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Tel Aviv University Department of Political Science

CHANGE IN THE WELFARE SOCIETY:

IMMIGRATION AND THE NEW RADICAL RIGHT IN FOUR WELFARE STATES

Approved research proposal

December 2011

Edan Raviv

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1 Introduction

In September 2010, an anti-immigrant, right-wing Swedish political party, the Sweden

Democrats, won 20 parliamentary seats in the general elections and came close to becoming a

key member of the next government coalition. What’s more, not three months later, an Iraqi-born

Swedish citizen detonated himself amidst Christmas shoppers in Stockholm in an attempted

suicide bombing. Long considered the quintessential model of social welfare and tolerance, it is

surprising that a wave of extremism would lay such a firm stake in perhaps the most socially

progressive Western nation-state.

Upon closer inspection, however, similar trends have been seen in several other European states

typically associated with the welfare state and its commitment to liberal socioeconomic policies.

Indeed if one glances at a list of the top Western welfare states, they are highly associated with

the rise of New Radical Right (NRR) parties: France, Germany, and Norway have been

incubators for the NRR for almost thirty years; Denmark and the Netherlands recently witnessed

an increased saliency in nativist politics; and of course Belgium has for years dealt with

nationalist tensions, nearly to the point of disintegration.

These developments pose an interesting paradox to both academics’ and practitioners’

understanding of the modern welfare state. In all of the cases mentioned above, the rise of the

NRR ostentatiously point to a clear instance of nativist reaction to an influx in foreign

immigrants. At the same time, the question begs to be asked, why have societies with such strong

welfare systems been particularly unable to cope politically with increased ethnic diversity? Is

there something inherent in the welfare system itself which exacerbates a nation’s ability, or

willingness, to absorb foreigners?

As a result, this proposed dissertation will treat the welfare state as an institutionally constructed,

independent variable, and seek to clarify its causal role in the rise of the New Radical Right (the

dependent variable) as a result of increased immigration (the intervening variable) in socially

progressive and democratic Western states.

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2 Literature Review

The explanatory literature on the rise of the New Radical Right (NRR) in Western Europe can be

generalized into two families of research: firstly, “demand side” explanations focus on the nature

of those who ultimately decide on whether an NRR party succeeds or fails in democratic

elections: the voter. These include the structural, socioeconomic conditions and the cultural

ideologies of a given nation. Secondly, “supply side” explanations focus on the national and

international institutions that have allowed NRR parties to enter and succeed in mass politics.

2.1 Demand Side Explanations

2.1.1 Voter Preferences

Demand-side scholars argue that it is primarily voters’ preferences that have determined the rise

of the NRR. Whatever the institutional context, so the argument goes, European electorates are

simply gravitating towards the perceived policy outcome that best represents their new

preferences positions (Van Der Brug et al. 2000;Macdonald et al. 2001). Kitschelt (1995),

however, offers that NRR voters are not necessarily more extreme in their views than their

mainstream counterparts; while Rydgren (2010) explains that the failure of the Sweden

Democrats to enter the government is in fact due to voter contempt for their ideological roots.

Voter-centric scholars further explain that support for NRR represents a cultural reaction to

immigration, often consolidated by a general realignment of traditional issue cleavages among

voters. The culturalist argument, however, shows mixed results (Semyonov et al. 2006; Oesch

2008; Rydgren 2010; Kriesiet al. 1995, 2006, 2008; Kitschelt 2004).

Lack of faith in a system or party perceived to be mired with incapacity, patronage, clientelism,

or corruption has also been shown to create voter demand for the NRR (Kitschelt 1995; Abedi

2002; Bergh 2004; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Mudde and Van Holsteyn 2000; Veugelers and

Magnan 2005; Rydgren 2005, 2010; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Tavits 2007). So too is it argued

that unstable levels of partisanship allow for the entry of new parties; though the exact opposite

could be logically argued for the same reason (Mair and Biezen 2001).

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2.1.2 Economics and the Political Economy of the Welfare State

An increasing number of scholars explain the salience of NRR as a result of structural economic

changes, such as increasing market and labor competition in an age of globalization (Kriesi et al.

2006, 2008), national economic growth, changing business cycles (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier

2000; Hug 2001), increasing inequality (Milligan 2010), level of education (Hainmeuller and

Hiscox 2007), and even gender (Givens 2004).However, these claims are challenged by

intervening institutional and socio-cultural qualifications (Tavits 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004;

Oesch 2008; Knigge 1998; Koopmans et al. 2005). Furthermore, not only has the NRR been able

to garner support by both winners and losers of the macroeconomy, its success is said to in fact

hinge on its ability to overshadow the economy with the cultural cleavage (Norris 2005;

Ivarsflaten 2005).

A common reasoning for the inadequacy of economic explanations is that structural conditions

today are so similar across Western Europe that they cannot explain variation in NRR

performance (Van Der Brug et al. 2005). Furthermore, it is also argued that migrants, when

evaluating potential destinations, look not at those host countries’ economic performances per se

but rather at the welfare benefits granted by the state (Bailey 2005). As a result, one might not

look merely at the structural conditions of NRR voters, but as to whether the state has (or has

not) been able to mediate the increased burden brought on by globalization.

Starting with Kitschelt (1995), the rise of NRR parties has been explained as a political

manifestation of “welfare chauvinism,” or the perception by an ethnic “in-group” that a scarcity

in employment, housing, and healthcare benefits has resulted from the increased demands of an

“out-group” (see also Veugelers and Magnan 2005; Zaslov 2004; Rydgren 2003).

A stronger welfare state, however, should intuitively neutralize these claims, by cushioning

natives against the negative socioeconomic costs of globalization. Indeed Crepaz (2008) has led

the advocacy of a nearly divine role for the welfare state in quelling social conflict. Strong

European welfare states such as those in Scandinavia, he argues, are showing increasing trust –

both for the welfare state itself and towards new external risks such as immigration (see also

Crepaz and Damron 2009; Kumlin and Rothsetin 2005; Bonoli 2007;Arzheimer 2009; Swank

and Betz 2003). As we have seen, however, the increasing gravitation of European polities –

particularly of those embedded in universal institutions – towards the nativist political agenda of

the NRR belie these conclusions, and beg for further investigation.

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2.2 Supply Side Explanations

2.2.1 Elite Politics and Issue Politicization

A first supply side explanation points to the power of the politician to mobilize voters, through

individual charisma (Lubbers et al. 2000), the mass media, and framing techniques (Chong and

Druckman 2007; Bale 2003; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren

2010; Herda 2010).

Mendelberg (2001), Boomgarden and Vliegenthart (2009), and Valentino et al. (2002) further

explain that symbolic cues embedded in political advertisements prime anti-immigrant attitudes

which voters then recall at the ballot, though Brader et al. (2008) stipulate that this effect

depends on the audience’s predisposition to those cues (i.e. not all immigrant groups pose the

same perceived threats to all host nations). Others point to the role of mere rumors in inciting

ethnic antagonism (Bhaynani et al. 2009).

However it is often difficult to disentangle charisma and success, since unsuccessful candidates

are assumed to be uncharismatic simply because they lost (Koopmans and Muis 2009). And

although Pappas (2008) and Hopkins (2010) require politicians to capitalize on “discursive

opportunities” such as sudden demographic change or anti-establishment protest votes, this only

submits the individual politician to the actual preferences of a national polity.

2.2.2 National Political Institutions

Weldon (2006) points to the variation in states’ citizenship regimes as a predictor of that nation’s

tolerance – defined politically as the support for liberal democratic rights and liberties, and

socially as the acceptability of differing content that find expression in those rights and liberties.

Natives in regimes which emphasize a “collective-ethnic” prerequisite for citizenship (Germany,

Austria, Belgium)exhibit low levels of tolerance; France and Denmark, who also emphasize the

collective nature of nationhood – but reject ethnicity as an element thereof – show low social

tolerance but high political tolerance; and “individualistic-civic” regimes such as the Netherlands

and Sweden show high tolerance of both types. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), however,

argue that Dutch multiculturalism in fact bread widespread intolerance between natives and

immigrants – in both directions.

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NRR success has also been shown to be dependent on a state’s electoral system, particularly

considering the fact that the NRR (and other small parties) seem to flourish in Europe because of

that continent’s favorability towards proportional representative systems (Arzheimer and Carter

2006; Swank and Betz 2003).An equal number of studies, however, find either little (Carter

2002) or even an inverse relationship (Golder 2003; Veugelers and Magnan 2005) between such

electoral systems and the success of the NRR.

Others find that the success of NRR parties is much more based on their ability to capitalize on

the spatial convergence (or polarization) of traditional mainstream parties (Kitschelt 1995; Abedi

2002; Bale 2003; Norris (2005), followed by a cost-benefit calculation of the probability of

success (Cox 1997; Hug 2001; Tavits 2007). These explanations, however, are generally based

on the nascent democracies of Eastern Europe, while their neighbors to the West are treated as a

counterfactual, since over time both opportunity structures and calculations become predictable

and stable (Tavits 2005).

2.2.3 The International System

Students of international relations suggest that the electoral success of the NRR represents a local

reaction to a global phenomenon: cross-border immigration (Rydgren 2008; Mayer and

Perrineau 2006; Lubbers and Scheeprs 2000; Lubbers et al. 2000; van der Brug and Fennema

2003; van der Brug et al. 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008). Quintelier and Dejaeghere (2008), however,

counter that increasing European integration conditions its citizenry otherwise.

Alexseev (2006) brings in concepts from international relations theory to explain European

“immigration phobia”: just as anarchy engenders a security dilemma among states in the

traditional sense, so too is a state’s capacity to control the flow of immigrants – whom are

perceived to bring unpredictable change to and resistance with a host society – believed to be

under threat. In practice, however, Western states with common institutional foundations portray

highly variable policies to absorbing immigrants (Weldon 2006).

Rydgren (2005) and Kriesi et al. (1995) point not to the structure of the international system, but

to a cascading effect of diffusion starting with the success of the French Front National in 1984,

which effectively replaced the former European “frame” of right-wing parties. Kayser (2009)

and Hellwig (2001) similarly show that the electoral fortunes of the political right in one country

will spill over to another, especially when those neighbors share similar political economic

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conditions. But then again, maybe we should actually appreciate the West’s generally nonviolent

expression of ethnic intolerance? After all, Olzak (2006) argues that globalization has in fact

only reinforced the West’s commitment to social protest through legal, democratic means (see

also Pappas 2008, who distinguishes between “radical” and “revolutionary” parties).

As we have seen, the literature on the rise of the New Radical Right (NRR) in Western Europe

provides a diverse toolbox of investigative frameworks. However, recent empirical developments

– which all too often appear in the literature as qualifications, outliers or anomalies – belie a

satisfying explanation for the rise and success of the NRR in modern European welfare societies.

This study, however, presupposes a more fundamental flaw in the literature than mere empirical

validity. Most studies of the NRR are, methodologically, more preoccupied with describing the

constant conjunction of an endless list of multilevel symptoms which ostensibly appear alongside

the NRR, rather than searching for the underlying causal mechanisms which bind some of these

conditions together and actually explain the puzzling political change which an increasing

number of Western European polities are experiencing. Thus scholars tend to treat demand and

supply side variables, macro- and micro-level data, as independent of one another, while their

studies are based on temporally static, multi-national foundations (Mudde 2007). Causal depth is

sacrificed for theoretical simplicity.

3 Research Argument

3.1 The Approach: Scientific Realism and Polanyi's Theory of Transformation

With an emphasis on causal explanation, the research argument detailed below will originate

from a post-positivist, realist philosophy of science. To be a “causal realist” is to adopt a

scientific approach founded upon two propositions which deal with our conception of reality and

accumulation of knowledge of it: “realism about entities” and “realism about theories,”

respectively (Wendt and Shapiro 1997). To be a realist “about entities” is to accept that reality is

stratified. In the first place, scientific realists accept that reality exists independent of the human

mind and takes the form of observable entities, which can be captured by the senses. Unlike

positivists, however, realists go one step further in claiming that the entities that we observe are

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but symptoms of the relationship between underlying, unobservable causal mechanisms (Elster

2007; Bhaskar 1978; Lane 1996; Churchland 1979).

How then can one know of this stratification of reality if one cannot observe half of it (and the

more important half, at that)? For scientific realists, the answer lies in their “realism about

theories” (Harré 1985; Hooker 1985). Once we know the observable effects of reality, we can

theorize about its unobservable causal mechanisms. These hypotheses can then be subject to

empirical verification which, once verified, can be used as a basis for hypothesizing about deeper

causal mechanisms, and so on.

Two important implications of these ontological and epistemological assumptions arise for the

purposes of explanation and confirmation. Firstly, explanation should be viewed as an ongoing

yet progressive tug-of-war between empirical observation and theoretical modeling, one that

differentiates between symptoms and causes, and one that rejects the positivist commitment to

“covering model” explanations at the expense of causal depth (Miller 1987). In regards to

confirmation, the scientist is to abandon the “deductivist” approach to confirmation – whether of

the logical positivist or Popperian falsification varieties – in favor of “fair causal comparison”

with rival hypotheses, based on agreed background principles (ibid).

3.2 The Role of Societal Interest in Explaining the Rise of the New Radical Right

Karl Polanyi’s study of The Great Transformation (1944) represents a social theory remarkably

in line with this post-positivist commitment to causality and its ontological, explanatory, and

confirmatory elements (for overviews, see also Block 2003; Burawoy 2003). Polanyi offers an

explicit alternative to social history than that presupposed by the covering laws of economic

determinism espoused by both classical liberalism and orthodox Marxism. For Polanyi, it is not

social relations which are embedded in and determined by the laws of the market; rather it is

society’s historically dynamic human institutions which both created the market in the first place

and which determined the political reactions of the “great transformation.” Thus, the pre-WWI

global capitalist market which developed so massively – whether in its dependency on “haute

finance,” international commerce, or the new organization of labor – were not determined by

Economic Man’s universal predisposition for utilitarianism, but rather the social creation of a

new set of rules.

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Similarly, the common national protectionist reactions should not be explained, as both Marxists

and liberals would have us believe, by the predisposed material interests of particular classes

competing in a zero-sum game, but rather as a societal reaction to the institutional threat brought

on by this newly created market society. Particularly, Polanyi shows that it was not the economic

symptoms of the market around which the different sections of society mobilized, but rather the

attempted commodification of society’s basic institutions (labor, land, and money). Thus while

the content of the public debate on protectionism took the form of various group interests – after

all, different members of society were affected by the same external challenges in different ways,

particularly as they relate to the three “fictitious commodities” – it was society’s ability to

overcome these differences as one voice which determined the success of change.

That Polanyi’s theory of social transformation represents a decisive post-positivist alternative to

the historical materialism of both liberalism and Marxism is important. However, it is in its

theoretical relevancy to our empirical puzzle which also deserves discussion. Recall that the

source of change for Polanyi’s study was not the market per se, but the threat of

commodification it brought to society as a whole. Thus society’s (perhaps intuitive) response

sought to counter the market’s predisposition to sell these human institutions as commodities on

the open market, or to “decommodify” the market society. In this way, Polanyi provides perhaps

the most important explanation of the institutional birth of the modern welfare state.

Still, Polanyi was himself but an observer of the institutional facts of his time, and thus

concerned with the legacies of feudalism, mercantilism, and industrialization, on the one hand,

and the revolutionary calls for fascism and socialism, on the other. The Western Europe of today

has survived the death of fascism, communism, and market liberalism, and has been immersed

for some time in highly developed welfare institutions, while facing new challenges of economic

integration through democratic mechanisms of change. Thus, although Polanyi’s theoretical

skeleton is highly capable to explain institutional change we must adapt the empirical objects of

investigation to reflect today’s reality.

In the first place, while Polanyi was concerned with the evolving “market society” of the time,

Europeans today are increasingly embedded in varying degrees of a “welfare society,” under

which there is a constant tug-and-pull between the integrative forces of globalization and

national identity. And while the nature of society is complex, at least one important variable of

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globalization is overwhelming Europe: the increasing presence of foreign-born populations in

historically homogenous societies.

Secondly, like Polanyi’s emphasis on the institutional (rather than material) threat to society

brought on by the market, we assume here that changes in mere population numbers cannot by

themselves determine the conscious political changes of European electorates towards the NRR.

Instead, immigration should be interpreted as a vehicle, carrying with it an adverse threat to the

fundamental institutions of a society, and the place of the veteran (i.e. native and past immigrant)

population in it. As begun with Polanyi, the main institutional outcome of the great

transformation’s “double movement” – and the primary source of societal interest today – is that

of the welfare state.

There is of course nothing novel in the theoretical link between immigration and welfare. Indeed

both the theoretical and empirical investigation of “welfare chauvinism” – an ethnic in-group’s

desire for preferential welfare treatment over an ethnic out-group – is the object of increasing

scholarly attention. At the same time, these investigations more often than not treat the welfare

state as an exogenous index of decommodification scores, undetermined by politically

constructed institutions. This of course runs contrary to Polanyi’s institutional explanation of

societal change, but can be rectified if we treat the welfare state as an institutional construct.

Thirdly, while Polanyi recognizes that the ignition and substance of change is dictated by social

interests, the final realization of change is formalized by a political agent who successfully

frames a societal interest. For Polanyi, societal interest was defined by the collective negotiation

and action of different social classes who were united under the umbrella of trade unions and

other organizations. In the current study, it is the “populist” political alternative offered by the

NRR. Generally speaking, populism is an agenda that frames various social interests under the

“general will” of the native population and against two particular types of out-groups: firstly, the

immigrants whom are effectively “re-commodifying” society’s basic (welfare) institutions; and

secondly, the disenchanted political elite, whose failing political constructs are viewed as

favoring foreigners over natives.

Finally, a word on the vehicle of political change: while Polanyi was concerned with the

revolutionary alternatives that faced society in the early 20th century, the observed increase in

cross-national support for the NRR today should be viewed through the lens of democratic

elections.

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3.3 Research Hypothesis

The research hypothesis to be forwarded in this study is that certain types of welfare systems (the

independent variable), in particular universal systems, under conditions of increased immigration

(the intervening variable), galvanizes a native chauvinistic group into political action and

increases the popular support for the New Radical Right (the dependent variable).

3.4 Nominal Definitions

Dependent Variable: The Popular Support for the NRR

An implicit “minimum definition” of the NRR’s core ideology can be found in the work of Cas

Mudde (2000; 2007), which will here be termed nativist populism. In this study nativist populism

represents a political ideology that advocates, firstly, a more favorable economic institutional

arrangement – whether through the market or the state’s welfare system – for a native society

over an ethnic out-group. Secondly, as mentioned above nativist populists assert that it is the

responsibility of government to at least not obstruct this distribution, if not to actively promote it;

in other words, change must be made by the replacement of the current, disenchanted political

elite within a democratic system of representation.

Independent Variable: Welfare Institutions

Beginning with Esping-Andersen (1990), students of social policy are taught to unpack the

welfare state into its various institutional designs in order to understand not only which programs

fall under the welfare state’s jurisdiction, but also who is entitled to its benefits (not to mention

how much). In addition, it is important to account for the fact that these designs are consciously

constructed by political agents, ostensibly to serve society’s interests (see also Kumlin and

Rothstein 2005, Kumlin 2002; Rothstein and Stolle 2003).

As a result, a welfare institution will be defined according to the three “worlds” of welfare

systems offered by Esping-Andersen: “liberal” systems rely on a strong role for the market in the

production of welfare, with a minimal state role (if any) in the provision of means-tested

benefits; “corporatist” systems lean heavily on programs that, while offering comprehensive state

sponsored benefits, preserve social differences by publicly identifying group specific needs; and

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“universal” systems provide benefits based on universal rights and access, with a minimal role

for the market.

Intervening Variable: Immigration

Critics of the immigration argument have shown that traditional measures of ethnic diversity are

indeterminate of the success of the NRR (Mudde 2007). However, the literature on

multiculturalism highlights that society’s very definition of an immigrant (or any “other” group

for that matter) is institutionally constructed. After all, the mere quantity of an ethnic minority is

irrelevant to a host group if the differences between the two are not (institutionally) recognizable

(see Crepaz 2008; Banting and Kymlicka 2003; Brubaker 2001; Entzinger 2003; Joppke and

Morawska 2003; Bruecker et al. 2002; Weldon 2006).

Perhaps the most important classification of citizenship rights comes from T.H. Marshall (1950),

who orders the historical development – and hence importance in blurring group differences – of

such “national” rights as progressing from civil to political to social. Marshall’s account,

however, was written at the birth of social rights; since then, modern Europe seems to have

switched the latter two in the order (Guiraudon 1998). Thus it is common practice for Western

states to immediately grant foreign-born residents civil rights and social welfare support, while

maintaining differences by the lack of political rights.

Thus henceforth an immigrant will be defined as an adult individual who is physically present

within the territoryof a state, but is not entitled to full political rights.

3.5 The Hypothesis’ Rationale

Immigration can thus be thought of as representing a “second coming” of the market’s attempt to

commodify humans. The more the market (i.e. immigration) is allowed to organize labor – a

fictitious commodity – and the less the state restricts the market, the greater is the hypothesized

support for NRRs. Thus liberal societies that rely primarily on the market for welfare production

never internalized a societal countermovement to the great transformation as Polanyi describes it;

in these systems welfare is mostly provided by non-state actors and social institutions such as

employers and trade unions, which are often structured to benefit the veteran population. Thus,

under conditions of high immigration these societies are hypothesized not to exhibit

overwhelming support for NRR political parties.

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In contrast, societies whose systems were designed specifically to promote national solidarity

through universally accessible and equitable benefits, have internalized welfare as a primary

societal interest, one that falls under the responsibility of the state to uphold. At the same time,

the universal makeup of these systems accommodates immigrants much more significantly,

instead of the selective (in effect) discrimination that immigrants suffer under liberal systems.

Thus, under conditions of high immigration universal systems are hypothesized to yield strong

support for the agenda of institutional change offered by the NRR.

Corporatist systems represent an intermediate case. On the one hand, welfare programs are

intentionally designed to define societal interest vis-à-vis the state – which provides fertile

ground for the NRR’s populist agenda. On the other hand, by relying on group specific

definitions of eligibility, corporatist programs can either favor or neglect veteran groups,

depending both on their institutional design as well as the particular demographic and

socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants. Thus support for the NRR across corporatist

systems should show the most variation out of the three systems.

4 Research Design

4.1 Operational Definitions

Dependent Variable: Popular Support for the NRR

Parties will be identified as NRR according to the issues that are most salient in their manifestos,

and their positions on these issues, especially immigration, welfare institutions, and government

performance (i.e. populism) – relative both to other political issues and to non-NRR parties.

Assuming that the main goal of NRR supporters is to influence state policy, it is important to

measure, firstly, their representation in legislative and executive bodies that have access to

society’s institutions. The dependent variable will therefore be gauged by the number of seats

that the NRR received in relevant local, regional, and national assemblies, as well as by the

number of votes received (i.e. this variable is of a ratio level of measurement) and the ratings of

NRR in public opinion polls.

In cases where an executive has institutional influence and is elected independently of an

assembly (at the local, regional or national level), the share of votes received by an NRR

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candidate will be measured. In bicameral parliamentary systems, the share of seats received by

NRR parties in both houses is relevant. In both cases, the results of individual voting districts

will be accounted for.

Independent Variable: Welfare Institutions

The independent variable will be measured according to a nominal classification of the three

types of welfare systems. Indeed, beginning with Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare systems have

been shown to cluster according to a weighted index of each system’s commitment to liberalism,

corporatism, and universalism. However, such indexes are based almost exclusively on measures

of welfare benefits; the institutional significance which welfare systems hold for societal interest

is neglected. As a result, the following alternative institutional criteria will be analyzed:

1. Relative depth of benefits: Since the end of the Second World War all three welfare

systems have shown a strong inclination by the state to provide basic income security in

the form of pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits. However, one thing that

separates the corporatist and universal systems from their liberal counterpart is the

former’s added provision of resources such as health, housing, and education. Thus the

depth of welfare benefits – the average financial value of benefits among eligible

individuals – that the state is legally obligated to provide will be measured. A similar

measure will be taken for welfare provided by non-state institutions, with the relative

depth being calculated as the ratio of the two. Universal and corporatist systems both

show a high ratio, while liberal systems show a low ratio.

2. Eligibility rights, as specified in a state’s laws, determine who is entitled to public

benefits for any given program. Universal systems enumerate the same eligibility scheme

for, potentially, an entire population – irrespective of demographic, socioeconomic, or

legal status. In contrast, corporatist systems customize welfare programs for different

status groups. Finally, liberal systems only provide means-tested relief for the poor

(typically, under both corporatist and liberal welfare systems benefits are available only

to lawful residents).

3. Welfare systems developed as a result of distinct institutional cultures, identified by

their historical roots in political thought and organizational evolution. Liberal systems

were institutionalized by classical liberals who, on the one hand, realized the potential

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calamities of the self-regulating market, but nevertheless introduced programs of “last

resort” because of their standing commitment to individualism, equal opportunity, and

free competition. Corporatist systems were forwarded by reformists seeking to preserve

the paternalistic authority of feudal society and/or the associationalism of the guild

system. Universal systems emerged in predominantly rural societies where socialist

movements espousing broad class unity successfully navigated newly instituted

democratic systems of representation.

Intervening Variable: Immigration

As with the dependent variable, immigration will be operationalized nationally and locally,

accounting for both the share of non-political citizens (legal and illegal) in each geopolitical

unit’s total population, as well as changes in the flows of immigrants over time.

4.2 Description of the Dataset

The spatial scope of this study encompasses six countries, which were selected to maximize

sample balance while minimizing selection bias: Denmark, Sweden, France, Italy, Switzerland,

and the United Kingdom. As will be shown, Denmark and Sweden embody the universal welfare

state, and while the success of the NRR is seen in both on a national scale, the temporal

occurrences have been equally varied: the former has witnessed NRR parties since the 1970s –

beginning with the Progress Party and today in the Danish People’s Party – while the Sweden

Democrats have only very recently emerged. France and Italy are better classified by the

corporatist regime, but have also witnessed varying degrees of NRR success. The National Front

in France has been around nationally for a number of decades, with significant variation in its

success over time, while the Lega Nord in Italy has witnessed consistent success, but on a

regional scale only. Finally, the United Kingdom (at least after 1979) and Switzerland fall under

the liberal system; but while the British National Party has held a marginal role in national

politics, the Swiss People’s Party is one of the largest political parties in that country’s

parliamentary history.

The temporal scope of the study encompasses 1960 to 2010 which, firstly, considers the

empirical variation of the NRR in these cases. By allowing for true fluctuations in NRR success

– not to mention changes in welfare institutions and immigration flows – the study will also

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consider when and why NRR parties experience failure (or at least stagnancy). Finally, the time

period is sizeable enough to allow for sufficient comparative and time-series analysis from a

historical institutional perspective.

4.3 Sources of Data

Dependent Variable

1. NRR identification will be drawn from the Comparative Manifesto Project, which codes

policy programs of political parties.

2. NRR success in elections will be provided by national election studies, as well as the

Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and other cross-national surveys.

3. Public opinion on immigration, welfare institutions, government performance, and

political ideology will be drawn from national surveys as well as the following

multinational surveys:

a. The World Values Survey, with data available since 1980.

b. The European Social Survey (ESS), with data available since 2002.

c. The Eurobarometer (EB), with data available since the early 1990s.

d. The International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which provides, in addition to

its permanent questionnaire, two relevant rotating modules: the “National

Identity” module and the “Role of Government” module.

Independent Variable

Welfare institutions will be tapped in state laws and non-state institutional regulations.

Where possible, primary sources will be utilized, but because of language limitations, the

study will also rely on secondary literature and translated material.

Intervening Variable

1. International migration data will be taken from national censuses, Eurostat, the Cross-

National Data Center in Luxemburg (LIS), and the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD).

2. Citizenship policies: the author is not aware of any authoritative or comprehensive

measurement system of national citizenship definitions, although a few authors do offer

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starting points (Banting and Kymlicka 2003; Lahav 2004; Weldon 2006). For lack of a

definitive scale, the citizenship laws of each case study will need to be tapped and

verified.

4.4 Tests and Expected Results

In order to show that it is highly unlikely that the research hypothesis is wrong (“reject the null

hypothesis”), the study will analyze the institutional and statistical data outlined above from a

qualitative perspective. The test will progress in two steps: first, “within-case” historical analysis

will be utilized to identify the mechanisms linking the independent and intervening variables to

the dependent variable; second, the results of individual cases will be evaluated through cross-

case comparisons (for an overview of qualitative methods see Mahoney 2007; Bennett and

Elman 2006). The tests and results may be formally presented and validated by Boolean analysis,

as codified in Ragin’s (1987) qualitative comparative analysis.

Following empirical analysis of each case and comparative analysis of the sample of cases, the

null hypothesized will be rejected in the following instances:

1. In universal systems, if (a) immigration is high, (b) support levels for NRR parties are

high, and (c) NRR support and immigration are shown to be positively and strongly

related.

2. In corporatist systems, if (a) the institutional welfare burden of immigration is high, (b)

support levels for NRR parties are high, and (c) NRR support and immigration are shown

to be positively and strongly related.

3. In liberal systems, if (a) the institutional welfare burden of immigrants is low, (b)

support levels for NRR are relatively low, and (c) NRR support and immigration are

shown to be unrelated.

In addition to considering each operational definition of the independent variable, the analysis

will consider alternative explanatory variables prevalent in the literature. Specifically, it will be

shown that it is highly unlikely that the type of electoral system shifts in party strategy and

political rhetoric, and cyclical changes in the national and global economies refute the research

hypothesis. This will be done by comparing variation in these variables over time and place with

variation in welfare institutions and NRR success, in similar fashion to the way in which

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immigration is considered when the null hypothesis is refuted. For example, one can suspect that

NRR succeed under difficult economic times. Thus, in universal and corporatist systems the

possibility that the relationship between welfare institutions and NRR success is spurious will be

ruled out if (when compared with the same analysis in countries with other welfare systems): (a)

the economy is booming, (b) support levels for NRR parties are high, and (c) NRR support and

immigration are shown to be positively and strongly related.

Although it is this study’s goal to provide a comprehensive explanatory model for the success

and failure of the New Radical Right in welfare society, the ambiguity of both causal direction

and intervening mechanisms between the variables should be recognized. For instance, it is

possible (and indeed has been shown by others) that welfare institutions may shape immigration,

if the immigrants “shop” for destinations with generous welfare benefits. But immigrants have

other motives too: they may search for destinations that would allow them to prosper without

welfare benefits, such as high-growth economies or destinations with an existing family or social

network they can tap into, or simply seek a more secure political environment. In addition,

whether or not welfare institutions shape immigration does not void the effect of immigration on

veteran societal interest.

Similarly, it is difficult to differentiate whether the hypothesized core ideology of the NRR is

determined by the public, or vice versa. Perhaps welfare populist sentiment is created from the

top-down, through manipulation of the media and other mechanisms? In the best worse-case

scenario, is it in fact the political elite or intelligencia whom observe the objective changes

sweeping through welfare society, and thereby direct public attitudes?

Nevertheless, the employment of a qualitative research methodology allows the social scientist to

engage in active dialogue between ideas and observations. It must thus be emphasized that the

investigation of the model presented above may very well uncover complementary (or even

supplementary) intervening variables and causal mechanisms in the course of research.

19  

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