ResilienceofurbansystemsinthefaceofnaturalhazardsTowhatextentdohumanitarianorganisationscontributeto

floodpreparednessinJakarta?

MasterThesis30ECTSNOHAMasterPrograminInternationalHumanitarianActionUppsalaUniversityJanuary2018

Author: SarahStinglSupervisors: Dr.LisbethLarssonLidén(UppsalaUniversity)

Prof.Dr.AndrejZwitter(RijksuniversiteitGroningen)

ThisthesisissubmittedforobtainingtheMaster’sDegreeinInternationalHumanitarianAction.Bysubmittingthethesis, theauthorcertifies thatthetext is fromhis/herhand,doesnot includetheworkofsomeoneelseunlessclearlyindicated,andthatthethesishasbeenproducedinaccordancewithproperacademicpractices.

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ABSTRACT

Today, the humanitarian sector is facedwith the interplay of several challenges: The

worldisincreasinglybecomingurbanizedandcitiesarerapidlyexpandingintomegaci-

tiesandmetacities.Atthesametimeitisconfrontedwithaheighteneddisasterriskthat

affectstheurbanrealminparticular.Thisisduetorisingexposureoftheurbantonatu-

ralhazards,whichareexacerbatedbyclimate change, coupledwithvulnerabilities in-

herentinurbanrealms.Nonetheless,thehumanitariansectorhasbeenexhibitingdiffi-

cultiesindealingwiththecomplexitiesofurbanrealms.

Therefore,thetheoreticalframeworkofthisthesisdiscussestheaddedvalueofadopt-

ing a system theoretical approach to the study of urban systems for identifyingwhat

factorsrenderanurbansystemresilientandwhichonesrenderitvulnerable.Atwhich

criticalpointcananurbansystemfail,resultinginahumanitariandisaster?

Inordertoanalysewhatrolehumanitarianactioncanthenplayassystempreserver,a

casestudywasconductedonthespecificcaseofJakartaanditsvulnerabilitytoflooding.

For this purpose ten interviewswere undertaken: Seven interviewswith representa-

tivesofhumanitarianorganisationsthathadnotableinvolvementinpastfloodrespons-

es,oneinterviewwiththeHeadofDepartmentofDisasterPreventionandPreparedness

at the JakartaRegionalDisasterManagementAgencyand two further informaldiscus-

sionswithformerstaff.

Themainconclusionswerethat,inordertoberesilientcitiesshouldexhibitproperties

ofcomplexadaptivesystems.Therolethathumanitarianorganisationsplayinstrength-

eningthesepropertiesinthespecificcaseofJakartais,withintheirlimitations,ofcrucial

importancefortheoverallfunctioningofJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystem.

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PREFACE

Thethesisathandistheresultofalongadventurousjourney.Ajourneyfilledwithups

anddownsthatrepeatedlyconfrontedmewithnewchallenges.Iwouldliketothanka

numberofpeoplethathavegivenmegreatsupportinthesepastcoupleofmonthsand

havemadethetripalittlebitlessrocky.

Firstofall,IwouldliketothankmysupervisorDr.LisbethLarssonLidénforguidingme

as well as for providing me with very helpful feedback and giving me reassurance

throughoutthethesiswritingprocess.Iwouldalsoliketothankmysecondsupervisor

Prof.Dr.AndrejZwitteraswellasAmarantaLunaArteagaforgivingmetheopportunity

ofcarryingouttheresearchformycasestudy.

A big thank you also goes tomy interview participants, without whom this research

wouldnothavebeenpossible.

Iwouldalsoliketoexpressmygratitudetowardsmyfamilyandespeciallymyparents,

whohavegivenmetheopportunityofparticipatinginthisMaster’sprograminthefirst

place.

Lastbutnot least, Iwould like to thankmyoverlypatientpartnerMarco,whohas in-

vestedanincredibleamountoftimeandenergyintosupportingmeespeciallythrough-

outthemomentsIwasstrugglingthemost.

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ACRONYMS

BNPB BadanNasionalPenanggulanganBencana

(IndonesianNationalBoardforDisasterManagement)

BPBD BadanPenanggulanganBencanaDaerah

(ProvincialDisasterManagementAgency)

ACF ActionContrelaFaim

CAS ComplexAdaptiveSystems

CASt ComplexAdaptiveSystemstheory

CRS CatholicReliefServices

DKI DaerahKhususIbukotaJakarta

(SpecialCapitalCityDistrictofJakarta)

EWS EarlyWarningSystem

GST GeneralSystemsTheory

HFI HumanitarianForumIndonesia

LDD LembagaDayaDharma

MDMC MuhammadiyahDisasterManagementCenter

PI PlanInternational

PMI PalangMerahIndonesia

PU DinasPekerjaanUmum

(MinistryofPublicWorks)

SOP SchoolOperationalPlan

STC SavetheChildren

UNOCHA UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

WV WorldVision

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................................1

PREFACE.............................................................................................................................................2

ACRONYMS........................................................................................................................................3

TABLEOFCONTENTS.....................................................................................................................4

1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................61.1 TheResearchProcess...................................................................................................................71.1.1 AimandResearchObjectives..............................................................................................................71.1.2 Researchquestions..................................................................................................................................71.1.3 PreviousResearchandRelevancetoHumanitarianActionField.......................................81.1.4 Methodology...............................................................................................................................................81.1.4.1 Samplingprocedure........................................................................................................................................101.1.4.2 DataAnalysis.....................................................................................................................................................11

1.1.5 Limitations.................................................................................................................................................111.1.6 EthicalConsiderations..........................................................................................................................121.1.7 ThesisOutline...........................................................................................................................................12

2 TheoreticalFramework.......................................................................................................142.1 UrbanizationandDisasterRisk...............................................................................................142.2 ASystemTheoreticalApproachtoUrbanComplexity.....................................................182.2.1 DefiningSystems.....................................................................................................................................182.2.2 SystemsTheory–AnOutline.............................................................................................................192.2.3 ComplexAdaptiveSystems,CAS......................................................................................................212.2.4 UrbanComplexityandUnderstandingCitiesasCAS..............................................................22

2.3 VulnerabilityandResilienceofComplexUrbanSystems...............................................242.3.1 UrbanVulnerability...............................................................................................................................242.3.2 DisasterResilienceofUrbanCAS.....................................................................................................272.3.3 KeyCASConceptstoStudyUrbanDisasterResilience..........................................................302.3.3.1 Anticipation........................................................................................................................................................302.3.3.2 FeedbackLoopsandAdaptation...............................................................................................................312.3.3.3 EmergenceandAggregateBehaviour.....................................................................................................32

2.3.4 UrbanSystemsFailureandHumanitarianDisasters..............................................................322.4 SummarizingtheTheoreticalFramework..........................................................................34

3 CaseStudy:FloodPreparednessinJakarta...................................................................353.1 CityProfileofJakarta:UrbanizationandFloodRisk.......................................................353.1.1 TheMegacityJakarta.............................................................................................................................353.1.2 TheFloodingHazardinJakarta........................................................................................................373.1.3 PerceivedRiskofFloodingforJakartaToday............................................................................39

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3.2 FloodResponseinJakarta:Experiencesfrom2007and2013.....................................413.2.1 Floodingin2007.....................................................................................................................................413.2.2 Floodingin2013.....................................................................................................................................43

3.3 TheCurrentFlood-Preparedness-SysteminJakarta.......................................................443.3.1 StructuralFloodMitigationMeasuresbytheGovernment..................................................443.3.2 FloodPreparednessStrategiesofHumanitarianOrganisations........................................453.3.2.1 SafeSchoolsInitiative:School-basedDRR............................................................................................463.3.2.2 Community-basedDisasterPreparedness...........................................................................................483.3.2.3 SiGAP:StrengtheningGovernment’sAbilitytowardsDisasterPreparedness......................493.3.2.4 PreparingforEmergencytoReducetheRiskofDisaster..............................................................49

3.3.3 EmergencyResponsePreparedness..............................................................................................503.3.3.1 CoordinationandCollaboration................................................................................................................513.3.3.2 Communication.................................................................................................................................................533.3.3.3 MonitoringandEarlyWarningSystem..................................................................................................533.3.3.4 TriggerforFloodResponseIntervention..............................................................................................553.3.3.5 PrepositionedStocks......................................................................................................................................55

3.4 SummarizingtheEmpiricalFindings....................................................................................55

4 Discussion.................................................................................................................................574.1 JakartaandtheFloods:ComplexityandVulnerability....................................................574.2 HumanitarianActors:VitalforJakarta’sFloodResilience?...........................................584.2.1 Anticipation–ProactiveandReactiveResilience.....................................................................594.2.2 FeedbackLoopsandAdaptation:.....................................................................................................624.2.3 EmergenceandAggregateBehaviour............................................................................................63

4.3 LimitationsofDiscussion..........................................................................................................66

5 ConclusionandRecommendations..................................................................................67

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................................70

APPENDICES....................................................................................................................................76AppendixI:InterviewConsentForm................................................................................................76AppendixII:Semi-structuredInterviewQuestions.....................................................................77AppendixIII:InterviewParticipants................................................................................................79

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1 Introduction

“Themoreweunderstandthecausesandconsequencesofriskgenerationandaccumulation,thebetterwewillbeabletoadapt,mitigateandpreventinthefuture,

whateverthatfuturemayhaveinstoreforus.”–MargaretaWahlstrom,UNISDR

Thehumanitariansectorisconfrontedwithanumberofchallenges.Forastart,destruc-

tiveextremeweathereventsareincreasinginintensityandoccurrence.Thisstressoris

exacerbated by environmental degradation and the phenomenonof climate change.A

further great challenge lies in the current demographic and socioeconomic develop-

ments, like population growth and rapid unplanned urbanization, accompanied by an

informalization of settlements and labour.Dealingwith these issues in isolation is al-

readyaverydifficulttask.However,wearefacedwiththeinterplayofthesestressors,

whichincreasesbothexposureandvulnerabilityofurbanagglomerations(andespecial-

lymegacities)tonaturalhazards. Inotherwords,theinterplayofthesestressorsfuels

thepotential fornatural hazardshitting vulnerable grounds and turning into vasthu-

manitariandisasters.Assuch,wearecurrentlyobservingashiftofcrisestourbanareas

–adevelopmentthathighlightstheneedforthehumanitariansectortoadaptitswork

inordertoreducetheamountofpotentialdamageandtopreventdisasters(Earle,2016,

p.77).

Urbanrealmsarechallengingthehumanitariansectorthathasdevelopedinruralcon-

texts (Campbell, 2016, p.8). Through their density, diversity and dynamics, they are

characterizedbyahighlevelofcomplexitythatincreasesthedifficultyforhumanitari-

anstorespondinginaneffectiveway.Infactthehumanitariansectorseemstobelack-

ingtherequiredunderstandingofandtheappropriatetoolsfortheurbancontext.This

couldbeseenintheearthquakeofPort-au-Princein2011justtonameoneexample.

AsystemtheoreticalapproachandespeciallylessonstakenfromComplexAdaptiveSys-

temstheorymayhelpustogetabettergraspofurbanrealms.Ultimately,abetterun-

derstandingofhowurbansystems functionaswellashowurbansystems fail, can in-

formthehumanitariansectoronhowtoworkwiththemandonhowtobetterprepare

forcrises(Earle,2016,p.83).

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1.1 TheResearchProcess

1.1.1 AimandResearchObjectives

Theaimofthisthesisistoanalyseinwhatwayshumanitarianactorscancontributeto

thepreservationofcomplexurbansystemsinthefaceofnaturalhazardsandincreased

vulnerability,inordertopreventasystemiccollapse,i.e.ahumanitariandisaster.

To approach this question the first objective of this research is to deduct some im-

portantlessonsfromComplexAdaptiveSystemstheory(CASt)andtoapplythemtothe

studyofurbanresilience.

ThesecondobjectiveistoexaminethespecificcaseofJakarta:Anumberoffactorsren-

derJakartahighlyvulnerabletotherisksofflooding.Thepurposeoftheempiricalpart

ofthisresearchistoseehowhumanitarianorganisationsdealwiththispressingissue

and inwhatways theyprepare topreventhumanitariandisasters related to flooding.

Theaim is topositionhumanitarianorganisationswithin Jakarta’s floodpreparedness

system:Whatroledotheyplayinstrengtheningitandaretheyacrucialcomponentof

it?WhataretheweaknessesofJakarta’scurrentfloodpreparednesssystemandwhere

canloopholesbeidentified?Theultimategoalistopotentiallydeductsomelessonsfrom

thecaseofJakartathatmightbetransferabletootherurbancontexts.

1.1.2 Researchquestions

Themainresearchquestionsare:

What role does humanitarian action play in fostering resilience of the complex urban

systemofJakartainthefaceofafloodhazard?Towhatextentdohumanitarianorgani-

sationsfunctionasurbansystempreserversinaflooddisasterrisksituation?

In order to answer these main research questions the following sub-questions were

formulated:

1. Whatcharacteristicsdoesanurbansystemneedtohaveinordertoberesilient?

2. BasedonthecaseofJakarta,whatstrategiesdohumanitarianorganisationsap-

plytostrengthentheresilienceofcomplexurbansystems?

3. Whatarepossibleinterventionpointstopreventasystemscollapse,i.e.ahuman-

itariandisaster?

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1.1.3 PreviousResearchandRelevancetoHumanitarianActionField

Alargeamountofresearchhasbeendoneonthevulnerabilityaswellastheexposureof

(mega)citiestonaturalhazards(someexamplesincludeMitchell,1999;Wamsler,2014;

Wamsler,BrinkandRivera,2013;Hall,2009;Petersetal.,2015). Theresearchidenti-

fiesaheighteneddisasterriskforourglobalcities,attributabletoslow-onsetandsud-

den-onsethazards, exacerbatedby climate change, aswell as to the vulnerability that

ourcitiesandespeciallymegacitiescarrytowardshazards.Thishasseriousimplications

for thehumanitariansector, as themajorityof theworld’spopulation isnow living in

ever-growing cities, which increases the risk of huge human losses. Thus, among the

humanitarian community it hasbeenwidely acknowledged thatmoreefforthas tobe

putintoincreasingpreventativemeasuresandthusintofosteringresilience.

However,researchhasalsoidentifiedthathavingdevelopedinruralsettingsandinref-

ugee camps, the humanitarian sector is currently ill-prepared to dealwith and strug-

glingtoadapttotheurbancontext(seeCampbell,2016,p.6;Earle,2016;Carpenterand

Grünewald,2016).Withoutdoubtthisisapressingconcernforthehumanitarianfield.

Nevertheless,theacademicfocusonhowtobestapproachurbanrealmshasbeenquite

limitedsofar.Somescholarshavehighlightedtheaddedvalueofanalysingurbancon-

texts through a systems theoretical lens, as it helps untangling complexity (important

examples include Campbell, 2016; McGranahan et al., 2005; da Silva, Kernaghan and

Luque,2012;Baietal.,2016).Nowthechallengeliesinunderstandingwhatrolehuman-

itarianactorscanandshouldplayinurbancontextsthatalreadyhavetheirownsystems

inplace.Thus,thisthesisaimsatmakingasmallcontributiontotheemergingliterature

onhumanitarianactionintheurbanrealm.

1.1.4 Methodology

Sinceinawidersensetheaimofthisthesisistounderstandthesocialworldbyexamin-

ingtheinterpretationofthatworldbyitsparticipants,aqualitativeresearchapproach

wasadopted(Bryman,2012,p.380).

Thethesisbuildsonastrongconceptualsection,whichisbasedonathoroughliterature

reviewandprovidesanswerstosub-questionone.Forthispartofthethesisacademic

papers,scientificjournalarticlesandpractitionerstudiesontheapplicationofasystem

theoretical and especially CAS theoretical lens to the urban contextwere analysed. It

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aimstoillustratetheconceptsofurbanvulnerabilityandurbandisasterresilienceand

to position humanitarian disasters in the lifecycle of a CAS. According to Gray (2014,

p.16)concepts“areabstractideasthatformthebuildingblocksofhypothesisandtheo-

ries”. Three key concepts of CAS theory (anticipation, feedback loops and adaptation,

emergenceandaggregatebehaviour)werechosen,inordertogetabetterunderstand-

ing of what characteristics resilient systems exhibit and of how strengthening these

propertiescanthereforebeseenasaleveragepointfor(humanitarian)intervention.

In order to fulfill the requirements of relevance and validity of the used sources, the

heartof the theoretical frameworkdevelopedupon theworkof leading scholars.Fur-

thermore,thedatawasvalidatedthroughaprocessoftriangulation,meaningthatmul-

tiplesourcesofdatawereusedtocrosschecktheinformationobtained(Bryman,2012,

p.392).

Inthesecondpartofthisthesisandtoanswersub-questionstwoandthree,acasestudy

ontheroleofhumanitarianorganisationsinthefloodpreparednessofJakartawascon-

ducted.For thisempirical sectionamixofmethodswaschosen:academicpapersand

organisationalreportswereutilizedforabasicunderstandingofthenatureofJakarta’s

floodingproblem.Toidentifyhowthecityengagesinfloodpreparednessandwhichrole

humanitarian organisationsplay in this aspect, qualitative datawas collected through

eightsemi-structuredinterviewsandtwoinformaldiscussionswithformerstaff.Seven

interviewswereconductedwithrepresentativesofnationalandinternationalhumani-

tarianorganisationsandonewiththeHeadoftheDisasterPreventionandPreparedness

Department at the Provincial Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan

BencanaDaerah,BPBD).TheinterviewswereconductedbetweenOctober30thandNo-

vember15thof2017,facetofaceinJakartawiththeexceptionofoneinterviewthatwas

arrangedoverSkype (seeAnnex III,p.79).The interviewswerecarriedout inEnglish

language and tookbetween50minutes and1,3 hours. A set of semi-structuredques-

tionswas compiled in advance andguided the interviewprocess (seeAnnex II, p.77).

This approach was chosen to allow for some flexibility in the sequence of questions

asked and for some room to follow-up on issues the interviewee deemed important,

while still allowing for comparabilityof results (Bryman,2012,p.471). It furthermore

enabledtheresearchertotakeupissuesaddressedbypreviousinformantsandaddress

themtoparticipantsinfollowinginterviews.

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1.1.4.1 Samplingprocedure

AccordingtoBryman(2012,p.418)mostqualitativeresearch includespurposivesam-

pling.Theaimofpurposivesamplingistoselectparticipantsinastrategicway,asthe

sample should be of relevance to the research questions (ibid.). Criterion sampling is

onetypeofpurposivesamplingthatinvolvesthesamplingofallunitsthatmeetapar-

ticularcriterion(ibid.).Thus,thecriterionofthissampleselectionwastoincluderepre-

sentativesofhumanitarianorganisationsthathaveastronginvolvementindealingwith

thefloodingissueinJakarta.Thisshouldensuretherelevanceofthesampletoanalyse

what role humanitarian organisations play for Jakarta’s flood preparedness. It should

subsequently provide the basis for drawing meaningful conclusions to the research

questions.

TheinitialsamplewasgeneratedbycontactinganumberoforganisationsviaEmailthat

couldbeidentifiedasmainplayersduringpastfloodresponsesthroughexaminationof

reportsandnewspaperarticles,includinghumanitariansituationreports,issuedduring

past flood events. However, this effort proved to be rather challenging, as only a few

stakeholderswouldrespondoragreetoparticipate.Therefore,at thebeginningofthe

researchstayinIndonesia,theresearcheralsorevertedtotheNOHAnetworkinJakarta.

WiththesupportofNOHAalumniworkinginJakarta,furtherinsightsintowhichorgani-

sationsplayan importantrole in the flooding issueweregainedandrelevantcontacts

forthesampleweremade.Throughthistechniqueandasnowballingapproach,mean-

ing that the sampledparticipantsproposedother relevantparticipantsand thesepro-

posed further participants (Bryman, 2012, p.424), the final research sample was at-

tained.

Inordertoobtainavalidsamplesize–althoughlimitedduetotimeandresourcecon-

straints–theresearchercrosscheckedwithUNOCHA’sofficerinchargeofcoordinating

organisationsthatimplementDisasterRiskReductionprogramsinIndonesia,toalsoget

theirinsightonwhotherelevanthumanitarianstakeholdersforfloodpreparednessare.

According to theUNOCHAofficer thenumberoforganisationsdealingwith floodpre-

parednessinJakartacurrentlyamountstoanestimated15to20organisations.There-

fore, the research sample includesapproximatelyhalf. It isworthmentioning that the

organisationsandinformantspointedoutbythisofficerasbeingrelevant,areincluded

inthissample.

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1.1.4.2 DataAnalysis

Theobtaineddatawastranscribedandathematiccodingapproachwaschosenforre-

sult aggregation (Robson andMcCartan, 2016, p.461). Using the programAtlas.ti, the

materialwasdividedintocategoriesandcodedaccordingly,allowingfortheaggregation

ofrecurringthemes.Thisprocesswasfolloweduntiltopicalsaturationwasreachedand

nofurtherthemescouldbeidentified.

1.1.5 Limitations

Bothsectionsofthisthesishavesomelimitationsthatshouldbeclarifiedatthispoint.In

thetheoreticalsection,thestudyofurbanresilienceisdelimitedtothreekeyconceptsof

CAStheory,mainlybecauseoftimeandlengthconstraintsofthisthesis.Assuch,apply-

ingotherCASconceptscanfurtherexpandthestudy.

AsfortheempiricalsectionthestudyisgeographicallydelimitedtothecityofJakarta.

Thiscarriedalogisticalconstraintinitself,owingtoJakarta’sextremetrafficsituation.It

limitedtheamountoforganisationsthatcouldbevisitedduringtheresearchstay,due

totheamountoftimeneededtoreachtheiroffices.Itisalsolimitedtothechosensam-

ple. Although the sample is of relevance to answer the research questions, the study

cannot claim to be representing the entirety of humanitarian engagement in Jakarta’s

floodpreparedness.

A further limitation is that the researchwas conducted inEnglish languagewithout a

translator.Thismighthavereducedthenumberoforganisationswillingtoparticipatein

theresearchandhaschallengedthemutualunderstandingduringtheinterviews.Once

italsooccurredthatwhentheresearcherarrivedtothemeeting,morepeoplethanex-

pectedwerepresentandnotallof themspokeEnglish.Therefore,onememberof the

organisation was translating the questions to the other participants and the partici-

pants’answerstotheresearcher.Someinformationmayhavebeenlostduringthatpro-

cess.Afurtherlimitingpointthatismentionworthyregardssomeculturalbarriersthat

challengedthecommunicationduringtheinterviews.Sometimesgettingtotheheartof

the issuesthat theorganisationsareandwerefacingprovedtobedifficult.This isbe-

lieved tobeattributable toageneral conductofaddressingproblems inamuchmore

subtleand indirectwaythantheresearcherwasaccustomedto fromtheowncultural

background.

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Itisfurthermoreimportanttostatethattheresearcherinevitablycarriesownbiasand

personal beliefs into the research, which impedes complete objectivity – a common

characteristicamongqualitativeresearch(Sarantakos,2005,p.93).

1.1.6 EthicalConsiderations

In order to comply with the ethical research standards the following measures have

beentakenthroughouttheinterviewprocedure.Attherecruitingstage,potentialinter-

viewees were informed via Email that their participation was entirely voluntary and

basedontheirconsent,andthattheywouldnotbecompensatedfortheirparticipation.

Participantswerealso informedthatthe interviewwouldbeaudiorecordedandtran-

scribed,but that theywouldgetanopportunity to review the transcript,before inclu-

sionintotheresearch.OncetheparticipantshadagreedtoameetingeitherviaEmailor

byphonecommunication,atthebeginningofthemeetingtheyreceivedthisinformation

oncemoreinwrittenform(seeAnnexI,p.76)andwerealsoinformedthattheyhadthe

rightnot toanswerquestionsor to stop the interviewat anypoint.Participantswere

alsoaskedtogivetheirwrittenconsenttotheaudiorecordingofthe interviewandto

theuseoftheirpositionandthenameoftheirorganisationinthefurtherprocess.

Aftertheinterviewallparticipantsreceivedthetranscriptsoftheinterviewsandwere

giventheopportunitytoreviewthemandofgivingtheirfinalconsentbeforeinclusion

intotheresearch.

Allcommentsandresponsesweretreatedconfidentiallyandparticipants’nameswere

notreported–theirpositionsandtheirorganisationshoweverareidentifiedinthisthe-

sis,aftertheyconsentedtoit.Atthestageofanalysisanddiscussionthehighestlevelof

objectivitywasaimedatbeingmaintained.

1.1.7 ThesisOutline

Inthetheoreticalframework(chaptertwo)thecurrentprocessofurbanizationaswell

astheincreasingnumberandintensityofnaturalhazardswillbedescribedandthecon-

clusionthatdisasterriskisincreasinglyurbanwillbedrawn.Inafurtherstep,building

ontheworkofotherscholars,citieswillbedefinedassystemsandmorespecificallyas

complexadaptivesystems.Fromhereurbanvulnerabilityandurbanresiliencewillbe

discussed with a focus on three key concepts taken from Complex Adaptive Systems

theory(CASt)andtheiraddedvalueforunderstandingdisasterresilience.Wewillthus

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lookathowanaturalhazardcanhitvulnerablegroundsinanurbansystemandaffect

itsfunctioningorevenleadtoapotentialcollapseofthesystem,i.e.ahumanitariandis-

aster.

The objective is to then identify the (potential) role of humanitarian organisations as

systempreservers.Therefore,theempiricalpartofthethesis(chapterthree)discusses

the case of Jakarta’s flood vulnerability andwhat kinds of strategies are being imple-

mentedbyhumanitarianorganisationstodealwiththehazardandreducedisasterrisk.

Inafourthchaptertheempiricalfindingsandthetheoreticalframeworkarerelatedto

eachothertoanalysewhatrolehumanitarianorganisationsplayforJakarta’sfloodresil-

ience.The findingsarehighlighted inaconcludingchapter that takesupthe initialre-

searchquestions.

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2 TheoreticalFramework

Inthefollowingchapterwewilldevelopthetheoreticalconceptsthatrepresenttheba-

sisof this researchandguided thewhole researchprocess.Wewill startwitha short

backgrounddescriptionofourproblem,bymappingthecurrentprocessesofurbaniza-

tionandtheparallelincreaseinthenumberandintensityofnaturalhazards,resultingin

aheighteneddisasterriskintheurbancontext.Inafurtherstepthefocuswillbelaidon

connecting lessonsfromsystemsthinkingandespecially fromCASttothestudyofthe

urban.Throughouttheprocesswewilltrytoshedlightonthefactorsrenderingurban

realmsvulnerableandtakethisasapointofdepartureforanalysingtheconceptofresil-

ience. Thereafter, wewill deduct three key concepts from CASt. These concepts shall

helpusingettingabetterunderstandingofwhatcharacteristicsarecrucialforthedis-

asterresilienceofanurbansystem.Inafinalsectionwewilldealwiththesituationin

which resilience declines and the urban system fails – the situation in which we are

facedwithahumanitariandisaster.

2.1 UrbanizationandDisasterRisk

Today urban agglomerations1are hosting more than half of the global population

(WorldBank,2016;UNDESAPopulationDivision,2016,p.ii).Thisequilibriumbetween

populationslivinginruralareasandthoselivinginurbanareaswasreachedin2008for

thefirsttimeinhistory(PriorandRoth,2013,p.59).ToputitinKooningsandKruijt's

words,in2008"theworldpopulationbecameurban"(2009,p.8).Whileatthebeginning

of the twentieth century the urban population made up only 15 percent of people

worldwide(McGranahanetal.,2005,p.797),thisshareisexpectedtoriseupto60per-

centby2030.Theprojectionsforthecomingdecades,pointtofurthergrowthofboth,

numberandsizeofcities,withAsiaandAfricaholdingthegreatestshareofurbanpopu-

lationgrowth(UNDESAPopulationDivision,2014,p.7;UnitedNations,2006,p.6).

Especiallychallengingisthefactthatthisdevelopmenthappenedonlywithinafewdec-

ades:Thefirst“megacities”wereTokyoandNewYork,whentheypassedthe10million1Anurbanagglomerationis“thebuilt-upordenselypopulatedareacontainingthecityproper,suburbsandcontinuouslysettledcommuterareas.Itmaybesmallerorlargerthanametropolitanarea;itmayalsocomprisethecityproperanditssuburbanfringeorthicklysettledadjoiningterritory.” (UnitedNations,2006,p.7)

15

inhabitantsmarkinthe1950s.Whilein2015,wecouldalreadywitnesstheexistenceof

29megacities,now,wearefacinganincreasingnumberof“metacities”,i.e.,citieswitha

populationof20millionandabove (UnitedNations, 2006,p.8).Theprospects for the

nearfuturearethatanewcategorywillemerge:“Gigacities”,whicharecitiesthathost

morethan50millioninhabitants(SattlerandBrandes,2015).

Paralleltothecontinuousprocessofrapidglobalurbanization,wecanidentifyanother

worrying trend: An exponential increase in fatalities and in economic losses due to a

risingnumberofnaturalandsocio-naturalhazardsoverthepast30yearsasrepresent-

edbyFigure1(Petersetal.,2015,p.2).

Figure 1: Number of geophysical, meteorological, hydrological and climatological events, 1990-2014(adoptedfromMunichRe,2016)

Thisdifferentiationbetweennaturalandsocio-naturalhazardsstemsfromtherecogni-

tion that “humanactivity is increasing theoccurrenceof certainhazardsbeyond their

naturalprobabilities”(UNISDR,2009,p.28).Thushumanactivity,suchasoverexploita-

tion,landdegradationorresourcedepletion(ibid.)inconjunctionwithnaturalhazards,

exacerbatetheoccurrenceofsucheventsandheightentherisktheyposetohumanset-

tlements.On top of this, there is a general consensuswithin the scientific community

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thatwearealreadyfacingandwillhavetofacetheimplicationsofclimatechange,which

furtherincreasesthefrequency,intensityandseverityofthesehazardousevents(Hall,

2009,p.808).

Differentiatingbetweendifferenttypesofhazardsbasedontheiroriginisquiteplausi-

ble,however,whenwespeakofdisastersthisseemstobeunreasonable(Petersetal.,

2015,p.2).Arguably,thereisnosuchthingasanaturaldisaster.Adisasteristheresult

oftheexposuretoa(natural)hazardlikeaflood,anearthquakeoravolcaniceruption,

coupledwiththeconditionsofvulnerabilitypresentinthecommunityorsocietyaswell

asaninsufficientcapacityofthe lattertoreduceorcopewiththeconsequencesofthe

hazard(UNISDR,2009,p.9).Petersetal.(2015,p.2)bringthisthoughttothepointby

statingthat“(…)everydisasteristheresultofthesocietalembeddinginwhichthehaz-

ardoccurs.”Thuswewilladoptthefollowingcommonlyusedformula:

DisasterRisk=HazardxVulnerabilityxExposure

CopingCapacity

Urbanagglomerationsexhibittwocharacteristicsthatposethematheighteneddisaster

risk:

First,theyappeartobeincreasinglyexposedtotherisingnumberofhazards.In2014,of

the1,692citieswithatleast300,000inhabitants,56percentwereathighriskofexpo-

sure toat leastoneof the followingnaturalhazards:cyclones, floods,droughts,earth-

quakes, landslides and volcano eruptions (UN DESA Population Division, 2016, p.8).

Thesehighlyexposedcitiesarehometo1.4billionpeopleintotal(ibid.).Figure2pro-

videsfurtherinformationonwherethesecitiesarelocated.Theshapeofthepointsindi-

catesthepopulationsizeofthecity,whilethecolourindicatesthelevelofexposure.

17

Figure2:Cities’riskofexposuretonaturalhazardsin2014(Source:UNDESAPopulationDivision,2014,p.8)

Secondly,cities–andespeciallymegacities–displaysomesocio-economicfactorsthat

increase their vulnerability and render them fragile to disaster: Inequality, exclusion,

segregation,violenceandinsecurity(KooningsandKruijt,2009,p.10).

Thus,oneconsequenceoftheurbanizationprocessisthat“theglobalpatternofworld

poverty,informalityandexclusionwilldefinitivelyacquireanurbanface”(ibid.p.8).

We can thus draw the conclusion that risk is “increasingly becoming urbanized”

(Wamsler,2014,p.3).However, thehumanitariancommunityseemstobe lackingpre-

parednesstotheconsequencesofthisshiftandtothusbestrugglingwithrespondingto

emergencies in urban realms (Earle, 2016, p.80; Campbell, 2016). Most notably, the

2010 earthquake in Haiti hasmade this shortcoming visible, as the humanitarian re-

sponseinthecapitalcityofPort-au-Princeprovedtobechaoticandhighly ineffective.

ThelessontobelearnedfromHaitiisthatthehumanitariansectorhastobetterprepare

foremergenciesinurbanagglomerations.

Thisimpliesaneedtogainagreaterunderstandingofhowcitiesworkandinwhatways

humanitarianactionneedstobereshapedinordertobebetterpreparedforurbanchal-

18

lenges.Howcanahumanitariandisasterbecontainedorevenprevented in theurban

realm?

Since the urban context is characterized by high complexity it is very difficult for the

humanmindtounderstandwhatfactorsmakeanaturalhazardbecomeadisaster.

Therefore,wewill adopt a system theoretical lens in order to first analyse cities and

theirvulnerabilitiesandtakethisasapointofdepartureforstudyingurbanresiliencein

thefaceofhazardsanddisasterrisksexacerbatedbyclimatechange.

2.2 ASystemTheoreticalApproachtoUrbanComplexity

2.2.1 DefiningSystems

As ordinary as it may sound, systems thinking recognizes and focuses on systems

(Campbell,2016,p.22).Butwhatexactlydoweconsidertobeasystem?

Systemscanbe foundanywhere: In thedomainsofphysico-chemical sciences, lifesci-

ences, socialsciencesorhumanities (HofkirchnerandSchafranek,2011,p.177), there-

fore it ischallengingto formulateonegeneraldefinition(Skyttner,1996,p.16).This is

reflectedintheliterature,inwhichavarietyofattemptstodefinesystemscanbefound

–someofthesedefinitionsbeingmoreconcretethanothers.

Boulding(1985;citedbySkyttner,1996,p.16)forexamplepresentsaverybroadunder-

standingofasystem:“(…)anythingthatisnotchaos”.Althoughthisdefinitionissurely

applicabletosystems,itsaddedvalueforanalyticalpurposesisquitelimited.

AccordingtothebiologistLudwigvonBertalanffy(1950,p.143),asystemisa“complex

of interacting elements P1,P2,…Pn”. This definition is still very broad, but it proposes

two relevant concepts for discussing social systems: Elements and their interaction

(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016a,p.202).

However,Iwouldarguethatthisunderstandingofasystemisstilllackinganimportant

conception,especiallywhenlookingatsocialsystems:Thenotionthatthesystemhasa

purpose.Thisnotionisreflectedinthefollowingquitecommondefinition,whichwewill

alsoadoptforthisthesis:

19

“A system is a set of interactingunits or elements that forman integratedwholeintendedtoperformsomefunction.”(Skyttner,1996,p.16f.)

2.2.2 SystemsTheory–AnOutline

“Ihaveyettoseeanyproblem,howevercomplicated,which,whenlookedatintherightway,didnotbecomestillmorecomplicated.”

–PoulAnderson_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Whentryingtomakesenseof thenatureandtheevolutionofsystemstheoryonecan

easily get overwhelmedby the sheer quantity of literature available and the differing

approacheschosenwithintheliterature.VonBertalanffy's(1972,p.407)advicetostart

viewing systems theory embedded in thehistorical context of thoughts leading to the

developmentofthisscience,seemstobeareasonableandindeedhelpfulapproach.As

newas systems theorymay sound, theunderlying idea canactuallybe tracedback to

Aristotleandhisconceptofholism.Aristotlearguedthatwecouldgetverydifferentand

newinsightsintoourobjectofobservationanditsfunctioningbyanalysingthatobject

asawhole,insteadoflookingatthesinglepartsofitindividuallyandthenaddingthem

up to one – in Aristotelian words: “The whole is more than the sum of its parts”

(Campbell,2016,p.23;Mele,PelsandPolese,2010,p.126;VonBertalanffy,1972,p.407).

Aristotelian’sholismisonefundamentalprincipleofsystemsthinking.

Thus, the philosophical foundations of systems theory were already laid in ancient

times.However,itwasnotuntilthe1950sthatVonBertalanffyintroducedthe“system”,

andmorespecificallyGeneralSystemsTheory2asanewscientificparadigmtostudythe

general relationships of the empiricalworld (Mele, Pels and Polese, 2010, p.127; Von

Bertalanffy, 1972, p.411; Boulding, 2004 [1956], p.128). According to Sterman (2000,

p.4)thisparadigmchangehadbeencalledforsincetheIndustrialRevolution.Herefers

2General Systems Theory (GTS) emerged in response to the need for a body of systematic theoreticalconstructstodiscussthegeneralrelationshipsoftheempiricalworld(Boulding,2004[1956],p.128).ItispredominantlyshapedbytheworksofthebiologistLudwigvonBertalanffy–whoalsocoinedthetermGeneralSystemsTheory(translatedfromtheGermanword‘AllgemeineSystemlehre’)–TalcottParsons,C.WestChurchman,AlfredEmerson,KennethBouldingandAnatolRapoport.GTSisconsideredtobeascienceofthe‘wholeness’thatpresumesthatalawoflawsexistsandisthere-fore in systematic searchof such a law (Skyttner, 1996, p.18). It is a cross-cuttingor evenoverarchingtheory,abletounifydifferentfieldsbydeductingandformulatingconceptsandprinciplesthataregener-allyvalidforsystems(vonBertalanffy,1950,p.139).

20

toHenryAdams,whointhiscontextnotedthatfundamentalnewwaysofthinkingwere

neededinordertounderstandthegrowingcomplexityandtheradicalchangesinsocie-

tyandits“dizzyingeffects”(ibid.):Systemsthinkingfoundanechoamongphilosophers

andtheorists,sinceitseemedtoprovidethatneededanalyticalframework.

Inessence,systemstheoryisascienceofthe‘wholeness’.Itteachesustoviewtheworld

asacomplexsystem,whichismadeupofmanyinteractingelementsthattogetherform

a whole performing some function (Mele, Pels and Polese, 2010, p.126; Meadows,

2008,p.12).Theseelements themselvescanalsobesystems,orsubsystems, thatagain

consistofinteractingelements.AsMeadows(2008,p.12)pointedlydescribes:“Systems

canbeembeddedinsystems,whichareembeddedinyetothersystems”andthus“eve-

rythingisconnectedtoeverythingelse”(Sterman,2000,p.4).

Herewecanalreadyseethekindofcomplexitywearedealingwith.

In a sense, one main endeavour of systems theory is to untangle this complexity by

focussing on understanding the relationship between a structure and its behaviour

(Meadows, 2008, p.1). Thus, we first need to describe the structure of a system and

identify the elements it consists of. This is already a challenge in itself, since there is

virtuallynoendtothisprocess(ibid.p.13)–wearedealingwithanindefinitenumberof

elements.Simplylookingattheelementsmakingupthewhole,however,willnotgiveus

agoodunderstandingofhowthatwholefunctions–ofhowitbehaves.

Meadows(2008,p.12)usesaverysimplequotethatillustratesthisstatement:

“You think that because you understand “one” that you must thereforeunderstand “two” because one and onemake two. But you forget that youmustalsounderstand“and”.”

We need to also understand the binding element that holds the parts together.

Therefore,thenextchallengeliesinidentifyingthelinkages,interconnectionsandinter-

relationships between these elements (Meadows, 2008, p.13; Campbell, 2016, p.23;

RiciglianoandChiagas,2011,p.3).

Inwhatrelationdotheystandandtowhatextentaretheyinterdependent?Whichparts

arevitalforthesystemtokeeponfunctioning?Whathappenswhencertainpartsstop

functioning?Thelattertwoquestionsareofspecialrelevancewhendiscussingthevul-

nerability,oralsothefragilityofasystem,andwhatimplicationsahazardmayhaveon

21

its functioning.Thisnotionwillbe furtherdiscussed inChapter2.3.4.-UrbanSystems

FailureandHumanitarianDisasters,p.32.

WithinSystemsTheoryseveraldifferingapproachesevolvedindependentlyofeachoth-

er todescribedifferentkindsof systems.Theybuildon thesamebasicprinciples,but

adaptedtotherespectivefieldsofscience.Thus,systems’dynamics,complexitytheory,

viable systemsmodeling, soft systemsmethodology, systems engineering and critical

systemsthinkingemerged(Nel,2015,p.22).

Inthiswork,wewillfocusonanddelimitourselvestoComplexityTheoryandparticu-

larlyComplexAdaptiveSystems(CAS),sinceitseemstobebestsuitedtounderstanding

theurbanization-risk-disaster-nexus(Petersetal.,2015,p.109).

2.2.3 ComplexAdaptiveSystems,CAS

ComplexAdaptiveSystemstheory3emergedwithintheecologicalandbiologicalscienc-

esinordertostudythosesystemsthatarecharacterizedbyalimitedextentofpredicta-

bility,originatinginthesheernumberof inter-linkagesandfeedback-mechanismsthat

operate these systems (Levin, 2002, p.17; Peters et al., 2015, p.109). CAS consist of a

greatnumberofdiversecomponents,alsocalledagents,thatinteractwitheachotherin

anon-linear,dynamicmatter(Holland,2006,p.1;Nel,2015,p.32).Economies,ecologies,

the immunesystem,evolvingembryosandthebrainareexamplesofsuchsystems,as

outlinedbyHolland (1992, p.17).These systemsall exhibit a very complexbehaviour

thatfailstobeaccuratelysimulatedbylineardiagnostictoolssuchascomputers(ibid.).

Thiscomplexbehaviour“emergesasaresultofinteractionsamongsystemcomponents

(oragents)andamongsystemcomponents(oragents)andtheenvironment.Through

interactingwithandlearningfromitsenvironment,acomplexadaptivesystemmodifies

itsbehaviourtoadapttochangesinitsenvironment”(PotgieterandBishop,2001,p.1,

citedbyRammel,StaglandWilfing,2007,p.10).

Holland(1992,p.18)reverts to the immunesystemforaclearer illustrationofwhata

CASis:Theimmunesystemcomprisesofahighnumberofantibodies,whose job isto

repelanddestroyanyinvaderenteringthebodysystem.Theinvaders,however,comein

3ProminentCASthinkersincludeJohnH.Holland,MurrayGell-MannandW.BrianArthur.

22

an almost infinite number of forms and develop further. The immune system has to

adaptitsantibodiestothenewinvadersinordertosuccessfullyrepelthemandsurvive.

The antibodies’ adaptabilitymakes it hard to predict the immune system’s behaviour

throughsimulations.

The immune system exemplifies the extraordinary capability of CAS of learning from

theirenvironment–Holland(1992,p.18)speaksofan“evolvingstructure”.Bylearning

fromtheirenvironment, thesesystemsconstantlychangeandreorganizetheircompo-

nentparts andadapt in away that allows them to surviveand/orabsorb shocks that

theirsurroundingspose(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016a,p.204;Holland,1992,

p.18). This underlines the importance of studying urban disaster resilience through a

CAStheoreticallens.

2.2.4 UrbanComplexityandUnderstandingCitiesasCAS

Justagenerationago,thestudyofcitieswasdominatedbyexplanationssupportingthe

conceptof citiesas structures characterizedby stability, thathad the formofordered

ring patterns around the traditional market centre (Batty, Barros and Junior, 2004,

p.15). But cities and especiallymegacities are and can never be in equilibrium (ibid.,

p.3).Theyareshapedbyfivemaindrivers,namelypopulationgrowth,economicgrowth,

further urbanization, increased dependence on infrastructure and increased role of

technology in society (Moavenzadeh 2007 cited inMcConnell, 2007, p.25).More than

everbeforecanJacobs’(2016[1961],p.101)conclusionthat“citiesarefantasticallydy-

namicplaces”,beappliedtoourglobalcitiesandcommunitiestoday.Theyare“incon-

stant fluxasaresultofmanydynamic factors,reorganisingandadaptingto feedbacks

acrossmultiplescalestemporallyandspatially”(daSilva,KernaghanandLuque,2012,

p.4).Thus,citiesarecharacterizedbyadaptivecapacityandassuchinconstantmove-

ment, always changing and developing further. Conceptualizing cities as stable struc-

turescan thereforebequitemisleading.But trying tounderstandtheir formandtheir

function and untangling their complexity is not an easy endeavour. How to approach

themandwheretobegin?

Wecouldtrytoidentifythesinglepartsconstitutingthecityandanalysethem.Howev-

er,ifwewouldthentrytosimplyaddthesesinglepartstogetherwiththeaimofcom-

23

prehending the essenceof thewhole city,wewould fail inourmission (Batty,Barros

and Junior,2004,p.1).This isbecausewewould leaveoutof thepicture the fact that

these single parts are also (highly) interconnectedwith each other. A Newtonian ap-

proach,i.e.areductionistanalysisstrategy,isnotabletocaptureurbancomplexity.

Inorder tograsp theurban realmwith its greatnumberofheterogeneousandhighly

interconnectedelements(Atun,2014,p.52),asystemtheoretical,andmorespecificallya

CAStheoretical,approachseemstobemoresuitable.Quitesomeworkhasbeendoneon

approachingcities fromasystemtheoreticalperspectiveso far (PriorandRoth,2013,

p.60;Ernstsonetal.,2010,p.533).Indeedwecanapplyourpreviouslyoutlineddefini-

tionofsystemstoourcities:Theyare“asetofinteractingunitsorelementsthatforman

integratedwholeintendedtoperformsomefunction”(Skyttner,1996,p.16f.).

AccordingtodaSilvaetal.(2012,p.6),themainfunctionofurbansystemsistosecure

well-being, i.e., thebasichumanneeds, being food,water and shelter, access to goods

and livelihood opportunity, security, health, social relations and freedom to act. This

seemstobesomewhatobvious.

However,whenitcomestooutliningwhatthecities’setofinteractingunitsorelements

consistsof,wearefacedwithabiggerchallenge,sincewearedealingwithahighlevelof

complexity.Thefollowingquotecapturesthisnotionwell:

“Thecity isoneof the largestcomplexspatialsystemsconsistingofhetero-geneousandinterconnectedelementsbothinphysicalandsocialstructures,among them humans, organisations, infrastructures, and economy.” (Atun,2014,p.51)

Urbansystemsaremadeupofnetworksofinfrastructure,institutions,ecosystemsand

knowledge.Theyarebuiltuponphysicalelementsliketechnologyandbuildingsaswell

asonsocialelementslikeregulatorystructuresandformalandinformalpractices(Prior

andRoth, 2013, p.7). Thus the complexwholeness of an urban system comprises the

followingfivekeysubsystems,ashighlightedinFigure3:Economyandlivelihoods,poli-

tics and governance, society and culture, infrastructure and services, aswell as space

andsettlements(Campbell,2016,p.25).

24

Figure3:TypologyoffiveUrbanSystems(adaptedfromCampbell,2016,p.25)

These subsystems and their elements,which form further subsystems and so on, are

interconnectedandinterdependent.Thequestionswehavetoaskourselves,whenana-

lysingacityfromaCAStheoreticalperspectiveare:Howaretheelementsofurbansys-

temsinteractingwitheachother?Wheredocausalitiesanddependenciesexist?Which

elementsareindispensableforthesurvivalofthewholesystem?

CAS’ helpful contribution inunderstanding cities and communities is that it embraces

newmodesofexplaininghowsocieties form,adapt,andevolveunderchangingcondi-

tions,whilequestioningexplanationsbasedonfindingrecurringpatterns(Batty,Barros

andJunior,2004,p.15).

2.3 VulnerabilityandResilienceofComplexUrbanSystems

“Attheheartofresiliencethinkingisaverysimplenotion–thingschange–andtoignoreorresistthischangeistoincreaseourvulnerabilityandforegoemerging

opportunities.Insodoingwelimitouroptions.”(WalkerandSalt,2006,p.9f.)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

2.3.1 UrbanVulnerability

Citiesareparticularlyvulnerabletonaturalhazards.Firstofall,theyarecentersofcon-

centratedpopulationandeconomicactivities,whereanyimpactordisruptioncanaffect

agreatnumberofpeopleandassets(Hoornwegetal.,2011,p.8).Thisisfurtherexacer-

Economy&livelihoods

Infrastructure&

services

Space&settlements

Social&cultural

Politics&governance

25

bated by the fact that our global cities are increasingly interdependent and intercon-

nected,bothinternallyandexternally.Thisresultsinpotential ‘downstream’or‘conta-

gion’effectsonneighbouringoreconomicallydependentcitieswhenadisasteroccurs,

meaning that the implications of a disaster extend spatially and aremuch broader in

urbanthaninruralsettings(PriorandRoth,2013,p.61;Atun,2014,p.55).

Secondly,therearemanyfactorsthatincreasethevulnerabilityofurbanrealmstonatu-

ral hazards. Before analysing what factors contribute to urban vulnerability, we will

clarifywhatwesubsumeunderthisterm.

According to Mitchell (1999, p.141) vulnerability is “the potential for loss”. It is “the

degreetowhichasystem,orpartofasystemmayreactadverselytotheoccurrenceofa

hazardous event” (Timmerman, 1981, p.21). The stronger the adverse reaction, the

higheristhelikelihoodtosufferloss.Theexentandthequalityofthisreactionandthus

the system’s vulnerability to hazards, are conditioned by the level of the system’s

resilience (Adger et al., 2005, p.1036; Timmerman, 1981, p.21). For a more detailed

discussiononresilienceseeChapter2.3.2-DisasterResilienceofUrbanCAS,p.27.

Thus,themorevulnerablefactorsorelementsasystemconsistsof,thelessthesystemis

able to dealwith the hazard (low resilience) and consequently themore damagewill

occurtothesystem.

Mostcitieshavetodealwithanumberofvulnerabilitiesinherenttotheirsystemsthat

leadtoacomplexriskprofile.Driversofthesevulnerabilitiesaredynamicpressureslike

rapid urbanisation, urban renewal, immigration and economic cycles (da Silva,

KernaghanandLuque,2012,p.4).Thesepressuresimpactlanduseandsettlementpat-

terns:Ruralspaceisconvertedintourbanareas.Thisdevelopmentfurtheraccelerates

rural tourbanmigration in addition to the rapidly growingpopulation,which in turn

acceleratesurbandevelopment.Thelittletimelefttoplantheurbanisationprocesswell

aheadleadstoinfrastructuredeficits.Frequentlyconstructionpracticesareinadequate

andthebuildingmaterialsofpoorquality,whichisdetrimentalintimesofnaturalhaz-

ards.With the development of urban areas comes an increased demand for drainage,

solidwastemanagementinfrastructure,electricity,water,housingandroadsaswellas

functioningmaintenance services. Often the supply of these services lacks behind the

urbanisationprocess, leaving the poorestwithout access to basic services and critical

infrastructure (CarpenterandGrünewald,2016,p.416).Lackingothercapabilitiesand

26

opportunities,theurbanpoorsettleinslumareasaroundthecitycentres.Herewecan

observethephenomenonofinformalization:Oftheeconomy,ofthesociety,andofthe

politicalsystem(KooningsandKruijt,2009,p.9f.).Parallelsocietiesform, inwhichthe

oldformalordererodesandwherepoliticalvoiceislacking–wecanobserveastratifi-

cationofthesociety.

Aswecanseewearedealingwithacomplexsetofvulnerabilities.Thesevulnerabilities

reduce the adaptive capacity of a city towards hazards and thus lower its resilience.

Therefore, the vulnerabilities coupled with a heightened hazard exposure lead to in-

creaseddisasterrisk.

Additionally,throughthephenomenonofclimatechangetheoccurrenceofnaturalhaz-

ardsismultipliedandintensified.Theimplicationsofclimatechangeoncitiesaretwo-

fold:Ontheonehanditdriveschangesofanumberofso-calledslowvariables,i.e.grad-

ual environmental trends like periodic flooding and sea level rise, and thus indirectly

impacts the system negatively (Ruth and Coelho, 2007, p.318; Ernstson et al., 2010,

OECD Global Science Forum, 2011, p.10f.). If the system is not able to adapt, these

changesleadtoadisruptionorlossofthoseessentialassetsandnetworksthatenable

thefunctioningofacity,i.e.,transportnetworks,power,potablewatersupply,fooddis-

tributionnetworks,wastemanagementfacilities,telecommunicationsystemsandsoon.

On the other hand, climate change can also directly impact the system negatively,

throughhighlossesoflifeduetoextremeevents–thenumberofwhichhasbeenrising

overthelastdecades(seeChapter2.12.1above,p.14).

Urban settlements and especially coastal cities are characterized by unprecedented

heightened vulnerability to the impacts of climate change on themagnitude and fre-

quency of hydro-meteorological hazards (Ruth and Coelho, 2007, p.324; Sattler and

Brandes,2015,p.4).Thiscanbeexplainedbythefollowingfacts:

First, thepopulationdensity in coastal zones is almostdouble (45percent) theglobal

average (McGranahan et al., 2005, p.801). Currently,mostmegacities are located and

furthergrowingalongcoastlines–adevelopment,whichismainlyrelatedtotheneedof

having access to both, natural resources and transportation networks in a globalised

world.

27

And secondly, coastal areas are especially vulnerable to natural hazards, due to their

exposureto floods,whichareexacerbatedbysea-levelrise, tostrongerstorms,dueto

thewarmerwaterandairtemperaturesandtotsunamis.AstudybytheWorldBankand

OECDfoundthatespecially floodswereputting theworld’scoastalcitiesat increasing

riskwiththeaverageglobalfloodlossespotentiallyrisingfrom$6billionin2005to$1

trillionperyearin2050,ifcitiesdonottakestepstoadapt(Hallegatte,Green,Nicholls

andCorfee-Morlot,2013,p.802).

Thedifficultyinpreparingforhazards,however,liesintheuncertaintytheycomewith:

Neither the timenor the location, letalone themagnitudeof thehazardareknown in

advance.Planningforsomethingunknownandforecastingitscausalitiesisachallenge

itself.Forecastingcausalitiesofanuncertaineventinahighlycomplexenvironmentlike

a city, which we already have a hard time understanding in the absence of hazards,

seemstoexceedourcognitivecapacities(Atun,2014,p.52f.).

Thus,thecomplexityitselfisseenasamaindriverofvulnerabilityandoneofthemain

sourcesforhazardscausingdamage(ibid.).Butatthesametimethecomplexityofacity,

withitseconomicproductionanddistribution,humanresourcesandavailabilityofser-

vices,alsooffersopportunitiestodecreasevulnerabilityandincreasedisasterresilience

(PriorandRoth,2013,p.59).Thiscanbeapointofdepartureforanalysingwhatfactors

mightincreaseurbanresilience.

2.3.2 DisasterResilienceofUrbanCAS

Today,whentalkingaboutreducingtheimpactofnaturalhazardsoncommunitiesand

theirlivelihoods,themagicalformulaseemstoevolvearoundtheconceptofresilience.

Therebyitappearsthatresilienceisquiteallcomprisingoratleastapplicableinanum-

berofcontexts.Withoutasolid theoreticalbase, “resilience”almostbecomesaredun-

danttermthatoffersverylittletoimprovetheeffectivenessofexistingdisasterriskre-

duction interventions or policy formulation (Mayunga, 2007, p.1; Manyena, 2006,

p.434).

This underlines the importance of clarifyingwhat exactlywe are talking aboutwhen

usingthetermresilience.Inordertodoso,wewill firsttakealookathowthishighly

contestedconceptemergedwithinthefieldofdisasterriskstudies:

28

Especiallyintheaftermathofthe2004IndianOceanTsunamiandwiththe2005World

ConferenceonDisasterReductioninHyogo4,cametherealisationthattryingtoreduce

thenumberofcasualtiesanddestructionbyactingonlyafterthedisasterhadoccurred,

wassimplynotaseffectiveaspreventativeaction(Coetzeeetal.,2016a,p.198).Thus,

thenotionofsupportingcommunitiesinbecomingresilienttotherisk–i.e.,theresultof

ahazardcoupledwithvulnerability–ofnaturalhazardsemerged.Therefore,thefocus

wassetonstrengtheningtheabilityofasocietytodealwiththeirvulnerabilitiesandto

reduce the risk of a hazard becoming a disaster. However, although very popular, an

agreementon “[h]owtooperationalize,quantifyordeterminewhich factors,variables

orindicators,makeacommunityresilient,hasnotbeenreached”(Coetzee,VanNiekerk

andRaju,2016a,p.198).

Coetzeeetal.(2016a)arguethatthispartiallyoriginatesinageneralconfusionofwhat

theconceptofresiliencecomprisesandalackofacommondefinition.

EtymologicallyspeakingthetermresilienceoriginatesintheLatinresilioandistranslat-

edasjumpingbackorbouncingback.Areviewoftheexistingliteraturerevealsanum-

berofdefinitionsofresilience,mostofwhicharecomingfromthefieldofecology.One

ofthemostciteddefinitionsofresilience,whichweadoptforthisthesis,stemsfromthe

workofHolling.AccordingtoHolling(1973,p.17)thebehaviourofecologicalsystemsis

shapedbyresilienceandstability.InHolling’sunderstandingresilienceis:

“(…) thepersistenceof relationshipswithina systemand (…)ameasureoftheabilityofthesesystemstoabsorbchangesofstatevariables,drivingvari-ables,andparametersandstillpersist.”

Thelowertheresilienceofasystemis,thehigherthechancesarethatthesystemisnot

able to absorb internal and external changes andwill thus become extinct. In simple

terms,Hollingseesresilienceastheprobabilityofextinction.Whenresiliencefails,then

thesystemfails.ThisthoughtisalsoreflectedintheworkofTimmerman(1981,p.21):

“Resilienceisjustoneofthepossiblevulnerablecharacteristicsofasystem.But – and this is critical – resilience is the one characteristic of a system,which,whenitisimpaired,alsoimpairsthepersistenceofasystem.”

4AdoptionoftheHyogoFrameworkforAction(2005)

29

Stabilityinturn,describestheextenttowhichasystemiscapableofreturningtoastate

ofequilibrium,intheaftermathofatemporarydisturbance(Holling,1973,p.17).

Hollingfurthermorestressesthatintegratingresilienceandstabilityintoonedefinition

of resilience can be deceptive. His reasoning is that it impairs the differentiation be-

tween the following: Those variables and parameters that are crucial for a continued

existenceofasystem–butthatatthesametimearemostlikelytofailandcantherefore

bringouttheextinctionofasystem–andthosecomponentsthatarenecessaryforthe

re-establishmentofstability(Timmerman,1981,p.21).

Thequestionthatweposeourselvesinthefollowingis:Whatarethefactors,whichcon-

tributetotheresilienceofsystems?

Ifwedefineresilienceastheabilityofresistingpressuresorchangesandofreturningto

asteadystateofequilibrium,i.e.,returningtothestatusquo,wecanseethatthislogicis

questionableduetothefollowingreason:Returningtoapriorleveloffunctioningaftera

disruption–inourcasetheimpactofanaturalhazard–impliesthatthesystemdidnot

learnfromtheoccurrenceandadapttothenewconditions.Insteaditremainsvulnera-

bletothe impactsof futuredisruptions(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016a,p.199;

Klein,NichollsandThomalla,2003,p.42).

Thus,wecanconclude that theadaptability, oralso the flexibility,of a system tonew

conditions isnecessary toreduce its inherentvulnerabilitiesand is thereforeacrucial

determinantforitsresilience(Hufschmidt,2011,p.626).Thisthoughtcanalsobefound

intheworkofBahadur,IbrahimandTanner(2010,p.196),whoviewresilienceasthe

“abilityofacommunitytorespondandrecoverfromdisasterimpactthroughadaptive

processesthatfacilitatetheabilityofthesocialsystemtore-organize,change,andlearn

inresponsetoadisaster”orasAdgeretal.(2005,p.1036)putit:“Resiliencereflectsthe

degreetowhichthesystemcanbuildcapacityforlearningandadaptation.”Partofthis

capacityistheregenerativeabilityofanecosystemanditscapabilitytocontinuedeliver-

ingresourcesandecosystemservicesthatareessentialforhumanlivelihoodsandsocie-

taldevelopmentinthefaceofchange.

Manyenaetal. (2011,p.418f.)concordwith thisview,as theypropagate thenotionof

disastersasplatformsfromwhichtheadaptabilityofsocietiesandtheirlivelihoodscan

bestrengthenedtodealwithchanges.Theyfurtherbringargumentsforviewingresili-

30

enceasa“bounceforward”and“movingon”process,asopposedtotheoriginal“bounce

back”idea,thatstressedtheimportanceofreturningtothestatusquoafteradisruption.

Thus, inordertoberesilienttonaturalhazardsasystemneedstobecharacterizedby

thecapacitytoabsorbnewforcesandadjusttoorcohabitwiththem–assuchtheability

ofasystemtoadaptandtoevolvearecrucial.CASarecharacterizedbythisability.

A further important recognition is that resilience differs from one community to the

next.Eachcommunityandtheenvironmentsurroundingthemhavetheirownspecific

characteristics. Thus, resilience in one communitymay comprise completely different

factorsthantheresilienceofanothercommunity.A“onesize fitsall”model inthisre-

gardwouldbeverychallenging(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016a,p.201).Rather

shouldresiliencebeanalysedanddeterminedcontext-specifically.

Therefore,wewill analyse the specific caseof Jakarta andhow it copeswith its flood

hazards.ForthispurposewewillfirstelaboratesomekeyconceptstakenfromCASthe-

orythatshallhelpusinstudyingurbandisasterresilienceinthefollowing.

2.3.3 KeyCASConceptstoStudyUrbanDisasterResilience

OnegeneralruleforCASis:Thereisnosinglegoverningequation,orrulethatcontrols

thesystem.Insteadwearedealingwithmanyinteractingandinterconnectedparts,each

ofthemgovernedbyownrules–andeachrulecaninfluenceanoutcomeaswellasthe

actionsofotherparts(Holland,1992,p.21f.).Alsoeachpartneedstobeabletoreviseits

rulesinordertoevolvewithitschangingenvironment(whichalsochangesasthesur-

roundingotherpartschangetheirbehaviours)andtothusadaptandensureitssurvival.

Inthefollowingwewillhighlightsomerelevantconceptsthatshallhelpusinbetterun-

derstandingourobjectofresearch.

2.3.3.1 Anticipation

AsdescribedbyHolland (1992,p.20) systems formanduse internalmodels thathelp

them inanticipatingorpredicting futureeventsaswell as the futureconsequencesof

theiractions.Thus, theydeveloprules for theirownbehaviourbasedon theexpected

outcomes.Thisenablesthesystemtoavoidactionsthat“wouldsetitirretrievablydown

someroadtofuturedisaster”(ibid.p.25).

31

If largenumbersofpartsarebeingconditioned(withrules fortheirbehaviour) indif-

ferentways,theeffectsonthemacro-levelarequitecomplex.Thisisbecausethebehav-

iourat the system-wide level is the resultof interactionsof the individual component

parts.

Forstudyingdisasterresiliencethisconceptisquitehelpful,asitteachesustoidentify

risks and vulnerabilities inherent in urban systems and their communities and those

points that are likely to fail, beforeaneventoccurs.Also, it isnecessary toassess the

strengthsofurbansystemsandtothentakeappropriateactiontostrengthentheirresil-

ience(Comfortetal.,2001,p.147).Assuchasystemthatisanticipativeischaracterized

byproactiveresilience(Klein,NichollsandThomalla,2003,p.39).

2.3.3.2 FeedbackLoopsandAdaptation

Feedbackloopsoriginateintheinteractionofsystemcomponents.Theycanbepositive

or self-reinforcing andnegativeor self-correcting and counteracting change (Sterman,

2000, p.12). Positive loops generate their own growth, for example:More chicken lay

moreeggs, fromwhichagainmorechickengrowandwhich thenagain layevenmore

eggs(Sterman,2000,p.13).Negativeloopshoweverareself-limitingandseekequilibri-

um:Themoreattractiveaneighbourhoodis,themorepeoplewillmovetoitandtheless

attractive itwill get as a consequence (Sterman, 2000, p.12). The complexity kicks in

whenmultipleloops–positiveandnegative–interactwitheachother(ibid,p.14).

Feedback loops are crucial in the development of CAS since they allow the system to

learnandadaptwithinadynamicenvironmentandthusprevent it frombecomingex-

tinct(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016a,p.205).Throughfeedbackloopswithinand

acrossinterconnectedcomplexsystemsandtheirenvironment,thesystemcanincrease

itsresilienceorevenrestoreitselfduringorafterashock(Atun,2014,p.57).

Itsusefulnessforstudyingdisasterresilienceisthatitleadsustoaskingthequestionof

howdocommunitiesororganisationslearnfrompasteventsandadapttobemoreresil-

ienttofutureevents?

32

2.3.3.3 EmergenceandAggregateBehaviour

Emergence is theglobalbehaviourofasystem(Nel,2015,p.40).Through interactions

betweensystemcomponentsatthemicro-levelemergelargerpatternsatthemacroor

systemwidelevelthatexhibitproperties,whichthesinglecomponentsalonedonotex-

hibit (Coetzee, Van Niekerk and Raju, 2016a, p.205; Holland, 1992, p.20). Even if we

knowtherulesthatgoverntheinteractionsbetweenthesystemcomponents,theemer-

gentbehaviourcannotbepredicted(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016a,p.117),be-

causethewholeisgreaterthanthesumofitscomponentpartsanditistheinteractions

betweenthepartsthatproducetheglobalbehaviour.Toelucidatethiswithanexample

takenfromHolland(1992,p.20):Inanembryotheaggregateoremergentbehaviouris

theoverallstructureofthedevelopingindividual.

The global behaviour of a system should outlast any of its component parts, i.e. the

wholepersistsovertime.Thismeansthatvariationsinthebehaviourofindividualcom-

ponentsshouldnotalternatetheemergentbehaviour(Nel,2015,p.40).Astheindividual

partsofCAScontinuouslyrevisetheirrulesofinteractionandeachpartisthusconstant-

lysurroundedbyanewenvironment(theotherpartschangingbehaviour),CASsteadily

evolve,adaptandexhibitnewformsofemergentbehaviour(Holland,1992,p.20).

However,canchangesinindividualcomponentsalsotriggerthewholesystemtomove

acrossathresholdintoadifferentstablestateorregime(WalkerandSalt,2006,p.35).

Theaddedvalueofthisconceptfortheanalysisofdisasterresilienceisthatitleadsusto

askinghowtheaggregationandinteractionofsmallermicro-levelvariablescouldbuild

macro-leveldisasterresilience(Coetzee,VanNiekerkandRaju,2016b,p.116).

2.3.4 UrbanSystemsFailureandHumanitarianDisasters

Inourdiscussionoverdefiningresilience(seeChapter2.3.2,p.27),wehaveseenthatin

thenormalstateasystem,inourcasethecitysystem,developsuntilitreachesacertain

levelofstabilityaswellasacertainlevelofresilience.However,whenchangesinslow

variablesoccur–i.e.,whenthesealevelcontinuouslyrises,whenperiodicfloodingtakes

placeorthedurationofdryspellsprolongsitself–thesystem’sresilience(werecallthat

thesearethevariablesthatarecrucial for thepersistenceor thesurvivalofasystem)

getsweakenedandgoesdown,untilpassingastabilitythreshold.Thesethresholdsare

33

situations where disasters are almost “waiting to happen”. Therefore, while moving

downto that threshold(whenresiliencediminishes), thesystemisexposedtogreater

risks,uncertaintiesandsurprisesandbecomesincreasinglyvulnerabletodisturbances

oracutethreats.Inourcasethesethreatsarenaturalhazardsexacerbatedbythephe-

nomenonofclimatechange. If thesystemisnotable toreorganize intoanewregime,

withdifferentsystemdynamics,inotherwords,ifthesystemisnotabletoadapttothe

changesoftheseslowvariables,duetolowresilience,thenthesystemceasestoexist–a

hazardcanturn intoadisaster(NicolisandPrigogine,1977citedbyRuthandCoelho,

2007,p.331;Ernstsonetal.,2010,p.532).

FromaCAStheoreticalperspectivewecandefineadisasteras“(…)thedisruptionofa

temporary steady state of the CAS to an extent that makes external help necessary”

(Petersetal.,2015,p.109).Thisdisruptioncanbeatthesystemwidelevelmeaningthat

theentirecityisaffected–itcanalsobeatthesubsystemlevelandthussubsystemsare

affected,eitherinthewholecityor‘only’inspatiallyrestrictedareas(ibid.).Inveryin-

terconnected systems the failure of one subsystem could provoke secondary and ter-

tiarydamagesandeventuallyleadtothefailureoftheentiresystem,causingahumani-

tariandisaster.This is called the ‘cascadeeffect’ or ‘dominoeffect’ (Atun,2014,p.54).

Thehighertheinterdependencewithinasystem,themorevulnerabletochainreactions

thesystemis.

AnexampleofthisistheKobeearthquakein1995,whichcausedthedisruptionofsev-

eralsubsystems,resultinginthestandstilloftheentireurbansystem.AccordingtoAtun

(2014,p.55f.)oneofthemaincausesfortheheightenedvulnerabilityofKobewasthat

the interdependencieswithin this complexurbansystemhadnotbeenconsideredbe-

forehand.The lessonwe can learn from this is thatweneedbe awareof the interde-

pendenciesbetweensubsystemsandhowthedisruptionofaparticularsubsystemmay

affectthewholesystem.Ifweareabletounderstandthecausalitiesitmightbepossible

toidentifytherightentrypointsinourresponsetothedisasterthatshouldhinderthe

cascadeeffectfromunleashing,thuscontainingthemagnitudeofthedamages.

Thekey lies in thepreparednessof complexurban systems to theoccurrenceofboth

slow-onsetandrapid-onsetnaturalhazards.Thus,urbannetworksofknowledge,infra-

structure and institutionshave to adapt to changing circumstances resulting from the

34

urbanizationprocessaswellastoextremeeventsresultingfromclimatechange,other-

wisetherewillbeprogressivedecayandcatastrophiccollapseofurbanareas(daSilva,

KernaghanandLuque,2012,p.16).Thisissomethingthatthehumanitarianfieldneeds

tobeawareofandpreparedfor.

2.4 SummarizingtheTheoreticalFramework

InthischapterwehaveintroducedsystemstheorywithafocusonCASt.Wehaveseen

that the addedvalueof seeing cities as CAS is, that it teachesus to identifywhat ele-

mentsurbansystemsandtheirsubsystemsconsistof,howtheyinteractwitheachother

andtowhatextenttheyareinterdependent.Thiscanhelpusrecognizethevulnerabili-

tiesinherentinanurbansystemandwhatimplicationsahazardmayhaveonitsfunc-

tioning. The more vulnerable factors or elements a system consists of, the lower its

disasterresilienceandthelessthesystemisabletodealwiththehazard.

Wehavedefinedresilienceas“(…)thepersistenceofrelationshipswithinasystemand

(…) a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables,

drivingvariables,andparametersandstillpersist”(seeChapter2.3.2,p.27).

Thereafter, we have outlined three key concepts of CASt that describe relevant

properties of disaster resilient systems: (1) anticipation, (2) feedback loops and

adaptationand(3)emergenceandaggregatebehaviour.

The lower the system’s resilience, the more damage can occur to the system, which

increasestheriskofsystemfailure–inourcaseahumanitariandisaster.Thishighlights

theimportanceofstrengtheningtheresilienceofurbansystems.

Now the question we have to ask is: What role can humanitarian actors play in

supporting the resilience of urban systems? The following chapter will look at the

specific case of Jakarta and its flooding challenge to identify what role humanitarian

organisationsplayinsupportingitsfloodpreparedness.

35

3 CaseStudy:FloodPreparednessinJakarta

Theaimof thiscasestudy is tohighlightwhatkindofprojectsandstrategiesarecur-

rentlybeingimplementedinJakarta,inordertoreducetheimpactsofflooding.Atwhat

tippingpointdohumanitarianorganisations intervene ina floodrisksituation topre-

ventdisaster?TogetabetterunderstandingofhowJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystem

hasevolvedoverthepasttenyears,wewillfirstdrawontheexperienceswithfloodre-

sponseactivitiessince2007.Howdidhumanitarianorganisationsengageinpast flood

responsesandwhatwerethemainchallengestheywerefacedwith?

3.1 CityProfileofJakarta:UrbanizationandFloodRisk

3.1.1 TheMegacityJakarta

Jakarta,thecapitalcityofIndonesia,isacityfullofcontrasts.Itisoneofthemostpopu-

lated urban agglomerations in the world. According to the last population census of

2010, Jakartahostsaround9.6millionpeople,however, it isestimated that in2016 it

hadexceededthe10millionmark(WorldPopulationReview,2017). If theGreater Ja-

kartaArea,i.e.themetropolitanareaJabodetabek5(seeFigure4)isconsideredaswell,

we are speaking of a population of more than 30 million (World Population Review

2017).

5Jabodetabek consists of three provinces: the Capital City of Jakarta (DKI Jakarta), Banten (TangerangRegency,TangerangandSouthTangerangMunicipality)andWestJavaProvince(RegencyandMunicipali-tyofBogor,RegencyandMunicipalityofBekasi,andDepokMunicipality)(Rustiadietal.,2015,p.422).

36

Figure4:MapofJabodetabek(Source:Rustiadietal.,2015,p.422)

Jakartahasnotalwaysbeenthisbigandimportant.Itwasnotuntilaftertheindepend-

ence of Indonesia in 1945 that Jakarta’s economic development started to boom

(Rustiadietal.,2015,p.424).Withthisboomcamethegrowthofthecity,asitattracted

immigration.Thepopulationexploded fromanestimated1.17million in1948 (Silver,

2008,p.91)andreachedthedimensionsofamegacitywithinonly6decades.Today,it

keepsonattractingpeoplefromacrossIndonesiaandbeyond.Thissustainedgrowthin

bothpopulationandeconomy,ledtoavastincreaseinurbanizedareaswhilelanduse

andsettlementpatternschanged(Sunarharum,SloanandSusilawati,2014,p.235).Fig-

ure5 illustrates thegrowthofbuilt-upareaandtherecessionofgreenareasbetween

1972and2012.

37

Figure5:MapoflanduseinJabodetabek,1972–2012(Source:Rustiadietal.,2015,p.435)

The spatial planning and infrastructure development, aswell as the provision of ser-

vices, like transportation,affordablehousing,cleanwater,healthcare,education,have

notkeptpacewiththisprocess(Dickson,Baker,HoornwegandTiwari,2012,p.99).Asa

consequenceJakartahasbeendealingwithanumberofproblems:Thehousing-demand

ismuchhigherthanthesupply,especiallyamongthepoorandlower-middleclass–the

landpricesareskyrocketingandthegapbetweenthewealthyandthepoorwidens.The

poorremainlivingintheflood-proneareasintheriverbanks,whicharemoreafforda-

ble, in slum and squatter settlements (Marfai, Sekaranom andWard, 2015, p.1134f.).

WastemanagementisafurtherchallengethatJakartaisconfrontedwith,asthereisno

officialwastemanagementsystem(Dicksonetal.,2012,p.99;Texier,2008,p.367).Fur-

thermore,isthecityfacinganenormoustrafficcongestionproblem,asaconsequenceof

lackingpublictransportation.AssuchmanystressorsincreaseJakarta’svulnerabilityto

naturalhazards,nexttofiresandearthquakes,floodingrepresentsthebiggesthazard.

3.1.2 TheFloodingHazardinJakarta

Jakartaislocatedonadeltaicplain.Anetworkof13riversflowsfromthemountainous

andhillyareaintheSouthofJakartathroughthealluvialandcoastallowlandsofNorth-

ern Jakarta into Jakarta Bay (see Figure 6), on the North Coast of Java Island

(Sunarharum,SloanandSusilawati,2014,p.235).Thetopographyandshapeofthewa-

tershedincreasethevulnerabilityofJakartatofloodingduringthewetseason,whichis

characterized by heavy rainfalls usually between October and April (Texier, 2008,

p.358).

38

Figure6:MajorriversinJabodetabek(Source:KatsuhamaandGrigg,2010,p.770)

Thisisexacerbatedbysocio-economicdriversincludingextensivelandconversiondur-

ingtheprocessofurbanizationoftherecentdecades.Itgreatlyreducedtheopengreen

spaceinJakartaandconsequentlyincreaseddirectrunoffduetoimpermeablesurfaces

(Wardetal.,2011,p.901;Marfai,SekaranomandWard,2015,p.1132).Therearealso

physicaldrivers,namelythelowdrainagecapacityofthecloggedriversandcanalsasa

follow-up of waste being thrown into them and sediments from erosion upstream

(Budiyono,Aerts,TollenaarandWard,2016,p.757).

Furthermore, around40percentof the city,mainly in theNorthernareaof Jakarta, is

alreadybelowsea level(Dickson,Baker,HoornwegandTiwari,2012,p.98).This is in-

fluencedbytwofactors:Therisingsealevelduetoclimatechange(Marfai,Sekaranom

andWard,2015,p.1132)andevenmoreduetotherapidrateoflandsubsidenceof10

cmperyearonaverage(Sunarharum,SloanandSusilawati,2014,p.235)causedbythe

increasingweightofthecityandthehighlevelofgroundwaterextraction(Texier,2008,

p.358).Figure7illustratesthelowelevationlevelofJakartaandthehighelevationlevel

totheSouth,whichincreasestheriskofflooding.

39

Figure7:Elevationdata,inred:DKIJakarta(Source:Marfai,SekaranomandWard,2015,p.1130)

This leaves Jakartaproneto flooding fromtheriverscoming fromtheSouthand from

coastal tidal flooding in the North. While flooding occurs annually and regularly

throughouttheyearatthesmallerscaleduringrainyseason,approximatelyeveryfive

years in recent times, Jakarta is hit by extreme flooding events– in1996, 2002, 2007,

2013and2014(Sunarharum,SloanandSusilawati,2014,p.235).

It is believed that the frequency and severity aswell as the impact of floodingdue to

heightened exposure of Jakarta will further increase (Marfai, Sekaranom and Ward,

2015,p.1131),making itoneof themostvulnerablecities toclimate relateddisasters

(Wijayantietal.,2017,p.1060).

3.1.3 PerceivedRiskofFloodingforJakartaToday

Whentherepresentativesoftheinterviewedhumanitarianorganisationswereaskedto

rank the risk that floodingposes to Jakarta todayon a scale fromzero to ten in their

opinion,theresponsesrangedbetweenmidtohighlevel,from4.5to8,themeanvalue

being6.3(SeeFigure8).

40

Figure8:PerceivedriskoffloodinginJakartaonascalefrom0to10(owncomposition)

Almostallinformantsmentionedthatinthelastthreetofiveyearstheriskofflooding

forJakartahadsignificantlydecreased.Thiswasmainlyattributedtothestructuralmit-

igationmeasuresbythegovernmentthroughinfrastructuredevelopmentandtheclean-

ing of the riverbanks by the last two Governors (Jokowi and Ahok). Although these

measures are not yet completed, it is felt that they already lowered the likelihood of

floodingtohappenandthattheareaoffloodingchangedanddecreased.Inthisregard

one respondentmentioned that from2007 to 2015 the flooding areawas around the

CiliwungRiver,since2015thoughtheriskoffloodinghasmovedtotheresidentialare-

as, like Kemang in Southern Jakarta or Kelapa Gading in the North. As such the risk

movedfromthepoortotherich.Anotherparticipantstatedthatthelastbigfloodevent

wasin2013andthatafterthatwiththeprogrambythegovernmenttherehadnotbeen

any furthermajor floodevents– therefore in theiropinion flooding isnot reallyabig

issueforJakartaanymore.

The informants, who ranked the risk higher on the scale, added that if the flooding

shouldoccur the related risks are still high, because asone intervieweeexplained: “If

thereisaflood,Jakartawillcollapse"(IntervieweeC,AppendixIII,page79).

First of all the coordination challenge among stakeholders persists. As one informant

putit:“Throughsimulationitisclearthatnotmanystakeholdersareready.”(Interview-

eeF1,AppendixIII,page79).

Secondly,alackofpreparednessatthefamilyandindividuallevelwereidentifiedbya

few stakeholders: Issues included the lack of risk awareness, like children playing in

dirtyfloodwater(healthrisk)orfamiliesnotprepositioningtheirownfoodandwater

012345678910

PMI STC HFI Karina LDD CARE MDMC PI

Perceivedrisk

41

stocks.Also theneed toprepare for the flooding in a comprehensivemannerwas ad-

dressed, since right now the structuralmitigationmeasures implemented by the gov-

ernmentarenotbeingfollowedbythecommunities:Theirbehaviourremainsthesame,

astheythrowgarbageintothedrainagesystemandkeeponbuilding,sothereisnonat-

ural rainwater catchment: “The mitigation that's done by the government is not fol-

lowedbythelevelofpreparednessatthefamilyorindividuallevel-itputstheriskhigh

in theend." (IntervieweeH,Appendix III,page79)Otherconcerns raisedwereas fol-

lows:Someearlywarningsystemshavenotbeenset-upproperly;thereisalackofco-

ordination between the government and the state-owned electricity company during

floods,whichincreasestheriskofshortcutsorexecutions;andlastlythepreparedness

leveloftheprovincialdisastercoordinationbody,theBPBD,wasquestioned.

3.2 FloodResponseinJakarta:Experiencesfrom2007and2013

WithinthepasttenyearsJakartahasregularlyfacedfloodsonasmallerscaleaswellas

twoextremeeventsin2007and2013.Theinformantswereaskedtosharetheirorgani-

sation’s experiences with their major flood responses within the past ten years. The

eventsmentionedby theparticipantswere the flood responses in2007and/or2013.

(seeAppendixIII,page79)Themainexperiencesaresummarizedinthefollowing.

3.2.1 Floodingin2007

The flooding inFebruaryof2007 is seenas theworst flood in Jakarta’shistory so far

(Marfai,SekaranomandWard,2015,p.1136),outdoingabigfloodin2002(Interviewee

A1,AppendixIII,page79).Torrentialrainscausedtheoverflowofthemajorwaterways

leavingalmost60percentofthecityunderwater.Thecasualtiesmountedto79people

andmore thanhalfamillionpeoplehadtobeevacuated(seeTable1).Thepublic life

wasdisruptedseverelywithelectricityandwatersuppliesbeingcut,thetelecommuni-

cation system failed, the public transportation was interrupted with closed roads,

among others the toll road connecting the airport with the city (Wilhelm, 2011, p.7;

ECHO/IDN/BUD/2007/02000,p.1).

42

Floodyear Inundationarea Evacuees Deaths Economicimpacts

2002 330km² 380,000 22 US$180million

2007 400km² 590,000 79 US$998million

2013 >400km² 18,000 15 US$2,000millionTable 1: Facts and figures of the flooding events of 2002, 2007 and 2013 (adapted fromSunarharum,SloanandSusilawati,2014,p.235)

Theinformationgatheredthroughtheinterviewssuggeststhattherewasalowlevelof

preparednessforthefloodsin2007,becausetheriskoffloodinghadbeenverylowas-

sessedin2007:“Before2007itwassmallfloods,thenin2007wewereallshocked“(In-

terviewee G, Appendix III, page 79). This notion is also reflected in the observations

madebyanotherinformant:

"We don't predict it, the very bad flooding. Because before 2007 is 2005.2005isverybigflooding.2013and2007wegetworse[flooding]than2005.Wejustsay:Repeatfiveyearflooding.Soif2005thenbigfloodingwillcomein 2010. But 2007 is already again, sowe don't predict it in 2007." (Inter-vieweeI,AppendixIII,page79)

The lack of preparedness developed into a panic situation, as the national authorities

wereoverwhelmedwiththesituation.Accordingtotheaccountsoftheinformants,who

wereworkingduringthe2007flood,theresponsewaschaoticanduncoordinated.One

respondent suggested that the response in 2007 was like an Indonesian saying ‘Apa

yanglomau,gueada’,meaning‘Whateveryouneed,Icandoall’:

"Itwaschaotic,youknow,itwaslikeanemergencycapacitybuildingatthattime.Sowegatheredand'Ok,whohasagoodwayofswimming,raiseyourhands' - (laughs) 'Ok, you come to the searchand rescue side.Who cannotswim?'Theygo to the left sideand then 'Ok,youdo thiskitchenworkandthenguys,whocanswim,theygobytheboats.”(IntervieweeG,AppendixIII,page79)

AnotherinformantdrewtheparalleltootherdisasterresponsesinIndonesia:

“In 2007 is the samewith the disaster in Indonesia, like 2004 the tsunamiandthen2006YogyaandthenJakarta2007.ManyNGOcomesandnocoor-dinatorandthegovernmentisnotpreparingabouttheonecommandothat'swhy[therewere]nolikestandardsforthework,fortheaid,foreverything.

43

(...)Everybody justdidwhat thebest theycando,no coordination." (Inter-vieweeF2,AppendixIII,page79)

The accounts allow for the conclusion that the main issue during the 2007 flood re-

sponsewasthelackofacoordinatingbodyguidingthestakeholders,whichleadtothe

organisations’ individual responses. Furthermore therewas no regulation on interna-

tionalinvolvement“soeverybodycouldcomeanddealwith[theflood]”.(IntervieweeG,

AppendixIII,page79)

Adifferentproblemfacedatthetimewasthatpeoplewerereluctanttoevacuateasthey

weretryingtoholdontowhattheyhad,whichraisedthenumberofcasualties.

3.2.2 Floodingin2013

InJanuary2013excessiveraininJakartaanditsgreaterarealedtoriversoverflowing

and resulting inmassive flooding.During this flood the dike at theWestBanjir Canal

betweentheManggaraigateandtheseacollapsed,causingtheCentralBusinessdistrict

of Jakarta and the Merdeka presidential palace to be inundated by the annual rains.

SincethecenterofJakartawasunderwater,someareasinJakartawereonstandstillfor

aweekwithoutschoolorwork.Jakarta’sGovernor–Jokowiatthetime,declaredstateof

emergency.

The flood responsewas lead by the local government (BPBDDKI Jakarta),which had

beenestablishedin2011,andsupportedbythenationaldisasteragency(BNPB).Inter-

national assistance was not requested, however, any support was welcomed (IFRC,

2013,p.5).

Themain issues raisedby the informantswhohadexperienced the2013 floodswere

thattheresponsewasveryuncoordinated:Accordingtooneinterviewee,schools,com-

munitiesandotherstakeholdersdidnotknowwhowasdoingwhatandwheretheevac-

uation centerswere located (Interviewee J,Appendix III, page79).Another informant

sharedthisexperience,whilealsocriticizingthecampmanagement:

“My experience in 2013 is (…): The campmanagement is really somethingthat needs to be improved, very, very improved in the future like the datamanagementitself,thecoordinationamongtheactorsthatalwaysneedtobeimproved because this is Jakarta, everyone can directly send their aid, likelots of independent groups, raise fund independently and then goes to one

44

specificKelurahan6orareaandthendistributetheaid.”(IntervieweeH,Ap-pendixIII,page79)

ItwasalsomentionedthatsincetheBPBD,hadjustnewlybeenestablishedatthetime

in terms of human resources they were still struggling to respond to medium-scale

floodsinJakartaandwerenotgoodatmanagingtheplanningandthedata,althoughthe

systemsinplacewerealreadygood(IntervieweeHandD,AppendixIII,page79).

Justoneinformantstatedthathisorganisationhadconductedstudiesintheaftermath

of2007.Thenin2010andin2011thereweresmall-scalefloodsforwhichtheorganisa-

tionwas alreadywell prepared, sowhen the 2013 flood hit theywere verywell pre-

pared,mainlybecauseof the technologies,butwithregards to logistics theywereand

stillarelackingcapacity(IntervieweeG,AppendixIII,page79).

Whenaskedabout themain takeaways fromthe2013 floodinganother informantad-

mittedthat:

“Mhh...This isourproblem.Weneverhadafteractionreview, ifwealreadymaderesponse,particularlyforbigevents,afterthattimeweneverdiscussedit, what should we do in terms of preparedness if there's any flood, a bigeventlikethat.”(IntervieweeD,AppendixIII,page79)

3.3 TheCurrentFlood-Preparedness-SysteminJakarta

3.3.1 StructuralFloodMitigationMeasuresbytheGovernment

Traditionally flood mitigation efforts in Jakarta have focused on technical measures

whilethedeepcausesofvulnerabilityhaveoftenbeenneglected(Texier,2008,p.368).

However, it seems thatwhen Jokowiwas elected Jakarta’s Governor in September of

2012thewaythefloodingissuewasaddressedfromthegovernmentalsidechanged.His

mitigationmeasuresincludeddiggingthemudinthedrainage,whichhadbeentherefor

thepast15yearsandthusre-establishingtheriverflow,aswellasthenormalisationof

theCiliwungRiver,which includes thewideningof theriver to increase its catchment

6Kelurahan=village

45

area.Thisimpliedtheevictionofthosepeoplelivingintheriverbanks–ahighlydebated

topicthatwewillnotgo intofurtherdetailwith,as itwillgobeyondthescopeof this

thesis.

The constructionworks started in 2013 and are not completed until the present day.

“Why?”TheHeadofDisasterPreventionandPreparednessDepartmentasksandhefol-

lows:

“I don't know, because PublicWorks [whomanage the constructions] is innational, not in our local government (….) we just manage our river gate,whatshouldwedowith therivergate?Weneed tomanageabout thecon-struction!(…)Takealookoverthere:Theymadeabigandhigh[canal]con-struction, soweneed tohighourstreetafter that, right?We justmadeourriver,weneedtomakeforthestreetforthebuilding,fortheparkafterthatright?”.(IntervieweeB,AppendixIII,page79)

NexttotheconstructionworksbeinginthehandsoftheMinistryofPublicWorksinthe

national government, the Head of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Depart-

mentinBPBDalsopointedtoanotherissue:

According tohim thecommutercitizenscoming fromthesurroundingareasofBogor,

TangerangandDepoktoworkinJakartadonotcareabouttheregulationsthatapplyin

Jakartaandthrowtheirgarbageintotherivers.Whenitstartsraininginthoseareas,the

stream running downhill into Jakarta is overloaded faster and causes flooding. The

BPBD representative locates theproblem in the governmental structure: It is theCili-

wung-CisadaneRiverBasinAgency(BBWSCC)undertheMinistryofPublicWorkswho

isinchargeofmanagingtheriverandnotthelocallevelgovernment:

“Wedon'thaveauthoritytodo'Hey,youcan'tthrowyourbagofgarbagetotheriver' -no,wedon'thaveauthority.” (IntervieweeB,Appendix III,page79)

3.3.2 FloodPreparednessStrategiesofHumanitarianOrganisations

Theempirical findingssuggestthatsincethegovernment isaddressingtechnical flood

mitigationmeasures,humanitarianorganisationsareinsteadputtingtheirfocusonnon-

structuralmeasures.Inthewordsofoneinterviewee:

“Andourorganisationweworkmoreontryingtoreducetherisktothepeo-plewhendealingwithfloodsorotherhazards.Wedon'tworkwiththeriver

46

andmakethedrainage,butweworkwiththepeople, theschools(…).”(In-tervieweeJ,AppendixIII,page79)

3.3.2.1 SafeSchoolsInitiative:School-basedDRR

Currently, the biggest ongoing disaster preparedness initiative in Jakarta is the Safe

SchoolsFramework,whichwasinitiatedasaglobalframeworkandthenbroughttothe

ASEANregion(ASEANSafeSchoolInitiative,ASSI).

TheFrameworkconsistsofthreepillars:

(1) Facilities:

Theschoolshouldconductastructuralandnon-structuralriskassessmentsupportedby

theNGO.Therecommendationsfollowingthisassessmentincludemeasureslikeelevat-

ingthefloors,fixingelectricity,identifyinganevacuationcenterandputtingevacuation

signs inplace.Onthebasisof theriskassessment, inwhichteachers,childrenandthe

school committee are involved, the stakeholders develop a school operational plan,

shortSOP,orschoolcontingencyplan.Thisplanshouldhaveaclearguidelineonwhois

doingwhatintheeventofflooding(orfire)tohappen.

(2) Management:

Thekey to success is the involvementof all education stakeholders andof course the

commitmentoftheschool’sprincipal,whichinpracticeisoftenchallenging(Interviewee

J,Appendix III,page79).Schoolsaresupposed tohavedevelopmentplans inplace,of

whichoneaspectisthebudgetallocation:Iftheschoolsconsiderdisasterasoneoftheir

priorities,theywillmostlikelyincludeitintheirdevelopmentplansothattheycanallo-

cate the funding of disaster preparedness activities in their school annual budget (or

calledRKAS:RencanaKerjadanAnggaranSekolah).Onesimpleexampleistheinclusion

ofregularevacuationdrillsinthebudgetallocation.Iftheprincipaldoesnotseedisaster

risk as one important issue, it won’t be considered in the budget allocation of that

school.This iswhereorganisations likeSTCstep inand try to raiseawarenesson the

importanceofpreparing for floodsor fires.Ultimately thegoal is toget theschools to

include disaster preparedness activities in their school development plan, “because if

47

that'sincludedthere,youcanatleastexpectthesustainabilitythere”(IntervieweeJ,Ap-

pendixIII,page79).

(3) Education:

ThewaySTC forexampleworks isbyestablishingdisasterpreparedness teams in the

schools (“Tim Siaga Bencana”) consisting of children in the older grades. STC trains

themandequipsthemwithdisasterriskknowledgeandsimpleskillsonhowtobehave

duringadisaster(f.ex.providingfirstaidorusingafireextinguisher).Themainroleof

theseteamsistothenraisedisasterawarenessamongtheirpeersanddisseminatethe

information through simple channels like puppet and theatre shows, songs and also

throughtheboyscouts.ThroughthechildrenSTCtriestoreachandinfluencethepar-

ents and consequently the community. The training takes place during the weekend,

although there are some efforts to insert the disaster topic into themain curriculum.

However, there are some constraints, like the capacities of the teachers in thepoorer

schoolsandthereforeworkingthroughextracurricularactivitiesisperceivedtobemore

effective.

InJakartatheSafeSchoolprogramwasinitiatedin2013byanumberofNGOs,among

themSavetheChildrenandPlanInternational.WhenPIwasfinishingitsprojectdueto

financial constraints theypresented a study to theBPBDhighlighting that therewere

5000schoolsinJakartawithalowleveloffloodpreparedness.Togetherwiththeeduca-

tionconsortiumtheywereabletoprovetheeffectivenessoftheinitiativeanditsrele-

vanceandsucceededinpushingthegovernmenttohaveaGovernorregulationonSafe

SchoolinJanuary2016(IntervieweeH,AppendixIII,page79).

ThroughtheregulationaSafeSchoolpartnershipbetweenSavetheChildren,PlanInter-

national, World Vision, Yayasan Tanggul Becana Indonesia and the BPBD was estab-

lished(IntervieweeJ,AppendixIII,page79).AlsoMDMCandLDDmentionedthatthey

wereworkingwithsomeschools.CurrentlytheBPBDistryingtoimplementtheinitia-

tive in50schools(IntervieweeB,AppendixIII,page79)andaskingforthesupportof

NGOsindoingso:

48

“AtthetimetheBPBDsaidourfirstyeartargetwillbe400schools.It'sveryambitious.Infacttheirtargetthisyearisonly50withsmallbudget,sotheystillwantustosupportthem.”(IntervieweeJ,AppendixIII,page64)

OneissuementionedbytheERCoordinatorofPlanInternationalinthisaspectwasthat

hewasnotsure,whethertheBPBDwasactuallyimplementingtheSafeSchoolInitiative:

“We are not able to track down until now howmany schools that they'vereachedalready,that'ssomethingthatwehavetoaskthemandthenthereiskindoflikenopublicinformationtocontinuetheSafeSchoolprogram.“(In-tervieweeH,AppendixIII,page79)

3.3.2.2 Community-basedDisasterPreparedness

SIBAT,oralsocommunity-baseddisasterpreparednessisaneffortthatwasinitiatedby

theIndonesianRedCross,PMI.Theaimistocreateagentsofdisasterpreparednessin

thecommunities.AssuchPMItrains30volunteersperKelurahan7(village)tobecome

firstresponders incaseofemergencyandbuildstheircapacities inevacuatingpeople,

settingupfield-kitchensanddistributingreliefitems(IntervieweeI,AppendixIII,page

79).According toa lessons-learnedreport issuedbyPMI in theaftermathof the2013

flooding,havingtheSIBATteamasfirstrespondersprovedtobe“averyimportantas-

pectofworkinginurbandisasters”(IFRC,2013,p.8).

Plan Internationalhas alsobeenengaging in communitypreparedness, as they imple-

menturbanDRRprojectsinacoupleofKelurahanintheWestofJakarta.Throughthese

projects, PI aims at raising risk awareness and developing contingency plans at the

communitylevel,whichitintegrateswiththecontingencyplansthatwereset-upatthe

school level. Just like forSafetheChildren, theirspecial focus lies inempoweringchil-

drenandtheyouthtobecomeagentsofchangeindisasterpreparedness(IntervieweeH,

Appendix III, page 79). A further important effort to preparing communities in three

slumareasfordisasterwasimplementedbyACFbetween2002and2010(Interviewee

A1andA2,AppendixIII,page79).

The importanceofestablishingcontingencyplansat thevillage levelandofpreparing

firstrespondercitizens,especiallybecauseoftheissueoftrafficjamswasalsoacknowl-

edgedbytheBPBD(IntervieweeH,AppendixIII,page79).

7IntheKampungMelayu,Bidaracina,BukitDuri

49

3.3.2.3 SiGAP:StrengtheningGovernment’sAbilitytowardsDisasterPreparedness

In January 2018 a new initiative funded by USAIDwill be implemented through STC,

CARE,WVandCRS.The goal is to help theBPBD increase its disaster awareness and

builditscapacity(IntervieweeCandJ,AppendixIII,page79).Furthermoretheobjective

will lie on developing or enhancing contingency plans at the provincial, subdistrict,

communityandschoollevel.

3.3.2.4 PreparingforEmergencytoReducetheRiskofDisaster

Sincetheendof2015thestrategyfollowedbyMDMCistoprepareforemergenciesin-

steadofimplementingDRRprojects.Thisisperceivedtobemoreeffective:

"Youknow,sometimesifwe'refocussingontheDRRthey'renotwellfortheemergency response, but if we set up a strong emergency response thenthere'll be a good DRR. That's our point of view, becausewe did it beforefromtheDRRperspective,butthatdidnotworkwellfortheemergencyre-sponse."(IntervieweeG,AppendixIII,page79)

Thereasonseemstobethat ifaDRRproject is implementedin2014forexampleand

thenin2015,2016and2017thereisnobigfloodevent,thenpeoplewillnotgiveany

relevancetotheDRRmeasures.Workingwiththe“whattodoincasethefloodhappens”

approach,however,seemstoprovemoreeffective.

50

3.3.3 EmergencyResponsePreparedness

Figure9:Perceivedpreparednessforfloodresponseonascalefrom0to10(owncomposition)

AswecanseeinFigure9,allinterviewees,butone,perceivetheirorganisationstohave

ahighleveloffloodemergencyresponsepreparedness.TheparticipantfromCAREre-

spondedthathisorganisationhadahighlevelofpreparedness,however,didnotstatea

number–thusCAREisnotrepresentedonthegraph.

The strong pointsmentionedwere that the organisation had experiencewith smaller

floodsnow,thattheyhadprepositionedstocksandsafetyequipmentinplace,thatthey

hadconductedtrainings,thattheyhadarapidneedsassessmentcapacityaswellasco-

ordinationmeetingsandgoodnetworks.

The weaknesses that were mentioned comprised logistical constraints, limited re-

sources,leadershipissues,i.e.thatthepersoninchargeisnotsuitableforthejobandfor

theinternationalcommunitythedependenceonthestatementfromthegovernmentin

ordertogetvisasquickly.

OnlytheHFIpointedtoverylowfloodemergencyresponsepreparedness,becausethey

hadnotdiscussedthepreparednessamongthemselves:

“Weonlyprepareifapproachingtotheemergencyresponse(laughter).May-besomemembersalreadypreparethingslikeforthestockpilingandthenfortrainingforpreparednessoffloods...maybe,IcansaymaybebecauseIdon'tknoweverydetailof them,butcollectivelyno.Sorry tosay that,butcollec-tivelywedon'thave...”.(IntervieweeD,AppendixIII,page79)

012345678910

HFI STC Karina PMI LDD MDMC PI

Preparedness

51

TheBPBDinturndidnotanswerthequestion,insteadpointingtothecitizensstayingin

theriverbanksthathadahigherresponseasopposedtothosethathadneverbeenim-

pactedfromflood(IntervieweeB,AppendixIII,page79).

3.3.3.1 CoordinationandCollaboration

The Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management, BNPB (Badan Nasional Pe-

nanggulanganBencana), functions as themain coordinating body in disastermanage-

ment.ItwasestablishedbythePresidentialRegulationNo.8of2008andreplacedthe

SATKORLAKPB,theNationalDisasterManagementCoordinatingBoard,whichhadbeen

inchargesince1979.AttheprovincialanddistrictlevelBPBDs(BadanPenanggulangan

BencanaDaerahs),provincialdisastermanagementagencies,areinthelead(seeFigure

10).TheBPBDoftheDKIJakartawasestablishedonlyattheendof2010,beforethatthe

disasterresponsewashandledbySATKORLAK.

Figure10Indonesiandisastermanagementgovernance(Source:Sunarharum,SloanandSusilawati,2014,p.233)

52

Thebiggest challengementionedbyallparticipantswasabout coordination.Thiswas

thecaseforthe2007flooding,duringwhichtheresponsewasledbytheSATKORLAK8

andagainduringthe2013flooding,inwhichtheBPBDwasalreadyincharge.Whileall

organisationsarecoordinatingandworkingwiththeBPBD,theparticipantsaddressed

major shortcomings in the coordination capacity of the BPBD: According to one re-

spondentoneof thechallenges that theBPBDis facing iscoordinatingacross thegov-

ernmentaldepartments(IntervieweeJ,AppendixIII,page79).Anotherinformantcriti-

cizedtheBPBDsharply,statingthat:

“[This]isonlymyopinion,thethingthatneedstobedonebetterbytheBPBDis about the coordination.Theydon'thave - Imean, I'm sorry to say that -theyneedtoimprovethewaytodothecoordination,that'sthething.Noton-lyinJakarta,inseveralareasinIndonesia."(IntervieweeC,AppendixIII,page79)

The Head of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Department of the BPBD himself

acknowledgedthattheNGOswerenotwell-coordinatedto100percent:

“(…)butnot100percentwell-coordinated, 40percentmaybeyes. (…) Justlike this,whendisastercoming in floodedarea inourvillages,wecallSavetheChildren'Pleasehelpustoday','Okay,okay'-Andtheywillbecomingthenextday(laughter).Andtheotherone,ItoldtheotherNGO'Ineedaboattoevacuateourcitizen,howmany?''Four'-Andtheywillbecomingwithone.Butit'sok,noproblem,theytrytodosomethingforourcitizen,that'sgood.”(IntervieweeB,AppendixIII,page79)

A further issue is that it seems thatpre-establishedcluster coordination ismissing, in

thewordsofoneinterviewee:

“Fromourprevioushistory-it'salwayswhenthestrikehitsthentheycoor-dinate. So, in 2015 there's a contingency plan. The contingency plan is for2016,butinherethere'snointersectioncluster-coordination.”(IntervieweeG,AppendixIII,page79)

Onthemeso-scalethereareanumberofcoordinationandcollaborationeffortsbetween

organisations,amongthemtheHumanitarianForumIndonesia,a faith-basedumbrella

organisationcurrentlyconsistingof15members;theEmergencyCapacityBuildingcon-

8Theirfunctionwasonlycoordinating,notdecision-making.

53

sortium(ECB),consistingoftheINGOsSTC,Oxfam,WV,CRS,MercyCorpsandCAREin

the lead; theSafeSchoolpartnershipwithBPBD,STC,PI,WVandYTBI;aswellas the

disastereducationconsortiumwithPIinthelead.

However,onthemacro-scalethereisnocommonplanonwhoisdoingwhatincaseof

flooding.Thisalsoappliestothefloodpreparednessmeasures:Fromtheempiricalfind-

ings itcanbeconcludedthatthere isnotonevisionguidingtheworkofhumanitarian

organisationsinpreparingforfloods.

3.3.3.2 Communication

All participants mentioned that their main communication channels are WhatsApp

groupsthatwereoftencreatedduringthe2013floods.Beforethatsomewereworking

withBlackberryMessengerorwithWalky-talkies.TheBPBDcommunicatesitswarnings

throughitswebsiteandsocialmedia,especiallyFacebookandTwitter.

3.3.3.3 MonitoringandEarlyWarningSystem

Themainsourceof information for themonitoringof thewater level in Jabodetabek’s

watergatesoftheCiliwungRiverisprovidedbytheBPBD,whointurnreceiveweather

informationfromthemeteorologicalagency,BMKG(BadanMeteorologiKlimatologidan

Geofisika).Thewaterlevelismeasuredinvariousfloodgatesincentimetersandclassi-

fiedintofourcategories(seeFigure11).Intheleftcolumnweseesomewatergates.The

columns next to the water gates describe which water height corresponds to which

standbylevel:Standbyfouristhenormalstateandiscolouredingreenwhilestandby

oneisthehighestwaterlevelandcolouredinred.

Basedonthisinformationinconjunctionwiththeweatherforecast,predictionsonwhat

waterlevelwillbereachedatwhattimearemade.Thecolumntotherightshowsthis

informationhourly foreach floodgate,byshowingtheheightof thewater, the levelof

alertnessasindicatedbythecolourandtheweatherforecastasindicatedbytheletter

nexttothewaterheight.Theabbreviationscanbefoundinthelegendofthefigure.

ThewaterlevelinformationissharedthroughthewebsiteoftheBPBD,itssocialmedia,

especiallyTwitterandFacebook,andalsothroughWhatsAppgroups.Ifthewaterlevelis

inthecategoryStandbyIII(yellow),thenasmallalertwillbegiventhroughspeakersys-

54

tem andWhatsApp groups by the BPBD. At Standby II (orange) level, thewarning is

spreadalsothroughSMS.WhenthewaterlevelincreasestoStandbyI(red),theChiefof

the neighbourhood, Rukun Tetangga (RT)will check all the households tomake sure

thatthecitizensmovedtotheshelter.(IntervieweeB,AppendixIII,page79)

WaterLevelDay/Date:Tuesday/24October2017Floodgate TheStandbyLimit(incm) Time

III II I 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00BendungKatulampa 80~149 150~199 ≥200 10T 10T 10T 10TPosDepok 200~269 270~349 ≥350 90T 90T 85T 85TPAManggarai 759~849 850~949 ≥950 640T 640T 610T 600TPAKaret 450~549 550~599 ≥600 390T 390T 370T 370TPasarIkan 170~199 200~249 ≥250 194T 194T 202T 209TLEGEND Categories StandbyI StandbyII StandbyIII StandbyIV

Weatherforecast T:Clear M:Cloudy H:Rain

MT:SlightlyCloudy G:Drizzling

Figure11:BPBDWater levelmonitoringsystem(adaptedandtranslatedfromBPBDDKIJakartaWebsite,http://bpbd.jakarta.go.id/,02.12.2017)

WhilethissystemseemstobeverywellappreciatedbytheNGOsandusedastheirmain

sourceofinformation,twoparticipantsalsoexpressedsomecriticism:First,notallthe

populationhasaccesstothis informationorevenknowsof itsexistenceandsecondly,

thewarningsbythegovernmentcomelastminutealthoughthefloodriskinformationis

well-known(IntervieweeGandH,AppendixIII,page79).

Thereforesomeorganisationstrytofillthatgapbyestablishingtheirowncommunica-

tionsystemswiththecommunitytosendthemalertswhenthewaterlevelgoesup.Fur-

thermoretheysupportcommunitiesinestablishingtheirownearlywarningsystemsas

part of the community SOPs: In someKampungs (villages) for example the Kampung

TimSiagaBencana,thecommunitydisasterpreparednessteam,checksthewaterlevel

and if thewater level rises theysendmessagesandwarn through thespeakersof the

mosqueoralsousingasirenthateverybodyshouldevacuate(IntervieweeJ,Appendix

III,page79).

55

3.3.3.4 TriggerforFloodResponseIntervention

Technically the trigger for responseshouldbegiven through theBPBD,whoconducts

thefirstresponse.If it lacksresourcesitwillaskforsupportfromNGOsortheprivate

sector(IntervieweeB,AppendixIII,page79).EspeciallyINGOshavetoworkunderthe

DisasterManagementLawNo.24of2007.BasedonthislawINGOsarenotallowedto

work in Indonesia unless there is an official request for international assistance or at

least a “welcome”. Instead they shouldwork through the existing system byworking

withlocalpartnersandprovidingthemwithreliefitems.

Alloftheinterviewedorganisationsworkwiththeearlywarningsystemofthegovern-

mentandfollowthealertsfromthewatergates.However,mostorganisationsalsohave

theirownunderstandingsandtriggersindependentlyofthegovernmentalsystem:Two

examplesIwouldliketomentionatthispointaretheIndonesianRedCross,whointer-

veneassoonastheyreceivealertsfromtheirvolunteersinthefield,andLDD,whoin-

tervenewhentheygetarequestfromtheparish.

3.3.3.5 PrepositionedStocks

Allinformantsmentionedthatarelevantpartoftheirfloodpreparednessstrategyliesin

appointingtheneededpersonnelduringtherainyseasonandinprepositioningstocksof

basicitems.

Furthermore,accordingtoempiricalevidence,sincethegovernmental floodprepared-

nesssystemislackingbothmanpowerandsuppliestorespondtoamajorflood,itisre-

lyingonthesupportofhumanitarianorganisationsintheseaspects.

3.4 SummarizingtheEmpiricalFindings

InthischapterwehaveportrayedthecharacteristicsofthemegacityofJakartaandits

vulnerabilities towards flooding.Wehave lookedat the twomajor floodeventsof the

past tenyears thatoccurred in2007and in2013.Theempirical findingshave shown

thatthe2007floodhadnotbeenanticipatedandtheresponsemanifesteditselfascha-

oticsincemanyorganisationsgotinvolved,buttherewasnoclearcoordinationamong

thestakeholders.Wecouldseethatsince2007anumberofmeasureshavebeenimple-

mentedincludingtheLawNo.24of2007,providingthelegalframeworkforactionand

56

regulating the involvementof internationalorganisations; theestablishmentof the In-

donesianNationalBoardforDisasterManagement,BNPBin2008andthereafterofthe

BPBD in Jakarta; structural floodmitigationmeasures by the government since 2012;

andtheEWSthatwassetupbythegovernmenttomonitorthewaterlevelofJakarta’s

rivers.Theempiricalevidencesuggestedthatthewaysinwhichhumanitarianorganisa-

tionsareinvolvedinJakarta’sfloodpreparednessaretwo-fold:Foronethingtheyfocus

onraisingawarenessondisasterriskandonstrengtheningcopingcapacitiesofcommu-

nitiesandschoolstodealwithfloods,foranotherthingtheyengageinpreparingforpo-

tentialfloodresponsesbyprepositioningstocks,conductingtrainingsandholdingcoor-

dinationmeetings.

Someroom for improvementbecameevidentwith regards to thecoordinationamong

thestakeholdersaswellastothecapacityoftheBPBD.

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4 Discussion

InthefollowingchapterwewillanalyseanddiscussthecaseofJakarta,aspresentedin

chapterthree,withthehelpofourpreviouslyoutlinedtheoreticalconceptsaspresented

inchaptertwo.Welookforthejustificationofourtheoreticalassumptions.

4.1 JakartaandtheFloods:ComplexityandVulnerability

Aswecouldseeinourpreviouschapter,Jakartaisaverydense,diverse,dynamicandas

such highly complex megacity. Its complexity is driven by variables like population

growth, economic growth, further urbanization and increased dependence on infra-

structure–variablesthataregenerallyamongthemaindriversofurbancomplexity(see

Chapter2.2.4,p.22).

Complexity canbe seenas reinforcing Jakarta’s ‘natural’ vulnerability to floodinghaz-

ards. This is becausewe arenot solemnlydealingwith single factors that are easy to

identify and consequently tackle; insteadwe are facedwith the complex interplay of

natural, socio-economic, technical, institutional and financial factors. The interplay of

stressors increases both exposure and vulnerability to the flooding hazard and thus

leavesJakartaatheightenedriskofdisaster.

Jakarta’sfloodingproblemisthereforeaperfectexampleforillustratingtheaddedvalue

ofapplyingasystemtheoreticallens.

Figure12showsanumberoffactorsthatinfluencethefloodhazard,albeitthelistisnot

complete.Someofthesefactorsare interconnected,whichinthefigureis indicatedby

thearrows–theydisplayrelationshipsanddirectionofcausality.Theseinterdependent

factorsareeitherreinforcingeachotherorhavinganadverseeffect (see theCAScon-

ceptoffeedbackloops,Chapter2.3.3.2,p.31).Understandingthebehaviourbetweenthe

componentpartsofJakarta’surbansystemisthereforevitalforcomprehendingitsvul-

nerabilitiestowardsthefloodinghazardaswellasforidentifyingpossibleentrypoints

tostrengthenitsresilience.

58

Figure12:Causal loop-diagramofthefloodhazardinJakarta(AdaptedfromAkmalahandGrigg,2011,p.739)

We can see that the added value of addressing Jakarta’s flooding issue froma system

theoreticalperspectiveisatleasttwo-fold:Ontheonehanditcanhelpusintracingthe

rootsoftheproblem,byleadingustoidentifyinterdependenciesandwhatfactorsfeed

intoeachother.Ontheotherhandasystemtheoreticalapproachalsoshowsusthat if

wewanttotacklethefloodingissue,weneedtoaddressitinaholisticmanner,bytak-

ingintoaccounttheinterplayofallfactorsandnotjustisolatedvariables.

Thissupportsourassumptionthatasystemtheoreticallensisusefulforhumanitarian

actorstogetabettergraspofurbanrealmsandtheirvulnerabilities,byhelpingtoun-

tangletheircomplexity(seeChapter2.2.4,p.22.

4.2 HumanitarianActors:VitalforJakarta’sFloodResilience?

The 2007 and the 2013 flooding events have revealed Jakarta’s vulnerability to the

floodinghazard.Inbothevents,theexposuretothehazardcoupledwithitsvulnerabil-

itytothehazard,resultedinhumanitariandisasters.Thishasreiteratedtheneedfora

59

betterfloodpreparednesssystem–asystemthatisproactiveandabletominimizethe

damagesandcasualtiesrelatedtoamajorfloodingevent.Thisisespeciallyrelevantas

floodingisarecurringevent–inthesmallerscaleannuallyandinthebiggerscaleevery

five tosixyears–and is furthermore likely toworsen inboth frequencyand intensity

duetoclimatechangeandlandsubsidence.

Asdiscussedinchaptertwo,inorderforJakartatoberesilienttothefloodinghazardit

needstoexhibitpropertiesofCAS,i.e.thecapacityoflearningfromitsenvironmentand

adaptingandreorganizingitscomponentpartsinawaythatallowsthesurvivalorab-

sorptionofshocksfromtheirenvironments(seeChapter2.2.3,p.21).

At thispointwebriefly recall ourdefinitionof resilience as outlined inChapter2.3.2,

p.27:

Resilienceis“(…)thepersistenceofrelationshipswithinasystemand(…)ameasureoftheabilityofthesesystemstoabsorbchangesofstatevariables,drivingvariables,andparametersandstillpersist.”

Sincethefocusofanalysisofthisthesisissetonunderstandingtheroleofhumanitarian

actorsinJakarta’sfloodpreparedness,wewillanalysetowhatextenthumanitarianor-

ganisations are supporting the system’s properties that render it resilient to flooding.

Thiswillbedonewith thehelpofour theoreticalconcepts taken fromCAS theory.To

whatextentarethetheoreticalconceptsapplicabletotheempiricalcase?

4.2.1 Anticipation–ProactiveandReactiveResilience

WerecallthatanticipationdenotestheabilityofaCAStobuildinternalmodels,which

help the system anticipate or predict future events and the consequences of their ac-

tions.Todosoathoroughanalysisofthestrengthsandweaknessesinherentinthesys-

temisnecessaryinordertoidentifywhatpartsofthesystemarelikelytofailintheoc-

currence of an event (a flood in our case). Appropriate action can then be taken to

strengthenthesepointsandassuchtheresilienceofthesystemproactively.

Theempiricalfindingsallowfortheconclusionthatthefloodingeventof2007hadnot

beenanticipatedbyneither thehumanitarianorganisationsnoranyotherstakeholder

involved in floodpreparedness and response in Jakarta.As such thenature of the re-

60

sponsetothiseventwaschaoticandpushingthesystemtoitslimit.Thereforetheinter-

estliesinidentifyingwhatthecapacityofanticipatingafloodingeventinJakartaisto-

day,andtowhatextenthumanitarianorganisationsaresupportingthiscapacity.

Forthispurposewewill lookattwomajorcategories:(1)Thesystem’santicipationof

aneventinordertostrengthenitsproactiveresilienceand(2)Thesystem’santicipation

oftheconsequencesofaneventinordertostrengthenitsreactiveresilience.

Forbothcategorieswewilldiscusstheeffectivenessofthemeasuresthatarecurrently

beingimplementedtostrengthentheanticipativecapacityoftheurbansystem.

Forthefirstcategory,oneofthemostrelevantmeasurestostrengthentheanticipative

capacity of Jakarta’s flood preparedness system identified, is the governmental early

warningsystem(EWS).Most, ifnotall, stakeholders includinghumanitarianorganisa-

tionsuseittomonitorthewaterlevelandtobealertforwhenthefloodinghits.Assuch

itcanbeseenasaninternalmodelofJakarta’spreparednesssystemtoanticipateflood-

ing.However,theempiricalfindingsalsohighlightsomegapsandshortcomingsofthis

system,namelythetimelinessofthewarningsandthelackofaccessibilitytotheinfor-

mationbyallcitizens.Alsonotall theaffectedpopulationsseemtoeitherbeawareof

theexistenceoftheEWSorknowhowtointerpretit.Thisiswherehumanitarianorgan-

isationsstepintofillthegap:Incollaborationwithschoolsandcommunitiestheyestab-

lishsimpleandcustomizedearlywarningsystems.Withthismeasuretheycontributeto

raising awareness onwhat the risks associatedwith flooding are and atwhat critical

pointitisthusnecessaryfortheaffectedpopulationstotakeaction.Throughthedevel-

opment of their own school or community flood contingency plans by means of as-

sessing their inherent risks, vulnerabilities and capacities, they are furthermore pre-

paredonwhatactiontheyshouldtakeincaseoffloods(seeChapter3.3.2,page45ff.).

Thus,itcanbeconcludedthatwithinJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystemhumanitarian

organisationsplay a vital role in strengthening the anticipative capacities of themost

floodaffectedcommunitiesthatmaynotbereachedbythegovernmentalEWS.

WithregardstothecurrentlevelofanticipationofamajorfloodingeventinJakartaby

humanitarianorganisations, theempirical findingssuggest thatwhilemanystakehold-

erswithinthehumanitarianpillararepreparingforapossiblebigfloodin2018,some

arepositioningthepossibilityofamajor floodingtohappenona lowscale.Theirrea-

61

soningbehindthisisthatsince2013nomajorfloodingeventshavetakenplacedueto

themitigationmeasuresbythegovernment(seeChapter3.1.3,p.39f.).

Our second category is the anticipation of the consequences of an event in order to

strengthenthesystem’sreactiveresiliencetoafutureevent.Togetaclearerpicturewe

willdifferentiatebetween(a)themicro-level,i.e.theindividualhumanitarianorganisa-

tions (b) themeso-level, i.e. the humanitarian subsystem and (c) themacro-level, i.e.

Jakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystemthatisrunbythegovernment.

For(a)theexampleoftheMuhammadiyahDisasterManagementCentershowsushow

humanitarianorganisationscanputthisconceptintopracticeatthemicro-level:In2007

theorganisationhadneitheranticipatedthemajorfloodnoritsconsequences.Assuch

theirresponselackedpreparednessandcoordination.Therefore,intheaftermathofthe

eventMDMCconductedanassessmentofitsfloodresponsetoanalyseitsshortcomings

aswell as the organisation’s vulnerabilities, risks and capacities to dealwith a future

flood.ThroughthelessonslearnedMDMCwasthenabletobetteranticipatetheconse-

quencesofthefloodingin2013andcouldthereforereacttotheeventaccordingly.

Atthemeso-level(b),currentlythefocusofhumanitarianorganisationsforstrengthen-

ingtheirreactiveresilienceismainlysetonprepositioningstocksandconductingtrain-

ings.Theempirical findingssuggestthattheprepositioningofstocks isananticipative

measurethatisofhighrelevanceforthefunctioningofJakarta’sfloodresponsesystem.

Assuch,ifincaseofafloodemergencythegovernmentalpillardoesnothavethecapaci-

tytodealwiththeevent,itreliesonthehumanitarianpillarforsupportwithboth,man-

powerandsupplies(seeChapter3.3.3.5,p.55).

Atthemacro-level(c),albeitthereisafloodcontingencyplanundertheleadofBPBDin

place, theempirical findingshavenotrevealedthattheprioritieswithinthefloodpre-

parednesssystemaresetonconductingoneholisticanalysisand identificationofvul-

nerabilities,risksandcapacitiesfordealingwithapotentialmajorfloodingevent.This

suggeststhatthereisnocollectivepreparednesssystem,whichclearlyoutlineswhoisin

chargeofwhichactivityincaseofafloodresponse.Insteadthecoordinationamongthe

responseactorsonlytakesplacewhenthefloodinghits–notbeforehand(seeChapter

3.3.3.1,p.51f.).

62

Itbecomesclearthathumanitarianorganisationsplayanimportantrole insupporting

thosepartsof thesystem’santicipativecapacity forbothproactiveandreactiveresili-

encethatthegovernmentiscurrentlynotaddressingsufficiently.Thisraisestheques-

tionofwhethertheyaresomewhatunderminingthesystem’sreactiveresiliencebybe-

ingtooreliantontheeffectivenessofthestructuralmitigationmeasuresbythegovern-

ment tocontain therisksof flooding.A fact that shouldnotbeneglected is theoccur-

renceofpastmajorfloodeventsinafivetosixyearscycle.Ifweconsiderthelastmajor

floodtohavetakenplacein2013,thecalculationwouldsuggestthatthenextbigevent

couldtakeplaceineither2018or2019.

4.2.2 FeedbackLoopsandAdaptation:

Webrieflycallbacktomindthatfeedbackloops–positiveorself-reinforcingandnega-

tiveorself-correcting–originateintheinteractionbetweenthesystemcomponentsand

enable the system to learn frompast events and adapt to bemore resilient to future

events.

Theconceptof feedback loopsandadaptationshallhelpus inanalysingwhatrolehu-

manitarianorganisationsplay instrengthening theadaptivecapacityof Jakarta’s flood

preparednesssystem.

ThereareanumberofmeasuresthatthegovernmenthastakentoadaptJakarta’sflood

preparedness system to the shortcomings that became evident during past flooding

events.Theempiricalevidencesuggeststhatamongthemostrelevantmeasuresarethe

establishment of the national disastermanagement agency BNPB in 2008 and conse-

quentlytheestablishmentoftheprovincialdisastermanagementagencyatDKIJakarta

levelin2011aswellasthepassingofthelawno.24of2007,whichsetthecurrentlegal

frameworkfordisastermanagementincludingtheroleofinternationalorganisations.

Furthermore,thechangeoftheGovernorofJakartain2012introducedaparadigmshift:

Floodingwassuddenlyseenasoneofthemainissuesonthepoliticalagendaandthere-

after structuralmitigationmeasures, including the normalization of the river and the

diggingofthedrainage,weretakentoaddressit.Thesemeasuresareseentobehighly

effectivebyhumanitarianactors,incontainingtherisksoffloodinginJakarta.

63

Thecontributionofhumanitarianorganisationstothefloodpreparednesssystem’sad-

aptationfrompasteventsappearstobelimitedtosomeaspects,whichdonot include

theimplementationofstructuralmitigationmeasures.Whilethereisnoclearexplana-

tionforwhythehumanitariansectorinJakartaisnotengagingintheseefforts,theem-

pirical findings suggest the following:Since large-scale structuralmeasureshavebeen

andstillarebeingtakencareofbyanothercomponentofthesystem,namelythegov-

ernment,humanitarianorganisationsdonotseemtobeseeingthenecessityofworking

inthisareaaswell.Insteadtheyfocusonworkingwiththepeoplethrougheducational

measures in schools and communities, next to preparing for an emergency response

(see Chapter 3.3.2, p.45ff.). However, these educationalmeasures are rather selective

than large-scale interventions.Thismaybeattributable to theproject-basednatureof

humanitarian work or funding restrictions and possibly also to the lack of authori-

ty/competencetoassumecertainresponsibilities.

Nonetheless,humanitarianorganisationsmanage to influence theadaptive capacityof

Jakarta’s floodpreparednesssystemthroughapositive feedback loop.TheSafeSchool

Initiative is an example that illustrates this strategy (seeChapter 3.3.2.1, p. 46f.):Hu-

manitarianorganisationslikeSavetheChildrenandPlanInternationalidentifiedaloop-

hole inJakarta’s floodpreparednesssystem,namelythedisasterpreparedness level in

schools. Therefore, they took initiative and pioneered the implementation of the Safe

Schoolframework.Asthismeasureprovedtobeeffectiveandworkingwell,theystarted

advocating itwith the government. Through the interactionwith the government, the

humanitarianorganisationssucceededinconvincingitofthenecessityoftakingupthis

workonto theirownagenda.Thisasa furtherconsequenceallows forascalingof the

measureandamuchgreateroutreach.Ultimately, itcanpromoteasystem-wideadap-

tionprocess.

Assuch, theSafeSchool Initiativehasshownthathumanitarianorganisationssupport

the adaptation and consequently the resilience of the flood preparedness system by

workingthroughloopholesandthefeedbackmechanism.

4.2.3 EmergenceandAggregateBehaviour

Aspreviouslyoutlined,emergenceistheglobalbehaviourofasystemthatresultsfrom

theinteractionsbetweenitscomponentpartsandoutlaststhesame.Wewillmakeuse

of thisconcept to identifywhatrolehumanitarianorganisationsplay insupporting Ja-

64

karta’s global behaviour in flood preparedness. For this purposewewill differentiate

into two levelsof analysis: (1) Jakarta’s floodpreparedness systemandwhat rolehu-

manitarianorganisationsasone“humanitarianpillar”playinitand(2)thehumanitari-

an pillar itself as one subsystem of Jakarta’s flood preparedness system (view Figure

13).

Figure13:LevelsofanalysisoftheglobalbehaviourinJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystem(owncomposition)

Thequestionswewilldiscussforbothlevelsofanalysisareasfollows:

(1)TowhatextentarehumanitarianorganisationsvitalforthefunctioningofJakarta’s

floodpreparednesssystem?Wouldtheglobalbehaviourofthesystemoutlastthebreak

offofthehumanitarianpillar?

(2)Towhatextentarethesinglecomponentsofthehumanitarianpillar,i.e.theindivid-

ualhumanitarianorganisations,relevantforkeepingtheglobalbehaviourofthesystem

functioning?Wouldtheglobalbehaviourofthesubsystemoutlastthebreakoffofindi-

vidualhumanitarianorganisations?

65

Forourfirst levelofanalysistheempirical findingshaveshownthatthehumanitarian

pillarplaysavitalrolefortheglobalbehaviourofJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystem.If

humanitarianorganisationswere to leave thepicture, theconsequences for theglobal

behaviourof the systemwouldbe strongly felt. Indeed theempirical findings indicate

thattheglobalbehaviourofJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystemwouldnotoutlastthe

breakingawayofthehumanitarianpillarastheotherstakeholdersdonotseemtohave

thecapacitiestocompensateforit.Thisappliestoboth,floodresiliencebuildinginitia-

tivesandthecapacitytorespondtomajorfloods.

As such thegovernmental flood resiliencebuildingefforts focus almost exclusivelyon

technicalmitigationmeasures(seeChapter3.3.1,p.44f.).Thustheyleaveoutofthepic-

turethehumanelement,whichisanecessarycomponentforaddressingthefloodriskin

aholisticmanner.ThiscleargapinJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystemisbeingcovered

throughtheworkofthehumanitarianpillar.Withitsprogramsthehumanitarianpillar

aimsatreinforcingtheresilienceofthosethataremostaffectedbythefloods–inmost

casesthepoorestofthepoorlivinginslumareasnexttotheriverbanks.

Notwithstanding the relevance of these measures, they are nevertheless limited to

small-scaleinterventions.Theimportanceofthehumanitarianpillar’spioneeringwork

for Jakarta’s flood preparedness system as awhole however, liesmuchmore in their

successfuleffortsinadvocatingthehumanaspectwiththegovernmentalpillar.Aspre-

viouslydiscussedthissuccessisreflectedintheadoptionofcommunityresiliencebuild-

ingmeasuresintothegovernmentalstrategy,whichcouldultimatelyupscaletheirout-

reach(seeChapter3.3.2.1,p.46ff.).Thegovernmentalpillarhowever,doesnotyethave

thecapacitiesforimplementingthesemeasuressingle-handedly.Insteaditisstillasking

for the support of humanitarian organisations in doing so. As such the governmental

pillarissomewhatdependentonthehumanitarianpillar.

Withregardstothepreparednesstorespondtopotentialmajor-scalefloodevents,itcan

bedeductedfromtheempiricalfindingsthatJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystembuilds

on the presence of the humanitarian pillar. As described in the above chapter, if an

emergencyexhauststhecapacitiesofthegovernmentalpillartodealingwithitalone,it

reliesonthesupportofthehumanitarianpillarthroughmanpowerandsupplies.

Afurtherissuethatbecameevidentthroughtheempiricalfindingsistheapparentlack

ofcoordinatingcapacitybytheBPBD,whilebeingtheonlyorganisationwiththeauthor-

66

itytocoordinateallstakeholders.Thishasproventounderminetheeffectivenessofthe

systeminrespondingtomajorfloods.Itisaconsortiumofhumanitarianorganisations

thathasmadeittoitsaimtotacklethisweaknessofJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssys-

tembyimplementingaprojectdedicatedtostrengtheningthecapacityoftheBPBD(see

Chapter3.3.2.3,p.49).

Lookingatoursecondlevelofanalysis,theimportanceofthecomponentpartsforthe

globalbehaviourofthehumanitarianpillar,theempiricalfindingsdriveustoverydif-

ferentconclusions.Asamatterof fact itseemssafetosaythattheglobalbehaviourof

thehumanitariansystemoutlastsitsparts.Thiscanmainlybeattributedtothefactthat

thereisnotoneclearplaninplaceonhowtosplittheworkamongtheorganisations,i.e.

whoisdoingwhatincaseafloodhappens?Withnostrictsysteminplace,theorganisa-

tionsareallworkinginsimilarfields.Therefore,ifonecomponentpartbreaksoff,itis

replaceablebyothercomponentpartswithnoconsequencesfortheglobalbehaviourof

thissubsystem.

4.3 LimitationsofDiscussion

Itisimportanttoremindourselvesthattheanalyticalaimwastofindouttowhatextent

humanitarian organisations contribute to Jakarta’s flood preparedness and not to see

whetherJakartaisresilienttofloods.Theapproachchosenforthispurposewastodis-

cuss in what ways humanitarian organisations work to strengthen three chosen key

characteristicsofCAS,namelyanticipation,emergenceandaggregatebehaviouraswell

asfeedbackloopsandadaptation.OtherconceptsofCAStmayhavealsoprovidedaval-

uablecontribution,butcouldnotbeincludedduetotimeandlengthconstraintsofthe

thesis.Furthermore, it is importanttonotethatthefindingsareconstrainedtothe in-

formationobtained through thechosensampleof informantsanddonot representall

ongoingfloodpreparednessinitiativesinJakarta.

67

5 ConclusionandRecommendations

Thisthesiswasbuiltontwobasicpremises.First,asaresultofagrowingdisasterriskin

anevermore-urbanizedworld,wecancurrentlyobserveashiftofhumanitariancrises

tourbanrealms.Second,ahighlevelofcomplexitycharacterizesurbanrealms,whichis

challengingtheworkofthehumanitariansectorthathastraditionallyengagedincrises

insimplerruralsettings.Thischallengebecameevidentthroughurbancrisesresponses

ofthepastfewyearsthathavepushedthehumanitariansystemtoitslimits.Thus,the

thesishastakenupthisissueandhashighlightedtheneedforthehumanitariansector

tobebetterpreparedfordealingwithurbansettings.

Forthispurposetheaddedvalueofapplyingasystemslens,andmorespecificallyaCAS

theoreticalapproachtothestudyofurbanrealmswasintroduced.Assuch, itprovides

us with an analytical framework that helps us untangling their complexities: First, it

teachesustoidentifythecomponentsofasystem,thesubsystemsthatformthesecom-

ponents,thecomponentsofthesesubsystemsandsoon.Andsecond,itsetsourfocuson

analysing the interactionsbetween thosecomponentsandon identifying interdepend-

enciesandpossiblecascade-effects,whichcanshedlightonthevulnerabilitiesofurban

systems.Itfurthermorestressestheconceptofadaptation,whichisarelevantaspectof

resilience.Werecallthatwehavedefinedresilienceas“(…)thepersistenceofrelation-

shipswithinasystemand(…)ameasureoftheabilityofthesesystemstoabsorbchang-

esofstatevariables,drivingvariables,andparametersandstillpersist.”

InafurtherstepwehaveoutlinedthreekeyCASconceptsthathighlightthecharacteris-

ticsanurbansystemneedstohaveinordertobedisasterresilient:Anticipativecapaci-

ty,adaptivecapacityandemergentbehaviour(seesub-questionno.1,p.7).

With thehelpof these conceptswediscussed the specific caseof Jakartaand the role

thathumanitarianorganisationsplayinstrengtheningitsresiliencetoflooding.Thecase

ofJakartahashighlightedthelimitedroomofpossibilitiesthathumanitarianorganisa-

tionshavetoinfluenceitsfloodpreparednesssystem.Financialconstraintsandthepro-

ject-basednatureofhumanitarianworkaswellasthelackofauthoritytotakeactionor

realizecertainmeasuresareamongtheselimitations.Assuchwecouldseethatpossible

interventionpointsforhumanitarianorganisationstoimpedethefailureofthesystem

68

canberestrictedthroughgovernmentalregulations–inourcaseespeciallyforinterna-

tionalorganisations(seesub-questionno.3,p.7).

Thestudyhashowevershownthatwithin theirconstraintsandtheirpossibilities,hu-

manitarianorganisationsasonesubsystemplayavitalroleforJakarta’sfloodprepared-

ness.Thisapplies tobothcommunityresiliencebuilding initiativesandemergencyre-

sponsepreparedness.

Their strategies for reinforcing the resilience of Jakarta’s flood preparedness system

couldbedividedintotwomainapproaches(seesub-questionno.2,p.7).Oneapproach

is the identification of loopholes in Jakarta’s flood preparedness system, followed by

owninitiativeinimplementingmeasurestofillthesegaps.Duetotheirconstraintsthese

measuresarehoweverlimitedintheirreach.Therefore,oncethemeasuresprovetobe

successful,humanitarianorganisationsadvocatethemandpushforthegovernmentto

takethemontoitsagenda,whichcanensureabroaderoutreachandsustainability.This

strategyhasmaderelevantcontributionstoclosingexistinggapsinthesystemthatno

otherstakeholderwasfillingandhasthusprovenitseffectiveness.

The secondapproach is thepreparation for a floodemergency response.Ouranalysis

hasshownthatJakarta’sdisastermanagementagencyiscurrentlyheavilyreliantonthe

supportbyhumanitarianorganisationsduringanemergencyresponse,whichismainly

attributable to limited capacities of the governmental agency in bothmanpower and

emergencyaidsupplies.

Wecanthusdrawtheconclusionthatwithinitslimitationstheroleofhumanitarianor-

ganisationsinJakarta’spreparednesssystemisofcrucialimportance.

At thispoint,however, it is important to remindourselves that the conceptual frame-

work for theanalysisofourcase is limitedto threeconceptschosen fromCAStheory.

OtherconceptsofCAStheorymayhaveshedlightorputfocusonslightlydifferentas-

pectsoftheempiricalfindings.Thiswouldindeedbeaninterestingquestionforfurther

research.

Therearealsosomemethodologicalconstraintsof thisstudy,suchasthe limitationto

onespecificcase,someconclusionsofwhichmaypartlybetransferrabletoothersimilar

contexts, someofwhichhowevermaybeapplicable to Jakartaonly. Furthermore, the

casestudyislimitedinthesensethatitdoesnotreflecttheperspectivesandtheworkof

all floodstakeholders, insteadfocussingonachosensampleofhumanitarianorganisa-

tions.Aconstraintalsoliesintheempiricalfindingsbeingrestrictedtotheaccountsof

69

theinformants,whichinturndependonvariousfactorsincludingtheirnumberofyears

ofexperienceortheirpositionwithintheorganisation.

Assuchitwouldbe interestingtodevelopthisworkfurtherbyexpandingitsscopeto

includingamoreholisticsampleoffloodstakeholders.

ThroughtheresearchsomeroomforimprovementinJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssys-

temasawholebecameevident.Themainissuehighlightedwasthelackofcoordination.

Thiswasoneofthemainpointsthatwerecriticizedabouttheresponsestothetwoma-

jorfloodsofthepastdecade.Theempiricalfindingsstronglypointtothefactthatcoor-

dinationisstilloneofthemajorchallenges,ifnotthemainone.Inthisaspectthesystem

seemstobe lackingadaptivecapacity,whichasa furtherconsequence isundermining

thesystem’sresilience.

Amoresystematicapproachtothefloodingissuecouldincreasetheeffectivenessofthe

flood preparedness system and consequently the resilience of the urban system as a

whole.Conductingaholisticanalysisofthevulnerabilitiestoandtheresultingrisksof

floodinginJakartacouldbethefirststepinensuringthis.Thereafter,thestrengthsand

capacitiesofthevariousfloodstakeholdersandoftheurbansystemasawholeshould

beassessed.Theseanalyses can thenbeused todeveloponecommonvisiononwhat

canandwhatshouldbedonetoaddressandminimizetheriskofandthevulnerabilities

toflooding.Whichstrategyshouldbefollowedtostrengthencriticalpointsoftheurban

system?Subsequently,aclearconceptonwhoisintheleadofwhichactivityandwhere,

shouldbedesigned.Thisisimportantwithregardstoboth,resiliencebuildingmeasures

andthepreparednesstorespond.Itispivotalthatallstakeholdersareinvolvedinthis

processtoguaranteethattheresourcesavailablewithinthesystemareusedeffectively

andefficiently.

Recapitulating,itcanbestatedthatdespitetheimportantrolethathumanitarianorgan-

isationsplayinJakarta’sfloodpreparedness,thereareindeedsomemeanstooptimize

theirworkanditsimpact.Theempiricalevidencedidnotrevealthattherisksofflood

hazardsinJakartacouldbeeliminatedandthatinsteadacertaindegreeofvulnerability

tofutureeventspersists.Thishighlightstheimportanceofgeneratingsynergiesamong

thestakeholderstotapthefullpotentialofJakarta’sfloodpreparednesssystem.

70

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APPENDICES

AppendixI:InterviewConsentForm

InterviewResearchTitle:TowhatextentdohumanitarianorganisationscontributetofloodpreparednessinJakarta?

Researcher:SarahStinglDateandtime: Place:Participant’spositioninorganisation:Nameoforganisation:

Numberofemployees Numberofvolunteers NumberofyearsoffieldexperienceinJakarta Consent• Thisinterviewisvoluntary.Youhavetherightnottoansweranyquestion,andtostoptheinterviewatanytimeorforanyreason.

• Youwillnotbecompensatedforthisinterview.

• Iwouldliketoaudio-recordthisinterviewandproduceatranscript.Iwillsendyouthetranscriptforreviewandapproval,beforeinclusionintotheresearch.Therecordingwillbedestroyed.

• Unlessyougivemepermissiontouseyourname,positionand/orquote,theinformationyoutellmewillbeconfidential.

Pleasecheckwhatapplies:

� Igivepermissionforthisinterviewtoberecorded.

� Igivepermissionforthefollowinginformationtobeincludedinpublicationsresultingfromthisstudy:

� myname � myposition � nameoforganisation � directquotes

NameofParticipant____________________________________________________________Signature________________________________________Date__________________________

PleasecontactSarahStingl(s.stingl@rug.nl)withanyquestionsorconcerns.

77

AppendixII:Semi-structuredInterviewQuestions

General

1) HowwouldyouassesstheriskthatfloodingposestoJakartaandthepeoplethatliveinitonascalefromzero0toten10,where0isthelowestvalueand10themaximum

Floodresponseinthepast(since2007)

1) Howwouldyouassesstheorganisation’sinvolvementinfloodresponseinthepasttenyearsonascalefromzero0toten10,where0isthelowestvalueand10themaximuminvolvementperceivedtobeinplace:______________________________________

a. Towhichmajoreventsdidyourespond?

b. Howdidyourespond?Whichactivities?

c. Didyoucoordinatewithotherorganisations?How?

d. Howdidyoucommunicatewitheachother?

e. Whatwerethemainissuesandchallengesthatyouwerefacing?

Floodpreparednesstoday

2) Howwouldyouassesstheorganisation´scapacitytobepreparedforflooding?Pleaseassessthepreparednessonascalefromzero0toten10,where0isthelowestvaluesand10themaximumpreparednessperceivedtobeinplace_____________________________

3) Whatkindofprograms/strategiesareyouimplementingtoprepareforfloods?

a. Whatandwhodoyoufocuson?

b. Areyoucollaboratingwithotherstakeholders?

c. Whatarethemainchallengesyouarefacing?

78

4) Whatdataandinformationdoyoubaseyourfloodpreparednessplansand/orprojectson?

a. Whatkindofdatadoyouuse?Owndata?Externaldata?

5) Aretherestocksofsuppliesinplace?

a. Whatkindofsupplies?

b. Wherearethesesuppliesbeingstocked?

6) Doyouhaveearlywarningsystemsinplace?

a. Whatisbeingmonitored?

b. Whatisthetriggerortippingpointatwhichyouintervene?

7) Isthereanythingelseyouwouldliketotellme?

79

AppendixIII:InterviewParticipants

OrganisationExperience

inJakarta

2007

Response

2013

ResponsePositionofParticipant

Dateof

Interview

Placeof

Interview

A ACF Since1998 X

(1) FormerDRRProjectManager

(2) FormerDRRProjectManager

(1)30.10.2017(2)04.11.2017

IkeaAlamSutera,Jakarta*

B BPBD Since2011 HeadofDisasterPrevention&

PreparednessDepartment03.11.2017

BPBD

Office,

Jakarta*

C CARE Since1967 XEmergencyResponseCoordina-

tor08.11.2017

Starbucks,

Jakarta*

D HFI Since2008 X Communication&Partnership 06.11.2017HFIOffice,

Jakarta*

E Karina Since2009 X X EmergencyCoordinator 02.11.2017

Karina

Office,

Jakarta*

F LDD Since1962 X X

(1)ChiefofCommunityBureau

Services

(2)Volunteer

02.11.2017

Karina

Office,

Jakarta*

G MDMC Since2004 X XJakartaRegionalChairmanfor

EmergencyResponse&Recovery31.10.2017

MDMC

Office,

Jakarta*

HPlanInterna-

tional/ X

DisasterRiskManagementPro-

gramManager15.11.2017

PIOffice,

Jakarta,via

Skype

I PMI Since1945 X XHeadofDisasterManagement

ServicesDivision07.11.2017

PMIOffice,

Jakarta*

JSavethe

ChildrenSince2013 X FieldManagerJakarta 08.11.2017

STCField

Office,

Jakarta*

*Interviewwasconductedface-to-face