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Oxfam Australia’s Review of Xenophobic Violence

and Subsequent Response

April 2015 – February 2016

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Contents LIST OF ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................................... 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................................ 4

1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................................................................ 4

2. A REVIEW OF THE RESPONSES TO THE XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE ................................................................................................. 5

2.1 Cross affiliate response .......................................................................................................................................................... 5

2.2 Oxfam partner response ........................................................................................................................................................ 6

2.2.1 Refugee Social Services ................................................................................................................................................... 6

2.2.2 Save the Children (in collaboration with other agencies): .............................................................................................. 7

2.2.3 Refugee Pastoral Care (RPC) ........................................................................................................................................... 8

2.2.4 Denis Hurley Centre (DHC) .............................................................................................................................................. 8

2.3 General Response .................................................................................................................................................................. 8

3. REFLECTION ON THE RESPONSES ............................................................................................................................................... 11

3.1 Reflection on Oxfam’s response .......................................................................................................................................... 11

3.2 Reflection on the general response ..................................................................................................................................... 11

4. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................................................. 12

5. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................................................. 13

6. REFERENCES: .............................................................................................................................................................................. 14

7. APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................................................... 15

APPENDIX 1: Organisations who participated in the review ..................................................................................................... 15

APPENDIX 2: Response from Home Affairs ................................................................................................................................ 16

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

CORMSA The Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa

COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions

DHC Denis Hurley Centre

FN Foreign Nationals

NGO Non-Government Organisation

OAU Oxfam Australia

OCA Oxfam Canada

OGB Oxfam Great Britain

OIT Oxfam Italia

OZA Oxfam South Africa

PSS Psychosocial Support

RPC Refugee Pastoral Care

RSS Refugee Social Services

SAHRC South African Human Right Commission

SitRep Situation Report

TOR Terms of Reference

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Commission

UN United Nations

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of violence in April 2015 against foreign nationals has been referred to as xenophobic or ‘afrophobic’ violence,

as the recipients of the violence were from African states. For the purposes of this review, the violence against foreign

nationals will be referred to as xenophobic violence. Xenophobia can be defined as a deep dislike of non-nationals by

nationals of a recipient state1.

This review aims at gathering and presenting key information about the xenophobic violence in Durban, South Africa in 2015.

It also aims at capturing and analysing reflections on the responses to the xenophobic violence.

1.1 Background Historically, the first and most significant of civil society’s response to xenophobia in post-apartheid Africa was the Roll Back

Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign. In partnership with the South African Human Rights Commission, the National Consortium on

Refugee Affairs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the RBX Campaign was launched in December 1998

in response to the rising levels of xenophobia particularly targeted at African migrants and refugees in South Africa. The

campaign aimed to combat xenophobia through public education in the media, communities, schools and work places. Its

funding ended and it was formally terminated in 2002 with, “the promise of the initiative…never realized” (Crush, et al.,

2009:84). Whatever its potential benefits, it did little to prevent the most acute manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa’s

history in May 2008.

The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) published an investigative report following the xenophobic violence in

May 2008. The report considered the preparedness and response of major state departments and contained the summarised

recommendations for them (see Appendix 2).

In January 2015, partner organisation, Refugee Social Services, mentioned to OAU that there seemed to be an increase in

tension amongst some of their clients and they feared that there would be an increase in violence motivated by xenophobia.

By the end of March 2015, this tension had escalated and eventually erupted when a group of foreign nationals were

forcefully removed from their place of residence. Violence intensified over the period 11-13 April 2015 and by the 15th April, it

was reported to have spread to Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg. This situation was recognised by Oxfam to be an

emergency.

1 South African History online, towards a people’s. Xenophobic violence in democratic South Africa.

http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa. Accessed February 2, 2016

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2. A REVIEW OF THE RESPONSES TO THE XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

The overall aim of the Oxfam joint response was to provide support to partner organisations responding to xenophobic

violence in Durban and other parts of the country. The ultimate outcomes were envisioned to be that partner organisations

would be able to assist those displaced by xenophobic violence in a way that ensures immediate safety and works toward

long-term reduction of risks and successful re-integration of foreign nationals living in South Africa. Another primary outcome

was that the experiences in the response were captured and integrated into training for future responses and advocacy.

2.1 Cross affiliate response

With the March/April 2015 xenophobic violence, the strategy to respond had to be made quickly and a joint coordinated

response within Oxfam agencies was vital for the best results.

At the time of the xenophobic violence, the Oxfam confederation was undergoing a number of change processes, which

included working towards the closure of programs in South Africa by Oxfam Italia, Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam Australia in

anticipation of the launch of Oxfam South Africa (OZA). Before this, the Oxfam affiliates operating in South Africa had been

working under a joint structure called the Single Management System (SMS) with Oxfam Australia as the leading affiliate. In

this position, Oxfam Australia also held the position of designated Humanitarian Lead Affiliate for South Africa. When the

xenophobic violence occurred, in the absence of this designated Humanitarian Lead Affiliate for South Africa (because of

these transitions) the Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) Regional Centre, which is the Humanitarian Lead for Southern Africa, was

requested to provide leadership and coordination support to Oxfam’s response in South Africa. However, OZA, under the

Executive Director, retained overall leadership of the response and hence was mandated to be accountable to the Oxfam

confederation for the response.

The decision was taken early in these discussions (see SitRep 1) that the implementation of responses and programming

would, at all times, be informed by the partner organisations that were directly responding or affected. This includes Refugee

Social Services (RSS), Refugee Pastoral Centre (RPC), Denis Hurley Centre (DHC), Save the Children (STC) and The Consortium

for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA).

Oxfam attempted to approach the response holistically by not only providing financial assistance for immediate concerns, but

engaged with concerns about advocacy, and attempted to lobby for change at a policy level, with the ultimate goal of a long-

term reduction of risks and a successful reintegration of foreign nationals living in South Africa. Oxfam’s involvement in the

many stakeholders’ meetings and committees where government, the UN, and municipal officials are present meant that

Oxfam was able to engage at the most strategic level, whilst coordinating with other stakeholders involved. The joint Oxfam

team developed a clear response plan with each affiliate staff member leading on different processes and activities in the

response; these include: management of the funds; proposal writing; partner support, including monitoring; security and

safety of Oxfam staff; influencing and advocacy work at different levels; networking Oxfam and partners together with

relevant stakeholders; feeding in and out information; being part of public meetings; participating in the United Nations (UN)

Protection Working Group; working with the UN and government organisations; and playing a role to influence government

to respond effectively.

Oxfam took a decision not to show a physical presence at the camps because there were many NGOs involved and there was

a flood of civilian support in the camps. Instead money was channelled through responding partner organisations. Oxfam

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made the decision to work with partner organisations that would provide the direct response for numerous reasons. The first

is that years of partnership with Oxfam had meant a level of trust and confidence in their work and systems. The second

reason is that some partners have had continuous experience engaging with foreign nationals in the country and has

developed an established relationship and reputation; this meant that partner organisations would have better insight into

people’s immediate needs. The third reason that this strategy was used was to avoid an overlap in the provision of resources.

By maintaining a coordinating/facilitating position, Oxfam was best able to develop an overview of the situation and minimise

any unnecessary doubling up. This partnership with the partner organisations also allowed Oxfam to assess any gaps around

the broader state-led response.

Oxfam did not have access to very large funding because, while all the Oxfams have access to emergency funding, in terms of

the global scale of humanitarian response, this was a very low key emergency because of its small scale (with less than 10 000

people affected). A proposal was submitted to Oxfam Australia, Oxfam Canada and Oxfam South Africa. These three affiliates

committed funds for the response. The decision was later taken not to use the Oxfam South Africa money due to the short

timeframes of the response. Oxfam set up a collective fund with committed funds reaching around R650 000. The funds from

Oxfam Australia were used first due to the fact that funds needed to be spent by a certain deadline.

In terms of funding, Oxfam wanted to create funding that was flexible. Some of the funding supported livelihoods, transport,

psychosocial support (PSS), and the debriefing of those affected by xenophobia, and their staff who were working closely with

those affected. While the debriefing of staff is not an area that any funder would normally fund, through Oxfam’s close

relationship with the partners, there was the realisation that debriefing was a vital part of the process in order to mitigate the

impact of post-traumatic stress from the response.

2.2 Oxfam partner response

2.2.1 Refugee Social Services

Refugee Social Services (RSS) is the implementing partner of the UNHCR in Durban; as such they were the main point of

contact. Given that they had experience from the 2008 outbreak of xenophobic violence, and an existing relationship with the

foreign national community in Durban and surrounding areas, the decision was taken that they would be the primary

implementing partner in the response.

RSS has a long-term relationship with Oxfam Australia and it was one of the first places the foreign nationals went to during

the xenophobic violence. In January 2015, they had anticipated the xenophobic violence, and there was communication with

Oxfam Australia around the matter.

RSS responded according to their experience from the 2008 incident:

They worked with the police, along with different community stakeholders and the eThekwini Municipality in helping

where they could.

RSS provided food and accommodation for those who lost their livelihoods

Helped with referrals for those needing assistance with legal documents and renewal of legal documents.

People affected by the xenophobic violence were provided with psychosocial support for the trauma.

Debriefing sessions were held for those that were giving support, in order to healthily process their experiences.

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RSS capacity was strengthened through partnering with Oxfam. Oxfam provided a psychologist to assist with a refresher

course on debriefing so that the staff who were helping to respond could have beneficial and meaningful debriefing sessions.

It was also noted that Oxfam staff were always present for emotional support; importantly Oxfam encouraged responders to

take time away from the situation for a few days, if needed.

2.2.2 Save the Children (in collaboration with other agencies):

Save the Children (STC) was an existing partner of OAU, and informed OAU of their decision to respond to the xenophobic

violence. STC drew on the support from their head office for this response. As such, OAU’s interaction with them focused

more on information sharing.

In terms of their response, STC helped in the establishment and management of child-friendly spaces for the children, and

collaborated with organisations such as the Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative (REPSSI), Doctors without Borders (MSF)

and the South African Red Cross. These spaces were clearly marked and recognisable so children could access them, and

despite the confusion of the transit camps, the Save the Children South Africa banners were easily visible. In these spaces:

Children were able to receive child-friendly trauma support

The learning and play activities offered children a familiar and normalised place to be, whilst their parents were busy

with official processes.

REPSSI provided trauma counselling to children

MSF attended to children’s medical needs

The South African Red Cross, together with Save the Children, provided food

The Red Cross monitored the cleanliness of the camp

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2.2.3 Refugee Pastoral Care (RPC)

RPC is not a partner organisation of OAU, however RSS informed OAU that RPC, who operate out of the DHC, was responding,

and required assistance for the cost of housing displaced foreign nationals. Given that they are not a partner organisation,

support was extended for this, through RSS. They were able to secure space for the newly arrived foreign nationals in Broad

Street.

RPC worked in conjunction with the following organisations: Bishops Conference; Oxfam; Diakonia Council of Churches; MSF;

and Refugee Social Services. Together these organisations mobilised resources to respond to issues such as schooling for

children, medical-related concerns and churches also came in to support in terms of prayer.

2.2.4 Denis Hurley Centre (DHC)

During OAU’s initial canvassing of partner organisations, the DHC, who responded in the 2008 xenophobic violence, and had

experience in this type of response, were contacted. There was a similar relationship of information-sharing with the DHC.

Many people went to the Denis Hurley Centre for shelter after the situation turned violent. In 2008, the previous building on

the same site had been used to house people, however the new building is not suitable for boarding.

The DHC:

Provided food at the temporary accommodation in Broad Street. The food was delivered as it wasn’t deemed safe

enough to expect people to travel to and from the accommodation to the DHC.

Provided access to sanitation facilities, such as showers and a washing machine

Was heavily involved in the subsequent discussions about social cohesion.

2.3 General Response

The government set-up 3 sites in Durban and surrounding areas as a safe site for foreign nationals who had been affected by

the violence. The three sites were located in Isipingo, Chatsworth and Phoenix. The camps were an attempt at a partnership

between the government and CSOs and included the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Health, the

Department of Social Development and Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.

In the weeks following the xenophobic violence, the SA government established a national inter-departmental task team with

the aim of eliminating criminal activities across the country. The task team, named 'Operation Fiela-Reclaim' (which means

operation 'sweep clean') executed several raids across the country, which has been criticised by some for allegedly targeting

foreign nationals and for the use of force. The Mail and Guardian reported on this in September 2015, and in terms of

context, is worth quoting in length:

“‘Government’s controversial crime-fighting blitz operation, code-named Operation Fiela, has led to the

arrest of over 9 000 people for severe crimes, including possession of drugs, suspects wanted for murder, theft

and sexual offences,’ Minister in the Presidency Jeff Radebe said on Monday.

‘The biggest Fiela multidisciplinary operations were held on July 30 and 31 where all provinces conducted

synchronized operations. These operations were held in major centres across the length and breadth of the

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country. The total arrests only for the two days was 2 908,’ Radebe told reporters in Pretoria at the Inter-

Ministerial Committee on Migration.

During the briefing, it was revealed that the majority of people who were arrested during the two-day operation

were mostly undocumented immigrants, which accounted for 1 123 of the 2 908 arrests. Other people were

arrested for possession of illegal cigarettes, fraud, employing undocumented immigrants, assault, and burglary.

Out of the total number of 9 968 people arrested in the operation, which started on April this year, Gauteng had

the majority of arrests, with records standing at 3 064 arrests. A total of 1 314 people were arrested in Limpopo,

1 264 nabbed in Western Cape and in Mpumalanga, police arrested 1 225 people. Other provinces had figures

less than 1 000 each, and in the Free State only 283 people were arrested.”2

Linking back to the previous spate of xenophobic violence in May 2008, it is important to note the South African Human Rights

Commission’s (SAHRC) investigative report following these incidences. The report considered the preparedness and response

of major state departments (see appendices). It should be noted that Malusi Gigaba responded positively to questions asked

in the national assembly in May 2015 regarding the implementation of the 21 recommendations by the SAHRC. Mr Gigaba

responded stating that the SAHRC report contains a total of 21 recommendations for the Department of Home Affairs and

that the department has implemented 19 of these recommendations (See Appendix 2).

The KZN Premier, Senzo Mchunu, in the weeks following the xenophobic attacks in April 2015, established the Special

Reference Group on Migration and Community in KwaZulu-Natal that looked at the causes of the xenophobic violence. The

reference group:

- Conducted a survey in KZN on the causes of the xenophobic attacks

- Attended meetings to observe and ask questions (meetings around the reintegration of foreign nationals into

communities)

- Made recommendations to the Premier on what needs to be done in order to respond to the xenophobic violence

- Worked with NGOs, trade unions, police, the army, and refugee organisations

At the time of doing this review the results for the reference group were not out yet, but the quote below explains the

purpose of the research:

“The broad mandate of the Reference Group is to investigate the causes of the attacks on foreign nationals and

advise the Premier. The strategic objective of the Reference Group will be to conduct representative

consultations, collate submissions and recommendations, and to advise the Premier on the potential for joint

implementation of programmatic responses to the prevailing situation.

The functions as the Reference Group are threefold: Firstly to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the

reported causes associated with the attacks; Secondly to undertake an assessment and consideration of

successes and short comings of past and on-going initiatives and recommendations; and thirdly to solicit

proposals and submissions from affected and interested parties and communities, and outline immediate and

long-term solutions in response to the violent incidents.

2 Maromo, J. (2015). The numbers behind operation fiela. http://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-07-the-numbers-behind-operation-fiela.

Retrieved February 3, 2016

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The Reference Group is chaired by Judge Navi Pillay, previous United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights, with attorney Comfort Ngidi as Vice-Chair, and Paddy Kearney, Vasu Gounden, Karen Lotter, Muzi

Ntombela and Stephanie Miller as members. The Group collectively brings decades of experience to bear in the

areas of law, business, media; the promotion of social harmony and the sustainable and equitable resolution of

conflict.

To support the work of the Reference Group a Secretariat was established, housed within the African Centre for

the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and based in Durban. ACCORD is an independent conflict

management institute that has a more than 20 year history of working to bring African solutions to challenges

posed by conflict on the continent” 3

3 Accord. (2015). About the Special Reference Group. http://www.kznspecialreferencegroup.org.za/about-us.php. Accessed February 2, 2016

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3. REFLECTION ON THE RESPONSES

3.1 Reflection on Oxfam’s response

The general reflections on this response were that it was quite challenging to respond to such a complex issue during the

changes in Oxfam. There was a lot of pressure and deadlines to meet. Some of the Oxfam staff members had to work beyond

their normal working time drafting proposals, meeting deadlines and doing a lot of administration while supporting the

partners on the ground.

Some challenges in this process involved communicating in extensive email chains. The process was described by some as

‘dragging’ and many believe that the result of this complexity was that it took too long for some important and urgent

decisions to be made.

There was a sense of frustration about the difficult process that needed to be carried out in order to get funding released for

this emergency. In an emergency situation, having to follow the current protocol meant that there was a delay in accessing

funds to support the response.

There were mixed feelings from the partner organisations about the way things were handled during the response to

xenophobic attacks. Some organisations felt that everything went smoothly, and challenges faced were normal for any

relationship with a funder. One respondent said that “All the funders and the responses need to be slightly quicker in an

emergency situation. Oxfam was quicker to respond and the communication was good” (Interview, 2015). There were some

situations where a few of the organisations felt that when it comes to sending a request for an emergency, it took too long for

Oxfam to respond. One organisation stated the following about the delay: “It took time for Oxfam to respond to emergency

issues, the processes appeared to be dragging. The approach and strategy to respond with Oxfam did not seem well

coordinated; it was not clear how and when to use the funds that were donated to us” (Interview, 2015). Another respondent

said that “Although Oxfam approached, they did not have a plan at hand to respond...Oxfam needs to respond to emergency

issues efficiently by making immediate decisions”. He also emphasised that the process would have been a lot smoother if

efficient sanitation had been addressed as an emergency issue (Interview, 2015).

3.2 Reflection on the general response

One respondent mentioned that while the government has the capacity to respond, it lacks good leadership and

coordination. The same issues from 2008 came up and there has been no adequate response.

Another respondent noted that the camps that government departments set up did not have resources and financial support

to ensure effective functioning; government departments depended on the NGOs and faith-based organisations that were

there for financial support and resources. It was believed that the government officials were there to gather statistics and

reports on the situation on a daily basis, rather than offer material and practical assistance.

One respondent stated the following: the municipality and the government departments worked at a very high level when

they were responding however they missed the important information. They could have managed the camps differently –

there is a need for a clearer system for verifying cases of displacement because a fair number of people showed up at the

camp needing assistance yet they were not displaced (Interview, 2015).

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4. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is important to ensure that partnerships are formed and maintained between CSOs, Oxfam affiliates, and partner

organisations. As mentioned above, good communication was key to an efficient and effective response, therefore

developing and maintaining good relationships ensures that in an emergency situation, a good foundation exists, on which to

build a response.

Oxfam’s continued support of various partner organisations across the country led to the strong relationship that exists

today. This relationship informed the OAU’s decision around how to approach the xenophobic violence response. The

partner-led response was successful for numerous reasons, as mentioned above. This model should be applied to future

emergency situations, with Oxfam playing a supporting, and coordinating role.

Good communication channels also need to be fostered between CSOs and government. In terms of the governmental

response, a key criticism in the reflection was that in many instances, people weren’t certain who was responsible, or what

their responsibilities were. It’s necessary for different departments and clusters within the South African government to plan

how they can better work together to establish relationships with CSOs before there is a disaster. This will allow for systems

to be checked, and ways of working to be agreed.

As Oxfam South Africa continues to develop its systems and processes, it is important to consider roles and responsibilities for

future humanitarian responses. One such example is to have a dedicated Communications Officer to ensure that information

is being circulated regularly and Oxfam’s statements regarding the emergency are released timeously. Importantly, this

position could be able to mitigate the misinformation and confusion from the media, including sensationalised reporting.

As a part of developing systems in place for such emergencies, one recommendation would be to have a clear and simple

process for the releasing of funding. The releasing of funds should be a top priority in such situations, and some criticism was

around how long the funds took to be released.

It would be suggested that OZA has a pot of contingency funds that can be released, at their discretion within 24 hours if

necessary.

After 2008, there were a number of decisions made and actions proposed to reduce future xenophobic violence. There should

be an active review of these, as well as the decisions from the 2015 response, most notably Operation Fiela-Reclaim and the

changes to legislation proposed by the Department of Home Affairs. This includes a deepening and extension of the social

reintegration and cohesion programs proposed by the South African government and members of the CSOs.

Since responding to xenophobic violence requires experience and expertise, efforts should be made to encourage and

facilitate emergency response training for various key people in the response.

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5. CONCLUSION

The 2015 xenophobic violence directly affected foreign nationals who were killed, injured, displaced and had their property

damaged and destroyed. Furthermore, it highlighted the tension that exists between people living in South Africa, especially

those living in precarious socio-economic situations.

The violence emphasises the need for long-term development work that addresses the underlying structural issues that

perpetuate poverty and inequality.

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6. REFERENCES:

Accord. (2015). About the Special Reference Group. Available at: http://www.kznspecialreferencegroup.org.za/about-us.php. [Accessed February 2, 2016] Maromo, J. (2015). The numbers behind operation fiela. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-07-the-numbers-behind-operation-fiela. [Accessed February 3, 2016]

South African History online, towards a people’s history. 2015. Xenophobic violence in democratic South Africa. Available at:

http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa. [Accessed February 2, 2016]

Interviews:

Please see list of interviews in Appendix 1.

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7. APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Organisations who participated in the review

No. Organisation Position Type Number

1 Denis Hurley Centre

Management Face-to-face interviews 2

2 OAU Management and staff

Face-to-face interviews; Skype meeting

3 1

3 Refugee Pastoral Care

Staff Face-to-face interview 1

4 Refugee Social Services

Management Face-to-face interview 1

5 Save the Children

Staff Telephone interview 1

6 OIT Staff Skype meeting

1

7 OGB Staff Skype meeting; Face-to-face meeting

1 1

8 OZA Management Skype meeting

1

TOTAL 13

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APPENDIX 2: Response from Home Affairs

About implementation of SAHRC recommendations from the 2008 xenophobic attacks

PQ 1690 – Whether with reference to the SA Human Rights Commission

(i) Rec No 1: Conduct a thorough and transparent evaluation of the challenges faced during the 2008 crisis and formulates

an action plan for future improvements: There is an Immigration Priority committee in the operating arm of the JCPS cluster,

namely the NATJOINTS (National Joint Operational Intelligence Structure). This priority committee is chaired by the

Department of Home Affairs.

The DHA is guided by reports and findings made by intelligence/law enforcement departments regarding risks and threats

and works jointly with other departments in the cluster to address such risks and threats. The terms of reference of this

priority committee include addressing anti-foreigner sentiment. Tasks of this committee include visiting areas with significant

numbers of foreign-owned businesses not only to engage with foreign nationals to register their businesses but also to find

out whether such business owners support the local community. Due to capacity challenges, the amount of time dedicated to

such engagements is limited.

(ii) Rec No 4: Ensure that detainees at Lindela Repatriation Centre have access to legal counsel prior to deportation and

eliminate undue administrative delays to such consultation: Civil society organisations have access to the Lindela Holding

Facility to monitor detainees and consult with them. Since September 2014, DHA has also extended an invitation to the South

African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to have a permanent presence at the Lindela Holding Facility so that they can

assist persons who require legal representation. The SAHRC also receives information about persons who are being held at

Lindela and whose detention is to be extended in order to assist such persons with legal representation.

(iii) Rec No. 5: Take immediate steps to counter the administrative injustices flowing from inconsistency in information

systems across refugee reception offices and Lindela Repatriation Centre: Since April 2008, all refugee reception offices are

linked up to a National Immigration Information System (NIIS) which contains all the biometric and personal information of

clients who apply for asylum nationally. The Lindela Holding Facility also has access to this system, which allows Lindela to

verify whether a detainee is an asylum seeker prior to being admitted at Lindela. Should a person be found to be an asylum

seeker whose claim is still pending during the screening process, such person will not be admitted at Lindela.

(iv) Rec No. 6: Ensure that all relevant officials and contractors adhere to the Immigration Act 2002 and Refugees Act

1998. All relevant officials sign Annual Performance Agreements and are bound to uphold the laws of the country, including

the Immigration Act and Refugees Act 1998. Several Chief Directorates within Immigration Services have also sought to

standardize practices through the development of Standard Operating Procedures that are reviewed as the need arises.

All officials who join the Department of Home Affairs also undergo a period of induction, including a number of modules on

Immigration Management to become familiar with key pieces of legislation administered by the Department and existing

Standard Operating Procedures. Should an official fail to abide by the Immigration Act and/or the Refugees Act, disciplinary

action (and legal action through the courts, where applicable) can be undertaken.

(v) Rec No. 7: Ensure that all officials and contractors work with constitutional principles foremost in their minds and work

cooperatively and in good faith with legal service providers to ensure that the right to individual liberty is protected. The

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answer to Recommendation 6 above refers. As mentioned earlier, legal service providers also have access to the Lindela

Holding Facility.

(vi) Rec No. 8: Conduct and provide to the SAHRC an annual assessment of DHA progress in actioning its recommendations

relating to abuses of process. The DHA has implemented a number of initiatives since the 2008 incidents of xenophobia;

however, it has not provided the SAHRC with annual progress reports. A review of existing Standard Operating Procedures

(SOPs) and development of new procedures, where required, has been undertaken by the Chief Directorate: Asylum Seeker

Management and Chief Directorate: Inspectorate.

Immigration directives are issued through internal communications in order to ensure that every official in the Department is

aware of the information, regardless of where that official is based. Further, all newly appointed officials undergo specific

induction training including Immigration Management modules. Training of immigration services staff has also been

undertaken in cooperation with UNHCR and IOM. Where there are specific abuses of process, such matters are taken through

internal disciplinary channels.

(vii) Rec No. 9: Implement disciplinary procedures against officials who were responsible for departures from legislated

administrative procedures or possible refoulement. More detailed information on the personal particulars of officials

allegedly involved in departures from legislated administrative procedures would be required to take action against specific

officials. However, such information has not been provided to the Department. Disciplinary action was taken against five (5)

departmental officials who conducted a deportation despite an order not to deport a Botswana national who was facing a

capital crime in Botswana.

(viii) Rec No 10: Adopt a consistent approach to voluntary repatriation during a displacement of non-nationals. The

Department’s role is to assist victims of displacement to obtain, often through re-issuance, documents that may have been

lost. If the victims wish to return to their home countries, the Department liaises with their embassies/consulates, takes their

personal particulars, issues such persons with travel cards to capture their movement, as well as arranges their transport in

collaboration with their respective embassy.

(xi) Rec No 11: In line with section 41 of the Constitution, develop cooperative relations with key structures of national and

provincial government to facilitate a speedy response to displacement and a quest for durable solutions for displaced

persons before terminating government shelter and assistance. The Department of Home Affairs participates in a number of

government cluster structures and works cooperatively with other government structures. The provision of shelter and

assistance falls outside of the mandate of the Department of Home Affairs. However, the Department assists with the

verification of status of displaced persons and the re-issuance of documents (where applicable) to enable their reintegration

into society once a decision to terminate government shelter and assistance is made by the government collectively.

(x) Rec No. 12: Develop specific guidelines on the DHA’s legislated xenophobia prevention and deterrence mandate. The

mandate of the Department of Home Affairs aims to prevent xenophobia by providing enabling documents to different

categories of migrants. Through its Stakeholder Management Directorate within the Chief Directorate: Asylum Seeker

Management, the Department has conducted a series of training sessions and workshops with ward councilors and Metro

police in various areas in Tshwane.

In the last two years, it has been determined that Home Affairs must contribute to the government outcome dealing with

social cohesion, which is led by the Department of Arts and Culture. In this regard, the Department has organised a Social

Cohesion Programme led by Minister, whose first meeting with stakeholders took place in April 2015 in Ekurhuleni.

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(xi) Rec No. 13: Be party to the programme of targeted conflict resolution initiatives to be implemented by a department

nominated by government’s social cluster: The DHA is a participant in the Social Cluster and remains committed to join

action mandated by the Social Cluster.

(xii) Rec No. 14: Partner with the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Disaster Management in responding to early

warning information or patterns of crimes against non-nationals. The Department participates in the JCPS Cluster and other

coordinating bodies within government. The Department remains committed to partnering with SAPS and Disaster

Management to ensure a consolidated response to early warning information.

In this regard, the Department participates in joint operations with SAPS to address immigration matters. As mentioned

earlier, there is an immigration priority committee in the operating arm of the JCPS cluster, namely the NATJOINTS (National

Joint Operational Intelligence Structure). This priority committee is chaired by the Department of Home Affairs and it has

undertaken a number of activities to respond to early warning information.

(xiii) Rec No. 15: Maintain a management approach to immigration, including undocumented immigration into informal

settlements. The Department has adopted a management approach to immigration; unfortunately, however, it does not have

the capacity to monitor, on a regular basis, activities taking place in informal settlements. Its approach has been to empower

key stakeholders (such as councilors) on the rights of different categories of migrants, to enable them to engage within their

respective communities. The Department has also undertaken steps to assist vulnerable populations such as Zimbabwean

nationals through a special documentation project.

(xiv) Rec No. 16: Assist the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) in formulating a policy on the partial formalisation of

informal settlements. DHS must lead in this area given its expertise in this subject area. However, the Department remains

committed to working with DHS as required.

(xv) Rec No. 17: Work with the Department of Social Development (DSD) on immigration-related aspects of the Population

Policy. The Department of Home Affairs developed draft Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) with DSD to assist

unaccompanied asylum seeker and refugee children. The SOPs have not been formally adopted, but engagements have taken

place with DSD on this matter. DHA remains committed to making inputs to aspects of Population Policy if requested to do so

by DSD.

(xvi) Rec No. 18: Through the Counter-Xenophobia Unit (CXU), assist in municipal local integrated development planning

for social cohesion. The Cabinet took a decision after the 2008 xenophobic attacks to appoint a lead Department which is

Department of Arts and Culture that will deal with issues of xenophobia and social cohesion .The Department of Home Affairs

is participating in the social cohesion initiatives which are led by the Department of Arts and Culture which was also

appointed as the lead Department in relation to Government Outcome 14.

The Counter-Xenophobia Unit (CXU) within the Department has ceased to exist. However, through its Stakeholder

Management Directorate within the Chief Directorate: Asylum Seeker Management, the Department has undertaken a

number of training sessions with ward councilors and members of the police to sensitize them to the issues of xenophobia

and social cohesion.

(xvii) Rec No. 19: Through the CXU, work with the Department of Education (DoE) and SAHRC to incorporate issues of

migration and xenophobia into the national syllabus. As mentioned earlier, the CXU does no longer exist within the

Department. However, the Department remains committed in providing information to the DoE on the different categories of

migrants and the rights accorded to them for purposes of incorporation into syllabi.

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(xviii) Rec No. 20: Extend the CXU’s counter-xenophobic performances to all schools in and around areas affected by

violence against non-nationals. Since the Department of Arts and Culture is the lead Department in this area, the

Department participates in such interventions as guided by the Department of Arts and Culture.

(xix) Rec No. 21: Demystify the link between DHA and SAPS databases in the awareness-raising messages of the CXU. This

recommendation relates to the confusion created whereas persons are of the view that the fingerprints taken by DHA for the

processing of ID documents are used by the police. However, the taking of fingerprints by DHA and SAPS are two separate

processes.

*Issued by Parliament, June 1 2015