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RETHINKING ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: THE ‘OTHER’ IN MODERN-DAY

SUNNI ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS

Muhammad Al Atawneh

INTRODUCTION

Muslim jurists and scholars have indeed been preoccupied with the issue of democracy

since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. In fact, this

scholarship has intensified over the last three decades in the wake of various global and

regional political upheavals, such as globalization, the end of the Cold War and the decline

of Arab nationalism, on the one hand; and the resurgence of Islam, on the other. For Muslim

scholars, such upheavals encourage the critical questioning of the role of Muslim societies

in the new world order and the relations between Muslims and the rest of the world.

This paper will present and elucidate some significant transformations in the Sunni Islamic

religious attitudes towards non-Muslims in late 20th century, with emphasis on Wahhabi

Islam. The two questions raised here are: How do modern-day Sunni religious writings

relate to non-Muslims and other world religions? and What are the main changes that have

occurred? Let us begin, however, with an overview of the ‘Islam and democracy’ debate.

DEBATING ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: OVERVIEW

In his article entitled (1991): “Democracy’s third wave,” and in his book (1993): The Third

Wave,i Samuel Huntington analyzes the transition of some thirty-five countries, mainly in

Asia and Latin America, from non-democratic to democratic political systems during the

1970s and 1980s. He refers to the widespread international push toward democracy

throughout this period. Huntington was especially pessimistic about the prospects for

democracy in Islamic countries, due to what he considered to be the antidemocratic

implications of Islamic religious doctrines in relation to the fundamental tenets of

democracy, such as pluralism, equality and interaction with other world cultures.

Bernard Lewis, however, seemed to have a different point of view regarding democracy in

the Islamic/Arab world. According to Lewis (2005): “To speak of dictatorship as being the

immemorial way of doing things in the Middle East is simply untrue. It shows ignorance

of the Arab past, contempt for the Arab present, and lack of concern for the Arab future.

Creating a democratic political and social order in Iraq or elsewhere in the region will not

be easy. But it is possible, and there are increasing signs that it has already begun”.ii

According to Lewis, Islam includes some democratic values, for example, equality,

consultation and freedom—that are in line with modern democratic perceptions; therefore,

democracy should not be entirely alien to Islamic/Arab societies.

The differing attitudes presented by Huntington and Lewis, in regard to democracy in

Middle Eastern and Islamic societies, represent a much larger and quite heated debate going

on between two major groups in western, as well as Muslim spheres, about Islam and

democracy: (1) the first group includes those who believe that the lack of democracy in

Muslim/Arab societies is due to Islam, while (2) the other group believes that the lack of

democracy has more to do with historical, political, cultural, and economic factors than

with religious ones.

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In any case, democracy in its western form has evoked many controversies among

contemporary Muslim scholars and jurists. Raghid El-Solh divided the scholars’ attitudes

toward democracy into three major groups (El-Solh 1988):

Group 1. Those that reject democracy as a foreign concept imposed by westernizers and

secular reformers upon Muslim societies. For the extremists in this group, democracy is

nothing but apostasy, due to its denial of the fundamental Islamic affirmation of the

sovereignty of God. According to El-Solh, those holding these views are less likely to be

the ones participating in elections. Many limit themselves to participating in intellectual

debates in the media and others remain aloof from the political dynamics of their societies.

Group 2. Those who believe that true Islam and democracy are compatible. They argue that

Islam is inherently democratic and that all of the principles and practices of democracy are

integral to it. Hence, the democratization and the Islamization of Muslim societies are more

or less the same process. Among the Islamists who belong to this group is the late Hasan

al-Turabi (d. 2016), the leader of the Islamic National Front in the Sudan.

Group 3. Those that place an emphasis on democracy in its representative forms. They

seem to be less skeptical than the members of the first two groups about the possibility of

implementing democracy in Islamic societies. Moreover, some in this group even argue

that, under the conditions of today’s world, democracy may be considered a requirement

of Islam. Certain scholars have been known to bring up historically-significant concepts

from within the Islamic tradition together with basic democratic concepts, as they are

understood in today’s world. El-Solh names two prominent Egyptian proponents of this

idea: Muhammad ‘Amara, a well-known Islamic thinker, and Shaykh Muhammad al-

Ghazali, a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.iii

For most advocates of democracy in the Muslim world, western democracy may be

compatible with Islamic society when serving as a ruling mechanism, rather than as a

democratic belief or ideology, as found in Joseph Schumpeter’s two theories of

democracy.iv That is, Islamic democracy should be connected to religion not to secularism,

as is commonly the case in the West. For these Jurists and scholars, secularism is not a

prerequisite for democracy; religion can play a significant role in democratic politics. This

group stresses that Islamic tradition contains a number of key concepts that are presented

by Muslim scholars as being the keys to ‘Islamic democracy’. They agree that it is

important for Muslims not to simply copy what non-Muslims have done when creating

democratic systems, emphasizing that legitimate democracies may take different forms.

For example, an Islamic democracy may include certain religious norms in its government.

These advocates of ‘Islamic democracy’, feel that contemporary democracies are suffering

from a major spiritual vacuum—that may be cured by Islam, by providing a framework for

combining democracy with spirituality and religious government.

Moreover, in the Muslim world, such a synthesis of spirituality and government builds on

a fundamental affirmation at the heart of Islam--the proclamation that: “There is no divinity

but The God” and the affirmation of the ‘oneness of God’, tawhid in Arabic. Such ‘oneness

of God’ requires some form of democratic system. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, a Sudanese

intellectual, argued in this respect: “No Muslim questions the sovereignty of God or the

rule of Islamic law. However, most Muslims do (and did) have misgivings about any claims

by one person that he is sovereign. The sovereignty of one man contradicts the sovereignty

of God, for all men are equal before God... Blind obedience to one-man rule is contrary to

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Islam.” In this way, it is argued that the doctrine of tawhid virtually demands a democratic

system, because humans are all created equal and any system that denies that equality is

then not Islamic (El-Effendi 2006).v Now, let us turn to the problem of ‘the other’ in the

writings of both, the advocates and rejectionists of democracy.

‘THE OTHER’ IN MODERN-DAY ISLAMIC WRITINGS

1. Advocates of democracy

The advocates of Islamic democracy see certain similarities between Islamic and

democratic systems in terms of the individuals’ rights. According to ʿAbd Al-Wahhab

Effendi, in liberal democracy, there are rights which individuals have as individuals, even

if they are in a minority. These rights are said to be ‘inalienable’ and cannot, therefore,

theoretically speaking, be violated, even by the overwhelming majority of the population.

Such violation, even if embodied in a constitution, makes the government undemocratic,

even tyrannical. One might think that the idea of ‘inalienable rights’ is not compatible with

the basic concept of democracy as ‘rule of the people’, because if ‘the people’ choose, by

majority vote, to deny a section of the population some of what the liberals consider to be

their human rights, then that is ‘the rule of the people’, thus making its veto undemocratic

(ibid.).

But on close inspection, one may see that this is not so, because equality is a fundamental

concept in democracy. It is precisely because people have an equal right to express their

own opinions as to how they should be ruled that democracy is ‘the rule of the people’. But

surely individuals have rights that are more basic than participating in decision-making,

whether directly or indirectly. In order to participate, they must be able to freely express

themselves, and so on. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the concept of

democracy, shura, and the idea of ‘inalienable rights’--that set the limits of majority rule.

Significantly, Islamic declarations on human rights in Islam acknowledge equality between

human beings, regardless their religious backgrounds. This is clearly indicated in the “Cairo

Declaration of Human Rights in Islam,” published by the Muslim World League (hereafter:

MWL) in 1990. Article 1 reads, for example:

(a) All human beings form one family, whose members are united by submission to God

and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic

obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, color,

language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations.

True faith is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human perfection.

(b) All human beings are God’s subjects, and the most loved by him are those who are most

useful to the rest of His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the

basis of piety and good deeds.vi

These new perceptions of ‘the other’ seem to accommodate the MWL’s declaration

regarding international relationships between Muslims and other nations. In its annual

conference held in Amman, Jordan, between 24-28 June 2006, the lecturers also addressed

issue such as the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as international law

and various international agreements. The summary statement from this conference reads

as follows:

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1. The relations between Islamic countries and other countries are based on peace and

the renunciation of war, mutual respect, and cooperation to achieve the common

interests of humanity.

2. The Islamic nation is not hostile to other countries that merely adhere to other

religions; it reacts with hostility only those countries that initiate hostility toward

the Islamic nation or who are detrimental to its symbols and holy sites. Jihad (war)

in Islam is a final resort done in self-defense, to repulse foreign aggression.

3. The need for overall cooperation and integration between Islamic countries, such as

the establishment of an Islamic Common Market, free economic zones, and the

ratification of various international accords.

4. There is no impediment to international agreements that promote Muslim interests,

as long as they do not contradict the principles of Islam and its rulings, and do not

lead to control by any non-Muslim international force.vii

For all intents and purposes, these declarations regarding ‘the other’ indicate a significant

shift in wasati, meaning mainstream Islamic juristic perceptions of non-Muslim minorities,

dhimmi. In fact, classic dhimmi doctrines, by means of which early Islamic law settled the

status of minorities in the Islamic nation, as well as determining the relations between

Muslims and non-Muslims, no more exists.

Most significantly, however, are the transformations within Islamic jurisprudence

regarding ‘the other’ instigated by those rejecting the general concept of democracy, as

previously described by El-Solh in his first group of Islamist attitudes towards democracy.

The Wahhabis are the most prominent members of this group, who historically not only

rejected democracy as being foreign to Islam, but also showed intolerance toward ‘others’,

both Muslim and non-Muslim. Yet, since the horrific events of nine/eleven (9/11), Wahhabi

doctrines of ‘the other’ seem to have undergone some fundamental changes, manifested by

a shift from their historic exclusivism to a new accommodation of ‘the other’.

2. Rejection of Democracy: Wahhabi Islam

Wahhabis are suspicious of foreign cultures, perhaps more than any other Islamic group.

Historically, they opposed admixtures of Islamic thought with foreign philosophies,

thereby condemning the rational school of Muʿtazila and accusing them of corrupting true

Islam by adopting some Greek philosophy. The Wahhabis rejected kalam, Islamic dogmatic

theology, including Ashʿarism, and insisted that innovations such as mysticism and

asceticism, philosophy and polemic theology, cult and ritual, are all foreign to the Qur’an.

In contemporary Wahhabi discourse, western influence on Islamic societies has been

described as an intellectual invasion (ghazw fikri) by which the West endeavors to turn the

Islamic nation away from its beliefs, in favor of western cultural perceptions. Shaykh ʿAbd

al-ʿAziz Bin Baz, considered the most authoritative contemporary Wahhabi scholar,viii has

expressed his concern regarding such ‘intellectual invasions’ on more than one occasion.

According to Bin Baz, this is nothing but a war being waged by the West in order to

influence Islamic societies via various methods, such as school curricula, printed

publications and the media. For Bin Baz, this ‘war’ is far more serious than a military war,

since it is insidious and has subtle objectives at first, such that the ‘invaded’ nation neither

perceives it, nor attempts to halt the process—thereby falling victim to it (al-Shuwayʿir

1997).ix

The Saudi Wahhabis’ negative attitude toward the West is articulated by the concept of

democracy as an integral part of western culture. The ʿ ulama, as well as the Saudi

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government, reject democracy as being incompatible with Saudi society and culture.

According to King Fahd (d. 2005), Islam provides a systematic and fully-integrated system

of governance that is not necessarily compatible with western democracy. In the King’s

words:

The democratic system that is predominant in the world is not a suitable system for the

peoples of our region. Our peoples’ makeup and unique qualities are different from those

of the rest of the world. We cannot import the methods used by people in other countries

and apply them to our people. We have our Islamic beliefs that constitute a complete and

fully-integrated system. Free elections are not within this Islamic system, which is based

on consultation [shura] and openness between the ruler and his subjects, to whom he is

fully responsible ... In my view, western democracies may be suitable in their own

countries, but they do not suit our countries (al-Siyasa, March 28, 1992). x

As one might guess, King Fahd’s main argument for rejecting democracy was the

incompatibility of democracy with Islamic values. Islam provides a: “complete and fully-

integrated system” that is consistent with Islamic society, while democracy, in its western

form, remains alien to this Islamic system, at least as conceived by the Wahhabis.

As for classic Wahhabi doctrines of ‘the other’, they clearly indicate the superiority of the

Wahhabiyya, as a Salafi movement, compared to other Islamic groups. This is reflected in

their legal opinions (fatwas) and in the writings of the highest modern Wahhabi religious

authorities, such as those of the Board of Senior ‘Ulama’ (hay’at kibar al-‘ulama’)

[hereafter: BSU] and of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal

Opinions (al-lajna al-da’ima lil -buhuth al-‘ilmiyya wal-ifta’ ) [hereafter: CRLO]. For

example, in the late 1990s, Shaykh Salih al-Fawzan, a member of the BSU, made this clear

when he stated the following:

To say that the Salafi [Wahhabi] movement resembles any other Islamic movement is

wrong. The Salafi movement is the only one that should be followed by adopting its

approach, joining it and doing jihad with it. Therefore, Muslims are not permitted to follow

any other movement, since all others are straying movements… ( al-Fridan 1999).xi

Thus, the Wahhabis maintained their intolerance toward other Islamic movements, such as

the Shiʿa. Historically, Wahhabis cast doubt on Shiʿa beliefs; therefore, eating Shiʿa food,

intermarrying with them or even shaking their hands is forbidden. Shaykh Ibn Jibrin, a

former member of the BSU, went even further when he declared the Shiʿa as rafida

(infidels), whom killing is not a sin, blatantly targeting various streams of Shiʿi Islam. In

fact, mainstream Twelver Shiʿa was denounced for its claims regarding the distortion of

the Qur’an by the Third Caliph, ʿUthman Ibn ʿAffan (r. 644-656), the negation of the

authentic Sunni Hadith corpus (which includes al-Bukhari and Muslim), and the

incorporation of new sources (based on the Twelve Imams) (al-Dawish 2000).xii

The Wahhabis were also intolerant of other monotheists (the Jews and the Christians). This

is evident at least in pre-9/11 writings and fatwas. For instance, a legal opinion on the issue

of religious unification was published by the CRLO, in which scholars rejected the public

‘call for unification of religions’, i.e. Islam, Judaism and Christianity. This call was aimed

at the promotion of tolerance among the peoples of these religions by means of joint

religious activities, such as the establishment of multi-faith prayer centers, especially in

universities and airports; the publication of the Qur’an, the Hebrew Bible and the New

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Testament in one volume; and the encouragement of joint conferences and symposia in

both the East and the West (ibid.).

The CRLO rejected these suggestions, arguing that they blatantly contradict the Islamic

principle that abrogates all previous religions. Calling for the unification of these three

monotheistic religions might be construed as a de facto admission that they are equal and

that people may adopt whichever they wish. According to the CRLO, this would involve

the denial of Islam as the purest of all the religions--the Qur’an being the only true book

and the Prophet Muhammad being the seal of all the prophets. This CRLO stance was based

on various sources, such as Q. 3:85: “If any one desires a religion other than Islam

(submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be in

the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good).” Scholars also found support in Ibn

Taymiyya’s relevant opinion:

Churches and synagogues are not God’s houses, but rather Allah’s houses are the mosques.

They (churches and synagogues) are houses of apostasy (kufr), even though God’s name is

mentioned in them. Houses are evaluated according to the creed of their people. People

who reject God’s last Prophet…are disbelievers, hence their houses are designated for the

worship practiced by disbelievers (ibid., 12: 282).

Wahhabis are also forbidden to publish the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, let alone

to bind them together with the Qur’an.

Furthermore, the CRLO considered all meetings with Jewish and Christian groups to be

both a form of acknowledgment of the validity of their religious beliefs and practices and

potentially dangerous, liable to: “enable them [Jews and Christians] to achieve … their

aims, breaking the bonds of Islam…” This statement based principally on the Qur’anic

verse (5:49): “… and follow not their vain desires, but beware of them lest they beguile

thee from any of that (teachings) which Allah hath sent down to thee…” Nonetheless, the

CRLO noted that calling non-Muslims, in general, and the People of the Book, in particular,

to Islam is not only permitted, but it is incumbent on all Muslims, as long as it is done in

accordance with the rules of Islam (ibid.).

Yet, the aforementioned Wahhabi perceptions of ‘the other’ seem to have undergone some

fundamental changes since the events of 9/11. In theory, this is manifested both by the

promotion of the concept of ‘tolerance’ in current Wahhabi religious teaching and by means

of interfaith dialogues conducted over the last decade.

From Exclusivism to Accommodation

Following 9/11, Saudi Arabia found itself under an unflattering spotlight, perhaps more

than any other country in the Middle East. The fact that fifteen of the nineteen suicidal

airplane hijackers were Saudi citizens provoked an avalanche criticism in the West, as well

as in some parts of Islamic/Arab world--criticism against Saudi religious beliefs, rulers,

social customs, educational curricula, etc. In 2003, the Kingdom faced another sort of

attack; it was attacked by al-Qaʿida or al-Qaʿida-inspired groups, including Saudi youth,

who targeted westerners, foreign embassies and government agencies. Yet, calls for

political and religious reforms, in general, and rethinking Wahhabism, in particular, have

been raised by different social and political circles in both the lower and upper classes of

Saudi society.xiii

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Indeed, in the last decade and so, one may observe changes in the Wahhabi position and a

novel openness towards other religions and cultures. That is, the Wahhabis now seem to

acknowledge non-Muslim religions, including non-monotheistic ones, and are quite likely

to shatter their self-made partitions that have been isolating them from the outside world.

Modern Wahhabis are currently stressing the importance of dialogue with ‘the other’;

‘dialogue’ has become a key term in 21st century Wahhabi discourse on ‘the other’,

‘otherness’ and tolerance. For example, in an opening speech at a conference entitled: “The

International Islamic Conference for Dialogue,” organized by the MWL and held from 4-6

June, 2008 in Mecca, Shaykh ʿAbd Al ʿAziz Al Al-Ahaykh, the Grand Mufti of the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Chairman of the Constituent Council of the MWL stated the

following:

Dialogue between people is one of life’s necessities and a means for connection,

coexistence and the exchange of interests within any nation. Indeed, there is diversity

among people in their habits and morals. They are different in their languages, colors, habits

and minds, and this is a universal truth …The diversity between people in their thoughts

and beliefs is an issue that the Holy Qur’an affirms. Allah (S.W.) says: “And if your Lord

had willed, He could have made Mankind one community; but they will not cease to differ

…” [Q.11: 118]. The importance of dialogue in Islam is shown through valuing it and

calling for it, in order to uplift people and nations, especially the call to Allah (S.W.). Allah

(S.W.) says: “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction and argue

with them in a way that is best” [Q.16: 125]. To be engaged in dialogue is human nature,

and Allah (S.W.) says: “But man has ever been, most of anything, [prone to] dispute”

[Q.18: 54] ...xiv

In the same vein, Shaykh ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Turki, the Secretary General of

the MWL, stated the following:

Dialogue is a means that derives both its legitimacy and its significance from the legitimacy

and importance of the goals it strives to achieve. Dialogue is both an authentic Qur’anic

methodology and a prophetic practice. It is a principle that is instilled in the mind of the

Islamic nation (umma) and has characterized the relations between Muslims and others

since the dawn of Islam and throughout its long history and profound heritage. It is also

based on both the magnanimity of Islam and the essence of divine law (Shariʿa), from

which Muslims derive their methodology ...xv

Thus, the Wahhabi religious leadership now encourages dialogue among nations with

diverse cultures. The following are the objectives and goals of the interfaith dialogue in the

words of the MWL:

1. To introduce Islam, its principles, humane tenets and heritage, and the great

civilization it possesses that enables it to effectively contribute to guiding the

march of human civilization.

2. To refute allegations leveled against Islam and rectify the distorted images of

Islam, its states and organizations in religious, academic and media circles.

3. To contribute to confronting challenges and to offer solutions to problems that

face humankind, as a result of their abandoning religion and departing from its

principles and values, an act that led to the suffering of mankind from injustice,

vice, terrorism, violations of human rights, and pollution of the environment

that God Almighty has bestowed on them.

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4. To support and defend just causes pertaining to human-rights violations and to

form international public opinion that supports such causes and helps achieve

their legitimate demands.

5. To expose those promoting the clash of civilizations [e.g., Samuel Huntington]

and ‘end-of-history’ theories [e.g., Francis Fukuyama]. To reject claims that

Islam is an enemy of contemporary civilization, thereby inculcating

Islamophobia in the minds of people—causing people to fear Islamic global

domination and the dissemination of a single culture.

6. To acquaint ourselves with people of other faiths and their cultures and together

to establish common principles that achieve peaceful co-existence and security

of human society worldwide. To cooperate with each other in spreading ethical

values, truth, benevolence and peace, and to challenge hegemony, exploitation,

injustice, moral deviation, family breakdown, and other evils that threaten

societies.

7. To solve problems and disputes that may occur between Muslims and others in

countries and communities, whether as majorities or minorities. To secure an

atmosphere suitable for national and social co-existence.

8. To achieve understanding with humane cultures and civilizations, as well as to

urge Muslims to join multi-civilization arrangements of mankind and use this

understanding to achieve and maintain world peace.

9. To interact and communicate with the followers of Islamic schools-of-thought,

in order to achieve the unity of the Muslim umma [Community of Islam] and to

lessen fanaticism and antagonism.xvi

In practice, both the Saudi government and the Wahhabi religious establishment have

sponsored several international conferences, meetings and seminars for dialogue in Saudi

Arabia and abroad over the last decade. Initially, these meetings were confined to

participation only by believers in monotheistic religions. According to King ʻAbd Allah (d.

2014): “The idea is to ask representatives of all monotheistic religions to sit together … as

we all believe in the same God.”xvii However, such dialogues were expanded to include

non-monotheistic participants, as shown below. In this regard, Prince Turki al-Faysal noted

that: “In these times, we must all learn to speak in God’s language, that is, one of love and

respect for people of all faiths, races and nationalities.”xviii

In June 2004, the Saudi government hosted the first International Islamic Conference on

Dialogue in Mecca, followed by a long series of conferences and workshops that took place

all over the world: New York, Madrid, Vienna, Almaty (Kazakhstan), Buenos Aires,

Tokyo, Colombo (Sri Lanka), Taipei, Taiwan and recently Hong Kong (China).xix A large

number of participants (scholars, researchers, preachers, religious leaders, representatives

of public relations agencies and other institutions concerned with dialogue between human

cultures and civilizations) participated in these conferences. A quick glimpse at the final

statements and declarations of these conferences indicates that dialogue is used as the

fundamental apparatus for communication between the various religions and cultures. For

example, the conference summation from the above Mecca International Conference, also

known also the “Mecca Declaration” addressed: “all governments, organizations and

peoples, irrespective of their religions and cultures,” urging them to undertake the

following:

1. To foster understanding between themselves and [Muslims], who believe in

God, the Creator, worship Him alone and seek the guidance He revealed to His

prophets and messengers.

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2. To challenge injustice, tyranny, despotism and hegemony, and to help each

other in ending wars, conflicts and international problems. To work together to

promote a culture of tolerance and dialogue, and to support institutions

promoting dialogue. To use dialogue as a means for achieving understanding,

cooperation and world peace. To desist from wasting human resources and to

stop the exploitation of individuals’ talents for the productions of weapons of

mass destruction that threaten the future of the Earth.

3. To cooperate with each other for the promotion of moral values and the building

of international ethical arrangements that resist the attack of moral deviation,

combat extra-marital relationships and provide solutions for the dangers

surrounding the family in a manner that secures the right of all to live within

happy families.

4. To work together as inhabitants of the Earth, according to the wish of God, who

sanctioned our Forefather, Adam, and his progeny to reform the Earth and halt

aggression, for the right of the coming generations to live in an environment

devoid of all types of pollution. To minimize the dangers of environmental

damage by means of common actions that seek to lessen the consequences of

pollution and to guide industrial, technological advancement.

5. To cooperate with the world community in eliminating corruption and

unhappiness, which need to be remedied through the mercy of God, which is

the essence of the message sent to the Prophet Muhammad: “We sent thee not

but as a mercy for all creatures” [Q. 21:107].

This conference also recommended the establishment of an international center for the

interaction of civilizations.xx

In 2008, two more conferences were conducted in Madrid and at the U.N. in New York, at

which the Saudi delegates expressed their commitments to international human rights,

cultural pluralism and freedom for all nations.xxi This is clearly stated in the closing remarks

given at a press conference by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faysal, stressing

the commitment of Saudi Arabia to the aforementioned goals and principles, as they appear

in the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Assembly acknowledged the Saudi initiative, calling for the

broadening of intercultural dialogue and global support for religious tolerance.xxii

Most important are the Wahhabi attempts to theorize and conceptualize ‘dialogue’ vis-à-

vis daʻwa. Much has been written on this issue under the auspices of the MWL, all

indicating the symbiotic connection between daʻwa and dialogue. For example, in an article

entitled “Dialogue and its objectives in the Qur’an and Sunna,” Saʻd b. Ali al-Shahrani, the

MWL Secretary General, asserted that:

… civilized dialogue with the West is considered an application of the principle of verbal

jihad… Dialogue falls under jihad by tongue, which is a great field and a suitable situation

from which Muslims can benefit in order to accomplish one of the duties of our religion,

which is the Call (daʿwa) to Allah (S.W.) with wisdom, good advice and reasoning in the

best manner. The Call, the invitation to Islam, and expounding the good and the virtues of

this religion are the highest and the most sublime objectives of dialogue...xxiii

According to al-Shahrani, daʿwa cannot be conducted as a one-sided monologue, but

should be done via dialogue. One should not abolish another; as such, a statement like: “We

are always right and the other is always wrong” merely obstructs the path of dialogue, as

well as being unrealistic in most cases. Al-Shahrani found support in the Qur’an that: “puts

interlocutors on the same level, whatever their convictions;” thus, “in dialogue, the truth

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does not belong to one party, but both parties are involved in the journey to find it

together.”xxiv Also, Al-Shahrani quoted the Quran [Q. 34: 24], relating to the Prophet’s

dialogue with idolaters: “Say, ‘Who provides for you from the heavens and the earth?’ Say,

‘Allah.’ Indeed, we or you are either well-guided or clearly in error.”xxv Yet, al-Shahrani

stresses that daʻwa and dialogue: “should be impartial, magnanimous, flexible, lenient and

open, without compromising convictions or retracting the constants, but argued in the best

manner.”xxvi

In fact, the new Wahhabi openness towards other cultures and communities has

significantly expanded to include even non-monotheistic religions and cultures. A good

example comes from a conference held recently in Hong Kong on 18-19 November, 2015,

entitled: “Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence.” There were a large number of participants

(scholars, researchers, leaders and members of different religions and cultures) from Hong

Kong and East Asia. According to the organizers, this conference discussed four major

themes: religious and cultural dialogue; cultural diversity in Hong Kong; human values in

multi-cultural societies; and religion and the culture of peaceful coexistence.xxvii For

Shaykh Abdullah b. ʻAbd al-Muhsin al-Turki, the Secretary General of the MWL, these

conferences aim: “at achieving the global peace and noble values for which the world is

longing, in a world where values are declining.”xxviii

The final message, written and published by the conference participants relates to the

importance of dialogue, while stressing universal principles and values of tolerance. It calls

for the development of better appreciation between the peoples of the world, for more

peaceful coexistence and for the promotion of noble, universal human values, as follows:

1. All men are equal in human dignity; divine honor includes everyone. [God] has

endowed [human beings] with minds and the ability to procreate and inhabit the

Earth. All this has come to be according to God’s design, as brought by the divine

messages.

2. Humanity’s different religions, cultures and races are ordained by Allah. They are

one of His signs … “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the Earth,

and the diversity of your languages and your colors. Indeed in that are signs for

those of knowledge” [Q. 30: 22].

3. Religiously and culturally diverse communities call for the establishment of fair

partnerships within social contracts approved by everyone. Such accords are best

used to attain the maximal diversity of visions for the sake of enriching civil and

cultural life, and to achieve national development …“O Mankind, indeed, We have

created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may

know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most

righteous of you” [Q. 49: 13].

4. Ethnic or cultural superiority must be rejected outright, and unjust images of racial

discrimination must be denounced … “O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you

from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many

men and women” [Q. 4: 1].

5. The divine messages’ basic tenets have been revealed to promote peace and

compassion among all peoples and to provide human civilization with moral and

spiritual values, so that it may take advantage of its achievement. They have been

sent down also to preserve the environment and to protect the Earth from pollution

and hazards. xxix

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For the Muslim participants, the call to dialogue was inspired by Islamic principles--to

establish of a world of justice, peace and compassion. According to the MWL, Muslims

now want to initiate fresh, positive relations between civilized nations; however, they must

be based on mutual respect and cooperation among the Earth’s inhabitants, in order to

secure human prosperity and security. The challenges threatening the future of Humanity

must be thwarted; religious leaders should be invited to stand together to face these

challenges. Together, they should build bridges of communication in support of virtuous

values and, thus, achieve the cooperation necessary in order to correct the path of human

progress.xxx

CONCLUSION

The modern-day Islamic jurisprudence on relations with non-Muslims seems to have

undergone fundamental changes and developments. The classical dhimmi doctrines that

often stressed the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims no longer exist in Islamic

contemporary wasati (mainstream) writings. This transition is now reflected in various

writings, fatwas and declarations, regarding relations between Muslims and the rest of the

world.

Most interestingly, however, is the Wahhabi case. Here, one thing is certain; the events of

9/11 and the subsequent criticism of Wahhabi Islam, as being ‘the cradle of violent

extremists’, triggered the need for Wahhabi self-examination on the issues of ‘the other’

and tolerance. It is also clear that prominent Wahhabis have acknowledged the problematic

nature of the traditional doctrine of ‘the saved sect’. An internal process was set in motion

to reconfigure the relevant Wahhabi religious and ideological concepts. It became

necessary to address the negative image that had been created of Islam, in general, and of

Wahhabi Islam, in particular. Accordingly, the Saudi government, with the full support and

cooperation of the official Wahhabi religious establishment, initiated a number of programs

to encourage both internal discourse and external dialogue, meant to promote universal

values in regard to tolerance and pluralism and to improve international communication.

This transformative process is manifested on both the theoretical and the practical levels.

Wahhabi scholars are reinterpreting and redefining key traditional, doctrinal concepts, such

as: loyalty, enmity, jihad, Islamic dissemination and intercultural communication, as

presented in the ‘National Vision’. These new interpretations represent a fundamental shift

in the Wahhabi perception of ‘the other’. For example, ‘enmity’ is no longer expressed as

hatred toward or shunning of ‘the other’, but rather as the accomodating ‘agreeing to

disagree’. This is evident in the new attitude being displayed towards Sufis, Christians and

other minorities in Saudi Arabia today. In fact, post-9/11, Wahhabis are now ready to meet

and enact dialogue with people from other religions and cultures, as illustrated by the

national and international interfaith/intercultural conferences sponsored by the Saudi

government, displaying unprecedented openness.

Overall, modern-day Islamic jurisprudence acknowledges the legitimacy of ‘the other’

perhaps more than ever before, thus, accommodating itself to another fundamental principle

of democracy--equality. Thus, another obstacle on the path to the democratization of

Islamic governance has been removed, potentially paving the way to the establishment of

an ‘Islamic democracy’.

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i Huntingdon Samuel (1993), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth

Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. ii Lewis Bernard “Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East.”

Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005. iii El-Solh Raghid, “Islamists Attitudes towards Democracy.” British Journal of Middle

Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1988), 57-63. iv Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 2nd ed. Floyd, VA:

Impact Books, 2014. v El-Effendi Abdelwahab, “Democracy and its (Muslim) Critics: An Islamic Alternative

of Democracy. In: Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates, and Philosophical

Perspectives, M.A. Muqtedar Khan (ed.). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006, pp. 227-

256. viThis Declaration is available online at:

http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html, accessed September 7,

2016. vii This Declaration is available online at: http://www.iifa-aifi.org/2221.html, accessed

September 7, 2016. viii Bin Baz filled a long series of important international and local religious functions.

Among the most outstanding in Saudi Arabia were his roles as the Head of the Dar al-Ifta

(1975-1999) and Grand Mufti of the Kingdom from 1993 until his death in May 1999, at

the age of 89. ix See Bin Baz’s legal opinion regarding this in Muhammad bin Sa‘d al-Shuway‘ir (ed.),

Majmu‘ fatawa wa-maqalat mutanawwi‘a, 13 vols. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Ma‘arif, 1997,

3:438-346. x al-Siyasa, March 28, 1992. xi Fatwa No. 209 in ʿAdil al-Fridan, Al-Muntaqa min Fatawa Fadilat al-Shaykh Salih b.

Fawzan b. ‘Abd Allah al-Fawzan. Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risalah, 1999, 1: 361; see also

the interview with Shaykh Ibn Baz regarding this, in al-Muslimun, 28 July1996. xii Fatwa No.11461 in A. al-Dawish, Fatawa al-Lajna al-Da’ima lil-Buhuth al-‘Ilmiyya

wal-Ifta’ wal-Da‘wa wal-Irshad. Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Abikan, 2000, Vol.2, pp.165-166. xiiiFor example, Senator John McCain said that Saudi Arabia had satisfied extremists at

home by allowing them to ‘have the megaphone’ and even financing some such groups.

Similarly, Senator Joseph Lieberman explained that the Saudis were trying to ‘ride the

back of this tiger [al-Qaʿida]’. Senator Joseph Biden, on the other hand, accused the

Saudis of ‘having to essentially buy off their extreme groups in order to maintain

themselves’. Laurent Murawiec went even further by describing Saudi Arabia as the

‘kernel of evil’, arguing that Saudis ‘are active at every level of the terror chain, from

planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader’. See

respectively, “Senators jump on anti-Saudi bandwagon,” Middle East Economic Survey,

No. 44 (29 October 2001); E. Sciolino & N. MacFarquhar, “Naming of hijackers as

Saudis may further erode ties to U.S.,” New York Times, 25 October 2001; Washington

Post, 6 August 2002. xiv Muslim World League, The International Islamic Conference for Dialogue: Makkah

al-Mukarramah, 21-24. Available at: http://en.themwl.org/content/international-islamic-

conference-dialogue, last access, September 7, 2016. xv Ibid. xvi Muslim World League, The International Islamic Conference for Dialogue, ibid., 631-

632.

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xvii King Abd Allah’s call has been reported by Saudi and international media. See, for

example, http://worldnews.about.com/od/saudiarabia/qt/abdullahfaith.htm, last access,

September 7, 2016). xviii Al-Faysal Turki, “We are trying hard to change,” USA Today, 4 June 2006. xix Al-Hayat, 8 June 2004. xx ‘Ayn al-Yaqin, 17 June 2008. xxi Al-Hayat, 7 June 2008 and 8 November 2008; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 November 2008. xxii Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 November 2008. xxiii Muslim World League, The International Islamic Conference for Dialogue, 117. xxiv Ibid., 260. xxv Ibid. xxvi Ibid. xxvii http://en.themwl.org/final-communique-dialogue-and-peaceful-coexistence-

Conference-hong-kong, last access, September 7, 2016. xxviii Ibid. xxix Available online at: http://en.themwl.org/final-communique-dialogue-and-peaceful-

coexistence-Conference-hong-kong, last access, September 7, 2016. xxx http://en.themwl.org/final-communique-dialogue-and-peaceful-coexistence-

Conference-hong-kong, last access, September 7, 2016.