Rethinking reputation: Group membership and trustworthiness

Margaret Foddy

Carleton UniversityOttawa, Canada

Third CEFOM/21 International Symposium, Sapporo, Japan

Outline of talk (for the tired ones)

• Review theoretical background for ingroup trust• Summarize work on selective interaction that results from ingroup trust• Convince you that category based trust is robust but not necessarily strong• Consider reputation in the context of ingroup identity, and its effect on

group-based trust• Report a study on reputation (when it means, what does x know about

what y did to a person in the ingroup/outgroup)• Speculate on possible implications across societies, and theoretical models

(especially the role of category based trust)• Consider links to other processes such as exclusion from groups,

willingness to stay in, or leave groups,

BACKGROUND

The allocator studies and trust in strangers: • Focus on unilateral trust, not cooperation • Explored the utility of social identity and self-

categorization theory for understanding group-based trust in strangers

• Collaboration with Michael Platow, (now Australian National University) & Toshio Yamagishi and Toko Kiyonari, Hokkaido University

Trust: expectation that an other person will perform an action which is beneficial, or not detrimental to us

When we trust, we commit ourselves to an action

• agree to put one’s outcomes in another’s hands

• take a cooperative action• Make oneself vulnerableBefore we know what the other will doWhen there is no assurance mechanism

Trust in strangers is important in establishing new relationships

Whom shall we trust?• People whose interests are aligned:

assurance (encapsulated trust; Hardin)• People who share category and/or group

membership with us: group-based trust• People who have proven trustworthy to People who have proven trustworthy to

us, or to others (reputation)us, or to others (reputation)

(In)group heuristicnaïve theory of groups

• People believe others in their own groups will treat them well• People do in fact show higher ingroup fairness, are “subject to”

principles of ingroup fairness and trustworthiness (Yamagishi)• Ingroup trust may be a “second order” belief, or one based on taking

the perspective of other(s), producing a consensus that groups can be relied on if you are included within its boundaries (Tyler)

• The effects are relatively weak—people trust ingroup more, but still place trust in strangers outside own group

(because) Group boundaries are relatively fluid (Brewer)

– Salience principles– People extend and contract the boundaries of the group; this may limit the

utility of group-based trust for both theorist and actors

• Interesting question: is this a psychological, sociological or economic question? (for discussion later)

Group identity and trust: what is the basis?Shared group membership affects:

• Evaluations of ingroup members vs outgroup (ingroup more positive? And if so, why?) Turner

• Differential distribution of positive outcomes to ingroup members Tajfel

• Expectations of fairness and cooperation from others in the group (Yamagishi)

Provide a categorical basis for trust in strangers

Experimental paradigm• Allocator game: a 2-dictator game• Allocator has $X to split between self and recipient: focus focus

is on recipientis on recipient• 2 Allocators: one each from

• the person’s ingroup (e.g.La Trobe Uni) • an outgroup (e.g. Melbourne Uni)

– RECIPIENT chooses one allocator to receive money from, and gives reasons for choice, predicts how much each allocator would have given him or her

– We assess relative, not absolute, trust, but results are similar when third choice option of sure thing is provided; similar when there is direct reciprocity as in the Berg game)

Results from choose the allocator studies• Strong preference for ingroup allocator, but not

extreme differences in expectations of positive treatment

• Preference holds for large and small ingroup categories (in the West and East?); for intact, minimal and categorical groups

• Preference disappears if allocator does not know of shared identity: blocks group based trust

• Preference for ingroup allocator even if outgroup stereotype is more positive (even economics students prefer ingroup (economics) allocator)

• Group stereotype has weak effect on expectations and preferences

• **Ingroup heuristic includes expectations of fair treatment from fellow group membersreduces uncertainty, forms basis for trust

Does shared identity matter only if there is no other information?

What about a person’s reputation? Is it more important than shared

group membership ?

How has reputation been conceptualized?“the estimation in which one is held; character in public opinion; the

character to attribute to a person, thing or action; repute”(plus a large literature in economics, political science, sociology etc.

indicating that there are multiple dimensions to reputation)Personal reputation: first or second hand knowledge of the pattern of a

person’s past behavior (e.g. fair; cooperative; competent)Organizational reputation: as above• Summarized in trait terms, generalized; or a record of behavior and

outcomes (e.g. a university)o reputation is “owned” by a person, and can be manipulated, communicated,

tested in law, etc.• Reputation reduces uncertainty; can be a positive or negative resource• Little research attention to the group contexts in which a person

establishes a reputation– Who is the relevant public?– What mechanisms are in place to govern true and false reputation (Toshio)

Groups, identity and reputation

• Category vs target based reputation: Reputation developed by/attached to the group may be transferred to individuals with no information about the individual’s behavior (e.g. nurses; used car salesmen): naïve theory says people can be expected to act in accordance with the group stereotype, but individuating information may reverse the stereotype-based inference

• ****** Ta da! (Main point)• Effects of reputation on trust depend on the relationship between the

truster and the target of trust• Group membership may condition interpretation of information about

another’s behavior– Expect different behavior from ingroup and outgroup members towards self– A third person’s behavior towards an outgroup member may not be

informative of their likely behavior towards an ingroup– Category based ingroup trust may:

• Replace reputation• Combine with reputation• Be replaced by reputation

How does reputation workin the group context?

• Reputation information may individuate the allocator and produce attributions to traits, or inferences about the person’s values (e.g. fair; shady; exploitative)

• Individuating information may be regarded as more reliable/informative than shared group membership as basis for trust

• Information about allocator’s behavior may block group categorization effects; block effects of group heuristic and in-group favoring norm

• Forecasting cross-cultural questions:– Is reputation information more important in the East or the West?– Are contextual effects of the group relationship between truster and

trustee more important in East or West/

Or, is reputation’s effect on trust moderated by the group identities of the people

involved?• Information about outgroup members’ treatment

of their own groups may not be informative: fairness within the outgroup does not predict fairness to those not in it

• Information about ingroup members’ treatment of outgroup may not be predictive of how they will treat ingroup members, or may confirm that positive ingroup bias will operate for ingroup (confirm the naïve theory about ingroup behavior)

Experimental paradigm: reputation• Choose between ingroup (A) and outgroup (B) • Recipient told allocators scheduled to make two

separate allocations—one to ingroup (A), one to outgroup (B) recipient

Experimental conditions:• 1.There is “reputation” information about neither

allocator (baseline)• OR about what ONE allocator has given another

recipient who was:• 2. From allocator’s ingroup • 3. From allocator’s outgroup • No reputation information about the other allocator,

who “has not done second allocation”

Information about ONE allocator’s division of $16 in a previous trial

Allocator fair to past Recipient (50-50 split)

Allocator unfair to past recipient (75-25 split)

Ingroup Allocator

Outgroup Allocator

Ingroup allocator

Outgroup allocator

Ingroup recipient

AA *BA Ingroup recipient

*AA BA

Outgroup recipient

AB BBIngroup oriented or universally fair?

Outgroup recipient

*ABSelfish? Group-oriented?

BB

A=ingroup; B=outgroupControl group: no reputation information*interesting conditions

Predictions• If individual reputation is basis of choice, the fair allocator

(regardless of target) will be preferred over the allocator with no reputation information, regardless of group, and the “no-reputation” allocator preferred to the one who has been unfair in the past

• If group membership affects the meaning of past fair behavior, then:– Past fairness within the outgroup (BB) will not

increase choice of outgroup by A– Fairness by outgroup to ingroup in past (BA) will

reduce ingroup preference (not a typical intergroup situation)

– Unfairness within the ingroup (AA) will reduce ingroup preference (allocator violates ingroup norms)

Frequency of choice of allocator when allocator has been FAIR (all choosers from group A)

Ingroup(A) Outgroup(B)Control18 3Reputation info

AA 18 2AB 17 4BB 17 4*BA 6 14

Expected % of funds: Allocator was FAIRIngroup(A) Outgroup(B)

Reputation info

AA .48 .34AB .46 .38BB .48 .34BA .37 .42

Note: recipients made predictions for both allocators, regardless of choice made

Frequency of choice of allocator when allocator has been UNFAIR (all choosers from group A)

• Ingroup(A) Outgroup(B)Reputation info

*A-A 10 9*A-B 10 10B-B 17 3B-A 17 3Control18 3

Expected % of funds to new recipient: Allocator was UNFAIR

Ingroup(A) Outgroup(B)

!AA .32 .28AB .28 .32#BB .39 .18BA .32 .29

Overall lower expectations than in FAIR conditionSmaller difference in expectations from A and BReputation information does not undermine trust in ingroup allocator as in

ingroup allocator

(!here is an ingroup member who does not treat an ingroup member well(#here is an outgroup person who does not treat an ingroup member well)

When ingroup allocator has been unfair, why do at least half still choose ingroup?

• Recipients gave reasons for choice of allocator;• Reasons coded: Those choosing the “unfair” ingroup allocator

referred to shared reciprocal obligation, common interests and similarity as a basis for expecting fairer treatment from ingroup compared with outgroup

Those choosing outgroup did not refer to shared group membership; main reasons were the unfair past behavior of the ingroup allocator (reputation), and decision to take a gamble with the outgroup

Summary of resultsPeople do NOT prefer an outgroup allocator who has been generous

to a fellow outgroup member (allocator’s ingroup), over an ingroup allocator about whom they have no information

People DO prefer an outgroup allocator who has been generous to a member of the person’s own ingroup (B was fair to A)—attribution to individual traits? People are evenly divided about reputation information when:

• Ingroup member is unfair to the ingroup• Ingroup member is unfair to the outgroup

Conclusions: 1• Reputation is not set up in a vacuum—behavior of a target

towards others is interpreted in part in terms of the relationships of self and the target, and the target with others (this information may not always be known)

• Expectation of ingroup fairness is the default option; not so clear that outgroup unfairness is the default (Brewer, 1981; Mummenday, 2000)

• Reputation may help identify the prevailing group norms, and a given actor’s adherence to them; clearer basis for trust or distrust

• When reputation information is ambiguous, person may apply a group, individual, or universalistic template to interpret the information; may reflect level of self-categorization, situational cues

• We know little about the relationship between the source of reputation information (ingroup; outgroup) and its influence on future trust of ingroup and outgroup members

Group-based reputation and trust: the same across cultures?

• Will simple shared category activate trust in cultures where “group” implies a network of obligation and sanction (assurance)?

• Is reputation information more important in “collectivist” or “individualistic” cultures? Will it destroy the ingroup preference completely?

• Are the norms of ingroup favouritism the same across cultures? • Are the effective groups the same across cultures? Categories—

minimal groups—connected groups—dyads? Reputation can operate in all of these, but may have different effects

• How is reputation information conveyed? Do we trust some informants more than others (second-order trust may arise from shared group membership with informants). Does it matter who told us? (e.g. an outgroup member told me that Toshio is not reliable; will I believe this? If an ingroup member tells me he is unreliable (joke), I may be more willing to believe it

Is individual reputation more important in collectivist societies?

• The “yes” side• If trust is based more on assurance and specific relationships in collectivist societies (i.e.

not generalized trust), reputation should be more important—target-based trust should dominate

• Category-based trust is weaker in collectivist societies, so reputation information will dominate (evidence is mixed)

• formal assurance systems in Western cultures may make reputation irrelevant• Group loyalty makes universal principles of fairness irrelevant• The “no” side• Individual reputation in Western societies is very important, and is used to make

attributions to individual as a basis for predicting future behavior and trustworthiness; the same applies to organizations

• Particularistic familism is as common in the West as in the East• Reputation is an important part of English common law (you can sue someone for

damaging your reputation)• E-business puts a lot of emphasis on reputation

• However, the issue of whether reputation is interpreted in group terms has not been systematically explored across cultures

Why does reputation matter?

• Conditions the interpretation of behavior to ingroups and outgroups• Forms the basis for selective interaction• May form the basis for inclusion or exclusion of people from groups • Affects people’s estimates of whether a common resource is viable,

and therefore willingness to stay in a group (e.g. if all members have a negative reputation, group will be less viable than if all positive)

• Why do ingroup effects on reputation matter?– Double standards in judging people (more lenient to ingroup)– Informative about naïve theory of groups– Important to theories of group identification– Window on cross-cultural differences in how trust is formed, and how

trustworthy behavior is generated

Conclusions 2

• Cultural differences in trust, the importance of reputation, and the willingness to exclude others from the group are not yet well-established

– Minimal group effects are obtained in Japan and China– Trust in category members occurs in both types of culture (sometimes)– There is not a lot of information about how group processes may differ between the

East and the West– Globalization means that the social structural sources of differences may be

disappearing– We have almost no idea how the “Middle East” fits into the picture!! Is behavior in

these cultures a reflection of shared beliefs and second order beliefs, or coercion?

• We need theoretical frameworks to understand any differences– Naïve theory of groups– Content of cultural beliefs– Social structural influences incentive structures