lIN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUITIN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CATHERINA PARETO and KARLA CASE NO. 2014-1661-CA-01ARGUELLO; JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ andDAVID PRICE; VANESSA ALENIER andMELANIE ALENIER; TODD DELMAY andJEFFREY DELMAY; SUMMER GREENE andPAMELA FAERBER; DON PRICE JOHNSTONand JORGE DIAZ; and EQUALITY FLORIDAINSTITUTE, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HARVEY RUVIN, as Clerk of the Courts ofMiami-Dade County, Florida, in his officialcapacity,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE

Plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, hereby respond in opposition to the Motion to

Intervene filed on February 25, 2014 by Florida Family Action, Inc., Florida Democratic League,

Inc., and People United To Lead The Struggle For Equality, Inc. (collectively, "Movants"),

seeking to intervene in this matter as Party-Defendants.

Movants do not satisfy the standard for intervention as they do not have "an interest of

such a direct and immediate character that [they] will either gain or lose by the direct legal

operation and effect of the judgment." Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Carlisle, 593

So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992).

Indeed, a week ago, in similar litigation challenging Florida's marriage ban, a motion to

intervene filed by one of the Movants here -- Florida Family Action, Inc. ("FFA") -- was denied

Filing # 13484702 Electronically Filed 05/09/2014 12:32:38 PM

even under the more liberal federal intervention rule, because FFA has only a "generalized

interest in opposing same-sex marriage [that] does not entitle FFA to intervene." Brenner et. al v.

Rick Scott, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Case No. 4:14-cv-00107-RH-

CAS (Copy attached as Ex. A). That is exactly the case here as well.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs seek an injunction of the enforcement of the Florida laws barring same-sex

couples from marriage, thereby requiring Defendant to issue marriage licenses to Plaintiffs and

all otherwise qualified same-sex couples who apply for marriage licenses. The relief they seek

will not affect opposite-sex couples' eligibility to obtain marriage licenses, require Movants or

their members to take or refrain from taking any action, or affect Movants' legal rights and

obligations in any way. On February 25, 2014, Movants filed a Motion to Intervene. They allege

they are three non-profit organizations who have worked in Florida to "preserve and protect

marriage as a foundational social institution" and to support the passage by public referendum of

Amendment 2, the Florida Constitutional provision excluding same-sex couples from the

freedom to marry. Their Motion fails to meet the legal standard for intervention under Florida

law.

Movants cannot establish the direct and immediate interest required for intervention, as a

judgment in this case will not have any legal impact on them. Movants have not cited any

authority that authorizes a supporter of a citizen initiative to intervene in a suit challenging the

validity of the law passed by such initiative, nor that authorizes a private citizen or organization

to intervene in an action challenging the constitutionality of a state law of general application.

As shown herein, Florida law is squarely to the contrary.

29959667.1 2

In addition, the purely governmental interests at stake in the defense of this matter are

adequately represented by the existing Defendant - an agent of the State, with able counsel -who

has appeared and filed defenses, and Movants improperly seek to insert collateral issues into this

case. The motion should be denied.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INTERVENTION

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 provides that "[a]nyone claiming an interest in

pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the

intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main

proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion."

In Carlisle, the Florida Supreme Court held that in evaluating a motion to intervene, a

court must first "determine that the interest asserted is appropriate to support intervention." 593

So.2d at 507. Thus, an "appropriate interest" must be established before the court is permitted to

exercise discretion as to any other factors and considerations. Id. As the Court explained, the

"asserted interest must both (a) already be at issue in the proceeding, and (b) be of a kind the

would-be intervener is a proper party to raise, i.e., either a necessary or proper party to the suit."

Id.

An "appropriate interest" is "an interest of such a direct and immediate character that the

intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment." Id.

(emphasis supplied). It must be created by "a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, ar

a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation." Id.

A showing of "indirect, inconsequential or contingent interests is wholly inadequate." Faircloth

v. Mr. Boston Distiller Corp., 245 So.2d 240, 244 (Fla. 1970); Kissoon v. Araujo, 849 So.2d 426,

429 (Fla. l s` DCA 2003). Moreover, intervention should be denied where the petition raises

29959667.1 3

issues collateral to those under consideration in the lawsuit. See Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401

(Fla. 1970).

As we now show, the Movants do not have any direct interest in the outcome of this

litigation. They have only general political interests in the subject matter of this case, which are

not judicially cognizable and are insufficient to justify intervention.

IIL MOVANTS DO NOT HAVE A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN THEOUTCOME OF THIS SUIT

A. A Judgment Would Not Impact Movants' Voting Rights

The entry of a judgment that Plaintiffs seek here will have no "direct legal operation and

effect" on the Movants. Movants supported the enactment of Amendment 2, as was their right.

Movants' individual members freely exercised their right to vote on Amendment 2. But, that

amendment is now Article I section 27 of the Florida Constitution. Movants have no special

relationship to section 27; instead, they have only the same generalized interest in the law that

other like-minded citizens of Florida possess.

The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.

2562 (U.S. 2013), is instructive. In Perry, the Court held that private advocacy groups supporting

Proposition 8 (the California citizen initiative that banned same-sex marriage) lacked standing to

appeal a district court decision holding Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional, because they

"suffered no concrete and particularized injury" as a result of the decision invalidating Prop 8.

133 S. Ct. at 2659. Just as in this case, "[t]hese proponents had not been ordered to do or refrain

from doing anything in the challenged judgment." Id. at 2662. Rather, "[t]heir only interest was

to vindicate the constitutionality validity of a generally applicable California law, which is

insufficient to confer standing." Id. In short:

29959667.1 4

Once Prop 8 was approved by the voters, the measure became a "duly enactedconstitutional amendment or statute." Petitioners have no role special orotherwise -- in enforcement of Proposition 8. They therefore have no "personalstake" in defending its enforcement that is distinguishable from the generalinterest of every citizen of California. No matter how deeply committedpetitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8 or how "zealous [their] advocacy,"that is not a "particularized" interest sufficient to create a case or controversyunder Article III.

Id. at 2663.

The Court further concluded that the proponents were not authorized to assert the State's

interest on the State's behalf. Id. As the Court put it, the proponents sought "an unelected

appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, however and to

whatever extent they choose to defend it," but intervention is "not a vehicle for the vindication of

value interests." Id. The Court also pointed out that it had never identified initiative proponents

as qualified defenders of the measures they advocated. Id.

All of this is true here, as well. Movants' argument would grant standing to every person

who voted for an amendment to the Florida Constitution to intervene in actions challenging the

legality of that amendment. There is no legal precedent for that proposition and Movants have

cited none.

The one "voting" case that Movants cite, Dubose v. Kelly, 181 So. 11 (Fla. 1938), in no

way supports their intervention in this case. Movants assert that in Dubose, "the Supreme Court

long ago affirmed the right of citizens to intervene in litigation that threatens to undue (sic) their

votes on a public issue." As shown by even a cursory reading, it does no such thing.

Dubose involved a suit by a City Commissioner seeking to enjoin the City Clerk from

implementing an election to recall the Commissioner. The successful intervener there was a

citizen who had signed the recall petition in accordance with the provisions of the City Charter.

29959667.1 5

The intervener sought to oppose injunction of the election in order to preserve his right to vote in

the scheduled recall election.

This case is entirely different. The intervener in Dubose was seeking to preserve his right

to vote prospectively in an election. An injunction of the election would prevent him from

exercising his right to vote on the recall petition. Here, Movants will not be prevented from

voting on anything.

It bears emphasizing that permitting any citizen to intervene in litigation challenging the

constitutionality of laws would render meaningless the legal standard for intervention, and would

open the floodgates to all other groups and individuals on both sides of the issue that have a

view about whether same-sex couples should be permitted to marry in Flarida. As the U.S.

Supreme Court recognized in PerYy, intervention is not a vehicle for the vindication of value

interests.

B. A Judgment Would Not Impact Movants' Advocacy Rights or Their Rightsto Speech or Religion

Movants' right to publicly advocate their political views on marriage does not include a

right to intervene in court cases where, as here, their own legal interests are not directly affected.

Plaintiffs can find no Florida case finding that a political position, no matter how deeply or

sincerely held, has been deemed to be a legally sufficient "interest" supporting intervention.

Movants cite to only one such purported case, National Wildlife Federation Inc. v.

Glisson, 531 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1St DCA 1988). That case does not support their motion. To the

contrary, it highlights why intervention is not permissible here.

In Glisson, Alachua County amended its land use plan, curtailing development in the

Cross Creek Village area and preserving the natural habitat of the area's wildlife. Individuals

who lived in that area filed suit challenging the validity of the amendment. Two environmental

29959667.1

groups sought to intervene to support the amendment, on behalf of several members who

submitted affidavits indicating that they were residents and real property owners and/or business

owners and operators in the Cross Creek area. The affiants testified as to their actual use of the

area in question, as well as the potential impact on their lives and businesses should plaintiffs

prevail in their suit against Alachua County.

Intervention was proper in Glisson because the advocacy groups represented individuals

who lived in, or owned businesses in, the affected area, and who accordingly would experience

direct and immediate impact from the new land use plan. As such, the Glisson interveners

represented individuals who would "gain or lose the quality of use of their land at issue" as a

result of the disputed zoning judgment. Kissoon, 849 So.2d at 430.

That is not the case here. Movants will not lose any rights or be subjected to any new

obligations or constraints as was the case with the interveners in Glisson.

In an analogous California case, Socialist Workers 1974 California Campaign Committee

v. Brown, 53 Cal. App. 3d 879 (1975), the court denied intervention in a case involving a

challenge to the constitutionality of a California statute where the would-be intervener was an

advocacy organization whose very purpose was advocacy on the underlying issues in the

litigation. The court there noted that an interest in the legal precedent that might be created by

the lawsuit did not constitute a "direct and immediate" interest in the case.

The same is true here. Whatever the outcome in this case, it will have no "direct and

immediate" effect on Movants or their members. They will retain the right to marry, to obtain

marriage licenses, to enjoy the benefits associated with marriage, and to advocate their views

regarding marriage.

299s966~.i 7

Movants have cited no legal authority to support their position that having strongly-held

political views is a ground for intervention and the Plaintiffs have found none. The only cases

they cite (not previously discussed) involve interveners with concrete, legally cognizable

interests in the underlying litigation, such that the outcome of the case would directly alter the

intervener's legal rights or obligations:

Insurance companies with explicit contractual subrogation rights to recover paid medicalexpenses were permitted to intervene in suits by their insureds against tortfeasars.(Abelove; Carlisle)

A condominium association, authorized as the condominium manager by Florida statute,was permitted to intervene in a suit by condominium unit owners against engineers fordamages caused by a defective plumbing system. The unit owners were asserting claimsfor damages to their condominium units whereas the association was asserting a claim fordamages to the common areas. (I3ay Park Towers)

Two community associations claiming a right to use recreation areas owned by a thirdcommunity association were allowed to intervene in a suit between the developer and thethird community association regarding the sale and transfer of the recreation areas.(Sweetwater)

No such concrete, legally cognizable interests are at issue here, where Movants have only

a generalized political interest in the challenged law. In fact, Movants' allegedinterests in this

case are far more indirect than in many cases where intervention has been denied by Florida

courts.

For example, Faircloth v. Mr. Boston Distiller Corp., 245 So.2d 240, involved a

constitutional challenge to a state law on equal protection grounds, as in this case, where a bottler

of alcoholic beverages sought to invalidate a state excise tax on the manufacture of certain

alcoholic beverages. Another bottler sought to intervene, to advocate a position beneficial to its

proposed prospective products (and financial interests), and was denied. The Florida Supreme

Court held that the excise tax rate applicable to the movant's current products was not at issue,

29959667.1

thus the case did not involve adjudication of any matter in which the movant had a direct and

immediate interest justifying its intervention.

Similarly, in Kissoon v. Araujo, 849 So.2d 426, the estate of a deceased patient brought a

medical malpractice claim against three physicians alleging they were responsible for a patient's

death. The defendants attempted to establish that another physician, Dr. Kissoon, was

responsible for the patient's death. Dr. Kissoon sought to intervene, alleging that a verdict in

favor of the defendants would have a devastating effect on his reputation, subject him to

professional investigation by the Florida Board of Medicine, and hinder his practice of medicine.

His intervention was denied because "none of these alleged consequences are a direct legal effect

of a judgment in this case." See also Fasig v. Florida Society of Pathologists, 769 So.2d 1151

(Fla. 5~~' DCA 2000)(denying patients' motion to intervene in an action brought by a group of

doctors seeking a declaratory judgment against an insurance company allowing them to bill

patients directly for "professional component" fees, because a ruling in the case would not have

imposed any direct liability on patients ar prevented patients from contesting fees in the future).

In this case, Movants' alleged "interests" which do not constitute any legally

cognizable interest whatsoever are far more indirect, remote and contingent than in these

illustrative cases, and are clearly insufficient to justify the requested intervention. Indeed, as

explained above, no matter how the case is decided, Movants' rights and obligations will not be

altered or affected in any way.

IV. MOVANTS' SUGGESTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WILL NOTADEQUATELY DEFEND THE CHALLENGED LAWS DOES NOT PROVIDEMOVANTS WITH A PROTECTED INTEREST

Movants suggest that the Defendant will not "adequately" defend the constitutionality of

Florida's marriage laws denying marriage to same-sex couples and, thus, they should be allowed

z99s966~.~ 9

to intervene for this reason alone. Before that could even be a consideration for the Court,

however, Movants must first establish their requisite interest in this case, and then must also

establish inadequate representation by the Defendant. Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Abelove,

556 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. St" DCA 1990); Fasig, 769 So.2d at 1154. They have not done so and

cannot da so.

Furthermore, Movants cannot establish inadequate representation by the Defendant,

based on their conjecture as to how "well" the Defendant may defend Plaintiffs' claims. If that

were so, any person or group seeking to intervene always could claim that the existing parties

will not zealously represent their perspective on the issues. The fact that Movants might bring

another set of viewpoints to the litigation is an insufficient basis to call into question the

adequacy of the existing parties' representation.

Thus, mere differences in strategy are not enough to justify intervention. U.S. v. Los

Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 402 (9r~ Cir. 2002). "The fact that Movants would have been less prone

to agree to the facts and would have taken a different view of the applicable law does not mean

that the existing parties did not adequately represent their interests in the litigation." U.S. v.

Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1986). A prospective intervener cannot rebut the

presumption of adequate representation by merely disagreeing with the existing parties' litigation

strategy. Chiglo v. Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 188 (8t" Cir. 1997).

As noted, this matter involves purely governmental interests, and a governmental

representative is defending the lawsuit. Plaintiffs have sued a proper governmental party (the

Clerk who implements and enforces the subject marriage laws), who has appeared and filed an

Answer and Defenses. Movants may not like the manner in which the Clerk is defending the

suit, but the Clerk is defending the suit.

29959667.1 1 ~

Moreover, pursuant to 86.091, Florida Statutes, Plaintiffs provided notice of this

constitutional challenge of Florida's marriage laws to the Attorney General, a governmental

representative, who has the statutory right to intervene. As to the singular legal issue before this

Court whether the state of Florida can establish a legitimate governmental interest served by

the challenged laws the State's interests are adequately represented.

V. CONCLUSION

Movants do not gain the right to intervene in Plaintiffs' case merely because of their

strongly held political views about marriage or the laws challenged in this case. This case, like

many others, raises important and often politically contentious issues, but that does not relieve

persons seeking to become parties of the obligation to satisfy the long-established legal standards

for intervention. To the contrary, the fact that certain segments of the public at large hold strong

opinions both pro and con about the issue of marriage for same-sex couples argues strongly

against allowing intervention unless the would-be intervener can demonstrate the required

"direct and immediate" interest inthe case. Opening this case to interested members of the

general public would multiply the number of parties and greatly increase the burden on the Court

and the existing parties.

a99s966~.i 11

Movants cannot establish any such "direct and immediate" legal interest. Their asserted

interests are an effort to cause undue delay and prejudice to Plaintiffs, who suffer every day that

they are denied the right to marry. The interests at stake are governmental, and a governmental

defendant is the appropriate party to represent those interests.

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Motion to Intervene be DENIED.

DATED: May 9, 2014 Respectfully submitted,

Shannon P. MinterChristopher F. StollDavid C. CodellAsaf OrrNATIONAL CENTER FORLESBIAN RIGHTS870 Market Street, Suite 370San Francisco, CA 94102Telephone: (415) 365-1335Facsimile: (415) 392-8442E-mail:sminter@nclrights.org

cstoll@nclrights.orgdcc~dell~a~nclrights.or~aorr@nclrights.org

Elizabeth Schwartz (Fla. Bar No.114855)ELIZABETH F. SCHWARTZ, PA690 Lincoln Road, Suite 304Miami Beach, FL 33139Telephone: (305) 674-9222Facsimile: (305) 674-9002E-mail: eschwartz@sobelaw.com

Mary B. Meeks (Fla. Bar No. 769533)MARY MEEKS, P.A.P.O. Box 536758Orlando, Florida 32853Telephone: (407) 362-7879Facsimile:Email: marybmeeks@aol.com

s/Nancy .I. FaggianelliSylvia H. Walbolt (Fla. Bar No. 33604)Luis Prats (Fla. Bar No. 329096)Nancy J. Faggianelli (Fla. Bar No. 347590)CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, P.A.4221 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Ste. 1000Tampa, FL 33601Telephone: (813) 223-7000Facsimile: (813) 229-4133Email: swalbolt@cfjblaw.com

1prats@cfjblaw.comnfaggianelli@cfjblaw.com

Jeffrey Michael Cohen (Fla. Bar. No. 91495)Cristina Alonso (Fla. Bar. No. 327580)CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, P.A.Miami Tower100 Southeast 2nd StreetSuite 4200Miami, Florida 33131Telephone: (305) 530-0050Facsimile: (305) 530-0055Email: jmcohen@cfjblaw.com

calonso@cfjblaw.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs

29959667.1 I Z

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was electronically

filed with the Clerk of Court through the Florida Courts eFiling Portal to be served this 9t" day of

May 2014, on counsel of record listed below to:

SYLVIA H. WALBOLTE-mail: swalbolt@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: rosborne@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: tpaecf@cfdom.netLUIS PRATSE-mail: 1prats@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: lcoffey@,CFJBIaw.comNANCY J. FAGGIANELLIE-mail: nfaggianelli@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: pparrey@CFJBIaw.comCARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, P.A.Corporate Center Threeat International Plaza4221 W. Boy Scout BoulevardTampa, Florida 33607-5780Telephone: (813) 223-7000Facsimile: (813) 229-4133

JEFFREY MICHAEL COHENE-mail: jmcohen@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: pwatson@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: miaecf@cfdom.netCRISTINA ALONSOE-mail: calonso@CFJBIaw.comSec. E-mail: cschmidle@CFJBIaw.comCARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, P.A.Miami Tower100 Southeast Second StreetSuite 4200Miami, Florida 33131Telephone (305) 530-0050Facsimile (305) 530-0055

Shannon P. MinterChristopher F. StollDavid C. Codell

Luis G. MontaldoP.O. Box 13267Miami, FL 33101E-mail: cocgencounsel@miamidade.govSec. &mail: larruza@miamidade.gov

Eileen Ball MehtaBILZIN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE &AXELRODLLP1450 Brickell AvenueSuite 2300Miami, FL 33131E-mail: emehta@bilzin.comSec. E-mail: eservice@bilzin.com

Counsel for Defendant

Horatio G. MihetLIBERTY COUNSELPost Office Box 540774Orlando, FL 32854-0774E-mail: 1lmihet~a~libert.~eduSec. E-mail: court~lc~or~

Counsel for Intervenors

29959667.1 13

Asaf OrrNATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIANRIGHTS870 Market Street, Suite 370

San Francisco, CA 94102E-mail: sminter@nclrights.orgE-mail: cstoll@nclrights.orgE-mail: dcodell@nclrights.orgE-mail: aorr@nclrights.org

Elizabeth F. SchwartzELIZABETH F. SCHWARTZ, P.A.690 Lincoln Road, Suite 304Miami Beach, FL 33139E-mail: eschwartz@sobelaw.com

Mary B. MeeksMARY MEEKS, P.A.P.O. Box 536758Orlando, FL 32853E-mail: marybmeeks@aoLcom

Counsel for Plaintiffs

s/Nancy J Faggianelli

29959667. I 14

Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 40 Filed 04/24/14 Page 1 of 5Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THENORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JAMES DOMER BRENNER et al.,

Plaintiffs,CONSOLIDATED

v. CASE NO. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS

RICK SCOTT, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING LEAVE FOR FLORIDAFAMILY ACTION TO INTERVENE BUT

ALLOWING IT TO PARTICIPATE AS AMICUS

In these consolidated actions, the plaintiffs challenge provisions of the

Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes on same-sex marriage. The defendants

include Florida's Governor and Attorney General, both of whom disagree with the

plaintiffs on the merits. Florida Family Action, Inc. ("FFA"), a "cultural action

organization" that opposes same-sex marriage, has moved to intervene in each

consolidated action as a defendant. This order denies the motions but allows FFA

to file a timely amicus memorandum on any legal issue submitted by the parties.

Consolidated Case No. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS

EXHIBIT A

Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 40 Filed 04/24/14 Page 2 of 5Page 2 of 5

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) entitles a person to intervene as of

right if (1) a federal statute gives the person an unconditional right to intervene, or

(2) the person "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the

subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless

the existing parties adequately represent that interest."

No federal statute gives FFA an unconditional right to intervene in an action

of this kind. So Rule 24(a)(1) does not entitle FFA to intervene.

Under Rule 24(a)(2), the "interest" that a proposed intervenor claims

must be a particularized interest rather than a general grievance. SeeHoward v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir.1986) (usingstanding cases to determine that intervenors with only generalizedgrievance could not intervene); Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. FederalElection Commission, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir.1982) (citingstanding cases to determine that intervenor's claimed interest thatunions would be financially overwhelmed in federal elections toogeneralized to support claim for intervention of right).

Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212-13 (l lth Cir. 1989).

FFA "claims an interest" in the same-sex-marriage issue, but it is a

generalized interest, not a particularized interest in anything directly affecting FFA

or its members. No FFA member seeks to enter asame-sex-marriage or will be

directly affected if others enter same-sex marriages. FFA's generalized interest in

opposing same-sex marriage does not entitle FFA to intervene. See Hollingsworth

Consolidated Case No. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS

Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 40 Filed 04/24/14 Page 3 of 5Page 3 of 5

v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (holdingon the issue of standingthat a

similar advocacy organization had no role in the enforcement of a same-sex-

marriage constitutional amendment after its passage and therefore lacked a

"personal stake" in the litigation "that [wa]s distinguishable from the general

interest of every citizen"); see also Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213 ("[S]tanding cases .. .

are relevant to help define the type of interest that the intervenor must assert.").

Another ground also supports this result. The existing defendants, especially

the Governor and Attorney General, can be relied upon to adequatelyindeed,

zealouslydefend these actions on the merits. Under the plain language of Rule

24(a)(2), a person is not entitled to intervene when an existing party already

adequately represents the interest claimed by the proposed intervenor.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) gives a district court discretion to

allow a person to intervene on a "timely motion" if (1) a federal statute gives the

person a conditional right to intervene, or (2) the person "has a claim or defense

that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact."

No federal statute gives FFA a conditional right to intervene in an action of

this kind. But FFA asserts a defense that shares with the main actions common

questions of law. FFA's motion to intervene was timely. The. court has discretion

Consolidated Case No. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS

Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 40 Filed 04/24/14 Page 4 of 5Page 4 of 5

to allowor disallowintervention. That FFA lacks standing to bring its own

action does not preclude intervention. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213.

The better course here is to deny intervention but to allow FFA to be fully

heard as an amicus. Factors that support this conclusion include the meager if not

nonexistent benefit that would flow from allowing FFA to intervene as opposed to

just allowing FFA to participate as an amicus, the unnecessary procedural

complexity that intervention would entail, and the likelihood that allowing FFA to

intervene would bring forth other proposed intervenors who would assert only

generalized political interests and whose participation probably would generate

more heat than light. FFA's views as amicus will be welcome, but FFA's

intervention would bring little additional value.

III

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. FFA's motions to intervene, ECF No. 22 in Case No. 4:14cv107 and

ECF No. 13 in Case No. 4:14cv138, are DENIED.

2. FFA may file a memorandum as amicus curiae on any motion. The

deadline for FFA to do so is the corresponding deadline for the memorandum of

the party whose position FFA supports. But when FFA supports the moving party,

the deadline for FFA's amicus memorandum in support of the motion is the earlier

Consolidated Case No. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS

Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 40 Filed 04/24/14 Page 5 of 5Page 5 of 5

of (a) the deadline for filing the motion, if there is a deadline, or (b) seven days

after the filing of the motion, without athree-day extension based on electronic

service of the motion.

3. The page limit for an amicus memorandum is 25 pages.

4. Each amicus memorandum must include the information listed in

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5).

The clerk must add FFA to the docket as an amicus so that its

attorneys receive electronic notices of filings.

SO ORDERED on Apri124, 2014.

s/Robert L. HinkleUnited States District Judge

Consolidated Case No. 4:14cv 107-RH/CAS