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Rethinking Conflict: Perspectives from the Insight Approach
By Neil Sargent, Cheryl Picard, and Marnie Jull
Abstract
In this article, the authors present the “insight approach” to conflict as an analytical and
methodological framework that addresses the dynamic interactions between conflicting parties.
According to the insight approach, conflict is relational, dynamic, and adaptive, generated from
the responsive interpretive frameworks that parties use to construct meaning. Conflict arises as a
result of parties’ experience of what insight theorists call “threats-to-cares”, which generates
defend-attack patterns of interaction between them. The authors suggest that rethinking the
nature of conflict so that it is seen as an interaction embedded in meaning-making enables
conflict interveners to help parties gain insight into, and articulate, the values that are being
generated, advanced, threatened, and realigned within the complex interactions that define us
as social beings. In doing so, parties develop abilities to generate new patterns, and solutions
that can limit and even eliminate the experiences of threat that generate conflict between them.
Introduction
Intervening in a conflict requires the practitioner to ask some deceptively simple questions: What
is going on here? How did this situation arise? What should I say or do next? Which strategy
would best help the parties now? The questions are deceptively simple because the answers are
based in a practitioner’s training and experience that bring together implicit, explicit, and
complex theories about conflict, human behavior and the nature of social interaction.
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This paper describes five perspectives about conflict that guide the strategies and
behaviors of practitioners trained in the insight approach to conflict. The “insight approach” was
first articulated in 2001, after researchers applied Bernard Lonergan’s (1992) theory of cognition
to empirically analyze successful strategies and operations in mediation (see Picard 2003; Picard
and Melchin 2007. Generating a dynamic movement between theory and practice, this paper
continues to refine the methodology and shape the theory of the insight approach. The paper’s
largely theoretical articulation of what we call an “interactionist” perspective on conflict is
intended to advance not only the work of insight practitioners but practitioners and theorists
engaged at all levels of conflict work, from the interpersonal to the international.
The insight approach is most fully introduced in Kenneth Melchin and Cheryl Picard’s
Transforming Conflict through Insight (2008). As the practice of insight mediation has
developed, it has become clearer how the theory of conflict embedded in this approach differs
from other conflict approaches. Picard and Melchin discussed these differences in an earlier
Negotiation Journal (2007) article, arguing that interest-based practitioners (Fisher and Ury
1981) have focused on the conflict problem with a pragmatic view to reaching settlement, while
narrative (Winslade and Monk, 2000) and transformative (Bush and Folger, 2005) mediators take
a more relational approach that shifts them away from an exploration of the conflict problem to
generate a new narrative or to achieve empowerment and recognition.
In this paper, we explore the distinct features of the insight approach primarily in
comparison to the interest-based approach as a way to generate dialogue directed at deepening
our collective understanding of conflict theory and conflict intervention practice. In making
comparisons, we want to make it clear that it is not our intent to minimize the effectiveness of
interest-based negotiation or disregard the contributions of transformative, narrative, or other
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approaches. Readers familiar with any of these approaches will recognize some of our shared
ideas, practices, and concerns. But despite these overlapping ideas, the insight approach does
have differing theoretical roots and, as a result, distinct strategies that set it apart from other
approaches.
The Insight Approach
The insight approach adopts an interactionist perspective that views human behavior as
fundamentally relational (Mead 1934; Niebuhr 1963; Laing, Phillipson, and Lee 1966; Taylor
1989; Winslade and Monk 2000; Bush and Folger 2005). As individuals, we do not stand outside
of the environment in which we seek to act, but are always part of the environment toward which
our actions are directed. Consequently, any changes in the conditions of that environment
necessarily have an effect on our consciousness and how we reflexively interpret our position or
standing within that environment. We are responsive actors as well as purposive actors; our
actions generate responses in others that have consequences for ourselves, consequences that are
not necessarily predictable in terms of the goals that motivated our actions in the first place
(Mead 1938; Niebuhr 1963; Waldrop 1992).
According to the insight approach, conflict emerges out of this responsive interactive
framework by which people make meaning out of their environment and seek to realize what
matters to them – their cares. Cares, in this approach, are understood to include more than the
pursuit of our individual or collective interests, needs, or values. They also include our value-
based expectations of other’s behavior, our assumptions of how people ought to act, the
presumed patterns of co-operation we consider necessary, and our value-based judgments of
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progress and decline that we perceive in the behaviors and intentions of ourselves and others.
Conflict thus arises from a person’s subjective experience of what insight theorists have called
“threat-to-cares” that in turn creates in that person a “defend” response, a response that can then
be seen as an “attack” on what matters to other people (Melchin and Picard 2008).
Our cares, therefore, are not just our own concerns, but also involve us in judgments
about how other people ought to behave and how the world ought to be ordered. These
judgments can account for the intensity attached to the conflict, even when it may seem to an
outsider that the conflict is only over a small issue. Thus because cares are relational and involve
the social identities of the parties, elements of identity-based conflict arise even in situations that
are more typically thought of as interest-based or distributive in nature.1
According to the insight approach, conflict arises when people perceive an actual or
perceived threat to their desires, disruptions of their expected patterns of co-operation, and/or
value based judgments of decline. These experiences of threat drive the intensity or tenacity
with which parties in conflict maintain a position or seek to overcome or defeat the other. In
turn, these defensive responses can often be experienced by the other party as an “attack” on
what he or she values. Insight practitioners explore “defend-attack” patterns of interaction to
generate insight into these threat experiences, insights that can help parties develop new patterns
of interaction in which the cares of each party can co-exist without the generation of threat.
Resolution, according to the insight approach, occurs through a process of learning in which
people adjust their interpretive frameworks; an adjustment that can have a significant and lasting
influence beyond solving the conflict at hand. When the parties and the intervener attend to, and
gain insight into what is threatening the cares of the parties in conflict and how they interpret
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those threats, opportunities for new interpretations emerge, different responses become possible,
and change in conflict behaviour patterns can occur.
Practitioners of the insight approach pay close attention to the defend responses of parties
because they can be key to understanding both their patterns of interaction and the cares that
underlie their conflict dynamic. At the interpersonal level, addressing emotions is an important
strategy because emotions reveal to the mediator, or to the parties, the experiences of threat-to-
cares that are so central to the defend-attack patterns in conflict (Melchin and Picard 2008). For
individuals, feelings signal whether our cares are affirmed or violated. Insight approach
practitioners understand that although the values in a conflict can be obscure, the feelings and
defensive responses that the conflict arouses are more visible. Organizations also respond to
perceived threat-to-cares through defend-attack responses although an organization itself cannot
experience emotions. Defend-attack decisions, policies, and actions in response to threats to
organizational values or concerns are clearly visible in the daily operations of government,
business, and communities as well as in conflicts around the globe.
Drawing on the theoretical foundations of Lonergan’s (1992) work on cognition and
learning, insight approach theorists and practitioners have developed practical strategies to help
parties to achieve insightinto their experiences of threat, which have become manifest in defend-
attack patterns of interaction. When parties learn about what matters to others, why those things
matter, and how what matters is perceived to be threatened, their reasoning about the intent of
the other often changes. This new found uncertainty about the other generates curiosity and a
willingness to talk and listen to each other. The insights gained through new interpretations and
understandings are what diminish the threat response and enable parties to find new possibilities
in which their cares can be accommodated without generating threat.
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To facilitate these insights, insight mediators use distinct skills to explore the interpretive
process through which the parties make meaning (Picard and Melchin 2007). These insights are
achieved through deepening conversations that enable parties to shift the conflict onto new
ground and toward new possibilities for change because their perceptions of threat are reduced or
eliminated. To facilitate these deepening conversations, insight mediators also use practices
familiar to interest-based, transformative, narrative and other conflict practitioners such as
reflective listening, strategic questioning, and reframing.
Key Elements of the Insight approach
Five core ideas lie at the heart of the insight approach to mediation. They are:
• Conflict is relational.
• Conflict is dynamic and adaptive.
• Conflict emerges from meaning-making.
• Values are always operating within a conflict.
• Communication involves interpretation as well as intention.
Each of these ideas and their implications is explained below.
The Relational Aspects of Conflict
Like the narrative and transformative approaches to conflict, the idea that human beings are
social actors, not just individual actors, is fundamental to the insight approach. We live our lives
within networks of relationships that are meaningful to us and from which we generate a sense of
our own identity (Merton 1968; Kidder and Stewart 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1987;
Moses 1990; Winslade and Monk 2000; Bush and Folger 2005). As G.H. Mead (1934 ) pointed
out, it is by imagining ourselves as others see us that we first become self-conscious, reflexive
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actors capable of observing and controlling our own behavior, even our own desires. Thus we
tend to be conscious of how others respond to us, and we relate to others in ways that both
generate and reinforce our own sense of identity.2
Our actions take place in social contexts, directed not only toward the realization of our
own goals but also designed to influence the ways in which others perceive and respond to us.
Our actions have impacts on our relations with others, sometimes indirectly and unintentionally.
Each person is both an actor, who seeks to modify his or her own environment in a purposive,
goal-directed way, and respondent, who perceives his or her own environment to be affected by
the behavior of others. Thus we argue that the behavior of parties can only be understood within
an interactionist framework – a framework that views each action as both an initiation on the
part of the actor and as a response to the perceived actions of others. Every action is both
initiation and response; just as every actor is both actor and respondent.
This relational understanding of human behavior differs from that of individualist
thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli, who start from the assumption that
humans are fundamentally self-referential actors, whose needs and desires are generated
internally, rather than relationally through the individual’s interaction with his or her social
environment. From this individualist perspective, if we want to understand the causes of conflict
behavior, we need to start by considering the interests and needs of the individual parties. Each
party is seen as the source of his or her own interests and needs, and as the author of his or her
own actions, almost as if the actor existed outside of any social relations with others (Niebuhr
1963; Taylor, 1989; Winslade and Monk 2000: 33).
Interest-based approaches to negotiation and mediation tend to depict conflict in
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individualist terms – as a competition or struggle arising out of perceived incompatibility of the
parties’ goals and interests. According to this interest-based understanding of conflict, if Party A
seeks to achieve a goal and Party B is viewed as having goals incompatible with this objective,
conflict may arise between parties A and B. The conflict takes the form of a struggle in which
each party seeks to achieve his or her own goals at the expense of, or in spite of, other parties. It
is each party’s perception of the other as an obstacle to the realization of his or her own goals
that fuels the conflict between them, sometimes resulting in bitter and protracted conflict.
Because obstacles must be overcome, and because overcoming such obstacles is often expensive,
difficult, and time-consuming, the costs of conflict – especially ones in which the parties are
relatively evenly matched in terms of resources - are often very high.
This calculus of the costs and benefits of protracted conflict to the parties themselves
tends to be the focal point around which interest-based conflict intervention approaches are
primarily oriented. Emphasis is placed on mutual gains, and the identification of shared or
“tradeable” interests that can provide the foundation for a mutually satisfying resolution to the
conflict (Walton and McKersie 1965; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991).
Interest based negotiators or mediators concentrate on helping the parties become “joint
problem-solvers,” who can each achieve more of their goals through collaboration and joint -
decision making than through competition and struggle (Axelrod 1984, 1997).
According to interest-based views of conflict, parties are rational, goal-seeking actors,
whose primary concern is with their own welfare and achieving their goals in an environment
that imposes constraints on their capacity to do so (Heath 1976). They seek to modify their own
environments to achieve their own ends – taking purposive, goal-directed, and future-oriented
action. This expectation is the basis for the concept of “rational choice” decision-making: what
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is the most rational decision I can make to achieve my desired goals in the future given what I
know about the state of affairs in the environment towards which my action is directed? (Heath
1976; Coleman and Fararo 1992). In the interest-based approach, parties are generally seen to
make autonomous choices based on a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of foreseeable
outcomes.
A view of the parties as rational, future-oriented decision-makers, however, can fail to
take into account the reflexive, two-sided dimensions of purposive human action (Mead 1934,
1938; Niebuhr 1963; Buckley 1967; Oakeshott 1975; Spector 1983; Sandywell 1996). As H.
Richard Niebuhr wrote, all purposive action looks backwards to a past that it is intended to be a
response to, as well as forward to a future that it seeks to amend (1963). Consequently, no action
ever commences with an act of the will, or with the formulation of an intention all purposive
action arises instead as the actor’s response to something in his or her environment (Mead 1938;
Niebuhr 1963; Buckley 1967).
The actor thus looks forward in time, purposively, toward a future that she seeks to
modify in accordance with her goals or intentions, and also looks backward, reflexively, basing
her actions on her interpretation of the circumstances that compelled her to act in the first place.3
Any purposive action or decision is, therefore, contingent, because it involves the testing of the
actor’s hypothesis about his environment, and is itself generated as a product of that very
hypothesis (Buckley 1967; Argyris, Putnam and McLain Smith 1985).
With this in mind, insight approach theorists do not define conflict as a struggle or
contest between two or more goal-directed actors pursuing incompatible goals. Instead, they
believe conflict emerges out of the the parties’reflexive experience of a threat to their deeply
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held desires, values, or patterns of normative expectations, and the behavioral responses that
such perceived threats elicit (Picard and Melchin 2007; Melchin and Picard 2008).
How we theoretically define what is going on in conflict can have important implications
for how we respond to it. If we define the conflict in terms of interest incompatibility or as a
struggle over competing aspirations, then it follows that mediators will seek to help parties
achieve their goals or realize their respective aspirations. Proponents of transformative and
narrative mediation approaches advocate alternative objectives to the interest-based focus on
problem solving to reach settlement. In transformative mediation, the goal is “empowerment and
recognition” (Bush and Folger 2005) and in narrative mediation it is the “generation of a new
story” (Winslade and Monk 2000). Because insight mediators believe that conflict is generated
reflexively from the parties’ experience of threat’ they focus on addressing the parties’ dynamic
interaction to help them find ways in which both parties’ cares can be maintained without
engendering threat in the other.
The following case study illustrates our argument that attending to the interactive nature
of conflict behavior is necessary and also highlights the relational generation of threats-to-cares.4
The conflict involved two co-workers in a library: Teresa, a new staff member, and Danny, a
long-time employee. When Teresa became an advocate for increased computerization within the
library, Danny experienced this as a threat to his competence and seniority within the workplace.
Danny complained to his fellow workers; for their own reasons, they responded by developing a
‘coalition of the unwilling’ to resist Teresa’s advocacy of workplace change. Teresa was taken
aback because she believed she was responding to staff consultations by moving toward a unified
approach to customer service. For her part, Teresa felt threatened and responded by escalating
her own efforts to overcome this resistance by holding focus groups and other efforts designed
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to argue the case for change and potentially recruit senior management in support of her cause.
The possibility that management would intervene into what had until then been a
horizontal workplace team discussion further heightened Danny and his co-workers’ sense of
threat, reinforcing their perception that Teresa was advancing her own agenda at their expense.
Increasingly, they treated Teresa as an outsider, further undermining her efforts to convince her
fellow-workers that her ideas had merit. As the stakes for each side grew, they lobbied for
support and pulled more people into the conflict. The escalating costs of the conflict rippled
throughout the organization.
From an insight perspective, it makes little sense to view these participants as rational
actors pursuing their goals independently of each other. The actions of each have consequences
for the other and for the workplace that they both inhabit, consequences that are not necessarily
predictable in advance nor directly attributable to the intentions or motives behind the initiating
action. In this co-evolutionary environment (Kauffman 1995), actions often have unforeseen or
unintended consequences, as when Teresa’s efforts to enlist management in support of her
proposal for library computerization had the effect of increasing Danny’s sense of threat and
making him and his co-workers more suspicious of any subsequent efforts on her part to re-
engage with them and de-escalate or defuse the conflict.
The experience of threats-to-cares is thus both simultaneously cause and effect of the
escalating conflict dynamic between the parties, and drives much of the pattern of defend-attack
behavior on both sides. Within an interest-based model, the focus of intervention might be on
assisting the parties to identify common interests as a basis for a negotiated resolution to the
conflict. But a problem-solving approach such as this tends to emphasize the rational pursuit of
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interests at the expense of disregarding the relational pattern of interactions that generate the
perception of threat within the conflict dynamic. As one can see in the above case, Danny’s
complaints organized his colleagues in unpredictable ways, while management’s potential
intervention was an unintended consequence of Teresa’s frustrated communication. In this case,
the conflict is both relational and non-linear: the causes and effects are complex and
unpredictable, embedded in different interpretive frameworks, organizational relations, histories,
and values.
The Dynamic and Adaptive Aspects of Conflict
Humans are social actors whose motivations are not just internal to themselves, but arise out of
the particular patterns of social, cultural, religious, political and/or economic relationships
through which we derive our identities. It follows then that if those patterns of relationships
change or – perhaps more important – if our perception of those patterns of relationships change,
then what matters to us may also change. We are constantly influenced by the environments we
inhabit, both physical and social, while our actions also affect those environments, generating a
dynamic, interactive relationship between the person and his world. A change in this interaction
can cause changes at another point in the interaction, in ways difficult to predict in advance
(Buckley 1967; Watzlawick et al. 1974; Spector 1983; Waldrop 1992; Kaufman 1995). Thus, a
model of dynamic, adaptive change is a critical element of our theory of conflict analysis and
resolution.
We cannot always predict the results of our actions, how they may affect us, and how
they may affect others. Particularly in a conflictual situation, our actions may have unintended
consequences. Thus, we should not analyze a conflict by reference only to the parties’ intentions
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as if they are chess players moving pieces on a board. In an emergent theory of conflict the board
may also keep moving, so to speak; so that the players have to decide not only what kinds of
moves to make in response to the other party’s actions; but also what kind of game they are now
playing - is it chess or chequers?
In many conflicts, the parties themselves often disagree about the nature of the conflict
itself or feel uncertain about exactly what kind of conflict they are involved in. A change in the
circumstances of the conflict, or an action by the other party, can increase a party’s uncertainty.
One way to manage this uncertainty is to become even more fixed and inflexible in how one
defines the nature of the particular conflict. And, of course, how we define the conflict
influences what we do with it.
The case of Danny and Teresa illustrates this phenomenon. Danny’s defensive response
to Teresa’s proposals for change set off an escalating cycle of interpretation-action-
interpretation-response sequences, in which the response elicited from the previous action was
often contrary to what the initiating actor intended. Teresa’s efforts to enlist management’s
support to overcome Danny and his co-workers’ resistance had the exact opposite effect that she
desired, by increasing their suspicion of her motives, and causing them to ‘circle the wagons’
against what they perceived as the threat from an ‘outsider’.
At the same time, Danny’s escalated response to Teresa’s efforts had the paradoxical
effect of making him more vulnerable in his job, by making it easier for Teresa and her allies in
management to call him an ‘obstructionist.’ To this extent, he seemed to be working against his
own long- term job-security interests. In each instance, the parties’ diminished each other’s
efforts to achieve their objectives through purposive goal-directed action via the definition that
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they imposed on the conflict. We can be prisoners of the labels imposed on us by others.
The Emergence of Conflict from Meaning-Making
Human beings develop our ideas and worldviews based on our own experiences and via
education and acculturation. We develop cognitive maps or frames of meaning that we use to
organize and manage complex information and stimuli and make sense of our own and others’
experiences (Berger and Luckman 1966; Goffman 1974; Thaler 1984,1999; Beach 1997).
Our cognitive maps, then, shape our understanding of our experiences. We each call on
multiple cognitive maps or frames of meaning, through which we make sense of our experience
and others’ action. This is why different people will often interpret the same action in different
ways. The similarities or differences in our interpretations do not follow only from the precise
data that we each observed – they also emerge from the interpretive frames we impose upon that
data. What Teresa from our case study intended as an objective observation about the state of
affairs in a particular workplace, Danny interpreted as a threat. The insight approach arises from
the idea that perceptions influence behavior and that how parties define the situations they find
themselves in influences the nature of their responses to those situations. Research in behavioral
psychology has shown that the way in which decision-makers frame problems significantly
affects the nature of the solutions that they propose (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986;
Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Thaler 1984, 1999; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990;
Bazerman and Neale 1992). Similarly, psychologists studying perception have demonstrated that
the mind does not directly experience the objects that the senses appear to present to the mind.
Rather, the mind draws what are called ‘“perceptual inferences”‘ from the sensory data and from
these inferences constructs mental representations or mental images (Beach 1997). Thus even
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our knowledge of physical objects is not generated directly from our senses but cognitively
constructed by our minds. This process of drawing inferences from the sensory data provided by
the senses enables us to organize, control, and manipulate our environment.
What is true of our encounters with objects in the physical world is even truer of our
encounters with other minds. We attribute meaning to the behavior of others, although we can
never actually read their minds to know for certain their true attitudes or intentions toward us.
Consequently, we must draw inferences from their observable actions. We form ideas about how
other people think to attribute motivations to their behavior, and we are often correct. We
constantly interpret our environment for clues as to how to respond to other humans. Our
response to the actions of others is determined not only by the material consequences of their
actions on us, but also by the inferences we draw about them and their intentions toward us,
inferences which we then rely on to orient our own actions towards them (Jervis 1976; Jonsson
1990).
If we interpret someone’s actions toward us as hostile, then we are likely to respond in a
manner consistent with that interpretation – we too become defensive, and quite possibly, hostile
and our response will often reflect that hostility, which can, in turn, generate hostile responses..
Research has shown that observers have a tendency to attribute dispositional tendencies to
others, while regarding their own behavioral responses to be more influenced by situational
factors (Jonsson 1990), a phenomenon that some conflict researchers have called the “attribution
error” (Deutsch 1991; Folger, Poole, and Stutman 2001).Thus, we are often guilty of adopting a
“double standard”‘ when evaluating conflict interactions: we interpret our own responses as
normal and appropriate, while viewing the responses of our opponents as unreasonable and even
malevolent (Jervis 1976).) We can observe this process of cumulative attribution errors (Jonnson
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1990) in the case of Danny and Teresa. Teresa characterized Danny’s responses to her
suggestions for change as threats to her goal of workplace improvement and thus reacted
accordingly. He then reacted to her advocacy for change and her enlistment of management
support with distrust, and responded accordingly by increasing his resistance. To understand the
dynamics of their mutually hostile interaction, we should look not just at Danny’s perceptions of
Teresa’s suggestions for change, but also at the perceptions that underlie Teresa’s interpretation
of his response, and how this influenced her subsequent behavior toward him, which then
reinforced his impression of her actions as threats.5
We can observe this spiraling of negative attributions – in which each party interprets the
other’s actions unfavorably and responds accordingly in many conflict situations. These cycles
fuel the conflict and have no obvious beginning or end. In some respects, the conflict between
Danny and Teresa is not unlike an arms race between two nations who do not trust each other’s
motivations, (e.g. Pakistan and India, the United States and the former Soviet Union). In each
case, the processes of attributing meaning to the behavior of others and then acting on the basis
of the meaning attributed to that behavior are similar.
This is not to say that the conflict lacks a material basis or that the conflict is solely about
perceptions, that it is “all in the mind.” Rather, what we argue is that a party’s attribution of
meaning and intent to actions and circumstances shapes that party’s perceptual experience,
activates motivations, and generates behavior that in turn affects how others perceive that party’s
behavior, motivations, and intentions.
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The Role of Values in Conflict
The insight approach questions the implicit assumption in much of the conflict resolution
literature that the concept of “interests” can be analytically differentiated from the concept of
“values” for the purpose of analyzing and changing a party’s behavior. Conflicts over values are
said to be more difficult to resolve than conflicts over interests because values are related to
individual’s identities – their core sense of who they are and how the world ought to be ordered –
and therefore are non-negotiable (Altran and Axelrod 2008).
Building on Lonergan’s (1992) work, the insight approach views values, needs, and
interests as interdependent and intertwined. This is why we use the term “cares” to describe what
underlies and motivates a conflict. In the insight approach, cares include particular desires that
we seek to realize for ourselves, and also encompass broader patterns of normative social
relations that we have come to value because we believe that they serve the greater good. Finally,
cares can operate at a third level, in which we use them to make value judgments that have a
more enduring effect on self-identity and relate to assessments of progress and decline. These
judgments are not immutable, they are linked to scales of value priorities that reflect wider
visions of who we are and how we believe people ought to behave (Morelli and Morelli 1997).
To give an example, waiting in line for theater tickets is a patterned response to a simple
problem of allocation: how to distribute goods or services when the demand exceeds the supply.
There could be other allocation systems, such as random selection; or differential treatment for
the wealthy, who could pay people to hold their places in line for them; or reverse alphabetical
order, which commences with names beginning with the letter Z. The particular cares here
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operate on multiple levels. First, patrons want to get tickets. Second, they want the ticket
allocation process to be understandable, logical, and fair, even if that process doesn’t guarantee
each patron a ticket. When people begin acting disrespectfully toward others in line by jumping
the queue, we begin observing these higher-level concerns at work. Most patrons believe that
personal convenience does not warrant a violation of the normative expectations concerning
standing in line. It is common to find others within a given culture who share our normative
expectations, such that it is often possible to construct powerful conflict alliances with others
through an appeal to higher level values and standards, even if they may not share our initial
concern, which in this case, is the purchase of theater tickets..
The same structuring of interests, within patterns of normative expectations and
judgements of value, can also be seen in the negotiation process. Morton Deutsch and others
have explored this topic in the context of their work on the role of justice norms in bargaining,
and the potential for conflict between competing justice principles (Deutsch 1985, 2000;
Deutsch, Bunker, and Rubin 1995; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo 1997; Hegtvedt, and
Cook 2001; Gelpi 2003). What Deutsch refers to as a “sense of injustice” can often engender
conflict and stimulate negative emotions for reasons beyond the immediate interests at stake in
the particular allocation or negotiation decision (Deutsch 1985, 2000; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith
and Huo 1997). A sense of injustice, whether experienced at the individual or group level, may
thus fuel the conflict, and make resolution more difficult (Deutsch 1985, 2000).
The implications of this idea can be seen in distributive conflicts, such as a negotiation
between management and union representatives over the terms of a new collective agreement. In
presenting their demands at the bargaining table, each side seeks to articulate its particular
immediate claims at one level, as well as persuade the other side of the legitimacy of its claims
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and the seriousness of its demands at a higher level. For example, the union asks for a six percent
salary increase because other employees in the same industry have negotiated salary increases in
this range. For them, this provides a valid standard of comparison. The management team, on the
other hand, judges the union demands as unrealistic given the company’s financial condition and
responds with the claim that management is trying to protect jobs by offering a much smaller
incremental increase. The union perceives management’s response - that union demands would
jeopardize jobs – as a challenge to the normative principle that salary rates for workers in the
same industry should be established on a comparative basis. And so the conflict intensifies.
In this instance, what is at stake in the negotiation process is not just the direct financial
outcomes for management and the union, but also the evaluative criteria or distributive justice
principles by which the financial issues are to be negotiated within complex patterns of
relationships. Moreover, the negotiation regarding the evaluative criteria may be more important
to the parties than the amounts directly in issue between them. The process and outcomes of this
bargaining round can have a lasting impact and establish a set of normative expectations that are
likely to influence the patterns of future negotiations, not only between these parties, but between
other parties in the same industry.
Once established, patterns of normative expectations often become entrenched, part of
the cognitive framework through which negotiating parties frame their understanding of the
negotiation process and interpret the behavior of other parties.6 These values are rarely explicit
until the patterns of expectations are disrupted, threat emerges, or defensive reactions are
encountered.
Normative expectations can certainly be discussed using the language of interests, e.g.
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the union has an interest in the normative principle of equality with other unions, or management
has an equally compelling interest in framing its rejection of the union’s demands in terms of
protecting jobs. But translating the language of values into the language of interests, we argue,
fails to capture the dynamic between them, the experience of the threat and the intensity of
attachment to particular outcomes that may override the immediate consequences for the party
concerned (Altran and Axelrod 2008).
A scenario from a popular British television series, Prime Suspect, illustrates this
dynamic. In the show, a police sergeant and his homicide squad actively sought to undermine the
authority of a newly appointed female police inspector, who was given responsibility for a high
profile homicide investigation. The police sergeant’s efforts to undermine his new boss were not
grounded in his own interests; he did not seek the job himself. Rather, his behavior arose from
his dissatisfaction with the organizational decision-making process that had resulted in the
dismissal of his former boss, to whom he was still loyal, and his replacement with an apparently
novice officer whom he considered to be unqualified.
In this scenario, we see a complex dynamic between interests and values. In the end it
was not their common interest in solving the crime that enabled the sergeant and the new chief
inspector to put aside their respective cares and threats and work together. As long as he saw her
as unqualified, the police sergeant continued to keep information from his boss, even if this had
the effect of undermining the efficiency and integrity of the investigation. His attitude changed
only once he began to see her as tough and competent, as a “boss” consistent with his established
pattern of normative expectations as a veteran police sergeant.
Most important, we cannot look at the parties’ interests without also considering the
21
meaning systems in which these interests are embedded. To put this more pragmatically, the way
in which interests are presented in terms of values is likely to influence another party’s
perceptions of the legitimacy of the interest. And this in turn can influence that party’s response
to the interest asserted, whether he or she will consider it worthy of accommodation or
resistance. Because of the connection between interests and values, the insight approach prefers
the term cares. This is why we define conflict as arising out of an experience of threats-to-cares,
which explicitly recognizes that a party’s response to a conflict can be linked to a sense of attack
at multiple levels.
The desires, expectations and values that underlie parties’ cares are often not
acknowledged and sometimes not even understood by the parties. Parties can be unaware of the
values attached to their demands, let alone the values that underpin the other parties’ demands.
When parties experience a threat to those values they respond defensively. The exploration of
defensive reactions can bring underlying values to the surface, allowing parties to talk about
what really matters rather than simply maintaining their patterns of defend and attack.
Interpretation and Intention
Communication plays a critical role in conflict; without it social interaction is impossible.
Humans are not like billiard balls, whose tendency towards movement can be predicted from
physical laws of motion, independent of any stimulus from within the ball itself. Instead, we
actively seek information from our environment in order to decide how to act in response to the
conditions in that environment. Communication is critical to our ability to act purposively on our
social and material environment, which in turn influences us.
22
Communication is an interactive process between parties, and it is critical to understand
how information is received as well as transmitted. The literature on communication and conflict
has tended to emphasize transmission over reception (Jonnson 1990). As Robert M. Krauss and
Ezequiel Morsella have observed (2000), the communication process is typically characterized as
a form of code encryption and decryption, in which a speaker formulates a message, encodes it in
the form of a signal, transmits the signal through a medium (e. g. written, spoken, or sign
language) to a receiver, whose job is then to decode the signal to reveal the speaker’s intention
encoded in the message.
In the intentionalist model above, the sender initiates the process of communication – the
receiver’s role is essentially passive. Problems of mis-communication arise when there is too
much “noise” in the channel accompanying the message, so that reception is difficult, or when
the intended message is ambiguous, contradictory, or otherwise difficult for the receive to
interpret. Alternatively, the receiver may not share the sender’s interpretive framework; this
frequently happens in cross-cultural communication situations, increasing the likelihood of
misinterpretation. In this model, the communication process is essentially purposive and linear,
involving an intentional transmission of information or ideas on the part of one participant to
another. That recipient then adopts the active role and transmits a message back to the original
sender, the roles of sender and receiver alternating as each party takes turns in this ongoing
interchange (Turnbull 2003).
What this intentionalist account leaves out is any consideration of the active role of the
receiver in eliciting information from the sender, sometimes independently of the sender’s
wishes. As mentioned previously, as listeners we never have direct access to another person’s
mind, thus we can never obtain direct access to his or her communicative intentions towards us.
23
Instead, we must rely on the message itself, as well as what we know of the sender and the
context in which the message was sent, to draw conclusions about the sender’s intent.
For example, phrases such as “I think that is a dreadful thing to say” or “I think you are
totally wrong about that” when accompanied by a wink of the eye is meant to indicate to the
listener that the speaker does not mean what he or she is saying, but rather is making a joke.
Another listener, with no access to these additional clues, might take the statement literally and
thus attribute an entirely different intention to the speaker.7 The capacity for different intentions
to be attributed to the same statement by different observers in different contexts using differing
interpretive frames can make ascertaining a speaker’s intentions a challenging and contingent
task.
In addition, reliance on the speaker’s intentions to determine the meaning of a message
assumes that all communicative acts are intentional, but we often communicate unintentionally.
Tone of voice, turn of phrase, gestures and body language all convey messages to others about
our attitudes and intentions toward them that we may not intend to send or even be aware of.
As Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin Bavelas, and Don D. Jackson (1967) point out, we can
never not communicate, insofar as we are always being interpreted. Our every communicative
gesture, intentional or otherwise – even silence – can be interpreted on at least two levels: the
purpose or content, e.g. “What did she mean by that?” and the affect, e.g. “What does his gesture
tell me about the relationship between us and how he views me?” Affect may be interpreted
differently than content – the tone of my message may contradict the content, undermining the
effectiveness of my communication.
Thus, the sender does not have a monopoly over the meaning of his or her own message.
24
In any given interchange, the information received can differ significantly from the message
sent. Readers of detective stories know that, during an investigation, a witness can make a
statement to the detective that unlocks the mystery. She may report that a suspect was seen
entering a drugstore at a particular time, when he was supposed, according to the testimony of
other witnesses, to have been somewhere else. This casual statement by the witness, who may
otherwise have little to do with the mystery, thus provides the detective with information critical
to breaking the suspect’s alibi. An apparently innocuous casual statement can thus have a
significance far greater than that which could have been apparent to the witness herself.8
In this illustration, the difference in the meanings assigned to the statement by the witness
and by the detective does not arise from miscommunication. Instead, it follows directly from the
fact that the receiver has a different perspective on the information than does the sender. As
William James (1906) might put it, the “cash value” of the information to the detective is greater
than it is to the witness. The difference lies in the uses to which this information can be put. The
relationship between the witness’s information and the other testimony gives this evidence its
particular importance. In short, its meaning is relational, and arises out of the exchange of
information between sender and receiver, rather than being immanent within the message or
located within the intentions of the sender. James observed that meaning “adheres” to a name of
a thing, or to a statement, in light of its consequences; it does not inhere within the word or the
statement in its own right (1963: 40). Meaning is emergent, and arises out of the dynamic
interaction between sender and receiver in the communication process, rather than being encoded
into the message at the outset by the sender and simply awaiting a receiver to decode it
(Watzlawick et al. 1967; Rosenblatt 1978; Jonnson 1990; Dewey 2008).
For mediators, this more dynamic view of the communication process in conflict
25
situations suggests that mediators should attend to the framework through which parties interpret
each other. As we have seen, the meaning of the message for the receiver may differ significantly
from what the sender intended. This gap is not explainable only as misinterpretation. Perception
is at the root of these differences in meaning-making. How parties perceive each other influences
the way they respond to each other. Parties – and mediators – will communicate more effectively
if they take into account the “listener’s perspective” (Krauss and Morsella 2000: 138).
Implications for Practice
It is clear from this discussion that, as mediators, our theoretical view of human interaction and
conflict interactions greatly influences the ways that we intervene in a conflict; what we think
influences what we do. Helping conflict practitioners become more explicit about their
theoretical standpoints can help them to become better practitioners. Using theory as a roadmap
to apply particular strategies and skills can enable them to be more intentional in their actions.
The following discussion sets out some of the practice implications for the insight approach to
conflict.
The insight approach posits that conflict emerges from a person’s perception that his or
her cares are threatened, and his or her protective or defensive reaction to that perceived threat.
This defensive response is consequently interpreted by the other party as an attack, thus placing
the parties in escalating and conflict-prolonging defend-attack patterns. Because of the
interpretive nature of the threat experience, insight practitioners seek to help the conflicting
parties ascertain if each other’s cares must necessarily be a threat and to discover whether their
differing cares can co-exist without the necessity of threat. Other approaches to the mediation
26
process, such as the narrative approach, also attend to the interpretive frames through which the
parties make meaning. Insight practitioners, however, do not see their role as fostering the co-
development of new narratives about how to resolve the conflict. Instead, they believe that
parties can, and do, maintain diverse narratives arising from their complex interpretive frames.
To the insight practitioner, parties need not necessarily agree on the narrative, rather they see
their primary role as changing defend and attack responses to enable parties to generate insights
that can open the door to changing threat-producing patterns of interaction.
Interest-based theorists have also acknowledged that parties may have different
interpretations of conflict (Fisher and Ury 1991; Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider 1994).
Addressing this in mediation could involve an interpretive “re-framing” of the conflict in an
attempt to shift parties from holding their positions to uncovering and advancing their interests.
But the insight mediator does not begin with a goal of reframing positions to discover mutual or
tradeable interests. Instead, insight mediators believe that the cares motivating the conflict are
generated within complex patterns of interaction, embedded in values and emotions, and that the
conflict arises from the perception of threat. Focusing on advancing interests alone, without
attending to the threats to one’s values and the social contexts that generate the perception of
such threats, means that parties may only be able to address a fraction of the conflict story.
Moreover, insight mediators seek to uncover not just the interests themselves but why they
matter to disputants, which insight mediators believe will give parties more satisfaction with the
overall process.
Engaging in what insight mediators call “deepening conversations” is what sets the
insight approach apart from other conflict intervention approaches. Deepening enables
practitioners to help parties understand the patterns of communication and interaction that have
27
led to the belief that what matters most to them is being threatened. The threat experience is
affective, so insight mediators focus on emotions to more clearly articulate what matters to the
parties and what is at stake. An insight mediator thus directs attention to the interpretative
process of meaning-making so that the parties are able to articulate what matters and why.
The following dialogue provides an example of a deepening conversation from our case
study involving Danny and Teresa. In this example, Danny’s current perception of threat stems
from his previous experiences of organizational change that were followed by job cuts. What
Teresa values as “innovation”, Danny experiences as “threat.” To ensure that she understood
him correctly, the mediator paraphrases what Danny had just said, a common strategy in most
mediation approaches, allowing Danny to verify if she had understood correctly or not. The
distinctness of the approach rests in what the mediator notices and to what she attends. Rather
than working with Danny to identify an interest, she notices how Danny had constructed his
interpretation of the meaning of his situation by reference to past events. She briefly deepens to
discover how the past has shaped the present by asking a series of layered questions a skill that
insight practitioners call layering.9 The implicit insight question then becomes – is it necessarily
the case that the term “innovation” has the same meaning and impact the way Teresa and the
supervisors use it as it did in the situations that have caused Danny concern? Is the dire outcome
that Danny has envisaged the only possible outcome? How can Teresa alter her interpretation of
Danny’s and her own behavior? How can gaining these insights help the disputants cease their
defend and attack behaviors?
This type of implicit, unspoken, curious, non-directive questions guide the insight
practitioner’s strategy. Although it is difficult to capture the trajectory of a mediation in a short
segment, the following sample dialogue reflects a few key elements of the insight approach.
28
Mediator: Over the past five years you’ve started to see lots of change in
your organization; people have left and things are different.
Danny: Yea, well in operations, you know, they started talking about
innovation and half of them lost their jobs.
Mediator: When was that Danny?
Danny: It’s about a couple years ago now.
Mediator: And so people lost their jobs as a result of changes that
happened in the past.
Danny: Well, yea, that’s the way it works. The new ones get the jobs and
the old ones sort of get shafted and put off in the corner somewhere.
Mediator: There seems to be a link between people losing their jobs in
the past through organizational change and what’s been happening
between you and Teresa as a result of her bringing ideas forward to
improve the workplace.
Danny: Well that’s the way I see it.
Mediator: And the link for you is?
Danny: Well change leads to people losing their jobs or people being put
out. Joe is trying to do this new thing Teresa suggested, but he doesn’t
know how to do it. And, there is no time for people to learn new stuff.
Teresa is too busy coming up with new ideas to help Joe out, and it is
embarrassing for him.
Teresa: But no one has ever asked me for help.
Mediator: Hang on for one sec Teresa. It seems this is an important piece
of information to be sure that we understand. Jot down that thought so
[you] don’t forget it when we come back to you.
Mediator: What I’m getting from you Danny is that that you and some of
the other staff are feeling that some of the changes that are being
29
suggested by Teresa are likely to result in job loss, or, the very least being
put into a position you are not trained for, or, a position where you are not
able to contribute in the way you would like. Have I got the right picture?
Danny: Yea, I think that sums it up. But she doesn’t seem to see that, it’s
pretty obvious.
In this brief segment, the mediator follows Danny’s interpretation of changes in his work
environment in the past when “they started talking innovation and half of them lost their jobs.”
Danny’s certainty about the current situation is based on experience, which suggests to him that
he and his colleagues risk job loss. By exploring the sense that Danny has made of what has
happened in his workplace, the parties and the mediator have taken the opportunity to gain
insight into his experience that his cares are being threatened, in the process providing Teresa
with her first knowledge of how Danny has interpreted the conflict. Until the mediation, he had
only made angry protests that made little sense to her other than as unfair challenges to her
competence. With the mediation helping to reduce Danny’s perception of threat, the parties can
discuss how their interpretations and response patterns have escalated the conflict.
When Danny said, “she doesn’t seem to see that, it’s pretty obvious,” he opened the door
for the mediator to focus on Teresa’s perception.
Mediator: What are you hearing Danny say?
Teresa: Well, he is saying the old way worked. But when I talked to
people, when I did the focus groups and the research to find out what kind
of change they wanted, people were saying it wasn’t working. New
technology gets implemented all the time that can help make our jobs
easier and allow us to do more things. A lot of people that I spoke with
when I did this research wanted change. They wanted to see a difference,
they wanted new technology, they wanted their jobs to be easier so they
30
could do things that were more interesting to them. They were bored with
some of the mundane things they had to do all the time; they wanted to do
new things. So when I was restructuring some of the jobs, I tried to match
up interests with people and what they wanted to do with their skills, so I
don’t see pieces, I haven’t seen that.
By drawing out the threats being generated within this defend-attack pattern, the mediator
has helped Danny and Teresa to identify specific interpretive frames fuelling their sense of
threat. As the mediation progressed, Danny and Teresa were able to develop new patterns of
interactions at work which did not involve Danny deliberately silencing Teresa in staff
meetings. At the same time, Teresa became more sensitive to the concerns of Danny and his
colleagues led to discussions about how redesigning staff training to make participants feel less
vulnerable without putting extra burden’s on the workers’ already busy schedules. Teresa and
Danny no longer felt it necessary to defend and attack because they were able to discuss, with
each other, what mattered most in how they made sense of the situation. In doing so, they were
able to find ways to reduce threats and allow their differing cares to co-exist.
Conclusion
We have argued that the analysis of conflict behavior should be considered from an interactionist
perspective; a perspective in which every action is viewed, not as a distinct event, but as part of a
sequence of interconnected actions and responses to actions that take place in complex social
dynamics and interpretive frameworks. Human behavior is both self-referential and other-
oriented. Our actions, feelings, hopes, and fears are both internally driven and also influenced by
our perceptions of the hopes, fears, feelings, and actions of others. This gives our perceptions a
31
two-sided quality, looking both backwards and forwards, both inwards and outwards. The same
holds true for our understanding of the communication process - the receiver’s perceptual frame
influences the message as much as the intentions of the sender.
We believe practitioners can benefit from an analytical framework for understanding
conflict as dynamic and interactive. The focus of conflict analysis and intervention need not
necessarily be linear and purposive, but can instead address the dynamic interactions between
conflicting parties rather than treating parties as self-referential actors whose interests can be
analyzed objectively as if they are distinct from the conflict itself. Articulating a more relational
and interactive theory of conflict can help practitioners develop a practice robust enough to
consciously address the complexity of conflicts they face.
Successful conflict intervention often involves helping the parties to question much of
what they think they know about the other in order to learn what really motivates them. If we can
reconsider something we were formerly sure about, our perceptions of the conflict can change
significantly. Expanding the parties’ horizons allows them to imagine new ways of interacting
that can potentially reduce the threat that they pose to each other’s core concerns and goals. This
in turn, allows them to find new ways of addressing, changing, or resolving the conflict between
them. Through skillfully addressing conflict, parties gain insight and articulate what matters to
them most – their cares, which are generated, advanced, threatened and realigned within the
complex interactions that define us as social beings.
32
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1 Fisher and Ury address this issue by acknowledging that most negotiations involve ‘relational interests’ as well as ‘substantive interests’. The authors recommend that relational interests should be disentangled from the substantive issues at stake - separate the people from the problem, and deal with the relational interests directly (1991: 20,21); see also Lax and Sebenius 1986: 70-74. Our understanding of the reflexive nature of human behaviour suggests that the people issues cannot always be clearly separated from the substantive issues. 2 R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson and A. R. Lee (1966: 5) make this point as follows: “My field of experience is .... filled not only by my direct view of myself (ego) and of the other (alter), but of what we shall call metaperspectives - my view of the other’s (your, his, her, their) view of me. I
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may not actually be able to see myself as others see me, but I am constantly supposing them to be seeing me in particular ways, and I am constantly acting in the light of the actual or supposed attitudes, opinions, needs, and so on the other has in respect of me..” 3 Niebuhr (1963) observed that all responsible purposive action is generated as an answer to the question “What shall I do?” but that this question cannot be answered only by reference to a prior question “What is my goal?” without also considering the answer to an antecedent question “What is going on?”. 4 The story of ‘Danny and Teresa’ was the first case study to which researchers applied Lonergan’s theory of cognition, thereby developing both the original theory and method of the insight approach. 5 For a foundational[statement of the dynamics of this spiral of mutually reinforcing distrust, in which each new response generates the data required to establish the premise on which the initial response was based, see Merton (1996: 183-201). Similar dynamics have also been explored in the field of international relations with reference to the security dilemma under anarchy, see Butterfield 1951; Hertz 1959; Jervis 1976. 6 Behavioral psychologists refer to this phenomenon in terms of anchoring assumptions, which orient the parties towards past outcomes, regardless of whether they are applicable to current circumstances. The implication, however, is that this represents a departure from cognitively rational behaviour, rather than a normative foundation for rational purposive action. 7 The example was suggested by one of the authors’ children, who claims to be able to tell by the movement of the author’s eyebrows whether any given comment should be taken seriously or not. 8 Indeed, the witness may not even be aware of the significance of her own testimony to the detective. Had the witness realized the importance of her evidence, she might have tried to conceal the information, or to extract a higher price for it in the information exchange, such as by trying to blackmail the real criminal; a practice that leads to unfortunate results in most detective novels. 9 Insight mediation uses terms such as deepening, layered questions, noticing, bridging, finishing, and using to describe the strategies and skills that mediators use to help assist the parties to understand more fully the patterns of interaction and communication that have created the conflict and keep it on-going.