Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

1 March 2020

ODIHR Election Assessment Mission

Final Report

Warsaw

27 May 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................... 3

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ....................................................................... 4

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................... 5

V. ELECTORAL SYSTEM ............................................................................................................... 7

VI. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................................... 8

VII. VOTER REGISTRATION ........................................................................................................... 9

VIII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION ............................................................................................... 11

IX. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT.................................................................................................. 13

X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE .............................................................................................................. 15

XI. MEDIA .......................................................................................................................................... 16

A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................... 16 B. MEDIA COVERAGE OF CAMPAIGN ............................................................................................ 18

XII. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ................................................................. 19

XIII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS ................................................................................................ 20

XIV. ELECTION DAY ......................................................................................................................... 20

A. EARLY VOTING AND ELECTION DAY ........................................................................................ 20 B. COUNTING ................................................................................................................................. 21

XV. ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS.... 22

XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 23

A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 23 B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 24

ANNEX I –ELECTION RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 26

ABOUT ODIHR ..................................................................................................................................... 27

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

1 MARCH 2020

ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report1

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following an official invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Tajikistan, the

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election

Assessment Mission (EAM) for the 1 March parliamentary elections. The mission assessed the

compliance of the electoral process with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and

standards for democratic elections and with national legislation.

The parliamentary elections took place in a tightly controlled environment. Systemic infringements

on fundamental political rights and freedoms have left no space for a pluralistic political debate, and

genuine opposition has been removed from the political landscape. Consequently, voters were not

presented with genuine political alternatives. Operational aspects of the elections appeared to be

efficiently administered, yet this did not offset the long-standing transparency and accountability

challenges within the election administration, which undermined the integrity and credibility of the

process. Significant efforts are needed to align the electoral process with Tajikistan’s OSCE

commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections.

The Constitution defines Tajikistan as a democratic, law-based, secular, and unitary state. The

president is the head of state whose executive powers encompass an effective control of all key

institutions, including those in charge of elections, through, among others, an appointment and

dismissal system of top executives at all levels and the judiciary.

Legislative powers are vested in a bicameral Supreme Assembly (Majlisi Oli) comprising a directly

elected lower chamber (Majlisi Namoyandagon) and an upper chamber (Majlisi Milli). Of the 63

members of the Majlisi Namoyandagon, 41 were elected from single mandate constituencies, 22

from a nationwide constituency under a closed list proportional representation system, with a five

per cent threshold. The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) led by President Emomali

Rahmon held the absolute majority in the outgoing parliament and local assemblies.

The Constitution formally guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms but unduly restricts suffrage

rights. Statutory legislation curbs freedoms of assembly, association and speech. Majority of

previous ODIHR recommendations to remove those and other infringements challenging the

integrity and credibility of elections remain unaddressed, underscoring the necessity for a

comprehensive review of the legal framework.

Recent constitutional amendments and subsequent electoral reform outlawed political parties based

on religious platforms, removed the limitation on the term in office of the president, removed party

representatives from the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CCER) and amended

the eligibility criteria for elected offices. The reform was proposed by the government and lacked

public consultations. The electoral legal framework was supplemented by CCER regulations, yet

they failed to address numerous legal gaps and to clarify key procedures. Not all regulations were

1 The English version of this report is the only official document. Unofficial translations are available in Tajik and

Russian.

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published on the CCER website. Positively, the regulatory framework was printed and disseminated

to electoral stakeholders.

The elections were managed by a three-tiered election administration, comprising the CCER, 41

District Election Commissions (DECs) and 3,412 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). Election

administration was adequately prepared for the elections. However, it lacked transparency at all

levels, and its impartiality and independence from the state authorities was questionable. In an

effort to mobilize the electorate, the CCER conducted an active voter information campaign.

A total of 4,929,128 voters were registered for these elections. Voter lists were compiled by the

PECs and updated through door-to-door canvassing. There is no centralised voter register and no

legal or practical safeguards against multiple registrations either prior to elections or on election

day. The authorities are implementing pilot electronic civil registration project, which could form a

solid basis for creating a centralised and accurate voter register.

A total of 241 candidates, including 48 women, were registered to contest 63 parliamentary seats.

All seven registered parties formally contested the elections, but only the PDPT fielded the

maximum number of candidates in both races. In many majoritarian constituencies, the PDPT was

challenged only by self-nominated candidates, allegedly affiliated with this party. The CCER did

not publish the full list of candidates depriving voters the possibility to familiarize themselves with

prospective deputies. The scant public information related to candidate registration precluded the

ODIHR EAM from assessing its inclusiveness.

The campaign was defined by the CCER and put into effect by the DECs and local administrations.

The ostensible uniformity of campaign methods and reluctance of political parties to raise their

profiles independently unveiled the detrimental effect of systematic removal of voices of dissent.

None of the parties challenged the President’s policies, scrutinised the performance of the

government or opposed one another. Neither the campaign nor party programmes prominently

featured gender equality issues. In addition, cultural and gender stereotypes are also a major

deterrent to women’s political engagement.

Electoral campaigns are financed by state funds and private donations. The law sets limits on

campaign spending and envisages campaign finance reporting by electoral contestants; however, it

does not foresee public disclosure. The CCER is to oversee the compliance of contestants with the

rules, yet the law and subsequent CCER regulations lack clear enforcement provisions as well as

range of proportionate sanctions. No excessive spending was observed or reported.

Legislative and regulatory instruments are frequently used by state institutions to intimidate media.

These include targeted tax inspections, limitations on distribution, as well as pressure on media by

state security structures. Insulting and defaming the president or other state officials, including

online, is a criminal offence. This curtails analytical journalism and induces self-censorship.

Media coverage of the elections reflected the lethargy of the campaign. There were no debates

between candidates, and media did not scrutinise their manifestos. Private outlets mostly relied on

information disseminated by the state-owned news agency, while the coverage of the President’s

activities dominated on state television. Only a few news websites, most of them operating from

abroad, some Facebook groups and blogs offered an alternative content. Authorities sporadically

blocked access to most critical news websites, including during campaign, effectively depriving

voters from making a fully informed choice.

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The electoral law provides for party proxies and international election observation, but does not

guarantee observers access to critical stages of the process. Contrary to OSCE commitments, the

law does not foresee nonpartisan citizen election observation, a vital element of scrutiny of the

elections.

The principle of judicial review is guaranteed for electoral disputes by the legislation and the right

to redress is afforded to all electoral participants. The ODIHR EAM was not aware of any

complaints filed during the entire electoral process, leaving the electoral dispute resolution

mechanisms untested.

The EAM, in line with ODIHR’s methodology, did not observe election day processes in a

systematic or comprehensive manner. The limited number of polling stations visited were

adequately equipped and organised. Access to polling stations for voters with reduced mobility was

improved by introducing ramps and its positive effect was also observed by the ODIHR EAM.

Serious irregularities were observed during voting and counting, including but not limited to proxy

and family voting and ballot box stuffing. Tabulation of results lacked transparency.

The CCER announced the preliminary election results on 2 March in a televised press conference.

The CCER published names of elected deputies in the state newspaper, but did not disclose results

from single mandate constituencies. The voting results were neither broken down by constituency

or polling station level, nor were they published on the CCER website. This significantly reduced

the trust in the integrity of result tabulation and effectively excluded any independent scrutiny of the

results. All but one party accepted the results and elected deputies were sworn in on 17 March.

This report offers recommendations to support efforts to align elections in Tajikistan with OSCE

commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. Priority

recommendations focus on the need to ensure full respect for freedom of expression, including

unimpeded work of independent media, to provide for CCER independence and transparency of

selection of election commissioners, to develop a centralized voter register, to institute robust

procedures for counting and tabulation, to respect voters’ right to information and to allow citizen

observation. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities to address the recommendations

contained in this and previous reports.

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Following an official invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan

(MFA) to observe the 1 March 2020 parliamentary elections and based on the recommendation of a

Needs Assessment Mission conducted from 9 to 12 December 2019, the OSCE Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Assessment Mission

(EAM) from 13 February to 7 March.2 The ODIHR EAM, led by Ambassador Eberhard Pohl,

consisted of seven experts from seven OSCE participating states. The EAM was based in Dushanbe

and visited the districts of Faizobad, Hisor, Nurek, Rudaki, Tursunzade and Vahdat.

The electoral process was assessed for compliance with OSCE commitments, other international

obligations and standards for democratic elections, and with national legislation. In line with

ODIHR’s methodology, the EAM did not observe election day proceedings in a systematic or

comprehensive manner, but visited a limited number of polling stations.

2 See all previous ODIHR election reports on Republic of Tajikistan.

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The ODIHR EAM wishes to thank the MFA and the Central Commission for Elections and

Referenda (CCER) for their co-operation. The assessment of the electoral process would have

benefited from the EAM having more regular and effective meetings with the CCER and more

timely and comprehensive information from the authorities.3 The ODIHR EAM expresses its

appreciation to civil society organizations, media, political parties, state institutions, and

international community representatives for their co-operation and for sharing their views.

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The Constitution defines Tajikistan as a democratic, law-based, secular, and unitary state. The

president is head of state determining domestic and foreign policy. The president’s executive

powers encompass an effective control of state institutions, including through appointing and

dismissing top executives and the judiciary.4 The far-reaching effect of those powers was exhibited

in early 2020 when more than 50 state officials, including ministers and their deputies, heads of

state institutions, prosecutors, police officers and district-level office holders, were either released

from their duties or rotated by Presidential decrees.5 Such a system undermines the separation of

powers.

Legislative powers are vested with the bicameral Supreme Assembly (Majlisi Oli) comprising a

directly elected lower chamber Majlisi Namoyandagon and an indirectly elected upper chamber

Majlisi Milli. One fourth of the latter is appointed by the president. People’s Democratic party of

Tajikistan (PDPT) led by President Emomali Rahmon holds an absolute majority in both chambers

and at all local councils, providing for an unopposed implementation of the President’s policies.6

On 4 December, the President decreed elections to the Majlisi Namoyandagon (hereinafter

parliamentary elections) to take place on 1 March. The fifth parliamentary elections, since the end

of the 1992-1997 civil war, took place against a backdrop of long-standing systemic curbs on

fundamental political rights and freedoms.7 Constraints on freedom of association include banning

of opposition parties and movements and labelling them as terrorist and extremist organisations.8

Consequently, no new political party has been registered since 2005; civil society refrains from

open discussion of politics and elections, citing fear of retribution and closure.9 The cumbersome

financial reporting requirements for civil society organisations introduced by the 2019 amendments

3 Standard election observation methodology includes regular meetings with electoral stakeholders and

observation of meetings of election management bodies. See the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International

Election Observation. 4 The president appoints and dismisses the prime minister, ministers and heads of executive authorities at regional

and local levels, as well as the prosecutor general, and nominates and appoints judges at all levels. 5 Presidential decrees from January and February 2020. None of those decrees contain an elaborated reasoning.

6 Following parties were represented in the outgoing Majlisi Namoyandagon: the PDPT with 51 seats, Agrarian

party of Tajikistan (APT) with 5 seats, Party of Economic Reform of Tajikistan (PERT) with 3 seats, Communist

party of Tajikistan (CPT) with 2 seats, Democratic party of Tajikistan (DPT) and Socialist party of Tajikistan

(SPT) with one seat each. The seventh registered party is Social Democratic party of Tajikistan (SDPT). 7 See paragraphs 24, 38, 48, 50 and 52-55 of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Concluding observations

on the third periodic report of Tajikistan (CCPR/C/TJK/CO/3, 22 August 2019). See also paragraphs 5, 6, 13, 14,

16, 20-22, 25, 28, 35, 37, 39, 42, 55 and respective recommendations No. 70, 72, 74, 79, 81 of the UNHRC

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and

expression on his mission to Tajikistan (A/HRC/35/22/Add.2, October 2017). 8 Banned parties and movements include Group 24 (judgement of Supreme Court (SC) from 9 October 2014),

Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (judgement of the SC from 29 September 2015) and The National

Alliance of Tajikistan (judgement of the SC from 15 August 2019). 9 Paragraph 9.1 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states: “everyone will have the right to freedom of

expression, including the right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive

and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”.

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to the Law on Public Associations and the obligation to submit yearly account on planned activities

had a further chilling effect on the nonpartisan activism.

The prosecution of human rights activists and journalists often cites security and radicalisation

concerns and curtails freedom of expression.10

Public space for a pluralistic discourse is scant as

media is subservient to the authorities and critical online sources are frequently blocked.11

According to ODIHR EAM interlocutors, coordinated online propaganda is used to control the

public narrative.12

Such an environment is not conducive to the conduct of democratic elections in

compliance with Tajikistan’s OSCE commitments and other international obligations with respect

to freedoms of expression, association and assembly, as well as citizens’ right to take part in the

conduct of public affairs.

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Tajikistan is signatory to the main international and regional human rights instruments relevant to

elections.13

Positively, in 2018, Tajikistan signed but has not yet ratified the UN Convention on the

Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Parliamentary elections are primarily regulated by the

1994 Constitution, last amended in 2016, the 1999 Constitutional Law on Elections to the Majlisi

Oli, last amended in 2019 (hereinafter the election law) and the 2019 Law on the Central

Commission on Elections and Referenda.14

The legal framework is supplemented by regulations

issued by the CCER.

To ensure universal suffrage the authorities should consider ratifying the UN Convention on the

Rights of Persons with Disabilities and consistently apply its provisions.

The Constitution formally guarantees fundamental freedoms of movement, association, assembly

and expression as well as the right to elect and to be elected based on universal, equal, direct

suffrage through secret ballot. However, it includes undue restrictions to suffrage rights, such as

blanket restrictions for citizens serving prison terms regardless of the severity of the crime and for

persons declared incompetent (see Voter Registration). Statutory legislation continues to curb the

free exercise of peaceful assembly, association and freedom of speech by subjecting public

10

In January 2020, authorities arrested more than 100 persons charged with being members of Muslim

Brotherhood, among them 20 university professors. The ODIHR EAM interlocutors saw this as election-related.

See also OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) call on Tajikistani authorities to remove names

of journalists from list of people with connections to terrorists (27 March 2018). Paragraph 38 of the UNHRC

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

while countering terrorism (A/HRC/31/65/, April 2016) reads that “while the right to freedom of expression […]

can, and sometimes must, be limited, these restrictions must not jeopardize the essence of the right, […], simply

holding or peacefully expressing views that are considered “extreme” under any definition should never be

criminalized, unless such views are associated with violence or criminal activity”. 11

See the OSCE RFoM’s call on Tajik authorities to reinstate access to online media resources (7 May 2019). 12

Several ODIHR EAM interlocutors informed that university students are often tasked with generating and

sharing online content that would praise state policies and discredit independent news. 13

These include the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the

1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its optional

protocol, the 2003 UN Convention Against corruption (UNCAC) and the 2002 CIS Convention on Standards of

Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms (CIS Convention). 14

Relevant provisions of the 1998 Law on Political Parties, the 2014 Law on Public Meetings, Demonstrations and

Rallies, the 2013 Law on Periodical Print and Other Mass Media, the 2008 Civil Procedures Code, the 2008

Code of Administrative Offences and the 1998 Criminal Code also regulate certain aspects of elections.

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gatherings to highly restrictive authorisation procedure, by banning the registration of new political

parties with unclear or undefined criteria; and by criminalising defamation.15

Tajikistan has committed itself to promote gender equality.16

The Constitution states that men and

women enjoy equal rights. In 2017, the government adopted the state programme for 2017-2022

aimed at the selection of qualified women for senior positions in all executive authorities.17

At the

same time, the legal framework does not provide for quota or any other special measures to enhance

women representation in elected positions. Women are underrepresented in the parliament and in

political life in general, especially in decision-making positions.18

Fourteen women (22 per cent)

were elected to Majlisi Namoyandagon, an increase from 19 per cent in 2015, which is positive.

Constitutional amendments approved during the 2016 national referendum outlawed political

parties based on religious platforms and removed the limitation on the term in office of the

president, reduced the minimum age to run for presidency from 35 to 30 years and increased the age

to stand as a candidate for parliamentary elections from 25 to 30.19

Further changes to the election

law enacted in 2017, 2018 and 2019 mirrored constitutional amendments. The reform was proposed

by the government and lacked public consultations.

Although legal framework could provide a basis for the conduct of democratic elections, the

legislation circumscribing the political environment in which elections are taking place does not

accord with international standards. Following the 2015 parliamentary elections, ODIHR offered

numerous recommendations to the Tajikistani authorities for consideration. Namely, lack of

independence of election administration, deficit of measures ensuring the separation between the

state and the party, undue restrictions to suffrage rights and extensive constraints on freedom of

expression, inadequate transparency and deficiencies in the polling and counting process were

among the issues covered in the recommendations for reform. Despite legal changes enacted in

2017, 2018 and 2019, all these shortcomings and infringements challenging the integrity and

credibility of elections remained unaddressed, having a detrimental effect on the 2020 electoral

process. This underscores the necessity for a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework as

well as practices employed by relevant state institutions.

A comprehensive review of the electoral legal framework should be undertaken in an open and

inclusive manner to eliminate the significant shortcomings identified in this and prior ODIHR

reports.

For these elections, the CCER reissued several regulations, including on candidate registration,

establishment and work of district election commissions (DECs) and precinct election commissions

(PECs), registration of domestic and international observers, campaign finance, and complaints and

15

Articles 12 and 13 of the Law on Public Meetings, Demonstrations and Rallies stipulate that an authorization is

necessary 15 days prior to the organization of any gathering and any event. Please also see section on Campaign

Environment. Paragraph 118 of the 2010 ODIHR and Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly recommends that “any legal provisions concerning advance notification should

require the organizers to submit a notice of the intent to hold an assembly, but not a request for permission”. 16

In paragraph 23 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document participating States committed to “making equality

between men and women an integral part of [their] policies”. See also article 7(b) of the CEDAW and paragraph

26 of the 1997 CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 23. 17

See the government decree No 158 of 1 July 2017. Minister of Justice stated to the ODIHR EAM that following

that decree all deputy ministers and deputy mayors were women. 18

See UN Committee on the Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report

of Tajikistan (14 November 2018), CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraphs 31-32. 19

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression

has stated that “constitutional amendments combined with several additional national laws have significantly

jeopardized the protection of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion”.

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appeals. Positively, key regulations were printed and distributed to contestants, as well all as to the

DECs and PECs. However, regulation on complaints and appeals and on campaign finance and

other essential information related to electoral process were not posted at the CCER website (see

also Election Administration). Most of the CCER regulations merely reproduced articles of the law,

failing to clarify areas that are not sufficiently regulated. For example, regulations do not detail

procedures for candidate registration, voting, including early and out of country voting, as well as

counting and tabulation of the results. The CCER did not address gaps in the law related to

campaign finance, including reporting requirements and criteria for sanctions.

The CCER regulations could be reviewed and published to adequately supplement the legal

framework in order to ensure that procedural aspects are sufficiently detailed in line with the

principles of legal certainty and access to information.

V. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The sixty-three members of the Majlisi Namoyandagon are directly elected for a five-year term

through secret ballot. Of them, 41 are elected from single mandate constituencies. If no candidate

receives more than 50 per cent of the votes cast, a second round is held within two weeks between

the two leading candidates. The other 22 members are elected from a nationwide constituency under

a closed list proportional representation system with a five per cent threshold. Seats are allocated

using the Hare quota under the largest remainder method.20

If voter turnout is below 50 per cent,

elections are declared invalid and must be repeated.

By law, the number of registered voters in the 41 single mandate constituencies should not deviate

from the national average by more than 20 per cent. The election law requires the CCER to revise

constituency boundaries before each election. However, as the CCER informed, constituency

boundaries were not revised for these elections in anticipation of the forthcoming census by the end

of the 2020. Despite previous ODIHR recommendation, and contrary to the law, 16 constituencies

diverged by more than 20 per cent; in one case reaching 51 per cent.21

While significant deviations

in 3 constituencies are explained by geographical constrains, no such reasoning could be applied to

the remaining 13, including 3 constituencies in the capital.22

Such disparities undermine the equality

of the vote and are contrary to international standards and good practice.23

Constituency boundaries should be regularly revised to uphold the constitutional principle of vote

equality, the provisions of the election law, OSCE commitments and other international standards.

To enhance the transparency, the revision process should involve broad public consultation.

20

The quota is obtained by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats contested (22). Then,

each party’s votes are divided by the quota, which yields the number of seats that each party won. Seats that

cannot be allocated in this way are given to the parties with the largest remainder of the votes. 21

The largest constituency No. 9 had 164,202 voters registered, while the smallest No. 41 had 57,616. 22

Three out of four constituencies in the capital are below national average by 27, 28 and 38 per cent. 23

Paragraph 7.3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides for equal suffrage. Paragraph 21 of the

UNHRC 1996 General Comment No.25 to the ICCPR states: “The principle of one person, one vote, must apply

and within the framework of each State’s electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of

another”. The Council of Europe Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 2002 Code of

Good Practice in Electoral Matters, section I.2.2.iv, states: “Seats must be evenly distributed between the

constituencies […] The permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10 per cent and should

certainly not exceed 15 per cent except in special circumstances”.

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VI. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Parliamentary elections were managed by a three-tiered election administration, comprising the

CCER, 41 DECs, one in each majoritarian district, and 3,412 PECs. A total of 39 polling stations

were established in diplomatic representations in 30 countries to facilitate voting abroad.24

The CCER is a permanent body, responsible for the overall planning and conduct of national

elections. In line with the Law on the CCER, its seven members are nominated by the president and

approved by the Majlisi Namoyandagon for a seven-year term. The new composition of the CCER

was appointed in 2019, and only two members are women. By law, members of political parties

cannot be appointed as CCER members; however, some ODIHR EAM interlocutors doubted

adherence to this principle in practice as some newly appointed CCER members were active party

members in the past.25

Further, interlocutors informed the ODIHR EAM that the nomination process lacked transparency

and the selection criteria were not publicized; the parliament approved proposed commissioners

without a debate. Salaries of the CCER members are determined by the president and security of

tenure is limited.26

Consequently, several ODIHR EAM interlocutors expressed their concerns

regarding CCER’s independence due to the lack of established criteria for selection and the

financial dependence on the president’s decisions.

The CCER members’ selection process should include adequate transparency and accountability

measures to ensure the CCER is independent from both government institutions and parliament in

the execution of its mandate. Security of tenure for CCER commissioners should be strengthened.

The DECs and PECs are temporary bodies formed at least two months and 45 days prior to an

election day, respectively. The DECs are responsible for the formation of the PECs, the registration

of candidates for the majoritarian race, the organization of campaign meetings for contestants, and

the establishment the election results in the single-mandate constituencies. The PECs are

responsible for the compilation of voter lists and the conduct of voting and counting. According to

the election commissions the ODIHR EAM met with, there were no technical or operational

difficulties encountered prior to or on election day. Special polling stations were established in

medical institutions and military barracks.

According to several ODIHR EAM interlocutors, the CCER selected and appointed DEC members

predominantly from among the employees of state institutions.27

PEC members were identified by

the respective local authorities, based on their experience, and appointed by the respective DECs.

Many PEC members met by the ODIHR EAM were employees of the institution where the relevant

PEC was located. ODIHR has previously recommended that the selection and appointment process

of the CCER, DEC and PEC members should be transparent and based on clear criteria to ensure

compliance with international standards.28

24

According to the CCER, results from out-of-country polling stations were first transmitted to the MFA, who

submitted them to the CCER. The latter sent vote totals to Shahmansur DEC in Dushanbe that had the

responsibility for disaggregating the results from abroad by each of the 41 DECs. 25

While the Law on the CCER clearly stipulates that members of political parties cannot serve as CCER members,

the election law contains no such restrictions for lower-level commissions. 26

Article 15 of the Law on the CCER states that the commission member can be dismissed for “non-compliance

with the requirements of the Law on Streamlining Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies in Tajikistan”. 27

Election law states that the CCER forms DECs based on the proposals of the local executive bodies. 28

Paragraph 20 of the UNHRC General Comment No.25 to the ICCPR requires that “[a]n independent electoral

authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly,

impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant”.

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The DEC and PEC formation process should ensure impartiality of the election administration and

be based on transparent selection criteria. Further safeguards should be developed and

implemented to ensure that the DECs and PECs are independent from central and local

government.

Contrary to international standards, activities of the election administration lacked transparency.29

The Law on the CCER states that the commission is a collegial body, that all sessions are open, and

decisions adopted under public scrutiny. However, the adherence to those principles could not be

verified and assessed in detail by the ODIHR EAM due the lack of access to regular sessions.30

The CCER published on its website a calendar of electoral activities, information on registered

candidates standing on the nationwide party lists, as well as procedural guidelines for party and

candidate proxies and international observers. However, it failed to publish important electoral

information of public interest that would foster transparency and enable independent scrutiny of

elections, such as guidelines, agendas of meetings and subsequent minutes and decisions of the

CCER, data on voter and candidate registration disaggregated by constituencies and PECs (for

voters), as well as by age and gender, data on distribution of ballots and detailed voting results,

including disaggregated by the DECs and PECs.

The CCER should utilize its website as an instrument to enhance transparency of the electoral

process. Information of public interest, including all CCER decisions and key electoral data, should

be made publicly available in a format that enables easy and prompt access.

The CCER conducted an active voter information campaign through television (TV) and radio

broadcasts, outdoor advertisement and in-person distribution of invitations to households, indicating

polling station locations and opening times. The voter information campaign primarily aimed at

mobilising the electorate and, positively, at discouraging proxy voting. The CCER also informed

the ODIHR EAM that it sought to promote youth participation and to make all polling stations

accessible for voters with reduced mobility.

VII. VOTER REGISTRATION

Citizens aged 18 years or older on election day are eligible to vote. Voting rights of citizens

declared incapacitated and those serving a prison sentence are revoked, irrespective of the severity

of the crime committed. Disenfranchisement of all prisoners, regardless of the gravity of the crime,

contradicts OSCE commitments and other international obligations for democratic elections.31

29

Paragraph 19 of the 2011 UNHRC General Comment No.34 to the ICCPR states: “[t]o give effect to the right of

access to information, States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of

public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective, and practical access to

such information”. See also Article 7 of the CIS Convention. 30

The ODIHR EAM was not informed about any session or meeting and hence could not observe them. Political

parties offered conflicting information on when such sessions were taking place and what was decided. Several

media outlets informed the ODIHR EAM that information from the CCER is being received only through the

state-owned news agency. 31

Paragraph 7.3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that participating States will “guarantee

universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens”; paragraph 24 provides that restrictions on rights and freedoms

must be “strictly proportionate to the aim of the law”. Paragraph 14 of the UNHRC General Comment No.25 to

the ICCPR states that grounds for the deprivation of voting rights should be “objective and reasonable”.

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Deprivation of the right to vote for persons with intellectual and psycho-social disabilities is

contrary to international obligations and standards.32

Restrictions on the voting rights of citizens serving prison terms regardless of the severity of the

crime should be reconsidered to ensure proportionality between the limitation imposed and the

severity of the offence. The restrictions on the voting rights of persons based on the intellectual and

psycho-social disabilities should be removed.

Voter registration is passive. The PECs compile voter lists for each election based on the data

provided by local authorities. The PECs, in cooperation with mahalla committees, update the lists

through a door-to-door canvassing.33

Inclusion in the voter list is based on residency. Voters

residing abroad are additionally recorded as such on a separate voter list, based on information

provided by other members of their household. Voters not detected during the canvass are not

removed from the list. There is no legal obligation or mechanism for other state authorities that

maintain data on citizens’ residence, births, deaths or civil status to provide updates to the PECs.

Despite previous ODIHR recommendations, there is no permanent voter register at any level, and

the legislation does not provide for any safeguards against multiple registration of voters

undermining the integrity of voter lists.34

Despite several requests, the authorities did not provide

the ODIHR EAM with any information on practical safeguards against multiple registration.

According to the CCER, 4,929,128 voters were registered, including some 600,000 labour migrants

residing outside the country.35

Other ODIHR EAM interlocutors claimed the latter to be as high as

one million. The lack of authoritative demographic data on population growth in Tajikistan prevents

a comprehensive assessment of the accuracy and inclusiveness of the voter registration.

Several interlocutors informed the ODIHR EAM of a pilot electronic civil registration project

initiated in 2016 and being implemented by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in cooperation with other

state agencies. The project is piloted in Kulyab and Rudaki districts and planned for expansion in

other districts.36

Population data held in the completed civil registry could form a comprehensive

basis for a centralised voter register, given that relevant data protection legislation is introduced and

ensured in practice.

According to the CCER, no voter lists were compiled for polling stations abroad in advance.

Citizens abroad could vote in both the proportional and majoritarian elections upon presentation of

a valid identity document (ID). No crosscheck of data is held by the PECs abroad and DECs.

32

According to Article 29 of the CRPD, “State parties shall […] ensure that persons with disabilities can

effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through

freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities to vote and be

elected”. Paragraph 48 of the CRPD Committee’s 2014 General Comment No. 1 to Article 12 of the CRPD

states that “a person’s decision-making ability cannot be a justification for any exclusion of persons with

disabilities from exercising their political rights, including the right to vote [and] the right to stand for election”. 33

Mahallas are informal, self-governing institutions in Tajik communities. Jamoats are the smallest administrative

units and consist of several mahallas. 34

Paragraph 21 of the 1996 UNHRC General Comment No.25 to the ICCPR states that “the principle of one

person, one vote must apply”. See also paragraph 7.3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. 35

The PECs informed the ODIHR EAM that during the door-to-door verification a separate list with voters

working abroad was compiled, and consolidated data were sent by the DECs to the CCER. 36

The civil registration project compiles data on births, marriages and deaths as well as residence abroad. Phase

one of the project began in 2016 and was completed in 2019. Phase two began in 2020 and will run until 2023.

The project is led by the MoJ with participation of the MFA, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, and

Ministry of Education. The project is being supported by the international community.

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The accuracy of voter lists should be improved, with consideration given to the introduction of a

permanent, centralized voter register. The voter register should be comprehensively updated ahead

of each election and be centrally checked for errors and multiple registrations.

Voter lists were displayed for public scrutiny 15 days before the election day at polling stations.

Voters could request inclusion to or correction of the voter list at any time until the election day.

The law also provides for election day registration at polling stations by PECs contrary to

international good practice.37

Voters, not found on the voter lists on election day, were added on a

supplementary list based on valid ID, with no crosschecks or safeguards applied against multiple

voting.

A legal deadline for closing voter lists prior to election day could be introduced. Supplementary

registration of voters on election day should only be permitted in accordance with clearly defined

legal requirements, subject to judicial or administrative control, with effective safeguards against

multiple registrations.

VIII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

Citizens of Tajikistan who hold no other citizenship, are at least 30 years of age, have resided in the

country for at least five years, possess a higher education and a full command of the state language,

and have no un-expunged criminal record are eligible to stand for parliamentary elections.

Limitations based on residency are excessive, while the ban on those with a criminal record,

irrespective of the gravity of crime committed, is disproportionate.38

Further, those under

investigation for committing a serious crime are also ineligible, contrary to the presumption of

innocence and at odds with international standards.39

The residency requirement, the blanket restriction on the right to stand due to a previous criminal

conviction or exclusion for being under investigation should be reconsidered and brought in line

with international standards and good practice.

Candidates may be nominated by a political party or independently. Political parties must put

forward candidates during party conventions. A party-nominated candidate can simultaneously

stand on both the party list and in a majoritarian constituency. Self-nomination is permitted only in

single mandate constituencies. Contrary to international good practice and a previous ODIHR

recommendation, independent candidates, unlike party nominees, are additionally required to

37

According to section I.1.2.iv of the 2002 Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters,

“polling stations should not be permitted to register voters on election day itself”. 38

Paragraph 15 of the 1996 UNHRC General Comment No.25 to the ICCPR reads: “any restrictions on the right to

stand […] must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand

for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence

or descent, or by reason of political affiliation”. See also paragraphs 7.3 and 24 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen

Document and sections I.1.1.c and I.1.1.d of the 2002 Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral

Matters. 39 Paragraph 5.19 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document stipulates that “everyone will be presumed innocent

until proved guilty according to law”.

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collect at least 500 supporting signatures within their respective constituency.40

Each voter can

support only one candidate, which may limit political pluralism.41

Aspiring candidates, both on party list and majoritarian, had to pay a deposit of TJS 5,800 (some

EUR 600).42

Deposits are refundable only if a candidate obtains more than 10 per cent of

constituency valid votes or if his/her party list reaches five per cent nationwide. While the deposit is

aimed at discouraging candidates without a realistic chance of winning, it was also seen by several

ODIHR EAM interlocutors as prohibitively high.43

Candidates were required to submit identity, educational attainment and proof of residence

documents, as well as proof of income. Contestants should also confirm their proficiency in the

Tajik language by passing a test designed and conducted by the CCER or respective DEC. Despite

previous ODIHR recommendations, the verification procedures of registration documents are not

clearly defined in the legislation or CCER instructions.

The CCER registered all party lists on 5 February.44

The DECs registered candidates in single-

mandate constituencies following their own schedule. Six parties did not inform the ODIHR EAM

of any difficulties, but the SDPT indicated an overly formalistic approach taken by the CCER in

verifying registration documents. In addition, the SDPT, unlike all other parties, faced a

considerable delay in transfer of state campaign funds and certification of candidates’ proxies.45

This effectively reduced campaign period for the SDPT to two weeks.

According to the CCER, a total of 241 candidates were registered for both races, including 48

women.46

For the proportional race, parties nominated 73 candidates. None was reportedly rejected,

while eight withdrew their candidacy. As a result, the CCER registered lists of all seven registered

parties comprising 65 candidates, including 23 women.47

. According to the CCER and political

parties, the DECs registered a total of 176 candidates, with 91 standing on a party ticket. Six

candidates were rejected by the DECs and one de-registered by the CCER.48

Only the PDPT fielded the maximum number of candidates in both races, with the APT being the

distant second contesting 27 single-mandate constituencies. In nine majoritarian constituencies, the

40

Paragraph 130 of the 2010 ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation

recommends that “Regulations regarding ballot access and fees, as well as and candidacy restrictions for parties

should be the same for independent candidates”. 41

Paragraph 77 of the 2010 ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation

recommends that “in order to enhance pluralism and freedom of association, legislation should not limit a citizen

to signing a supporting list for only one party”. 42

According to the law, deposit is calculated on a basis of an indicator that is reviewed yearly in the Law on State

Budget. EUR 1 was approximately TJS 9.6 (Tajik Somoni) during the candidate registration. 43

According to the Agency for Statistics, the minimum wage in Tajikistan in December 2019 was TJS 400;

average wage – TJS 1,357. 44

According to the election law, candidate registration takes place between 45 and 20 days before the election day.

Election campaigning begins on the day of registration of a relevant contestant. 45

The SDPT claimed all documents were submitted in early January, yet they were registered only on 5 February.

The state funding was transferred to the party account only on 14 February, while candidates’ proxies received

the registration certificates on 19 February. 46

The official statistical data related to candidate registration was never published. The ODIHR EAM received it

only from the CCER during a meeting on 29 February. 47

The CCER registered 26 candidates (13 women) on the PDPT list, 12 (2 women) on the APT, 7 (1 woman) on

the PERT, 5 (2 women) on the CPT, 5 (1 woman) on the SDPT and 4 (1 woman) on the DPT list. 48

The CCER cancelled one DEC decision to register a candidate who had not reached the required age. The DECs

refused registration of five candidates due to their un-expunged criminal records and one for falsification of

signatures. The ODIHR EAM could not independently verify grounds for rejections.

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PDPT was challenged only by self-nominated candidates, allegedly many of whom failed to secure

nomination in the PDPT convention.49

The CCER did not publish a combined list of candidates standing in either race or a consolidated

information regarding the number of nominees rejected and the reasons for the rejection. Inaction

by the CCER curbed voters’ easy and prompt access to information on candidate registration and

notably limited independent scrutiny of prospective deputies.50

The CCER should publish a consolidated list of nominated and registered candidates disaggregated

by political party and gender for both the nationwide and single mandate constituencies, including

on its website, in a format that respects voters’ right to easy and prompt access to such information.

IX. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

The election law stipulates equal campaign conditions for all contestants and assigns a principal

role to the CCER and local administrations in defining the campaign modalities. According to the

election law, candidates and political parties have the right to independently determine the form and

nature of their campaign. In practice, the CCER approves all campaign materials, while the DECs

and local administrations jointly decide on a schedule of meetings with voters. According to the

Law on Meetings, Demonstrations and Street Processions, any other public event initiated by

candidates or parties should be pre-approved by authorities. As requests for pre-approval should be

submitted at least 15 days prior to the event, electoral contestants had little to no chance to design

their own campaign schedule. The legal framework and practices employed by authorities unduly

restricted freedoms of assembly and expression during campaign, at odds with international

standards.51

The role of electoral management bodies and local authorities in defining campaign modalities

should be substantially reduced enabling candidates and parties to design and conduct their

campaigns independently. The Law on Meetings, Demonstrations and Street Processions should be

amended to require a simple notification procedure rather than an authorization.

The campaign took place in a tightly controlled and regulated environment that did not offer space

for any viable political alternative to the President-led PDPT. None of the civil society

organizations initiated a debate on politics or elections fearing prospective retaliation; candidates

did not confer with each other either in public or in media. Hence, contrary to international

standards for democratic elections, a key component of a genuine campaign, a free and pluralistic

debate about political ideas and alternatives, was absent.52

49

The ODIHR EAM was informed that PDPT members were allowed to run as self-nominated, and many did so. 50

Paragraph 19 of the 2011 UNHRC General Comment No.34 to the ICCPR requires that “[...] State parties should

proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest”. 51

Paragraph 7.7 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document commits participating States to “ensure that law and

public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which

neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting

their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them”. 52

Paragraph 3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document recognizes “the importance of pluralism with regard to

political organizations”. Paragraph 10.3 compels participating States to “ensure that individuals are permitted to

exercise the right to association, including the right to form, join and participate effectively in non-governmental

organizations which seek the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. See also

paragraphs 8, 12 and 25 of the 1996 UNHRC General Comment No.25 to the ICCPR. Its paragraph 25 reads “to

ensure the full enjoyment of rights protected by article 25, the free communication of information and ideas

about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential”.

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Limitations on activities of civil society organizations should be repealed to comply with OSCE

commitments and other international standards for the right to political participation and the right

to freedom of expression by law and in practice.

The key components of the campaign were meetings with voters, which were required to follow a

strict format designed by the CCER. Such meetings were jointly organised during working hours by

respective DECs and local administrations, primarily in schools, university halls and state

institutions whose employees or students filled auditoriums to their capacity.53

While the CCER

informed the ODIHR EAM that a total of 2,000 meetings took place across the country, political

parties altogether confirmed from 3 to 20 such meetings per a constituency. Candidates had some

10 minutes to present their programme and, at times, respond to questions from the audience. None

of these meetings were advertised to a broader public online, in mainstream media or on public

information boards in mahallas. Such limited engagement with the electorate notably reduced

voters’ ability to assess the candidates independently, key to making an informed choice.

While all parties met with the ODIHR EAM claimed to carry out door-to-door visits, only those of

the PDPT and to some extent of the SDPT were featured in parties’ online media accounts. No

schedule for canvassing was published, and the ODIHR EAM was not able to observe any. Two

parties named mahalla committees in rural localities as a particularly important target audience as

their backing could expand and fortify party’s support base.

Outdoor political advertising comprised a limited number of standardised A3 and A2 size posters

with candidates’ images and biographies, placed primarily at public buildings, fences and in a close

proximity to polling stations. The template poster for all parties was designed by the CCER. In

Dushanbe, the PDPT posters visibly outnumbered those of other contestants. The number and

format of party posters stood in stark contrast with an abundance of large billboards and banners,

featuring the President or his policy statements displayed on roadsides and walls of public and

private buildings.

Online sources and social media were used for campaign purposes only by the PDPT and SDPT.54

The PDPT had a handful of inter-connected Facebook pages, promoting the party and its ability to

implement policies as set by the President in each region. The SDPT leader campaigned from his

personal account; often his posts were followed by numerous negative commentaries posted within

a few minutes.55

Neither the PDPT, nor the SDPT used paid political advertisement on Facebook.

None of the parties used alternative political publicity techniques, including digital information

dissemination tools, social networks or websites to promote the party or its candidates.56

A small amount of paid-for TV airtime was purchased by the APT, PDPT and PERT, while all

seven had quid pro quo deals with a few newspapers. Apart from the PDPT, only the APT and CPT

had seemingly active campaign offices located inside public buildings. Overall, the apparent

53

The ODIHR EAM observed that, at times, participants to those meetings were registered by authorities, some

parties confirmed this to be a common practice. 54

The APT, DPT and SPT had Facebook accounts with less than 160 followers each, last updated in 2015 (two

cases) or 2019 (one case). As of 27 February, parties did not have official accounts on Russian-language popular

social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. 55

Frequency and likeness of multiple comments from otherwise passive accounts indicated an orchestrated effort

to undermine and ridicule the SDPT. 56

None of the parties, including the PDPT, had an active and up to date website; none used SMS to mobilise

voters, none had a YouTube channel or used Twitter.

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uniformity of the campaign and reluctance of parties to raise their profiles independently gave scant

credibility to the official public narrative of a competitive, pluralistic and engaging campaign.57

All parties published their manifestos, none of which challenged the President’s policies or

development plans, scrutinised the performance of the government or offered a viable governance

alternative. Apart from the PDPT, only the APT had alternative proposals on lower-level sectoral

changes. Only the SDPT displayed features of an opposition, yet had limited manpower, reach and

opportunities to engage with voters directly. Consequently, voters were not presented with

genuinely differing political choices. Overall, the lacklustre and election administration-driven

campaign illustrated the detrimental effect of systematic curbs on civic activism and the gradual

removal of voices of dissent.58

Neither the campaign nor party programmes prominently featured gender equality issues. The

PDPT and the CPT had women in decision-making positions; the PDPT and the PERT had a fair

representation of both genders in their candidate lists, while the CPT list was led by a woman.

However, their actual impact on political agenda was limited, as the overall political environment

discourages independent advocacy for issues, including related to gender parity in public and

political life. In addition, cultural and gender stereotypes are also a major deterrent to women’s

political engagement.

X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Electoral campaigns can be financed by public funds and private donations. Public funding is

transferred to electoral contestants after their registration.59

While state funding aims to ensure a

level playing field, all parties informed the ODIHR EAM that public funds could cover only a small

portion of campaign expenditures. Most of the costs were covered by candidates’ own savings,

private donations or contributions from the nominating party, that in turn were primarily financed

by membership fees. Some parties raised funds by a mandatory subscription to a party newspaper.

One candidate sought crowd funding online.

Candidates can contribute to their campaign funds up to TJS 29,000 from their own resources and

parties – up to TJS 58,000. Individual donations to a candidate and a party cannot exceed TJS

2,900, and TJS 5,800, respectively. Legal entities may donate up to TJS 5,800 to a candidate and

TJS 29,000 to a party. Donations from state-owned, anonymous and foreign sources are prohibited.

The spending limit for a majoritarian candidate is set at TJS 87,000 and for a political party – at TJS

1,740,000. None of the parties considered the campaign expenditure ceiling as prohibitive.

Campaign funds are administered through a dedicated bank account, opened by the CCER. The

bank is required to report regularly to the CCER on the status of the account, and inform if a

candidate or a party is overspending. Five parties informed the ODIHR EAM that they did not face

any financial shortages. Other two noted difficulties in securing sufficient campaign funds as many

citizens feared to donate to a political cause. No excessive spending was observed or reported.

57

All public statements by government officials and the CCER stressed the transparency, competitiveness and

pluralism as key characteristics of the campaign. 58

According to paragraph 25 of the 1996 UNHRC General Comment No. 25 to the ICCPR, “full enjoyment of

rights protected by article 25 […] requires the full enjoyment and respect for the rights guaranteed in articles 19,

21 and 22 of the [ICCPR], including freedom to engage in political activity […], freedom to debate public

affairs, to hold peaceful demonstrations and meetings, to criticize and oppose, to publish political material, to

campaign for election and to advertise political ideas”. 59

Each registered candidate was allocated TJS 5,000 and each party TJS 50,000. State funding is calculated on a

basis of an indicator that is reviewed yearly.

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The CCER is mandated to oversee compliance with campaign finance rules. While the election law

includes de-registration of candidates as the only sanction for non-compliance, the Code of

Administrative Offences sets administrative fines for breaches of campaign finance rules.60

However, there are no defined criteria for applying sanctions in the laws or in any CCER

regulation, which could lead to an arbitrary de-registration of candidates.61

The election law foresees the submission of financial reports by all contestants, but it does not

demand disclosure of financial data by parties or the CCER, preventing public scrutiny and

hampering transparency of campaign finance. The CCER informed the ODIHR EAM that although

not all parties had submitted their financial reports, no sanctions would be applied and that public

would not be informed which parties failed to submit the reports. Only one political party published

information on its campaign spending.62

Public disclosure requirements should be introduced to enhance transparency and uphold the

principle of voters making an informed choice. Campaign finance rules could be further

strengthened by providing clearly defined and proportionate sanctions for established violations.

XI. MEDIA

A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship. Primary legislation

provides for the right to freely seek for and receive information, foresees freedom of the press,

ensures access of the media to public information and establishes basic protections for journalists

and owners of the media. However, contrary to international standards calling for decriminalisation

of defamation,63

an insult and slander of the president or other state official, including online, is a

criminal offence punishable by up to five years in prison.64

Importantly, a recent arrest of a

journalist, charged with a vaguely defined “incitement of religious discord”, had a further chilling

60

Breaches include acceptance of donations from illegal sources, spending over the limits established, failure to

submit the financial reports to the CCER. 61

Paragraph 224 of the 2010 ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation

recommends “Sanctions should be applied against political parties found in violation of relevant laws. Sanctions

must at all times be objective, enforceable, effective and proportionate to their specific purpose”. 62

Article 7.3 of the 2003 UNCAC obliges states to “consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative

measures, […] to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where

applicable, the funding of political parties”. According to paragraph 201 of the 2010 ODIHR and Venice

Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, “requirements for the disclosure of political financing are

the main policy instruments for achieving such transparency”. 63

Paragraph 38 of the 2011 UNHRC General Comment No.34 to the ICCPR states that “all public figures,

including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state …, are legitimately subject to

criticism and political opposition. Accordingly, the [CCPR] expresses concern regarding laws on such matters

as… defamation of the head of state and the protection of the honour of public officials, and laws should not

provide for more severe penalties solely on the basis of the identity of the person that may have been impugned.

States parties should not prohibit criticism of institutions, such as the army or the administration”. Paragraph 47

further notes that “defamation laws must be crafted with care to ensure [...] that they do not [...] stifle freedom of

expression. States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation”. 64

In 2012, Articles 135 (Defamation) and 136 (Insult) were removed from the Criminal Code, but Article 137 still

criminalizes the public insult and slander, in broad terms, of the president and other public officials.

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effect on already stifled pre-election reporting environment.65

Several ODIHR EAM interlocutors

characterised the official charge with the incitement as highly disputable.66

Criminalisation of defamation and insult of the president and state officials should be repealed in

favour of proportionate civil sanctions, designed to restore the reputation harmed.

Overall, the media landscape is rich in numbers but not in pluralism and diversity of content, with

the media market heavily dominated by the state.67

Television is the main source of information,

followed by radio and news websites. State TV and radio have the largest audiences, as no private

outlets are licenced to broadcast nationwide. Newspaper circulations are low and limited to the

larger cities.68

Most commercial outlets’ newscasts reproduce stories published by the state-owned

news agency Khovar that is the only authorized source of official information. Overall, this results

in the state effectively monopolising media content and ensuring for a uniform coverage of events

of public relevance, including the elections.

All newspapers with a circulation of more than 100 copies should be registered with the Ministry of

Culture. The State Committee on Television and Radio (SCTR), electronic media regulator, issues

licences to broadcasters. The procedure and criteria for licensing and registration of media are

cumbersome and enable state authorities to hold a monopoly over the media sector.

Only a few online news websites were offering alternative content; most of them operating from

abroad. State authorities often block access to those news websites and social media, and

periodically cut access to mobile and messaging services.69

For example, the popular and outspoken

website Ozodagon continues to be blocked, while other online news websites such as AsiaPlus and

Radio Liberty were sporadically blocked, including during the campaign. Decisions on blocking

and unblocking websites and mobile data exchange services are not public. The decision-making

process lacks transparency and right to effective remedy is not guaranteed. Such state actions do not

conform with international standards and effectively prevent voters from receiving election-related

information from alternative sources.70

The state authorities should maintain open access to the Internet. Any restrictions imposed on

access to online information must be provided for by the law and conform to the strict tests of

necessity and proportionality, as outlined in international standards. The authorities should

establish a transparent procedure and provide clear and exhaustive criteria for exceptional

blocking of online media or social networks.

The election law governs media coverage of the campaign and guarantees equal access to state-

owned outlets for all electoral contestants. The SCTR, which closely cooperates with the CCER,

65

An independent journalist Daler Sharipov was detained on 28 January. National and international organisations

advocating for freedom of expression have called for his immediate release. Over the last decade, most of

independent journalists have been forced in exile or have stopped working in media. 66

See also paragraph 48 of the UNHRC 2019 Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Tajikistan. 67

There are 34 state owned televisions, of which 8 have a nationwide coverage, and some 20 private TV stations;

376 newspapers (including 112 state-owned), 245 magazines (114 state-owned), 71 publishing houses (10 state-

owned) and 10 information agencies (including 1 state-owned). 68

According to the National Association of Independent Media, Imruz newspaper is the country’s only daily

newspaper. 69

The OSCE RFoM on 9 May 2019 called on the authorities to reinstate access to numerous web resources,

including online media, social platforms and Google services, in Tajikistan. 70

Paragraph 15 of the 2011 UNHRC General Comment No.34 reads: “States parties should take all necessary steps

[...] to ensure access of individuals thereto (online media)”. The 2012 UNHRC Resolution on the promotion,

protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet affirms that “the same rights that people have offline

must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression”.

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further oversees and regulates media coverage of the campaign. According to the SCTR, all

candidates in single-mandate constituencies were granted 20 minutes of free airtime and political

parties – 40 minutes. The SCTR did not conduct comprehensive media monitoring to assess the

respect for equality of opportunity in editorial outputs.

In December 2019, the CCER adopted a regulation allotting up to eight pages in national and local

newspapers to parties and candidates. None of the seven parties informed the ODIHR EAM of

being aware of this opportunity and, accordingly, making use of it.

The SCTR has instructed private radio and TV companies to weekly provide their broadcast plans.71

The broadcasters were warned that “measures would be taken” against those who would fail to

submit such plans. Private broadcasters were also urged to air more programmes “promoting

patriotism [and] stressing the importance of Tajikistan’s independence, its traditions, and history”.

Private media saw these demands as “illegal and intrusive”. Such requests do not conform with the

Constitution and international standards for freedom of the media.72

B. MEDIA COVERAGE OF CAMPAIGN

The tone and content of the campaign coverage was set by the state news agency Khovar. From 13

February until the end of the campaign, only 10 per cent of Khovar news were related to elections.73

They primarily featured voter mobilisation messages and CCER meetings with international

observers. More than half of news featured the President, his decisions and policies.

The state-owned broadcasters appeared to follow a similar pattern. Outside of the free airtime, the

reports on daily activities of the President and the government dominated news and current affairs

programmes, leaving little space for coverage of the candidates. State media neither organised

debates between the candidates, nor analysed the campaign within its editorial programming. The

failure of the state media to comprehensively cover the candidates’ campaigns contradicts

paragraph 7.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and other international standards.74

The authorities could consider changing the status of state broadcasters to public media. Editorial

independence and financial autonomy of these media should be guaranteed to ensure public access

to different political views.

Private media largely refrained from featuring candidates and assessing parties or their manifestos.

This reflected the lethargy of the campaign and absence of distinguishable political alternatives.

ODIHR EAM media interlocutors also cited the common practice of not covering sensitive issues,

such as politics and consequently the elections, allowing them to remain in publication, avoiding

prosecution and other forms of pressure and harassment. Most common practices, applied by state

institutions against journalists include license revocation, targeted tax inspections, denial of the use

71

Respective letters were issued on 31 January and 4 February. 72

Paragraph 9.1 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states “everyone will have the right to freedom of

expression, including the right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive

and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. See also

paragraph 25 of the 1996 UNHRC General Comment No. 25 to the ICCPR and paragraphs 39-42 of the 2011

UNHRC General Comment No.34 to the ICCPR. 73

The ODIHR EAM assessed all news published on the website from 13 to 29 February. 74

Paragraph 7.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that participating States will “provide that no

legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory

basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process”. Paragraph 19 of

the 2011 UNHRC General Comment No.34 reads: “States parties should ensure that public broadcasting services

operate in an independent manner. In this regard, States parties should guarantee their independence”.

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of printing facilities, power cuts, limitations on access to official information, and phone calls and

interviews by state security structures.75

Such practices induce self-censorship and hinder the work

of independent media. Overall, the limited coverage of political matters coupled with an absence of

televised debates between the candidates, curbed voters’ ability to make a fully informed choice on

election day.

State authorities should refrain from interfering into journalist and media work to enable them to

carry out their professional duties freely while covering political issues, including party and

candidate activities during the campaign.

In a positive development, some state-owned broadcasters frequently aired voter education

programmes aiming to raise the participation and awareness of voters about the constitution, date of

elections and importance of the principle of one person – one vote. These broadcasts were often

translated into sign language. Positively, sign language was added to many news bulletins.

Social networks were the only platform for a genuine and relatively lively debate on political and

social matters, especially for younger voters. For instance, discussion groups on Facebook, such as

Rozinav, Akhbr Bayor Afkor and Dushanbiest, offered a space for discussion on a range of issues,

including politics. AsiaPlus on its Facebook page published analytical articles, while a few bloggers

on Telegram unveiled pressing social problems. At times, those online discussions challenged or

questioned the political narrative set by the authorities. Overall, in contrast to traditional media, a

handful of online journalists, bloggers, administrators of groups on social networks and their

respective followers were the only ones sustaining a pluralistic debate, although to a limited degree.

XII. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

The election law provides for election observation by contesting parties and self-nominated

candidates as well as by international observers. However, there is no provision for observation by

non-partisan citizen observers, which reduces the transparency of elections and excludes an

impartial domestic scrutiny of critical stages of the process, at odds with OSCE commitments and

international good practice.76

Public reporting by non-partisan election observers could promote

accountability and serve as an important source of information on electoral matters.

Representatives of parties and candidates are registered by the DEC in the constituency they intend

to observe. According to the CCER, 4,910 party and candidate agents were accredited.77

None of

the parties reported difficulties in accrediting their agents. The CCER registered 236 international

observers from four international organisations and several diplomatic representations.78

The legal framework lacks clarity and fails to guarantee observers the right to follow the entire

electoral process. Observers may observe only until 24 hours following the close of polling stations

on election day. Further, observers are not entitled to receive copies of results protocols and

75

Some of Radio Liberty's journalists were unable to obtain accreditation. 76

Paragraph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states: “The participating States consider that the

presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process”. See also paragraph 10 of

1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. Section II.3.2.b. of the 2002 Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in

Electoral Matters advises that “observation must not be confined to the election day itself […]. It must make it

possible to determine whether irregularities occurred before, during or after the elections”. 77

In average from one to two observers per PEC. The CCER did not publish or inform the ODIHR EAM on the

breakdown of national observers per political party. 78

Including ODIHR, Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), The

Executive Committee of the CIS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

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observer presence is not envisaged during the tabulation of results at the DECs. While the ODIHR

EAM had unrestricted access to the DECs and PECs, the mission was not provided essential

electoral data and could not meaningfully observe the actual work of the CCER.

The electoral law should provide for independent, non-partisan citizen election observation, in line

with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. All observers should be afforded the same rights by

law and in practice, explicitly allowing observation of all stages of the electoral process.

XIII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

Electoral dispute resolution processes are regulated by the election law, the code on civil

procedures, the Code of administrative offences and the CCER regulations. Complaints and appeals

procedures are generally in line with international standards and commitments. The law provides

for open hearings, reasonable deadlines for review and there are no court fees for election related

cases.79

Any decision, action or inaction of the election administration can be challenged before a higher

commission or a district or city court. Complaints against CCER decisions can be brought before

the Supreme Court. Both courts and election commissions have the authority to consider first

instance claims; however, the law is clear that courts have precedence over election commissions.

Allegations on breaches of basic freedoms can be filed with the courts and the Ombudsperson.80

The CCER did not receive any complaint and the ODIHR EAM is not aware of any complaint filed

with any court.81

At the same time, the general prosecutor informed the ODIHR EAM about four

inquiries of violations of electoral rights; all out of prosecutor’s purview.82

No electoral offences

were reported to public and to the ODIHR EAM. The absence of formal complaints, despite some

grievances being conveyed to the ODIHR EAM, might indicate the reduced trust in the impartiality

and independence of election administration and judiciary as well as lack of public awareness about

the electoral dispute mechanism.

XIV. ELECTION DAY

In line with ODIHR methodology, the EAM did not conduct a comprehensive or systematic

observation of election day proceedings. Mission members visited a limited number of polling

stations in Dushanbe, Faizabod, Hisor, Rudaki and Vahdat districts on election day, as well as in

Dushanbe and Nurek district during the early voting period.

A. EARLY VOTING AND ELECTION DAY

Early voting, intended for those unable to vote on election day, was available from 23 February.

Several PECs visited by the ODIHR EAM were ill-informed of the early voting procedures.83

This

79

Complaints can be filed within 10 days from the day the alleged irregularity occurred and considered within 3

days or immediately if submitted less than 6 days before elections. 80

The Ombudsperson informed the ODIHR EAM that no such cases were ever reviewed. 81

Judges and election officials alleged that the lack of complaints indicates improved legislation, performance of

the election administration and the absence of Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan in electoral contest. 82

One was submitted by an anonymous claimant, two – by candidates whose registration was rejected based on

previous criminal records, and the fourth by a candidate who did not receive his registration card in time. 83

One PEC visited indicated that early voting was permitted only three days prior to election day and another

indicated that it was not permitted at all.

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indicated that DEC and PEC members were not adequately trained on the election-day procedures.

The CCER did not release any data on turnout during early voting.

Election day proceeded orderly and polling was well organised at the polling stations visited by the

ODIHR EAM. Voting took place between 6.00 and 20.00 and mobile voting was provided for

homebound voters, upon justified request. The limited number of polling stations visited by the

ODIHR EAM were properly equipped, had received their ballot papers and materials on time, and

their layout allowed for an orderly flow of voters. No queues were observed. All polling stations

visited were well staffed and party observers were notably absent. When party observers were

present, they were exclusively from the PDPT.

In all polling stations visited, the ODIHR EAM observed several irregularities, such as instances of

proxy voting and multiple ballots folded together inside the ballot box. Cases of identical signatures

on voter lists, observed in polling stations visited, also indicated either ballot box stuffing or proxy

voting. In all polling stations visited, a significant number of voters were added to the voter list on

election day, including in small villages. PEC members could not provide a plausible explanation as

to why those voters were added in the voter list and allowed to cast their ballots.

The election administration should undertake measures to ensure the integrity of the electoral

process, in particular by preventing proxy voting, multiple voting and ballot box stuffing.

All polling stations visited by the ODIHR EAM were accessible for voters with physical

disabilities, with step-free access and a designated polling booth with seating. Women were well

represented at the PEC level forming more than half of polling station staff in locations visited.84

B. COUNTING

The ODIHR EAM was allowed to observe the count in the polling stations visited, but along with

party agents was requested to remain at a long distance from the count making any observation

effectively impossible. In addition, attempts were made by PEC members to obstruct observers’

view of the procedures, further reducing transparency of the counting process.

In spite of constrains imposed, the ODIHR EAM observed a number of irregularities during

counting. The validity of ballots was not determined in a consistent manner, the reconciliation of

cast ballot papers against the voter list was not conducted, and unused ballot papers and the final

results were not recorded properly. PEC results protocols were not publicly displayed at polling

stations observed, at odds with the election law. Party observers informed the ODIHR EAM that

they were allowed only to record the numbers, but not to take a photocopy or a snapshot of the final

protocol. While visiting a DEC in Dushanbe on 2 March, the ODIHR EAM found no PEC protocols

posted, and no protocol data was provided to the ODIHR EAM upon request. The DEC chair could

not provide any detail on the actual number of votes cast in the constituency or on the candidates

elected, which highlighted the lack of transparency in the ballot counting and tabulation process in

that particular DEC.

Robust procedures for counting and tabulating results and storage of sensitive materials should be

developed and adhered to at all levels of election administration in order to enhance integrity,

accountability and transparency in the result management.

84

The CCER did not provide the ODIHR EAM with the data on the gender composition of the PECs and DECs.

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XV. ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION DAY

DEVELOPMENTS

On 2 March, the CCER announced the preliminary results and reported nationwide turnout at 86.4

per cent in a televised press conference. Announcement was made within the legal deadline of 24

hours of the election. The CCER reported on its performance prior to the elections, vote totals for

proportional race and names of the winners in the single mandate constituencies. The full text of the

announcement was not published on the CCER website. Other essential information, including

disaggregated voter turnout by DEC and PEC, votes cast abroad, number of invalid votes, number

of votes cast for each candidate in single mandate constituencies and winner’s party affiliation, was

also not released.

The election law stipulates that election results be published no later than two weeks after the

elections. The CCER published names of elected deputies for both races on 10 March in the state

newspaper. However, final results protocols were neither published online nor did the CCER

provide such information upon ODIHR EAM’s request. According to the ODIHR EAM party

interlocutors, detailed results were not shared with the parties as well. This way of proceedings does

not conform with international standards and previous ODIHR recommendations related to

transparency and accountability in electoral process. It also prevents voters from scrutinising the

election results independently.85

The lack of published results for each polling station undermined transparency of the elections and

impeded candidates’ and political parties’ ability to assess their electoral support as well as could

preclude them from requesting a re-count or from submitting a complaint if desired.86

Further, there

was no standard procedure for the storage and transportation of election materials.

In line with basic principles for transparency and accountability, the CCER should publish full

preliminary and final results for all races in a timely manner, disaggregated by polling stations.

Six parties received seats in the Majlisi Namoyandagon, with the PDPT having the absolute

majority. Apart from the PDPT, the APT and PERT are entitled to form a faction. According to the

CCER, winners in all single-mandate constituencies scored more than 50 per cent of votes,

eliminating the need for a re-run.

None of the six parties that entered the Majlisi Namoyandagon raised publicly any issues with the

outcome of elections. The leader of the SDPT, on his Facebook page, denounced the results citing

politically motivated fraudulent activities of the authorities. However, no complaints were filed

either with the CCER or the courts. The absolute majority of media merely cited the CCER

announcement, as published by the official news agency. Only Radio Liberty and AsiaPlus offered

a journalistic analysis of elections and interviewed political parties about their views on results and

the electoral process. In line with the presidential decree, the newly elected Majlisi Namoyandagon

convened on 17 March.

85

Paragraph 20 of the 1996 UNHRC General Comment No.25 reads: “There should be independent scrutiny of the

voting and counting process […] so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of

the votes”. Article 10 of the 2003 UNCAC states that State party shall take such measures as may be necessary

to enhance transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning and

decision-making processes. 86

All electoral stakeholders, including voters, could request recounts, but no one exercised this right.

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XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations, as contained throughout the text, are offered to further enhance the

conduct of elections in Tajikistan and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE

commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections.87

These

recommendations should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that Tajikistan

has yet to address. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Tajikistan to further improve the

electoral process and address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.

A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A comprehensive review of the electoral legal framework should be undertaken in an open and

inclusive manner to eliminate the significant shortcomings identified in this and prior ODIHR

reports.

2. State authorities should refrain from interfering into journalist and media work to enable them

to carry out their professional duties freely while covering political issues, including party and

candidate activities during the campaign.

3. The CCER members’ selection process should include adequate transparency and

accountability measures to ensure the CCER is independent from both government institutions

and parliament in the execution of its mandate. Security of tenure for CCER commissioners

should be strengthened.

4. The accuracy of voter lists should be improved, with consideration given to the introduction of

a permanent, centralized voter register. The voter register should be comprehensively updated

ahead of each election and be centrally checked for errors and multiple registrations.

5. The electoral law should provide for independent, non-partisan citizen election observation, in

line with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. All observers should be afforded the same

rights by law and in practice, explicitly allowing observation of all stages of the electoral

process.

6. Robust procedures for counting and tabulating results and storage of sensitive materials should

be developed and adhered to at all levels of election administration in order to enhance

integrity, accountability and transparency in the result management.

7. In line with basic principles for transparency and accountability, the CCER should publish full

preliminary and final results for all races in a timely manner, disaggregated by polling stations.

87

In paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document, all OSCE participating States committed themselves “to

follow-up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations”. The follow-up of prior

recommendations is assessed by the ODIHR EAM as follows: recommendations 20 and 29 from the ODIHR

final report on the 2015 parliamentary elections (2015 Final Report) are fully implemented. The

recommendations, 19 and 27 from the ODIHR final report on the 2013 presidential election (2013 Final Report)

are mostly implemented. The recommendations 13, 14 and 21 from the 2015 Final Report, and 13 from the 2013

Final Report are partially implemented.

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B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

8. To ensure universal suffrage the authorities should consider ratifying the UN Convention on

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and consistently apply its provisions.

9. The CCER regulations could be reviewed and published to adequately supplement the legal

framework in order to ensure that procedural aspects are sufficiently detailed and published in

line with the principles of legal certainty and access to information.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

10. Constituency boundaries should be regularly revised to uphold the constitutional principle of

vote equality, the provisions of the election law, OSCE commitments and other international

standards. To enhance the transparency, the revision process should involve broad public

consultation.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

11. The DEC and PEC formation process should ensure impartiality of the election administration

and be based on transparent selection criteria. Further safeguards should be developed and

implemented to ensure that the DECs and PECs are independent from central and local

government.

12. The CCER should utilize its website as an instrument to enhance transparency of the electoral

process. Information of public interest, including all CCER decisions and key electoral data,

should be made publicly available in a format that enables easy and prompt access.

VOTER REGISTRATION

13. Restrictions on the voting rights of citizens serving prison terms regardless of the severity of

the crime should be reconsidered to ensure proportionality between the limitation imposed and

the severity of the offence. The restrictions on the voting rights of persons based on the

intellectual and psycho-social disabilities should be removed.

14. A legal deadline for closing voter lists prior to election day could be introduced.

Supplementary registration of voters on election day should only be permitted in accordance

with clearly defined legal requirements, subject to judicial or administrative control, with

effective safeguards against multiple registrations.

CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

15. The residency requirement, the blanket restriction on the right to stand due to a previous

criminal conviction or exclusion for being under investigation should be reconsidered and

brought in line with international standards and good practice.

16. The CCER should publish a consolidated list of nominated and registered candidates

disaggregated by political party and gender for both the nationwide and single mandate

constituencies, including on its website and in a format that respects voters’ right to easy and

prompt access to such information.

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CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

17. The role of electoral management bodies and local authorities in defining campaign modalities

should be substantially reduced enabling candidates and parties to design and conduct their

campaigns independently. The Law on Meetings, Demonstrations and Street Processions

should be amended to require a simple notification procedure rather than an authorization.

18. Limitations on activities of civil society organizations should be repealed to comply with

OSCE commitments and other international standards for the right to political participation and

the right to freedom of expression by law and in practice.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

19. Public disclosure requirements should be introduced to enhance transparency and uphold the

principle of voters making an informed choice. Campaign finance rules could be further

strengthened by providing clearly defined and proportionate sanctions for established

violations.

MEDIA

20. Criminalisation of defamation and insult of the president and state officials should be repealed

in favour of proportionate civil sanctions, designed to restore the reputation harmed.

21. The state authorities should maintain open access to the Internet. Any restrictions imposed on

access to online information sources must be provided for by the law and conform to the strict

tests of necessity and proportionality, as outlined in international standards. The authorities

should establish a transparent procedure and provide clear and exhaustive criteria for

exceptional blocking of online media or social networks.

22. The authorities could consider changing the status of state broadcasters to public media.

Editorial independence and financial autonomy of these media should be guaranteed to ensure

public access to different political views.

ELECTION DAY

23. The election administration should undertake measures to ensure the integrity of the electoral

process, in particular by preventing proxy voting, multiple voting and ballot box stuffing.

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ANNEX I –ELECTION RESULTS

The information below is based on the data announced at the CCER press conference held on 2

March.88

Political Party

Votes Cast

(Nationwide

District)

Percentage

(Nationwide

District)

Nationwide

seats

Single-

mandate

seats

Total seats

PDPT 2,139,741 50.4 12 35 47

PERT 705,252 16.6 4 1 5

APT 700,582 16.5 4 3 7

SPT 218,696 5.2 1 0 1

DPT 216,526 5.1 1 0 1

CPT 132,000 3.1 0 2 2

SDPT 13,735 0.3 0 No

candidates

nominated

0

Self-nominated Not reported Not reported Not reported

Votes against all 52,030 1.4

Turnout 4,260,951 86.4

Registered voters 4,929,128

88

The CCER did not publish preliminary and final election results at their website. The number of the seats

received by the PDPT includes the number of self-nominated candidates elected and affiliated with the PDPT.

ABOUT ODIHR

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the OSCE’s principal

institution to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (...) to build,

strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society”

(1992 Helsinki Summit Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.

ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris

Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to

reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over

150 staff.

ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. Every year, it co-ordinates

and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE

region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards

for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth

insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps

participating States to improve their electoral framework.

The Office’s democratization activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic

governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a

number of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.

ODIHR also assists participating States’ in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect human

rights and fundamental freedoms consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is

achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide

expertise in thematic areas including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the

human rights protection of trafficked persons, human rights education and training, human rights

monitoring and reporting, and women’s human rights and security.

Within the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, ODIHR provides support to the participating

States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-

Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-

discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring,

reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as

educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.

ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on Roma and Sinti. It promotes

capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the

participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.

All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE

participating States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international

organizations.

More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).