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Restructuring Nepal Army:
A Conflict Transformation Perspective
Bishnu Raj Upreti
1. Introduction
Nepal is at a crossroads of fundamental socio-political
transformation. Facilitating and sustaining such transformation requiresnew vision, new constitutional framework, new institutional
arrangement, new instruments and new commitment. Conduct, action
and behaviour of the political parties, judiciary, security (military,
armed police, civilian police, intelligence and other security related
institutions) and bureaucracy are some of the fundamental institutions
that determine success or failure of materializing fundamental socio-
political transformation. Hence, substantial reorientation of these
institutions is a precondition to make them relevant to the changing
political context. This paper discusses the restructuring of military,
one of the fundamentally important security components of security
sector, from the conflict transformation2 and peace building perspective.
The objective of this paper is to initiate a constructive debate on the
need and approach of restructuring of Nepal Army in the changing
political context. The paper brings argument that the relevance of
transformation of Nepal Army is essential at the present context.
2. Restructuring of Security Sector: A Conceptual Basis
Restructuring of security sector is not much debated in Nepal. Even
the definition of security sector is globally contested and difficult to
find a unanimous definition. OECD defines security sector as those
state institutions, which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of
the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion3. Security
Sector Reform (SSR) is a common concept globally used in the post-
conflict literatures. SSR is a process of transforming the organizations
having legitimate authority to use or order the use of force such as
police, army, paramilitary, local security units, intelligence and other
legally defined arrangements4. Changing roles, responsibilities and
actions of security actors in a changing context in consistent with
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democratic norms, values and principles of good governance are some
of the basic elements of SSR.5
Fundamental principles of SSR are civilian control and parliamentary
oversight of security apparatus, rightsizing and modernization and
professionalisation of security forces, respecting rule of law, facilitating
war to peace transition, etc.6 SSR is a concept of total reform in the
shortcomings and weaknesses of security sector, new vision and
neutrality that demands honest commitments and impartiality from both
civilian government and security professionals. Appropriate trainings
(both military and human rights, capacity building and technicalcompetence), mainstreaming security issues into development policy
and programme, delicate balance between confidentiality and
transparency, strong co-ordination and operational mechanisms,
relationship between military and civilian, building public awareness,
strengthening constitutional and legal frameworks, periodic review of
performance of security sector and strengthening of independent
oversight mechanisms (e.g., public complaint bodies like human right
commission, auditor general, legislative and judicial bodies, etc.) are
some of the important elements of SSR.7
Restructuring of military is not only related to security aspects but
also with social, political, economic, international and development8
issues. Security sector reform has to address policy, legislative,
international relations; structural and oversight issues set within standard
democratic principles and value.9 The classical security approach mainly
focuses on legal monopoly of state to use the security instruments and
security force for safeguarding people and national security specifically
to defend against external threats. Further, the conventional notion of
existence of military force is to prepare for, prevent and engage in
war 10 and army, paramilitary and police forces, intelligence and secret
services are used for this purpose. This conventional state centric
approach of security operation is narrow and ignores modern notion
of security that relates with holistic framework of human rights,
livelihood security, environmental security, energy security in other
words broader human security with peoples rights for dignified life.11
Hence, democratic governance, which is a serious issue in Nepal, is a
central element of security sector restructuring.12
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3. Changing Political Context and Security Sector
Transformation in Nepal
The 10 years' peoples war waged by the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist)13 [hereafter CPN (Maoist)] since 1996 and the peoples
movement of April 2006 and consequent peace process (signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Accord; involvement of the United Nations (UN)
in assisting management of arms and armies, promulgation of the Interim
Constitution and formation of the Interim Parliament) have paved the
path for fundamental socio-political restructuring of Nepal.
Nepal is now at a crossroads of transformation from a centuries'old feudal, top-down, autocratic and exclusionary monarchical regime
to a modern nation.14 The kings 1st February 2005 coup greatly helped
the major political parties, popularly known as Seven-Party Alliance15
or SPA to work together and to collaborate with the CPN (Maoist) to
defeat the king as CPN (Maoist) was proposing from the last two
years. As a consequence, a 12-point understanding reached between
them, ultimately leading to the mass agitation in April 2006 that defeated
the king and brought the Maoists in the mainstream. The
Comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the government and the
CPN (Maoists) on 21 November 2006 not only formally ended the
armed conflict and but also outlined ways for restructuring of the unitaryNepali state.
The clause 4.7 of the Section Four of the Comprehensive Peace
Accord mentionsed that the Nepal Army should be democratize It
states"
The cabinet would control, mobilize and manage Nepal Army as
per the new Military Act. The interim cabinet would prepare and
implement the detailed action plan of democratization of Nepal Army
by taking suggestions from the concerned committee of the interim
parliament. This includes works like determination of the right number
of Nepal Army, prepare the democratic structure reflecting the national
and inclusive character, and train them on democratic principles and
human rights values.
Similarly, Article 144 (3 and 4) of the Interim Constitution has
stated similar provisions. Hence, the new political context has clearly
envisioned restructuring the existing army structures. However, neither
the Comprehensive Peace Accord nor the Interim Constitution has
aptly visualized the comprehensive need of security sector restructuring
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Nepali Journal of Cont emporary Studies Vol. VII No. 1 2007
which includes holistic approach, i.e., developing national security
policy (by complementing international relations, defense policy, and
economic policy; establishing a supreme and powerful national security
apparatus such as national security council), reforming intelligence,
restructuring army, police and other security apparatus. Some isolated
effort of restructuring of one component of security sector alone cannot
produce expected result. It therefore needs holistic approach. Military
is obviously an extremely important component of the security sector
and therefore transformation of military is the focus of this paper.
3.1 Steps and Process for Security Sector Reform
Step 1: Analyze security sector
Prioritize core needs and challenges,
Identify weaknesses and constraints,
Explore opportunities and potentials.
Step 2: Formulate new policy, institutional and legislative framework
based on the identified opportunities and potentials,
Step 3: Translate policy, institutional arrangement and legislative
framework into action.
3.2 Basis of Security Sector TransformationOften the need of security sector reform arises from:
Transition form war (civil or inter-state) to peace,
Fundamental political change in the country,
Unanticipated security related crisis faced by the country,
Regal or gradual process of change.
In any of these situations, important interrelated basesis are:
The context of the country (economic, political, security, etc.),
International relation policy of the country,
National defense policy of the country.
The following figure shows interrelationship between the context,
international policy and defense policy as a basis of transformation of
security sector.
There are some established approaches of security sector reform
widely used in post-conflict countries. OECD/DAC approach17,
European approach18, UNDP approach are some of the more common
operational approaches. However, discussing these approaches is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.4 Why Security Sector Reform
As Nepal is entering into a new era, new vision, new policy and
legal framework, new institutional arrangement, new orientation, new
relations and change in behaviour of security forces are essential to
meet the new challenges faced by the country in the 21st century.
Meeting these needs requires fundamental transformation of security
sector based on the holistic framework (defining new security policy
based on the defense, international and economic policy; and human
rights standards; social justice and good governance framework,
recognizing Nepalese people as the ultimate source of power).
The new security policy of Nepal should not be limited to the
conventional security paradigm practiced so far and must cover the
new paradigm that includes:
National defense,
International relation, Territorial security,
Human security,
Environmental security,
Livelihood security, and
Energy security.
Policy on
International
Relations
The Context
National Defense
Policy
Basis for
SSR
Security/ Military
Judiciary
Bureaucracy
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The current debate on security policy includes even good
governance framework, economic and development policy of the state.
Conventional security is not enough to provide security to a nation and
its people, especially in the developing countries. The Brandt
Commission 21 and Olaf Palme Commission22 have amply highlighted
this issue. The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) has vividly establisheds relationship between reform of security
centre and development by embedding reform of security sector into
human development and helping poverty reduction and expanding
options for life of poor people.23Hence, Nepal needs to reorient securitysector according to the new security paradigm mentioned above.
4. Restructuring of Nepal Army
Despite the reservation of few critical commentators, the history of
Nepal Army is linked to state building King Prithivinarayan Shah's
effort of unifying several petty states into the modern state of Nepal
was made successful by the army. Historically, they were in the
forefront while resisting external security threats. The Military Act
2063 (BS) has stated the need of Nepal Army for the protection of
independence, sovereignty, national integrity and national unity of the
nation.Security apparatus, bureaucratic apparatus and judicial apparatus
are three fundamental permanent pillars of any governing system of a
modern state. These three structures provide basic services to citizens
of a country. It is not possible to govern democratically without
modernizing and professionalizing these fundamental state apparatuses
and making them accountable. As Nepal Army is one of the very
important components of the security sector of Nepal, its restructuring
in the changing political context is highly expected by both political
actors and citizens.
While discussing the restructuring of Nepal Army, four areas are
crucial. They are:
1. Rule transformation (laws and regulations; guidelines, norms and
values, etc.),
2. Content transformation (training content, orientation, issues,
structural arrangements, etc.),
3. Procedure transformation (organizational culture, behaviour and
action, operational style, use of symbols, etc.),
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4. Relation transformation (civil-military relation24; media policy;
balancing transparency and confidentiality; accountability and
civilian control and parliamentary oversight; human rights, etc.)
4.1 Existing Areas of Engagement of Nepal Army25
1. Safeguarding territorial integrity,
2. Mobilization during internal conflict,
3. Development work:
a. Road construction,b. Construction of bridges and other vital areas,
4. Nature Conservation (parks and reserves),
5. Disaster management and responding to crisis,
6. UN peace keeping,
7. Security of palaces26 and V/VIPs,
8. Rescue and recovery (mainly helicopter service),
9. Protection of vital areas:
a. Airport security,
b. Border security,
c. Security of banks and fund transfer,
d. Telephone towers and relay stations,e. Jail security,
f . Others.
10. Provisional emergency medical services to limited general public
through Chhauni Military Hospital, Kathmandu.
These areas of engagement can be redefined, reoriented, combined,
modified or reduced on the basis of the comprehensive assessment of
Nepal Army as outlined in the section 3.1 considering the changing
context of Nepal and international security dynamics. Some of the
existing areas of engagement of Nepal Army may not be necessary
given the changed context. A debate is emerging on the engagement
of the army in National Parks and reserves as people-park-partnership
is becoming more sustainable and effective. A large number of the
army deployed in the security of the palaces and the royal families are
no longer needed as the government has already shifted that role to the
police force. The engagement of security in development work such
as construction of roads and other infrastructures is also the issue not
beyond debate on economic and social grounds.
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4.2 Why Rrestructuring of Nepal Army?
The success of the peoples movement in April 2006 and the political
development that followed brought to light debate on restructuring of
the state. Ssecurity sector in general and the Nepal army in particular
became the integral part of the debate.
The holistic transformation of the security sector in general and
Nepal Army in particular hinges on the new constitution to be made
by the constituent assembly as it is to decide on security issues,
international relations, economic issues, states political structures
(federal or decentralized autonomous region, etc.). Guiding principles,content, process, institutional arrangement and regulative and legal
framework of the restructuring of the security sector will be clear only
after the new constitution to be made by the elected constituent assembly.
However, it is essential to have some debate on security sector
restructuring to make people aware so that they would elect right people
in the constituent assembly.
4.2.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Nepal Army
Nepal Army was largely a close structure in the Panchayatregime.
It was presented as some thing especial and beyond the proper
understanding of general public. The palace always used this institution
for strengthening its power and privileges. Even after the political
change of 1990, Nepalese politicians and the government failed to
regulate, monitor and oversight the army. They perceived that Nepal
army was the interest of the palace only. Consequently, Nepal Army
continued its loyalty with the palace. The National Defense Council
Strengths
Disciplined and hard working, Professional,
Good reputation in UN peace keeping
operation in different parts of the
world,
Not ambit ious for mil it ary ru le
(Never attempted to rule the country
militarily),
Not observed resistance to the change
process of 2006.
Weaknesses
M on ar ch is t o ri en ta ti on
27
an daccountability (the king as supreme
commander),
L es s r ep re se nt at iv e (Madeshi ,
women, etc.),
Inadequate civil-military relation,
Controversy in human rights issues
(Doramba, Nagarkot, Belbari,
etc.),
Lack of tr ansparency ( ra tion ,
welfare fund, etc.).
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totally failed to perform its role envisioned in the constitution but the
parties and their governments either suspected or blamed the army for
not being cooperative with them. Obviously, the palace made efforts
to control the army and also succeeded in it because of the culture,
tradition and command structure (the King as supreme commander).
The National Defense Council and Prime Minister/Defense Minister
should be held responsible for weaknesses and the disputes related to
the army in the last 15 years.
Image is a powerful instrument as it influences society both positively
and negatively . Therefore, organizations and individuals always attemptto provide good image in society. Nepal Army in the Panchayatera
was perceived as a powerful, elitist and especial institution because of
the use of language and words, action and response. Its image after the
1990s political change has to be examined into four stages. They are:
1. 1990 to 2001: less controversial and largely accepted as a credible
institution in public,
2. The armys involvement in armed conflict: controversy started,
Maoists targeted army as main enemy, cases of human rights abuses
and disappearance by the army increased, public fear towards army
multiplied. Relation with civilians worsened. International Crisis
Group has extensively reported about the involvement of the armyin the armed conflict of Nepal28.
3. Royal takeover of 1st February and April Movement: The army
fell intocontroversy, lost its credibility domestically29 and
internationally.30 General public thought that the king used the army
as a tool to suspend democracy and establish autocracy.31 General
people, civil society and political parties lost their faith in the army
when it suppressed Janaandolan. The already deteriorated image
of the army from the 1st February coup was further worsened even
internationally because of its role in suppressing the April 2006
peoples movement 32 as it was globally covered by the international
media. In this stage, it lost its image and acceptance detrimentally.
4 . PostJanaadolon: Nepal Army showed its commitment to political
change. Contrary to the assumption of some of the analysts that
Nepal Army would openly stands for the king, it cooperated with
government, expressed its commitment to peace and responded
positively. It has even started taking proactive role in initiating
debates of transforming the army.
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Nepal Army claims that inclusive process in the army is already
underway as it is recruiting women in non-technical officers, cadets,
military police, etc. and, establishing Sabujgan ofMadheshi community
inJaleshworofDhanusha andRipumardanigan ofKirantcommunity
in Hile ofDhankuta districts33 It is claimed that more than 50 castes
and ethnic groups are working in the army.
Military welfare fund and financial contribution deducted from the
army participating in UN peacekeeping force are facing a court case
for the legal settlement. However, the image and credibility of Nepal
Army in UN peace keeping operation (approximately 36000 NepalArmy personnel have so far participated in the UN peace keeping
operation in different war-torn countries) has been characterized as:
Honest and sincere,
Hard working and committed,
Professional,
Brave and able to work in adverse condition in different war-
torn countries.
4.3 Holistic Approach of Restructuring
A successful restructuring of Nepal Army depends upon internalizing
the holistic approach of security sector restructuring. That means: Developing new national security policy (defense and
international relations)
Redefining National Defense Council (existing arrangement of
NSC is too narrow)
Restructuring of Ministry of Defense
Transforming
o Nepal Army
o Civilian Police
o Armed Police
Redefining state intelligence (both security and civilian structures)
Redefining and strengthening of oversight bodies (parliamentary,
judicial and human rights bodies)
These components of security sector are interrelated and
complementary. Therefore they need to be reformed simultaneously
to meet the requirements of modernization, professionalisation and
democratic governance of security sector.
Nepalese people, especially political parties, should realize that
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national security and international policy must be developed by
consensus (there should be in-depth study, serious discussion and wider
interaction among and between political parties while formulating these
policies) but once they are finalized, theses policies must be common
for all political parties and must not change with the change of
governments.
4.4 Basic Principles of Restructuring of Nepal Army
Nepalese people as the ultimate source of power,
Accountability, Transparency,
Representation,
Rule of law and human rights,
Social justice and good governance principles,
International provisions and standards.
The new army act has introduced some of these principles.
4.5 Rightsizing of Nepal Army
The actual size of Nepal Army depends upon several factors. Some
of them are:
Long term national security policy, International power relations and Nepals position
Economic feasibility of the state
Possibility of mobilizing alternative security arrangements (e.g.,
military training to eligible citizens, mobilizing paramilitary,
etc.),
Major areas of engagement (3 categories: must be engaged, better
to engage and less important to engage)
Other factors
The Comprehensive Peace Accord and Interim Constitution state
about redefininge the size of Nepal Army. There are several arguments
for and against of reducing the existing size of Nepal army (the total
strength: 91444 persons34). Theoretically, there can be three options:
Downsizing of the existing strength,
Upsizing of the existing strength,
Keeping the existing strength.
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4.5.1Arguments for keeping the existing strength (or not drastically
downsizing)
Reducing the existing size causes imbalance in the command
and control strengths particularly in senior positions,
Need for deterrence in case of unexpected external interference,
Serious problems occur in nature conservation,
Affects development work carried out by Nepal Army,
Alters contribution in UN peace keeping,
Affects in disaster management and risqu operation,
Affects security of V/VIPs, Affects protection of vital areas such as airport security, security
of banks and fund transfer, telephone towers and railway stations,
Affects jail security,
Requires strengths if internal conflict escalates.
4.5.2Arguments for downsizing the existing strengths
The expansion of the existing military size into double during
the past 10 years was precisely because of the Maoist armed
conflict and this strength is not needed after the end of the Maoist
armed conflict,
Nepal, a poor country, can not sustain big size of military as itis an extremely expensive institution,
Some of the conventional areas of military engagement such as
palace security, parks and reserves security should be terminated,
Nepal can not militarily confront or compete with the giant
neighbours
If deterrence needed, Nepalese citizens should be trained.
The down sizing of the army is coming vehemently from the CPN
(Maoist). In his first public appearance at the Prime Ministers official
residence,35 Prachanda said that Nepal needs only about twenty
thousands army to provide military training to all eligible Nepalese
people as the security of the nation is the responsibility of all citizens.
4.5.2.1 General criteria for downsizing
Terminatiing who have completed the legally defined pension
period (phasewise criteria can be used),
Terminating who have records of human rights abuses,
Accepting voluntary resignations,
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One time decision for premature pension retirement (one or two
years before the normal pension time depending upon the size
to be reduced),
No new recruitment in vacancies created from the completion
of pension period and from other reasons (exception may apply
in some crucial positions),
Golden handshake package, where appropriate,
Other appropriate criteria defined by the government.
4.5.2.2 Social reintegration and other options for Nepal ArmyFor reintegrating the reduced army in society, the existing
reintegrating procedures and packages should continued as the obvious
option. However, in case of a large scale downsizing, the following
are potential areas of engagement:
Placing in the permanent peace keeping force of UN. It requires that
the government should take especial efforts to convince the UN,
Adjusting in private security sector: industrial security, security
of public institutions, etc.
Engage in skill based occupations, income generation,
Creating special force of post-conflict reconstruction and
development, Assigning civilian roles in the government structures where
appropriate,
Other relevant options.
4.6 Establishment of Technical committee for Restructuring
of Nepal Army
Both Comprehensive Peace Accord and Interim Constitution state
that the interim government should prepare and implement the detailed
action plan for democratizing Nepal Army by taking suggestions from
the concerned committees of the interim parliament. In addition to this
provision, there is a need of setting up a technical committee comprising
PLA leaders, Nepal Army officers and experts to assist parliamentary
committees (State Affairs, and other relevant committees) and the
interim government. This committee has to workout all necessary details
to overcome technical complications while transforming Nepal Army
and integrating PLA. This committee should continue till the complete
transformation of security sector.
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4.7 The Right Time for Restructuring of Nepal Army
Some work such as revising military act has started. The focus is
on the military alone, leaving holistic transformation of security sector
a side. However,Comprehensi ve Peace Accord and Interim
Constitution have opened some avenue to work on security sector
transformation. However, it is extremely difficult to make a clear
proposal of military restructuring because of uncertainty on the states
structure (unitary or federal). Nepal's national defense policy, foreign
policy and economic policy will most probably undergo a change after
the new constitution to be promulgated by the constituent assembly.Hence, only an informed debate on military restructuring would be
appropriate. The following three-stage strategy is useful to initiate
restructuring:
4.7.1 Pre-constituent assembly election
Debate and discussion,
Analyzing security sector,
Exploring opportunities and challenges.
4.7.2 Post-constituent assembly election (during the period of
constitution making) Ensuring the incorporation of fundamental principles of operating
security sector (discussed in the section 4.4) in the new
constitutional provisions,
Providing conceptual framework for the modern, professional
and democratically operating security apparatus.
4.7.3 By The elected government after promulgating new
constitution
Preparation of comprehensive security sector transformation
package,
Execution of actual security sector reform according to the new
constitutional provision by restructuring
o National Defense Council,
o Ministry of defense
o Nepal Army,
o Nepal Police,
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o Intelligence
o Other Security Apparatus.
5. Integration between People's Liberation Army and Nepal
Army into a single structure
The Maoists argue for forming a new national army by combining
both PLA and Nepal Army. Though the Maoists have not made public
the detail on how to form a new national army, they have raised this
issue very strongly.
The actual size of PLA will be clear only after the completion ofverification process by the UN. PLAs verified by UN will be eligible
candidates for the integration if they meet some standard criteria.
As the Maoists are repeatedly saying that the existing size of army
is not necessary for Nepal, it will be difficult for them to justify their
argument of incorporating all PLAs in the army. Hence, the down
sizing means less number of PLA integrating in the army. However,
determining the actual size is a political decision but it should be based
on the sound technical basis.
There is argument that the PLA is an ideologically indoctrinated
body of political cadres of one party and that cannot be professionally
neutral.
5.1 Criteria of Selection
The interim government needs to decide on selection criteria after
a through discussion with senior officials of PLA and Nepal Army.
However, the following can be general bases to integrate the verified
PLA in national army:
Giving up the party membership (neutrality principle)
Physical fitness,
Meeting the standard age requirement and other standard selection
criteria,
No record of human rights abuses,
Inclusiveness and representativeness - caste, geographical regions
and sex
5.2 Mainstreaming and Integration of PLA
Disarming is a process of handing over of the arms used by
individuals to the authorities who are responsible for the safe storage,
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redistribution or even to the destruction of those arms. Demobilization
is an act of either disbanding arms unit, reducing the number of
combatants or an interim stage before reassembling entire armed forces.
Reintegration is a social and economic process by which ex-combatants
acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and
income.
The Maoist leaders have so far rejected the classical notion of
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). They interpret
DDR as an approach to apply only for the defeated rebel force.
However, the agreement between the government and the Maoists onmanagement of arms and armies and involvement of UN Mission in
Nepal39 (UNMIN) is an integral part of DDR. Further, DDR applies
to both the defeated rebel force and the state security force, no matter
which side wins or defeats.
Once the integration of the registered PLAs in Nepal Army starts,
those who do not meet the criteria have to adjust in different areas
such as:
Industrial security,
Engage in skill-based occupations (by providing training,
resources and conducive environment), Adjusting in private security sector: industrial security, security
of public institutions, etc.
Creating special force of post-conflict reconstruction and
development,
Assigning civilian roles in the government structures where
appropriate,
Other options.
6 Role of International Community in Security Sector
Restructuring
In developing countries, military assistance is often provided by
donors mainly under the framework of development cooperation.40
Global experiences of the conflict ridden and war torn countries show
that international communities and aid agencies play leading role in
security sector reform, DDR and post conflict development. 41 Their
engagement in security sector reform has shown both positive and
negative outcomes, depending upon the degree of involvement
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(facilitation to dictation and promotion to control of the process). The
dominance of donors and aid agencies in the security sector
restructuring, police and military reform, post conflict development
and reconstruction is shaped by their financial support and associated
technical assistance.
In the case of Nepal, we need donors' support but not control over
the transformation process and imposition on the restrictive conditions
to facilitate home-grown security sector transformation process,
assisting in national capability building and providing required financial
resources.
7 Challenges and Opportunities for Military Restructuring
Challenges:
Old mindset of key actors (both security and political),
Vested interests of certain domestic groups/individuals,
Unwanted international influence,
Managing smooth transition
Proper reintegration of security forces including PLA into society
Unanticipated or unintended consequences and risks;
preparedness to deal with these uncertainties,
Others
Opportunities:
Peoples aspiration and pressure to decision makers from general
public,
Commitment made in the interim government and Comprehensive
Peace Accord,
Realization by Nepal Army for the need of change,
Commitment from political parties including Maoists,
Others.
Endnotes
1 This paper is based on the work partially supported by NCCR North
South.
2 Conflict transformation refers to outcome-, process- and structure-
orientated long-term peace building efforts shaped by new forms of
relation, which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct,
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cultural and structural violence.
3 OECD, Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good
Practice, http://www. oecd.org/dac/conflict, 19 May 2004 as cited
in Kumar and Sharma, Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges
and Opportunities. Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 2005
4 O. Greene, "Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and
Regional Perspectives," Journal of Security Sector Management,
Vo.1, No. 1, 2003, PP. 1-15
5 A. Schnabel and H-G Ehrhart (eds.), Security Sector Reform and
Post Conflict Peace Building, New York, Tokyo and Paris: United
Nations University Press, 2005
6 B.R. Upreti,Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal: The Maoist
Insurgency, Past Negotiation and Opportunities for Conflict
Transformation. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2006; op. cit. 3;
DFID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform,
London: Department for International Development, 2002
7 David Baldwin, The Concept of Security,Review of International
Studies , Vol. 23,1997; N. Ball, Enhancing Security Sector
Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP, www. undp.
org/bcpr/jssr/docs/UNDP_ SSR_ Concept_Paper_9 October, 2002;
A. Aditya, B.R. Upreti and P.K. Adhikari , Countries in Conflict
and Processing of Peace: Lessons for Nepal, Kathmandu: Friends
for Peace, 2006; DFID, Security Sector Reform Policy Brief, January
2003; A. Ebo, "The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector
Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia," Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Force, Occasional Paper, No. 9, 2005
8 The relationship between security sector and development has been
extensively discussed by the report of the Club of Rome in early
1970s (Meadows et al., 1972),Brandt Commission (1980) and Olaf
Palme Commission (1982).
9 Ibid
10 S. M Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies, International
Studies Quarterly, June 1991
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11 Op.cit., Upreti, 2006; B. R. Upreti, The Price of Neglect: From
Resource Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom,
Kathmandu: Bhrikuti Academic Publications
12 D. Kumar and H. Sharma, Security Sector Reform in Nepal:
Challenges and Opportunities, Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 2005;
B.R. Upreti, "Security Sector Reform: A Neglected Agenda," The
Kathmandu Post, 9 May 2003, A. Aditya, B.R. Upreti, and P. K.
Adhikari, Countries in Conflict and Processing of Peace: Lessons
for Nepal, Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 200613 The details of the Maoist insurgency is covered in the three books
of the author entitled 1)Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal:
The Maoist Insurgency, Past Negotiation and Opportunities for
Conflict Transformation, 2006, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 2)
Nepal ma Maobadi Sasastra Danda: Karan, Ashar Ra Amadhanka
Prayashhru (Armed Maoist Conflict in Nepal: Causes, Consequences
and Efforts for Resolution), Kathmandu: Bhrukati Academic
Publications. 2005; and 3) The Price of Neglect: From Resource
Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom ,
Kathmandu: Bhrikuti Academic Publications, 2004.
14 ICG, 2006a; op.cit., Upreti, 2006
15 The Alliance is composed of the Communist Party of Nepal, Unified
Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), Nepali Congress (NC), Nepali
Congress-Democratic (NCP-D), Nepal Sadbhawana Party
(Anandidevi), Nepal Peasants and Workers Party, United Left
Front and Samukta Janamorcha.
16 Op. cit., OECD
17 M. Chalmers, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: an
EUPperspective, Joint report published by Saferworld and the
Conflict Prevention Network, http://www.saferworld.co.uk/pubsecu.htm, 2000
18 N. Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual
Framework for UNDP, www. undp. org/bcpr/jssr/docs/UNDP_
SSR_ Concept_Paper_9 October, 2002
19 Op. cit., Kumar and Sharma
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20 Brandt Commission,North-South: A Programme for Survival,
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980
21 O. Palme, Common Security: A Blue Print for Survival, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1982
22 Ibid
23 See Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, London: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press for the detail about the conceptual basisof civil military relations, 1957
24 Information obtained from Army Command and Staff College on
19 January 2007.
25 The Government of Nepal decided to use police instead of Nepal
Army for the security of palace after the historic declaration of the
Parliament on 18 May 2006.
26 Dhruba Kumar and Hari Sharma (op.cit., 12) wrote, The army
believes the popular forces as being intrusive to the political landscape
of the country causing instabilities and discords, hence threat to the
status quo that has preserved peace, independence and sovereignintegrity of the state. For them the symbol of national unity and
stability remain the institution of monarchy. Such a perception on
monarchy is nowhere reflected more poignantly than in the keynote
speech of the incumbent Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung Thapa to
the graduate officer cadets at the 11th convocation of the Command
and Staff College of the Royal Nepal Army on May 14, 2004.
According to him, The Crown is the symbol of our identity and
the kingship is the progenitor and guardian of the Royal Nepal Army
along with the unalterable symbol of Nepali nationalism and national
unity. The faith, devotion and the trust of the people towards the
Crown have remained the essence of Nepali nationalism since time
immemorial. All Nepalis should therefore be united to work towards
preserving the symbol of our identity along with the fundamentals
of our national interests (COAS 2004, Sri Sam. Pra. Se. Pa. Jyu
bata Si.Sam. 11 Kamand Tatha Estaf Talimko Dichayanta
Samarohama Dinu Hune Sambodhan, (The Statement prepared for
the Rt. Honble Chief of Army Staff to be delivered at the 11 th
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Command and Staff Convocation Ceremony of the Military
Academy, May 14).The motto of the army has been Rajbhakti,
Hamro Shakti, i.e. the loyalty to the king is the power of the
army. Monarchy as integral to the integrity of the state has thus
become the acquired value, which should be the primacy of national
security and political stability. Therefore, the army has always been
cautious about identifying itself with the democratic government
rather than monarchy.
27
International Crisis Group (ICG) is globally perceived as one of themost credible international organizations in producing conflict
analysis report. It has produced a series of report about Nepal after
2003. These reports are: 1) Nepal: From People Power to Peace?,
Asia Report N115, 10 May 2006; 2) Nepals Crisis: Mobilizing
International Influence, Asia Briefing N49, 19 April 2006, 3) Nepal:
Electing Chaos, Asia Report N111, 31 January 2006; 3) Nepals
New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and The Maoists, Asia Report
N106, 28 November 2005; 4) Nepals Maoists: Their Aims,
Structure and Strategy, Asia Report Briefing N104, 27 October
2005; 5) Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N41,
15 September 2005; 6) Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: TheConstitutional Issues, Asia Report N99, 15 June 2005; 7) Nepal:
Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N94, 24 March
2005; 8) Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N36,
24 February 2005; 9) Nepals Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation
Worse, Asia Report N91, 9 February 2005; 10) Nepal: Dangerous
Plans for Village Militias, Asia Briefing, 17 February 2004 11)
Nepal: Back to the Gun, Asia Briefing, 22 October 2003; 12) Nepal:
Obstacles to Peace, Asia Report N57, 17 June 2003; 13) Nepal
Backgrounder: Ceasefire Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, Asia
Report N50, 10 April 2003.
28
Reports of local media and human rights organizations from February2005 to April 2006 widely documented the controversy during the
direct rule of the country. They argue that king would not be able to
conduct coup if army was not involved.
29 The international missions visiting Nepal (for example, US Senators,
EU Troika mission, ICJ mission, Amnesty International mission
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and many others) and organizations closely watching Nepals political
crisis after the royal takeover expressed their deep concerns about
the deteriorated situation because of the coup and autocratic rule.
30 See ICG reports: 1) Nepals Crisis: Mobilizing International
Influence, Asia Briefing N49, 19 April 2006, 3) Nepal: Electing
Chaos, Asia Report N111, 31 January 2006; 3) Nepals New
Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and The Maoists, Asia Report
N106, 28 November 2005; 4) Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia
Briefing N41, 15 September 2005; 5) Towards a Lasting Peace inNepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N99, 15 June 2005;
6) Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N94,
24 March 2005; 7) Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia
Briefing N36, 24 February 2005; 8) Nepals Royal Coup: Making
a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N91, 9 February 2005; for
detail.
31 ICG Report No 36, Feb 2005
32 SeeNepal Samacharpatra Daily, 23 January 2007 for detail.
33 The figure obtained from the Army Command and staff Colleague
on 19 January 2007. If we see the castewise distribution of 91444people working in the Nepal Army, 8901 are Brahmin, 37764
Chhetri, Thakuri 3706,Janajatis 22000,Madeshi 5122,Newar5821,
Dalit5655,Muslim 13 and 2462. In terms of gender disaggregating,
1025 are women and remaining are men.
34 Prachanda, chairman of the CPN (Maoist) appeared in public after
the first summit meeting between the Seven-Party Alliance and the
Maoists at the Prime Ministers official residence at Baluwatar in
Kathmandu on Friday, June 16, 2006 and first time publicly express
about the size of Nepal army and since then various leaders have
repeated the same.
35 C. Gleichmann, Odenwald, K. M. Steenken and A. Wilkinson,
Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field
and Classroom Guide. Swedish National Defense College, Pearson
Peacekeeling Centre, German Technical Cooperation and The
Norwegian International Defense Centre, 2004
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36 Ibid
37 Ibid
38 UN Security Council passed a resolution on 23 January 2007 to
operate UN Mission in Nepal for a year where more than 186 arms
monitors and around 600 persons in total will work in different part
of the country.
39 M. Brzoska,Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector
Reform, Occasional Paper No. 4, Geneva: Geneva Centre for theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), November, 2003;
N. Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual
Framework for UNDP, www. undp. org/bcpr/jssr/docs/UNDP_
SSR_ Concept_Paper_9 October, 2002
40 Op. cit., Schnabel and Ehrhart
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