MARYLAND:IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Brett Kimberlin,

Plaintiff

v. Case No. 403868V

National Bloggers Club, et al.,

Defendants

DEFENDANT WALKER’S REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE HEARING ON HIS UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

THAT THIS COURT IMMEDIATELY GRANT HIS UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS

NOW COMES Defendant Aaron J. Walker, Esq., and files this “Request for an Immediate

Hearing on his Unopposed Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, that this Court Immediately

Grant his Unopposed Motion to Dismiss,” and states the following:

On April 15, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the instant action (Dkt. No. 1).

On April 28, 2015, Defendant Walker1 filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 6). In it, Mr.

Walker pointed out that 1) the entire case is barred by the principle of res judicata and 2) the

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for a single claim. Mr.

Walker moved to dismiss the case against himself and, in the name of judicial efficiency, to grant

that dismissal for all defendants. The same motion asserted that this suit was a bad faith lawsuit

intended to inhibit expression protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution within

1 Mr. Walker refers to himself in the third person for stylistic purposes and to de-personalize this case.

the meaning of MD CODE Cts. & Jud. Proc. §5-807, and, as such, Mr. Walker was entitled to “a

hearing on the motion to dismiss as soon as practicable.” §5-807(d)(1).

The Plaintiff’s opposition was due on Monday, May 18, 2015.

As of Friday, May 22, 2015, no opposition has appeared on the Maryland Judiciary Case

Search, and, as of Saturday, May 22, 2015, Mr. Walker has received no such opposition in the

mail. Therefore, Mr. Walker motion to dismiss invoking §5-807 is unopposed.

The Plaintiff clearly knew of the motion to dismiss because he filed a motion to strike it

(Dkt. No. 7) on the frivolous grounds that 1) the Plaintiff had not served the complaint on Mr.

Walker yet and 2) that Mr. Walker could not represent himself before this Court because he is a

lawyer in Virginia and the District of Columbia. However, the Plaintiff has not filed an

opposition to the motion to dismiss.

His failure to oppose it and contest Mr. Walker’s contentions means he has consented to

the motion and conceded that this lawsuit is subject to §5-807.

The language in §5-807(d)(1) is mandatory, not permissive. It states that if Mr. Walker

meets the conditions of the statute, that “the court shall hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss

as soon as practicable” (emphasis added). In turn, the word “practicable” is defined as follows:

“Practicable is that which may be done, practiced, or accomplished; that which is performable,

feasible, possible[.]” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, Mr. Walker

has a statutory right to a hearing on his motion to dismiss as soon as possible and hereby

invokes that right.

Alternatively, Mr. Walker believes that this statutory provision is equally satisfied by

providing Mr. Walker with immediate dismissal on the motions, and without a hearing. That is,

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if a full dismissal is granted before a hearing on said motion to dismiss is “practicable,” that

would satisfy §5-807(d)(1).

WHEREFORE Defendant Walker requests:

A hearing on his unopposed motion to dismiss on the earliest available date; or

In the alternative, that this court immediately grant his unopposed motion to dismiss.

Or that this Court order any other relief it deems appropriate.

Friday, April 28, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

Aaron J. Walker, Esq.

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