Resemblance, Representation and the Paradox of Rule-following Pictures and Objectivity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

Monika Jovanović, Belgrade University

Aim

to compare Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblance” and the concept of representation with respect to the kind of objectivity each of these concepts requires

Concept and essencethe common-sense perspective Plato’s methodology and the western

thought the problem of definition:What is X?

(justice, virtue, knowledge, beauty...)There has to be something common

for all members of a certain set. An item is to be subsummed under a certain concept in virtue of that property.

Wittgenstein – a new perspectiveWhat is language?language-games -- simple ways of

using wordsIs there something common for all

language games? “Don’t think, but look!”

Investigations, §65

Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations.--For someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language...

Investigations, §65

And this is true.--Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,--but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language".

Investigations, §66

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?--Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "--but look and see whether there is anything common to all .--For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.

Investigations, §66

To repeat: don't think, but look!--Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball -games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost...

Investigations, §66

--Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared.

Investigations, §66

Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

Investigations, §66

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

Philosophical Grammar, p. 75

Thus, there is probably no single unique characteristic common to everything we call game. However, we also cannot say that ‘game’ simply has several independent meanings (the way, say, word ‘bank’ has).

Philosophical Grammar, p. 75

Thus, there is probably no single unique characteristic common to everything we call game. However, we also cannot say that ‘game’ simply has several independent meanings (the way, say, word ‘bank’ has)...

...Indeed even if a feature is common to all members of the family, it need not be that feature that defines the concept.

Two implicit principles

I – There is a more or less determined set of individually necessary conditions (α, β, γ, ...) for X to be a game.

Two implicit principles

I – There is a more or less determined set of individually necessary conditions (α, β, γ, ...) for X to be a game.

II – No conjunction of properties α, β, γ, ... gives sufficient condition for X to be a game.

Philosophical Grammar, p. 75

What a concept-word indicates is certainly a kinship between objects, but this kinship need not be the sharing of a common property or a constituent. It may connect the objects like the links of a chain, so that one is linked to another by intermediary links. Two neighbouring members may have common features and be similar to each other, while distant ones belong to the same family without any longer having anything in common. […]

Philosophical Grammar, p. 75 The relationship between the members of a

concept may be set up by the sharing of features which show up in the family of the concept, crossing and overlapping in very complicated ways. […]

It might be said that the use of the concept-word or common noun is justified in this case because there are transitional steps.

Investigations, §67

And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a--direct--relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

Three additional principles

III – There is a disjunctive set of sufficient conditions for X to be a game.

IV – Each of these disjuncts represents conjunctions of necessary conditions for X to be a game and some other properties belonging to the set of properties a, b, c…

V – These disjuncts are mutually connected in the following fashion:

(α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ a ˄ b ˄ c) ˅ (α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ b ˄ c ˄ d) ˅ (α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ c ˄ d ˄ e) ˅ (α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ d ˄ e ˄ f)˅...

abc

bcd

cde

def

Implicit principles I – There is a more or less determined set of individually

necessary conditions (α, β, γ, ...) for X to be a game. II – No conjunction of properties α, β, γ, ... gives sufficient

condition for X to be a game. III – There is a disjunctive set of sufficient conditions for X

to be a game. IV – Each of these disjuncts represents a conjunction of

necessary conditions for X to be a game and some other properties belonging to the set of properties a, b, c…

V – These disjuncts are mutually connected in the following fashion:

(α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ a ˄ b ˄ c) ˅ (α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ b ˄ c ˄ d) ˅

(α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ c ˄ d ˄ e) ˅ (α ˄ β ˄ γ ˄ d ˄ e ˄ f)˅...

Objectivity and relevant similarities

the trap of decisionism

Autonomous/Conventional Representations

There are representations which convey certain meaningful content without mediation of language.

That is, they represent by natural similarity.

Autonomous/Conventional Representations

All representations always presuppose mediation of something verbal in the broadest sense of the word:

Common knowledge and conceptual apparatus.

Specific knowledge: 1) about historical context; 2) of some relevant facts about the author (more precisely, author’s semantic

intentions).

Portrait

Still life

Landscape

Reflections – Natural Representations?

Duck-rabbit

Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: ‘…no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite relationship of reference. Nor is resemblance necessary for reference; almost anything may stand for anything else.’

Kristóf Nyíri, Bergen Conference: ‘if pictures preserve real-world visual information, then it is not the case that anything can be a picture of anything’.

Extending application of concept-words and

Representation

as instances of rule-following

THANK YOU!