[Review] Roland Irons - Dialectics of the Concrete - The Text and its Czechoslovakian Context

Dialectics of the Concrete: The Text and Its Czechoslovakian ContextDialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World by Karel Kosik; KarelKovanda; James SchmidtReview by: L. Roland IronsNew German Critique, No. 18 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 167-175Published by: New German CritiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487855 .Accessed: 05/09/2013 13:54

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REVIEW ESSAY

Dialectics of the Concrete - The Text and its Czechoslovakian Context

by L. Roland Irons

Dialectics of the Concrete was published in 1963 and set the pace for the events in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968.1 The political repression since that time does not require extended comment.2 However, the social and political upheavals of that spring in 1968 are not entirely forgotten, and Dialectics of the Concrete remains its philosophical manifesto. The overall task of the work has been characterized as a "rigorous recasting of Marx's entire theoretical framework, incorporating new developments while at the same time accounting for their genesis."3 Kosik's approach, of course, was severely criticized by the orthodoxy of Marxism-Leninism for "Hegelianizing pseudo-materialist tendencies."4 Yet, its central concerns display significant theoretical as well as practical implications. The "concrete totality" is primarily relevant to Marxian thought since its essential theoretical tenet posits a systematic critique of the tendency to dichotomize Marx into the "scientist" and the "philosopher."5

Kosik does not begin with an abstract model that provides "scientific" theorems for political action, nor does he commit the error of Lukacs' formulation in History and Class Consciousness where objective consciousness ends up entrusted to a political party.6 Rather, the production and reproduction of consciousness are situated in everyday life. This preserves the mediated beginning of Kosik's exposition and provides the subject-object

1. Karel Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World, trans- lated by Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976. All page references in the text are to this book.

2. For an overview of the repression since 1968 see, Otto Ulc, "Social Deviance in Czecho- slovakia," in Ivan Volges, ed., Social Deviance in Eastern Europe (Boulder, 1978), pp. 23-33.

3. Paul Piccone, "Czech Marxism: Karel Kosik," Critique, 8 (Summer, 1977), 43. 4. Ibid., p. 45. 5. See for example, Louis Althusser, For Marx (London, 1969) and Louis Althusser and E.

Baliber, Reading Capital (London, 1970). 6. Piccone, op. cit., p. 48. See George Lukdcs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in

Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). 167


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duality of modem philosophy with a materialist grounding in the historical nature of the "fact" of work as a world-making activity. The subjective basis of this interpretation implicates history as the systematic objectification of scientific facts which, as theoretical abstractions, conflict with the practical activity of individuals in everyday life. These abstractions are codified into social discourse and preserve a hegemony over everyday life. This state of affairs has taken a variety of forms in terms of Czech culture and is exemplified by the good soldier Schweik's significance vis-a-vis the repressive system underlined by Kafka's The Trial. Kosik articulated this point in his discussion of Jaroslav Ha'ek's The Good Soldier Schweik and Kafka's The Trial at the Lublice Conference on Kafka in Prague, 1963. "Man is irreducible to an object, he is more than a system. As yet we lack suitable description for the fact that man contains in himself the tremendous and indestructible force of humanity.'"7

The concrete totality specifies the structure as well as contradiction of humanity as afactual whole which exists in an open system of socio-historical relations. Essential relations then are only accessible dialectically. The whole is not fixed in the sum of its individual parts, rather represents a system of relations articulated by living and acting individuals: it is a materialist structure which mediates between history and nature. Kosik's grounding of dialectical contradiction within materialism "gave the Czech meaning to Lukcs' definition of ideology as 'false thinking'."8 Although the work of Lukacs and Marcuse had "been considered taboo by the regime" before the publication of Dialectics of the Concrete, 9 Kosik reintro- duced Lukacs' treatment of the subject-object problematic and also trans- cended it by situating it in everyday life. In so doing Kosik vacillates between existentialism and Marxism and mediates the two dimensions of reality with a theory of consciousness which he calls "monadic materialism":' "Consciousness is the unity of both forms [predicative and pre-predicative] which intermingle and influence one another because they are based, united,

7. Karel Kosik, "Ha'ek and Kafka," Telos, 23 (Spring, 1975), 88. The conference at Lublice represented a turning-point in the post-1956 "de-stalinization". Soviet censorship and interpretation of the Russian translation of Kafka's work ideologically circumscribed it as reactionary. Following the Czechs' invitation to the leading members of Western European communist parties - Roger Garaudy of the French Politbureau and Ernst Fischer - to attend, the Soviets cancelled their plans to attend. Kosik's address on Ha'ek and Kafka framed Kafka's literary style in The Trial as one centered on the problem of reification whereas Haek's Good Soldier Schweik signified the force of humanity and the potential transformation of cultural reification. Dialectics of the Concrete then posited a general critique of Soviet hegemony and domination of Czech-Slovak culture, thus serving as a political dynamic interfused with everyday-life. For an extended discussion of this theme, see Antonin J. Liehm, "Franz Kafka in Eastern Europe," Telos, 23 (Spring, 1975), 53-83.

8. Vladimar V. Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring (Oxford, 1971), p. 38. 9. Galia Golan, "Czechoslovakian Marxism in the Reform Period," in S. Avineri, ed.,

Varieties of Marxism (The Hague, 1977), p. 300. 10. Piccone, op. cit., p. 51.


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on objective praxis and on the spiritual-practical reproduction of reality" (p. 12) in human form. As Bakan notes: "Kosik criticizes reductive Marxism from the perspective of existential phenomenology and phenomenology from the perspective of Hegelian Marxism.""

This theoretical unification of human experience and social structure salvaged a conception of subjectivity in Marxist thought which provided Czechoslovakian culture and its intellectuals with a materialist base for criticizing Soviet orthodoxy in a subtle manner - and within its own framework. Kosik's overriding quesions of "What is Man?" and "Who is Man?" must thus be viewed within the context of an emerging revolutionary and cultural criticism of Soviet ideology. Similarly, the history of Czechoslovakian politics and the nation-state provided Kosik with a cultural context from which to do this. As in the Soviet experience, the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, under the leadership of Gottwald, underwent a period of political terror which could be appropriately termed "social fascism". The Communist Party equated itself with the state and provided the Czech- Slovak nations with a "prefabricated socialism as a gift."" As a consequence, the Czechoslovakian political tradition was strait-jacketed into an iron cage and, subsequently, the Prague Trials of 1950-1954 were characterized by the juridical principle of concretizing logical necessity through analogy. This method had been successfully employed in the Moscow trials of 1936.13

The intellectual/philosopher as well as politician, whose questions of truth and justice were framed in the concreteness of culture as an emergent totality, was directed to become "other than himself." In Sartre's words, "no one dared to realize that what he was asked to do to erase his suspect differences was to deny himself, to make himself other than himself in order to join others insofar as each of them was trying to make himself other than himself."14 This idealist form of self-consciousness represents a product of the "artificially created political offense" and was utilized in the Prague Trials in order to extract a self-critical confession from which "there is no meaningful tie between the order of the facts. . .and the order of human purposes."'5 Personal knowledge as well as social history were excluded in

11. Mildred Bakan, "Review of Karel Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete," Telos, 35 (Spring, 1978), 244. 12. Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Socialism That Came in From the Cold," in Antonin J. Liehm,

The Politics of Culture (New York, 1970), p. 7. 13. The principle of analogy was first introduced into Soviet law directly after the Revolution

due to the inability of codified legal statute to comprehensively "protect the young state." It was previously endorsed in a number of nineteenth-century European states. As a recent scholar of Soviet criminal law defines the principle of analogy, it "empowered judges to convict persons whom they judged to have committed socially dangerous acts, even if these acts were not described by individual crimes in the criminal code." Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy (New York, 1978), pp. 22-23. See also Otto Kirchheimer, "Politics and Justice," Social Research, XXII (1955), 408-427. For an analysis of the Prague Trials see, Jeri Pelikan, ed., The Czechoslovak Political Trials (Stanford, 1971).

14. Sartre, op. cit., p. 18. 15. Kirchheimer, op. cit., p. 420. In this context see the discussion of Soviet criminology in


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deference to an abstractly totalized necessity. In Kosik's view, "we learned that Stalinism was not a deformation of a particular conception of socialism but a fuller realization of an entirely different conception of socialism."'6 Dialectics of the Concrete was primarily a call to ground socialism in the Czechoslovakian political tradition.

The Czechoslovakian experience was a turning point in the rise of Euro- communism. As Sartre has pointed out, a democratic consolidation of post- World War II Czechoslovakian socialism would have provided the West with a model of socialist transformation different from the Soviet or the Chinese versions. Instead, Czechoslovakia fell into an idolatrous relation to its Soviet "big brother." '7 In this international context Czechoslovakia was instrumentalized by the Communist Party, and this instrumentalization could only be effectively challenged through political and cultural questions concerning everyday life. Dialectics of the Concrete did precisely this.

In a fashion reminiscent of Gramsci's analysis of the intellectual, Kosik outlines a materialist epistemology whereby reality is "intellectually repro- duced on all levels and in all dimensions" (p. 15). Yet this does not mean that Kosik attributes the everyday character of reality with truth-productive qualities. For Kosik ideology is equivalent to a "false totalization". "A dialectical conception of totality means that parts not only internally interact and interconnect both among themselves and with the whole, but also that the whole cannot be petrified in an abstraction superior to the facts, because precisely in the interaction of its parts does the whole form itself as a whole" (p. 23). Phenomenon and essence represent two dimensions of the same historically mediated experience. As a recent commentator on Kosik maintains, "the truly concrete recovers the lived, everyday world in terms of a critical perspective that grasps the dialectical unity of everydayness in a totality.""8 This does not explain how the materialist nature of the concept relates to the concrete totality as a social fact. Kosik's discussion of the social fact does not locate the facticity of the concept in the externality of the thing itself but views it as the concrete movement of a humanly created contradiction through the reality of social structure. This dialectical basis of the social fact extends to his conception of economics. Thus, according to Kosik, economics cannot be treated as a closed system of equilibrium between whole and part but must instead allow for the philosophical critique of the whole, i.e., the search for truth. The social actor must be viewed as an active rather than passive individual who reasonably discriminates between phenomenon and essence on the grounds of truth, not factuality. Whereas the objectivistic knowledge of utilitarian ideology factualizes labor into a

Alvin W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," Telos, 34 (Winter, 1977- 78), 36-38.

16. Interview with Karel Kosik in Antonin J. Liehm, op. cit., p. 404. 17. Sartre, op. cit., p. 9. 18. Bakan, op. cit., p. 248.


Review Essay 171

system of relations, i.e., a functioning whole, praxis acts as a dynamic sieve which separates the factual appearance of a system from its essential form.

The experiential base of economic structure, i.e., social being, cannot be systematized without providing an objective-subject to discriminate among the system's autonomous and contingent facts. This, for Kosik, represents a critical shortcoming of the reductionist interpretation of economics as a factor rather than a historical structure of social relations, as a world-making activity. "Man is primordially what his world is. .... The materialist thesis which states that man is an ensemble of social conditions but neglects to mention who is the subject of these 'conditions' leaves it to the 'interpretation' to fill in the blank either with a real or with a mystical subject, with the mystified I or the mystified we. Both transform the real individual into a tool and a mask" (pp. 46-47). Contrary to sociologistic and idealistic interpretations, Kosik introduces a distinction into his considerations on the concrete totality between the socio-economic structure of society and the economic factor as a social condition. It is here that Kosik's criticism of Heidegger emerges.

Kosik charges that in Heidegger's philosophy the everyday world is split into a duality of care and procure which reflects "in a mystified fashion the process of intensified fetishization of human relations. . . . The individual moves about in a ready-made system of devices and implements, procures them as they in turn procure him, and has long ago 'lost' awareness of this world being a product of man. Procuring permeates his entire life" (p. 39). The experience of this alienation "invalidates the present and fastens onto the future. . .care considers the present not as the authentic existence, as 'closeness to being,' but rather as flight" (p. 42). Thus, care distorts the authentic character of time and grounds social individuality in the future rather than dialectically grounding it in the present. "As caring, the person lives in a future which never comes...to describe man and his everyday world in terms of care. . .is to take man in terms of a world in which technology and its control are beyond our ordinary capabilities."'19 Alternatively, Kosik presents praxis as a dynamic and generic structure of relations which fuses the truth of the present with the reality of the future through the temporal structure of historism. This conception of praxis, as temporal emergence, becomes distorted when economics is conceived as the interplay of autonomous factors. Construing the basis of economics as a system results in the truth of the present being abstractly equated with the utility of the future and collapses the objective-subject of historism into the historicity of the economic factor as the ultimate condition of truth. As Kosik remarks, "the substitution of 'procuring' for labor does not reflect the qualities of a particular philosophic thought or of philosophy as such; rather, it expresses in a certain way changes in the objective reality itself" (p. 39).

19. Ibid., p. 248.


172 Irons

A scientific perspective on economics conceives praxis and practicality to reflect the reason of the system as utility in everyday life rather than the reason of an objective-subject who "grasps and realizes the dialectics of the relative and the absolute in an historical process" (p. 60). In a system of economic things the subject appears phenomenally as a derivative of the external world. The grounding of the subjective dimension of the concrete totality and politics alternatively lies in the interpretation of experience, phenomenologically as an objectively unified contradiction. "In one instance, the alienation of the everyday is reflected in consciousness as an uncritical attitude, in the other.as a feeling of absurdity. . .it is not enough for the truth of reality to be presented to man; man has to perform this truth" (p. 49). Thus, the reproduction of truth relations cannot be separated from the intentional performance of truth in everyday life. Placing the factual relevance to one above the other constitutes the precondition for a false totalization and distorts the relation between science and philosophy in the historical exposition of qualitatively new phenomena. This insight serves Kosik well as he begins consideration on the method of interpretation utilized by Marx in Capital.

Rather than providing a perspective which separates philosophy and science in Marx's writings, Kosik seeks to "arrive at an authentic under- standing of the text" (p. 95). This project necessitates a theoretical access to "the very essence and specificity of Capital" (p. 97), and it is within this treatment that Kosik's method of concrete totality displays its social and political potential. Capital does not represent the movement of Marx's intellectual development from that of philosophy to science. Indeed, this specification of Capital is underscored by a false assumption which requires the abolish- ment of philosophy and additionally conceals an eschatological fiction in turn requiring that the very existence of philosophy and truth "testifies to the unreason of reality" (pp. 101-102). It is in this sense that Kosik vindicates philosophy against the tendency of scientific Marxism as well as critical theory, i.e., Horkheimer and Marcuse, to abolish it in two ways: "by realizing it as well as by transforming it into social theory" (p. 128). In one of his most significant passages Kosik contextualizes this problem in Marx's conception of class. "The suggestion that philosophy is necessarily an alienated expression of an inverted world, because it has always been a class philosophy, might have originated from a misreading of the Communist Manifesto. This suggestion would have the text read thus: 'History of mankind does not exist, there is only the history of class struggle'; instead of the actual text, 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.' Then it would follow that every philosophy has been exclusively a class philosophy. In reality, however, that which has a class character and that which has a human character have formed a dialectical unity throughout history" (p. 102). A misreading of this nature substitutes a conception of the historicity of conditions for the historism of reality. This eschatological fiction was insightfully termed an "explosive illusion" by


Review Essay 173

Gramsci20 and represents in a "dynamic terminology.. .a static content; reason is historical and dialectical only up to a certain phase in history, up to a turning point, whereafter it changes into a trans-historical and nondialec- tical reason" (p. 103).

Kosik avoids this dependence on eschatology by reconsidering the relation between literary figureheads of the Odyssey: Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx. The stance of either perspective in relation to the other has the potential of claiming absoluteness for its ability to demonstrate the philosophical base of historism or the temporal emergence of social being as a system. However, the scientific basis of critical analysis is grounded in the ability to unify criticism as an odyssey of movement, i.e., as an activity, capable of incorporating the duality of the Other within its own particular stance. "The method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete is a method of thinking, in other words, it is a movement realized in the concepts and life-element of abstraction. Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is not a transition from one level (the sensory) to another (the rational); it is rather movement in thinking and the motion of thought. . .which amounts to materialist epistemology" (p. 16).

Kosik's interpretation of Capital incorporates Hegelianism and existentialism as "so many varieties of idealism: objective and subjective" (p. 104). Dialectics of the Concrete argues that "Hegel and Kierkegaard can be comprehended on the basis of Marx, but not vice versa" (p. 105). This perspective utilizes the antinomy of the commodity-form and class-structure to demonstrate the economic category's relation to praxis, i.e., as an existential criticism of system determination. "The finding that a commodity is the elementary economic form of capitalism can become the starting point of a scientific explication only if the entire subsequent process of presenta- tion substantiates the appropriateness and necessity of this starting point" (p. 109). In order to approach social being as a moment of praxis, Kosik extracts activity from the rigid-dynamic duality of reductionist and idealist interpretations. His critical theory of economy "dissolves" the fixed attach- ments of social being and "conceives them as an expression of people's objective praxis and of their interconnected social relations at a particular stage of development" (p. 117).

The contextualization of objective praxis in the historism of reality provides Kosik with an interpretative supplement to his question "What is Man?" - man is the objective-subject of an epistemologically concretized socio-historical formation. Social individuality therefore is always perceived in the form of a particular type of individuality which, in order to become unified with the totality, must penetrate everyday-life with a rational critique. The question "Who is Man?" allows Kosik to situate Marx's philosophy of labor into a critical theory which, distinct from a particularistic

20. Antonio Gramsci, "Notes on Journalism," Telos, 32 (Summer, 1977), 44.


174 Irons

anthropology, "has not been rendered obsolete by history" (p. 119). In Kosik's words, "labor is a happening which permeates man's entire being and constitutes his specificity" (p. 119). When labor ceases to unify fact and value as representations of irreducible phenomena, individuals become preoccupied with the future of their present state of utility, and the results of planning for the future become mechanically derived from the given system rather than dialectically structured on the principle of "free" social activity. Reification, or objectifying one's self as procurer, then systematically occludes the concrete relation of the individual to the social whole. Thus, the possibility of an artistic grounding in labor becomes subordinate to the systemic fact of the individual's future utility and its accompanying social relations.

For Kosik, the scientific foundations of critical theory, i.e., human consciousness, can only be meaningfully formed through the objective unfolding of subjectivity in everyday life. "Human consciousness is the activity of the subject who forms a socio-historical reality as a unity of being and meaning, of reality and sense" (p. 148). Thus, the reified nature of everyday life can only be critically penetrated and its truth revealed to the individual through the method of concrete totality which, in order to remain epistemologically grounded, must return to the typified form of the everyday. "Kosik's concrete moves from the everyday back to the everyday through access to its hidden relation to totality."21 The mediated nature of scientific exposition allows no less. Whole and part must be unified through labor as phenomenon (necessity) and essence (freedom). The structure of class relations and the form of human relations then are inviolably connected by Kosik through the historism of reality. This is the central feature of Dialectics of the Concrete. Society as a functioning, yet contra- dictory system represents an irrational totality in which the objective praxis of individual actors in everyday life is abstracted and reduced to a factor of system's utility, i.e., the procuring of commodities. In order to avoid such an outcome neither fact nor value can take precedence over the other: both must be practically utilized within the genetic-dynamic of irony as a dimension of personhood. "Through a de-reifying grasp of the genesis of our everyday life, we gain insight into our world as humanly made and therefore possibly otherwise."22 Kosik accentuates this practical and emancipatory purpose of irony: "Evil is a component of good; its positive role is in preparing and evoking good" (p. 144).

Kosik practically situates the dialectic of the fact of evil and the value of good within a unified context, both functionally and methodologically concrete. The theoretical performance of irony concretizes praxis into everyday life rather than abstracting it within a system. The method of concrete totality utilizes irony for its practical effect in demonstrating the

21. Bakan, op. cit., p. 248. 22. Ibid., p. 251.


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limits of a particular social space and its human form of reification. Dialectics of the Concrete was a practical attempt to theoretically expose the limitations of the Czech-Slovak social space through its concretization of irony within the form of Soviet hegemony. As Horkheimer once noted: "To recognize the space within which one finds oneself, one must discover its limits."23 Dialectics of the Concrete not only exposed the ironic nature of Soviet hegemony but, more importantly, profoundly demonstrated the cultural limitations of the socialist space of "objective knowledge" to which the Russians laid claim. However, this contextualization of the political significance of Dialectics of the Concrete must not be overextended, for, as Skilling has suggested, there are two prevalent tendencies in historical evaluations of Czechoslovakian tradition.24 One emphasizes the continuity of the two nations' development;25 the other cites the discontinuous features which derive from internal, cultural factors as well as external, political and economic factors.26 Kosik provided a mediation between these two extremes by demonstrating the historical grounds of pluralism in Czech- Slovak culture and, furthermore, elaborated a materialist philosophy of consciousness that vindicated the movement of thought, i.e., the historism of reality as a precondition for concrete totality.27 His material resource was "the real dialectical disunity of our everyday lives which he used as the basis of a rational critique of everyday intentionality."28 To this extent Kosik subsumed irony into praxis.29

23. Max Horkheimer, Dawn & Decline: Notes 1926-1931 and 1950-1969, trans. Michael Shaw (New York, 1978), p. 115.

24. H. Gordon Skilling, "Sixty-eight in Historical Perspective," International Journal, 4 (Autumn, 1978), 678-701. See also H.G. Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, 1976).

25. Cf. David Paul, "The Pluralization of Czechoslovak Politics in the 1960's," Slavic Review, XXXIII (December, 1974), 721-740.

26. Skilling, op. cit., p. 685. 27. This observation comes from a speech delivered by Kosik on November 7, 1968 at Listy.

"Central Europe is not a geographical concept; it is a historical reality. We are a political nation only to the extent that we participate in the creation of Central Europe. Central Europe exists only to the extent that the nation continues as a historical subject which can not only put up with the tension of various currents and influences, but convert them into an independent political, cultural, and spiritual synthesis." Karel Kosik, "Illusion Versus Reality," in Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter In Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak-Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 397.

28. Bakan, op. cit., p. 245. 29. David Gross, "Irony and the 'Disorders of the Soul'," Telos, 34 (Winter, 1977-78), 167-172.


Article Contentsp. 167p. 168p. 169p. 170p. 171p. 172p. 173p. 174p. 175

Issue Table of ContentsNew German Critique, No. 18 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 1-180Front Matter [pp. 1-2]The Failure of the New Left? [pp. 3-11]Praxis and Poiesis: Toward an Intellectual Biography of Herbert Marcuse [1898-1979] [pp. 12-18]Herbert Marcuse and the Vulgarity of Death [pp. 19-20]Marcuse and Feminism [pp. 21-23]The Critical Spirit of Herbert Marcuse [pp. 24-27]An Open Letter to Friends of Herbert Marcuse [pp. 28]Interview with Jrgen Habermas Starnberg, March 23, 1979[pp. 29-43]The Habermas-Gadamer Debate [pp. 44-73]Georg Lukcs and Irma Seidler[pp. 74-106]Horvth's Renewal of the Folk Play and the Decline of the Weimar Republic[pp. 107-135]Brecht, Horvth and the Popular Theater[pp. 136-150]Politics, Aesthetics, and Patriarchy in the Confessions of Winifred Wagner [pp. 151-166]Review EssayDialectics of the Concrete: The Text and Its Czechoslovakian Context [pp. 167-175]

ReviewReview: untitled [pp. 176-180]

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[Review] Roland Irons - Dialectics of the Concrete - The Text and its Czechoslovakian Context

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