REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH...

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REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Claim No. CV 2014-02818

BETWEEN

ISHRAK DANIEL

T/A DANIEL’S GROCERY

Claimant

AND

ISLAND PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION

Defendant

Before the Honourable Madame Justice Margaret Y Mohammed

Date of Delivery April 08, 2020

Appearances:

Mr. Colin Kangaloo instructed by Mrs. Nicole de Verteuil-Milne and Mr. Adrian Ramoutar

Attorneys at law for the Claimant.

Mr. Rishi Dass instructed by Ms. Marina Narinesingh Attorneys at law for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

1. The Claimant is one of the children of Mano Daniel (“the Claimant’s father”) who had a

business relationship with the Defendant since the early 1970’s. This business relationship

evolved from the 1970s to 2014 when the relationship between the Claimant and the

Defendant soured causing the Claimant to institute the instant action.

2. The Defendant is a non-profit company, which comprise primarily of persons who live and

own property on the five islands off the North West Peninsula of Trinidad and persons

who moor and store boats on its business premises. The purpose of the Defendant is to

provide facilities to those persons. Originally, the Defendant operated out of a portion of

land located at Staubles Bay, Chaguaramas (“the former premises”) and the Claimant’s

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father operated grocery on the former premises. However, in 1975 all lands in the North

West Peninsula of Trinidad including the former premises were vested in the

Chaguaramas Development Authority (“the CDA”) by virtue of the Chaguaramas

Development Authority Vesting Order No.69 of 1975. The CDA allocated the former

premises for another purpose and in 1977, the Defendant entered into occupation of the

present premises situated at No 12 Western Main Road Chaguaramas (“the present

premises”) with the permission of the CDA.

THE CLAIMANT’S CASE

3. The Claimant’s case is that (a) the Defendant is not entitled to terminate the concession

granted to the Claimant’s father to operate as a grocery (“the grocery”) as the latter

owned the building (“the building”) which houses the grocery and he was promised by Mr

Philip Lazzari on behalf of the Defendant that he could operate the grocery in the building

as long as the Defendant continued to lease and/or occupy the present premises; (b)

based on the promise by Mr Lazzari the Claimant’s father and the Claimant invested in

the grocery and the building to their detriment if the concession for the grocery is

terminated; (c ) he became the owner of the grocery and the building in 1994; and (d) the

Defendant breached the terms of the concession by refusing to allow him to repair the

roof to the building in 2013.

4. The facts, which the Claimant relied on, are as follows. In or around 1977 the Defendant

approached the Claimant’s father to set up a grocery on the present premises to

accommodate members of the Defendant, as it did not have money to build a grocery.

The Claimant’s father agreed to finance and build the grocery, he commenced the

building, which houses the grocery in, or around 1977, and it was completed in 1978 at a

cost of $14,200.00.

5. It was agreed that the said sum of $14,200.00 would be treated as a loan (“the said loan”)

by the Claimant’s father to the Defendant. By letter dated 23 May, 1978 the Defendant

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set out the terms of the proposed agreement (“the 1978 agreement”) with the following

terms and conditions:

(a) The concession was to commence retroactively from the 1 January 1978

(b) The cost of the building and facilities was agreed at $14,200.00;

(c) Rent in the sum of $142.00 per month was to be deducted from the said loan at

the end of each calendar month for the sum of $14,200.00 from the 1 January,

1978 until the total amount was repaid;

(d) The grocery was required to provide the Defendant’s members with the services

for which the concession was granted being:

i. The sale of foodstuff and aerated and other beverages;

ii. The sale of cigarettes, cosmetics and other miscellaneous items;

iii. The sale of LPG for domestic use

(e) The prices charged for those items should be reasonable and are subject to the

Board of the Defendant if necessary;

(f) The opening hours of the grocery should be suitable to the Defendant’s

members’ requirements and subject to agreement by the Board of the

Defendant;

(g) The Defendant was entitled to cancel the “concession” by giving 6 calendar

months’ notice and paying the balance due on the said loan of $14,200.00; and

(h) The said agreement was subject to the Defendant’s tenure of the present

premises with the CDA.

6. In 1980 with the approval of the Defendant, the Claimant’s father extended the building

at his own costs. In or about September 1980 due to financial constraints the Defendant

requested the Claimant’s father to start paying the sum of $500.00 per month by way of

rent for the concession of running the grocery on the basis that the said loan would be

waived and the Claimant’s father would own the building which the Claimant’s father

agreed to. Also in 1980 Philip Lazzari, a Board Member of the Defendant promised or

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represented to the Claimant’s father that he would not be removed from the present

premises as long as the Defendant remained in occupation of it and that the Claimant’s

father would be entitled to remain on the premises and to continue to operate the

grocery from the building.

7. A second extension was done to the building in 1985 by the Claimant’s father who was

never repaid by the Defendant for the said extensions.

8. The Claimant’s father told the Claimant in or around July 1994, and on several other

occasions that he gave the latter, his licence to occupy and operate the grocery and his

interest in the building and the right to occupy it wholly. By a letter dated 25 July 1994,

the Defendant was notified by the Claimant’s father of the assignment to the Claimant.

By the said letter, the Claimant’s father also requested that the Defendant note that

future receipts of payment by him to the Defendant were concession fees for providing a

grocery service to the Defendant. In the said letter, the Claimant’s father also offered to

sell the grocery to the Defendant for the sum of $544,000.00, which the Defendant never

accepted.

9. By letter dated 18 June 2009 the Defendant informed the Claimant that based on the 1978

agreement, all monies expended by the Claimant’s father in the construction of the

building had been repaid by way of set off since April 1986. In a letter, dated 21 August

2009 the Claimant’s attorney at law wrote to the Defendant disputing the said assertion.

10. The Claimant’s father had on-going issues with the Defendant since 1978 such as

increasing the rent for the concession of the grocery on two occasions, and requesting

that the Claimant close the grocery at 6 pm daily instead of 8pm. The Claimant refused to

pay the increased rent as the Defendant is a non-profit organisation and there was no

basis for the increased rent.

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11. The Claimant also alleges that from June 2009 to July 2014, there has been a concerted

effort by the Defendant to have him and the grocery removed. In particular, in February

2011 the Defendant’s agent informed him that the Defendant proposed upgrading and

developing the present premises and that it wished for the Claimant to vacate the building

with an assurance that he would be offered new premises once the existing facilities were

upgraded. In May 2012, the Defendant issued a notice addressed to its members

concerning improved security on the present premises. The notice also included

“Compound Rules” to be adopted in July 2012, which prevented the Claimant from

stocking the grocery properly. Rule 18 of the Compound Rules had a negative impact on

the Claimant’s ability to run the grocery since it set out guidelines for pedestrians entering

the present premises where the grocery is situated; it restricted parking for vehicles and

delivery trucks going to the grocery; and it prevented consumption of alcohol on the

present premises.

12. In June 2012, the Claimant commenced repairs to the roof of the building with the

approval of the Defendant. He was later stopped prematurely and in August to September

2013, the Claimant’s suppliers had to park their delivery trucks 50 to 100 feet away from

the grocery. The Claimant’s customers were informed by the Defendant’s security that

they were not allowed to stay more than 15 minutes at the grocery. In July 2014, the

Defendant informed the Claimant that it intended to upgrade its facilities, which included

demolishing the building.

13. By letter dated 6 July 2014, (hand delivered to the Claimant on 8 July, 2014) the

Defendant informed the Claimant that it would be embarking on a long overdue and

necessary exercise to upgrade its facilities for the benefit of the membership in keeping

with the objects of the Defendant. It stated that works were expected to commence on

the 4 August 2014 and that in keeping with the development plan, the building was to be

demolished. The Defendant also indicated that the development plan was intended to

include a facility similar to the grocery, which would be constructed at a different location.

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The said letter further indicated that the Defendant could not guarantee the Claimant a

tenancy of this new facility, but that he would be invited to accept an offer of a tenancy

of any new premises upon such terms as the Board of the Defendant might decide.

14. In or about the 8 July, 2014 the Claimant noticed a sign at the entrance of the present

premises which stated that it would be closed to the public from the 4 August 2014 until

further notice.

15. By letter, dated 18 July 2014 the Claimant’s Attorney at law wrote to the Defendant

indicating that the Claimant owned the building and that he was entitled to open the

grocery without any interference from the Defendant.

16. By letter dated 24 July 2014 the Claimant’s Attorneys at Law received a letter via e-mail

from the Defendant, replying to its letter of the 18 July 2014 which advised that its

position with respect to the grocery was on hold as it had sought legal advice.

17. By letter, dated 25 July 2014 the Claimant’s Attorneys-at-Law replied to the Defendant’s

dated 24 July 2014 requesting the Defendant, to refrain from taking any action until the

11 August 2014 and in any event, that it give the Claimant one weeks’ notice of what the

Defendant intended to do regarding the building. The Claimant’s Attorneys-at-Law also

requested, an undertaking that the Defendant, its servants and/or agents refrain from

demolishing or taking any steps to demolish the building and to desist from harassing

and/or molesting and/or interfering with the Claimant, his employees, agents and/or

servants and/or or his customers and/or visitors to the grocery. The Claimant’s Attorneys-

at-Law further requested the said undertaking no later than 4:00 pm on Monday the 28

July 2014 in default of which, the Claimant had instructed his Attorneys-at-Law to seek

injunctive relief against the Defendant. The said letter was emailed to the Defendant as

well as a hard copy was hand delivered by the Claimant to the Defendant’s offices.

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18. By an email, dated 27 July 2014 the Defendant replied to the Claimant’s Attorneys-at-Law

wherein Mr. Ian Cross of the Defendant advised that the Defendant had no intention of

operating outside the parameters of the 1978 agreement. By email dated the 28 July,

2014 the Claimant’s Attorneys-at-Law replied to the said email requesting the Defendant

to confirm that it would give an undertaking in unequivocal terms as requested. The

Claimant’s Attorneys-at-Law again re-iterated that if the Defendant failed to give an

undertaking by 4:00 pm on the 28 July 2014, the Claimant had instructed them to seek

injunctive relief against the Defendant forthwith.

19. On the 12 August 2014, the Claimant obtained certain injunctive relief, which maintained

the status quo until the determination of the substantive issues in the instant action.

20. Based on the aforesaid facts, the Claimant is seeking the following declarations: (a) he is

the owner of the building; (b) he is entitled to remain in occupation of the building; (c) he

is entitled to operate the grocery out of the building on the present premises pursuant to

a licence granted by the Defendant to the Claimant’s predecessor in title, the Claimant’s

father and assigned to the Claimant, coupled with the Claimant’s interest in the building.

21. The Claimant is also seeking orders restraining the Defendant and its servants and/or

agents from demolishing, disposing of or otherwise dealing with the building and from

interfering with the Claimant’s operation of the grocery; from harassing and/or molesting

and/or interfering with the Claimant, his employees, agents and/or servants and/or

customers of the grocery and/or visitors to the grocery. The Claimant further claims

damages for breach of the concession between the Claimant and the Defendant by the

Defendant refusing to allow the Claimant to repair the roof of the building; interest, costs

and further or other relief.

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THE AMENDED DEFENCE AND COUNTERCLAIM

22. The Defendant’s position is that the Claimant’s father had a lease or a tenancy to operate

the grocery on the present premises and he did not have any right to remain on the

present premises outside of the said lease. Under the variation of the said lease, the

Claimant’s father had a right to be repaid for his investment in the building, which houses

the grocery if the concession is terminated, if he had not been repaid earlier. The

Defendant did not know if the Claimant’s father passed the grocery and the building unto

the Claimant. Further, there was no promise made by Philip Lazzari on behalf of the

Defendant to the Claimant’s father that he could remain on the present premises as long

as the Defendant was there. The Defendant also asserted that it was entitled under the

terms of the 1978 agreement to terminate the concession, which it did on the 17 August

2016 by serving a Notice to Quit (“the Notice to Quit”) and that the Claimant has been a

trespasser after the expiration of the Notice to Quit in February 2017. The Defendant’s

position was that it did not breach the concession since it did not refuse to allow the

Claimant to repair the roof of the building. The Defendant based its position on the

following facts.

23. The Defendant did not dispute the terms of the 1978 agreement and the variation in 1980

where it was agreed that the Claimant’s father would own the building and pay rent of

$500.00 per month to operate the grocery. The Defendant’s position was that while the

Claimant’s father constructed the building where he operated the grocery it is unaware if

the Claimant owns the building and/or the grocery as it was not notified that the

Claimant’s father had assigned the grocery and the building to the Claimant.

24. The Defendant was aware that the Claimant’s father extended the building at his own

costs but that it was unaware of the actual costs and it has no record of its consent or

approval. It accepted that it has increased the rent/concession fee from time to time but

it stated that the increase was not arbitrary since it was done on a commercial basis to

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cover rental for the land on which the building stands and from which the grocery

operates.

25. The Defendant acknowledged that it informed the Claimant that he needed to close the

grocery earlier and it did so due to security concerns. However, it was unaware if the

Claimant lost income. It denied that it accepted a lower rent from the Claimant since it

had called upon the Claimant in March and April 2009 to pay the arrears of rent.

26. According to the Defendant, there was no tension between it and the Claimant’s father

as it did not prevent customers from accessing the grocery and it did not try to have the

Claimant and the grocery moved.

27. The Defendant asserted that it had a 12 year lease from the CDA in 1990 with an option

to renew but since 2007 it has held over the present premises as a monthly tenant while

it negotiates with the CDA for another long term lease. One of the CDA’s prerequisites for

another long-term lease is a detailed proposal for redevelopment of the present

premises. In the draft proposal submitted by the Defendant to the CDA, the relocation of

the building from which the Claimant operates the grocery, in addition to other changes,

were proposed.

28. The Defendant stated that it issued a notice in May 2012 with the Compound Rules which

were intended to provide greater security.

29. The Defendant stated that it did not have any issue with the Claimant repairing the roof

but its concern was the Claimant’s attempt to significantly change the elevation of the

roof since its proposed redevelopment of the present premises contemplated the

relocation of the grocery to a different part of the present premises. The Defendant’s

concern was that the improvement to the building would affect the compensation it

would have to pay for the building.

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30. The Defendant also stated that the purpose of the communication between June 2012 to

December 2012 on the issue of the repairs to the building and a new licence to operate

on its premises, was not a concerted effort to remove the Claimant but rather since it was

a tenant of the CDA, any changes to the building had to be approved by it as it impacted

on the its plan for the present premises.

31. The Defendant denied that in August to September 2013, it caused the delivery trucks

from the Claimant’s suppliers to park 50-100 feet away from the grocery to make their

deliveries. It asserted that part of its overall development plan is the construction of a

perimeter wall to assist in addressing an escalating security concern. It closed the present

premises to drive-in access to non-members due to security concerns and that the

Claimant was informed on the 6 July 2014 of the proposed construction of the perimeter

wall. The Defendant stated that it was not its intention in the said letter to convey to the

Claimant that the demolition of the building was imminent. It acknowledged that it would

first have to terminate the concession to operate the grocery and that the issue of

compensation to the owner of the building would have to be considered before the issue

of the demolition of the building.

32. The Defendant acknowledged that it would also have to address the question of the grant

of a new concession to operate a grocery on the present premises and that while there

were preliminary discussions held with the Claimant relating to the proposal of a new

grocery concession those discussions were never concluded.

33. The CDA issued a notice to quit dated 12 August 2016, which took effect from 12

September 2016 to the Defendant to give up possession of the car parking lot located

opposite to the present premises. The effect of the CDA’s Notice was that it reduced both

the income of the Defendant and the available parking for its members and the customers

of the Claimant.

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34. The Defendant acknowledged that the relationship between the parties deteriorated

after 2014 and the Defendant indicated that it no longer desired to continue its

concession with the Claimant. Consequently, the Defendant, as it was entitled so to do,

exercised its right to end the concession granted to the Claimant’s father in the 1978

agreement on 17 August 2016, the Defendant served the Notice to Quit upon the

Claimant, which expired on the 28 February 2017.

35. The Defendant asked to dismiss the Claimant’s claim and it has counterclaimed seeking

the following orders:

i. A declaration that it is entitled to terminate the concession of the Claimant by

virtue of the Notice to Quit;

ii. A declaration that the Claimant is required to give up its concession, cease

operating the grocery on the present premises on the expiration of the notice

period on 28 February 2017;

iii. A declaration that the Claimant is liable for damages for trespass for any

occupation of the present premises in the operation of the grocery after 28

February 2017

iv. An Order that the Claimant vacate the present premises and cease operating the

grocery by 28 February 2017;

v. An Order that the Claimant remove the building on or before 28 February 2017

or accept payment of the value of same as determined by the Court.

vi. Costs

vii. Any such further relief or other relief.

DEFENCE TO COUNTERCLAIM

36. In the Claimant’s Defence to Counterclaim the Claimant called upon the Defendant to

prove that it suffered a reduction in its income and available parking spaces for its

members and the Claimant’s clients. He contended that the Defendant was not entitled

to issue the Notice to Quit in the face of the injunction, which was granted on the 19

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August 2014 in the instant action, and the Notice to Quit was issued in bad faith. He

repeated his understanding of the 1980 variation of the 1978 agreement, which was that

the Claimant’s father had agreed to waive the loan of the value of the building to the

Defendant and to start paying rent on the condition that he would not be ejected from

the present premises. He also asserted that it would not be just and equitable for the

Claimant to only be paid for the value of the building.

REPLY TO THE CLAIMANT’S DEFENCE TO COUNTERCLAIM

37. The Defendant’s Reply was that the Notice to Quit was not issued in bad faith since it had

a right to do so as the 1980 variation did not restrict its right to do so. It also denied that

any of its servants and or agents made any promise either expressed or impliedly to the

Claimant’s father as asserted by the Claimant.

THE ISSUES

38. In order to determine which party succeeds in whole or in part in obtaining the respective

reliefs sought the following issues are to be resolved by the Court:

(a) What was the nature of the relationship between the Claimant’s father and later

the Claimant and the Defendant?

(b) Was there any promise by Mr Lazzari of the Defendant to the Claimant’s father

that he would remain on the present premises as long as the Defendant was

there and based on that promise the Claimant’s father acted to his detriment?

(c) Was the Defendant entitled to terminate the concession by the Notice to Quit?

(d) Is the Claimant entitled to damages for breach of the concession by the

Defendant’s refusal to allow the Claimant to repair the roof of the building?

(e) Is the Claimant entitled to be paid for the building?

(f) Is the Claimant liable in damages for trespass?

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WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CLAIMANT’S FATHER

AND LATER THE CLAIMANT AND THE DEFENDANT?

39. The Claimant stated in his witness statement that his father managed a grocery on the

former premises from about the 1960’s for the then owner Mr Herve de Verteuil who in

the 1970’s handed over the business to him. In 1977, the Defendant set up its base of

operations at the present premises and at the same time, it approached the Claimant’s

father to set up the grocery at its compound for the Defendant’s members. The Claimant’s

father agreed and built the building, which houses the grocery on the present premises.

By the 1978 agreement the terms were:

(i) The cost of the building and facilities was agreed at $14,200.00;

(ii) Rent in the sum of $142.00 per month was to be deducted from the said loan at

the end of each calendar month from the sum of $14,200.00 from 1 January 1978

until the total amount was repaid;

(iii) The grocery was required to provide certain types of items at a reasonable cost;

(iv) The opening hours of the grocery should be suitable to Defendant’s members’

requirements;

(v) The Defendant was entitled to cancel concession by giving 6 calendar months’

notice and paying the balance due on the said loan of $14,200.00; and

(vi) The said agreement was subject to the Defendant’s tenure with the CDA.

40. The Claimant also stated in his witness statement that he was aware of discussions

between the Claimant’s father and the Defendant with respect to setting up the grocery

and the 1978 agreement as the Claimant’s father kept him abreast and showed and

discussed with him the said letter. In September 1980, the Defendant requested the

Claimant’s father to start paying $500.00 per month by way of rent, which the Claimant’s

father agreed to. The Claimant’s father showed him the letter from the Defendant dated

19 September 1980 and a subsequent letter dated 4 November 1985 from Philip Lazzari

to Brian Fletcher.

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41. In cross-examination the Claimant accepted it was never the intention that the Claimant’s

father had a right to remain indefinitely on the present premises, as it was always subject

to termination by the Defendant. He agreed that the right to terminate could be exercised

prior to the building being repaid, in which case the Claimant’s father would have been

entitled to be repaid what was then outstanding. He stated that initially it was never the

intention of the Claimant’s father to permanently own the building, which he had

constructed but instead to enter into an investment permitting him the facility of selling

on the present premises. The Claimant accepted that the right to operate on the present

premises was of real benefit, which gave the grocery a substantial commercial advantage.

The Claimant also agreed that as a commercial investment, it was in the Claimant’s

father’s interest and his own, from time to time to improve and maintain the building

because it was an income generating asset and it was never the intention that the grocery

was to open at its own hours, irrespective of what the board of the Defendant wanted.

42. Halsbury’s Laws of England 1 described a relation of relationship of landlord and tenant

as:

“A relationship of landlord and tenant arises when one person (‘the landlord’) grants

to another (‘the tenant’) a right to the exclusive possession of land for a term less

than that which the landlord has in the land. The grant must be either for a period

which is subject to a definite limit originally (as in the case of a lease for a term of

years certain) or for a period which, although originally indefinite, may be made

subject to a definite limit by either party as of right by that party giving appropriate

notice to the other (for example, a tenancy from year to year, which allows each party

to determine the tenancy at the end of any year). It is not necessary for the full

establishment of the relationship of landlord and tenant that the tenant should have

entered on the land.”

1 5th ed Vol 62 at paragraph 1

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43. Halsbury’s Laws of England described that the contract of tenancy can be created as:

“A contract of tenancy may be created either by conduct, or by writing or orally by

any words which express the intention of entering into legal relations and which grant

exclusive possession for a fixed or periodic term. A legal estate for a term of years

may be created by a lease by deed for any term., or by a written or oral tenancy

agreement for a term not exceeding three years taking effect in possession at the

best rent that can be reasonably obtained without taking a fine (that is, a premium).

Any other written or oral contract of tenancy of which specific performance may be

ordered creates an agreement for a lease and, in addition, if the tenant enters and

pays rent at a yearly rate, creates by operation of law a legal estate, namely a yearly

tenancy.”

44. The general rule with respect to fixtures on the land was set in Halsbury’s2 as:

“In accordance with the general rule of law that anything fixed to the freehold

becomes part of the freehold, chattels affixed to premises at the date of a lease by a

landlord, or some prior owner or tenant, pass under the demise unless they are

expressly or impliedly excluded from it. Chattels so affixed, and chattels affixed

subsequent to the commencement of the lease, must be delivered up to the landlord

on the determination of the tenancy, unless the tenant is entitled to remove them by

virtue of some special rule of law, statute or agreement, in accordance with the rule

of law that whatever has once become part of the inheritance cannot be severed by

a limited owner, whether he is owner for life or for years, without the commission of

waste.

Two questions usually arise for consideration with regard to chattels attached to land

or other premises:

2 Halsbury's Laws of England/Landlord and Tenant (Volume 62 (2016), paras 1–560; Volume 63 (2016), Paras 561–1166); Volume 64 (2016), paras 1167–1798)/4. Demised Premises/(4) Fixtures/(i) What Are Fixtures/166. Classification of objects brought onto the land.

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(1) whether the attachment is such that they are to be regarded as forming

part of the premises, whether permanently or as fixtures; and

(11) if they are fixtures, whether they can be removed by some person other

than the owner of the freehold by virtue of some special rule of law,

statute or agreement. (Emphasis added).

45. In the instant case, both parties also acknowledged the Defendant’s right to occupy the

present premises was based on a lease from the CDA and that the Claimant’s father’s right

to occupy the building and operate the grocery was set out in the letter dated 23 May

1978. They also agreed that the 1978 agreement was varied in 1980. The dispute is the

parties’ understanding of the conjoint effect of the 1978 agreement, the 1980 variation

and the letter dated 4 November 1985. The three contemporary documents, which define

the nature of the relationship between the Claimant’s father and the Defendant, are the

1978 agreement, the 1980 variation and the letter dated 4 November 1985.

46. In my opinion, the 1978 agreement between the Defendant and the Claimant’s father was

in the nature of a lease. The Defendant granted the Claimant’s father permission to

operate the grocery/ concession from the 1 January 1978. The period was during the

tenure of the Defendant on the present premises as agreed by the CDA from time to time.

The Defendant could terminate the permission to operate the grocery if it felt that there

was good reason and proper justification to do so. If the Defendant took such a decision,

the Claimant’s father was entitled to be given 6 months’ notice and to be paid any balance

due to him on the said loan. In return, the Claimant’s father agreed to construct the

building on the present premises to house the grocery at a cost of $14,200.00. In addition

to this initial capital output the Claimant’s father agreed to pay the monthly rent in the

sum of $142.00 from the 1 January 1978 and that this rent was to be deducted from the

total cost of the building at the end of each month until the total sum was reduced. The

Claimant’s father also had to maintain adequate fire insurance for the building and sell

certain items in the grocery at a reasonable cost.

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47. Therefore, by the 1978 agreement although the building was a fixture to the present

premises, the Defendant had expressly agreed that the Claimant’s father would receive

an interest as he would be compensated for his investment in it if the concession for the

grocery was terminated before he was repaid for his investment.

48. The 1980 letter was written to the Claimant’s father from the Defendant. It confirmed

that there was a meeting between the Claimant’s father, Mr Lazzari, Mr De Verteuil and

the writer and it was agreed that the Claimant’s father would pay a monthly rental of

$500.00 for operating the grocery from 1 October 1980.

49. The letter dated 4 November 1985 was written on behalf of the Claimant to the

Defendant. In the opening paragraph of the said letter, the issue, which was raised, was

the ownership of the building. The material paragraphs stated as follows:

“When I was on the Committee, a meeting was held and it was decided that they

would ask both Mr. Daniel and Mr Scott to pay rent instead of having their rent

applied to the purchase of their buildings. At that meeting, which should be in the

minutes of the Association, both Harold Tucker and myself were asked to see Mr.

Daniel and Mr. Scott and try to arrange for the change in the method of rent. In due

course, Harold and I met the two gentlemen and discussed the matter with them and

it was agreed that they would pay rents of, in the case of Mr. Daniel, $500.00 and in

the case of Mr. Scott, $1,000.00 a month.

The Association found it necessary to change the method in which these gentlemen

were paying their rents because we did not have any money. So on the basis of the

agreement which we made with Mr. Daniel and Mr. Scott at the present time, they

are the owners of their buildings.”

50. In my opinion, the effect of the 1980 and 1985 letters was that the only variations to the

1978 agreement were: (a) the Claimant’s father was now the owner of the building; (b)

the rent which the Claimant’s father paid to operate the grocery was increased to $500.00

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per month; and (c) any rent paid subsequently by the Claimant’s father to the Defendant

was not applied to a reduction of the said loan.

51. The other terms of the 1978 agreement remained, namely; (a)the items which the grocery

were to sell; (b)that the prices for those items had to be reasonable; (c) the opening hours

for the grocery were suitable to the Defendant; (d) the Defendant was still able to

terminate the concession for the grocery with 6 months’ notice (e) the Claimant’s father

was to be paid the sum due to him for the building; and (f) the lease between the

Claimant’s father and the Defendant was subject to the Defendant’s tenure on the

present premises.

52. Therefore, the only substantive change by the 1980 variation was that the Defendant no

longer had to repay the Claimant’s father for his investment in constructing the building

as it recognized him as its owner. Instead, it had agreed that once it made a decision to

terminate the concession to operate the grocery, it had to pay the Claimant’s father for

the costs of the building as it had recognized him as its owner.

53. It was not in dispute that after the letter dated 4 November 1985, there were several

correspondence, which passed between the Claimant’s father and the Defendant and

later the Claimant and the Defendant between the periods 1988 to 2009. In all the

correspondence, the parties referred to the rent being paid by the Claimant to the

Defendant. In my opinion, the reference in the said letters demonstrated that both parties

acknowledged and accepted that the relationship between the Claimant’s father and later

the Claimant was that of a landlord and tenant and nothing more.

54. In the letter dated 31 March 19883 the Defendant wrote to Mr Donald Berment, the

Claimant’s representative, acknowledging that the Claimant was its tenant for many

years; it indicated that the Claimant had not paid rent for 5 months and he was constantly

3 Exhibit YG 12 of the witness statement of Yohann Govia

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delinquent in paying his rent. In another letter from the Defendant to the Claimant dated

11 December 20084 the Defendant indicated to the Claimant that effective 1 February

2009 the monthly rent increased to $4,000.00 plus VAT i.e. $4,600.00. In the Claimant’s

letter dated 22 December 20085 to the Defendant, the Claimant referred to his rent being

increased, which would reduce his income tremendously.

55. The Defendant’s letter dated 5 March 20096 to the Claimant indicated that the last

payment of rent of $3152.00 was received on the 12 February 2009 which represented

rent for January 2009 and that rent was payable at the beginning of each month. There

was another letter from the Defendant to the Claimant dated 9 April 20097 where the

Defendant reminded the Claimant of its previous correspondence concerning the rental

cost of his tenancy. The Defendant again wrote the Claimant on the 18 June 20098

referring to the Claimant’s letter dated the 22 December 2008 where he protested the

increase in rent.

56. On the 21 August 2009,9 the Defendant wrote to the Claimant referring to issues

concerning the tenancy of the Claimant’s portion of the present premises. On the same

date, the 21 August 200910 the Claimant’s attorney at law wrote to the Defendant where

she stated that in the 1978 agreement the Claimant’s father agreed to pay a monthly

rental of $142.00 with the said rent to be set off against the costs of the construction of

the building in the sum of $14,200.00 until the total amount for the said construction had

been paid off. The said letter also stated that the parties agreed to vary the 1978

agreement when the Defendant asked the Claimant’s father to pay rent instead of having

it set off against the costs of the building; in or about October 1980 the rent was increased

to $500.00 per month which was paid; in the later 1980’s the Defendant increased the

4 Exhibit YG 15 of the witness statement of Yohann Govia 5 Exhibit YG 17of the witness statement of Yohann Govia 6 Exhibit YG 17 of the witness statement of Yohann Govia 7 Exhibit YG 17 of the witness statement of Yohann Govia 8 Exhibit YG 17 of the witness statement of Yohann Govia 9 Exhibit YG 17 of the witness statement of Yohann Govia 10 Exhibit ID 12 of the witness statement of the Claimant

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rent to $2,000.00 per month; with the introduction of Value Added Tax the Claimant’s

rent increased to $2,300.00; in or about 2005 the Defendant increased the Claimant’s rent

to $2,750.00 plus VAT totally $ 3,162.50 and in the letter dated 11 December 2008 the

Defendant once more arbitrarily purported to increase the rent to $4,600.00.

57. Therefore, the nature of the relationship between the Claimant’s father and the

Defendant was one of landlord and tenant and they had expressly agreed that the

Claimant’s father was to be compensated for the building which was a fixture on the

present premises in the event the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the period

of notice of 6 months.

WAS THERE ANY PROMISE BY MR LAZZARI OF THE DEFENDANT TO THE CLAIMANT’S

FATHER THAT HE CAN REMAIN ON THE PRESENT PREMISES AS LONG AS THE

DEFENDANT WAS THERE AND DID THE CLAIMANT’S FATHER ACT TO HIS DETRIMENT?

58. This aspect of the Claimant’s case is grounded on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

The principles of this doctrine are settled. The elements of proprietary estoppel were

repeated by Mendonca JA Nester Patricia Ralph and Esau Ralph v Malyn Bernard11 at

paragraph 38 where he referred to the dicta in Thorner v Major and Ors12 where Lord

Walker pointed out that “while there is no universal definition of proprietary estoppel,

which is both comprehensive and uncontroversial, that most scholars agree that the

principle of proprietary estoppel is based on “three elements, although they express them

in slightly different terms; a representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance

on it by the claimant and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable)

reliance...” For a claimant therefore to properly plead his case in proprietary estoppel, he

must set out those three elements; a representation or assurance, reliance on that

representation or assurance and detriment as a consequence.

11 Civil Appeal No. 131 of 2011 12 [2009] UKHL 18

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59. In Mills v Roberts13 Jamadar JA (as he then was) explained that the elements of

proprietary estoppel must be examined holistically in the round and are not “watertight

compartments”. The Court will examine the alleged inducement, encouragement and

detriment to determine if they are both real and substantial and the Court “must act to

avoid objectively unconscionable outcomes”. Jamadar JA (as he then was) stated at

paragraphs 19 and 22 that:

“19. In respect of the law of proprietary estoppel we are more troubled about the

correctness of the application of the law. Whereas in promissory estoppel

there must be a clear and unequivocal promise or assurance intended to

effect legal relations or reasonably capable of being understood to have that

effect in the law of proprietary estoppel there is no absolute requirement for

any findings of a promise or of any intentionality.

22. In proprietary estoppel therefore, the focus shifts somewhat from the search

for a clear and unequivocal promise and for intentionality, to whether the

party claiming the benefit of the estoppel had a reasonable expectation

induced, created or encouraged by another, and in those circumstances acted

detrimentally to the knowledge of the other. For proprietary estoppel to

operate the inducement, encouragement and detriment must be both real

and substantial and ultimately the court must act to avoid objectively

unconscionable outcomes.”

59. Kokaram J (as he then was) in Kurt Farfan and Ors v Anthony White14 at paragraph 26

stated the extreme care the Court should adopt when examining the questions of

promise, reliance and detriment. Kokaram J (as he then was) referred to Sir Henry Brooke

in the Privy Council decision of Knowles v Knowles15 at paragraph 27 who stated:

13 CA T243 of 2012 14 CV 2016-03644 15 [2008] UKPC 30

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“In Jennings v Rice [2002] EWC Civ 159 [2003]1FCR 501…Robert Walker LJ said at para

58 that the essence of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary

to avoid an unconscionable result. In the opinion of their Lordships it would be

unconscionable in this case to deprive George of his property when he had done

nothing at all to encourage any belief that his brother and sister-in-law could treat

the property as belonging to them. While recourse to the doctrine of estoppel

provides a welcome means of effecting justice when the facts demand it, it is equally

important that the courts do not penalise those who through acts of kindness simply

allow other members of their family to inhabit their property rent free. In E & L Berg

Homes Ltd v Grey (1979) 253 EG 473, [1980] 1 EGLR 103 Ormrod LJ said at p 108: ‘I

think it important that this court should not do or say anything which creates the

impression that people are liable to be penalised for not enforcing their strict legal

rights. It is a very unfortunate state of affairs when people feel obliged to take steps

which they do not wish to take, in order to preserve their legal rights, and prevent

the other party acquiring rights against them. So the court in using its equitable

jurisdiction must, in my judgment, approach these cases with extreme care.’ ”

(Emphasis added)

60. The Court must examine the inducement, encouragement and detriment to determine if

they are both real and substantial. The Court must act to avoid objectively unconscionable

outcomes16.

61. It was submitted on behalf of the Claimant that Mr. Philip Lazzari promised the Claimant’s

father in 1980 that he could remain and operate the grocery in the building on the present

premises as long as the Defendant continued to lease or occupy it.

62. On the other hand the Defendant’s positon was that there was no such promise made by

Philip Lazarri to the Claimant’s father since if such a promise was made either party would

16 Jamadar JA in Esther Mills v Lloyd Roberts Civ Appeal No T 243 of 2012

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have raised it in the several correspondence which passed between the Claimant’s father

and the Claimant and the Defendant during the period 1988 until 2012.

63. The evidence of this alleged promise were from the Claimant and one of his brothers

Omar Daniel (“Omar”).The Claimant’s evidence was that in 1980 Philip Lazzari, a Board

Member of the Defendant promised or represented to the Claimant’s father that he

would not be removed from the present premises as long as the Defendant remained in

occupation of it and that the Claimant’s father would be entitled to remain on the present

premises and to continue to operate the grocery from the building because the Claimant’s

father had agreed to waive the said loan to the Defendant and he had started paying

rent.

64. In cross-examination the Claimant agreed that he did not mention in his Statement of

Case that Mr Lazzari had promised the Claimant’s father that he could never be removed

from operating the grocery in the building once the Defendant was on the present

premises. He agreed there was no amendment in his Statement of Case setting out the

promise. He stated that he was not aware that the first time mention of any promise by

Mr Lazzari to the Claimant’s father in the instant proceedings was in 2017.

65. The Claimant was taken through several correspondence, which passed between the

parties to identify where the Claimant’s father and/or the Claimant asserted the right to

remain on the present premises based on the alleged promise by Mr Lazzari. He accepted

that there was no reference in any of the letters. In particular, the Claimant admitted that

in the letter dated 30 March 1988, which was written on behalf of the Claimant’s father

by Mr Donald Berment, there was no reference to the alleged promise made by Philip

Lazzari to the Claimant’s father of a right to remain on the present premises indefinitely.

66. The Claimant was also shown a letter dated 8 June 1988 from Mr Donald Berment written

to the Defendant on behalf of the Claimant’s father. The Claimant accepted that Mr

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Berment did not mention anything about the Claimant’s father having a right to remain

on the present premises indefinitely.

67. The other letter, which the Claimant was shown, was a letter dated 25 July 1994 written

by the Claimant’s father to the Defendant wherein the former indicated to the latter that

he intended to relinquish operational control of the grocery in the short term to the

Claimant. The Claimant accepted that the said letter did not indicate that the Claimant’s

father was promised that he could remain operating the grocery in the building on the

present premises as long as the Defendant was in occupation.

68. Further, the Claimant accepted that in the three letters written on his behalf by his

attorney at law on the 21 August 2009, 16 February 2011 and 14 December 2012 his

attorney at law did not indicate that the Claimant’s father was promised that he could

remain on the present premises operating the grocery in the building as long as the

Defendant was in occupation.

69. Therefore, the Claimant’s evidence of this promise which was made by Mr Lazzari was not

borne out by the several correspondence which passed between the parties between

1988 and 2012.

70. Omar stated in his witness statement that in or around 1980 the Claimant’s father told

him that he owned the building and that the Defendant had assured him that he would

be there as long as the Defendant was on the present premises. However, in cross-

examination Omar’s evidence on this alleged promise was unreliable and lacking in

credibility. Omar stated in cross-examination that he remembered something like the

Defendant promising the Claimant’s father that he could stay as long as the Defendant

was on the present premises. However, he admitted that it could be that he remembered

that the Claimant’s father owned the building and not the promise of staying on the

present premises. When Counsel for the Defendant indicated to Omar that this was

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different from what he said in his witness statement, he said whatever was in his witness

statement was the correct thing.

71. In my opinion, Omar’s contradictions and lack of certainty was not proof of any clear and

unequivocal promise made to the Claimant’s father that he could remain on the present

premises as long as the Defendant was in occupation.

72. I have therefore concluded that there is no merit in the Claimant’s assertion that Philip

Lazzari promised the Claimant’s father in 1980 that he could remain on the present

premises operating the grocery in the building as long as the Defendant was in

occupation. In my opinion, the Claimant did not have first-hand knowledge of such

promise. In any event, the evidence of his witness Omar was not reliable and lacking in

credibility. More importantly, it was not supported by any of the letters written on behalf

of the Claimant’s father and the Claimant during the period after 1988 to 2012. In my

opinion if there was such a promise, either the Claimant’s father or the Claimant would

have raised this in the several letters which were written to the Defendant during that

period.

73. Even if the Claimant had crossed the first hurdle of proving the alleged promise, which he

has not, in my opinion, his claim in proprietary estoppel would also fail on the basis of lack

of detriment.

74. The Claimant stated in his witness statement that as business increased, the Claimant’s

father with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the Defendant, extended and or

made improvements to the grocery at his own cost. In 1980, the grocery was extended by

the construction of a storage room to the back. At that time, he was working in the grocery

and various members of the Defendant’s Board visited the grocery while these works

were being carried out and they would stop and talk to the Claimant’s father. In 1985,

additional work was done to the grocery, which consisted of burglar proofing. The

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Claimant’s father told him that he carried out these extensions as the building belonged

to him, in light of the agreement with the Defendant with the full knowledge, consent and

approval of the Defendant.

75. The Claimant admitted in cross-examination that the Claimant’s father obtained a

substantial commercial advantage by being able to operate the grocery on the present

premises. He also admitted that as a commercial investment it was in the Claimant’s

father’s interest and his own from time to time to improve and maintain the building

because it generated income for them. The Claimant also recognized that if the Defendant

exercised its right to terminate (as it was entitled to do) before the building was repaid

the Claimant’s father was entitled to be compensated for the building.

76. Even if there was unequivocal evidence of the promise asserted by the Claimant, there

was no detriment to the Claimant’s father or him since based on the Claimant’s evidence

the Claimant’s father and later the Claimant incurred a benefit by being able to operate

the grocery on the present premises and in any event the Claimant’s father is entitled to

be compensated for the building.

WAS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE CONCESSION OF THE CLAIMANT

BY THE NOTICE TO QUIT?

77. It was submitted on behalf of the Claimant that the Defendant was wrong to issue the

Notice to Quit which expired on the 18 February 2017 since it agreed that the Claimant’s

father would own the building and that as long as the Defendant continued to lease

and/or occupy the present premises that the Claimant’s father would be entitled to

remain on it and to continue to operate the grocery from the building. It was also argued

that the Defendant acted in bad faith by serving the Notice to Quit on the Claimant since

the Court had granted injunctive relief on the 12 August 2014.

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78. The Defendant argued that it was entitled to serve the Notice to Quit under the terms of

the 1978 agreement as varied in 1980. The Defendant also submitted that there was no

claim before the Court for any conduct, which was allegedly in breach of the injunction,

and therefore this is not relevant at the trial.

79. Having found that the Defendant is entitled under the terms of the 1978 agreement as

varied in 1980 to cancel the concession by giving 6 months’ notice and paying the

compensation for the building, it follows that the Notice to Quit which was served by the

Defendant was valid.

80. Further, I agree with Counsel for the Defendant that the proper course to be adopted by

the Claimant if it was of the view that the Defendant acted in bad faith by issuing the

Notice to Quit after the injunction order, was to issue proceedings for contempt but no

such application was made.

IS THE CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CONCESSION BY THE

DEFENDANT BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE CLAIMANT TO REPAIR THE ROOF OF THE

BUILDING?

81. The Claimant sought an order that he is entitled to damages for breach of the concession

as the Defendant failed to allow him to repair the roof of the building. In my opinion, this

claim by the Claimant must fail for the following reasons.

82. First, the Claimant did not plead that any works to the roof was an expressed or implied

term of the 1978 agreement between the parties. Neither in the 1978 agreement nor in

the 1980 variation was there any expressed provision about repairs to the roof of the

building. By the 1980 variation, both parties agreed that the Claimant’s father was the

owner of the building. At best, it is reasonable to imply that the Claimant’s father as the

owner of the building was entitled to do repairs to the roof. However, the parties had

agreed in the 1978 agreement, which was not altered by the 1980 variation that if the

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Defendant had served a notice on the Claimant’s father to terminate the concession for

the grocery, he was entitled to be paid for the outstanding sum owing on the building. In

this regard, the evidence of Mr Yohann Govia, the sole witness for the Defendant is

relevant. Mr Govia stated in his witness statement that it has always been the position of

the Defendant that it had no objection to the Claimant carrying out repairs to the roof.

However, the Defendant’s objection was the Claimant carrying out extensive renovations

or improvements to the roof instead of repair works. In cross-examination, Mr Govia

admitted that the Defendant’s main concern was the costs of the repairs and that the

Defendant never objected to the roof being replaced. In my opinion even if it was an

implied term it was reasonable for the Defendant to approve any repairs to the roof since

if the concession was terminated, the Defendant had to pay compensation for the

building.

83. Second, the extent of the Claimant’s pleading on this alleged breach was that in June 2012

the Claimant commenced repairs to the roof of the building with the approval of the

Defendant but he was later stopped prematurely. There were no particulars pleaded of

any loss, which the Claimant suffered.

84. Third, it was not in dispute from the evidence that a new roof was put up on the building.

Therefore, in the absence of any evidence from the Claimant of the loss he suffered as a

result of the alleged stoppage, there is no basis to make a finding that the Defendant

breached the concession.

IS THE CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO BE PAID FOR THE COSTS OF THE BUILDING?

85. Having found that the Claimant’s father’s interest in the building was not a fixture which

was attached to the present premises and that he was entitled to be compensated for it,

I now turn to whom should this sum be paid to.

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86. It was not in dispute that by letter dated 25 July 1994 the Claimant’s father wrote to the

Defendant indicating that he intended to relinquish operational control of the grocery to

the Claimant.

87. Although the Claimant stated in his witness statement that the Claimant’s father told him

that he handed over ownership of the grocery and building to him, he accepted in cross-

examination that the letter dated 25 July 1994 only indicated an intention by the

Claimant’s father to transfer operational control of the grocery to him in the short term

and that it did not state that the Claimant’s father transferred ownership of the grocery

and the building to him.

88. However, after the Claimant’s father sent the letter dated 25 July 1994 to the Defendant

the latter continued to treat the Claimant as he was its tenant by continuing to collect

rent, exchanging correspondence with him on matters concerning the grocery and the

building and it even served him the Notice to Quit. For these reasons, any payment for

the building by the Defendant should be made to the Claimant. While I accept that the

Claimant did not seek such an order in his claim, the Defendant in its counterclaim sought

an order that “the Claimant remove the building on or before 28 February 2017 or accept

payment of the value of same as determined by this Court”.

89. With respect to the sum to be paid for the building, the parties agreed to a single joint

expert Mr Tiwary to prepare a valuation of the building. Mr Tiwary was not called to give

evidence at the trial as the parties had agreed that his Report, the Supplemental Report

and his letter dated 5 April 2019 be admitted into evidence by consent to form part of his

evidence at the trial of this matter. In the Supplemental Report Mr Tiwary stated that the

value of the building as at March 2019 was $300,000.00 and in his letter dated 5 April

2019, he stated that the value of the building was to be reduced by the sum of $4,500.00.

90. The parties also agreed to admit into evidence the expert report of Grant Thornton dated

2 February 2018 on the value of the goodwill of the grocery and to make submissions on

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its relevance at the end of the trial. It was submitted by the Defendant that the Claimant

did not make a claim to be compensated for the goodwill of the business and as such, the

evidence is not relevant.

91. In my opinion, in the absence of any claim that the Claimant is to be compensated for the

goodwill of the grocery, the expert report of Grant Thornton is not relevant to the issue

of the compensation to be paid for the building.

IS THE CLAIMANT LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS?

92. In the Counterclaim, the Defendant sought an order that the Claimant is liable for trespass

for any occupation of the building situated on the present premises after the 28 February

2017.

93. Halsbury’s Laws of England17described the right of the right of a landlord to claim

damages for trespass against a tenant who has overstayed as:

“The landlord may recover in a claim for mesne profits the damages which he has

suffered through being out of possession of the land or, if he can prove no actual

damage caused to him by the defendant’s trespass, the landlord may recover as

mesne profits the value of the premises to the defendant for the period of the

defendant’s wrongful occupation. In most cases, the rent paid under any expired

tenancy is strong evidence as to the open market value. Mesne profits, being a type

of damages for trespass, may be recovered in respect of the defendant’s continued

occupation only after the expiry of his legal right to occupy the premises. The

landlord is not limited to a claim for the profits which the defendant has received

from the land, or those which he himself has lost.

17 Landlord and Tenant (Volume 62 (2016), paras 1–560; Volume 63 (2016), paras 561–1166); Volume 64 (2016),

paras 1167–1798) > 7. Recovery of Rent and Related Sums > (1) Recovery of Rent Etc; in General > 279. Mesne profits.

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Mesne profits are treated as income for tax purposes and are thus calculated on a

gross basis without deduction of income or corporation tax payable by the recipient.”

94. It was not in dispute that the Defendant served the Notice to Quit on the 17 August 2016,

which expired on the 28 February 2017. Having concluded that the Defendant was

entitled to do so under the terms of the 1978 agreement and were not altered under the

1980 variation, it follows that the Claimant having remained in occupation of the present

premises is liable to the Defendant for damages for trespass. The said damages is the

mesnes profits calculated in the monthly rental sum from February 2017 until he vacates.

ORDER

95. The Claimant’s action is dismissed.

96. Judgment for the Defendant on the counterclaim.

97. It is declared that the Defendant is entitled to terminate the concession of the Claimant

by virtue of its Notice to Quit dated 17 August 2016.

98. It is declared that the Claimant is required to give up its concession, cease operating as a

grocery on the present premises on the expiration of the notice period on 28 February

2017.

99. The Claimant is liable to the Defendant for damages for trespass for the occupation of the

present premises calculated in the monthly rental sum from February 2017 until he

vacates.

100. The Claimant vacate the present premises within 28 days from the date of this order or

any other period which the parties may agree to.

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101. The Defendant is to pay the Claimant the value of the building in the sum of $300,000.00

less $ 4,500.00.

102. The Claimant to pay the Defendant the costs of the claim and the counterclaim in the sum

of $14,000.00 each with a total of $28,000.00

Margaret Y.Mohammed

Judge

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