REVIEWING DISASTER MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES IN BIHAR

This report has been compiled by Sheena Arora, Nishant Buragohain, Kaustubh

Devale , Praveen Pawar and Aahna Srikanth of RedR India in March-April 2013, as

a part of the review of Bihar’s Disaster Management capacities for the Bill &

Melinda Gates Foundation.

RedR India is a member of the RedR International federation, providing training,

recruitment and advisory services for emergencies. A humanitarian and non-profit

organization, RedR India maintains a register of experienced humanitarian

professionals who are available to assist governments and external support

agencies working in the humanitarian sector. The RedRs have a global reputation

for the development and presentation of high quality training for the humanitarian

aid sector and have offices in Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka

and the United Kingdom. For more details on RedR India please visit

www.redr.org.in

Cover Photo:

People in Khagaria district, Bihar, crossing the Bagmati River to reach Chheda Khera Panchayat.

Layout: Ashok Nirgulkar

Photo credits: RedR India

October 2013

Facilitating Humanitarianism

I N D I A

REVIEWING DISASTER MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES IN BIHAR

FOREWORD

Responding to emergencies effectively and efficiently requires strong national and local disaster management systems and emergency responders with the knowledge and information about the risks and hazards that they potentially face, the existing capacities of all actors; and the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders in a time of disaster. The Emergency Response team at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation funded this study in an effort to support and assess emergency response capacity at State, District and local levels in the disaster prone State of Bihar, India. Our aim is to share this report with stakeholders to ensure that disaster preparedness, response and management is efficient, effective and sustainable – ultimately resulting in a reduction of loss of lives and assets.

There is a mounting body of evidence that the frequency and severity of disasters is increasing and leaving greater numbers of people vulnerable to their effects. In 2012, the estimated economic losses from natural disasters was USD $ 157 billion and surpassed the annual average damages from 2001 to 2010 by almost ten percent (USD $ 143 billion) according to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).

CRED also reports that when assessing geographical distribution of disasters, Asia was the continent most often hit by natural disasters in 2012 - accounting for 40.7 percent. According to UNDP’s vulnerability profile of India, over 70 percent of the nearly 7,500-kilometre long coastline is prone to cyclones, 70 percent of the land under cultivation is prone to drought, 60 percent of India’s landmass is susceptible to earthquakes,

over eight percent prone to floods, and 2.25 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product has been swept away by disasters. The numbers are stark. Constrained resources demand innovative thinking and risk-informed planning so as to preemptively avert huge losses.

Within India, the State of Bihar is highly prone to multi-hazards including floods, earthquakes, drought, monsoons, high wind velocity, cold waves and recurrent fires during summer months. In this context, we believe that all actors in the region, both development and humanitarian, should have access to knowledge and concrete recommendations that will serve to increase capacity to mitigate, prepare for and respond to various threats and disasters across all levels.

We hope that all stakeholders in Bihar will consider the information in this report to ensure that planning efforts are r isk- in formed- proper ly address ing and contextualizing emergency risks, integrating prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery strategies into programming from the outset.

Valerie Nkamgang BemoSenior Program Officer, Emergency Response

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Amanda Lanzarone Associate Program Officer, Emergency Response

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for commissioning the review of Bihar state’s disaster

management capacities and for publishing this review report.

This document has evolved due to the immense help and kind support extended by many individuals, organisations

and communities in Bihar.

We would like to extend our sincere gratitude to Mr. Vyasji Mishra, Principal Secretary DMD and Mr Anil K Sinha, Vice

Chairperson BSDMA for their support and inputs towards the process. Dr. Gagan (OSD, Principal Secretary Health

and formerly OSD in the DMD), Mr Sanjay Pandey (Convener, BIAG) and Mr Banku Bihari Sarkar (Senior State

Coordinator- DRR, UNICEF Bihar) need special mention for their willingness to engage with our never ending

questions and provide crucial insights. We would also like to thank Dr. D.K Mishra for taking time out of his busy

schedule to share his invaluable experiences and counter perspective.

Interactions with members of the BIAG were crucial at both the formative as well as final stages of the review, helping

us understand their individual organisations as well as the disaster management community. Additionally, we would

like to thank the entire range of stakeholders (government departments, quasi-government institutions, INGOs,

NGOs, Civil Society and individuals) at the state, district and block levels who willingly engaged with us and whose

insights were key in informing the report.

Dr. ELSN Bala Prasad (Director General, BIPARD), Mr. Vishal Vaswani (BSDMA) and Mr. Sarbjit Singh Sahota

(Emergency Specialist, DRR Section, UNICEF India) need special mention for their continued support and critical

inputs.

Th ‘Ananya’ teams in Delhi and Bihar helped us understand the project better, especially Indrajit Chaudhary in Patna

and Sharad Chaturvedi and his team in Saharsa.

We are grateful to the many communities and individuals in Begusarai, Darbhanga, Gaya, Gopalganj, Khagaria,

Patna, Saharsa, Samastipur, Supaul, and West Champaran districts for their bottomless cups of chai (tea), their

warm hospitality as well as their generous and honest sharing of experiences.

Finally, we are grateful to the entire RedR India team for not only critically appreciating this review process but also for

the logistics support and camaraderie throughout the nine months of this review.

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0TABLE OF CONTENTSFOREWORD

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

ACRONYMS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

THE REVIEW DESIGN

OVERVIEW OF THE STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROFILE

STATE PROFILE

DISASTER RISK CONTEXT

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

POLICY ENVIRONMENT

ANALYSIS OF POLICY ENVIRONMENT

PEOPLE – THE DM ECOSYSTEM

ANALYSIS OF DM ECOSYSTEM

PROGRAMMES

ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMMES IN THE DM ECO-SYSTEM

PERFORMANCE

CRITICAL ANALYSIS - CATALYSTS AND BARRIERS

RECOMMENDATIONS

I

iii

v

vi

vii

ix

1

2

2

7

8

10

13

16

18

25

27

30

32

34

40

43

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1: Framework of Analysis 3

Figure 2: Sample Selection Criteria 4

Figure 3: Key-informants for the review 5

Figure 4: Multi-hazard zones in Bihar 10

Figure 5: Disaster Management Context Timeline 15

Figure 6: The DM Ecosystem 26

Figure 7: On-going DM Programmes in Bihar 31

Figure 8: Performance Analysis 37

Table 1: Key Demographic Indicators of Bihar 8

Table 2: Status of Policy Instruments in Bihar 18

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ACRONYMS

AWC Anganwadi Centre (Nutrition & early education related service provision centre at the community level as part of Integrated Child Development Scheme of Government of India)

AWW Anganwadi Worker (Nutrition related service provider at the community level as part of the Integrated Child Development Scheme of Government of India)

ANM Auxiliary Nurse Mid-Wife (Community level trained health service provider)

ASHA Accredited Social Health Activist (Community level health animator)

APHC Additional Primary Health Centre (health facility at a cluster of villages)

BSDMA Bihar State Disaster Management Authority

B-IAG Bihar Inter Agency Group

BIPARD Bihar Institute for Public Administration and Rural Development (Government of Bihar, administrative training institute)

BUDA Bihar Urban Development Agency

BAPEPS Bihar Aapda (Disaster) Punarvasan (Rehabilitation) Evam (And) Punarvikas (Reconstruction) Society (An organization formed by the State government for the recovery work following the August 2008 'Kosi disaster')

BDO Block Development Officer

CBDRR Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction

CO Circle Officer

CDPO Child Development Project Officer (Block level official of the Social Welfare Department, Responsible for managing the ICDS programme in the block)

CMG Crisis Management Group

CP Contingency Plan

CS Civil Surgeon (District level official of the Health Department)

DAO District Agriculture Officer

DAHO District Animal Husbandry Officer

DDMA District Disaster Management Authority

DDMP District Disaster Management Plan

DHM District Health Manager

DM Act Disaster Management Act 2005

DM Disaster Management

DMD Disaster Management Department

DPO District Project Officer

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

EOC Emergency Operations Centre

EWS Early Warning System

FMIS Flood Management Information System

FMP Flood Management Plan

GIS Geographic Information System

GOB Government of Bihar

GOI Government of India

GP Gram Panchayat (decentralized governance unit of PRI at the village level)

HSC Health Sub-Centre

ICDS Integrated Child Development Scheme of Government of India (Flagship initiative of GOI since 1975 to ensure nutrition, health and pre-school education related rights of children as well as health and nutrition support to the mother)

ICS Incident Command System

IDSP Integrated Disease Surveillance Project

IFHI Integrated Family Health Initiative

IMD Indian Meteorological Department

INGO International Non-Government Organization

MOIC Medical Officer In-Charge (of the Primary Health Centre, block level health facility)

MIS Management of Information System

MNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (Flagship initiative of GOI since 2005 to enhance livelihood security of citizens through guaranteed 100 days of work per family in rural areas)

NDRF National Disaster Response Force

NGO Non-Government Organization

NPE Non Plan Expenditure

NRHM National Rural Health Mission

OSD Officer on Special Duty

PHC Primary Health Centre

PHED Public Health Engineering Department

PRI Panchayati Raj Institutions (3-tier decentralized governance system in India functioning within each state at village level as GP, block level as PS and district level as ZP)

PS Panchayat Samiti (block level governance unit of PRI)

SDMP State Disaster Management Plan

SEC State Executive Committee

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SSA Sarva Shikshya Abhiyan (Government of India, Universal Primary Education Scheme)

ULB Urban Local Bodies

ZP Zilla Parishad (district level governance unit of PRI)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The National Disaster Management Act of 2005 has resulted in several initiatives on disaster management (DM) in

Bihar, however, how this has translated into disaster management capacities, is yet to be analyzed. The Bill &

Melinda Gates Foundation commissioned RedR India to undertake this review of Bihar state’s disaster management

capacities.

Review design: This review, focused on assessing the DM-related policy environment, the DM ecosystem’s

capacities as well as examining the critical catalysts and barriers in the efficacy of the ecosystem’s functioning.

Adopting the appreciative enquiry approach, this review was guided by a “PPPPP” framework wherein enquiry and

analysis traced the DM landscape in Bihar from Policy to People to Programmes to Performance and Projected

recommendations for the DM ecosystem. The review was conducted through constructive engagement with DM

ecosystem actors at the state level and across 10 districts, which were selected based on their disaster proneness,

event history, disaster risk reduction initiatives, areas where the ‘Ananya’ programme is being implemented and

feasibility of access.

Key findings:

Policy environment: A clear progression of the disaster management framework in the state is discernible in line

with evolution of the national DM discourse, socio-political changes in the state, and the changing natural

environment. The evolution of the policy landscape in Bihar and the concomitant actions in the last 5 years

(development of policy instruments and establishment of DM institutions) are indicative of a conducive policy

environment for programs and partnerships for DM. Yet, the policy focus is primarily on preparedness for response, is

mono-hazard focussed and hardly addresses the prevalent significant urban disaster risks. Further, convergence

amongst related policies appears to be minimal, including the absence of a clear roadmap for mainstreaming and a

shared vision for capacity building for DM.

People: An ecosystem approach was adopted in this review to understand the role and presence of different actors in

order to account for their multiplicity, interconnectedness and dynamism. It was found that several actors are

operational at different stages of the DM cycle, with varying spheres of influence and many successful partnerships;

yet a collective envisioning of shared goalposts has not been done. Further, there is a need for enhancement of

technical capacities for disaster risk analysis, risk-informed planning and management of programs especially within

the government systems wherein the ethos of DM continues to be that of an ‘additional charge’. Programmes: An analysis of the programmes carried out by the ecosystem at different stages of the DM cycle, also

highlighted the primary focus on preparedness for response and an approach of mono-hazard focus in programming

and implementation as well. Further, it was found that the programme design for both government and non-

government programmes addresses principle risks but is yet to carry out differential planning that accounts for

contextual risks. This is highlighted in the review through an analysis of the flood control policy and it’s intended and

realized outcomes and implications for future programming.

x

Performance: Analysis of the policy and programmatic performance against the expected outcomes as laid out in

the national and state policy framework point out the positive impact of the various policy instruments, a committed

political leadership and civil-society-government partnerships; while at the same time, delineating the need for

demand creation for disaster risk reduction (especially mitigation, prevention and mainstreaming), collective

envisioning, dynamic and differential risk analysis, data management and systematic capacity building.

Core recommendations:

It is recommended that the DM ecosystem engages in a collective envisioning exercise and set consensus-based

goalposts, identifying a role for every actor at different stages of the DM cycle. Further, this should be informed by a

multi-hazard approach, cognizance of urban risks and spaces for mainstreaming DM into existing frameworks.

Finally, it is recommended that technical capacity be enhanced through a number of suggested actions.

xi

INTRODUCTION1

Background

his document has evolved from a study conducted by RedR India for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,

Treviewing the Disaster Management capacities in the state of Bihar. The review was conceptualized in the

context of on-going developments for Disaster Management in Bihar, especially since the passing of the

National Disaster Management Act of 2005. Given the number of activities being carried out by the government and

various other stakeholders, it was thought important to analyse the impact these have had on the preparedness

levels of the state to respond to a disaster situation. Towards this end, the review was carried out with the following

key objectives:

• To research the existing and newly formed government institutions for disaster management at state and district

level in Bihar, their roles and responsibilities, and assess current levels of functioning

• To analyse the gaps and trends in capacities of the various stakeholders (Government, NGOs, Red Cross, UN

and communities) with regards to disaster management

• To identify the catalysts and barriers for effective functioning of the stakeholders, and recommend actions for

strengthening the stakeholders

In addition to the above-mentioned objectives, the review also explored the disaster risks to on-going programs of the

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the state. These findings, while not included in this document, are available in

the detailed report.

This document presents the key findings and recommendations emerging from the review process. This chapter

provides a background of the review, including details about the design, process and coverage. This is followed by an

overview of the disaster management profile of Bihar state. Thereafter, findings of this review are presented in four

sections viz. policy environment, people (DM ecosystem), programmes, and performance. Recommendations

emanating from these findings have been shared in the next chapter titled, ‘Recommendations’, and these have been

arranged in two sections viz. policy environment, and the DM ecosystem.

The Review Design

Approach: The review followed an approach of appreciative enquiry, consolidating a cohesive narrative of disaster

management capacities in Bihar through the shared experiences, opinions and perspectives of different

stakeholders in the state.

Framework of Analysis: Information collection and analysis were guided by a framework of analysis that traced the

Disaster Management scenario in Bihar from Policy, People, Programmes and Practices, Performance and finally

towards Projection of Recommendations. The matrix below provides indicative areas of enquiry and analysis under

each theme.

2

Figure 1: Framework of Analysis

The team perceives the state’s capacities as its ability to cope with disasters, emerging from a confluence of

capacities of all stakeholders, including communities, civil society and the government (administration and people’s

representatives) at all levels. At the same time, given that the government is the primary and largest actor for disaster

management, this review mainly focusses on the systems and processes within the government while reviewing the

actions and initiatives of other actors where possible.

Framework of Analysis

POLICY PEOPLE PROGRAMMES & PRACTICES PERFORMANCE

Legal Framework

Stakeholders /duty-bearers /

institutions

On-going and completed projects, schemes, activities

Parameters of review

Catalysts and Barriers

Analysis of policyprovisions for DM

Mapping of DM actors at different levels

in Bihar, and their roles and responsibilities

Analysis of status of capacities for DM

at all levels

Review of capacities against credible

benchmarks

Identifying catalysts

and barriers

PROJECTION

Recommendations

DM Act, National Policy, State Disaster Management Policy / Plan

National

State

District

Village/

GP

Family

DM Institutions, Govt. Depts.,

NGOs, CBOs,

community members

Knowledge Skills Attitude

Resources: E.g. Infrastructure,

Financial and Human Resources

Systems: E.g. Coordination,

EWS, EOC, Data Management,

Planning

DRM Activities across the DM Cycle:

E.g. Response, Risk Assessment,

Preparedness, Mitigation,

Traditional Practices Application

Measured against - legally mandated

provisions (DM Act, NDMA

Guidelines, state SOPs)

efficiency and effectiveness of past responses,

current levels of preparedness

As emerging from the review

and analysis

3

Coverage: This review was conducted through engagement with actors at the state level, 10 districts (out of total 38 in Bihar), 14 development blocks, 10 villages and 3 urban wards. Selection criteria for the districts, blocks and villages/ wards included disaster proneness (including hazard exposure and socio-economic vulnerabilities), past experience of disaster, disaster risk reduction actions undertaken (especially since 2007), areas with ongoing

1‘Ananya’ programme activities and feasibility of access (geographic, informants, time constraints). Selection of villages in north Bihar was such that settlements both within and outside the embankments were explored. One of the villages was selected for having experienced a recent fire incident for a better understanding of the ensuing relief and response activities. The list of districts and rationale for their selection is presented in below:

Figure 2: Sample Selection Criteria

Multi hazard prone; ‘Ananya’ Priority district

Begusarai

Khagaria

Flood prone, site of confluence of seven rivers; planned ‘Ananya’ innovation on referral systems for remote / inaccessible areas

Dense urban area; multi-hazard profile; ‘Ananya’ priority district

Patna

Gopalganj

Multi-hazard prone district in north-west Bihar; large scale disaster-induced displacement; ‘Ananya’ priority district

West Champaran

Multi-hazard prone district in western boundary of state; On-going DDMP formulation pilot; ‘Ananya’ priority district

Samastipur

Flood prone; On-going DDMP formulation pilot; ‘Ananya’ Priority district

Darbhanga

Multi-hazard prone district in north Bihar; second largest urban centre in high risk zone; presence of socio-economically vulnerable groups like Musahar; ongoing CBDRR and Kosi recovery programs

B I H A R

Drought prone district in south Bihar; affected by left wing extremism

Gaya

Supaul

Multi-hazard prone district in north Bihar; site of Kosi embankment breach of 2008; on-going recovery project

Multi-hazard prone district in north Bihar; on-going Kosi recovery project; on-going ‘Ananya’ innovation on real-time data monitoring

Saharsa

4

The Process: This review was conducted in three phases. Phase one included:

• Desk-Review - analysis of available secondary sources including national and state government documents,

data from line departments, program documentation and publications from non-governmental organizations,

academic articles on Bihar and its disaster context, print and web-based media reports;

Scoping Phase - Preliminary consultations and key informant interviews with key state government officials,

including the Principle Secretary of the Disaster Management Department and the Vice Chairperson of BSDMA,

UN agencies, INGOs, select quasi-government institutions and media agencies. These interviews helped in

understanding the policy framework, state level DM institutions, their roles and responsibilities and the current

levels of functioning of both state and humanitarian organizations. To understand the district level DM processes

and capacities, three districts namely Samastipur, Begusarai and Patna were selected for visits in the first leg and

key stakeholders at the district, block and village level were interviewed. Field visits to the communities were

organized with support from local NGOs and focus group discussions were conducted with community groups.

Patna district was selected to understand the urban risk context and disaster management capacities. This

scoping phase one concluded with the finalization of the review design

Detailed Review- In this phase, 8 districts were visited. Overall, the team interacted with 145 an additional

stakeholders through key informant interviews, focus group discussions, structured interactions, and group

discussions at four levels - state, district, block and community (village and urban wards). Government officials

from the administration and key line departments (Disaster Management, Health, Agriculture, Public Health

Engineering, Water Resource Department, Animal Husbandry, and Social Welfare) were interviewed.

In addition to meetings, the team participated in the development of

two SOPs - Mass Casualty Management (MCM) and Drought;

visited the Kosi Barrage (Birpur) and the August 2008 embankment

breach site located in Nepal; and visited key DM structures like

newly-constructed EOC buildings, warehouses and flood shelters.

Upon the completion of the field visits, a consultation meeting with

B-IAG members and Government representatives was done to

share the impressions, corroborate factual aspects and to seek

their opinions on the emerging findings.

Focussed interactions with key representatives of Bill & Melinda

Gates Foundation India office and stakeholders of Ananya

programme were held in phase one as well as after completion of

the field visits. The adjacent graph depicts the key informants

interacted with as part of the review: Block / Villages District State

15

50

6 9

2

20

22 21

Government

Quasi-Government

UN & Civil Society

Communities

Figure 3: Key-informants for the review

5

In August 2013, the team revisited Patna and one of the 10 selected districts, Saharsa, to carry out a real-time

analysis of the situation in the monsoon season. This included interactions with key government and non-

government stakeholders while they were dealing with the evolving flood situation in areas along the Ganga river as

well as visits to the settlements inside the Kosi embankments in Saharsa.

Principle of optimal ignorance and proportional accuracy: In order to meet the objectives of this review, in the

given time-frame the team sought key stakeholders and informants and collected only that data and information

which was relevant for the review. Thus, the findings and analysis are primarily based on the information shared by

these stakeholders as well as that available from secondary sources.

Challenges / limitations: During the process of the review, all the stakeholders shared their views, thoughts and

concerns generously. At the same time, the team encountered the following challenges and limitations:

• The government engineers from PHED and WRD were on strike and in most cases the team was unable to meet

them at office. Even though the team managed to meet most of these officials out of office, this limited access to

relevant documents and plans.

• The timing of the review coincided with the financial year end and the budget session of the state assembly,

impacting the availability of quality time from key government officials. • The team could not visit few communities in Gaya district which is affected with Left Wing Extremism.

6

1: In May 2010, the Government of Bihar and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to accelerate improvements in health, nutrition and sanitation in Bihar linked to MDGs 4, 5 and 6. The foundation is providing technical, management and program design support towards this partnership via a program called ‘Ananya’. Most of the Ananya projects have initially been implemented in eight innovation districts chosen by the GoB and the Foundation.

Chapter Endnotes

OVERVIEW OF THE STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROFILE2

State Profile

The state of Bihar is situated in the northern part of the country sharing a long international boundary with Nepal.

th 2It is the 12 largest state in the country with an area of 94,163 square kilometres and has the highest

population density at 1,102 persons per square kilometre. Bihar has a total of seven river basins with perennial

rivers, originating from the Himalayas, like the Saryu (Ghagrah), Gandak, Kosi, Burhi-Gandak, Bagmati, Kamala-

Balan and Mahananda flowing through the state to merge with the river Ganga, which divides the plains into two

parts. Other rivers of the state are Sone, Punpun, Phalgu, Kiul and Sakri that descend down the Chota-Nagpur

Plateau south of Bihar. The state is subject to the summer monsoons during the months of June to September.

Socio-economic profile

3Human Development : Although Bihar is one of the fastest growing states of India (GDP growth rate of 9.56 percent

while the national rate is 8 percent), it faces immense development challenges. Key demographic indicators of the

state are presented in the following table:

4Table 1: Key Demographic Indicators of Bihar

Particulars

Population

Male

Female

Child Population (0-6 yrs.)

Male child

Female Child

Sex Ratio (females per 1000 males)

Literacy Rate

Density (population per sq. Km.)

Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)

Census, 2011

10,38,04,637

5,41,85,347

4,96,19,920

1,85,82,229

96,15,280

89,66,949

916

63.82 percent

1,102

48 (as of 2010)

Remarksrd3 highest among states;

Population has increased from 829.99 Lakh in 2001

to 1038.05 Lakh in 2011.

th5 lowest in India (national sex ratio 940)

Lowest among the states

Most densely populated state of the country

Reduced from 60 in 2003

The state has high levels of intra-state disparity with north Bihar lagging behind due to low agricultural productivity,

poor irrigation facilities and high vulnerability to floods. The state is also often referred to as one of the most under-5developed state in the country . According to the Tendulkar Committee Report 2009, nearly 54.4 percent of the

population lives below the poverty line, which is much higher than the national average of 37.2 percent. However, if

factors beyond income are considered (Multi-dimensional Poverty Index), about 79.3 percent of the state’s

population lives below the poverty line. In fact, the poverty ratio of the state is the second highest in the country.

8

Rural poverty at 55.7 percent is also much higher than the urban poverty at 43.7 percent. Poverty in Bihar is a function

of low per capita land holding, very low industrialization base and limited opportunities in the service sector. Low

human endowment and poor infrastructure compound the problem. Due to limited opportunities in the state, there is

large scale out migration from the state both in lean and peak agriculture seasons of the country.

Land and its people: Predominantly an agrarian society where 88.70 percent of the population belongs to the rural

areas, Bihar’s soil conditions are conducive for agricultural practices. The average land holding size in the state is

0.58 hectare, which is half the all-India average of 1.57 hectare. Over 80 percent farms are very small (average size

0.30 hectare), whereas small and marginal farms together constitute 91 percent of the total land holdings. The

uncertainty of the monsoons, the impact of floods and droughts on agriculture clubbed with the low investments rates

brings about low crop productivity in the state.

Migration: “The incidence of out migration from rural Bihar is probably greater than anywhere else in India” (ODI,

London, 2006). Seasonal and long term migration has been the trend of the workforce of the state. The workforce,

especially from poorer households and relatively from poorer regions migrates in search of better employment

opportunities and to access better labour markets. Of a sample survey conducted, it was found that around 80 6percent of migrant people are male and between 15 and 40 years .

Rural Urban Composition: The total area of the state is 94,163.00 Sq.km. out of which 92,257.51 Sq.km (97.98 7percent) are rural areas and 1,095.41.Sq.km. (2.02 percent) are urban areas . There are 14 urban agglomerations

and 199 towns in Bihar with 11.30 percent people live in urban regions. This has increased drastically by 35.11 8percent in the last 10 years. This significant increase has been mainly due to the development of towns such as

Patna and Muzaffarpur as commercial hubs and Darbhanga emerging as an educational hub in the state.

9

Bihar has the second highest poverty ratio in the country despite being one of the fastest growing states in India (Tendulkar Committee Report 2009/ UNDP - Bihar Economic and Human Development Indicators)

Disaster Risk Context

Multiple hazards and related zones: The geographical composition of Bihar, its boundary, land, water bodies,

climate and above all its location makes it vulnerable to multiple hazards. Almost all the districts are prone to most of 9the major hazards viz. earthquake, floods, cyclone, drought, fire and heat and cold wave. The following map depicts

the multi-hazard zones in Bihar:

Figure 4: Multi-hazard zones in Bihar

10

Earthquakes: Bihar is located in the high seismic zone that falls on the boundary of the tectonic plate joining the

Himalayan tectonic plate near the Bihar-Nepal Border and has six sub-surface fault lines moving towards the

Gangetic planes in four directions. Of the 38 districts, 11 districts fall in seismic zone V of which 2 districts (Madhubani

and Supaul) fall entirely in seismic zone V while 30 districts fall in seismic zone IV and 13 districts in seismic zone III

with most districts falling under multiple seismic zones (i.e. either seismic zone V & IV or seismic zone IV & III). The

state has in the past experienced major earthquakes; the worst was the 1934 earthquake in which more than 25,000

people lost their lives. Recent earthquake was the Sikkim earthquake in September 2011.

Earthquakes are a major threat to cities, especially the new and growing urban centres in the state where building

codes and control mechanisms are not strictly enforced. This could result in social infrastructures such as schools

and hospitals that are not built to be earthquake resistant could lead to severe damage and loss of lives as well.

Floods: Bihar’s topography is marked by a number of perennial and non-perennial rivers of which, those originating

from Nepal are known to carry high sediment loads that are then deposited on the plains of Bihar. A majority of the

rainfall in this region is concentrated in the 3 months of monsoon during which the flow of rivers increases up to 50

times causing floods in Bihar. According to the Bihar Government’s Flood Management Information Systems Cell, 10floods of Bihar can be divided into 4 categories namely:

1. Class I: Flash floods– floods occurring due to rainfall in Nepal, lead time is short (8 hours) in Kamla-Balan,

receding of flood waters is fast;

2. Class II: River floods– lead time 24 hours, receding of flood waters is 1 week or more;

3. Class III: Drainage congestion in river confluence- lead time more than 24 hours, lasting full monsoon season (i.e.

receding of flood waters takes 3 months), and no Kharif season agriculture;

4. Class IV: Permanent water logging- shrinkage in area only in February, local rainfall, micro-relief aspects.

As such, 73.63 percent of the geographical area of North Bihar is considered to be flood prone. Every year, 28

districts get flooded (of which 15 districts are worst affected) causing huge loss of property, lives, farmlands and

infrastructure. During the 2008 Kosi floods, over 350,000 acres of paddy, 18,000 acres of maize and 240,000 acres of 11other crops were adversely affected, impacting close to 500,000 farmers .

12According to an IGC report , Bihar has had four major flood events in 1954, 1974, 1987, and 2004. In addition, in the

years 1978, 1987, 1998, 2004, 2007 and 2008 Bihar witnessed high magnitudes of floods. The total area affected by

floods has also increased during these years. Bihar’s strategy to tackle these floods over the years has been to

construct embankments so as to control the flow of rivers. Even though there has been significant increase in the

funds allocated to the building of embankments through the 5 year plans of the state, frequency and intensity of floods 13has not reduced .

11

A large part of Bihar is located in the high seismic zone and 28 districts experience flooding every year (National Consortium of Civil Society Organizations on MGNREGA, 2001)

Drought: Bihar also faces drought situations primarily in South and South-West parts of Bihar however increasingly

even North Bihar, which has a high concentration of rivers and receives ample rainfall, has also started experiencing

droughts. Districts of Munger, Nawada, Rohtas, Bhojpur, Aurangabad and Gaya are the known drought prone areas

of the state. In just the last decade, drought was declared in 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010 and 2013.

Conflict: It is evident that there is a growing extremism situation in Bihar. The fatalities in the Naxal (left wing 14extremism) violence in Bihar were 586 victims between 2004 and 2013 out of which 271 were civilians . One of the

worst Naxal affected districts is Gaya in South Bihar.

Other Hazards: Apart from the above hazards, the state is also prone to cold and heat waves, Cyclonic storms (high

speed winds) and other human-induced hazards like fire, epidemics, industrial and road / boat accidents. Incidences

of fire are mainly local in nature but have a severe impact on villages. Since a majority of Kucha houses have thatch

roofs and wooden structures, in the summer months when winds are high, fires from the traditional stoves spreads

the damage to the entire village.

Climate change: 15Uncertain weather patterns, changes in temperature and precipitation , and an increase in

extreme weather events is increasingly a reality in Bihar, as with the rest of the country. It has been seen that these 16changes have led to alterations in agricultural produce as well as increased incidents of localised drought and floods

within the same year in the region.

2: Source: 2011 Census of India3: UNDP - Bihar Economic and Human Development Indicators (Factsheet)4: Source: 2011 census of India5: GoI (2013) Report of the committee for evolving a composite development index of states6: Journal of Social and Economic studies, A N Sinha Institute for Social Studies, Patna7: GOB site: http://www.brandbihar.com/english/geography_of_bihar.html 8: Extracted from the census 2011 (Bihar)9: Department of Disaster Management, Government of Bihar, http://disastermgmt.bih.nic.in/Map/Maps.htm 10: NFMISC , “Flood Report 2009”11: National Consortium of Civil Society Organizations on MGNREGA, 2001, “Leveraging MNREGA for Flood Control: A case study for

Policy Reform in Bihar”ational Consortium of Civil Society Organizations on MGNREGA, 2001, “Leveraging MNREGA for Flood Control: A case study for Policy Reform in Bihar”

12: International Growth Centre, 2012, “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)”

13: ibid14: Fatalities in the left wing extremist violence in Bihar. SATP, as accessed on 12/07/13

(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/bihar/data_sheets/annual_casualties.asp)15: Effect of climate change on River Kosi and its basin, Rama Mani, India Water Portal, as accessed on 20/09/13

(http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/effect-climate-change-river-kosi-and-its-basin)16: Impact of climate change on wheat and winter maize over a sub-humid climatic environment, A.V.A Haris et al., Current Science,

Volume104, NO. 2, January 2013

Chapter Endnotes

12

Bihar is increasingly witnessing adverse impacts of drought, climate change, human-induced hazards and conflicts

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS3

14

he disaster management context in Bihar has been shaped by a history of frequent small-scale and key large-

Tscale disasters spread across the state. While communities facing these disasters have continued to respond

and adapt to these risks, the institutional origins of disaster management have been reactive, and in some

ways, continue to be so. Yet, a clear progression of the disaster management framework in the state is discernible in

line with evolution of the national DM discourse, socio-political changes in the state, and the changing natural

environment. This progression, as represented in the timeline (Figure 2) below, provides a good starting point for

reviewing the state’s disaster management capacities and enables an analysis of the contributing factors to the

same.

This section (in accordance with the framework of analysis) explores the different elements of the disaster

management context and its progression – policy, people, programmes and their performance. At the outset, the

policy context and its progression are presented with an analysis of the existing framework and its implications on

disaster management in Bihar. This is followed by an analysis of the DM ecosystem, its constituent actors and the

linkages between them. The programmatic activities and initiatives being undertaken within the DM ecosystem are

then analysed for their focus and intended impact. Finally, the performance of the policies and programmes is

examined on the basis of responses of the key informants, observations of the team, parameters existing in the

international and national DM discourse, and the real-time monsoon analysis undertaken in the month of August

2013.

15

Munger Earthquake

1934

Separate Department for Disaster Relief

1978

Large-Scale Floods& Earthquake

1987/88

IAG Informally Constituted

Large-Scale FloodsUnmanageable by

Single Actors

2002

Bihar State Disaster Management Act;

Dept. of DM constituted

Large-scale floods in

18 districts,drought in 20

2004

National DM Act adopted by Bihar state

2005

Change in state government

Drought

2006

SDRFConstituted

Drought

2010

First Joint Assessment between IAG

and Govt.

434 houses were destroyed in fire

incidences across the state

2011

Norms of assistance passed SOP for Flood Disaster Management approved

Directives regarding fire, cold wave, hail storm and lightening related losses issued

2012

SOPs for MCM and Drought

being formulated

20132007

FMISC Constituted

Large-ScaleFloods

2009

BSDMAConstituted

Drought

2008

International attention towards the disaster

scenario in Bihar

Kosi Breach

Figure 5: DM Context Timeline

16

The evolution of

the DM

framework in

Bihar has been

influenced by

changes in the

national DM

discourse,

socio-political

changes in the

state as well as

the intensified

disaster events

in recent history

Policy Environment

The Disaster Management Department (DMD) is the nodal department for DM in Bihar. The DM institutions in the

state have evolved from a relief-oriented set-up wherein disaster relief was as an additional charge with the

Department of Revenue and Land Development. In 1977-78, a separate Department of Relief and Rehabilitation

was established for better management of relief operations and distribution of relief packages received from the

central government. In 2004, the name and focus of this department changed from relief and rehabilitation to disaster

management based on recommendations from a High Powered Committee. This department is currently headed by

a Principle Secretary on additional charge and comprises Secretary, Additional Secretary, three Officers on Special

Duty (Finance, SDRF and Administration), support staff and with no personnel (rank and file) at the sub-state level.

Bihar passed its state DM Act in 2004, even prior to the national DM Act of 2005. In 2007, the state Act was repealed

and the National DM Act was adopted. In line with the DM Act, the state DM Policy was developed with the stated

goal of making a shift from the traditional relief-centric approach towards developing a ‘Culture of DRR’ in Bihar . In 17

the last six years, DM institutions have been established and policy instruments developed towards the fulfilment of

the objectives set out by this policy. These are discussed below, followed by an analysis of the policy framework for

DM in Bihar.

Policy-mandated institutions and status: The DM policy environment in Bihar has evolved through the

establishment and strengthening of institutions for implementation and action. In 2007, Bihar State Disaster

Management Authority (BSDMA) was constituted as the strategic institution for informing and shaping DM policy.

BSDMA is headed by the Chief Minister as the Chairperson, with a senior retired IAS official in-charge of operational

leadership as the Vice-Chairperson. The DMD is the nodal government department responsible for DM while

BSDMA is mandated to inform policy and focus on DRR. In practice, the DMD focuses on preparedness and

response aspects while BSDMA focuses on planning, knowledge-building and DRR measures. Operationally, the

BSDMA functions independently, while its budget is routed through the DMD.

In addition to the BSDMA, the Crisis Management Group (CMG), State Executive Committee (SEC), State Disaster

Response Force and State Disaster Response Fund have been specifically constituted for DM at the state-level,

while the District Disaster Management Authorities have been created at district-level. The CMG is the apex state

government institution, headed by the Chief Secretary and comprising representatives (Principal Secretaries) from

21 DM-related Departments, which is mandated to direct the management of any crisis in the state.

Typically, the CMG approves and recommends financial measures for preparedness and mitigation as well as inter-

departmental coordination; and in case of an event, meets on a weekly basis for taking stock of the severity of the

crisis. Constituted in 2008, the SEC is the highest level body which monitors disasters, plans and sanctions

guidelines, sanctions expending of funds (non plan expenditure of DMD), reviews progress and is empowered to

authorize DMD to withdraw funds from State Disaster Response Fund for preparedness and mitigation actions

under different heads of Non Plan Expenditure. The SEC is headed by Chief Secretary with Principal Secretaries of

DMD, WRD, Finance and Development Commissioner as members and special invitees from related Departments

as per the nature of event (for e.g. in case of drought, representatives from Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

departments are invited). Typically, the SEC meets on a monthly basis with the Chief Secretary chairing the

proceedings.

In accordance with NDRF (fund) mandated by the DM Act, Bihar has created a State Disaster Relief Fund in 2010 for

providing relief and compensation in case of natural hazards. Guidelines for the same have been developed; the

DMD is the nodal Department in the state government that manages the SDRF through its Non Plan Expenditure,

and the same is sanctioned by SEC. A decision has been taken to create the State Disaster Mitigation Fund with an

initial corpus of INR 10 Crore in the BSDMA, directives for which are still under formulation. In line with NDRF (force)

mandated by the DM Act, Bihar has constituted the State Disaster Response Force in 2010 for search and rescue

operations. Operational norms and functioning guidelines for this force have been developed and approved by the

State Cabinet. Selection of State Disaster Response Force personnel has started since 2011 from amongst the State

Police Cadre as well as from the armed forces and civilians. A battalion has been created, which is being commanded

by an OSD from within the DMD with plans to recruit a commander from the Police Services of the rank of Inspector

General. Training of recruited State Disaster Response Force personnel has commenced with experienced NDRF

personnel acting as trainers. District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) have been constituted at the district

level across all 38 districts, as mandated by the DM Act. DDMA is chaired by the District Magistrate, with the

president of the ZP as co-chair and the SP, Civil Surgeon, Chief Engineer of WRD and Executive Engineer-PHED

being the members. DDMA is mandated to sanction measures for preparedness and relief / response as well as to

assess and monitor the disaster events. The DDMA is also mandated to plan for and undertake DM related planning

and mitigation actions.

Policy Instruments and Operational Tools: The shift in focus of the state machinery towards strengthening

preparedness for response has been accompanied by the development of norms, procedures, guidelines and 18directives for operational clarity at multiple levels, especially since 2008. In early 2012, Norms of Assistance were

19approved for relief and response through the national and state disaster response funds in Bihar. Two Standard

Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been developed and four are under development for aiding consistent and swift

action before, during, and after disasters. Typically, SOPs are developed in a consultative process led by the DMD

with inputs from related Departments and members of the civil society (through the B-IAG), UN agencies and NDMA.

After approval from the Cabinet, these are shared with the districts for implementation and are mandatory for

implementation by the concerned officials. In addition to these, the DMD sends Directives to guide DM processes at

district and block / circle levels, for e.g. in January 2012, a directive was sent regarding the actions to be taken by

districts in response to the cold wave. A similar process is facilitated by the DMD for other departments like Health 20Department. Apart from the operational tools developed by the DMD, Technical Guidelines are developed by

BSDMA, for e.g. the recently released guidelines for earthquake resilient construction. The following table depicts

the status of the various policy instruments in Bihar as of April 2013:

In Bihar, the DM policy mandated institutional architecture is in place with clarity in its objectives and operations

17

Table 2: Status of Policy Instruments in Bihar

Instrument

State Disaster Relief Fund Norms

Flood SOP

Earthquake SOP

Mass Casualty Management SOP

Hospital and Fire Safety SOP

Drought SOP

Drinking Water Scarcity SOP

Cold Wave/ Fire/ Hail Storm Directives

Health Department Directives

Retrofitting Guidelines

Earthquake Resilient Construction Guidelines and Circular

State Flood Management Plan

Dai ly Report ing Form/ Weekly Reporting Form IX

Status (as of April 2013)

Approved and issued in 2012

Approved and operational – used for preparedness planning at district level

At preparatory stage

Process of draft finalization

Awaiting cabinet approval

Process of draft finalization

Approved

Issued by DMD in 2012

Issued pre-floods since 2007-08

Released in 2012

Released in 2012

Draft awaiting approval

Daily/ weekly reporting during disaster-annual form consolidated at district level and shared with DMD by October

The

development of

instruments and

operational

tools to

translate the

DM policy into

practice has

gained traction

and momentum

since 2012

Analysis of Policy Environment

o Conducive policy environment: The evolution of the policy landscape in Bihar and the concomitant actions in

the last 5 years are indicative of a conducive policy environment for programs and partnerships (both between

the government and civil society; and intra-government) for DM. This can be attributed in a large part to the 21frequency and scale of damage by disaster events in the state, especially floods. It has been argued elsewhere

that a ‘focusing event’ (disaster of a significant scale) leads to policy and programmatic initiatives pertaining to

DM by the State. In line with this argument, it can be said that Bihar witnessed a ‘focusing event’ (Kosi 2008) at

least from the governmental perspective leading to policy reform and capacity building in the state. This was

evident from the multi-hazard risk perception and orientation towards DM found in discussions with state level

officials who reflected upon the state’s increasing focus on strengthening preparedness and response. Many

highlighted the role of the current centralized political leadership in the state in pushing the DM agenda in

accordance with the national discourse. The state’s commitment has been articulated in the Approach Paper to ththe 12 Five Year Plan which recognizes the shift in national priorities towards DM and highlights the intended

goal of “Safer Development in Bihar” through DM.

18

o Policy focus:

o Primary focus on preparedness for response: It is evident from the nature of policy instruments being

developed and budgetary allocation by the government that the current focus for DM is primarily on

preparedness for response. The SOPs and directives are geared towards strengthening response capacities 22at different levels of the government. Further, all the planned expenditure of the DMD in 2012-13 had been

proposed for preparedness activities. This includes the budget head for awareness generation and capacity

building, under which, search and rescue training was conducted with communities, divers and boat drivers. 2395.3 percent of the non plan expenditure was for relief and response, while 3.9 percent was for

preparedness. Only 0.7 percent was, then, proposed towards mitigation and prevention activities as the

amount allotted to BSDMA.

o Mono-hazard approach: In line with Bihar’s DM policy, which seeks to bring about ‘a culture of safety’, most thpolicy documents including the State Disaster Management Plan and Approach Paper to 12 Five Year Plan

recognize the multi-hazard nature of risks and event history in the state. However, this does not get translated

into a multi-hazard approach in policy and programmatic actions. Almost 14 districts in Northern-Bihar are in

seismic zone IV or V, are at high risk of flooding, and are at medium to high risk of high wind, cyclones and fire

events. Yet, there is no policy document developed for this region addressing all the risks (across all stages of

the DM cycle) in a collective manner. Different line departments, during the summer months, take

preparedness related actions towards flooding but there is negligible focus on preparedness for earthquake

or secondary hazards like fire. This lack of multi-hazard approach is also evident in policies and programs of

the non-governmental actors.

A conducive policy environment for DM has evolved over the past few years in Bihar primarily due to increasing disaster events, heightened sensitivity of officials and the political leadership

A large part of DM

expenditure in the state is

currently on preparedness

measures. Photo: Newly constructed

warehouse for DM in West

Champaran district.

19

o Urban risks: With 35.11 percent rate of urbanisation (decadal growth for 2011-2001), Bihar currently has 7 24Municipal Corporations, 42 Nagar Parishads, and 75 Nagar Panchayats of which several urban areas lie in high

multi-hazard risk zones. Yet, there is marginal recognition of urban disaster risks in the DM policy framework

apart from risks identified to the capital city, Patna. The state policy takes peripheral cognisance of the risks and

measures to reduce them, which is further reflected in the absence of urban analysis and planning in the District

Disaster Management Plans. While there are on-going efforts for reviewing and adapting the building bye-laws

with a DM focus, this has not been incorporated in town planning yet and no roles have been defined for Urban

Local Bodies in DM. For e.g., one of the biggest municipal corporations in the state, Darbhanga, doesn’t have a

town planning department. This results in not only unplanned and unregulated growth of private housing without

any audits of structures, but also in congestion, sewage mismanagement and ultimately in worsening the

dynamic risk factors to the town. Even in the case of Patna, disaster management actions are limited to

prevention of water from entering the city in the monsoon season, as was seen in 2013. Due to heavy rainfall in

Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh, the River Ganga was flowing above the danger mark this season, threatening

floods in the city after 38 years. Several blocks, including Danapur, Bakhtiyarpur, Maner, Fatuha, Patna Sadar,

Barh, Athmalgola and Mokama, along the banks of the Ganga in Patna district were flooded for over a month.

While actions were taken to ensure the safety of the of the 24 km long protection wall, which was created along

the right bank of the Ganga river after the flooding of the city in 1975, risk reduction actions have not been planned

for or implemented in this regard. This is evident by the fact that unregulated construction of private and public

infrastructure has been allowed inside the protection wall.

• Policy Convergence: As in other contexts, disasters impact different facets of life in Bihar as well. Therefore, in

addition to the DM policy, the policies developed by various Departments, including but not limited to Agriculture,

Health and Water Resources have implications for DM. However, a comprehensive and collective envisioning on

DM is yet to be undertaken in the state, resulting in a lack of convergence between different policies and resultant 25actions. For e.g., the State is in the second phase of implementing its Agricultural Roadmap , yet this roadmap is

still not informed by the differential disaster risks across the state. This lack of analysis also translates into sub-

optimal strategies proposed by the roadmap; for e.g. despite 15 districts of north Bihar being in a high flood-risk

zone, efforts for developing flood-resistant crops have not been included in this roadmap. Further, despite the 26expanse and diversity of river systems in Bihar, the state’s high dependence on water bodies , prevalent

27hydrological disaster risks, and the state’s changing patterns of water usage and availability , Bihar does not

have a comprehensive Water Management Policy. Different departments have drafted water management

policies for the state, but none of these have been approved yet. Such a policy will not only have implications for

management of disaster risks, but also prevent the creation of future risks. Similarly, the Flood Control Policy of

the state (as explained below) does not have convergence with the various DM related policies.

Currently, urban

risks feature

only marginally

in the DM policy

framework

20

Bihar’s Flood Control Policy

Since the mid-1950s, structural measures for managing the flow of rivers (in particular, construction of

embankments), have been the primary flood control strategy in Bihar and the rest of India. This flood control

policy has translated in the creation of dams, barrages, canals and embankments for managing the direction

and volume of flow of the seven major rivers in the state. Two barrages have been constructed on the Kosi

and Gandak rivers; an embankment and canal system has been established in linkage with these barrages;

and embankments constructed on the remaining five major rivers flowing through north Bihar. Till date, the

policy focus is on creating and strengthening embankments for flood control; 3,629 km of embankments

having been constructed so far (out of which 3179 km lie in north Bihar), with plans afoot for further

construction so as to ultimately manage the flow of all 7 major rivers before they drain in river Ganga.

The current policy stance is to prevent floods through:

• Construction of embankments on the rivers that haven’t been fully embanked, like the river Bagmati• Anti-erosion works on the embankments in the pre-flood period• Deployment of home-guards for protecting the embankments against breach due to sabotage and natural riverine action • Flood-fighting works on embankment during flood season

However, there is lack of clarity about the minor rivers, tributaries and of the major rivers whose distributaries

flow has been restricted from draining into the major rivers.

Given the perils of too narrow a restriction of river flow and the perils of narrowing down the river bed thus

restricting its flow and making it prone to overflow, the embankments were so constructed that the average

width between the eastern and western embankment is around 10 Km. (for Kosi River embankments). This

thus created a large amount of area (viz. 120 Km length of embankments * 10 Km average width = 1200 sq.

Km.) suitable for agriculture and habitation during the non-flooding months. Along with the construction of

the embankments, the rehabilitation process was initiated in the 1960's but this rehabilitation is still

incomplete due to communities either choosing not to avail their rehabilitation package, not receiving the

package or accepting the package but still choosing to return to their villages inside the embankments. It is 28estimated that “380 revenue villages spread over four districts and 13 blocks” are still inside the Kosi

embankments alone, with a population of 9.88 lakh.Since government policy doesn’t recognise the legitimate

existence of these villages, they also continue to be far removed from government entitlements as all the

official infrastructure is located outside. This also impacts the declaration of floods and subsequent relief

distribution even though the area within the embankments gets inundated annually for 2-3 months causing

flooding of varying intensities.

21

The Birpur Barrage (in the picture) was

constructed in 1962, followed by

embankments along the Kosi riverbed.

• Role of PRIs: The disaster management policies and policy instruments envision a minimal role for people’s

representatives at the village, GP and district levels. The flood SOP highlights the role of GP members and

Mukhiya at the village level in a few preparedness measures (identification of safe spaces, shelter sites,

vulnerable groups, mapping, early warning communication) and in response measures (deployment of boats,

damage assessment and reporting, provision of relief material; activation of Anna Kalash Yojana, identification of

households for compensation). However, PRIs have no role in declaration of a disaster event and in DM per se,

apart from that of monitoring of relief measures and recommending priority areas for relief measures. This was

also witnessed during the floods of 2013 which affected 20 districts in the state; the PRIs had no role in

declaration of these floods and initiating the relief measures. Discussions with ZP representatives revealed that

100,000 INR is allotted to the ZP for DM, but these are almost always unspent because of lack of guidance on the rd thsame. Despite the emphasis on decentralized governance in India after the 73 and 74 Amendments, the role

for PRIs has not been clearly defined in the DM policy framework.

• DM cycle approach: The state DM policy of 2007 emphasises on bringing in a ‘DRR culture’, policy and

programmatic initiatives are yet, to be designed taking into consideration the cyclical nature of DM. The two

principal government institutions mandated for DM, viz. DMD and BSDMA, do not design and implement

programmes for all the stages of the DM cycle and have specific roles wherein DMD is responsible for

preparedness and response while BSDMA is responsible for knowledge building and DRR. Recovery and

reconstruction measures are undertaken by the Planning Department. It was noticed that the absence of a cycle

approach in practice results in non-synergistic priorities amongst the principal actors, and translates to

differential prioritization of investment in different stages, primarily skewed towards preparedness and response.

• Mainstreaming: thBihar state’s Approach Paper to the 12 Five Year Plan recognises the need for mainstreaming

DRR and identifies four key priority areas (housing, infrastructure, health and education) for doing the same.

However, this policy document neither provides guidance towards a strategy for policy convergence nor a vision,

road-map or perspective plan for mainstreaming. While initiatives have begun to emerge towards translating this

policy into action, for e.g. BSDMA has initiated the process of reviewing and modifying the building bye-laws and

has reviewed the Bihar Urban Development Act with a DM lens, these remain piecemeal so far. As reported by

the DMD, 21 DM-related departments in the state have been identified and have appointed nodal officers for

DM, however, the mechanisms for these officials to plan and review actions collectively are yet to be put in place.

Further, the approach paper mentions that related departments should have DM plans on the basis of which they

should have 10 percent budgetary allocation for DM, but this is not followed in practice. The 600-odd GoI and

GoB schemes currently being implemented in Bihar present many avenues for mainstreaming DM, an

opportunity that has not been systematically explored so far.

23

The DM policy

framework

currently does

not clearly

define a role for

PRIs in disaster

management,

nor does it

provide a plan

for DRR

mainstreaming

• Capacity Building for DM: All the policy documents related to DM recognise the need for capacity building at

many levels and a large number of people have been trained since the early 2000’s under different programs and

by multiple agencies. This includes training of community emergency response teams on early warning, search

and rescue, first-aid, relief camp management, household-level preparedness; specialist training for divers; and

orientation of government officials at the block levels, amongst others. However, a clear vision for capacity

building is not evident in the policy framework for DM and has, thus, not translated in a capacity building plan.

Capacity building is currently perceived as training only, without a wider learning cycle approach or a plan for

ensuring the application of acquired knowledge and skills. There hasn’t been an evaluation of the learning

outcomes or existing learning needs till now, and follow up or regular engagement with trained individuals is not

strategically incorporated in training programs. The principal capacity building institution for the state is BIPARD,

which has a Centre for Disaster Management, yet, DM forms a small part of the courses conducted by BIPARD.

Mainstreaming of capacity building for DM in on-going administrative training for officials at different levels has

not been conceptualized on the basis of learning need for e.g. newly recruited district level officials expressed the

need to be equipped with knowledge and skills on the state’s norms and provisions for DM to be able to

implement them without delays during a disaster. However, this is not included in their training program so far.

24

Key stakeholders recognise the importance of capacity building for DM but a comprehensive understanding and vision for the same is yet to evolve in the state

People – The DM Ecosystem

An exercise in mapping the actors involved in DM in Bihar reveals that an actor-centric

approach does not quite capture the multiplicity and complex interactions that guide DM

actions in the state. An ecosystem approach is better suited to understand and

conceptualize the diversity of actors and processes that influence DM actions. Such an 29approach has been used extensively to understand complex adaptive systems that

involve the interaction of social, economic and environmental elements, and has been 30recently proposed for urban policy development and management. In essence, such an

approach recognizes that the interplay between natural processes and human activities

influences and determines the DM functions carried out by constituent actors of the

ecosystem. Further, the conceptualization of the DM ecosystem in Bihar is derived from its

following qualities:

• Multiplicity: DM actions are currently undertaken by several actors with varied

mandates, identities, and roles; through diverse programmes; and in different

geographies. These include Government actors, Quasi-Government actors, Civil

Society actors, UN agencies, Corporates, Academia, and the affected communities 31themselves. The levels of action vary from the hamlets to village, block, district

(town/city in urban areas) and state.

• Interconnectedness: DM actions taken by many actors are interrelated and often

dependant on those of other actors for effectiveness, for instance, timely release of

information about the water discharge from the barrages by WRD can enable early

warning regarding floods to government officials and community members. Similarly,

for the Health Department to ensure the safety of hospitals in urban centres like Patna

or Darbhanga, coordination and partnerships would be required between departments

for urban development, building construction, disaster management and urban local

bodies. What makes this interconnectedness an inherent quality of the ecosystem is

that the achievement of DM outcomes is dependent on collective action and synergy.

• Dynamism: Tracing the historical evolution of the DM context (see Figure 6 below)

reveals that the ecosystem has also evolved along with disaster and socio-political

events, as indicated by the emergence of new actors in close progression with these

events. Additionally, the actions taken by the ecosystem influence the levels of disaster

risks in return. These factors make the ecosystem an inherently dynamic entity.

Figure 6 represents the different actors in the DM ecosystem according to their stage of functionality (response, early recovery, rehabilitation/ reconstruction, mitigation/ prevention and preparedness) and levels of action (state, district/ towns, block, and village/urban ward). Additionally, their identity is represented through the colour of the circles (government- maroon, quasi-government- purple, UN- pink, civil society- orange and communities- blue) and their

32‘sphere of influence ’ indicated through size of the circle (small, medium and large). The reporting lines between these actors (where existing) are also indicated in the illustration with directional arrows.

25

The DM ecosystem of Bihar

comprises a multitude of

actors with varying spheres

of influences and having

forged successful formal-

informal connections; yet,

this ecosystem lacks

collective envisioning and

shared goals

DDMA

CBOsVDMCsCERTS

CommunitiesService Providers

DDMA

Communities

UNUN

Service ProvidersCommunities Communities

NDRF/SDRF

RedCross

BSDMA

RedCross

KosiRecovery

Project

BIPARD

FMISC

ResearchInstitutes

FBOs

NGOs

Media

Corp.

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Line Agencies Line Agencies

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High to low

Sphere of influence Quasi-governmentGovernment UNCivil Society CommunitiesIdentity of actors

Figure 6: The DM Ecosystem

Miti

gatio

n &

Pre

vent

ion

Mai

nstr

eam

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Analysis of DM Ecosystem

In many ways, the DM eco-system in Bihar is a nascent one despite the long history of disaster events in

the state. A few actors like the Water Resources Department, DMD (earlier, as Department of Relief and

Rehabilitation) and some non-governmental organisations have been traditionally involved in disaster

response; yet, the evolution of many actors, increased engagement of pre-existing actors, and

expansion of their functionality in different stages is fairly recent and still on-going.

It is evident from Figure 6 above, that a large majority of actors are still operational in response and

preparedness stages, and very few actors are engaging in other aspects of disaster risk reduction.

While a quasi-government body has been established for rehabilitation and reconstruction (BAPEPS),

none of the government actors have a specified role in early recovery. This may, however, also be

because separate actions for early recovery (other than immediate response actions) have not been 33envisioned in the policy framework itself. INGOs have carried out early recovery actions post the

floods in 2008, including livelihood restoration through cash-for-work programmes, seed provision etc.

Further, it should be noted that no single actor is functional across all stages of the DM cycle apart from

the affected communities themselves. In their case also, the involvement is minimal in mitigation,

prevention and mainstreaming. Other actors who are depicted under mitigation, prevention and

mainstreaming (like research institutes - BIPARD, WALMI, FMIS) have very limited roles currently

contributing towards these goals. ULBs and people’s representatives have a very small sphere of

influence on both policy and implementation at all stages, except the PRIs at the village and GP levels

who are involved in beneficiary identification and monitoring of response / rehabilitation work. The role of

corporates is also very limited so far with agencies like Mahindra Foundation and ICICI Foundation

stepping in to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities after the 2008 Kosi floods. This DM

ecosystem also has a limited role in influencing the declaration of a disaster event in the state, as

evidenced during the declaration of 2013 floods in Bihar.

Collective Envisioning: Despite the interconnectedness of the actors in the ecosystem, a shared

vision for disaster management which takes into account the multiple aspirations, capacities and

linkages between the actors is yet to be realized. Evolving a shared vision and goalposts, which are

lacking at present, would enable inclusive strategies for DM whereby every actor has a defined role,

there exists collective leadership, and a well-defined roadmap for implementation.

27

The WRD has been traditionally involved in DM through flood

protection work. Picture: Anti-erosion work on river Gandak in

West Champaran district.

Connectors: The functional dependence between actors in the ecosystem is operational through both formal and

informal connectors. Mandatory instruments like the flood SOP and official directives on preparedness and response

enable consistent actions across different administrative levels; information-sharing protocols like the Form IX

enable data collection; partnership arrangements between state-level and district-level NGOs further aid action and

information collection. In the current scenario, strong relationships between DMD and civil society actors (through B-

IAG) also act as informal connectors, enabling collaborative efforts between government and civil society. The

impact of weak / absent connectors in the eco-system, then, also impacts its effective functioning for e.g. the

reporting lines from the DMD at the state-level extend through the district administration and circle officers but are not

connected to GP or village level actors, impacting the outreach of DM actions.

Capacities of the Ecosystem:

The DMD at state level is headed by a Principal Secretary with an additional charge for the Health Quantum:

Department and has other officials either on special duty or on deputation with significant number of posts vacant.

There is no rank and file for the department at the district, block and community levels thus the functioning of the

department is dependent on officials from other departments (Revenue, Health and such) to function on additional

charge. These officials are already burdened with, what is considered, their primary responsibilities and often take

up DM as a seasonal responsibility. In other departments, 21 Officers have been appointed as nodal officers for

disaster management. BSDMA is also currently understaffed with only 3 out of 8 nominated members and no

technical experts or implementing staff and also doesn’t have any staff other than at the state level. – It is notable,

however, that the process for recruitment of technical experts under five divisions - Natural Disaster Division,

Environment and Climate Change Adaptation Division, Human Resource Development and Capacity Building

Division, Human Induced Disasters Division and Administration & Finance Division is on-going in the BSDMA.

The training institutes responsible for DM also face a major human resource gap, currently functioning without a

single in-house trainer for DM.

Existing staff of the DMD or the 21 nodal officers have not yet been systematically trained Technical Expertise:

on disaster risk analysis, planning and programming; however, a few officers have had opportunities to participate

in capacity building workshops and conferences. This has resulted in limited technical expertise on disaster risk

analysis, planning and programming amongst the nodal officers and the DMD. This is so probably because DM

occupies a very small part (2-3 days in a 6 month period) of the training programme for administrative officials, and

additional training efforts have been piecemeal. Different kinds of technical capacities are required at different

levels, for e.g. policy-making, expenditure of allocated budget (only 20 percent of the planned expenditure was

spent in 2012-13), data-management (use of population data for risk analysis and planning), planning and

implementation. Additionally, capacities for designing and delivering effective training are yet to be strengthened

to an optimal level.

29

The DM

ecosystem has

a multitude of

actors but is

constrained by

the lack of

sufficient and

technically

capable human

resources for

disaster

management

While this review did not focus on the technical capacities within the various non-governmental agencies and groups,

it is pertinent that these be explored in detail for a better understanding of the available resources within the state.

Capacity building forms a key component of many civil society initiatives, including training courses on community-

based disaster risk management for their staff, amongst others. The impact of these needs to be studied to explore

whether this has created a pool of technical experts, or further enabled the emergence of risk reduction initiatives by

these individuals. Currently, there doesn’t exist a comprehensive roster of all the trained experts in the state, even

though the Inter-Agency Group facilitates this process from within their members when there is a requirement.

Programmes

The realization of policy objectives by actors in the DM ecosystem is undertaken through various programmes

including projects (for e.g. the Kosi Recovery Project was started by the World Bank in 2010 to support flood recovery

and risk reduction efforts of GoB), schemes (for e.g. the Anna Kalash Scheme was launched by the GoB in 2011 to

prevent starvation deaths by ensuring decentralized access to contingency food grains, especially in drought-prone thdistricts), and activities (for e.g. BSDMA organises the observation of Earthquake Safety Week in the state from 15

January). These programmatic actions are undertaken in different stages of the DM cycle and vary from as short a

time period as one week, to a couple months (as in the case of small-scale responses), to long term programmes (for

e.g. UNICEF’s Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction Programme has been on-going since 2009). The nature

of work carried out in these programmes also has commonly emerging themes running across different stages like

infrastructure development, provision of equipment and materials, capacity building etc. At the same time, some

programme actions are typical to a stage of disaster management. A snapshot of the on-going programme actions in

different stages of the disaster management cycle is presented in the illustration below (Figure 4). This is followed by

an analysis of the design and nature of programmes in the ecosystem.

57 flood shelters have been proposed under the Kosi Recovery Project.

Picture: Flood shelter in Birpur block of Supaul district.

30

Various schemes, long-term programmes, projects and activities for DM are being carried out in the state. However, a comprehensive analysis of existing and requisite capacities for DM is yet to be undertaken

Analysis of Programmes in the DM Eco-system

• Hazard Focus: An analysis of the nature of programme activities reveals that their focus is largely on a singular

hazard i.e. floods. While such a focus in the response and rehabilitation / reconstruction phases can be explained

by the non-occurrence of major hazardous events other than floods in the recent history, it is still noticeable that

specific actions for earthquakes, fires, and drought are either minimal or missing from the preparedness and

mitigation / prevention stages as well for e.g. all the equipment and material that has been provided to the district

administration so far is for flood preparedness. The flood-prone districts are equally prone to frequent fire

incidents that, although localized, cause substantial damage to the affected households. Yet, adequate fire-

fighting equipment is yet to be made available and accessible in times of need. There exist civil-society DRR

programs that take multi-hazard perspectives, working with communities for taking precautionary measures

against fire incidents or ensuring earthquake safety in schools but these are limited to the pilot districts. At the

same time, there are few on-going civil society programmes for drought in the stages, even in the districts of south

Bihar that face droughts annually. Finally, initiatives have been undertaken towards earthquake awareness and

development of guidelines for safer construction in the state, but these remain marginal so far.

• Geographical Focus: It was observed that while most on-going programmes in the DM ecosystem are designed

to address the principle risks faced by districts, the contextual risks of socio-geographies within the districts are

not addressed through differential planning. All the governmental and non-governmental programmes are

implemented uniformly across all areas, without addressing the differential risks within and outside the

embankments. Civil society targeting does seek to address social vulnerabilities by focussing on areas with large

population of Maha-dalits and dalits, but the program design remains constant. In the same vein, urban risks

remain largely unaddressed due to focus on rural areas.

• Community Participation: Discussions with different stakeholders in the eco-system revealed that almost all the

government initiatives for DM were not community-driven and often involved minimal community participation,

both in the design and implementation phases. The design of capacity building modules or awareness campaigns

does not involve inputs from communities either in the form of needs assessment or inclusion and utilization of

traditional knowledge. Similarly, while role of people’s representatives is envisioned for the identification of

beneficiaries during response, the lack of community engagement in the preparedness phase results in

implementation gaps. This was also reflected in the process of construction of flood shelters in selected districts in

the Kosi river basin, whereby neither the identification of location, nor the management of the shelters is

community-driven. While it is evident that gaps in the existing level of functioning of the PRIs in Bihar translates in

to the lack of people’s participation in DM programs, it is also true that a well-defined role for PRIs has not been

envisioned in the DM eco-system yet. Perhaps, the only exception to this is the Owner Driven Reconstruction

component of the Kosi Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project wherein the owners of the houses are involved

in the selection and construction of their houses. Started as a civil society initiative, the

32

While there exist diverse initiatives for DM in the state along all stages of the DM cycle, many emerge as being mono-hazard focused. They lack people's participation and leave many contextual underlying risks un-addressed.

housing reconstruction project was transferred to

the government and engages community

facilitators for ensuring people’s participation.

• Piecemeal approach on DRR: This review is not

meant to be an evaluation of the government and

civil society programmes. Yet, the sense that one

gets while interacting with the actors from the DM

ecosystem and especially the communities

across 10 districts is that the nature and design of

the civil society initiatives is more “project” based

wherein the scale and duration of the initiative is

limited. For e.g. for a decade now, DRR

programmes by civil society have focussed on

creat ing and s t rengthening communi ty

institutions for DM resulting in numerous such

committees across the state. However, a stock-

taking exercise of these institutions and their level

of functioning has not been done even as more

institutions continue to be created. Increasingly,

civil society actors incorporate lessons learnt from

past programmes to focus on establishing

linkages with the government, but a long-term

vision is still lacking and the challenges of

sustainable development also continue to be

faced by DM programmes. DRR is yet to be

integrated in the DM related programming by

actors of the DM ecosystem in the state despite

the evident need for the same.

Despite multi-hazard risks, the focus of most DM programmes is still largely on floods.

Picture: Fire Station in Bettiah, West Champaran

33

Performance

Measuring the performance of DM policies, people and programs presents unique

challenges, in a large part because of the dependence of performance on the

occurrence of a hazard event. This challenge is heightened as one moves across the

stages of the DM cycle, wherein actions taken during a response can be measured

against its intended outcomes in the short-term, and preparedness actions against

response actions when there is a response. For example, such retrospective analyses

of the response to the 2008 floods due to the breach on the Kosi embankment have 34been carried out and informed action thereafter. According to a report , “one of the

clear lessons learned that emerged from the Kosi 2008 floods for the Government of

Bihar is to improve the institutional performance of agencies engaged in flood risk

management activities in the state. Shortcomings in decision making, staff skills and

delays in maintenance were some of the key factors that underpinned the Kosi Afflux

Bund breach in 2008.” However, it is difficult to estimate the impact of other risk

reduction actions. Standards, like the Sphere Standards, enable benchmarking and

evaluation of a response performance, and by extension, preparedness actions as

well. But no such standards exist for risk reduction actions. Internationally, the Hyogo 35Framework of Action provides a comprehensive framework for risk reduction, and

there exist indicators for monitoring progress on its five proposed priority actions. But

this has not been adapted for the Indian context yet. Nationally, the NDMA Act and

policy instruments like the NDMA Guidelines provide hazard-specific actions for DM

across all stages. These, and state level instruments like the SOPs, have been used in

this section to review Bihar’s performance so far. Further, in order to overcome the

challenge of performance measurement, a real-time analysis was undertaken in the

monsoon months in August 2013 to enrich the findings of this report. The

preparedness and response sections are informed by this real-time analysis.

34

Policy Performance

T h e f o r m a t i o n o f a s e p a r a t e

department of disaster management

has brought in focussed action

towards DM, extending beyond relief.

However, this department still remains

as an additional charge with the

Principal Secretary of the Health

Department. Currently, the DMD is

only able to spend 20 percent of its

planned expenditure, and lacks staff at

the sub-state level as well as lack

technical staff at the state level.

Additionally, large-scale responses

also impact the financial management

at district, circle and GP levels wherein

large sums of money flow in during

disasters which the PRIs and banks

are not equipped to handle, leading to

leakages. BSDMA has carried out

several, albeit piecemeal, initiatives

for risk reduction and has established

the norms and rules for its operation in

2012. But it currently lacks technical

capacity for planning, monitoring and

implementation and has inadequate

staff.

Performance analysis of the state’s

flood cont ro l po l i cy has been

presented separately below given the

criticality of the same: Despite the rehabilitation policy, 9.88 lakh people continue to live within embankments, commuting across the rivers to the mainland.

Photo: Supaul block, Supaul

Policy Performance: Bihar’s Flood Control Policy

The policy of controlling floods in Bihar through embanking its

major rivers has been consistently upheld since the 1950’s. Since

the pre-1954 period, when there were 160 km of embankments, the

total length of embankments in the state has increased to 3,465 km. 6 Government expenditure on flood protection works has increased 3

from INR 0.13 million in the First Five Year Plan (1951-1956) to INR

106 billion in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007). INR 159 billion

has been spent by the WRD on flood protection works in 2010-2011

alone. Despite the increasing investment towards the policy, an

evaluation of its projected and real impacts is yet to be undertaken

at the state-level.

Even as a systematic study is yet to be conducted, an analysis of

the pre- and post-embankment socio-geographies is indicative of

the changes brought about by the construction and maintenance of

embankments. The estimated flood-prone area has gone up from 37

2.5 million hectares in pre-1945 period to 6.89 million hectares in

the post-1954 period. A study of land contours shows that the river 38

bed has risen approximately one metre per decade after the

embankments were built. This is due to the siltation in the rivers,

especially Kosi, resulting in a situation where the riverbed is higher

inside than that outside the embankments. Despite the

rehabilitation process accompanying embankment construction,

nearly 25 percent of the population in northern Bihar lives within the

embankments in 380 villages . 39

35

The settlements within the embankments face annual inundation resulting in flooding of varying intensities. As per

reports and experts, heavy flooding is caused when the water discharge from the barrage exceeds 350,000 cusecs

and results in inundation of that heightened level for more than a week. This heavy flooding results in the river waters

entering people’s houses causing displacement. During this period, people take up temporary shelters on the

embankments for several weeks at a stretch resulting in complete disruption of access to and provision of entitlements

as well as emergence of dignity and protection-related issues. Such heavy flooding has occurred a few times (1987,

1990, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2007) in the past couple of decades. Medium flooding is caused when the water

discharge from the barrage is between 200,000 to 350,000 cusecs and results in inundation for more than a week. This

medium flooding results in the river waters entering people’s agricultural lands and causing land erosion and at times

also loss of home-stead lands. Medium flooding of such nature occurs in those years when heavy flooding is not there.

Given the state’s stance on having rehabilitated these settlements and the continuing disruption of access, provision of

entitlements within these villages is impacted all year round. On the other hand, the villages immediately outside the

embankments experience water-logging for 0.5 to 1 km on both sides, hindering agricultural activity in water-logged

fields. The seepage of water from the embankments contributes to this situation. A comparative analysis of

development indicators between these settlements and outside is yet to be undertaken. While this was not the focus of

this review, the team’s discussions in these districts suggest variability in access to essential services, infrastructure

development and security conditions. The heightening social unrest in these areas was especially flagged as a cause 40of concern by many. Interestingly, the only available study comparing these settlement types concludes that the

“strategy of gradually moving away from reliance on embankments and instead building infrastructure to live with

floods would (1) Not result in a net loss of agricultural or other output or health, etc., (2) Save large sums of money

currently going into embankment maintenance, and (3) Prevent the apparently inevitable disasters that occur every

few years when there is a major embankment breach”.

Further, an analysis of the breach history reveals two salient points. Firstly, despite the investment in embankment 41protection (it is estimated that the cost of managing embankments is far higher than building them), 13 breach

incidents have occurred on the Bagmati river embankment alone since 1985. Secondly, the causes of the breaches

are not just natural and may result from local understanding and actions towards release of river water by cutting the

embankments.

This evolving disaster risk context in Bihar merits questioning whether the current flood control policy is “encouraging

mitigation measures based on technology, traditional wisdom and environmental sustainability”, as envisioned in the

National Policy on Disaster Management (2009); thus, also necessitating that future risk reduction actions be informed

by an analysis of the context and the relevance of existing policies towards addressing the risks.

36

Salient features of the policy and programmatic performance across various stages (refer to Key below) of the DM cycle are presented in the tables below:

Preparedness Response Early Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Mitigation & Prevention

Figure 8: Performance Analysis

Institutional strengthening and policy instruments have created a paradigm shift from relief to preparedness. The Flood SOP has streamlined monsoon preparedness planning by providing a checklist of clear actions that need to be taken. However, this does not always get

translated into action uniformly at all levels. Other SOPs are yet to be finalized or used by the districts.

Existing administrative structures from state to circle levels are geared for L1 flood, fire and drought responses; relief distribution has been standardized through the 42

State Disaster Relief Fund norms. However, the engagement of communities and people’s representatives has not been realized yet, leading to gaps in outreach and exclusion biases. The incident command system is not clear for an eventuality of L2/L3 floods or earthquakes, especially in urban areas. The provisions for effective drought management are also yet to be standardized in state policy and guidelines. Neither the policies nor its instruments provide clear guidance on declaration of a disaster event.

Lack of a clear roadmap and leadership for mainstreaming has resulted in DM focus largely towards preparedness and response. Review of urban policies has been initiated but ULBs currently have a limited role in town-planning and legal enforcement and therefore, monitoring and regulation of

modifications to existing buildings, including seismic strengthening and retrofitting is not being carried out currently. The State Disaster Relief Fund is meant for preparedness and response measures and therefore mitigation and prevention actions remain marginal. DM has been incorporated in the school curriculum for class 9 and 10. Civil Society actors like INGOs and NGOs also don’t have a clear policy for mainstreaming within their own systems, wherein on-going projects under different sectors

are yet to incorporate disaster risk reduction measures.

The rehabilitation policy for embankment related displacements is yet to be evaluated for its effective implementation, while a large population continues to live within embankments.

The Kosi Rehabilitation policy is being actualized, but with reported operational challenges (including targeting and inclusion) and delays.

Policy Performance

37

The State-level response plans currently are not made for different levels of disasters or for multiple hazards; most of north Bihar districts prepare flood preparedness plans and the south Bihar districts contingency plan on drought. No plans include earthquake or on fire preparedness which is common in the state.

The pre-monsoon preparedness plans and drought contingency plans are made based on the directives by the respective state department. Besides, all departments at the district level function as per the directives and orders of the District Magistrate.

As per the DM Act 2005, the state is responsible in drafting the SDMP at the state level and DDMPs at the respective district level, the state plan has recently been released. The drafting of DDMPs is being done on a pilot basis with civil society organizations,with a couple of DDMPs released. Most of them, however, are still yet to be finished.

Program Performance: Planning

The currently existing model for capacity building in all stages does not involve a systematic engagement with different elements of the learning cycle – learning needs assessment, design of modules based on needs at different levels, follow-up with participants with refresher courses, evaluation of impact or ensuring the application of acquired knowledge and skills.

38

Program Performance: Infrastructure

Program Performance: Capacity Building

The lists of trained divers are archived with the district and local authorities but it was observed that at critical times it becomes difficult to mobilize these trained divers. This is a partly a reflection of the participant selection process (often from one village for the entire district) and partly because the participants are not engaged with after the training. In certain situations it was reported that these divers were not able to handle actual situations as they did not feel confident even after undergoing the training.

Community Emergency Response Teams and task-forces established by civil society have shown to respond to disasters in the past, but there has been no systematic evaluation of their performance. Given that the communities have always been first responders to disasters, the response actions cannot be conclusively attributed to capacity building efforts. Similarly, the Red Cross is reported to have trained 75,000 volunteers across the state who play an active role immediately after a disaster, yet this hasn’t been systematically analyzed or their performance tested.

Capacity building was undertaken for masons and architects under the Kosi Recovery Programme for reconstruction work, and they are currently engaged with the programme for the same.

The training on earthquake resilient building for engineers, architects, masons and contractors is a promising initiative by the state. Efforts are on-going to bring technical experts from IIT to deliver these training. However, the entire process was delayed by 1-2 years as the state lacked capacities for undertaking this process. Additionally, there is low uptake amongst the master trainers for this training, which is delaying the process further.

EOC buildings have been established at state and district levels. However, operational mechanisms for the EOCs are yet to be developed despite initiation of the process since 2009-10. This impacts DM actions like the dissemination of early warning messages from the state to the community (last mile connectivity), which are yet to be carried out effectively during disasters.

Similarly, the newly constructed warehouses in the districts visited are yet to be fully used for prepositioning, which is proposed for the pre-flood season every year.

Construction of all the proposed flood shelters is still on-going, and is perceived as a welcome development in the recipient villages. Since there hasn’t been an event since then, their use hasn’t been tested, but currently operational mechanisms for the shelters are yet to be put in place.

The infrastructure for fire hazards, both primary and as a secondary hazard from earthquakes remains largely inadequate. This includes fire-stations and hospitals that need to be equipped for mass casualty management.

The newly constructed bridges and road network has increased connectivity to previously remote areas in north Bihar. At the same time, it is opined that the bridges may further restrict the flow of the fast-paced rivers without creation to alternate exit points for the water. This is yet to be analysed.

Solar panelled hand-pumps and iron filters fitted in Kosi recovery areas, but were not found to be functional in areas visited.

The issue of raised river bed inside the embankment has so far not been resolved thereby creating additional pressure on the embankments and worsening the risks. Moreover there is no clear stance and / or guidelines about development of public infrastructure for areas within the embankments.

Preparedness Response Early Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Mitigation & Prevention

Form IX is prepared and sent on a weekly basis along with report from blocks to District during floods. These are then compiled and sent to the state based on which decisions about relief and compensation are meant to be taken. However, the credibility of the data for decision-making was questioned by many stakeholders interviewed. Further, there are currently no monitoring processes to ensure robustness of this data.

Program Performance: Data Management Program Performance: Equipment and Material

Though there is good coordination between the government and other stakeholders at the state and district level, however at the block level there is a lack of coordination amongst departments. Actions are taken as per the directions of CO and BDO who are the weakest link in the entire DM eco-system. In most occasions the local authority ends up seeking support from community first responders, volunteers and civil societies.

There is lack of coordination and structured dialogue between WRD and DMD as the prior is involved in embankment construction and the later in relief distribution. There is no dialogue with civil society activists on issues related to embankments and drought.

There is very less involvement of DMD and BSDMA in rehabilitation work. 39

NDRF is well-equipped with all necessary equipment and materials. They are aware of the usage and maintenance

Where boats are available, their deployment is not based on a standard and transparent process.

The State is yet to involve corporate sector in making available their services and resources to the government during immediate aftermath of disasters.

After the experiences from 2008, it is the first time that boats and communication equipment have been provided at the district levels. This has been accompanied with training of boat drivers in some districts, but not all. Discussions with district level officials revealed, however, that the quantity is not enough for e.g. most districts get 2-3 motor boats, while they are required by different departments in addition to administration. Private boats are hired in this scenario, but many boat owners are not ready to work for the local authorities due to delayed payment procedures.

District officials are not aware of the usage of office equipments like GPS, fax machine and computers and in most districts these still remain unused, therefore not serving the purpose it was intended to.

Program Performance: Equipment and Material

Forms ‘P’ and ‘S’ are collated by the district health societies and shared with state health societies to ensure early warning and early action systems for detection of outbreak. The operational and quality issues with data collection has affected the readiness of the systems for early detection and response to outbreaks of disease.

Currently, there is no system for collecting, analyzing and monitoring risk information for better preparedness apart from the information received by the districts about water discharge from barrages.

Kosi recovery project monitored and evaluated by the World Bank and GoB, but these results are currently not in the public domain.

Village-wise information about flood-proneness exists with FMIS. The state has also developed flood atlas which is yet to be released. A multi hazard vulnerability mapping exercise is also in process.

Despite these innovations, these efforts remain piecemeal, and most importantly, currently do not inform planning.

Preparedness Response Early Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Mitigation & Prevention

The state has identified 21 departments related to DM. These 21 departments have appointed one designated nodal officer (officer in-charge) to oversee the DM activities in their respective departments. However, these nodal officers do not come together at a common platform for joint planning and coordination of preparedness actions.

The Bihar IAG which is a civil society initiative is appreciated by the state and is a coordinating body between the government and the civil society. The civil society supports the government in DM activities for e.g. in developing SOPs, finalizing SDMP, etc.

Critical Analysis - Catalysts and Barriers

A retrospective analysis of the performance of the DM ecosystem reveals that certain factors have aided and

expedited progress towards DM goals. At the same time, there exist barriers that hinder optimal performance of

the ecosystem. Emerging from analysis, these factors were also discussed and validated with key informants in

Bihar. These are discussed below:

Catalysts

• Event History: Bihar has witnessed multiple events of various hazards over the past few decades, some

resulting in impact of very high magnitude (most recent being floods in 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2008). This has

drawn national and international attention to the flood-related risks in the state as well as enhanced the sensitivity

of the state administration towards the risks due to first-hand experiencing of the events by the officials. This

coupled with the recent discussion and debate in the disaster management discourse has acted as a catalyst in

influencing the agenda and urgency in functioning of the DM ecosystem in Bihar.

• Political will and Leadership: The keenness of the current political leadership towards ensuring that the scale of

devastation experienced in past disasters is not witnessed again emerged as a common theme across many

discussions with administrative officials at all levels. It was opined that this will and its practical expressions, when

coupled with the existing incident command system, is a clear catalyst. Further analysis of the DM context

timeline reveals that many critical DM actions and developments have been preceded by the appointment of the

current heads of the DMD and BSDMA. Despite the clear lack of human resources, the leadership has been able

to steer the DM institutions towards development of policy instruments and introduction of DM programmes

outside of the relief-centric approach. And this leadership emerges as a salient catalyst towards the evolution of

the DM ecosystem in Bihar.

• Policy-mandated Institutions and Instruments: The establishment of DM institutions and development of

policy instruments have definitely brought focused attention towards DM actions, acting as connectors between

the multiple actors in the ecosystem. A separate department of Disaster Management has enabled allocation of

human (albeit few) and financial resources towards disaster management, while the BSDMA has initiated many

studies and policy review processes, initiatives that were clearly undertaken because of the formation of these

institutions.

Advocacy and Partnerships: The role of partnerships between civil society and government / quasi-government

actors is evident, especially in development of policy instruments like the SOPs, awareness programs like the

Flood Awareness Weeks and capacity building programs like the planned mason training courses. This

recognition of the need for collective action and its translation into practice is a key factor for expediting progress

of the ecosystem.

40

The partnerships between civil society, government actors and the political leadership in the state emerge as catalysts enhancing the efficacy of the DM ecosystem

Barriers

• Demand for DRR: Despite the frequent event history and regular impact of disasters in majority of the state, the

demand for disaster risk reduction appears to be very low across the political spectrum and the primary

constituency viz. the affected-communities. Disaster relief still continues to be an entitlement that is sought and

finds articulation in the demands and actions of people’s elected representatives. At the same time, however, it

needs to be explored whether the demand (for risk reduction actions, especially mitigation, prevention or

mainstreaming) itself is low or the avenues for its expression limited. In either case, this translates into an absence

of people’s pressure, which perpetuates the prioritization of DM actions in the eco-system towards preparedness

and response only.

• Public Discourse on DM: The engagement between different actors in the eco-system is yet to be a sustained

and vibrant one, resulting in sub-optimal utilisation of the space for discourse and knowledge creation despite the

partnerships established. That DM has not entered the public discourse beyond relief is evident in the lack of

activities like the people’s report or annual ranking of DM actions; seminars; research papers; media engagement

and lastly, of dissenting voices in the eco-system. This further impacts decision-making, which still has to be

informed by debate, incorporation of local wisdom and collective evaluation of the disaster management policies

so far.

• Collective Envisioning: The lack of collective envisioning by all the actors in the eco-system is also a barrier to its

effective functioning for even though several actors are involved with varying mandates, resources and

capacities, they are currently not working towards commonly set goalposts.

• Technical Competencies: Even where institutional goals and strategies exist there is a lack of technical

competencies for risk analysis, risk-informed design and management of programmes, both in the administrative

framework and in the policy-making / shaping institutions. This also includes the lack of competencies for carrying

out the capacity building work itself and is thus, a key barrier for progress.

• Lack of adequate human resources: The lack of rank and file, for the DMD, at the district and sub-district level

acts as a barrier given that the revenue department’s officials at district to community level are required to

undertake the DM related actions, which do not become a priority until a disaster is declared. The lack of

orientation or capacity building on disaster risk analysis and risk-informed development planning of the revenue

department’s officials at the cutting edge also acts as a barrier in the effective functioning of the DM ecosystem.

41

The barriers

hindering the

efficacy of the

DM ecosystem

are

underpinned by

political

economy

factors in Bihar

as well as the

systematic gaps

within the DM

ecosystem itself

17: Government of Bihar (2007) Bihar State DM Policy, pp 418: DMD, Government of Bihar (2012) 19: The two approved SOPs are available at http://disastermgmt.bih.nic.in/publication_1.htm20: See for example, Zone V Guidelines http://bsdma.org/images/stories/Documents/BSDMA/Zone5.pdf21: Erramilli, B. P., 2008 "Disaster Management in India: Analysis of Factors Impacting Capacity Building", Political Science Dissertations.

Paper 15.22: Amounting to INR 51,60,53,000 (GoB, 2013)23: Amounting to about INR 400 Crore (GoB, 2013)24: GoI, Approach Paper to 12th Five Year Plan25: Launched in 2008, the agricultural road map is an initiative by the Department of Agriculture in Bihar to increase the income of farmers to

viable levels, ensure food and nutritional security, and revitalize farming and to ensure agricultural growth with justice. It not only focuses on agriculture, but also on its allied fields of livestock and poultry, sericulture, fishers, etc.

26: Government of India, 2008 “Bihar’s Agriculture Development: Opportunities and Challenges – A report of the Special Task Force on Bihar” 27: Kishore A., 2004 “Understanding Agrarian Impasse in Bihar”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 39, No. 3128: Mishra, D. K., 2008 “Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters”29: See Machlis, G E, Force, J E, and William R Burch, Jr., 1997 “The Human Ecosystem Part I: the Human Ecosystem as an Organization

Concept in Ecosystem Management”, Society & Natural Resources 10, 347–367 and Pickett, S T A, William R, Burch, J, Dalton, S. E., Foresman, T W, Grove, J M, and Rowntree, R., 1997 “A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Human Ecosystems in Urban Areas”, Urban Ecosystems 1(4),185–199

30: UNU/IAS (2003) Defining an Ecosystem Approach to Urban Management and Policy Development31: Villages in Bihar comprise clusters of households called hamlets, often located a distance away from each other. A village may have as

many as 5-6 hamlets.32: The Sphere of Influence is based on interactions with key stakeholders on the perceived mandates and roles of actors in the eco-system,

scale of resources allocated for DM, and the current levels of functioning33: As also discussed here, UNICEF/BIAG/ Knowledge Works, 2012 “Review of Disaster Management Act, 2005 - Potential and Prospects” 34: GoB, 2010, as quoted in International Growth Centre, 2012, “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources

Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)”35: The HFA is a 10 year framework for action, developed and agreed on in 2005 between governments, international agencies, and disaster

experts. It outlines five priorities for action, and offers guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience. More information on the HFA can be found at http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa

36: NDMA Guidelines categorize the levels of disasters into L0, L1, L2, & L3 based on the ability of various authorities to deal with them.37: WRD Annual Report 2010-11, as quoted in: International Growth Centre, 2012, “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and

Water Resources Management in Bihar: Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)”38: Ibid.39: Dixit , A., 2009 “Kosi Embankment Breach in Nepal: Need for a Paradigm Shift in Responding to Floods”40: Mishra, D. K., 2008 “Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters”41: Somanathan, E., 2012 “Are embankments a good flood-control strategy? A case study of the Kosi river”42: International Growth Centre, 2012 “Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Flood and Water Resources Management in Bihar:

Developing a Strategy for Reform (Phase One)”

Chapter Endnotes

42

RECOMMENDATIONS4

A. Policy Development and Strengthening

1. Enroot a collective vision for the DM Ecosystem: Given the multiplicity of actors functioning within the DM

ecosystem and the varying nature of their mandates and foci, it is imperative that this ecosystem collectively

evolves a vision for itself. This vision would help in setting consensus-based goalposts and identifying a role for

every actor at different stages of the DM cycle. It is recommended that the DMD initiates this envisioning process

with other key actors like BSDMA, B-IAG and civil society, resulting in a vision document for disaster

management in Bihar. It is further recommended that this vision document should guide development of a joint

strategy, prioritization of focus areas, programming and the management of ensuing DM actions by the DM

ecosystem.

2. Integrate priority areas in the policy environment: The complexity of disaster risks and diversity of DM actors

in Bihar necessitates a dynamic policy environment that takes into account multiple hazards and geographic

variability in disaster impact, and ensures integration of DM actions within the existing institutional framework.

Thus, it is recommended that the DMD and BSDMA develop an approach paper providing a roadmap with clear

milestone-based actions for all the actors of the DM ecosystem, whereby:

i. A multi-hazard approach is adopted, which mandates risk analysis, planning and action for all probable hazard

events in the state at all stages of the DM cycle.

ii. Urban risks are recognised, systematically analysed, and addressed.

iii. DM actions across all stages of the DM cycle are encouraged with risk-reduction actions being prioritized through

appropriate resource allocation.

iv. DM is mainstreamed, both through a convergence with related policies and implementation of programme

actions. Mainstreaming needs to be informed by an analysis of the 600-odd GOB and GOI schemes in the state

from a DM lens, identifying creative spaces for integrating DM actions. For e.g. construction of disaster-resilient

houses can be undertaken as a part of the Indira AwasYojana. Further, this policy shift towards mainstreaming is

also recommended for non-governmental actors for ensuring that their programming is informed by an analysis of

disaster risks in their operational areas and that risk reduction actions are integrated into their initiatives.

v. Role of PRIs is strengthened through policy refinement and appropriate resource allocations whereby the PRIs

could play an integral part in risk analyses as well as undertaking of risk-informed DM actions across all stages of

the DM cycle in addition to their existing role in few preparedness and response actions and recommending and

monitoring of relief measures.

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vi. Declaration of an event as a disaster is streamlined through refining the norms / parameters for determining and

declaring an event as disaster, bringing in more transparency in the assessment of an event and how this

assessment gets translated into a declaration (or non-declaration).

vii. Scope of the Right to Public Services Act is widened so as to include the key actions across DM cycle (especially

the preparedness, relief and response measures, and risk reduction actions) under this Act. This is possible given

that actions across the DM cycle are essentially public goods and services. This, widening of scope of the Act,

would enable the state to transition from the present culture of ‘right to relief’ to a culture of ‘right to risk-informed

development’. This process could be initiated by including the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) under the

ambit of the Act.

3. Strengthen disaster risk analysis: At the moment, the disaster risk analysis is mono-hazard focussed, not done

on a regular basis and does not take into consideration all inherent vulnerabilities and complex risks in the state.

This has led to the DM planning and programmes being not informed by a robust and regular risk analysis. Hence,

it is recommended that the DMD and BSDMA undertake regular disaster risk analysis along with B-IAG and other

relevant actors, which results in the development of a five-yearly publication on the disaster risk analysis of Bihar.

This disaster risk analysis needs to:

i. Be such that it’s timely and is accessible at different levels.

ii. Inform planning and action whilst addressing the multi-hazard nature, underlying and differential vulnerabilities as

well as the limited capacities and technical competencies existent in the state.

iii. Enhance community participation and / or be community driven by taking into account the traditional knowledge.

iv. Integrate the use of technology not only in the disaster risk analysis but also in the design of actions across all

stages of the DM cycle as well as in real time documentation and sharing of the same.

4. Develop a vision paper for Capacity Building for DM: Even as the need for capacity building emerged as one

of the key gaps from within the DM ecosystem itself (especially the lack of technical competencies) and many

programme actions seek to address this gap, the DM ecosystem does not have a vision for capacity building yet.

Not only have the intended outcomes not been identified, the strategies for achieving the same (assessing

learning needs, following-up with participants, evaluating impact etc.) have not been mapped or made

operational. It is recommended that such a vision paper be developed, guided by the DM ecosystem’s vision. This

vision paper should not only map the existing capacities, skills and competencies, but also the expected

outcomes of capacity building, the role of different actors in achieving the same, and application in practice.

45

5. Conduct an impact assessment of flood control / embankment policy: The flood control policy of the state

has been consistently pursued for 50 years. Even as the flood-prone area is reported to have increased three-fold,

a significant population is still residing within embankments and there have been several breaches causing large-

scale flooding in the past, this policy is yet to be evaluated for its intended and real impact. It is recommended that

such an impact assessment be undertaken and inform policy decisions on disaster risk reduction in the state.

6. Finalize the Water Management Policy: The state’s disaster event history in the past decade reveals that there

have been two major floods and three major droughts impacting multiple districts and with large-scale losses. The

changing water use and availability patterns, including an unregulated and systematic mismanagement of water

bodies and rapid urbanization exacerbates the existing disaster risk scenario. Couple of departments (WRD,

PHED) of the state government have developed draft water management policies, which have non-uniform

outlook and also have not yet been finalized. It is recommended that a comprehensive water management policy

is developed for the state.

B. People and Programs for DM

1. Develop human resource for DM: DMD is the principal stakeholder, within the DM ecosystem, mandated for

policy and programming on DM. Yet, the department has officials either on special duty or on deputation with

significant number of posts vacant. Further, the department does not have a rank and file (administration /

officials) at the district, block and community level to implement the DM policies and programmes. It is

recommended that a technically competent cadre of officials be created at the district and block level specifically

for DM and holding DM as their primary responsibility. This would enhance:

i. Policy shaping and planning.

ii. Prioritize implementation of the existing policies and programmes by bringing in an efficacy in the same.

iii. Effective monitoring and data management.

iv. Optimal resource allocation for overcoming the infrastructure, equipment and materials related gaps. This could

be done by developing a five-year perspective plan, in line with the state five-year plan, for budget allocation and

spend for the infrastructure, equipment and materials related gaps as well as orientation of all relevant officials on

ushering a culture of safety and on ensuring that allocated budget is spent in a given financial year as per the

perspective plan.

46

2. Establish a planning and monitoring cell in the DMD: While the DMD is responsible for policy and

programming on DM, 21 other key departments related to DM in GoB (Health, PHED and such) also have either

an officer on special duty or a nodal designated officer for DM within their department. However, there is no

planning and monitoring cell in the DMD to oversee the actions of these officials or even to supervise the

implementation of the DM policies, instruments and programmes. Thus, it is recommended that a planning and

monitoring cell should be established in the DMD for support in planning, data management and evidence

generation as well as engaging with relevant departments for risk analyses, prioritization of focus areas,

programming and the management of ensuing DM actions through regular reviews. A planning and monitoring

cell in DMD would enable the department to oversee the actions of these officials as well as the implementation of

the DM policy instruments and programmes.

3. Establish a resource centre for DM: Key actors within the DM ecosystem have a good rapport that translates

into a good working relationship; however the focus is mainly on operational aspects without much focus on

drawing out learning from the policy instruments and programmatic actions. This coupled with the lack of technical

competencies underlines the need for establishment of a resource centre pertaining to DM. This resource centre

can play the role of bringing in technical excellence and knowledge from the wider DM discourse in the functioning

of the DM ecosystem. Further, it can also contribute in assessing the functioning of the DM ecosystem and

drawing out the policy and programmatic learning from the same through instruments like ‘DM report card’ and an

annual / status report on the DM ecosystem.

47

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