Succes and Failure on the (Populist) Right: The Case of Wilders and Verdonk

Matthijs van Tuijl

0850845

Master Thesis Political Behaviour and Communication

Leiden University

6-6-2011

Prof. Dr. Galen Irwin

‘I want to be Prime-Minister’1 was Rita Verdonk’s claim on October 18 2007, when

she founded her movement Trots op Nederland (TrotsNL, Proud of the Netherlands). At that

point in time not an unrealistic claim, with the polls having her at 25 seats 2 in parliament

shortly after. Geert Wilders with his Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom Party), lost half

of his supporters to Verdonk when she announced her party3. However, on June 9 2010, the

day of the Dutch General election, Wilders managed to secure 24 seats and Verdonk was

voted out completely by the people.4 How is it possible that Rita Verdonk could not win any

seats in the end and that Geert Wilders showed a significant growth? That there was a

potential for Verdonk to be successful was clear from the last general election in 2006, when

she was involved in a fierce battle for the leadership of the liberal party (VVD) with now

Prime-Minister Mark Rutte. She just lost, but did manage to get more votes during that

election than Rutte. With 620,555 votes, she got almost 100,000 votes more than her party

leader5. Verdonk was forced to leave the VVD after an internal dispute with him, with the

leadership contest, in practice, still going on after the elections. When she left, as the polls

show, she remained popular and was therefore for a while seen as a serious force within

Dutch politics. Geert Wilders, himself also a former VVD MP, having left the party a few

years earlier, enjoyed growing support after the elections until Verdonk founded her new

movement. At that point in time there were two right wing populist parties looking for the

favour of the Dutch voter, only one was capable of claiming victory in the end.

Populism as a force in politics has received a lot of attention by scholars. An important

question has always been what the exact definition of the word is. Even though it is not the

focus of this study to define populism, it is important to know what we are actually dealing

with. Related to the concept of populism is the impact it has on modern politics. Especially in

Europe there is a growing number of (mostly) right wing parties entering the arena and

successfully claiming a position in parliament. According to some, the de-alignment process

that took place across Europe, led to the rise of these new parties, focusing more on party

leaders and less on a fixed ideology (Dalton et al., 2002: 22, 31-32). The FPO in Austria and

the Danish People’s Party are just a few examples of parties that even managed to participate,

in some form, in their countries’ government. Since 2010, Wilders and his Freedom Party

now also lend support to the government and therefore has a major influence on Dutch policy.

1 De Telegraaf, October 18 2007, ‘Verdonk wil in Torentje; ‘Trots op Nederland’ moet Fortuyn evenaren’ 2 Nieuw Haags Peil, November 4, 20073 Nieuw Haags Peil, October 21, 20074 Kiesraad, June 9, 2010, ‘Tweede Kamer 2010’5 Kiesraad, November 27, ‘Proces-verbaal Tweede Kamer 2006’

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While the reasons behind the political success of populist parties have been studied in detail,

focusing on elements as political leadership (or charisma), protest voting and issue

preferences, there is still no definite answer on how they managed to do it and what elements

are most important. While there are many examples in Western Europe of populist parties

effectively claiming an influential position within their countries’ politics, the parties that do

not make it have not received that much attention. What is interesting about the movement of

Rita Verdonk is that there was initial success, with over half a million voters preferring her

over the party leader, an exceptional situation in Dutch politics. Why she did not make it and

Wilders did, will be the puzzle of this thesis. The findings of this study could contribute to a

better understanding of the development of populist parties in general. What defines the faith

of these intriguing phenomenon? It leads to the research question of this study.

What explains the success of the PVV and the failure of Trots op Nederland in the period

2006-2010?

1. Theory

1.1. Populism

Populism is a concept that is not that easy to define in terms of when a party can be called

a populist party. It is a concept that has many features and is has developed over time. In his

study on Populism, Paul Taggart (2000) describes this process and defines modern populism

as the New Populism, which has its roots in Western Europe. He sees it as a movement of

multiple parties across countries with some defining characteristics. First of all, it is reaction

to bureaucratised welfare states and corruption within the existing political parties. Secondly

they reconstructed politics around a key issue, either taxation, immigration and nationalism or

regionalism. Thirdly, they organise themselves differently from existing parties, as a result

from distrust of political institutions. Party membership is only active and direct and

personalised leadership is prevalent. Fourth, they like the establish a link between the people

and them and place themselves outside of the centre of the political spectrum (Taggart, 2000:

75). Canovan explains this link to the people more clearly by distinguishing between three

different types: the united people (as in a nation), our people (in an ethnic sense) and the

ordinary people (against the privileged) (Canovan, 1999: 5). These separate types make the

faces of populism more clear. It can focus on a certain ethnic group and be an excluding

factor or it can rebel against the elite and be the voice of the common man. The elite is seen as

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corrupt and going against the general will. Cas Mudde considers that to be the centre piece of

populism, the restoration of the will of the people in a country. In that way, populism is a very

moralistic ‘ideology’ (Mudde, 2004: 543-544). In this view, the common man is no longer in

power, the elite is and that is de facto a bad thing. Populist parties are there to restore popular

control over a nation. The important thing to realise from the New Populism of Taggart is

that these parties are effectively trying to find a niche in politics based on dissatisfaction with

modern politics. They see politics as no longer representing the people and try to re-establish

that link with them by focusing on issues that appeal to certain groups in society. As Taggart

explains, the people are here portrait as an unity within a heartland. That heartland can best be

seen as an imaginary place that emphasises all the good and virtues aspects of life. It is

however not all inclusive. It is for a large extent based on nationalism of an ‘organic

community’, excluding certain groups in society (Taggart, 2000: 95, 97). Related to this is the

creation of conspiracy theories. The elite conspires together, no longer protects the heartland

and there should be something done about that. This is argued to be a major factor to mobilise

support (Ibid.: 105) Leadership is also a defining feature of populist parties. With populist

parties you can have two types of leadership. Most common is the type based on charisma,

centred around leaders with a large popular appeal. When this is however not present, it is

argued that in that case it tends to be authoritarian (Ibid.: 103). The result of this leadership is

the creation of a populist mood. The idea that something needs to fundamentally change and

the country needs to be reshaped. This mood has the power to encourage otherwise non active

citizens to participate in politics and to get out and vote (Canovan, 1999: 6). Interesting

points are raised by Mudde in clarifying some basic elements of populism, related to

democracy and leadership. As he argues, when it comes to democracy, populist parties want

responsive government not necessarily direct democracy. They want the outcome to be

representing the will of the people, but those people do not have to participate directly, as

long as they are heard. On the point of leadership, he says that the people want their leaders to

be in touch, but not be one of them (Mudde, 2004: 558-559). This marks some interesting

aspects of populist parties and can explain for the apparent paradox of authoritarian leadership

and listening to the will of the people. That will needs to be represented by the political

leaders, but the people should not take over from them. Although some other scholars present

a somewhat more different picture and argue that populist parties will demand more direct

democracy. Democracy should in that view be seen as an ideal that includes ‘referenda,

popular consultation and direct elections of office- holders (Keman and Krouwel, 2007: 25).

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What we see is that the concept of populism is not unambiguous. However, as seen above,

there are still some defining features of these parties.

1.2. Wilders and Verdonk as Populists

In order to analyse the success and failure of populist parties in the case of Wilders and

Verdonk, it is important to establish what kind of characteristics they share with this populist

image as sketched above. Koen Vossen, comparing Wilders and Verdonk in terms of populist

tendencies, distinguished seven features of populism comparable to the points mentioned

above. Some of them, the ‘folksy style’ and ‘voluntarist approach’, are somewhat similar to

other points. The folksy style more or less relates to how politicians act, being one of the

people, speaking with the same language. The voluntarist approach relates to politics not

having to be as complex, the peoples’ qualities are enough to govern (Vossen, 2010: 25).

These two points clearly focus on the incompetent elite in comparison to the people. It again

stresses the fact that the political organisation has become filled with an unnecessary

bureaucracy which needs to be fixed. The voluntarist approach also moves away from a

politician as a professional. The common man should be represented and therefore there is no

need for professionals.

(Vossen, 2010: 34)

Wilders

As shown in table 1, there are some doubts with Vossen about the basic idea of Geert Wilders

as a populist in the traditional way. He calls Wilders a half-hearted populist, mainly because

he is a professional politician and he is not glorifying the people to the extent that an ideal

populist would do. Instead he also criticizes them on occasions (Vossen, 2010: 30). The

interesting thing about this is that Wilders is a former MP for the VVD, as is Rita Verdonk,

but in contrast to her, he has a large history for the party. He had been active for the

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parliamentary party since 1990, working as a policy advisor. Known as a hard worker,

Wilders was living politics. This is illustrated by the fact that when he was forced to leave

parliament after the 2002 elections, he was devastated, having no alternative for politics

whatsoever (Fennema, 2010: 66). Wilders can therefore with reason be called a professional

politician and not so much a ‘common man’. It might be this background that prevents him

from actively calling on the people as a source of wisdom and more relying on his own mind.

In contrast to not glorifying the people, Wilders does denounce the elite and rises up against

them. He has managed to create a link between progressive politics and the anti-establishment

idea of populism. He has created an image of the Dutch elite as a leftish elite with an

inclination for cultural and moral relativism (Vossen, 2010: 27 ). It might be this explicit

definition of the elite that explains for him being a professional politician at the one hand but

mixing that with some form of populism. It is just a certain part of the political spectrum that

is completely on the wrong path. Wilders wrote a ‘declaration of independence, his starting

point for his movement. In this he explicitly mentions that elite let ‘this’ happen and now hold

their hand in the air and say there is nothing they can do about it anymore (Fennema, 2010:

103). With this he focused on the cultural aspects. This also shows his focus on the

progressive elite, conspiring against society. He made a distinction between the Labour party

of Wouter Bos, which he thought to be pampering, and the VVD. Who did not want it to go

completely wrong should vote VVD (Ibid., 105). The exponent of this focus on the cultural

and moral relativism of the Dutch elite, is his own conspiracy theory about Islam taking over

Europe (Eurabia). As Vossen shows, Wilders actively spreads this image of islamification,

referring to many experts in the field. With this he is trying to give weight to his claims and

focus his campaign on the issue of immigration of Moslim immigrants (Vossen, 2010: 27).

Vossen gives no definite answer on whether Wilders is a charismatic leader, calling it difficult

to measure in his case because of the closed nature of the party. However according to him

the style of leadership is more important in his case. Wilders is the only member of his party,

trying to control the internal decision making (Ibid.:28). This relates to the points made by

Taggart on authoritarian leadership. Wilders, whether charismatic or not, should then more be

seen as an authoritarian leader. Paul Lucardie (2007), also shows the special position Wilders

has put himself in. He qualifies Wilders as a right-wing, semi- hearted liberal nationalist and

populist (181). As well as Vossen, he acknowledges that Wilders his behaviour is not one of

standard populism. Wilders focuses on freedom, but it is limited and very inconsistent with

respect to (Islamic) religion. The populism, although by some seen as limited is according to

Lucardie clearly noticeable in his reference to the people and the corrupt elite (2007: 179-

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180). Geert Wilders, although not being the ideal type can therefore be characterised as a

populist politician. Especially his anti-elite politics and the focus on Islam as the key issue

around immigration are clear indicators. The leadership elements can also be found. What is

however clear is that Wilders has some points that distinguish him from an average populist.

Verdonk

Where Wilders is a somewhat more complicated story in terms of populism, Verdonk seems

all the more fulfilling the standard definition of a populist. As can be seen in table 1, she

scores on all the criteria that are outlined. Research on her speeches and interviews show a

clear distinction between the corrupt elite and the people as the virtuous element in society.

There is a distrust of the people caused by the elite (Vossen, 2010: 30). Note here that

Verdonk does not care for the elite being left or right wing, it is just the elite. Unlike Wilders

she tries to take on the entire establishment and does not even leave out her own former party.

She mentioned Mark Rutte as being too left wing and therefore also being out of touch with

the people. When founding her movement she did not want to take sides either and think in

the old way of how the political spectrum was divided. She did not want to be mentioned left

or right, but wanted to think in old and new (Lucardie, 2007: 181). With this she cannot be

seen as more distinguishing herself from the establishment or elite and taking the side of the

people. From her history it does make sense for her not just to criticise the left, since she was

ousted by the VVD party leaders, but favoured by the people during the elections. In general

we can see Verdonk trying to frame that image of her party taking on politics in general. The

other important point to qualify Verdonk as a populist is that she emphasises vigorously on

voluntarism and direct democracy. In her view the people should govern and we do not need

politicians to sort out the best solutions. This is best illustrated by the fact that she wanted

citizens to discuss with each other what the best solutions to certain problems are. The real

knowledge of ordinary people would improve this country (Vossen, 2010: 31). What we see

here is Verdonk going away from the politican as a professional in politics. Politicians should

listen to the people and she goes to extremes to establish that link. She also did not present a

real party manifest until very late. Only in april 2010, people really got a chance to know what

Verdonk would fight for and which issues were relevant to her party. She then focused on

taxation, subsidies and other public spending6. The personality of Verdonk was therefore very

important. As Vossen stresses, she mainly relied on her own popularity and her image she had

built during the years before. Trots op Nederland is very apolitical, in that way and more a

6 De Telegraaf, April 8 2010, ‘ToN richt pijlen op ambtenaren’

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feeling. A feeling of distrust to politics in general (Vossen, 2010: 32-33). Because of that lack

of content of what the party is really about, it is difficult to clearly explain what kind of party

or movement it is. It could only somewhat be qualified as a nationalist party. She does

emphasize Dutch culture and the relevance of putting that up front, but not as extreme as

Wilders does it. She could therefore best be seen as a populist liberal-conservative (Lucardie

2007: 182). The clear difference here is that Wilders actually wants to tackle the influence of

Islam in society, whereas Verdonk does not see that danger. She sees it more in terms of not

letting the Dutch society fade away in general. By focusing on taxation and more power to the

people, she fits very clearly in the classic image as depicted by Taggart.

1.3. Success and Failure

In general there are three reasons that can be defined why people vote for populist parties. The

protest vote, in reaction to other parties; voting for the charisma or leadership or voting for

substance of policy preferences.

Immerfall sees a neo-populist agenda. He focuses on what the emphasize is of a populist party

and sees its appeal accordingly. He argues it to be important for such a party to hold together

what he calls, a neo-populist coalition. This is aimed at exploiting country specific issues,

mainly focused on the economic situation of the nation, in order to attract voters (Immerfall,

1998: 250). Populism here is seen as a reaction to what is happening in a country and the

reason of existence is an appeal to the people. Populist parties, by showing what is wrong,

have a reason to exist. Voters then react to this by seeing the establishment as incompetent

who fail to take care of the nation and vote for the party that raised those questions (Ibid.,

258). This explanation of the populist vote has nothing to do with the appeal of leadership or

what plan are presented to the people. It is the basic idea of framing the image of the corrupt

elite that let the people down and is not representing the general will anymore. As Taggart

explains, there are a problems with the way populist parties behave or are organised,

especially in this way. One of those things is their critique on established parties. They want

to distance themselves from them, but are forced, by the way politics is organised, to behave

in a similar way. As a consequence, they have a large risk of internal conflicts or collapsing

(Taggart, 2000: 100). In practice it comes down to a very simple logic. At first a populist

party successfully explains why the old parties are not the right choice for the voter. With this

they create momentum for them to grow support. However, since this is not based on concrete

plans or policy they fall in the trap they have created for themselves. Once the people notice

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that they are not capable of fulfilling their needs either, the image of a strong counter party

disappears and the party collapses.

Roger Eatwell sees the importance of charisma in leaders for explaining the success of

populist parties. Whereas it is a concept that cannot be defined very easy and can take on

many forms, he focuses on the personal presence of the leader. It is about being able to create

the right image on television and to catch the right sound bite and not so much about the

physical attraction of the party leader. The focuses of the publicity tends to be on the

personality of the leader and this creates electoral appeal (Eatwell, 2005: 108). This approach

takes away the idea of charisma just being about the leader and puts the emphasis on the

actions of him or her. It still remains a personalised attraction, but of a different nature.

Taggart sees the problems with charismatic leadership in the long run. He argues it to be

unstable and not very reliable. Politicians can never be certain how to effectively sustain their

charisma and it is therefore very unstable (Taggart, 2000: 102). As long as politicians are seen

to be charismatic and are capable to catch the eye of the people, they will continue to be

popular. However relying on charisma alone seems to form a problem in the long run. A new

contender can come along and take away the support or people will start to see through the

charismatic mask. Van der Burg and Mughan (2007) conclude from their study on Dutch

populist leaders, that they do not have a greater effect on the voting behaviour than their

counterparts of the established parties. Even for Pim Fortuyn, arguably a very charismatic

man, there was not to be found any significant difference (Van der Burg and Mughan, 2007:

44). This further puts pressure on the effectiveness, if any, of just the leader as a token to

attract votes. Even though in a best case scenario it helps to improve voting for the party, it

seems to be the case that a populist party cannot rely on the leader alone. There is more to it

and Mughan and Paxton (2006) try to explain this with a case study of anti-immigrant feelings

in Australia. What they find is that policy preference is highly significant as an explanation

for the populist vote. Only if there is correspondence between what voters want and what

parties offer them, they will vote for them (Mughan and Paxton, 2006: 354, 357). It seems

that voters have an idea on what they want to happen in a country and need parties to defend

this or to bring this forward. It can effectively boost the claim made by many populists that

the old parties are not representing the will of the people. It could be the case that it is then

more than a protest vote and basic rhetoric and gives a chance for parties that can actually find

a niche in politics to grow and become important. Ivarsflaten, shows the volatility of populist

parties when it comes to issues and thereby also acknowledges the importance. She shows that

the saliency of (especially the economic) issue is important (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 489). The

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populist voter does look at issues and does take in account the state of the nation and is not

simply affected by rhetoric or leadership appeal. Van der Burg and Fennema (2003) firmly

support this conclusion and state that conclude from their analyse on the development of anti-

immigrant parties, that voters vote according to their issue preferences. They argue that voters

for those parties vote for the same reasons on a party as any other voter does. Some evidence

even hints that they are even more ideological voters. (Van der Burg and Fennema, 2003: 66.

70-71). It seems that we should not underestimate the voters for populist parties. There is

evidence that they are not the simplistic voters as some people hold them to be. The strength

of a party does not just rely on the leadership or on a protest vote. It heavily depends on which

issues are salient and whether a party manages to bring them forward in a right way. There are

therefore many ways for a populist party to go wrong and it depends on the context whether

such a party is successful or not.

1.4 Hypotheses

Based on the literature and the characterisation of both Wilders and Verdonk, it is possible to

formulate some hypotheses to explain the success and failure of their parties.

H1 (Policy matters hypothesis): Wilders found a niche in politics to continue to attract voters

whereas it was never clear what Verdonk her party was about.

H2

H3.

2. Methodology

This study will focus on the period between 2006 and 2010. By looking at the relevant events

and moments in time, based on weekly opinion polls, it is possible to reconstruct the story of

these two political leaders and their movements. A newspaper analysis of De Telegraaf will

be carried out of this period. The searchterm ‘Rita Verdonk’ for the period 21-09-2007 (Day

before the 2006 general election) to 10-06-2010 (day after the 2010 general election) resulted

in 649 Telegraaf hits. A similar search for ‘Wilders OR PVV’ resulted in 2378 hits. These

results will be grouped and linked to specific moments in time to analyse them and see what

accounts for the changes. (INSERT GRAPH MEDIA ATTENTION TELEGRAF OVER

THE YEARS)

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The advantage of doing this qualitative research over a more quantitative approach is that a

better understanding can be acquired about the circumstances under which the shifts in

popularity took place. This can then be linked to the theory on populist support, hypotheses

can be tested on the basis of the relevant narrative. This in-depth approach can shed more

light on what factors are different for these two parties and should therefore not be limited to

raw data.

- Nieuwsmonitor?

- 2010 NKO, wat voor analyse

……….

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A short analysis

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Peilingen Tweede Kamer 2006-2010

PVVTON

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De Hond/Peil.nl

The results of the polls (2006-2010) of the PVV (Wilders) and TrotsNL (Verdonk) are

presented above. The source for these polls is the research done by Peil.nl (Maurice de Hond).

The reason to use these polls are first of all that they are very accessible for the general public.

More importantly however, de Hond includes all kinds of extra research done on a week to

week basis of the most striking issues developing that week or the most important changes

that happened. On several occasions he includes trust in politicians or the ‘rapport cijfers’, he

also measures the faith people have in a certain politicians as PM (note that these figures are

not presented on a weekly basis). He also presents extra research when certain issues are more

salient in a particular week, examples of this are the discussions about the AOW, the purchase

of the JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) and the military mission to Uruzgan. When Rita Verdonk was

forced to leave the VVD, he measured the potential of her party and compared that to the

PVV voters. On some other occasions he also includes the potential of a certain party in

general and the potential of TON when the other party would not be there as a second choice.

This was important for certain local elections where the PVV did not participate. He also

looked at the question which newspaper the populist voters read most. Here we can see a large

number favouring de Telegraaf.

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The Polls

What this figure above shows is that there are clear movements of the two parties. We can

clearly define some momentum with each of the parties at certain points in time. What we can

also see is the difference between success and failure. Wilders had success, growing from 9

seats after the 2006 general election to 24 seats in 2010. Verdonk failed, by being the first

member of parliament elected with more votes than the party leader and initially growing in

(virtual) seats but ending up with nothing at the actual elections.

The first pre-Verdonk period can be characterised as one of a small increase in potential for

the PVV, with immediately after the election the reaction on the cabinet formation,

discussions on asylum issues an double passports, leading to more trust in Wilders and more

potential votes. In the summer of 2007 the Islam date rose again with critique on then

Minister Vogelaar. The PVV reached a high of 19 seats in the polls before Verdonk split up

with the VVD.

The first time Verdonk was taken in account in the polls there is a clear indication in how the

vote was initially split between the PVV and Verdonk (later TON or TrotsNL). A poll was

conducted with Verdonk and a separate one without her for a couple of weeks. If Verdonk

was included, almost half of the PVV seats would go to her party. A study researching the

position of the electorate for each party was included in this particular poll, showing how left

or right PVV and Verdonk voters were. It seems as though the initial bump for Verdonk up to

25 seats had mainly to do with her establishing the party. The moment she officially

announced to start her own party and to participate in the next election, she rose from 18 to

23/25 seats (a small research on the opinion of the foundation of her party is also included).

There seem to have been some consolidation back to that starting point of 18 seats (Verdonk)

and 11/12 seats (Wilders). That is until the Fitna discussion began (early 2008). Here we an

initial small increase for Wilders, but more importantly, the polls show an increase for

Verdonk once the movie was released on the internet. The numbers show a lot of trust in

Verdonk and a decline of the PVV after Fitna. One of the explanations could be that right

wing voters did not think Wilders should have gone that far and found Verdonk a safer

alternative. Once that effect had gone away, the problems for Verdonk started. Gradually she

declined in the number of seats. A defining moment there was her adviser Ed Sinke showing

problems within TON. That led to Verdonk losing 8 seats in September 2008. After that trust

in Verdonk declined and Wilders took over these voters. An additional research of October

2008 shows this trend of TON voters no going to the PVV instead. Another adviser, Kay van

der Linde left the party in November 2008, resulting in the loss of 2 more seats. From then on

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Verdonk did not get a chance to recover anymore, although she did get some minor bumps

when the cabinet addressed difficult issues (such as the AOW or the Iraq war). It was however

Wilders how managed to draw attention. After taking over the Verdonk seats the trial against

his person started, with the court ordering the prosecution to start a case against him. That

attention and the failed trip to England to show Fitna secured a lot of virtual seats. In January

2009, he gained 6 seats in the polls by this. Leaving parliament in a protest against the

government on march 2009 and the Joint Strike Fighter discussion, showed another gain of 3

seats leading to the PVV becoming the largest party in the polls with 33 seats. This major

position in the polls had worn off several months later, but the PVV remained the biggest

party in the polls.

But this is not the entire story, there is also a point of electability in the period between the

municipal elections and the general elections of 2010. Polls and numbers show that there was

a question of whether the PVV should have participated in the city executive (college van

B&W) in Almere and the Hague and if they did not simply opt out too simple. There is an

indication that some PVV sympathisers doubted Wilders and the PVV. Trust in Wilders

declined in comparison to the period before and voters shifted to the VVD instead. The PVV

still being the largest party in the polls after the municipal elections gave away to the VVD

and ended up in third place. The most important conclusion here is, they did not profit from

the fall of the cabinet, they lost. The success story of Wilders therefore also has another side.

Overall, there seems to be a strong connection between the Verdonk vote and that of the PVV.

De Hond also shows, that even though Verdonk in early 2009 had declined to almost nothing,

she was still a good second option for PVV voters. Also, the movements in the polls of the

parties are almost mirrored. The strongest indication that this link is present is the start of the

Group Verdonk, where she took over many PVV votes. At the end, Verdonk seemed to have

lost momentum by internal struggles, it being a clear turning point in the popularity of her

party. Wilders, gaining from this could not secure an overall victory at the elections, but

managed to grow a staggering 15 seats in comparison to the previous general election.

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List of References

Under construction.

Dalton et al, 2002

Taggart, 2000

Canovan, 1999

Mudde 2004

Vossen 2010

Fennema 2010

Lucardie 2007

Immerfall, 1998

Eatwell, 2005

Van der Burg and Mughan, 2007

Mughan and Paxton, 2006

Ivansflatern, 2005

Van der Burg and Fennema, 2003

Keman and Krouwel, 2007

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