CSIR Research Report

Research Report: The Border Intelligence

Fusion Section Perspectives on Joint Interagency Intelligence Collaboration along the U.S. Southwest Border

CAPT Rodd Ricklefs November 2015

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The Border Intelligence Fusion Section:

Perspectives on Joint Interagency Intelligence

Collaboration along the U.S. Southwest Border CAPT Rodd Ricklefs

United States Coast Guard

November 2015

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

CAPT Ricklefs is the USCYBERCOM liaison to USSOUTHCOM. This research report is the product of

independent scholarly investigation and is not finished intelligence. The opinions expressed in this report

are solely the author’s and are not those of the National Intelligence University, Defense Intelligence

Agency, or Department of Defense. An expanded discussion of these findings is available upon request to:

NIU_Research@dodiis.mil. This report has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of

Corporate Communications, Defense Intelligence Agency, case #15-520.

On the cover: Border Patrol agents observe Arizona National Guard soldiers training for

Operation Copper Cactus at an undisclosed location in Arizona, Aug. 25. Operation Copper

Condor is the Arizona National Guard's contribution to the up to 1,200 National Guard troops

being deployed to support the Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the

four Southwest border states. By SFC Jim Greenhill.

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Introduction. United States Southwest border (SWB) security is a subject of national prominence, resonating strongly in the public domain over the last eight years.1 To improve the

region’s security, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense (DHS, DOJ, and

DoD) bolstered resource investments along the border, augmenting the already-considerable

state, local, and tribal law enforcement (LE) commitments.2 Numerous speeches, editorials, and

academic research projects assert collaboration between these SWB LE stakeholders is the key to

overcoming advanced transnational crime organizations (TCOs) which represent the most

consistent threat to SWB security.3 As a result, over 250 separate task forces and intelligence

fusion centers currently operate along the SWB.4 This study investigated one such collaborative

effort: the Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) at El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). i BIFS

was a multiple-source analytic team, established in November 2010, composed of DOJ, DHS, and

DoD personnel. This team’s objective was to provide SWB stakeholders with fused intelligence

and tactical information to support LE investigations and operations. Despite possessing an

organizational description that conforms exactly to what stakeholders claim to desire in the

region, U.S. policymakers disbanded BIFS after just over three years of existence.

Based on documentation and interviews of BIFS executive agents, leaders, analysts, and

customers, this study examined those factors that motivated BIFS’s creation, influenced its

mission execution over time, and ultimately led to its demise.

TINAJAS ATLAS

MOUNTAINS, AZ.

Large steel fence

protecting the

border between

Mexico and the

United States.

I El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was founded in 1974. Its mission is to collaboratively support U.S. law enforce-

ment and interdiction components through the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and

alien movements, and criminal organizations responsible for these illegal activities. Representatives from over 20 agen-

cies participate at EPIC in a common facility at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, TX, with a Drug Enforcement Agen-

cy (DEA) senior official serving as Director. See http://www.dea.gov/ops/intel.shtml#EPIC.

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Resource limitations, unclear strategic plans, and uneven levels of internal, top-leadership, and political

support all affected BIFS’s final outcome. The research findings determined that the presence (or lack) of

individual champions, weariness of grand strategic initiatives that lack execution details, and the

proper management of expectations are critical considerations for future DHS, DOJ, and DoD

leaders as they continue to determine how best to accomplish intelligence collaboration among

SWB stakeholders.

Study Overview. In order to understand which factors influenced the demise of BIFS, I compiled perspectives on interagency collaboration and organizational transformation from

more than 50 published studies. Based on that review, five managerial actions stood out that

offer value during such a transformation:5

Because few details regarding BIFS’s history are available publically, the study produced a

history of BIFS based on interview data and more than 100 archived e-documents provided

from 16 BIFS executive agents, leaders, analysts, or customers. From this historical data, I

produced 24 findings that were relevant for BIFS capacity to succeed. While these findings were

the result of evaluating BIFS’s history against the five managerial actions above, the findings also

enabled the evaluation of those same five managerial actions to determine their relevance in

public organizational transformation.

{ 1) Build internal support. Those within the organization support the transfor-mation.

2) Develop a vision and strategy. The organization’s desired end-state follow-ing the transformation is clear and understood, and a functional plan to implement that transformation exists.

3) Ensure top-management support and commitment. Top leaders with-in the organization support the transformation long-term.

4) Build external support. The organization’s relevant political apexes and external stakeholders support the transformation.

5) Provide resources. The organization is provided adequate resources to enact the transformation.

}

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History of BIFS: Foundation, Establishment, and Ending. As drug cartel-related violence increased exponentially along the U.S.-Mexican border region in

the late 2000s, SWB security became an important political issue for U.S. policymakers at all

levels of government. Policymakers and security officials were particularly concerned about the

potential for cartel violence to de-stabilize the Mexican government—a situation that would

adversely affect U.S. security along its southern borders and beyond.6 Given these concerns, the

U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) re-prioritized its counter-TCO and counter-narcotics missions.

As part of this renewed national effort to address SWB security, the Office of National Drug

Control Policy (ONDCP) initiated a National Southwest Border Counter-Narcotics Strategy in

2007. One way that this strategy aimed to combat the increasing TCO threat was by prioritizing

intelligence and information sharing between government agencies in the SWB region. This

effort grew out of concerns by senior officials in Washington that SWB stakeholders were failing

to integrate their strategic and tactical approaches to addressing the TCO threat.

DHS and DOJ specifically prioritized interagency collaboration in formulating strategy.7 The

subject of interagency collaboration was particularly important and sensitive among EPIC

leaders and DOJ officials as a result of a DOJ Inspector General (IG) report published in

EL PASO, TX:

Skyline of down-

town El Paso with

yucca plant in the

foreground and

mountains on the

Mexican side of the

border.

By Frontpage.

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”

“ At least 13 senior officials from DoD, DOJ, and

DHS praised

the creation of

BIFS during

Congressional

testimony.

June 2010 that criticized the lack of collaborative practices at the site.8 DoD assets with SWB ties

also received pressure to broaden partnerships in May 2010, when the new NORTHCOM

commander noted that support to the government of Mexico in its conflict with TCOs was one of

three major mission areas he needed to improve during his tenure.9

The combination of political pressure and the need to fulfill departmental priorities prompted

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to propose establishing an inter-departmental

analytic section at EPIC that included I&A analysts. Senior leader introduced this proposal

during meeting at EPIC on June 8, 2010, attended by 13 DOJ and 10 DHS high-ranking

principals. At the meeting, the principals approved “the creation of the Border Intelligence

Fusion Section led by DHS within EPIC… [that] will address DHS needs for additional border-

centric intelligence without creating another intelligence center.”10 In addition, “the new section

would seek opportunities, means, and methods to increase the exchange of intelligence with

State/local/tribal LE agencies along the expanse of the SWB and across the country.”11

Initially, SWB senior stakeholders were, at worst, optimistic and, at best, enthusiastic with BIFS’s

potential to bolster collaboration between interagency partners. In multiple border security-

related strategic plans, documents, and speeches, BIFS was highlighted as a positive step toward

furthering regional partnerships—a glimpse at what many hoped was the model for similar

interagency endeavors. In fact, between February 2011 and April 2012, at least 13 senior officials

from DoD, DOJ, and DHS praised the creation of BIFS during Congressional testimony. Over

the next three years, BIFS would grow to a workforce of 53 individuals from 10 different

agencies, providing support to federal, state, and local SWB stakeholders. Its product line

included Area Studies, Target Packages, Person of Interest Reference Cards, Intelligence Notes,

and Post-Seizure Analysis and Story Boards on evolving events. In fiscal year 2013, EPIC’s Joint

Collection Management and Dissemination unit (JCMU), originally a sub-section of BIFS,

processed over 4,000 requests for information and supported stakeholders with intelligence

products from DoD and national collectors.12

Despite this initial cross-departmental enthusiasm from senior executives in Washington and an

intended mission designed to mitigate an intelligence gap of increasing public concern, BIFS did

not sustain itself as an organization in the manner its founders and allies hoped. Although BIFS

developed significantly as an organization in the years following its establishment, EPIC started

planning an organizational evolution in 2013 that would shift its overarching focus from

development and dissemination of actionable intelligence toward a more strategic “hemispheric

approach” that would consider “all threats, all hazards.”13 EPIC’s organizational transformation

plans reconstituted its analytic workforce into “strategic,” “operational,” and “tactical” sections.

Those plans called for BIFS analysts’ reallocation to the new Strategic Analysis Section (SAS)—a

move that effectively terminated BIFS by February 2014.14

Specific details regarding the motivation behind EPIC’s organizational transformation were

difficult to obtain because of limited access to EPIC/DEA senior management during the study.

Interviewees offered mixed opinions of experiences with SAS compared to those with BIFS.

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With SAS, overall production (i.e. product output) has increased dramatically and incorporates

more strategic-level assessments. However, the same customers and partners admitted the loss of

the agility and capabilities BIFS provided prior to EPIC’s reorganization.16

Research Findings. The following represents the aforementioned 24 findings determined to concretely demonstrate some measure of impact on BIFS’s capacity to succeed,

either positively or negatively (or both depending on perspective). They are sub-divided into

four categories: organizational, cultural, political, and resource-related. These findings represent

the basis for the study’s subsequent analysis of the five proposed managerial actions and final

perspectives.

It was not clear to all stake-holders if BIFS’s primary mis-sion was strategic, operational,

and/or tactical support.

BIFS was not constructed to be driven programmatically by

customer requirements.

There was no consensus among BIFS’s partners for

performance measures.

Support from the BIFS director

was consistent and ardent.

Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N) support significantly impacted

BIFS’s development.

JTF-North’s relationship with EPIC/BIFS had limitations, which affected its support to

BIFS.

BIFS’s desired mission impact was not rationally scoped

based on resources provided.

BIFS’s mission required exten-sive negotiation through legal

and policy challenges.

BIFS’s intended intelligence analysis approach significantly clashed with EPIC’s criminal

investigative approach.

Personnel assigned to BIFS from LE agencies demonstrat-

ed resistance to sharing data.

Personnel assigned to BIFS from EPIC initially demonstrat-ed considerably more loyalty to their agency than to BIFS’s

mission or leadership.

An acceptable “credit for re-sults” culture among inter-agency partners was not estab-

lished within BIFS.

BIFS was a DHS I&A-generated

initiative.

There was debate as to wheth-er EPIC should have direct

oversight of BIFS.

There was debate whether BIFS should have an operational

tasking component.

DEA senior leadership did not

support BIFS concept.

Support to BIFS from EPIC Directors was uneven and in-

consistent.

Perceptions existed that BIFS was threatening to “over-

shadow” EPIC itself.

EPIC leadership’s frustration with its Liaison Officers at the time likely affected considera-

tions made regarding BIFS.

EPIC personnel assigned to BIFS did not possess the ana-lytic tradecraft to carry out

BIFS’s intended mission.

BIFS’s level of investment to-ward one particular mission affected its organizational

development.

BIFS struggled to develop and implement a cloud-based,

data-sharing e-architecture.

Some partners’ support to BIFS waned over time after

failing to see near-term value.

Ultimately, DHS did not demonstrate appropriate long-

term commitment to BIFS.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL POLIITICAL RESOURCE-RELATED

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Conclusions for Better Understanding Public Organization

Transformation. Analysis of the history and research findings suggested the five proposed managerial actions need further refinement. Based on these research assessments, the

study offered a revised set of five managerial actions which are presented in order of priority

and relevance:

1) Secure external support for the vision. “Build External Support” was the most relevant managerial action, so it was given top priority. “Secure” was substituted for “build” to

denote the importance of obtaining support from the political apex of relevant supporting

organizations from the outset of an initiative, not in the middle of it. Though development of a

“macro vision” was not found to be specifically relevant, having an initial vision to advocate is

an inherent necessity.

2) Scope the mission based on anticipated resources; identify/satisfy

lynchpin requirements. “Provide resources” was almost too inherent a managerial action and, thus, was of limited value as a strategic learning point. The findings from this study

offered some potential enhancements to this managerial action, including the notion of refining

the original vision appropriately based on resources provided and ensuring sustainment of any

specific resource requirements deemed absolutely critical to a vision’s long-term success.

3) Develop a comprehensive execution plan based on vision. This managerial action replaced “develop a vision and strategy,” which this study found to have

limited relevance in public organizational transformation. What this study did indicate,

however, was although formation of a vision may be an important first step in the transfor-

mation process, the detailed plan to execute that vision is much more relevant to the

transformation’s success.

4) Ensure top-management support and commitment. This managerial action was particularly relevant, and was, therefore, included unchanged. An executive

unwilling to support an organization’s transformation may have the ability to single-handedly

disrupt or discontinue it, either directly or indirectly. New initiatives need well-placed

champions to survive.

5) Build internal support. The study determined this managerial action was relevant, but of lower priority than the others. Unlike many modern business transformations, the

impetus for public organization transformation is not often led from within, but rather from

senior levels in the hierarchal bureaucracy.17 Given this dynamic, resistance to change is

common, and internal support for transformation is generally soft in the beginning.18 Because of

deeply engrained cultures common within interagency collaborative efforts, incremental

improvements of internal support are all one should really expect. Building gradual internal

support over time is an acceptable practice.19

FIVE

TRANSFORMATION

MANAGERIAL ACTIONS FOR PUBLIC ORGANIZATION

}

}

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Final Perspectives. Champions can make a huge difference. Academic literature specifically notes the importance individual leaders play in during public organizational change, perhaps

even more critical than for change in private business.20 As new initiatives for SWB collaboration

emerge, strong leaders must be chosen to direct them and advocate their causes in the face of

political and cultural pressures.

Be wary of “good idea” initiatives that lack an adequate execution plan. It is not unusual to see new fusion

centers, collaborative teams, task forces, and working groups “pop-up” in the SWB region

without necessarily a good plan for how their mission can be effectively integrated into the

community’s holistic intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination strata. Haste to

implement organizational structures prior to defining their scope of mission and securing

adequate resources to accomplish it can prove detrimental to such initiatives.

There are no quick solutions. Government organizations are generally only capable of incremental changes,

even when leadership desires more dramatic transformation;21 and it is not unusual for it to take

four to six years for interagency partnerships to fully mature and achieve a sustainable level of

collective trust.22 Stakeholders and customers that expect organizations like BIFS to mature and

achieve efficient operations after just one, two, or even three years, are likely being too ambitious.

Interagency collaboration will always encounter friction. Opposing agendas, clashes of culture, and

divergent personal and political motivations will never cease to exist and will always represent a

source of conflict. What is detrimental to a collaborative organization is when, over time, those

conflicts result in frustrations that significantly hamper future interactions. If these inherent

challenges are understood and accepted, progress can be made. Collaboration at 70 percent

optimal efficiency is still a better option than when stakeholders choose not to collaborate at

all. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //

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Notes.

1 United States Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, “Fiscal Years 2014–2018, Strategic

Plan,” 28; The White House, "White House Drug Czar Releases Southwest Border Counternarcotics

Strategy," ONDCP Press Release, October 2, 2007. 2 Jerome P Bjelopera and Kristin Finklea, “Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the

Lens of the Southwest Border,” paper written for Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2014, 10;

Southwest Border Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4882, 113th Congress, 2nd Session, 2014. 3 Stephen G. Lauer (principal author, project group of 10), “Southwest Border Support Strategy,” School

of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, academic

research paper submitted to Honorable Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, 2011, 5; CAPT Bob Allen, CAPT Mary Jackson, COL Janice

King, and CAPT Jorge Palacios, “Aligning for Hemispheric Defense: Synchronizing NORTHCOM and

SOUTHCOM Efforts to Combat Transnational Criminal Organizations,” thesis for Joint Forces Staff

College, Class 12-2, June 5, 2012, 3; Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of

National Drug Control Policy, “National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy,” 2011, 9; United

States Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan,” Annex B, 56-59. 4 Bjelopera & Finklea, 10. 5 Though multiple works contributed, the following article was the most relevant to the development of the

five managerial conditions: Walter J. M. Kickert, “Specificity of Change Management in Public

Organizations: Conditions for Successful Organizational Change in Dutch Ministerial Departments,” The

American Review of Public Administration 44, no. 6 (2014): 693-717, originally published online April 23,

2013. 6 Interviewee #10, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, April 24, 2015. 7 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A

Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” February 2010, 36; United States Department of Justice,

Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Justice Information Sharing: A 2010–2012 Strategic Action Plan,

Accomplishments and Status Report,” updated November 2012, 30. 8 United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections

Division, “Review of Drug Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Intelligence Center,” I-2010-005, June

2010, 27–29. 9 U.S. Northern Command, Office of History, “A Short History of United States Northern Command (as of

December 31, 2013),” 10; Interviewee #9, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, April 14. 2015. 10 “DOJ-DHS Leadership Meeting El Paso Intelligence Center,” June 8, 2010, document received via e-

mail from Department of Homeland Security official on April 7, 2015. 11 “DOJ-DHS Leadership Meeting El Paso Intelligence Center,” 3–4. 12 Data obtained from “Trans-border IPC EPIC Discussion,” October 1, 2013, document received via e-

mail from Department of Homeland Security official on April 7, 2015, 3. 13 Interviewee #4, interviewed by author, via phone, on April 23, 2015; Interviewees #12 and #13,

interviewed by author, El Paso, TX, April 27, 2015; Interviewee #16, interviewed by author, El Paso, TX,

April 28, 2015. 14 El Paso Intelligence Center, The EPIC Observer 2, no. 2 (February 2014): 2. 15 Interviewee #11, interviewed by author, El Paso, TX, April 27, 2015. 16 Interviewee #16. 17 Kickert, 699–701, 713.

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18 Tom Karp and Thomas I. T. Helgo, “From Change Management to Change Leadership: Embracing

Chaotic Change in Public Service Organizations,” Journal of Change Management 8, no. 1 (March 2008):

85–96. 19 Patricia Klarner, Gilbert Probst, and Richard Soparnot, “Organizational Change Capacity in Public

Services: The Case of the World Health Organization,” Journal of Change Management 8, no. 1 (March

2008): 57–72, 69; Kickert, 713. 20 Ben S. Kuipers, Malcolm Higgs, Walter Kickert, Lars Tummers, Jolien Grandia, and Joris van der Voet.

“The Management of Change in Public Organizations: A Literature Review.” Public Administration (Vol.

92, No. 1, 2014): 1-20, 11. 21 Kickert, 713. 22 William D. Leach, Neil W. Pelkey, and Paul A. Sabatier, "Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative

Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria Applied to Watershed Management in California and Washington,"

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 21, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 645–70, 666.

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