Rethinking Prevent: A Case for an Alternative...
Transcript of Rethinking Prevent: A Case for an Alternative...
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Foreword
Throughout the career of the late civil rights leader Ratna Lachman, she never once deviated from the fact that Prevent needed to be independently reviewed and that in its current form it was encroaching and breaching the very civil liberties and human rights of communities that it claimed to protect. So when Ratna saw the opportunity for JUST to lead that review, she grabbed it with both hands. The JUST view is not to prove Ratna’s policy position on Prevent; rather it is to provide an independent perspective that can provide a direction and the beginning of a national conversation that is rooted in protecting the liberty and human rights of all citizens. That both Prevent detractors and supporters recognise that change and review of Prevent is healthy, particularly if it brings in from the cold those communities that feel they are either excluded from the conversation, or perceived to be (as Baroness Sayeeda Warsi puts it), the Enemy Within. Whatever the perspective, all mainstream political parties have agreed at some time or another that Prevent must be reviewed. As Chair of JUST Yorkshire I am thrilled that we have been able to realise Ratna’s vision through the publication of this report. I am conscious that there are many divergent views on Prevent from all sides of the political spectrum, including from those civil society organisations that constantly claim its overwhelming success. It is sometimes claimed that charities like JUST are not interested in the success of Prevent – nothing could be further from the truth. The JUST position is that it has never claimed to be a counter-terrorism expert, it is first and foremost, and always will be a human rights charity that works to protect the civil liberties of all citizens. JUST should be seen as a credible reference point that enables and empowers dialogue to happen from grass roots up – particularly but not limited to those communities that are seldom heard. This report provides a set of evidence based recommendations that I believe will lead to a new beginning that is based on learning from the past, and moving forward together in the future. Furthermore, the credibility of this report and the findings are strengthened by the comments made by Max Hill QC on the 19th of August 2017, who stated in an interview with The Independent that the Government should consider abolishing all anti-terror laws as they are “unnecessary” in the fight against extremists. He argues that potential extremists can be stopped with existing “general” laws that are not always being used effectively to take threats off the streets. This unforeseen intervention by Max Hill QC provides the clearest indication that a change in philosophy is needed. This report has the potential to be a catalyst for that much needed change. Put simply, irrespective of which side of the fence the supporters or detractors sit on Prevent, one thing is certain, that terrorism on the streets of Britain is more complex than it has ever been, and as we approach the third successive year where the terrorist threat is severe we must consider an alternative that is bottom up underpinned with a covenant of trust between state and citizen. I am delighted to endorse this report, and look forward to the much needed dialogue that follows.
Nadeem Murtuja, Chair, JUST Yorkshire
August 2017
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Acknowledgements
This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Open Society Foundations. Additionally, we would like to thank Leila Taleb and Khalida Ashrafi who worked tirelessly to recruit participants and conduct the interviews. We would like to thank Fiaz Ahmed for his technical assistance and unwavering support and we would also like to thank Dr. Joanna Gilmore for taking the time to proofread the report and offer suggestions. Finally, our greatest thanks are reserved for the research participants, whose fascinating insights shaped the direction of our report.
Any errors in this report are solely the responsibility of the respective co-authors.
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Contents Page
Foreword 3
Executive Summary 6
1. Introduction 9
2. Islamophobia, Racism and the ‘Good Muslim’ 12
3. Surveillance and Censorship: The Higher Education Example 20
4. Victimisation, Power and Dissent 23
5. Austerity and the Impact of Cuts to Youth Services 27
6. Accountability and Effectiveness 30
7. Power Relations and the Coercion of Prevent 35
8. Solidarity, Resilience and Resistance 37
9. Concluding Remarks 41
10. Recommendations 43
Appendix 1: Brief Respondent Biographies 44
Executive Summary
I. In approaching this study, JUST
Yorkshire were able to draw upon over a decade of experience of holding the state to account in the field of counter terrorism. Specifically, JUST has sought to protect civil liberties and pursue racial justice through an evidence based approach and genuine community engagement with grassroots voices. This report highlights the multiple harms caused by Prevent, which are compounded by the introduction of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The respondents for this study highlight how Muslim communities in particular experience a disproportionate and discriminatory counter terrorism focus. This report details how Prevent is having a chilling effect on several aspects of society, undermining fundamental rights for all but particularly those of Muslim minorities.
II. The Prevent strategy (and the harms it causes in communities) is sustained by a logic of Islamophobia, racism and a reliance upon a ‘Good Muslim/Bad Muslim’ dichotomy. This expresses itself in an undue focus on British Muslim communities as collectively suspect, whereas the threat of far-right extremism is downplayed. Moreover, attempts to instill ‘British values’ within institutions serve an ‘othering’ function which fracture social bonds between racialised minorities and their peers. ‘Good Muslims’ are regarded as those who are servile to government demands in the arena of counter terrorism, whereas ‘Bad Muslims’ are those who actively challenge Prevent, despite doing so through democratic means.
III. Prevent has significantly contributed to a climate of fear, suspicion and censorship, primarily, but not
exclusively, among British Muslims. Prevent officers have actively engaged in censorship by attempting to force the cancellation of legitimate events and intimidated student bodies by requesting information about Muslim event attendees. Muslim and non-Muslim academics have noted the impact of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) in particular in encouraging a form of self- censorship. As a result, a ‘policing culture’ is now noticeable, particularly within higher education institutions.
IV. Despite protestations from the government and supporters of Prevent, there are numerous examples of injustice, discrimination and human rights abuses in the implementation of the Prevent strategy. This victimisation has often targeted Muslim men, whilst instrumentalising Muslim women in the process. British Muslim activists have found themselves targeted by the state, due to their dissenting views and political campaigning. Some of the reported cases included a Black student activist being reported to Prevent, seemingly for engaging in anti-racist activism.
V. The impact of austerity and the withdrawal of youth services has had a significant impact upon young people. Access to services and youth provision is diminished, whereas interventions under the guise of counter terrorism have increased in frequency. There is a widespread belief that the political choice of austerity has led to a situation in which vulnerable young people have little recourse to social welfare or youth provisions and are now inappropriately being dealt with through a counter terrorism framework.
VI. There is a severe lack of transparency and accountability in
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the implementation of the Prevent strategy. Whilst the apparent successes of Prevent are frequently reported by the government, these examples are not supported by evidence. This lack of accountability coalesces with the lack of an evidence base underpinning Prevent training delivered across the public sector, which is informed by the highly criticised ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalisation and the identification of ‘signs’ and ‘stages’ of the radicalisation process. There is little to no recourse for individuals wrongly identified as being at risk of extremism and terrorism, or any acknowledgement from the state that this constitutes harm. The ineffectiveness of Prevent is underscored by its reliance on institutionalized Islamophobia.
VII. Unequal power relations are identified, particularly in terms of British Muslims being regarded as the primary group associated with radicalisation, extremism, violent extremism and terrorism. There is recent evidence that practitioners within some institutions are interpreting their responsibilities under Prevent as a requirement to focus their attention upon Muslims. Moreover, the CTSA 2015 and the obligations it places upon public sector workers has created a climate of coercion in which non-compliance is feared. In such a climate, the scope for unnecessary referrals to Prevent and Channel are increased, and so too is the likelihood of harm.
VIII. Despite the discriminatory impact of Prevent and the long-term effects of Islamophobia, a generation of young Muslim activists has emerged to democratically challenge the government’s approach to counter terrorism. This has manifested itself
in the form of protests, community organising and online/offline debate. Despite dissenting British Muslims being viewed as a threat and placed under additional scrutiny, many have been politicised by their negative experiences of Prevent in order to effect progressive change. This activism has been shaped by a discourse grounded in human rights and anti-racism.
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Recommendations
1. For the Prevent aspect of the government’s CONTEST counter terrorism strategy to be immediately withdrawn in order to prevent further human rights abuses
2. For a full and independent inquiry into the entire government counter-terrorism strategy, to be conducted with full transparency by a non-governmental organisation, where the terms of reference are framed following consultation with charities, human rights organisations and civil liberties groups
3. For the government to release details of all projects funded through counter terrorism budgets in order to allow full and transparent public scrutiny. Specifically, this information should include all costs associated with funded projects, demographic information of those subject to the projects, details on how success was determined and any subsequent evaluations undertaken
4. For the government to reverse budget cuts to youth services and provision promoted under the austerity programme, particularly those in deprived neighbourhoods
5. For the government to cease the divisive and discriminatory practice of embedding counter terrorism aims and objectives within social policy programmes aimed at British Muslims, particularly in the area of ‘integration’ and through the discourse of ‘British values’
6. For the government to encourage and fund a national programme of multicultural initiatives and
programmes - outside of a counter terrorism framework
7. For government ministers and senior police officers with responsibility for counter terrorism to cease targeting the critics of Prevent
8. For independent academic research to examine the specific issue of self censorship among Muslim students and academics within universities, particularly following the introduction of the CTSA 2015
1. Introduction
“My view is Prevent can never
create community cohesion, never.
Because, you are starting from the
point of view that the community is
guilty by definition”1.
1.1 Prevent is a government counter-
terrorism initiative first established in
2006 with the remit of ‘preventing
terrorism’. Prevent refers those
identified at risk to Channel, a multi-
agency ‘deradicalisation’ programme
tasked with identifying and working
with individuals who are believed to
be at risk of being drawn into
terrorism. Both Prevent and Channel
have been widely criticised by
human rights groups, Muslim
community groups, academics,
student bodies, trades unions and
anti-racism campaigners2. This
critique has highlighted the opaque
and misguided concept of
‘radicalisation’ underpinning the
Prevent strategy, the ways in which
Prevent focuses primarily on
Muslims and Islam as the
proponents of violent and nonviolent
extremism (in turn reinforcing
Islamophobia and promoting
prejudice), and the role of Prevent in
suppressing free speech, open
debate and dialogue.
1.2 The recently implemented Counter
Terrorism and Security Act 2015
(CTSA 2015) has placed a statutory
duty on schools, colleges,
universities and other public-sector
1 Humera Khan, respondent; see Appendix 1. 2 See e.g. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/prevent-will-have-a-chilling-effect-on-open-debate-free-speech-and-political-dissent-10381491.html
bodies to actively demonstrate they
are tackling ‘radicalisation’. The Act,
which is part of a wider counter
terrorism state strategy attempting to
address ‘non-violent extremism’, has
been criticised as a threat to free
speech and an ultimately counter-
productive development. Many of
the criticisms have centred on the
assertion that Muslim individuals,
groups and communities will
continue to be disproportionately
targeted by Prevent and that
moreover, it is problematic and
inappropriate for public sector
employees to effectively be given
responsibility for counter terrorism
policing duties.
1.3 In 2017, traces of the UK
government’s counter terrorism
approach are visible in all aspects of
civil society. Employees working for
public sector institutions are now
routinely provided with a counter
terrorism training input (often of
dubious quality), schools are obliged
to promote ‘British values’ to
supposedly ward off the threat of
‘extremism’ and public discourse,
from news programmes to
newspaper headlines, is saturated
with concern and fear regarding the
threat of terrorism. In the period
building up to the recent general
election, the UK experienced a
number of deadly terrorist attacks in
Manchester and London. These
tragic events provoked a national
debate regarding Prevent, the most
familiar arm of the government’s
counter terrorism strategy.
1.4 The debate emerged following news
that several of the individuals
responsible had previously been
reported by their communities to the
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police and authorities, only to be left
unchecked to commit their
atrocities3. Jeremy Corbyn, leader of
the Labour Party, argued publicly
that a debate was long overdue on
the role of the UK’s foreign policy in
encouraging individuals to commit
acts of violence4. Such a viewpoint,
expressed by a leading mainstream
politician, begins to deconstruct
simplistic connections to Islamism
and enables a wider discussion on
the causes of extremism and
terrorism.
1.5 The 2017 General Election
manifestos of all of the major parties
included radical policy positions on
counter terrorism; with the Labour
Party promising a review of Prevent,
and the Liberal Democrats
proposing to scrap Prevent
altogether5. 2017 marked a seismic
shift in public discourse concerning
Prevent and there is now a widely
held, and mainstream, opposition to
this key element of the government’s
counter terrorism strategy.
1.6 This report serves as one of the few
examinations of Prevent and counter
terrorism following the
implementation of the CTSA 2015
3 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/security-services-missed-five-opportunities-stop-manchester/ 4 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/26/jeremy-corbyn-manchester-british-foreign-policy 5 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/13/lib-dems-aim-to-scrap-counter-productive-prevent-strategy
and is an attempt to critically engage
with the key issues from a
grassroots perspective. This report
has engaged with young Muslim
people and stakeholders from
across the country, including a
significant number from the
Yorkshire area. This is due to the
long-standing presence and
expertise of JUST Yorkshire in local
communities over a number of
years. Furthermore, from a research
perspective Yorkshire was
considered to be particularly worthy
of inquiry due to Leeds and Bradford
being designated as national
‘priority’ areas for intervention from
Prevent6.
1.7 Aims and Objectives
In undertaking this report, JUST set out to
address the following aims and objectives:
● To demonstrate how the Prevent
agenda has impacted upon
stakeholders locally
● To develop an evidence base to
demonstrate the needs of
community stakeholders and young
people and how this relates to the
government counter terrorism
agenda.
● To understand the role of race,
ethnicity and faith in the context of
the Prevent agenda
6 http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/leeds-faces-great-challenge-in-bid-to-turn-young-away-from-terror-1-7273419
Rethinking Prevent: Introduction
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● To provide a voice for young people
in particular who have been targeted
or impacted by the Prevent agenda
● To give a voice to a range of
viewpoints relating to the Prevent
agenda, including dissenting views
which are often marginalised in
public debate
● To examine the views of young
people and stakeholders in the
aftermath of the implementation of
the Counter Terrorism and Security
Act 2015
1.8 Methodology
1.8.1 This report is primarily based on a
thorough review of the existing
academic and policy evidence on
Prevent and 36 in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with young
people and stakeholders7, which
lasted between 20 minutes to 2
hours.
1.8.2 Key themes to emerge from the
interviews form the substantive
sections of this report. Within the
report a number of interviewee
respondents chose to be named.
Others, however, chose to remain
anonymous, citing the fear of
publicly speaking out against
7 In total, 18 men and 18 women were interviewed. 16 of the 36 respondents were young Muslims aged between 18-25. 20 were stakeholders, and included professionals with experience of working with Prevent, academics, teachers, faith leaders, race equality practitioners and charity representatives.
Prevent, and possible reprisals for
doing so. It is of note that despite
approaching a number of current
Prevent officers and government
staff working within counter
terrorism, the vast majority did not
respond to our requests for
interview. The report therefore
reflects our assessment of the
academic and policy literature and
the views of the respondents that
engaged with us.
2. Islamophobia, Racism and
the ‘Good Muslim’
2.1 Prevent has been widely criticised,
almost since its inception, for
disproportionately focusing on, and
problematising, the British Muslim
population. As far back as 2009, the
JUST evidence submission to the
Communities and Local Government
Committee on Preventing Violent
Extremism called for the withdrawal
of the Prevent programme on the
grounds that, “It has led to the
disproportionate criminalisation of
BME and, particularly, Muslim
communities”.
2.2 In response to criticisms of undue
focus on the Muslim community, the
2011 Prevent Guidelines made local
authority funding ‘intelligence led’
and ‘proportionate to threat levels’.
Despite this, the 25 ‘priority’8 areas
were still selected based solely on
Muslim demographics; further
entrenching an unsubstantiated link
between Muslims generally and
terrorism specifically. As Mythen et
al observe, ‘evidence from the
Citizenship survey is used
selectively as a means of
underscoring the ‘riskiness’ of
Muslims’9. Attempting to conflate an
increased risk of extremism within
towns and cities with significant
Muslim populations is fundamentally
exclusionary and discriminatory.
8 Prevent ‘priority’ areas receive additional
counter terrorism funds and resources as they are considered to have the most significant problems with extremism 9 Mythen, G. Walklate, S., Peatfield, E. J. (2017) Assembling and Deconstructing Radicalization in Prevent: A case of policy-based evidence making. Critical Social Policy Vol 37 (2) 180-201: 189
2.3 6 years after the guidelines were
issued, our report has found that
British Muslims continue to
experience a disproportionate focus
of Prevent and counter-terrorism at
every level of social interaction.
“We know it’s based on racialised
and Islamophobic logics, we know
the figures, where the people who
have been questioned under
Prevent are disproportionately
Muslims and people of colour so
there’s no denying that this is a
racist and Islamophobic policy
despite all the claims that it’s for
everyone and so on. So, I think it
really goes hand in hand with the
obviously, like the political climate,
it’s there as a tool to really try and
deny Muslim agency and Muslim
expression, that’s how I see it”10.
2.4 At the level of implementation, this
focus is a direct consequence of the
22 ‘indicators of radicalisation’ that
frontline workers are trained to look
out for. These indicators are
described by respondents as ‘crude’,
conflating Islamic practice with
radicalisation. The indicators,
formulated using limited data
compiled from research with
Muslims incarcerated for violent
crime, insert into the pre-crime
space a direct conflation of being
Muslim and the commission of
violent crime. Such a conflation is
perceived by many respondents as
being directly contradictory to the
reality on the ground.
“The criteria are pretty crude
because they seem to conflate
religious piety with extremism and
10 Anonymous, University Lecturer 2
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extremism with terrorism and the
problem is that there has never been
a proper definition of extremism”11.
2.5 Connecting the most banal Islamic
practices, such as the adoption of
the hijab, to signs of radicalisation is
resulting in the increased suspicion
of the entire Muslim community:
“Young Asian man plays with
fireworks and gets arrested for
multiple weeks despite there being
no case. Racism is plain. Making a
terrorist out of someone who wasn’t
even a criminal”12.
2.6 Islam and extremism have become
firmly wedded in public discourse.
This has resulted in a number of
discriminatory and unjust acts such
as the demands that public venues
refuse to provide a platform for
Muslim civil society organisations
and the suspicion of toddlers, under
the guise of ‘safeguarding’. It is
telling that our respondents reported
a number of prejudicial and
discriminatory acts within the current
climate of anti-Muslim racism in
which Prevent operates. Extremism
is now seen as a catch all term, that
can be used at will to accuse, surveil
and even arrest Muslims - simply on
a whim.
“You don’t have to do anything, you
don’t have to say anything really to
be labelled an extremist. Anything,
from like your silence, to your family
members, people who you don’t
11 Frances Webber 12 Female 9
have any contact with, those are
used as evidence of your
extremism”13.
2.7 The failure of government to
respond to, modify or even engage
with research that has shown the
inherent flaws in these indicators
has weakened the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the entire Prevent
apparatus - a fact not lost on our
respondent. For many, it negates
any genuine intention on the part of
government to tackle terrorism:
“ˆ[E]ven on its own terms it doesn’t
seem to be working in terms of
spotting people who might, people
who are going to go on and commit
a terrorist offence - which isn’t
surprising since the profile of those
people who have committed terrorist
offences is completely different from
the profile that is used in Prevent”14.
2.8 The inclusion of far right extremism
into the 2011 guidelines was weak;
and belies claims from Prevent
supporters that Prevent ‘applies to
everyone’. The feigned inclusion of
the far right is all the more blatant in
the guideline’s description of the
process of radicalization which
focuses almost entirely on Muslims,
going so far as to identifying
Mosques as ‘radicalisation
locations’15.
2.9 Our respondents repeatedly
highlighted the unequal treatment of
13 Female 10 14 Frances Webber 15 HM Government (2011) PREVENT Strategy
London: TSO: 18
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Muslims and non-Muslims in the
implementation of Prevent:
“He mentioned ecowarriors and he
got pulled out for that, and police
questioned him and asked him, “Are
you linked to ISIS?” A twelve year
old. That’s quite extreme doing that,
just for mentioning ecowarrior. He
was Muslim. If he wasn’t, that
wouldn’t have happened. Just for
mentioning those two words”16.
2.10 Most respondents felt that claims
made by proponents of Prevent that
the strategy was not focused on
Muslims because far fight extremists
are also ‘subject to referrals’17, was
misleading. For many respondents,
even a cursory glance at Prevent
referal figures is a stark
demonstration of this
misinformation:
“He goes look, 25% of referrals are
far right; that’s a very reasonable
thing. It shows that there isn’t just
this over-emphasis on Muslims.
Except what David Anderson18 is
being disingenuous with, is what
those numbers mean because, 25%
of referrals, let’s take a sample of
1000 individuals, right? We did a
thousand referrals. So, 25% are
those are 250. There’s 250
referrals. The white population of
16 Male 5 17 Commander Dean Haydon, Scotland Yard 18 Reference to statistics cited by David
Anderson QC, a reviewer of the Government’s
counter-extremism system.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/15/o
ne-four-extremists-reported-governments-
deradicalisation-programme/
the UK is 50 million. Okay, so, that’s
250 referrals out of the potential
population of 50 million individuals.
If say 150 referrals came out of a
population of 3 million, okay...When
you do 250 out of 50 million and 750
out of three million, and then do a
straight ratio between the two, you
find that it is 50 to one...That is
discrimination by any stretch of the
imagination, pure and utter
discrimination”19.
2.11 The statistical inequality also
resonates with the experiences of
many of the respondents in terms of
how terror attacks are treated.
Respondents observed that
atrocities committed by people other
than Muslims are treated differently,
both by the media as well as
security agencies.
“A lot of children have come to me
and when there has been atrocities
around the world, involving non-
Muslims, so they’ve maybe killed
people for whatever reason and they
say, “Oh sir, why is this not being
classed as terrorism?”20
2.12 Furthermore, the ‘British values’
narrative is increasingly used by
politicians and mainstream media to
underpin Prevent. What constitutes
‘British values’ has remained
woefully undefined given that they
are being used as a yardstick.
Officially, ‘British values’ are spoken
of by the government in the context
of respecting ‘democracy, the rule of
19 Asim Qureshi 20 Anonymous, Teacher
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law, individual liberty, and mutual
respect and tolerance for those of
different faiths and beliefs’21. The
concept of British values has been
extensively criticised by a number of
political commentators as lacking in
substance, being ill informed and
divisive in its implemtation22.
2.13 Taken in conjunction with baseless
indicators, this narrative of British
values was regarded by our
respondents as problematising
anything that is considered different,
especially where the individual
concerned also happens to be
Muslim. For many of our
respondents, what they are being
told by the Government is that it is
not possible to be regarded as
Muslim and British at the same time.
“The British value agenda is always
invoked when there is a national
crisis taking place. For
example..Theresa May says, “Look,
it’s all to do with values. We have
particular value sets. They have a
completely different value set.” By
‘them’, she doesn’t necessarily imply
those minority nutcases that do
these appalling, atrocious activities,
but it’s ‘those lot”23.
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published 22 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/04/theresa-may-british-values-muslims-terror-threat 23 Anonymous, University Lecturer 1
2.14 Prevent was regarded by many of
the respondents as treating the
Muslim population of Britain
differently to other groups in society.
By entrenching Prevent into every
facet of society, from schooling to
health to public spaces, the
government has arguably legitimised
the exercise of Islamophobia in the
name of British values and
securitisation. Respondents
described the ‘othering’ of British
Muslims and the values they hold.
“But British values are human values
and human values are Islamic
values. But saying British values is
otherising it and saying if you don’t
subscribe to British values, any
other values that are not ‘British
values’ are not in line with our
society”24.
2.15 There was a recognition from our
respondents that the approach and
implementation of Prevent has
directly resulted in making the
Muslim community as a whole
potentially suspect, therefore leading
to the embedding of institutionalised
Islamophobia.
“it has been a longer-term trend,
where there is a very, sort of, racist
tendency right throughout the
terrorism tragedy, which is, you
know, “Be vigilant of black, brown,
Muslim people. Be vigilant of people
of colour, generally speaking. And if
they start changing their
behaviour…”25
24 Male 5 25 Anonymous, University Lecturer 3
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2.16 The ‘them’ and ‘us’ binary promoted
through the use of British values is
not just detrimental to Muslims, but
to the social cohesion of wider
society. Some of our respondents
made the observation that far right
groups such as the English Defence
League and Britain First actually
feed off the constantly reinforced
perception that special measures
such as Prevent need to monitor
and intervene with Muslims, all of
whom are regarded as potential
terrorists.
2.17 There is the sense amongst some
respondents that there exists a
proactive and deliberate
demonisation of the Muslim
community by the government. The
imposition of ‘British values’ and the
‘us v. them’ narrative is central to
this as what makes a ‘good Muslim’
is defined by what is ‘palatable’. A
case referred to by the following
respondent concerns that of Sara
Khan, founded of ‘counter
extremism’ group Inspire who were
revealed to be funded directly by the
Home Office and managed by a
professional public relations
company called Breakthrough
Media, despite their claims of being
grassroots and independent26:
“The key people who started
Breakthrough Media were actually
from Bell Pottinger and Bell
Pottinger had been given $500
million by the US to develop counter
26 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/feted-counter-extremism-campaigner-linked-covert-propaganda-company-746667480
insurgency videos in Iraq...some
people like Sara Khan from Inspire,
for instance, has been managed by
them [Breakthrough Media]. You
know, managed by them quite
closely to give her the media
platform and probably the media
skills that she otherwise would never
have accessed or obtained. So,
there is definitely some kind of
giving access to certain voices as
well as de-legitimising others”27.
2.18 It was observed that some ‘good
Muslims’ deliberately demonise the
collective Muslim community and
are given legitimacy by the wider
public as providing an insight into
‘their own’, whilst not being given
any legitimacy by the Muslim
population generally. The
government-defined ‘good Muslim’
further alienates a population that
does not see itself in the caricatures
being held up as acceptable:
“I think what Prevent has managed
to do really, really well is bring to the
surface a bunch of people up and
down the country who have got, let’s
say, let’s call them ‘distasteful
agendas’ and it’s done that
exceptionally well. So organisations
that we can call out are ‘Quilliam’ ..
and there’s a few others out there,
but I think organisations like that,
who make it their daily job, their
bread and butter to demonise
Muslims and actually call out Muslim
organisations who, that are actually
trying to defend grassroots
27 Anonymous, Researcher and Activist
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individuals on the ground, like we
are”28.
2.19 As some of our respondents
observed, such ‘good Muslims’ or
the organisations they represent,
serve only to cause further social
divisions at best and speak to the far
right agenda at worst. They do not
resonate with the vast body of
British Muslims:
“Some foundations, that are disliked
by the larger sectors of the
community..take huge amounts of
[Prevent] money and they have zero
effect….because they are disliked
by [other] organisations, they are
disliked by the masjid [mosques],
they are disliked by everyone in the
community...You are basically
digging in the wrong place”29.
2.20 For many respondents, to speak out
about matters such as foreign policy,
civil rights, and equalities is to be
labelled a ‘Bad Muslim’ by the
government and security agencies.
This is highly problematic, and
speaks to the deliberate curtailment
of civil liberties and the legitimate
right of British citizens to hold their
government to account:
“The narrative around...the whole
good Muslim, bad Muslim logic and
those who are resisting it are going
to be categorised as suspect, as bad
Muslim, and I think what’s sustaining
is the whole discourse, this idea of
dealing with, or trying to manage a
28 Third Sector Worker 2 29 Shaykh Ahmed Saad al-Azhari
population that just won’t, and rightly
so, refuses, rather to assimilate to a
particular way of life which is based
on very western, British, white
supremacist values”30.
“So, what we’ve had over the last
12, 13 years if you like, is attempts
to actually marginalise certain
people from the public sphere. I
kind of coined the term professional
Islamophobia if you like. Where in
essence, what we’re seeing is
people being smeared, demonised
with labels of extremism, or Islamists
or everything else, where they’re not
accepted, or they’re the wrong
people to engage with. You know,
they’re barred from university, all
public sphere’s if you like, all the
civic sphere’s, all the social spheres;
to the point where they’re taken out
of the game. The only people, that
from a Muslim community
perspective, the only people that are
worthy of engaging are those that
kind of tow a particular line”31.
2.21 Subjection to consistent stereotypes,
structural Islamophobia and the
erosion of civil liberties has had a
disconcerting impact on some of the
younger respondents, who appear in
some cases to have internalised the
terrorism narrative. This is manifest
in terms of self-policing and an
apparent acceptance that they, as
British Muslims, should be policed
more than other British citizens. One
young respondent sought to set up a
student collective called the Muslim
30 Anonymous, University Lecturer 2 31 Azad Ali
Rethinking Prevent: Islamophobia, Racism and the ‘Good Muslim’
Page 18
Union at her college, a replica of the
Christian union that already existed.
Constant red tape being introduced
by the college administration
actually resulted in the Muslim union
being disbanded. Despite this, the
respondent ‘understood’ the
approach of the college:
“Things can't always go to plan and
they, kind of, expected us [Muslim
Union] to have a plan set in place
months in advance, which speaker
we have, which teachers are going
to be supervising, you know, it's not
doable, sometimes the speaker will
cancel or it will be a different
speaker because that one's too busy
and we used to get into trouble for it
because, you know, they didn't know
who the speaker was or we had to
provide them with an email with
details of where the speaker studied,
who they're associated with before
we could have them in which I do
understand but it just felt, kind of; I
didn't feel like Christian Union had to
go through all that if they wanted to
have guests in or a speaker in”32.
2.22 Despite the internalisation of
Islamophobia amongst some, there
remains a strong sense of British
identity among many respondents.
Almost all the 18 - 25 year old
Muslims interviewed spoke of a
strong Muslim identity alongside a
positive British identity, regardless
of what the wider political or media
narrative is:
32 Female, 5
“It’s [Islam] a religion that allows us
to lead our life in a balanced way.
Like you can be, you can live in the
West and following Islam, it has its
struggles but because of the
message that it gives us and if you
try you can live, you can live in the
West and sort of have a balanced
life”33.
2.23 Along with this identity comes a
legitimate demand to be treated
equally, with due regard to their civil
liberties:
“When the Prevent was connected
to the Home Office and DCLG34, to
Local Authorities, then it became
problematic. It then bypassed what
the Local Authorities should be
doing anyway to safeguard their
communities... Equal Opportunities
and everything. But, we had the cart
before the horse, we have this
counter-terrorism policy, in the
absence of safeguarding Muslims
against discrimination. So, what
happened is, that... your voice was
further taken away”35.
2.24 One respondent spoke to the
potential of Prevent being far more
effective if it were to use faith and
faith based ideology as central to
tackling terrorism, rather than the
cause for it. The case study of the
Radical Middle Way (RMW) is one
prime example of this. Founded in
the wake of the 7/7 attacks on the
33 Female 7 34 Department for Communities and Local
Government 35 Humera Khan
Rethinking Prevent: Islamophobia, Racism and the ‘Good Muslim’
Page 19
London underground, RMW
describes itself as aiming to promote
a mainstream, moderate
understanding of Islam to which
young people can relate. By working
alongside grassroots partners, RMW
says it “creates platforms for open
debate, critical thinking and deep
spiritual reflection. RMW aims to
give its audiences the tools to
combat exclusion and violence, and
encourage positive civic action”:
“[What we were able to do was] set
the agenda where Islam was not
viewed as the problem, but actually
a core part of any response to
violence, extremism, terrorism would
have to be as much theological as it
was intelligence led”36.
36 Abdul Rehman Malik
3. Surveillance and
Censorship: The Higher
Education Example
3.1 It is evident from our respondents
that Prevent is contributing to
structurally excluding certain groups
from actively engaging in civic
society and thus restricting their
ability to bring about progressive
change. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the field of Higher
Education. A wide spectrum of our
respondents articulated concerns in
relation to surveillance, censorship
and the resultant isolation felt by
many. Several of these concerns
stem from their direct negative
experiences of Prevent.
3.2 For instance, a student activist from
the National Union of Students
spoke of an encounter with a
University-based Prevent officer,
who demanded a list of student
names associated with the Islamic
Society37. There was no legitimate
justification for this request, and
taken together with other
interactions with this Prevent officer,
made this individual feel as though
they were ‘spied upon’.
3.3. Such concerns extend beyond those
of Muslim students, to those of
Muslim academics too. One such
respondent reported feelings of an
increased level of self-doubt and
anxiety, particularly concerning the
ways in which they are viewed by
the wider public. The climate of
suspicion, encouraged by Prevent,
has led to a degree of self-enforced
marginalisation for this individual:
37 Anonymous, NUS Officer
“There have also been times when I
have been concerned about the way
in which people have perceived me
and the kinds of things that I say. So
just at a personal level, I am not….
Trusting relationships are very
difficult for me, particularly amongst
the wider British community38.
3.4 Other academics, both Muslim and
non-Muslim, also reported the
negative impact of Prevent on
University life. There is an
acknowledgement from academics
that Prevent is leading them to be
extra vigilant about how they
articulate themselves, and that this
quite often translates into a form of
self censorship. One British Muslim
academic, specialising in the field of
race, ethnicity and education,
explains how the climate Prevent
has facilitated impacts on his
everyday work:
“Because the Muslims are no longer
a faith community; they are a
suspect community now. I think that
climate… sometimes, I have to
control what I write. A lot of the
times I might write a sentence and
end up deleting it. A lot of people go
through self-censorship”39.
3.5 Interestingly, some non-Muslim
academics we spoke to also
mentioned the fear associated with
censorship, particularly due to
writing material considered to be
critical of government policy. The
medium to long term impact of this
will be to considerably weaken
academic freedon, a concept
38 Anonymous, University Lecturer 3 39 Anonymous, University Lecturer 1
Rethinking Prevent: Surveillance ance Censorship: The Higher Education Example
Page 21
recognised as representing the
democratic foundations of British
society. When academics are
engaging in acts of self-censorship,
effectively withdrawing themselves
from certain debates, the intellectual
rigour with which government policy
can be challenged, is compromised:
“I do think, like I said, there is a bit of
a wariness about and I’m thinking of
academic peers about, “Oh my god,
can we write this,” and so actively
challenge it. So, there is now a
questioning and with established
people as well because it’s really
had that effect on making us having
to perhaps question our work when
we shouldn’t even have to... it’s
making any forms of critique, feel
illegitimate when they’re completely
not but that’s against the climate that
we’re working within”40.
3.6 Moreover, it is firmly acknowledged
that Muslim students experience
particular forms of exclusion
stemming from what one academic
describes as a ‘policing culture’
within University spaces:
“So, someone who might identify as
being somebody who challenges
actively Prevent, you’ve also got to
self-surveil yourself as well, because
there’s always those dangers, your
ideas interpreted. So, it’s a constant
policing culture that’s being really
ingrained and it’s having a massive
effect… universities are supposed to
be spaces of academic freedom,
critical exchange and so on. But
40 Anonymous, University Lecturer 2
that’s really now being hollowed out
through the Prevent policy”41.
3.7 Whilst many of our respondents
spoke of a climate or culture of
suspicion leading to self censorship
among Muslim students and
academics, of greater concern is the
number of actual instances of
attempted censorship reported to us.
There is an abundant body of
evidence suggesting that Prevent
officers have proactively taken steps
to disrupt events organised by
academics, campaigners and
human rights activists, quite often
leading to their cancellation42. These
events typically featured discussions
of Prevent and Islamophobia43:
“Prevent officers, in each locality, a
lot of their time is spent policing
Muslim organisations that criticise
the policy. They’re trying to actively
disrupt them from organising events,
to protest the policy. So, it's
become a political containment
exercise….So this huge focus on
some quite small NGO’s that are
actually quite small and are
struggling… they have support from
the Muslim community but I would
say that they’re under huge
pressure. Everybody from the Prime
Minister on down has named
checked these organisations, in
41 Anonymous, University Lecturer 2 42 https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2015/jun/15/university-research-terrorism-without-state-government-rightwing-interference 43 https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eroding-trust-20161017_0.pdf
Rethinking Prevent: Surveillance ance Censorship: The Higher Education Example
Page 22
trying to derail them and blacken
their name”44.
3.8 The reports of active attempts by
Prevent officers to interfere with the
organising of events should alarm all
those concerned with protecting civil
liberties and who are committed to
encouraging free debate within the
democratic norms of society. Our
respondents, including many Muslim
students, spoke of avoiding
classroom debates on topics such
as Israel and Palestine, for fear of
being singled out and regarded as
controversial. Other respondents
spoke of Muslim students retreating
from campus based activism, with
the knowledge that this may also
place them under greater scrutiny.
Such acts of self censorship were
also reported by Muslim academics,
suggesting that a significant issue
exists in terms of Prevent impeding
the ways in which Muslim students
and academics experience higher
education as well as participate in
civic life.
44 Anonymous, Researcher and Activist
4. Victimisation, Power and
Dissent
4.1 Across the board, respondents,
Muslim and otherwise, either spoke
of or alluded to the Prevent agenda
as being directly responsible for the
Muslim community being viewed as
‘different’:
“Seeing us as... subversives, not as
full citizens, with political concerns
but as people who have to be
contained and have to be counter
surveilled and have to have counter
insurgency techniques used against
our population. Counter subversion
techniques, which is aiming and
shaming, framing and blaming our
community institutions and our
people”45.
4.2 Almost every respondent
interviewed was able to recount at
least one, if not multiple accounts, of
individuals and families that have
been the victims of the Islamophobia
inherent in the Prevent apparatus.
The sense of victimisation
experienced ranged from feeling
unable to engage in broader society
in the same way as every other
British citizen, to the long term
impact of having been the subject of
a Prevent referral:
“He [volunteer] was actually
investigated by Special Branch and
they actually wrote to our board and
things like that. He was a very young
guy and he was doing a good job.
He was a really nice lad but
basically he was forced to leave and
then as far as I know, he really had
difficulty finding jobs after because
45 Anonymous, Researcher and Activist
he was on the blacklist. He wanted
to do youth work and things like that
but when they did the checks on
him, he would pop up as a risky
person. That fed into my research as
well and I started looking into things
like how Prevent works in schools,
how it works with young people, how
people get onto this list and what
happens once they're on this list” 46.
4.3 One respondent in particular
highlights the different approach
Prevent has towards Muslim women
and men. The government has
injected funds into programmess
that claim to lift Muslim women out
of stereotypically ‘restrictive’
situations in the name of
empowernment, whilst at the same
time problematising Muslim men:
“She [Hazel Blears MP47] very
clearly said to me... "We have a very
different approach between men and
women. Women are being
empowered to deal with what
Muslim men are doing and Muslim
women are being empowered and
they're being strengthened and they
are our allies, whereas Muslim men
are being dealt with strictly by the
Home Office Counter Terrorism
department, policing and stop and
search and control orders. That's the
strategy for men and this is the
strategy for women" 48.
4.4 Some respondents, particularly
those engaged in activism,
highlighted the importance of
tackling racism and structural
exclusion. It is through activism that
46 Zareen Ahmed 47 Former secretary of state for Communities
and Local Government 48 Zareen Ahmed
Rethinking Prevent: Victimisation, Power and Dissent
Page 24
individuals are able to effectively
challenge the long term impact of
Islamophobic and racist attitudes
and perceptions that are now
embedded in so many aspects of
British society:
“we argued for us to be able to
engage as communities, you have to
be free of discrimination. You have
to be recognised as a community.
Also, we worked on that premise,
that we are citizens, tax-payers,
therefore the statutory sector needs
to engage with us in a way that it
engages with everybody else. As
citizens living in the local areas, who
have a right to live freely,
basically”49.
4.5 Many respondents alluded to the
idea that unequal power relations
have been built into the
Islamophobic narrative that Prevent
gives rise to. These devalue the
voice of even the most qualified
Muslims, simply by virtue of them
being Muslim. A prime example of
this is the perception of one of our
respondents who felt that no matter
how qualified she becomes, as a
Muslim, her voice will never be given
the same legitimacy as even the
most unqualified white person:
“if I was just a random white guy on
Twitter expressing my...opinions, not
necessarily needing any experience
or anything to say anything, I feel
like that is accepted. Whereas, if I
say a qualified political opinion,
based on experience, based on that
49 Humera Khan
research or whatever, people are
just like, oh well, you are Muslim, of
course you are going to think that.
Yes, of course you don’t like foreign
policy”50.
4.6 It is not just one’s ascription to a
particular faith, but also certain
positions that strip people of the
power to challenge government.
This is primarily because of the
statutory duty and the subsequent
accountability that creates the sense
that people in certain positions of
employment are not able to
challenge Prevent. It is notable that
non-Muslim respondents in non-
governmental positions of power
afford them a level of security from
which they can challenge authorities
without the repercussions that their
Muslim counterparts would face:
“Because I’m the [position in NUS],
I’m like, well listen, no-one can really
say anything...I had the confidence
to say, “No, fuck off.” [when asked
for names of every member of the
Palestine society]. But if it had been
any other job with any other junior
position where I didn’t have any
power, I’d have been like, oh I don’t
know what to do and that’s the
position..[of]...nurses, doctors …
whatever, they don’t necessarily
agree with it but they don’t feel
confident enough to stand up to it
and say, ‘No’”51.
4.7 Prevent is encouraging a culture
whereby any challenge of the status
50 Female 10 51 Anonymous, NUS Officer
Rethinking Prevent: Victimisation, Power and Dissent
Page 25
quo or of stringently defined ‘British
values’ can be regarded as a sign of
radicalisation:
“Any critics of the policy will be
branded a terrorist sympathiser”52.
4.8 Moreover, the climate that has been
developed is one where dissent from
a non-Muslim is fine, but the very
same dissent from a Muslim is
unacceptable. For respondents, this
is experienced as deliberate
criminalisation and demonisation.
For example, when a Muslim speaks
about, for example, foreign policy,
this is more likely to be deemed
radicalisation. It is precisely for this
reason that some of our
respondents engage in significant
levels of self-censorship (see
Section 3 for further details):
“I know for a fact that if I held the
political views that I hold now and
was to air them in school, college or
university and I was Muslim, that I
would definitely, definitely, definitely
be reported by now and I feel in a
privileged position, I feel like I can
say these things, I can, as a non-
Muslim, say certain things, either in
person or on Facebook, which would
be a big no-no if you were a
Muslim”53.
4.9 For many respondents, the racism
inherent in Prevent bleeds across
faith based affiliation. As a result,
challenges of the status quo by
Black and ethnic minority individuals
52 Anonymous, NUS Officer 53 Anonymous, NUS officer
are perceived by respondents as
being subject to Prevent as a means
of shutting down their voice, without
safeguarding their civil rights to do
so:
“In the last month, this person, this
academic made a referral of a black
woman - she’s not a Muslim, she’s a
black woman - at my university to
the Prevent programme because
she said that this student was talking
about anti-racism, that we need to
fight racism, all of that kind of stuff.
And that meant that this academic
became apprehensive about this
student, and reported it”54.
4.10 The disempowerment is not only
experienced by those who challenge
Government policy generally, but
perhaps more impactfully, those who
find themselves being subjected to
the Prevent apparatus. For
respondents, this is all the more
surprising in instances where the
Prevent apparatus comes into play
in relation to individuals that are
highly educated and deeply
embedded in British institutional
frameworks. There is the sense that
if they are unable to navigate the
system so as to protect themselves
from apparently baseless
accusations, then those with less
social capital will be entirely unable
to do so:
“So, one example is a doctor and
her husband is also a consultant.
So, these are very educated people
and their child gets referred to
54 Anonymous, Journalist
Rethinking Prevent: Victimisation, Power and Dissent
Page 26
Prevent. Prevent officers come and
visit them. Then they call Social
Services and all of this kind of
activity, it’s traumatised them. They
just couldn’t believe, “Well, what’s
happened here? How has it
escalated that Social Services are
involved, police are involved, and all
my son did is something stupid
maybe, or said something maybe
shouldn’t have said. How has it
escalated to this point?” That’s part
of the problem”55.
4.11 Stripping those who are able to
challenge Prevent of voice
corresponds with an absence in the
Prevent apparatus to build
resilience. Whilst the Prevent
guidelines demand staff or
organisations are able to challenge
extremist ideology, it is unclear
what, if any, guidance is provided to
build such resilience. Rather, the
deliberate conflation of religion and
political activism actually embeds a
culture of ignorance and fear.
Furthermore, it is impossible to build
community resilience when
community work is itself carried out
within a definitively ‘Prevent’ lens
and objective - it is both
counterintuitive and embeds
mistrust.
55 Azad Ali
5 Austerity and the Impact
of Cuts to Youth Services
5.1 A number of respondents made
reference to the wider social policy
context concerning Prevent and
counter terrorism more generally.
The intensification of counter
terrorism work in recent years has
dovetailed with drastic budget cuts
to local authorities for vital services
in the landscape of youth work and
engagement. The prioritisation of
policing and enforcement over other
forms of engagement has had a
significant impact on the wellbeing of
young people and social cohesion
generally:
“I think, if anything needs focusing
on it is the online element - but
again I think that there are
programmes in schools that have
nothing to do with Prevent which are
to do with cyber safety and so, yes,
you don’t need to target a particular;
the framework is all there for
protecting young people. The
framework was there, so what the
government has been doing is
demolishing brick by brick that
framework of youth services and
youth provisions and all of that and
replacing it with this policed model
which we don’t need, which is
divisive and dangerous and
counterproductive56.
5.2 This respondent, like others, argues
that the current social welfare
system would be doing its job in
identifying vulnerable individuals and
providing appropriate support, if it
was properly funded. This calls into
56 Frances Webber
question the requirement and
necessity of an interventionist
counter-terrorism apparatus:
“You strip resources from youth
services, social services, from
education, you’ve put a load of
resources in this counter terrorism
thing, you pick up kids who could
have been picked up, or should
have been picked up, would've been
picked up if the resources had been
there by these other, in the different
context of social work by teachers
whatever and where there have
been successes it has been
because people have needed help
in getting their life together or in
finding some sort of, in just getting,
sometimes it is material help,
sometimes it is psychological help,
you don’t need a counter-extremism
policy for people to get that kind of
help”57.
5.3 The austerity programme has had a
significant impact on public services,
ranging from the closure of public
libraries and swimming pools to the
wholesale abandonment of youth
services. The detrimental impact of
national budget cuts on young
people, introduced by the Coalition
government under the political guise
of austerity, are well
documented58,59. The evidence also
suggests that those living within
57 Frances Webber 58 https://www.bma.org.uk/-/media/files/pdfs/working%20for%20change/improving%20health/child%20health/cutting-away-at-our-childrens-futures-austerity-child-health-guuk-2016.pdf?la=en 59 https://www.unison.org.uk/content/uploads/2014/07/On-line-Catalogue225322.pdf
Rethinking Prevent: Austerity and the Impact of Cuts to Youth Services
Page 28
deprived communities have been
disproportionately impacted by such
political decisions60:
“It got to a point where BME
organisations are all saying, ‘go get
Prevent, take from Prevent’. Well
hang on; are there no other streams
of funding open to BME
organisations? I know from
speaking to lots of different charities,
little ones, on the ground, struggling
charities, struggling small
organisations, that they felt that they
were being pushed towards Prevent
whether they wanted to take that
money or not. And a lot of them did
actually have to compromise, do
they keep the organisation running,
do they take the money or don’t
they?”61.
5.4 The impact of austerity also has, for
some, a tangibly gendered impact in
respect of Prevent:
“The austerity cuts from the
government, the Conservative
government, have not helped
matters at all, because on the one
hand, the Prevent pressures on
schools and all these sorts of things,
they've remained whilst cutting
things like the youth service and
funding to community projects and
things like that. Now more than ever
I think we need a youth service with
good youth workers that can talk to
60 https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/Summary-Final.pdf 61 Third Sector Worker 2
young people, talk to men in
particular and help them and
empower them and guide them in
the same way that many women's
organisations got funding from
DCLG, as Hazel Blears said. I saw
the proposals for all the funding and
they were all for women's
organisations. They weren't
targeting men62”.
5.5 This is not to say, however, that
Muslim women’s groups funded by
the government have not
encountered problems. A recent
study has demonstrated that Muslim
women’s groups who adopted more
critical stances towards government
positions in the arena of counter
terrorism were often overlooked or
marginalised, whilst those that
attempted to ‘toe the line’ found
themselves treated more
favourably63. One of our
respondents, who has worked within
Prevent programmes funded by the
government, directly relates the
austerity agenda and counter
terrorism by suggesting that youth
work has a vital role to play in
tackling radicalisation:
“Well, if you look at austerity.
Austerity has eroded away
traditional youth work. I’d argue that
a greater investment into youth work
services would reduce the potential
of radicalisation”64.
62 Zareen Ahmed 63 Rashid, Naaz. 2016. Veiled threats: Representing the Muslim woman in public policy discourses, Bristol: Policy Press 64 M. Ali Amla
Rethinking Prevent: Austerity and the Impact of Cuts to Youth Services
Page 29
5.6 Views such as this, expressed by a
frontline professional working within
the counter terrorism apparatus, call
into question the unintended
consequences of political decisions
framed within the discourse of
austerity. Relatedly, there have been
recent calls to acknowledge that
tackling inequality, and fostering
social cohesion, may play a role in
preventing extremism65. Such an
approach would place an emphasis
upon social and economic
investment in communities, with
youth work and services at the
heart.
5.7 Other respondents have observed
that austerity and cuts to youth
services have occurred alongside an
over-emphasis on seeking to
collaborate with faith-based
organisations. This is yet another
manifestation of the government’s
view that religiosity is a key factor in
extremism:
“You need to get loads of social
workers and youth workers that are
really getting out there. Some of
whom are out there already, but
that’s the kind of approach that
needs to be taken, not on a faith
basis. Prevent appears to be taking
things down the route of faith, and
it’s not like that. Anybody’s
susceptible to it”66.
65https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/06/uk-extremism-manchester-london-attacks-inequality 66 Female 9
5.8 There is, in fact, much evidence
dismissing the premise that religious
practice is a key factor in
extremism67. The government’s
ongoing commitment to austerity
and failure to invest in young people
are missed opportunities to make a
tangible positive impact. It is a poor
indictment of the strongly policing
centric model of engagement that
favours surveillance and
enforcement over genuine attempts
at community engagement.
67 https://www.tmimag.com/articles/absurdities-counter-extremism/
6. Accountability and
Effectiveness
6.1 Prevent is shrouded in secrecy at all
levels, from the guidance and
training given, the grounds upon
which referrals are made, the
success indicators, if any, and the
statistical data associated with it.
Often any data that does enter the
public domain has only been made
available upon Freedom of
Information requests, although many
of these requests are rejected on the
grounds of national security. The
reluctance to make data available
places numerous obstacles in the
way of public scrutiny of the entire
Prevent apparatus.
6.2 Notwithstanding the difficulty in
accessing data from the relevant
agencies, studies as far ranging as
those by the Institute of Race
Relations to the United Nations have
repeatedly spoken of Prevent not
being fit for purpose. These findings
are consistent with the perceptions
and experiences our respondents
have with Prevent:
“I don’t know whether reports are
published on the success of Prevent
and the benefits of it or anything like
that. But as a society, I just haven’t
seen anything positive, and as a
member of society I’ve never seen
anything positive come out of it”68.
6.3 With no formal accountability
frameworks there is little scope for
checks and balances in the
implementation of Prevent:
68 Male 5
“There is no reporting back, there is
no accountability, there is no kind of,
we don't know what happens, we’re
not told, there is no obligation of the
Home Office counter extremism unit,
or counter terrorism unit, to report to
Parliament to say that in this year
you know, we did this with this
number of people or anything like
that, or what the effects were” 69.
6.4 This accountability vacuum is
problematic given the continued
absence of any agreed upon
definition of extremism. The usage
of the term extremism has come to
be perceived, and indeed
experienced, as a political tool. The
application of extremism seems to
reflect changes in government
policies and allies rather than
holding its own:
“[It’s] the government that says who
the extremists are and who aren’t
the extremists, and it's when they
say they are or when they aren’t and
it's according to the interests of the
state. So, yesterday’s extremist
could become tomorrow’s allies and
vice versa, which we've seen time
and again in the history of our
foreign policy. One minute we’re…
Gaddafi is the biggest problem, then
he’s our ally then he’s a problem
again. The Mujahideen were once
our friends, then they became our
enemies. There’s no, sort of,
objective systematic definition of
extremism and there never will, it's
always a political label that’s
dictated by the interests of the
governing class. I don’t see that will
ever change”70.
69 Frances Webber 70 Anonymous, Researcher and Activist
Rethinking Prevent: Accountability and Effectiveness
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6.5 In a context where there is no actual
agreed upon definition to the
standard being applied, and where
there is no apparent accountability,
the knowledge of those who are
implementing a policy becomes all
the more significant. A number of
respondents describe the training
given to frontline workers that are
subject to the Prevent duty as being
highly problematic, and devoid of
any real substance. This training is
often limited in time and very
Muslim-centric in content:
“I remember speaking to someone,
three years ago, who attended a
WRAP71 session, who said, “The
only thing I learned was that I need
to watch out for somebody overly
saying ‘Salam’ in the playground.”
Really?..., I felt so frustrated on the
simplified narrative some trainers
were delivering. It allowed people to
focus and look upon Islam and
Muslims as a potential threat. That
for me is where Government is really
missing a trick”72.
6.6 As a consequence, frontline workers
are often left to apply Prevent on the
basis of their own views, however ill-
informed. This lack of knowledge
combined with structurally
embedded Islamophobia results in
the potential for discrimination
against almost any expression of
Muslim identity:
71 Workshop to raise awareness of Prevent.
This respondent stated that WRAP training had subsequently improved. 72 M. Ali Amla
“I think they don’t even have a clue
what the success indicators are,
because, first of all, we’ve got a
Government that fails to even give
us a definition of extremism. It’s
incredibly subjective...people who
are implementing it in universities,
teachers, lecturers, students in fact,
don’t really have a clue about…
what’s defined as extremist
behaviour. I mean it ranges from
graffiti, to, I don’t know, suddenly
wearing the veil; and I mean these
are really ridiculous indicators...so,
what it’s doing is making almost any
behaviour, just by being Muslim, you
are a suspected extremist...So, I
guess success could be measured
by how many Muslims can we take
in the net of this but that for me, isn’t
success, that’s a massive epic
failure”73.
6.7 There is a reluctance, on the part of
government, to engage with
evidence that challenges the
existing Prevent narrative as well as
the linkages between Islamic
practice and radicalisation. This
suggests a focus on maintaining the
status quo, and speaks to a greater
commitment, on the part of
government, to remain focused on
an easily identifiable section of the
population rather than actually
tackling the causes of radicalisation:
“Forget the evidence. This is about
ideology. And I just know.” And this
is where the Islamophobia comes in,
the clash of civilisations comes in,
Orientalism comes in. “I just know
73 Anonymous, University Lecturer 2
Rethinking Prevent: Accountability and Effectiveness
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that Muslims are terrorists because
this is what I have known. This is
their history. So I don’t care about
what the evidence says to me, I just
know it, that they are”74.
6.8 Claims such as those recently made
by Commander Dean Haydon, one
of the most senior police officers in
Scotland Yard, who said “I have
seen the work of Prevent….it’s a
fantastic tool and it’s here to stay”75
have no discernable grounding in
evidence. Moreover, such claims are
rarely challenged in the public
domain in an informed manner as
little air space, or indeed intellectual
freedom (as discussed earlier in
Section 3) is given to those who
would be able to do so.
6.9 The deliberate and consistent
reluctance to open up Prevent to
public scrutiny also enables the
proponents of Prevent to dismiss
any critique. The assertion by Cdr.
Haydon, Senior police officer at
Scotland Yard, that “[T]hey [critics of
Prevent] don’t understand properly
how Prevent works”, is one such
example76.
6.10 Such sweeping statements from
people in authority belie the lived
experience of large groups of the
population and delegitimise those
involved in holding government and
government agencies to account.
74 Anonymous, Journalist 75 Asian Network, Cdr Haydon, Thursday 8th Aug 2017 76 Asian Network, Cdr Haydon, Thursday 8th
Aug 2017
This effective silencing is further
compounded by the perceptions that
widespread surveillance gives rise to
the misinterpretation of words
and/or actions (see Section 3 for
further details).
6.11 The recent terror attacks in
Manchester and London have cast a
spotlight on the failures of the entire
counter-terrorism apparatus, as well
as the inherent hypocrisy of those
who push the false narrative of
‘Muslims need to do more’:
“How effective is Prevent if terrorist
incidences are on the rise? This
question is being asked by teachers,
activists as well as young
Muslims”77.
6.12 The perpetrators of the Manchester
attack, Salman Abedi, was known to
British security services for 5 years
before the attack; having been
reported by a community worker,
religious leader and family
members. Despite this the Chief
Constable of Greater Manchester
said he was not known to the
Prevent programme. The leader of
the London attacks, Khurram Butt as
well as one of his accomplices
Youssef Zaghba had both been
reported to the police. The New York
Times reported that Khurram Butt
was subject to the Prevent
programme78. Despite the
demonstrable failure of security
77 Female 6 78 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/europe/london-attack-uk.html?mcubz=0
Rethinking Prevent: Accountability and Effectiveness
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services to follow through on
complaints, it was British Muslims
that were subjected, yet again, to
calls of “Muslims need to do more”.
The irony of this was not lost on
some of our respondents:
“I’ve been reading in the media lots
of well-known people have been
saying the Muslim community needs
to do more and should do more, but
my question is: what do they want
the Muslim community to do? For
me, that’s the question, because this
young man was known to MI5, MI6
or whoever, and yet they couldn’t
prevent this action. So how do other
people – non-Muslims – expect
Muslims to try and deal with these
people?”79
6.13 For many of the respondents it is the
exclusionary culture being cultivated
in Britain, and the institutionalisation
of Islamophobia that Prevent gives
rise to, that are the actual cause of
extremism, and not faith based
belief. There can be no greater
condemnation of the effectiveness of
Prevent than its own role in the
fuelling of radicalisation:
“It’s breading the radicalisation that
it’s trying to get rid of, that’s what it’s
doing”80.
6.14 Some of our respondents posit the
notion that it is not Prevent, rather
the existing criminal justice system
that should be utilised to tackle the
challenges posed by terrorism
79 Anonymous, Teacher 80 Female 9
related crimes. They suggest that
the creation of an entire gambit of
legislation and institutional
frameworks is actually
counterproductive, elevating
criminals to martyrs and making
collateral damage out of an entire
religious group. This is all the more
significant given the observation that
what unites those who commit
terrorist offences, Muslims and
otherwise, is a tendency towards
criminality rather than faith or
ideology:
“These are not religiously pious
conservative Muslims. They usually,
are petty criminals with a criminal
record for drugs, possibly violence,
and it is quite obvious that... the
profile is completely wrong. It
doesn’t accord with reality81.
6.15 In apparent contradiction, some of
the younger respondents expressed
a desire for crimes by far-right
groups to also be referred to as
terrorism in a bid for Muslims and
non-Muslims to be treated equally.
However, many activist respondents
argued that in their struggle for the
Muslim population to be given equal
treatment they do not mean
reducing civil liberties for others,
rather raising the standards and
respecting all groups:
“Prevent is a policy that in essence
is counter-productive. We do not
believe in this policy to be used
against far-right extremism either
because, it would do the same to the
81 Frances Webber
Rethinking Prevent: Accountability and Effectiveness
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white working-class people, as it is
doing to the Muslim community. It
will stigmatise young people,
children in particular. You know,
children do and say a lot of things.
The interventions that need to
happen are already in place under
the safeguarding kind of policies”82.
6.16 Respondents draw attention to the
legitimacy, and indeed
effectiveness, that the criminal
justice system can provide to any
state enforced counter-terror action.
The checks and balances of the
criminal custice system seem, to
some respondents, as an effective
way of tackling terrorism related
crime whilst still protecting civil
liberties:
“You need to focus in on criminal
justice approaches, because they
are much more effective, because
what you are doing there is you are
focusing in on evidence. Counter-
terrorism today is devoid of
evidence. It’s ideological...What
criminal justice does is it says,
“What’s the evidence? And is it
strong evidence?’ Counter-terrorism
Prevent says, “They have changed
their hairstyle a little bit. They have
changed their dress code a little bit.
Does that indicate that in ten years’
time they might become a terrorist?”
So it’s guesswork”83.
82 Azad Ali 83 Anonymous, University Lecturer 3
7. Power Relations and the
Coercion of Prevent
7.1 Several respondents spoke of the
uncritical manner in which frontline
professionals, such as teachers and
doctors, were approaching Prevent,
particularly following the introduction
of the Counter Terrorism and
Security Act 2015. This Act places a
duty on public sector professionals
to take an active role in preventing
extremism, and is highlighted as
particularly problematic in promoting
an overly zealous approach in
identifying suspicious individuals
and behaviour.
7.2 Of greater concern are the
practitioners and institutions directly
engaging in racial profiling through
an Islamophobic lens. This racial
profiling can occur through
deliberate prejudice or a
misunderstanding of roles and
responsibilities in terms of counter
terrorism; as one of our respondents
a race equality professional, recalls:
“Whilst Prevent is meant to be
addressing all forms of
extremism...there was one school
that I contacted recently and then
they said, ‘oh we don’t really have
any Muslim students, even though
they should be aware of the Prevent
duty’”84.
7.3 This confirms findings from a recent
academic study, which in examining
Prevent and its implementation
within schools, found that extremism
was primarily understood as a
‘Muslim’ issue. The authors
84 Anonymous, Race Equality Professional
comment that “[T]his clear disparity
reveals the blatant and specific
focus on the governing, regulating
and spying on almost exclusively
Muslim children”85. This study also
confirms respondent’ observations,
detailed in Section 6, of a
demonstrable lack of knowledge
among teachers of basic cultural
and diversity issues. This, in turn,
raises significant questions about
their roles in policing their students
for ‘signs’ of radicalisation or
extremism.
7.4 With all the inherent flaws of Prevent
already identified, the impact of
making it a duty is that
discrimination becomes entrenched
as professionals simply tick the
boxes. One of our respondents
addresses this area by suggesting
that teachers may choose to
overlook the injustice and prejudice
associated with Prevent simply to
ensure that they are complying with
the law:
“The whole mass space of Prevent
is going to continue, whether you
like it or not, and actually, your
ordinary teacher, for example... they
might not even want to understand
why it impacts inevitably in
communities, because, actually,
their bit of world, is we’ve got
officers coming in, they are going to
ask us have we done our Prevent
training and can we get our tick on
that?”86
85 Sian, Katy P (2015) ‘Spies, Surveillance and Stakeouts: Monitoring Muslim Moves in British State Schools’, Race, Ethnicity and Education 18, no. 2: 183-201 86 Anonymous, Race Equality Professional
Rethinking Prevent: Power Relations and the Coercion of Prevent
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7.5 The above quote provides an insight
into the coercive effects of Prevent,
which many may see as simply a
tickbox exercise but which, for
racialized minorities and Muslims in
particular, has very real, serious and
deleterious consequences. Some
respondents find that even where
there was an apparent willingness
on the part of public sector agencies
to ensure an equitable, non-
discriminatory application of
Prevent, this will dissipates in the
face of legal duties:
“When it had the force of the law
behind it, then they went into their
little boxes and said. ‘Right, okay.’
You know, ‘we appreciate that there
are all these problems with it, but we
have got a legal duty...”87.
7.6 There has been concern from a
number of quarters that institutions
such as universities, in rushing to
comply with the Prevent Duty, are
overlooking other responsibilities,
particularly in terms of equality and
human rights. In addressing this, the
Equality and Human Rights
Commission released a short guide
for universities in early 201788 titled
Delivering the Prevent duty in a fair
and proportionate way.
7.7 Whilst this guide contains useful
advice for higher education
institutions, its very recent
introduction, and relatively low
87 Anonymous, Academic 88 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/delivering-the-prevent-duty.pdf
profile in comparison to the Prevent
Duty, indicates that increasing the
awareness of legal responsibilities
related to equality and diversity is
not a government priority in terms of
the counter terrorism landscape.
Such a scenario can be seen to
further contribute to an environment
where Muslim individuals, groups
and communities are regarded as a
collective ‘suspect community’89 and
wrongly ascribed, among
practitioners and frontline
professionals, as the sole or primary
focus of counter terrorism efforts.
89 Pantazis, Christina, and Simon Pemberton. 2009. “From the ‘Old' to the ‘New' Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation.” British Journal of Criminology 49 (5): 646–666
8. Solidarity, Resilience and
Resistance
8.1 Whilst many of our respondents
reported negative experiences
associated with Prevent, a
prominent theme emerged in terms
of the effects it had in politicising
individuals and leading, in some
cases, to highly informed activism:
“It’s institutionalised a lot of
marginalisation, a lot of
demonisation of the community. It’s
made a lot of confident people
become people who now have to
bury their head in the sand. At the
same time, it’s empowered a lot
more people. There are people now
who, just to use an example, the
only thing they knew about life was
handbags and shoes, are now
actually writing very in-depth and
articulate political blogs, and do
speeches challenging a lot of
things”90.
8.2 Whilst for some individuals Prevent
led them to becoming withdrawn,
paranoid and distrustful, for others it
proved to be a spark for taking an
increased interest in civil liberties
and civil society through protest,
activism and organising. A number
of our respondents recognised the
resilience of, particularly young,
Muslims who continue to make
space for themselves and thrive in
often hostile environments:
“I mean there have been some
positive impacts as well because
when pressure is put on a certain
90 Azad Ali
segment of society, especially young
people will respond, stand up and
it's empowering. So when you put
young people under pressure, it's
like with the election, there you go.
How did young people respond
when they were told that they don't
count really? They said, "Right, we'll
show you". They all responded. In a
way, the same thing has happened
in the Muslim community. The more
negativity they've had, the more they
will empower themselves. They will
organise some things like the digital
technology that, of late, has
impacted young people in particular,
it has been incredible”91.
8.3 Many young Muslims have
proactively and creatively responded
to much of the negativity associated
with them by bringing out the very
best in themselves and those
around them. One respondent
highlights the central role that many
young Muslims now play in the
charity sector, and of how this is a
crucial aspect of shaping identities:
“One of the biggest things, areas
where I've seen an impact of this is
in the charity sector because young
Muslims, most of them, don't go out
drinking and that sort of thing. They
don't socialise in that way but a lot of
young Muslims that I know, they
socialise through organising charity
events. ...This is very recent that
Muslims are creating their own
identity and their own place in
society. I think it has a really good...
it's exemplary to other young ...
There are a lot of young people
helping the homeless and doing
charity work in this country, not just
91 Zareen Ahmed
Rethinking Prevent: Solidarity, Resilience and Resistence
Page 38
abroad. I think there have been
many positive impacts”92.
8.4 The divisive climate has been
staunchly rejected by some, as
communities, groups and individuals
have come together to challenge
certain narratives. Many of our
respondents felt supported and
defended by non-Muslims who
sought to mitigate the impact of
Prevent in various ways - such as
political or online activism93, vocal
support and even principled stands
that have resulted in the loss of a
career:
“I have a friend who's just given up a
teaching position because of what
the curriculum is and and alongside
because of what they what they
wanted to teach these kids she
didn't feel like it was ethically right
and one of those things being it
wasn't exactly like Prevent but it was
to some extent... she's non-Muslim
and she did not agree with it at all”94.
8.5 There is recognition and respect for
the support shown to Muslim
communities by groups such as the
National Union of Students, the
National Union of Teachers and the
Universities and Colleges Union, all
of whom have released statements
or passed motions at conferences
condemning Prevent. Such
resistance, from a wide variety of
individuals, groups and
organisations, has often been
92 Zareen Ahmed 93 Male 6 94 Female 1
overlooked in popular and political
discourse. Instead of taking such
stands seriously, critics of Prevent
are often dismissed as ‘Islamists’ or
as aspects of the ‘far left’. The
evidence however suggests that this
is far from the reality, with
representatives of the United
Nations, the civil liberties group
Liberty and a whole host of other
human rights organisations, all
offering critique of the government’s
counter terrorism strategy and
approach.
8.6 Despite many young Muslims
resisting Prevent through
engagement with democratic
processes and local community
organising, our respondents do
share a number of deleterious
effects of constantly being
demonised and seen through the
prism of extremism, terrorism and
radicalisation. These include
significant impacts to a sense of
identity, belonging and citizenship.
This impact is likely to become all
the more problematic in a context
where nursery school age children
are subjected to the Prevent
apparatus:
“But, I’d certainly worry about how
it’s affecting, as well, young people’s
confidence in their own sense of
self. I mean, from that research I
was telling you earlier when we were
in schools. Five year olds, you know,
being subjected to that and probably
not aware whatsoever but it’s still in
the long run, probably going to have
unintended or subconscious effects
Rethinking Prevent: Solidarity, Resilience and Resistence
Page 39
on them. They’re being monitored in
such a way and I just think that must
really affect young Muslims”95.
8.7 The following quote, from a race
relations campaigner and former
barrister, highlights the case of a
schoolboy who was asked if he was
a supporter of radicalism and
terrorism after innocently using a
legitimate word in the classroom:
“It completely shook his trust in that
school. It was so out of the blue, so
his whole relationship with that
school was profoundly and, I think
permanently, damaged. His own self
confidence took a beating; although
because his mother supported him
with tremendous tenacity and then
because of the support that he got
from other quarters by publicizing
the case, in fact he’s, he’s sort of
regained his self confidence
because he’s, he spoke very
articulately about what had
happened to him”96.
8.8 In discussing resistance to the
government’s counter terrorism
strategy, reference was made to the
healthcare sector and specifically
the doctor/patient relationship.
Arguably, less is known about the
implementation of Prevent in the
healthcare sector as compared to
schools and universities, but the
existing evidence points to
disturbing cases of anti-Muslim
discrimination, racism and breaches
95 Anonymous, University Lecturer 2 96 Frances Webber
of doctor patient confidentiality97.
One respondent discusses how
Prevent places additional pressure
on practitioners already suffering
from the significant budget cuts
implemented through the austerity
agenda and alludes to the risks they
take in speaking out:
“So, this kind of push by the
government to make it a public duty
has backfired really spectacularly on
them. I think the resistance against it
has become obvious from those
professionals that are involved. The
doctors, they really feel that they are
letting their patients down because
that patient doctor relationship is
breaking down. You know, they’re
already under stress with their cuts
and everything else, now on top of
that they have to deal with that as
well”98.
8.9 Critique of Prevent is often
dismissed, particularly in the right
wing press, but increasingly too by
politicians and political
commentators, as the work of
‘Islamists’ or ‘Islamist sympathisers’.
Such criticisms ignore the opposition
and resistance to Prevent from a
cross section of society, often from
individuals committed to the values
of human rights and social justice.
Some of our respondents
highlighted the ways in which
resistance to Prevent can be
characterised as risky and
dangerous, due to the reputational
97 https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n10/karma-nabulsi/dont-go-to-the-doctor 98 Azad Ali
Rethinking Prevent: Solidarity, Resilience and Resistence
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damage suffered by those who
publicly speak out as critics of
government policy:
“We don’t rise up and say, “Yes, we
need to take a stand, we need to
fight against oppressive counter-
terrorism policies,” and whatever.
Actually no, it’s often the opposite.
I’ve had volunteers working for
CAGE, whose parents have been on
the phone to me saying, “Please, we
don’t want our son or our daughter
to be involved in this type of work
because they’ll become a target
then.” It’s not because they don’t
believe in the work, that’s crucial.
They believe in the work, they just
don’t want their child to be
targeted”99.
8.10 The following quote usefully
summarises this section and
illuminates the need for resisting
unjust counter terrorism policy and
legislation via a rights based
discourse. Such an approach has
been taken, at times with great risk
to personal reputation, by many of
the respondents we spoke to:
“But to be honest with you, you’ve
got to stand for what you stand for,
really. You can’t tiptoe around what
the government wants. You know,
you can’t have state approved
debate; that’s not going to get
anywhere. You need to stand up for
what you want. If that means it’s
going to be a problem, that’s not a
problem for the people because the
99 Asim Qureshi
people have got the full right to
speak up about things”100.
100 Male 3
9. Concluding Remarks
9.1 Prevent is a harmful policy that
disproportionately impacts the
Muslim community. There is little to
no evidence of its potential to tackle
extremism, yet there is abundant
evidence to demonstrate its harms.
9.2 In this report we address the
unwarranted surveillance and the
consequent self-censorship of many
Muslims. This self-censorship is a
direct attempt to ensure they are not
victimised further by structures that
have problematised them from the
outset.
9.3 A 2016 Parliamentary report
highlights that failing to take into
account complexities would be
counter-productive and “fuel the
attraction to the extremist narrative
rather than dampening it”101. Whilst
a positive step in beginning to
explore government culpability, this
also runs the risk of the broad brush
approach being applied to the
Muslim community at large. What is
clear is that in ignoring such
complexities the government
persistently demonstrates a lack of
will to actually tackle the issue of
extremism and terrorism as they
themselves have defined it.
9.4 The vast proportion of those that feel
unheard, isolated or subjected to
securitisation do not turn to
extremism or violence. Whilst our
report finds that the sense of
discontent is certainly increased in
such instances, this is not to suggest
101 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Report (2016) Radicalization the Counter Narrative: Identifying the Tipping Point. London, TSO: 9
that it directly corresponds to a
likelihood of increased violence. In
fact, in many instances it increases
civic and political engagement as
individuals and organisations seek
to alter the status quo and reclaim
their voice.
9.5 Crimes by those ascribing to right-
wing fascist ideals have significantly
increased in a climate where
grievances can not just be aired, but
are proactively espoused by people
in national and international
positions of power. The focus of
Prevent on one entire section of the
population, irrespective of whether
they are innocent or guilty, makes
the government complicit in creating
a climate of right-wing radicalisation.
It also results in the demonization of
minorities and certain faith groups,
and highlights a lack of will to tackle
the increasingly visible threat posed
by white supremacists.
9.6 Our report, supported by multiple
studies, demonstrates the urgent
need to alter the discourse. As
Mythen et al argue, “It is vital that
distorted constructions of Islam and
approaches that assume Muslims to
be a homogenous and risky group
are challenged and rebutted”102.
9.7 Our report has found that the
Prevent strategy is not just
ineffectual but actually
counterproductive to its purported
aims. Furthermore, the introduction
of the CTSA 2015, effectively
placing Prevent on a statutory
102 Mythen, G. Walklate, S., Peatfield, E. J. (2017) Assembling and Deconstructing Radicalization in Prevent: A case of policy-based evidence making. Critical Social Policy Vol 37 (2) 180-201: 192
Rethinking Prevent: Concluding Remarks
Page 42
footing, has compounded these
problems. The issues with Prevent
are all the more evident in the
context of increasing numbers of
terror attacks, threat levels
remaining at an all time high, and
egregious human rights abuses
9.8 A healthy and robust society is one
in which government agencies are
accountable to civil society. The
intrusion of Prevent into almost all
levels of civil society as a statutory
obligation, without the establishment
of any form of public accountability,
demonstrates the damage Prevent
is doing.
9.9 The vast body of academic and
policy based research, supported by
our own findings, demands that
Prevent be deconstructed from the
wider substantive CONTEST103
counter terrorism strategy. Our
report points to the urgent need for a
radically different anti-terror
approach - one that respects civil
liberties, avoids the targeting of
racialised minority groups and does
not necessitate the presence of
policing and surveillance in all
aspects of public life.
103 The four elements of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare constitute the CONTEST government counter terrorism strategy
Page 43
10. Recommendations
1. For the Prevent aspect of the government’s CONTEST counter terrorism strategy to be immediately withdrawn in order to prevent further human rights abuses
2. For a full and independent inquiry into the entire government counter-terrorism strategy, to be conducted with full transparency by a non-governmental organisation, where the terms of reference are framed following consultation with charities, human rights organisations and civil liberties groups
3. For the government to release details of all projects funded through counter terrorism budgets in order to allow full and transparent public scrutiny. Specifically, this information should include all costs associated with funded projects, demographic information of those subject to the projects, details on how success was determined and any subsequent evaluations undertaken
4. For the government to reverse budget cuts to youth services and provision promoted under the austerity programme, particularly those in deprived neighbourhoods
5. For the government to cease the divisive and discriminatory practice of embedding counter terrorism aims and objectives within social policy programmes aimed at British Muslims, particularly in the area of ‘integration’ and through the discourse of ‘British values’
6. For the government to encourage and fund a national programme of multicultural initiatives and programmes - outside of a counter terrorism framework
7. For government ministers and senior police officers with responsibility for counter terrorism to cease targeting the critics of Prevent
8. For independent academic research to examine the specific issue of self censorship among Muslim students and academics within universities, particularly following the introduction of the CTSA 2015
“You know, they don’t do anything
on hate crime, they don’t do
anything on Islamophobia, they
don’t do anything on, even like,
community cohesion, they want to
do all of that through counter-
terrorism. And, that is like, the
biggest mistake... If it comes from
wanting to create a good, strong
society where everyone succeeds,
then, it has to come from
somewhere that is not related to
counter-terrorism”104.
104 Female 10
Appendix 1: Brief Respondent
Biographies.
Young Muslims
Female 1
25 year old British Pakistani, university
graduate on maternity leave from
teaching.
Female 2
23 years old British Pakistani, university
graduate, currently working full-time.
Female 3
21 years old British Pakistani university
student.
Female 4
23 years old British Pakistani, studying at
university
Female 5
18 year old British Pakistani studying at
post-secondary school.
Female 6
24 years old 3rd generation British Asian.
Primary school teacher.
Female 7
19 year old British Indian, works at a call
centre.
Female 8
22 year old Female Pakistani currently a
university student. Also works at a further
education institute.
Female 9
25 year old British Pakistani, self
employed university graduate.
Female 10
25 year old British female Pakistani.
Active in student politics. University
graduate, currently employed full time and
in part time education.
Male 1
18 years old British Pakistani, recently
completed college. Will be attending
university in September. Has memorized
the Qur’an.
Male 2
18 year old British Pakistani male,
studying BTEC level III. Has a conditional
place to start university in September.
Male 3
25 year old British Pakistani university
graduate, currently in full-time education.
Male 4
22 year old male post-graduate university
student.
Male 5
24 year old British Pakistani. University
graduate currently pursuing a Masters.
Male 6
24 year old Black male, undergraduate
student and employed.
Stakeholders
Abdul Rehman Malik
Currently a fellow at Yale. Journalist,
Educator and Organiser. Programme
Manager at Radical Middle Way (RMW).
RMW worked with the government from
December 2005 to approximately March
2011; after which RMW did not engage
with the particular Prevent funds that were
created.
Anonymous, Activist
Campaigner against foreign policy abuses
and anti-Prevent activist.
Rethinking Prevent: Appendix 1
Page 45
Anonymous, Journalist
Mid-30s, South Asian British male with
post-graduate qualifications. Covers
stories of extremism and radicalisation.
Anonymous, NUS Officer
Youth worker, also employed at further
education institute. University graduate,
active in student politics.
Anonymous Politician
Mid 50s, British Pakistani male, University
graduate with a number of professional
qualifications. Previously employed in
community development and as Prevent
Officer.
Anonymous, Race Equality
Professional
Director of an organisation that provides
Prevent training as well as research and
facilitation.
Anonymous, Researcher and Activist
Community activist and commentator. Has
worked in publishing for a number of
years. Currently pursuing Doctorate. Part
of the preventing extremism together task
force in Windsor in 2005. Written
numerous publications on Prevent.
Anonymous, Teacher
27 year old British born Pakistani.
Secondary school maths teacher.
Anonymous, University Lecturer 1
Male, Senior Lecturer in Education.
Anonymous, University Lecturer 2
Early 30s, female, university Lecturer,
non-Muslim.
Anonymous, University Lecturer 3
Early 30s, Male, working at university in
south England.
Asim Qureshi
Graduate in Law, Masters in international
law, international human rights law
andIslamic law. Worked with NGO CAGE
since 2004, focusing on research. Also
works with legal teams as an advisor.
Francis Webber
Retired barrister working specifically in the
field of immigration, refugees and human
rights. Involved with the Institute of Race
Relations since the late 1960s, presently
the Vice Chair. Conducts research and
writes on issues of institutionalized racism
in different fields including policing and
national security.
Humera Khan
Following a degree in Social Policy, began
working in equalities in Housing. Founding
member of An-Nisa, independent
organisation that works on issues that
affect Muslim communities.
M Ali Amla
Freelance Researcher, Trainer and
Project Manager. Research Associate with
Lancaster University, specifically,
researching and focussing on
transnational activism. Has an MA in
Social Work and is currently studying for
an MA in Religion and Conflicts, with
specialism in radicalisation. Engaged with
Prevent agenda for the last 10 years,
originally, on the Channel pilot projects.
Included in Home Office Best Practice
Catalogue on Prevent in 2015.
Rethinking Prevent: Appendix 1
Page 46
Shaykh Ahmed Saad al-Azhari
Egyptian scholar first came to the UK in
2004, 2005 and 2006 as a visiting imam
to the East London mosque during
Ramadan. Worked at Finsbury Park
mosque for 5 years since 2006 after it was
taken over from Abu Hamza al-Masri.
Established Ihsan institute in 2012 that
aims at teaching Islam to adults.
Third Sector Worker
Mid-40s, female, works for a charity that
serves Muslims across the UK.
Third Sector Worker 2
Works for a Muslim women’s charity, has
decades of experience working in the not-
for-profit sector.
Dr Zareen Ahmed PhD
Entrepreneur, humanitarian and activist.
Has two businesses and runs a charity
called The Halimah Trust. Also does
academic work speaking on issues such
as Prevent and women's issues. PhD
thesis was from a Muslim woman's
perspective looking at the role of Muslim
women within Prevent.
Zulaikha Farooqi
Campaigner and community activist.
Father was arrested and sentenced to life
under terrorism legislation when she was
19 years of age.