Retrenchment Strategies in Two Canadian Universities: A Political Analysis

Retrenchment Strategies in Two Canadian Universities: A Political Analysis

Cynthia Hardy McGiN University

Abstract This article compares thestrategies aabptedby two Cana- dian universities in response to financial restrictions. Using a political perspective, it first explores the context of each institution by examining the behaviour of key interest groups. It then shows how the political context shaped the way in which cutbacks were made. The strategies adopted by the two universities were influenced by the need to accommodate powerful, or potentially powerful, interest groups, and in particular, the desire of central administrators to avoid opposition from these groups.

In May of 1983, the Social Credit Party of British Columbia (BC), Canada, was reelected on the basis of a promise to control government spending. It introduced a restraint program involving thirty-four legislative acts. The Public Sector Restraint Act specifically enabled tenure to be abandoned in the event of financial problems. Following widespread political protest, the government eventuallyamended the legislation to allow for exemption by an organization, if the intent of the act was retained through a collective agreement. Accompanying the restraint legislation were reductions in the operating grants to the three universities in the province: In 1983 grants were frozen, and the following two years each saw a five percent decrease.

Simon Fraser University (SFU), which opened in 1.965, had over 400 faculty, 800 nonacademic staff, and 12,000 students in 1984. Its budget was around $70 million, excluding research grants. The new president, who had been appointed in 1983, immediately had to set about

The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Address all correspondence to Cynthia Hardy, Faculty of Management, McGill University, 1001 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, QC, H3A 1G5, Canada.

Rksumd Cet article compare les stratkgies aabptkes par deux universitks canadiennes face am coupures budgktaires. Aabptant un point de vue politique, l’auteur analyse en premier lieu lecontextedechaque ktablissement enktudiant le comportement des groupes d’intkr2t les plus importants. I1 montre ensuite comment le contertepolitique module les coupures budgdaires. Les stratkgies aabptkes par les deux universitks ont ktk influenckes par la nkcessitk d’accommoder des groupes d’intkret puissants ou potentiellementpuissants et, en particulier, par le &sir des aahinistrateurs d’hiter l’antagonisme de ces groupes.

ways of making reductions. He wanted to maintain a balance between reducingexpenditure and maintaining the morale of staff. “The strategy was to pull the cuts off and still keep the university; and not have it fragment around us politically” (dean). It ruled out the termination of tenured faculty. Instead, expenditures were reduced through attrition, an early retirement package, not Filling vacant positions, and an agreement with the faculty association to take a pay cut. In addition, the faculties of the university were \restructured- the Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies was folded into existing faculties, and a new Faculty ofApplied Engineering was created. In addition, programs in German and Russian were discontinued and the budget of the Centre of A r t s was cut by one third.

The reorganization had followed the establishment of a Presidential Advisory Committee on University Priori- ties, somewhat unfortunately labelled PACUP. It had con- sisted of five senior academics from different areas of the university, who had conducted a review by inviting briefs, holding meetings, and conducting interviews. From the information they gathered and analyzed, they had made a variety of recommendations for change, which were similar, but not identical, to those described above. Following the submission of the PACUP report in 1984, the president made a presentation of “The President’s Plan,” inwhich he

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RETRENCHMENT STRATEGIES.. . HARDY

outlined his own proposals for change. They were subse- quently presented to and approved by senate, and put into effect.

The neighbouring University of British Columbia (UBC), which opened in 1915, had 27,000 students, 1,900 full-time, tenure-stream faculty, and over 4,000 nonacademic staff in 1984. Its operating budget exceeded $260 million, excluding research research grants. The president at UBC had established, in 1984, an advisory committee chaired by the vice president (academic) with four professors from different areas. It examined the university’s operations, and resulted in a series of letters from the vice president (academic) to the deans, asking them to “show cause” why certain areas should not be discontinued. The deans were expected to respond early in the new year, by which time the president had left, and the vice president (academic) had become president pro tem. At the same time, the Senate Budget Committee (SBC) had been developing procedures to use for program discontinuance. SBCadvised the president onbudgetary issues, and following a widening of its mandate in 1982, on academic priorities. It had produced a planning document, which ratedall UBC’s programs as core, core-related, and noncore, on the basis of quality, cost, enrolment, uniqueness, and special value to the province and nation. Those programs rated as noncore were considered prospects for closure.

In May 1985, a series of proposals for program elimi- nation was presented by the acting vice president (academic) based on, but not identical to, the recommendations of SBC. Senate debated the proposals, and programs in Dental Hygiene, Industrial Education, Recreation Educa- tion, Media Technology, the Licentiate in Accounting, and the Diploma in Agricultural Sciences were discontinued. One prcposal - in Landscape Architecture - was not apprwed by senate. In addition, unspecified cuts of $3 million were made in Arts , Science, Medicine, Applied Science and Education. These cuts resulted in the elimina- tion of approximately 100 faculty positions associated wi th the discontinued programs, mainly through the closure of vacant positions. Twelve faculty members, however, received termination notices, of whom nine were tenured. This decision to terminate tenured faculty caused widespread protest. The faculty association gave a vote of no confidence in the board, president pro tem, and acting vice president (academic), and a committee of inquiry was set up by the Canadian Association of University Teachers (see Dennison, 1987).

These two universities clearly adopted different retrenchment (cutback) strategies in response to the same external pressures. SFUexplicitly ruled out the termination of tenured faculty; UBC engaged in program discontinuance that resulted in nine tenured faculty losing theirjobs. This article compares the two institutions [ l ] and analyzes theirretrenchmentstrategiesfromapolitical perspective. It

shows how thedistributionand use ofpowerwithin the two universities helped to shape the choice of strategy. The differences between the two institutions offer a useful opportunity to learn more about the problems of managing cutbacks. While UBC’s budget cuts do not compare with the cutbacks experienced in some U.S. and U.K. universities (for example, Mortimer & Tierney, 1979; Simpson, 1983; Sizer, 1988; Walford, 1987), they nevertheless represent relatively severe financial problems in the Canadian context. The universities in British Columbia rely on government funding for 85 percent of their operating revenues, and the cuts there were more dramatic than in other provinces, where funding restrictions had occurred over a longer time period (for example, Hardy, 1987a, 1988a, 1990a; Skolnick, 1986). Moreover, UBC’s decision to terminate tenured faculty is the only example of such dismissals in the context of the current financial restrictions in Canada.

The remainder of this article presents a review of the different theories of university decision making, followed by closer examination of the political model. The political contexts and strategies at the two universities are presented. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.

Decision Making in Universities

Universities are generally conceived of as professional organizations in which certain bureaucratic features coexist with professional authority and decentralized decision making power (for example, Blau, 1973; Hardy, 1990a; Mintzberg, 1979; Platt & Parsons, 1968; Satow, 1975). Within this structural context, decision making processes may adopt a number of forms (Hardy et al., 1983).

The rationalbureaucratic model assumes that the bureaucratic features to be found in universities reflect administrative rationality, where goals are clear; a number of alternatives, generated by analysis, are considered; information is procured and analyzed; criteria are clearly expli- cated; the optimal outcome is selected and resources are channelled towards it (Chaffee, 1983b; Hardy, 1988b; see also Baldridge, 1971; Birnbaum, 1988). While limits to cognition, information, and time, clearly bound rationality (Simon, 19.55), there is, nevertheless, anattempt to produce optimal solutions based on extensive analysis.

The traditional view of the university is a community of scholars (Goodman, 1%2), operating by consensus (Millett, 1962). The collegial model is thus predicated on the idea of professionals working together to produce decisions by consensus. It presupposes shared norms and values about organizational purpose, and a commitment to institutional objectives which often seems to revolve around excelleiice. Participants are motivated by common interest,

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and if different alternatives are generated by different conceptions of the common interest, perhaps because of different disciplinary perspectives, they are resolved as a result of consensus building to which participants are willing to contribute the necessary time and effort (see Bess, 1988; Chaffee, 1983a; Hardy, 199Oa; Hardy et al., 1983). The political model focuses on a decision-making process centred on negotiation, bargaining, and political influenceon the part ofdivergent interestgroups (Baldridge, 1971; Bucher, 1970; Darkenwald, 1971; Hill & French, 1976). Pfeffer and colleagues (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer, Salancik, & Leblebici, 1976; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974) conducted a series of studies on the relationship between power and decision outcomes. (See also Hackman, 1985; Welsh and Slusher, 1986.) The political model assumes that interest groups attempt to acquire resources to protect and enhance their positions. They are thus motivated by self interest. Since interests often diverge and conflict, these groups try to influence decision outcomes, by mobilizing power and negotiating with other groups (Chaffee, 1983a; Hardy, 1985a,b; Hardy et al., 1983).

The garbage can model, which views universities as organized anarchies, argues that behaviouris not purposive because of ambiguity in preferences, technology, and participation (Cohen et al., 1972; Cohen & March, 1974; March & Olsen, 1976). Preferences are inconsistent and ill- defined. They emerge out of decisions rather than provide an a priori basis for action. Technology is unclear because organizational processes are not well understood by members. As a result, decision making often operates on the basis of trial and error. Participation is fluid because people vary in the amount of time and effort they are willing to devote to issues. Consequently, decision making is not a linear process where intention is followed by actions that produce outcomes. Instead, decisions are the result of the mix of the problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities that happen to be in the garbage can at the time. Issues often have a low salience and the total system has high inertia. Processes are subject to overload and there is a weak information base (March & Olsen, 1976). Deci- sions are made by default or by accident, rather than by intention, and resolution is not the most common Corm of decision making (Chaffee, 1983a).

This article adopts a political framework to explain the events at the two universities, for a number of reasons. The political model assumes that individuals are motivated by self interest, rather than the common interest that underlies the traditional collegial model (Hardy et al., 1983). The division of labour (Cyert & March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973), or in the case of universities, the loosely coupled nature of facultiesanddepartments (Weick, 1976), producesa number of groups with potentially conflicting interests, while the decentralization and dispersion of power provide them

with the means to influence decisions. In order for political decision making to occur, however, these interest groups must possess not only the ability to influence decision making, but also the motivation to do so. There must be a perceived conflict of interest as well as sufficient recourse to power sources (Hardy, 1985~). Loose coupling produces diverse interest groups, but it also enables them to coexist harmoniously by insulating them from each other, and allowing disparate goals to be accomodated. It is only when the groups come into competition with each other that they act politically and use their power; otherwise it is possible for collegiality to prevail (Hardy et al., 1983). Scarce resources often provide the motivation for political behaviour-decision making quickly becomes a zero sum game when there are insufficient funds for everyone to achieve his goals (Hardy, 1985b; Hardy et al., 1983).

A Political Framework

The political model revolves around the use of power to influence decision making. Politics is defined as the use of power - “power in action” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 7; see also Hickson et al., 1986; Pettigrew, 1973) - and power is defined as the potential capacity to produce desired outcomes. Power is a relational phenomenon, rather than a possession or attribute of a particular individual, and has to be exercised to have an effect on outcomes.

The aspect of power that has received the most attention revolves around resource dependencies - the control of valued resources (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Hickson, 1971; Pfeffer, 1981) - including information, expertise, sanctions and rewards, political access, and credibility (Crozier, 1964; French & Raven, 1968; Mechanic, 1962; Pettigew, 1973). It has been called overt power (Hardy, 1985a,b) and surface power (Frost, 1989; Frost & Egri, 1989) since it involves the visible use of power to defeat resistance in the pursuit of self interest. It derives from the definition of power and political behaviour in terms of resistance or conflict (Cavanagh et al., 1981; Gray & Ariss, 1985; Murray & Gandz, 1980; Nord, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Tushman, 1977; Velasquez et al., 1983; Welsh & Slusher, 1986). Pfeffer (1981), for example, argues that “without opposition or contest ... there is neither the need nor the expectation that one would observe political activity” @. 7).

The focus on conflict and resistance follows from Dahl’s definition of power as the ability of A to make B do something B would not otherwise do - the ability of an actor to carry out his or her will despite resistance. Dahl (1957) was part of a school of thought known as the pluralists (see Hardy, 1986; Lukes, 1974). It assumed that individuals were aware of their grievances and acted upon them by participating in the decision-making arena, which

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was considered to be open to anyone with an interest in it. Radical writersstarted to question theseassumptions in the light of the civil rights movement, urban riots and backlash to Vietnam, which cast doubt on the “permeability” of the American political system (see Parry & Morriss, 1975). The concept of nondecision making was developed by Bachrachand Baratz (1962), who pointed out that powerful actors are able to exclude threatening issues and individuals from the decision-making process (see also Crensen, 1971; Plott & Levine, 1978). It has been argued, however, that nondecision making continued to assume the existence of conflict - opposition occurs but is neutralized by being kept out of the decision-making arena (see Hardy, 1985a,b, 1986; Ranson et al., 1980).

Researchers began to realize that they could not con- fine their studies to power mobilized in the event of conflict. They also had to consider the possibility that power could be used to prevent conflict from arising among certain groups

by shaping perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine noalternative to it, or because they view i t as natural and unchangeable, or because they value i t as divinely ordained and beneficial (Lukes, 1974, p. 24).

If conflict occurs only when groups possess both objective, structural sources of power (the ability to resist) and the subjective will to resist (Hyman & Fryer, 1975), strategies can be employed to reduce or remove the latter (Hardy, 1985a,c). Actors can influence perceptions and obscure the realities ofstructural power (Frost & Egri, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979 Ranson et al., 1980; Walsh et al., 1980).

This form of power has been termed unobtrusive (Hardy, 1985a) and deep structure power (Frost, 1989; Frost & Egri, ? %?). It relies on the use of symbols and language (Pf?;‘:‘ei, 1981) to create legitimacy (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984) for certainactions anddecisions (Pettigrew, 1979).

Politics concerns the creation of legitimacy for certain ideas, values and demands -not just action performcd as a result of previously acquired legitimacy. The management of meaning refers to a process of symbol construction and value use designed both to create legitimacy forone’sowndemandsand to“de1egitimize” the demands of others (Pettigrew, 1977, p. 85).

So, actors may use power to create legitimacy for their position and goals and thereby protect their privileged position orsecure desired outcomes. Enz (1988) illustrates how actors retain power even after environmental changes have reduced their power derived from strategic contingencies (Hicksonet al., 1971) or resourcedependencies (Pfeffer

& Salancik, 1978). Similarly, Hickson et al. (1971) point out that “today’s authority hierarchy is partly a fossilized impression of yesterday’s power ranking” @. 218), while Tolbert (1985) demonstrates how dependency relations become institutionalized over time (Meyer & Rowan, 1977,1978). So, to understand power and politics fully, we need to include the process of legitimation (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Bendix 1956; Lipset, 1963). Actors who cancommand this aspect of power are extremely powerful, even though they do not appear to be exercising any power at all (Welsh et al., 1981).

Stable organizing power requires legitimation. To be sure, men can be made to work and do obey commands through coercion, but the coercive use of power engen- ders resistance and sometimes active opposition.. .effective operations necessitate that they be kept toaminimum thereand, especially, that membersdonot exhibit resistance in discharging their daily duties but perform them and comply with directives willingly (Blauner, 1964, pp. 199-200).

It is inherently safer than overt power because, instead of risking defeat in open conflict, spheres of influence are sectioned off where dominant groups are unchallenged (Burawoy, 1979; Ranson et al., 1980).

The political analysis that follows here focuses on both the power sources possessed by key interest groups - the political context - and their use of that power - political strategies. It considers the use of power both to defeat opposition and prevent it from arising.

The Political Context

This section examines the political context of each university. The analysis focusses on the key interest groups: the president, central administration, senate, board of governors, faculty associations, and the government.

SFU

SFU was a relatively centralized institution in which central administrators held a considerable amount ofpower. The budget was one of the key mechanisms of this centralization. It was highly restrictive, since all budget items were categorized, and deans found it difficult to move money between categories. For example, one dean explained that since computers and office equipment were under different categories, replacing a typewriter with a word processor required central approval: “We don’t have much room for making decisions. We almost have a line by line budget. It’svery tight. Icertainlyadmire thedeanwho hasaoneline budget .”

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The vice president (finance) exerted considerable control. An example was cited where faculty had received $l,OOO research grants, against which they could claim research expenses. It had been argued by some people that the vice president (finance) had been responsible for deciding what did, and what did not, constitute justifiable academic expenses. This tightly managed financial situation looked likely to continue. The administration had a con- servative financial policy, and believed that strict financial control was essential in the prevailing climate of funding restraint.

The budget process is highly centralized, with some frustration on the part of the deans. We are committed to reducing it but recently we’ve been in a crisis and chasing our tails. Everything militates against rational planning, long term planning, committee advice etc. Until we have a longer time horizon, and we know the budget in advance of the fiscal year, we can’t change (central administrator).

The central administration was also powerful because a group of deans had recently been been appointed to the vice presidential level from Education, Continuing Stud- ies, and (the now disbanded) Interdisciplinary Studies, which were considered to be highly influential faculties. In the 1970s, their deans had been important decision makers inboth their faculties and the university as a whole. As they wereelevated to the central level, decision-making respon- sibility had shifted correspondingly. The existence of new vice presidents has dramatically changed decision making. “It has shifted power away from the deans. The first ten years I was a dean, the deans had a lot of power” (dean).

The high degree of centralization had affected the role of the remaining deans. They complained about their lack of autonomy in budgetary matters, and perceived themselves to have lost power to the vice presidents. These feelings were partly the result of the existence of the new “cabinet” of vice presidents, especially since it contained some knowledgeable and experienced members of the university. It was also the result of a lack of cohesiveness within the new group of deans, which had contributed to the diminution of their power. The lack of cohesion was the result of two factors. First, some personality differences had obviously been introduced into the group with the appointment of new members. “,The deans at one point were very clubby but now there are a couple of new club members” (professor). Second, scarce resources had exac- erbated this conflict. “I need threepositions and, frankly, I don’t give a damn what positions are needed in other departments” (dean).

This fragmentation had prevented the deans from using theircombinedpower to influence the central administration. “I don’t think the deans have used the power they have. They have become more competitive and are not so

collegial now because of the personalities. This explains why they don’t work as a force together” (central administrator). In particular, the deans had not fully exploited the power they had as members of senate. All the deans sat on its two key committees - the Undergraduate Cumculum Committee and the Academic Planning Committee. If they voted in unison, they could influence the outcome of central initiatives, particularly at the committee stage. Together, they represented a large percentage of the votes, and they also influenced other senators by a show of force. For example, a recent proposal of the president to make two vice presidents members of senate was withdrawn when it became clear that the deans opposed the idea.

The administrationisvery powerful on senate-all the deans are there, although senate does outvote the administration. The deans are also on the committees. They don’t outvote the other members but if they turn out and vote en bloc, they would probably win on any given day, and the deans do sway other votes. It is in the committee structures that the deans are very powerful, but they don’t feel that it gives them much authority (central administrator).

The deans, however, rarely mobilized senate in this way, preferring to side with the central administration on most matters and rendering senate the “gutless wonder,” as it was affectionately known.

Other interest groups also appeared relatively power- less in comparison with the central administration. The board of governors played a relatively passive role in the internal administration ofthe university and, on the whole, was supportive of presidential proposals.

I often think that the real role of the board iscommunity relations. They pretty well pass everything that is put before them. Part of the problem is knowing what information to ask for. It’s always struck me how little the board is involved in the day-to-day affairs of the university (board member).

Relations between the faculty association and the administration were cordial. Regular meetings were held between the respective presidents and, as a result, militant action on the part of the association was rare.

The current president has created the impression of being open, accessible, and willing to listen, if not always willing to agree. You felt that at least you had a chance by talking to him (faculty association repre- senta tive).

In summary, SFU can be described as a relatively centralized university, because of strict budgetary control and the power of the Central administration. The board, senate, and faculty association were not particularly influ-

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RETRENCHMENT STRATEGIES ... HARDY

ential in university decision making. Nor did the deans “run” SFU, as they had in the past. Key individuals had moved up the hierarchy, taking their power with them, leaving behind a group of deans which had either failed or chosen not to capitalize on its potential power sources.

CJBC

The political context at UBC was characterized by a central administration which was traditionally weak in comparison to the deans, who were powerful, independent “sovereigns” of their particular faculties. The deans were not part of any formal policy- making team for the university as a whole, but individually, they had a great deal of influence on decisions taken by central administrators.

By dint ofpersonality, influenceorinterestadeancould be about as influential as he wanted to be; but the deans are not collectively built into the organization in the formal sense. The corollary is that the dean has a great deal more autonomy in hisown faculty (central administrator).

are best run as faculties rather than integrated into the university” (dean). Consequently, the deans often represented groups of competing interests.

UBC has a lot of antagonism in it. It i s part of the confrontation politics. The departments shook a stickat the faculties who shook a stick at the president, and we are coming to answer for it. AII the faculties fought and werevyingwitheachother away from thecentre. Itwas all shenanigans, old boys, slap happy (dean).

Senate Budget Committee (SBC) was another key interest group. It did not report directly to senate on the budget, but was responsible for advising the president. Nevertheless as “a group of senators representing the university” it had some influence on senate, which ulti- mately had to approve program closures.

SBC is moderately influential and valuable, of some importance but not central to budget activity. I don’t think it’s just window dressing. They could make life very difficult for the administration if they felt they were wrong (dean).

The deans had retained control of many functions, such as budgeting and purchasing, which would have been camed out centrally in many other universities.

As a result, it was consulted by the central administration on budgetary matters, even if its advice was not always followed.

This university has prided itself on spending less on administration than any other university in the country. What they’ve really been doing is spending more on administration because a lot of jobs that should have been done in the president’s office have been done in the deans’ offices (central administrator).

The deans, as a result of this decentralization, retained a considerable amount of information about the operation of their faculties, which they often kept to themselves, rather than sharing it with the central administration.

Information has not been widely shared - it’s been kept in the dean’s office. [There are] people who operate on the mushroom principle - you leave them inthedarkandcoverthemwithwhateverit is youcover mushrooms with (central administrator).

They also maintained their independence by keeping aloof from each other.

Deansdidn’t talk toeach other very much. They tended to be very independent and somewhat isolated from each other. Information in the past has been very jealously guarded (dean).

The result was, many argued, that the deans had developed a faculty perspective, rather than a global view of, and identificationwith, the institutionas a whole.“I thinkmany of the deans think the faculties are the university, and they

SBC advises the president on behalf of the aca- demicsector of the institution. They are perceived to be people who can review the budget from the academic point of view. It lends propriety to the budget development process. Everything is run through them, probably more so than in the past (central administrator).

When compared with its counterpart at SFU, it was wnsid- erably more influential. The SBC (which exists under provincial law at both universities) played no role in the cutbacksat SFUor, forthat matter, in thebudgetaryprocess in general. “Everything gets vetoed [from going before SBC] because no one wants the members looking at it. We’re trying to keep the political fires down” (SFU central administrator).

Relations between the faculty association and the central administration were not particularly cordial at UBC, at least on the matter of proposed redundancies. Repeated attempts at establishing agreements on the criteria for the declaration of financial exigency and redundancy procedures had failed. In 1984, an agreement was reached with the executive, but failed to receive ratification from the membership. Subsequent negotiations in 1984 and 1985 also failed.

Finally, UBC‘s board of governors had a reputation for challenging the central administration when in disa-

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greement. The majority of board members were representatives of the Social Credit government and, as such, were perceived to be unsympathetic towards the university. While board members were reluctant to talk about specific issues, they nevertheless indicated a willingness to make their views clear to the university administration.

If they [the board members] don’t think the president is doing something right they speak up on it. There might be the odd specific thing where there has been no agreement, but I don’t think I’d like to go into that. Certainly, the board hasn’t been reluctant to say “No” to the president and the administration, “and here’s why.” That message has been communicated (board member).

In summary, the political context at UBC was characterized by a relatively weak central administration sur- rounded by a myriad of conflicting interests. There was a powerful group of highly individualistic deans. SBC had some power through its ability to influence senate, which had to approve program discontinuance. Negotiations with the faculty association on retrenchment had proved difficult. The board of governors was perceived to share the government’s concern about inefficiency in the the university, and to expect the university to take some action. The prospect of program discontinuance might be expected to induce these interest groups to mobilize their power to safeguard their interests.

The Politics of Strategy Making

The differences in political context helped to account for the retrenchment strategies that were adopted and the way in which they were implemented in each university. Strategies were shaped by the need to accommodate the interest groups and their actual or potential recourse to power.

SFU

The degree of centralization afforded the new president an additional margin of manoeuvre in deciding how to respond to the financial situation. His power was increased by two other factors. First, his recent appointment made i t difficult for the university community to dismiss his proposals. “The feeling was - if we don’t do it what is the president’s future here? This was his major program. There was a feeling of: give the man a chance” (senate member).

Second, the government’s restraint program, the threat to tenure, and the severity of the cutbacks (at least compared withother Canadianprovinces) createda feeling that the university faced a crisis. As is often the case, central administrators were able to assume a considerable amount

of power in these circumstances, because of perceptions that rapid and drastic action was necessary (for example, Hardy et al., 1983).

There’s always talk about tough times but no one believed it, and noone believed here in the 1970s. Now people are sensi tized to the idea that there are some very real budget problems (central administrator).

The president had, then, a clear mandate for action. The changes he proposed had two major characteristics. First, they involved considerable reorganization, including the creation of a new Faculty of Applied Science. They were highly visible changes, with an emphasis on the “high tech” aspects of the university. One reason for their adop- tion was the desire to show the government that the university was ‘‘paying its dues” in making cutbacks, and in providing the province with needed, relevant expertise and skills training. “It is clear that a lot of these decisions were political - what can we do to increase the visibility of the university in the province. We did it by riding pretty hard over groups in Arts” (board member).

Second, the president made it clear that he was commited to avoiding the dismissal of tenured faculty.

The president said very clearly, and he deserves a lot of credit for this, 1 do not want to cut faculty positions. If we can put through this program, I can guarantee that there will be no cuts in tenure stream faculty. So, no one felt there was an axe hanging over their heads (faculty association representative).

It undoubtedly predisposed the union to agree to a salary cut which, in turn, provided additional flexibility for the central administration. The changes proposed by the president reflected, then, a desire to show the external community that the university was acting responsibly and to reassure the internal community that their jobs were not threatened.

His proposals would, at some point, have to be approved by senate and the previous work undertaken by PACUP played an important role in legitimizing them. It helped to create an awareness that a problem existed; it appeared to be an independent, representative committee, with no particular axe to grind; and it provided a mecha- nism through which the faculty were seen to be consulted. “Everyone understood that something had to be done. It was better to have these things done by faculty than administrators, so PACUP lent some credibility to the process” (dean). It would be unfair, however, to suggest that the creation of this committee was purely political. As a newcomer to the institution, the president knew relatively little about SFU, and PACUP undoubtedly provided him with useful information about which areas might be cut back or reorganized.

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There was, however, a risk with PACUP: if it arrived at conclusions that were unacceptable to the deans, they might be prompted to use their power to block the proposals in senate. As a result, PACUP’s role was restricted to an advisory one. Any recommendations were to be discussed by the president with his vice presidents and deans, and he was under no obligation to accept them.

There was always concern about what PACUP might come up with, but we understood that they would only be recommendationsand they would always be brought back to us - recommendations to the president on which he may or may not choose to take action (dean).

In summary, SFU’s response to its financial problems was influenced by PACUP, the deans, and the central administration, as well as a desire to maintain collegial relations with the faculty, and to demonstrate to the government that the university was taking responsible action.

UBC

UBC’s decision to terminate tenured faculty looks, in comparison with SFU, like a major and drastic act. It has been argued that the dimissals were forced on the central administration by the board of governors which was sym- pathetic to government demands for cutbacks and which expected the university to make an appropriate response. There was certainly a perception in the university community that, if UBC did not take action, the board would do it for them. The dismissals have thus been interpreted as a highly visible strategy (much like SFU’s reorganization) designed to placate the government. “[The closures] were good choices as an answer to the government. If the government was going to play a game, we were going to play a game too. The twelve people were the sacrificial lambs” (dean). In reality, however, the dismissals saved only a small amount of money: attrition and closing vacant positions were more important in reducing expenditures.

In the end it was only nine people who were terminated soitdidn’tsolve themajor budgetaryissue; on theother hand it was a sharp signal to the community that we were protecting our strengths. It was very important to say to the community: yes, we can take tough decisions (central administrator).

Having decided to implement program closure, the work done by the SBC on core and noncore programs appeared to play an important part in formulating the proposals that were presented to senate. These proposals, were, however, also the subject of other influences. They were shaped by the ideas of the president pro tem who had, as vice president (academic), chaired the 1984 study into cutbacks and asked the deans to examine various cutbacks.

The second influence was that of the deans. The decentralization of power at UBC meant that both SBC and the central administration were forced, in formulating their recommendations, to rely on the deans for information about where cuts should be carried out. The deans were not always willing to provide information which, in theview of one dean, “they didn’t need.” The deans of the larger faculties, in particular, had a monopoly of information and knowledge which they did not always share.

Some deans responded [to SBC] well, others not so well. Some did not want to say where they would cut. It’s easy in the small faculties because you can see clearly where they cut - there’s no room to play with. When you get to Art sand Medicine it’s terribly difficul t to get into that whole budget (SBC member).

As opinion leaders in senate, the deans also had the power to inhibit the implementation of any proposals, by persuad- ing senate to vote against them. “The deans had to put up a token resistance but couldn’t go all the way. If the deans had wanted to put up a fight on the floor of senate, they could have got every one of those [cuts] rescinded”(senate member).

The recommendations that went to senate were not, therefore, a simple regurgitation of SBC’s suggestions, nor were they the implementation of a presidential plan; they were also a reflection of the deans’ willingness and ability to negotiate.

In retrospect, the cuts were determined by how persua- sive particular deans or department heads were. There were units to be terminated but their dean made a fuss forwhatever reasonand theunitwas kept. Noonereally knows what SBC recommended. There was significant overlap but some units were taken off. Too much dependson the deans. Astrongpersuasive dean islikely to get off easier than he would if i t were judged on need orquality.Theprocessisnotasobjectiveasitshould be (dean).

The central administration did not want to act on proposals that would produce outright opposition. The deans of the larger faculties, such as Medicine, Arts and Science, thus received percentage budget reductions rather than targeted cuts, because they threatened resistance.

SBC wanted to discontinue more things than w e were prepared to recommend to senate. In some of those, we didn’t have the support of the dean. The last thing we wanted to do was get into senate and end up arguing with the dean (central administrator).

The failure of senate to approve the proposal to close Landscape Architecture was further testimony to the strength of the deans.

187 RCSA / CIAS, 9 (3), 180-191


We got caught by the dean being less neutral than she’d led us to believe she would be (central administrator).

SBC’s participation in the retrenchment exercise may have been more important in legitimating the proposals than in formulating them. It ostensibly incorporated faculty representation into the decision process, which undoubtedly helped secure senate approval. The power of the deans, however, meant that some of SBC’s recommendations were politically infeasible.

The president’s office has to involve us but they don’t have to take our advice. Now, they would have a tough timegettingit throughsenate. Theonly thingsthey took to senate were the things SBC agreed to, except the Arts and Medical targe ts.... Places where. we differed they did not take to senate. It is true that the SBC wanted larger cuts than the president’s office (SBC member).

UBC’s retrenchment strategy would appear, then, to represent a delicate balance by central administrators in accommodating competing interest groups - government, board, senate, and deans - with which they were faced. Given the complexity of their situation, i t is perhaps difficult to understand how they managed to make any sort of cutbacks at all. In this respect, the sense of crisis that prevailed in British Columbia universities at that time undoubtedly increased their ability to act. It also helps to explain why the deans agreed to at least some form of cutback, since they, too, had become “aware of the corpo- rate problem” (dean). Finally, the fact that the president pro tern was leaving shortly to take up a post inanothercountry may have contributed to his willingess to take action, since he did not have to worry about long term popularity.

Conclusions

A political analysis of events of UBC and SFU would appear to be a useful way of understanding their responses to financial restrictions. It helps to explain, first, why these universities incorporated such visible changes into their retrenchment strategies and, second, accounts for the direc- tions these strategies took during implementation. It is not tosay that noevidenceofothermodels was to befound.The use of both PACUP and SBC suggests collegial elements, in the sense that central administrators saw the need to involve professors in the process of deciding where cutbacks or changes should be made. These committees also embodied rational/bureaucratic rpechanisms, in terms of the need to procure information about the different areas of the university and develop ways of evaluating and compar- ing them. There was no apparent evidence of the garbage can, which is, perhaps, not surprising: It has been pointed out that the existence of organizational slack is necessary

for the garbage can to dominate decision making processes, which is hardly the case in the event of fiscal restraint (Hardy et al., 1983; March & Olsen, 1976).

This political analysis focuses, first, on the political context - the identification of key interest groups and an assessement of the nature and extent of their power. The key groups reported here included the government, central administration, deans, senate, board and faculty association although, in other institutions or decisions, groups such as nonacademic staff, students and other outside groups might also be included. An assessment of the political context is then complemented with an analysis of the strategies employed by these groups, as they translate power into action in the form of political behaviour.

Recapping the findings: The political context was more constraining at UBC than at SFU. While the government’s restraint policy was putting pressure on both institutions, it appears to have been more keenly felt at UBC because of the position of the board. This situation helps to explain why UBC felt compelled to use program closure and the resultingdismissals to signal to thegovernment that it was taking restraint seriously, while SFU chose other means. Another reason relates to the relationships between central administrators and the faculty association: faculty at SFU volunteered a pay cut that presumably afforded the central administration some additional financial flexibility, while the parties at UBC had been unable to come to an agreement about redundancy procedures.

Internally, the central administration at UBC also had to contend with powerful deans and a more active senate, as well as the board and faculty association already men- tioned. Its counterpart at SFU had more power in this respect, although it recognized that the deans had, at the very least, the potential to block central initiatives through senate. The ability of both presidents to take action was somewhat enhanced by the sense of crisis the honeymoon period of the new president (in the case of SFU), and the imminent departure of the president pro tem at UBC. The differences in context helped to account for the form that implementation took. The use of PACUP at SFU helped to engage professorial representatives in the process, while its limited terms of reference afforded the president sufficient flexibility in the event that recommendations alienated the deans. SBC provided a similar consultative function at UBC, and when it came up with recommendations where the deans’ tacit approval could not be guaranteed, unspecified cuts were substituted.

The comparison of the two institutions shows how political contexts and actions influenced retrenchment strategies. Both institutions were attempting to accommodate the financial and political pressures forced upon them by the government. In order to do so, central administrators had to juggle the different interest groups that had the power (or potential power) to have an impact on the

188 RCSA / CJAS, 9 (3), 180-191


retrenchment decision process. It also illustrates the use of powerto prevent conflict and opposition. SFU’s strategy to avoid dismissals obviously marked a desire to avoid conflict.Tocarry out thatstrategy, however, thecentral administration relied on the use of political skills in choosing a committee, defining its terms of reference, and securing senate and decanal approval. UBC’s strategy appears, on the face of it, to be much more confrontational since it involved program closures and dismissals. Nevertheless, many of the steps taken were designed to avoid overt opposition. SBC helped to legitimize the process; and the deans that threatened outright opposition were accommo- dated.

Gamson (1%8) has differentiated between the strategy of conflict and the management of conflict. The former revolves around competing interest groups, each using power to achieve its own goals. It represents the picture traditionally associated with political behaviour. The management of conflict, on the other hand, refers to the use of power to achieve organizational goals. This use of power is rarely viewed in political terms, even though political skills may be crucial to its success (Hardy, 1986). The management of conflict - reconciling potential or actual differences of interest in an attempt to achieve some broadergoal -sounds much like managing collegiality. If universities are to operate on the basis of collegiality, it is time to recognize that decentralization and loose coupling is likely to produce diverging views, goals, and interests (Hardy et al., 1983; Weick, 1976). In the context of cutbacks and fiscal restraint, this divergence is likely to intensify. The question is how to manage it, without incurring outright conflict. Lessons from the political literature-and the use of symbolic, unobtrusive power which legitimizes outcomes - may well be useful, Perhaps it is time to focus more attention on how the use of power and how political skills can help administrators in managing conflict and nurturing collegiality.

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Notes

1. The larger study involves the comparison of six Canadian universities in three different provinces in terms of their response to budget cuts. In each university, interviews were carried out with representatives of the central administration, deans, members of key committees, the board, senate and faculty association, as well as representatives from the education ministry and intermediary body. In British Co- lumbia over fifty individualswere interviewed during 1986. These interviews were semi-structured, lasted between one and two hours, and were recorded. The quotations ci ted here are takenfrom therecorded interviews. They areanonymous in order to protect the individuals concerned. It is important tonote that they are not theidiosynaaticviewsofoneortwo individuals. They represent a common pattern of thought in a particular interest group. In addition to the interviews, relevant documentation, such as budgets, annual reports, and internal reports, wascollected and analyzed. The written report on each institution was sent back for correction of factual errors.

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Retrenchment Strategies in Two Canadian Universities: A Political Analysis

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