to be higher in urban areas than ruralareas. They also increased at a greater rate which may suggest greater inflation ineducational costs in urban areas or a shift in parental spending towards educationalgoods.

As noted earlier, rising enrolments have not generally translated into efficientprogression through the primary grades as illustrated in Figure 2. According to Minis-try of Education statistics, on average out of every 1000 children who enter Grade 1in Ghana, just over half (56%) progress to Grade 6, about 16% drop out and over aquarter (28%) repeat at least one year of primary school before dropping out orcompleting Grade 6 (MOESS 2006). This is indicative of the low quality/low effi-ciency of primary schooling, which could in turn lower demand for primary educationby the poorest households for whom the opportunity costs are usually higher. In fact,the GLSS data suggest that primary school attendance rates among older children (12–14) who had completed primary education and were attending secondary barelychanged, although it had improved for girls from the lowest welfare quintile (seeTable 5). But among non-completers, primary attendance dropped by about a quarter.This could mean that timely progression through the primary grades is associated withlower dropouts at the post-primary level.

When household surveys in Ghana have asked why children are not in school, thetwo common replies from parents and children are: schooling is not interesting (an

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Figure 3. Mean attendance rates by Welfare Quintile – 6 to 11 years.Source: Based on GLSS 4 and 5 data.

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Comparative Education 185

Tabl

e 3.

Sch

ool

atte

ndan

ce r

ates

by

hous

ehol

d w

elfa

re q

uint

ile,

age

gro

up, u

rban

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ion

and

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er (

GL

SS

4 &

5).

Rur

alU

rban

Tot

al

6–11

6–8

9–11

6–11

6–8

9–11

6–11

6–8

9–11

Gir

lB

oyA

llG

irl

Boy

All

Gir

lB

oyA

llG

irl

Boy

All

Gir

lB

oyA

llG

irl

Boy

All

Gir

lB

oyA

llG

irl

Boy

All

Gir

lB

oyA

ll

GL

SS4

10.

680.

710.

700.

710.

660.

680.

650.

780.

720.

880.

860.

870.

770.

840.

810.

980.

900.

940.

700.

730.

720.

710.

680.

690.

690.

790.

752

0.78

0.84

0.81

0.73

0.80

0.77

0.82

0.88

0.85

0.88

0.92

0.90

0.91

0.91

0.91

0.84

0.94

0.89

0.80

0.86

0.83

0.76

0.83

0.80

0.83

0.89

0.86

30.

880.

890.

880.

840.

850.

840.

930.

940.

940.

870.

930.

900.

850.

910.

880.

890.

950.

920.

870.

900.

890.

840.

860.

850.

920.

940.

934

0.89

0.87

0.88

0.86

0.89

0.88

0.91

0.85

0.88

0.88

0.92

0.90

0.80

0.89

0.84

0.96

0.94

0.95

0.88

0.89

0.89

0.84

0.89

0.86

0.93

0.88

0.91

50.

850.

920.

880.

780.

780.

780.

840.

950.

890.

930.

970.

950.

970.

950.

960.

880.

990.

940.

900.

950.

930.

930.

930.

930.

860.

980.

92T

otal

0.80

0.82

0.81

0.78

0.78

0.78

0.82

0.86

0.84

0.89

0.94

0.91

0.89

0.92

0.90

0.90

0.96

0.93

0.90

0.96

0.93

0.81

0.82

0.82

0.84

0.89

0.87

GL

SS5

10.

630.

640.

640.

610.

590.

600.

650.

700.

680.

830.

690.

740.

890.

690.

750.

780.

700.

730.

640.

650.

640.

620.

600.

610.

660.

700.

682

0.82

0.86

0.84

0.76

0.82

0.79

0.89

0.90

0.90

0.95

0.88

0.92

0.92

0.80

0.86

0.98

0.96

0.97

0.84

0.86

0.85

0.79

0.82

0.80

0.90

0.91

0.91

30.

900.

900.

900.

870.

880.

870.

930.

930.

930.

930.

980.

960.

920.

970.

940.

940.

990.

970.

910.

930.

920.

890.

900.

900.

930.

950.

944

0.90

0.93

0.91

0.89

0.91

0.90

0.91

0.96

0.93

0.96

0.99

0.97

0.95

0.98

0.96

0.96

1.00

0.98

0.93

0.96

0.95

0.92

0.95

0.93

0.94

0.98

0.96

50.

920.

900.

910.

870.

870.

870.

960.

930.

950.

970.

970.

970.

960.

990.

970.

980.

950.

970.

960.

950.

960.

940.

960.

950.

970.

950.

96T

otal

0.79

0.80

0.80

0.76

0.77

0.76

0.83

0.85

0.84

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.94

0.94

0.94

0.96

0.96

0.96

0.85

0.85

0.85

0.82

0.82

0.82

0.87

0.88

0.88

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186 K. Akyeampong

indication that children are not making much sense of what they are learning inschool), or it is not useful (an indication that the returns are judged to be low). Thesereasons are cited more for older children (12–14) at junior secondary level thanyounger children (6–11) at primary level (see Ye and Canagarajah 2002; GSS 2003).It is an indication that the quality of primary provision has not improved sufficientlyto reduce non-completion rates and, in particular, increase the chances of poor pupilsprogressing to secondary education. Fewer children from the lowest welfare quintileare accessing post-basic education as Table 6 indicates. Children from the highestwelfare quintile are twice as likely to enrol in secondary schooling than childrenfrom the lowest welfare quintile. Access to higher education is even less likely for thepoorest households.

Table 4. Mean household expenditure*per child (6–14-year-olds) and household welfarequintile at constant 2005 prices.

GLSS4 Rural Urban Total children GLSS5 Rural Urban Total children

1 65,290 48,348 62,663 1 137,776 192,570 141,9832 49,508 110,335 63,086 2 260,565 499,495 297,7063 82,133 128.002 93,389 3 334,496 563,275 397,2154 91,115 184,166 113,012 4 581,389 823,407 712,5635 121,118 400,990 205,620 5 870,717 1,746,365 1.560,539Total 79,477 181,840 103,687 Total 289,615 977,390 493,680

Source: Author’s calculations.*Includes expenditure on school and registration fees, contributions to PTA, uniforms and sports clothes,books and school supplies, transport to and from school, food, board and lodging at school, expenses paidfor extra classes, in-kind expenses and other expenses incurred in relation to schooling.

Table 5. Primary school attendance* rates among 12- to 14-year-olds.

Primary Completers (12–14) Primary Non-Completers (12–14)

GLSS 4 Girl Boy All Girl Boy All

1 0.89 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.94 0.922 0.90 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.97 0.943 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.954 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.955 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95Total 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.94GLSS 51 0.94 0.79 0.86 0.67 0.65 0.662 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.87 0.85 0.863 0.94 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.91 0.904 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.86 0.96 0.915 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.96 0.91Total 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.83 0.82

Primary attenders are defined as children who are attending school whose highest grade completed(GLSS5) was P6 or higher or (GLSS4) whose highest education level completed was primary

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Comparative Education 187

Attendance, poverty and age (GLSS 5)

The main finding that attendance by the bottom welfare quintile had dropped whilstother welfare quintiles had improved over the period of FCUBE led us to exploreother characteristics of attendance, this time focusing on GLSS 5 data. The results aredisplayed in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7. Figure 4 reaffirms what other surveys have foundabout late enrolment in Ghanaian education and the implication that this has forattendance, repetition, dropout and completion (see Awedoba et al. 2003; GSS 2003).Generally most Ghanaian children do not enrol at the age appropriate for their gradeand repetition can be quite common. Overage attendance and late entry is likely tocreate additional difficulties for teachers trying to facilitate learning for a wide rangeof age-related ability levels whilst operating what is essentially a monograde curricu-lum. Mean age-grade delay2 is highest in regions with low gross enrolment rates(GERs) in Ghana, in particular the three northern regions (Figure 5) which, onaverage, have as high as 40% of 6–11-year-olds out of school, compared to a nationalaverage of 15% (Akyeampong et al. 2007).Figure 4. Mean age grade ‘delay’ per pupil by household welfare quintile.Source: Based on GLSS 5 dataA large survey on child labour in 2003 found that about two-thirds of Ghanaianchildren combined school with work, and that most of these children were aged

Table 6. Enrolment in public schools (percentage).

Quintile Secondary (2005/05 Tertiary (2005/06)

Poorest quintile 12.1 1.82nd quintile 17.2 7.83rd quintile 23.7 9.44th quintile 23.3 14.1Richest quintile 23.8 66.9Richest to Poorest 2.0 37.2

Source: MOESS (2008)

01

23

4

mea

n ’d

elay

’ in

year

s

1 2 3 4 5welfare quintile

Figure 4. Mean age grade ‘delay’ per pupil by household welfare quintile.Source: Based on GLSS 5 data.

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188 K. Akyeampong

10–14 years (GSS 2003). The survey also revealed that a higher proportion ofurban children (72%) compared to rural children (62%) combined work withschooling (GSS 2003, 53), which could be an indication of increasing povertyamong the urban poor households given that more of them have to work alongsidestudying. If children are combining school with work, this is likely to affect theirclass attendance, learning achievement and increase their chances of dropping out.Ensuring that poorer children enrol at the appropriate school age appears to mattermuch more than for the ‘non poor’ (Figure 6). In urban locations, attendance isconsistently higher for all ages and drops after age 14, whereas in rural areas bothyounger and much older children have lower attendance (Figure 7). The childlabour survey found that by age 8, twice the proportion of rural children wouldhave started work (GSS 2003). This probably explains why attendance amongyoung rural children is also low. These are issues and challenges that have rarelybeen the subject or target of reforms to improve access, particularly initiatives thatare likely to reduce overage attendance.

Children from the poorest households, on average, had a mean-grade delay ofmore than 3 years, which could be due to late enrolment, repetition or both. In effect,these children are, on average, in a grade three years lower than the one which is nomi-nally appropriate for their chronological age. It would appear that household welfarematters to age-grade ‘delay’ (Figure 4). It is important to point to the effect of self-selection, as the figures refer only to pupils who were attending school when the datawas collected. In general, non-attendance is more common in the poorer groups. Thepoorest are more likely to be in work only or in neither school nor work, and the rich-est more likely to be in school only (GSS 2003).Figure 5. Mean age-grade ‘delay’ by regionSource: Based on GLSS 5 dataThe Ghana Child Labour Survey found that earnings from children’s work areconsidered by parents to be a significant contribution to household welfare (GSS2003, 96). Fee abolition may therefore not be enough for families that are heavilydependent on child labour for their economic survival. These issues bring to the forethe deep challenges that face the effort to enrol all children in Ghana by 2015, and

01

23

4

mea

n ’d

elay

’ in

year

s

weste

rn

cent

ral

grea

ter a

ccra

volta

easte

rn

asha

nti

bron

g ah

afo

north

ern

uppe

r eas

t

uppe

r wes

t

Figure 5. Mean age-grade ‘delay’ by region.Source: Based on GLSS 5 data.

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Comparative Education 189

point to the need for further incentives which tackle the root of the problem of lateenrolment and grade repetition, especially in the three northern regions. Improving thequality and outcomes of basic education is vital to offset the opportunity cost of atten-dance and improve demand among the poorest households.Figure 6. Attendance by age and poverty statusSource: Based on GLSS 5 dataFigure 7. Attendance by age and residenceSource: Based on GLSS 5 data

The effect of declining teacher and school quality indicators

FCUBE was unable to match the increasing student intake in schools with theadequate supply of trained teachers. As a result, the net student to trained teacher ratio

0.2

.4.6

.81

Mea

n A

ttend

ance

Rat

e (%

)

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Source: GLSS 5

Extremely Poor Poor

Non-Poor

Figure 6. Attendance by age and poverty status.Source: Based on GLSS 5 data.

0.2

.4.6

.81

Mea

n A

ttend

ance

Rat

e (%

)

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Source: GLSS 5

Rural

Urban

Figure 7. Attendance by age and residence.Source: Based on GLSS 5 data.

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became much worse than at the time the policy was initiated (see Table 7). Student totrained teacher ratio increased from 43:1 in 1996 to 63:1 in 2005. The number ofuntrained teachers doubled for both primary and junior secondary schools. Trainedteachers in deprived districts declined from 55% in 2003/04 to 37% in 2007 and it isin these districts that gross/net enrolment and achievement levels are particularly low(MOESS 2008). Although the overall primary student teacher ratio increased by about4% between 1996 and 2005, much of that increase was due to the high influx ofuntrained teachers. The combined effect of high student teacher ratios and decliningnumber of trained teachers offers one explanation as to why student achievement hasbeen low and stagnant (see Table 8 and Figure 8). As Table 8 shows, BECE (Grade 9leaving examinations) pass rates have stalled at around 60%. If we take into accountthat pass rates are based on a wide aggregate range, this would mean that even fewerchildren are performing at levels that would be considered as highly proficient.Figure 8. Trained public primary teachers (1998–2007).Source: Various Ministry of Education Science and Sports EMIS data

Table 7. Indicators for basic education supply in Ghana, 1996/97 and 2005/06.

Attendance (All Ghana) 1996/97 2005/06

Number of students (primary) 2,333,347 3,122,903Number of students (JSS) 738,057 1,041,002Number of students in P6 326,003 402,253Number of students in JSS3 (grade 9 – end of basic) 212,563 279,683Number of trained teachers – primary 54,572 49,807Number trained teachers - JSS 32,032 39,920Number of untrained teachers – primary 18,768 38,654Number of untrained teachers – JSS 8,385 16,565Student to teacher ratio – primary 31.8 35.3Student to teacher ratio – JSS 18.3 18.4Student to trained teacher ratio – primary 42.8 62.7Student to trained teacher ratio – JSS 23.0 26.1

Source: Provided by Ministry of Education Sports and Science (MOESS) EMIS Unit.

Table 8. Basic Education Certificate Examinations pass rates (1998–2008).

Year Number Number Passed (aggregate 6 to 30) Percentage

1998 229432 138477 60.41999 233741 140851 60.22000 233786 141532 60.52001 247699 149611 60.42002 264979 160261 60.52003 268284 163613 60.82004 278382 170323 61.22005 287297 176959 61.62006 308383 190924 61.92007 320247 196240 61.32008 338292 210282 62.2

Source: Provided by Ministry of Education Sports and Science (MOESS) EMIS Unit.

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Comparative Education 191

According to a recent National Education Assessment (NEA) exercise whichattempted to provide an indication of educational quality at the basic school level,most pupils in public schools are performing below proficiency in Mathematics andEnglish. The NEA tests set the minimum level competency score at 35% and profi-ciency level at 55%. For 2005 and 2007, the mean scores were just above the mini-mum competency for Grade 3 Mathematics and English, and Grade 6 Mathematics.Also the number of pupils achieving minimum competency level for Grade 3 droppedin both English and Mathematics, and increased slightly for Grade 6 (Table 9).

Generally the scores are low with fewer students attaining proficiency levels. Pupilperformance on the tests is an indication that FCUBE and other school improvementinitiatives that have followed, have not delivered substantial gains in learningoutcomes. It adds to the risk that further expansion will increase the numbers wholearn little of what is required to complete basic education successfully at levels thatassure sustained literacy and numeracy. The general low achievement level in publicschools could be counter-productive to efforts to increase household demand forschooling, especially for those for whom the opportunity costs outweigh the cost ofattendance.

Part of the problem why demand might be declining among poor households couldbe the decline in availability of trained teachers as Figure 8 shows. This problemparticularly affects rural areas of Ghana (Hedges 2000; Akyeampong 2003). It raisesthe importance of balancing expansion with school quality inputs. Coupled with prob-lems of high teacher absenteeism it is not surprising that the ‘hoped for changes inclassroom in terms of better management of teaching and improved teaching methods’under FCUBE hardly materialised (World Bank 2004).

In 2003, nearly 13% of teachers had been absent in a one month period as compared tojust over 4% in 1988. In 1988, 85% of schools did not suffer at all; whereas this figurehas now fallen to 61%, with 13% of schools with over one-third of the teachers beingabsent for reasons other than sickness in the past month. (World Bank 2004, 103)

The problem of worsening teacher absenteeism in many developing countries,including Ghana, compounds the challenge of improving educational quality, espe-cially in rural areas where the problem is chronic (Bennell and Akyeampong 2007).Improving physical access, without it being meaningful, in the sense that teachers arepresent in class and offering real opportunities for pupil learning and achievement,would undermine the value of fee-free education especially for poor households inrural areas.

Table 9. National education assessment results for Grades 3 and 6.

2005 2007

MeanMinimum

competency Proficiency MeanMinimum

competency Proficiency

P3 English 38.1 50.5 16.4 37.6 50.1 15.0P3 Math 36.6 47.2 18.6 35.0 42.6 14.6P6 English 43.1 63.9 23.6 44.2 69.7 26.1P6 Math 34.4 42.7 9.8 35.7 46.2 10.8

Source: MOESS (2008).

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Conclusion

FCUBE and other policies before it, did not offer completely free education byabolishing all forms of fees even though this appeared to be the early intention.District levies provided a backdoor for reinstating some fees. If all fees had beenabolished and other initiatives that further offset the opportunity cost of schooling hadbeen introduced, the gains might have been higher. Secondly, the impact on schoolquality appears to have been low for reasons that appear to be the result of inadequatesupply of teacher training and high teacher absenteeism. Increasing teacher absentee-ism over the period compromised school quality even further.

In particular, FCUBE and other policies before it seem not to have fully recognisedand addressed the problem of overage attendance. This is a problem with roots elsewhere.Children often attend school late because of work and/or poverty. Since the majorityof Ghanaian children engage in some form of work and school at the same time in orderto supplement household income, or for their own upkeep, this could create a disincentiveto enrol, especially if enrolment is delayed. As children get older, the desire for theirparents to enrol them in full-time education declines (GSS 2003). When these olderchildren manage to attend, they are also less likely to complete perhaps because of thesame pressures. Work, poverty and late enrolment are all ingredients leading to dropoutand non-completion. Radical policies which have the potential to motivate householdsto enrol children at the age appropriate for their grade, in order to reduce the incidenceof low attendance, especially among poor households, are called for. For example, condi-tional cash transfer schemes which have been applied successfully in some low-incomecountries (Patrinos and Ariasingam 2002) could be used as an incentive to encouragepoor households to enrol children early and complete basic education.

Years

% trained

Per

cen

tag

e

80

90

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Figure 8. Trained public primary teachers (1998–2007).Source: Various Ministry of Education Science and Sports EMIS data.

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Comparative Education 193

The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that the biggest challenge Ghanafaces in its attempt to achieve education for all by 2015 is how it can significantlyincrease and sustain attendance from the poorest households. Lessons from FCUBEsuggest that as enrolment expands effort should be made to improve and maintainquality to ensure demand. The recent introduction of a capitation grant scheme isgoing in the right direction in order to correct some of the mistakes of FCUBE.Increasing the amount of capitation and targeting the poorest and most disadvantagedgroups would seem more likely to offset the opportunity costs of schooling for thesegroups and improve demand. As other countries have demonstrated, it is equallyimportant to reduce considerably indirect costs, such as school uniform, stationery andtransport cost, in order to achieve and sustain high school enrolments.

AcknowledgementSpecial thanks to Caine Rolleston of the Institute of Education, University of London, whoproduced the GLSS graphs for this paper.

Notes1. The World Bank’s figures are based on Ghana Ministry of Education figures adjusted on

the basis of a re-estimation of school-age population to interpolate with a constant growthrate from 1986–2000, thus eliminating a population drop in 2000. The MOESS figuresfrom 2001 are not based on this adjustment, but the trend from 2001 to 2006 is consistentwith a general pattern of growth

2. ‘Mean age-grade delay’ describes the mean difference between the average actual age in aparticular grade and the age which would be consistent with timely enrolment and progress.

Notes on contributorKwame Akyeampong is senior lecturer and deputy director at the Centre for InternationalEducation at the Sussex School of Education, University of Sussex. He has researched andpublished on teacher education, basic and post-basic education in Ghana. His most recent bookKey Issues in Teacher Education – sourcebook for teacher educators (with Janet Stuart andAlison Croft) was published in 2009 by Macmillan.

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