Reprinted fromTheAmerican Ecclesiastical Review Vol. CLIX ... · four aisles, shadowless lighting,...

ABORTION AND CATHOLIC FAITH

BY

GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

Associate Professor of PhilosophyGeorgetown University

Reprinted from The American Ecclesiastical ReviewVol. CLIX, No. 2, August 1968

Made in the United States of America

Abortion and Catholic Faith

GERMAIN G. GRISEZ*

At five in the afternoon of 10 May, 1968, the tenth International Colloquium on Sexology convened under the sponsorship of the CardinalSuenens International Center at the Catholic University of Louvain,Belgium. Over one-hundred-fifty registered participants came—theologians,biologists, physicians, lawyers, philosophers, sociologists, journalists, educators, pastors, and psychologists. More than half of them from Belgiumitself, but the list also included almost thirty from France, about tenfrom the U.S., seven from England, five from Canada, four each fromEire and the Netherlands, three from Italy, and one or two from eachof eight other countries. The flags of the nations of participants weresnapping in the wind outside the meeting hall, a contemporary buildinglocated in a new part of Louvain's campus. Representing only themselves,the participants gathered for scientific discussions rather than for practicaldeliberation.

The common interest which brought together this diverse group wasabortion. For that was the theme of the conference, a grey area thatmatched the drabness of the Belgian sky. And the focus within the tangledarea of abortion was the especially grey area of legally authorized abortion—a medical procedure that many of the medical men may be asked toperform and that many of the theologians and others may be asked toadvise about.

Beginning with discussions of love and self-control in 1959, the; annualColloquium at Louvain had advanced to an examination of birth-regulation in 1965, and now in its tenth year the group was ready to discuss the

♦Associate Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

96

Abortion and Catholic Faith 97

difficult problems of abortion—a topic which goes beyond the medico-moralissues of sex to involve the medico-moral and legal issues of killing.

As the subject matter of the Colloquium has evolved over the years, sohas its format. In earlier meetings, participation was limited to a selectgroup which met in a private home. But for the meeting on abortion,invitations to participate were extended much more widely, and thesessions were held in a modern lecture hall. The hall, with tiered seating,

four aisles, shadowless lighting, excellent acoustics, and the most modernelectronic equipment, was an ideal setting for such a conference.

As participants gathered, we found every provision had been made forour convenience and comfort. The hotel, Hof Terbank, provided excellentservice and very good (if minimum) accommodations for $4.10 per day,tax and tip included. The languages of the Colloquium were French andEnglish, but simultaneous translation service—similar to that at the UnitedNations—was provided, with a headset at every place.

American delegates were asked to convey the thanks of the CardinalSuenens Center to Dr. Mary S. Calderone for the simultaneous translationfacility. (Mrs. Calerone edited the volume, Abortion in the U.S., fromthe 1955 conference sponsored by the Planned Parenthood Federation;precisely what fund she drew upon to provide translation service atLouvain was not announced, but the facilities were very good, and thedonor certainly deserves the thanks of all participants who made use ofthem.)

The fee for registration at the Colloquim was only $5.00, an amountthat would hardly have covered more than the preliminary correspondenceand preparations. At the meeting each participant received a prepareddossier of summaries of papers and other useful information, all enclosedin a plastic folder with an individual plastic name tab.

The participants were given, without additional charge, six excellentmeals with wine at the~ lunches and dinners. Although an occasionalnostalgic remark about the old days when the Colloquium was morepersonal indicated that participants of former years felt something important had been lost in the process of moving into the big-time, newparticipants (like myself) felt the meeting was very well produced andmanaged.

98 The American Ecclesiastical Review

The program of the Colloquium consisted of invited papers (longerpapers, specifically arranged for by the organizers), contributed papers orcommunications (shorter papers, volunteered by participants and acceptedby the organizers), and discussions (rather brief and formal periods ofcomment both by those on the program and by other participants). Thegroup remained together during all the formal sessions; no sectionalmeetings or small discussion groups were allowed for in the program.

The rather full program ran from late Friday afternoon until late Sunday afternoon. Meals provided some opportunity for informal discussion,although the noise in the dining hall prevented more than half-a-dozen persons from engaging in a single conversation. Much of the informal discussion took place after dinner and extended late into the ni^ht. At anyColloquium or Conference, such informal contacts are quite important.But since each participant has a different group of such experiences, eachone's general impression of the whole meeting will be unique.

In this report I will be concerned only with the content of the publicsessions (at which at least one working journalist also was present). Myreport is based on the pre-printed summaries and on my notes, whichdepended upon the translation service for material delivered orally inFrench. Therefore, while I have made every effort to be accurate, there isa certain possibility of misinterpretation. In analyzing the vast bulk ofthe material in order to note the more interesting points, various individuals who spoke in diverse contexts sometimes are grouped together.In these cases, it is important to realize that frequently those who agreeupon one point may disagree quite radically on another.

A very interesting presentation early in the program was that of Mme.Dr. Genevieve Abiven, a psychiatrist from Paris. She pointed out thatabortion for the sake of the mother's mental health is almost totally without scientific foundation. In reality, such abortion is a method of disposingof pregnancies that women, and perhaps also society at large, simply donot wish to accept. One of the most telling points in this analysis wasthat the use of such a specious excuse certainly indicates that somethingimportant is not being faced honestly. Mme. Abiven returned to thispoint in later discussions, noting that the tendency of both physicians andmoralists to let the other group decide revealed some unadmitted need forevasion.


In general, however, the biological, medical, and psychiatric paperswere not impressive. Dr. H. van den Berghe of Louvain presented aninvited paper on eugenic indications for abortion. One familiar with thesubject could follow the paper and recognize all the familiar, horribleexamples. Those unfamiliar with the material may have been impressed bythe examples, but they had difficulty following the exposition, which wasnot reduced to non-technical language.

In another long and not especially interesting invited paper, Dr. M.Chartier of Paris presented a technical statement of various methods ofabortion and their medical uses and limitations. Dr. A. Hustinx of The

Hague read a very long contributed paper describing the procedure forsorting applications for abortion at the hospital in Leiden. He stressedthe long discussion that precedes any approval.

One tendency in the more biological-medical part of the conference wastoward agreement that from a scientific point of view there is no particularstage at which one can draw a sharp line in the continuous process of humandevelopment. Thus it seems one cannot say scientifically that prior to acertain point the developing individual is not human (and may be killed).Dr. M. Renaer of Louvain, who chaired one of the discussions, observedthis tendency toward consensus, but also argued that this did not settlethe matter for practical purposes.

Yet the issue has to be settled precisely for practical purposes. FatherArthur McCormack, a member of the Pontifical Commission on Justiceand Peace, urged in a discussion that some definite conclusion be soughtconcerning whether life is human and inviolable from conception. If it is,he argued, then several current methods of birth control, including intrauterine devices, would be abortifacient.

This argument, together with almost everything said at the Colloquium,implicitly assumed that contraception is morally unobjectionable, and thatthere is no point in even discussing this. Paul VI has not yet spoken, butfew at the Colloquium seemed to be waiting to hear from him.

M. Rene Simon, a philosopher-theologian from Paris, made one attemptto answer the question Father McCormack was concerned about. In a

contributed paper, M. Simon, combining Aristotelian philosophy withmodern science, argued that the early embryo is not yet capable of fully


human life. Dr. J. Ferin of Louvain cited the figures of Hertig which suggest a high rate of loss of life very early in pregnancy; although Dr. Ferindid not assert that these showed anything, these data often are used toargue that the developing individual cannot be regarded as human fromconception.

Another contributed paper, by Professor J. Liefooghe and M. Gaudefroyof Lille, attempted to settle the question by some rather arbitrary definitions. According to them, abortion is impossible until after implantation—that is, around the time of the first missed period after conception. (Thereare about two weeks between conception and the first missed period.) Thecolleagues diverged rather sharply in the discussion, for Dr. Liefooghewanted to define specifically human life by a characteristic pattern of brainwaves, which does not appear until rather late in pregnancy, while Dr.Gaudefroy held that life is human from conception and that killing it atany stage would be wrong.

Monsignor Victor Heylen, a moral theologian at Louvain, presentedsome history of discussions about when the developing individual receivesa human soul. Theologians in different eras have held various views. ButMonsignor Heylen also speculated in the direction of regarding the trulypersonal as socio-cultural rather than biological. At the same time, withsome confusion, he hoped that the scientists would solve the problem, andpending a definitive answer he speculated on the possibility of sacrificingthe questionably human lives of the unborn for the certainly human livesof those already living.

In subsequent discussion, a number of other suggestions were made inthe general direction of putting the inviolability of the unborn in question.Monsignor Heylen mentioned that Canon Law does not invoke canonicalpenalties against abortion unless something is expelled. (This of coursedoes not touch the moral issue, but merely the question of whether thoseguilty are excommunicated or not.)

Dr. Liefooghe argued that the person is a collection, similar to a heapof wheat, and that at some point of smallness the embryo could not beregarded as a person, just as at some point in taking grains away froma heap, it would no longer be a heap.

Father Marc Oraison observed that one does not have funerals for three-

month old fetuses as one has for infants.


Professor Louis Dupre, a philosopher at Georgetown University inWashington, wished to distinguish between life and human life. He heldthat human life is defined by something transcending the material. Theargument about when the soul is inserted is irrelevant, and it depends onprimitive notions of soul and body. Better to admit that life begins at conception, but that there are degrees of humanity. Thus the life is more orless human in a continuous process of development. This suggestion, thathuman life and consequent inviolability is subject to degree, returned insome of the subsequent discussions. If it were accepted, abortion might beconsidered legitimate on the ground that the less human must give wayto the more human (those alreadyborn).

There were some sharp replies to these arguments. Mme. Dr. MicheleGuy, a physician from Grenoble, France, argued strongly that there is continuity of development and that there is no reasonable point at which todraw a line. Moreover, against Monsignor Heylen's point that doubt ofthe fact might permit abortion, Dr. Guy urged that the presumption incase of doubt must be that the unborn is a person. One who kills what forall he knows is a person, is willing to kill a person.

Contrary to the widespread notion that women are more favorable toabortion than are men, the women at the Colloquium seemed to be uniformly against it. Mme. Marie-Therese van Lunen, a Belgian journalist,insisted that the Christian tradition did not accept the notion that theunborn might not be persons and could therefore bekilled. She also pointedout that mothers who lose a baby by accident are always convinced it ishappy, whether that is good theology or not.

At another point in the Colloquium, Mme. van Lunen contributed herown excellent paper highlighting the role of propaganda in the development of abortion-mindedness. Her telling comments were clear and to thepoint, and included a good many fresh insights. Her paper was a bit longand was cut off before its conclusion—the only paper in the Colloquium tobe terminated in this way, although some of the other contributed papersalso were much beyond the established limit.

Father Enda McDonagh, a moral theologian at Maynooth, Ireland,argued both in his paper and in later comments that a human individualis equally human at every stage of his life. True, at later stages of development certain functions are achieved that are not possible at earlier


stages. Still the earlier stages are fully human too, for throughout life aman is a potential and developing being. At no one moment does he havethe perfection of his whole life; the total reality of human life is found onlyin the unity of the whole from beginning to end. No one part of a humanbeing's life is more essential, more human, than any other part.

In my own contributed paper, I tried to clarify the problem with a coupleof distinctions. We should not confuse the concept of "living humanindividual" with that of "person." The former concept belongs to biology,and from this point of view it is clear that each human individual comes tobe at conception. The concept of "person" is ultimately a metaphysical andtheological notion. Thus it is a mistake to expect science to determinewhether the unborn are persons or not. Still, such a determination is notso central to the issues concerning the morality of abortion as might seemto be the case. For if we think the person has a reality transcending thispresent life, then persons cannot be destroyed, and neither abortion norany other kind of homicide will be regarded as immoral because a personas such is destroyed. Rather, homicide will be thought wrong because itdeprives a person of his human, bodily life—the very life we know scientifically begins at conception.

I also tried to respond to Professor Dupre's suggestion that human lifemight be subject to degree, to Father Oraison's remark about the lack of afuneral liturgy for the fetus, and to Dr. Liefooghe's analogy between theperson and a heap of wheat. All such arguments, it seemed td me, ignoredthe distinction between mytho-poetic meaning and analytic meaning. Inmytho-poetic meaning there is no room for definiteness; everything blendsinto everything else, and things come to be by gradual emergence. Forsuch thinking it makes sense to imagine that a person comes to be bydegrees. Thus the analogy to the heap of wheat, and thus the lack of afuneral rite for very early fetuses. Thus also the plausibility in the ideathat some human beings—the unborn, for example, or Negroes—are lesshuman than others.

Analytic thinking, by contrast, admits that while a given thing can bemore or less in various ways, a thing cannot be more or less what it is.Thus a human being can be more or less deeply pigmented and can be moreor less fully grown. But it is nonsense, from any scientific or legal point ofview, to think of human beings as more or less human. Those who want to


rationalize any sort of attack on human beings and their rights naturallyresort to mytho-poetic thinking. But analytic thinking must be employedif we wish to learn what is and what is not morally right.

Father McDonagh's paper was the main paper on the moral aspects ofabortion. The paper had been invited only a few weeks before the Colloquium, but it was very well written and showed the results of a gooddeal of thought. The substance of this paper was a fairly clear discussion,without any definite conclusion, of ethical issues involved in abortion. Butthe manner in which the paper was written suggested its author's sympathy for the view that in some cases abortion is not morally wrong. Thissuggestion was conveyed in several ways. Father McDonagh labeled thetraditional Catholic precept forbidding abortion "the present, official position," while he referred to a recent Anglican report approving abortion incertain difficult cases as a "considerable Protestant development." RecentProtestant teaching was given the honorific title "more flexible"; we wereassured that this "more flexible" teaching did not mean that other Chris

tians had "sold out."

Father McDonagh also pointed out that the traditional position allowsthe baby all the rights and no responsibilities, and he asked whether this isfair. Again, he argued that not merely the fact of life but the quality oflife is the object of "Christian concern." He suggested that moral theologycould not reach decisive conclusions independent of the intuitions and experience of those who might be called upon to perform abortions. And hetreated the condemnation of abortion as a conditional right, thus indicatingthat the rejection of abortion is not a strict duty for all Christians andteachers of the Christian faithful.

The substance of the paper followed a pattern that has been used oftenin the contraception debate. First, a review of "present" Catholic andother Christian positions. Then a glance into history, which reveals thatcertain Catholic moralists have at times approved abortion in difficult cases.(This was during an epoch when it was believed, quite mistakenly, thatscience can demonstrate that the embryo is not "ensouled" during the firstsix or twelve weeks of life.) Next, the sound point, mentioned above,concerning the unity of human life. Father McDonagh does not proposeto evade the moral issue by the easy but intellectually confused route ofquestioning the basic humanity of the unborn. After that, the argument


that the traditional prohibition of killing has allowed some exceptions—for example, the just war, capital punishment, and self-defense. Evenin the area of abortion, killing has been permitted if it is indirect. ByFather McDonagh's definition: "Indirect killing, where one did not willthe death of another but merely permitted it, followed from an action notof itself directed to his death but to the achievement of some comparablegood. His death followed as a per accidens, if inevitable, consequence ofone's good action."

Here we must stop a moment and notice that traditional moral teachinghas indeed accepted the moral legitimacy of indirect abortion, although thedefinition of "indirect" has usually been rather more strict than FatherMcDonagh suggested. The typical example of an indirect abortion wouldbe the surgical removal of a cancerous womb, even though the developingembryo within that womb surely would die. In cases such as this, thesurgical procedure has not even been regarded as abortion; from themedical point of view, the abortion was an incidental and inevitable consequence of a vitally necessary procedure that first of all was directed toanother and legitimate goal.

Father McDonagh, however, did not stop to exemplify and limit theprinciple. Instead he mentioned two recent theories, one that of theProtestant theologian, Paul Ramsey, who would permit abortion whenthe mother's life is at stake on the ground that the unborn may then beregarded as material aggressors—as one would regard a maniac makingan attempt on one's life. In such cases, self-defense is legitimate even ifit means killing the attacker. The other theory, proposed by some Catholictheologians to support arguments in favor of contraception, is that thegood motive alone is enough to make an act indirect, even if the surgicalprocedure itself is nothing but what is usually condemned. By this rule,whichis very flexible indeed, all abortions become indirect if there is a goodenough reason for them.

Having opened up the traditional position concerning abortion wherethe mother's life is at stake—without taking a definite stand on it—FatherMcDonagh proceeded to raise the cases of the mother's health, of pregnancy resulting from rape, and of the unborn with a probable defect. Ingeneral, he seemed unenthusiastic about the prospect of extending moralapproval to abortion in all these cases, though he did not absolutely


exclude any of them. Honestly admitting that there is an inherent dynamismwhich tends always to enlarge the grounds on which killing is permitted, heseemed troubled by his inability to limit a process on which he took it forgranted moral thought must embark.

In the final section of his paper, he suggested some of the general framework that he thinks should govern consideration of the morality of abortion. He accepts the currently popular "personalistic" view according towhich morality is a function of a person's response to others in given situations. From this viewpoint, one may assume certain general values, whichbecome determined oilly through personal experience in life. The ultimatestandard is the well-being of the perfect human community, which for theChristian becomes identified as the worldly aspect of the Kingdom of God.

With this background, he drew his most important conclusion. Hewould like to turn attention away from the prohibition of abortion, forhe regards negative rules as relatively unimportant. Instead, he wouldhave us seek better solutions for the real needs of those who have abortions.

Within this positive context of care for others, he would permit us todiscuss the limit cases. How we are to settle them, except by a balancingof everyone's rights, he did not suggest.

This paper ought to have been subjected to immediate and thoroughdiscussion. However, the program had been arranged to preclude immediate discussion. Two invited papers, one of them my own, concluded thelong Saturday's sessions. Sunday morning began with a scientific report oncurrent research, by Dr. Jacques Ferin of Louvain. Then an invited paperon legal aspects of abortion and three contributed papers on ethical-legalaspects. Only after all these papers, just before the mid-day meal, wastime allowed for a brief discussion of moral and legal aspects, coveringthe eight papers beginning with Father McDonagh's. Of course, noserious exploration of the issues developed.

The invited legal paper, by Professor P.-E. Trousse of Louvain, mainlyreviewed the actual state of law in various countries. However, there

were some general observations. The legal concept of abortion, according

to Dr. Trousse, includes deadly intervention during the entire period ofpregnancy from the very beginning. The law does not recognize any distinction between life and human (personal) life. The laws against abortionwere essentially Christian in their inspiration. The legal permission of abor-


tion under very wide indications, particularly at the mother's mere request,easily leads to a justification of infanticide.

Here M. Trousse spoke with considerable authority, for he was a participant at the famous Liege trial, at which a woman who had killed herbaby, one deformed by thalidomide, won acquittal from a sympatheticjury. The woman's defense ultimately came to the simple statement: "Afterall, it was my child."

But instead of concluding that abortion should be legally prohibitedaltogether, Professor Trousse only asked that some legal conditions beestablished in order that it not be permitted simply at the mother's demand.He felt that a social judgment has to be made to permit abortion in difficultcases.

The presentations of Father McDonagh from a moral theological viewpoint and of Professor Trousse from a legal viewpoint paved the wayfor the concluding "summary" or synthesis of Monsignor Victor Heylen,Louvain moral theologian. This paper was much more than a summaryof what had gone before. It was in fact an integrated argument which madeuse of some of the earlier presentations but which extended beyond anyof them. However, the position of this paper in the program, after the lastperiod of discussion, altogether precluded objection to it by other participants.

Monsignor Heylen's argument assumed that abortion is not intrinsicallyimmoral. He spoke at length about the value and sacredness of life, and thegeneral wish to reject abortion and all other activities that attack life.Still, despite this emphasis on the positive, he opened the door to theapproval of abortion both by moral theology and by law. The moraltheological argument rested on the supposition that the evil of abortionholds true only in general. In exceptional cases, where there is a conflictof rights, abortion may be the best possible course of action—for example,when the life of the mother is at stake. Here he disdained any attempt atanalysis in terms of direct and indirect abortion, and treated the problemstraightforwardly as a matter of exceptions to a rule. The rule is onlygenerally valid; exceptions are justified in particular situations.

The theory of exceptions was supplemented by the notion that doing thelesser evil is sometimes necessary because of man's undeveloped condition.


The ideal simply is not attainable by men who are at a very imperfect stateof development. Thus regrettable necessities can be morally approved.

A further step in the argument was that man must exercise a ministerialpower over human life itself. God gave man responsibility over visiblecreation. This responsibility, though it is not absolute lordship, must befulfilled as well as possible, even when that means the killing of humanbeings. Man's bodily life, after all, does not define his human personality,for man transcends the animal by his interior spirit.

But what of the strong condemnation of abortion, even from the momentof conception, issued by Vatican II? Monsignor Heylen was not in theleast deterred by this condemnation. For him, it is only a statement ofthe general principle, which remains valid despite the exceptions to itthat must be made. The fact that the Council did not specifically mentionindirect abortion was assumed by him in support of his interpretation,although generally he displayed no interest in the traditional distinctionbetween direct and indirect abortion. (It could also have been argued,if the opportunity had been permitted for argument, that Vatican IIassumed the traditional distinction, which does not regard indirect abortion as a human act of abortion at all. Monsignor Heylen's way of proceeding, however, treats as morally acceptable acts which he admits to beabortion properly so-called.)

With regard to the laws, he stressed the distinction between moralityand law, including canon law. He suggested that the past legal rejectionof abortion was based upon the interests of the mother. Assuming theposition that law should reflect the consensus of opinion in society, heseemed to conclude in favor of laws permitting abortion under a list ofspecified conditions.

Leon Joseph Cardinal Suenens, Archbishop of Malines-Brussels, concluded the conference with some "pastoral" comments. Actually the talkwas rather long and rambling, and the Cardinal managed to include agreat deal. He noted with satisfaction that the Colloquium had progressedover the years. He stressed strongly the positive values of life and theaction that should be taken to alleviate the problems which lead to abortion.

But Cardinal Suenens also essentially subscribed to the position Monsignor Heylen had outlined. The heart of the matter was expressed briefly


in the opinion that moral theology can only give a general guide or background. Exceptional cases must be treated on a secondary plane, not by atheological casuistry. In the concrete, moral theology, conscience, andpersonal sensitivity must all converge toward a solution. Although theword "compromise" was not used, the idea seemed to underlie thisnotion of "convergence"—that a concrete moral judgment must be acompromise between principles and the necessities of each situation.

Although one American presented an invited paper and four othersgave contributed papers, none of these was among the most importantpapers of the Colloquium.

Dr. Bernard Pisani, of St. Vincent's Hospital in New York, presentedthe opening, invited paper. It was concerned with medical indications forabortion. Dr. Pisani noted that such indications have shrunk almost to

none and he took a firm stand against expanding legalized abortion. Thispresentation, like others that ran against the main current of thought atthe Colloquium, was neither attacked nor commented upon. It was simplyignored.

Father James T. McHugh, Director of the U. S. Catholic Conference'sFamily Life Bureau, summarized developments in the United States withrespect to the campaign to loosen the abortion laws. He also summarizedthe results of the international conference on abortion that was held in

Washington last year under the joint sponsorship of the Harvard DivinitySchool and the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation. This conference,while it did not establish a single position, brought together Catholic andnon-Catholic scholars, and tended toward the same general position towhich the Louvain Colloquium seemed to be directed: the moral acceptanceof abortion in exceptional cases and its legalization within defined limits.However, Father McHugh did not note this coincidence. (In his remarks,Cardinal Suenens mentioned the Harvard-Kennedy conference, and notedthat Sargent Shriver, who was active in arranging that meeting, had beenin communication with him.)

Dr. Frank Ayd, a Baltimore psychiatrist, prepared a paper which wasread for him by Mrs. Ayd. Dr. Ayd strongly attacked attempts to loosenthe laws concerning abortion. For him, these attempts really aim not at afew difficult cases but at an easy solution to vast socio-economic problems


of eugenics, population, and poverty, and to the personal problem of thefailure of contraception. This paper, the last before Monsignor Heylen's"summary," was completely ignoredby it, though Dr. Ayd argued plausiblythat seemingly moderate liberalization of the abortion laws is only one stepalong a path toward euthanasia and other violations of human life.

My own contributed paper was limited to the fifteen minutes the program officially allowed for such papers. Hence I made no effort to developan argument against abortion, because to make a plausible case would takea good deal more time than that. I presented a few distinctions which Ifelt might help the discussion avoid confusion.

In addition to points mentioned previously, I argued that those whofavor abortion must proceed with a very definite understanding of manand the meaning of human life, since otherwise they could not have theself-assurance to know that they have justification for killing. Those whooppose abortion, on the other hand, really wish to keep open the possibilityof what man can be, and so they cannot tell when killing is justified. Ipointed out also that one cannot take for granted the view that just law ismade simply by a majority consensus, since there are rights that even themajority cannot take away.

Professor Elmer T. Gelinas, philosopher at St. Mary's College inCalifornia, argued that St. Thomas Aquinas' theory of natural law allowedexceptions to all moral norms. Hence Dr. Gelinas wished to justifyabortion in some cases. Begging the question at issue, he argued: justicerequires that we practicemercy rather than adhere to the strict requirementof a general norm.

In the discussion, I criticized Professor Gelinas' paper, both because Ithought it inappropriate to try to settle the issue by invoking the authorityof a theologian, even one of St. Thomas' stature, and because I believed

the interpretation of Aquinas to be erroneous. Interestingly enough,Monsignor Philippe Delhaye, a Louvain theologian, also attacked ProfessorGelinas for confusing theology and philosophy and for presenting atheory of natural law that was neither true to St. Thomas nor to anymodern theory. Monsignor Delhaye was anxious to exclude any traditionalsolution that might involve casuistry. Thus Professor Gelinas was caughtin a cross-fire. And though he wished to reply, Monsignor Heylen found


no opportunity for him to do so during the too brief discussion. In the midstof battle, there was no time to worry about the casualties!

Another American present, though not on the program, was Dr. FrankNotestein, until recently President of the Population Council. This organization has played an important role in funneling foundation and U. S.Government funds into birth control programs around the world as well asinto various research projects. Dr. Notestein's presence showed thefriendly interest of the Population Council in the Louvain Colloquium. Heinquired when we met if I were the person who had received a grant fromthe Population Council to come to the Colloquium. I answered that I hadnot received such a grant. He explained that he thought I might be theindividual, because it was someone whose name began wih "G."

In general, the Colloquium pointed to the following conclusions:

1) Individual human life begins at conception.

2) Whether such life is to be regarded as personal and inviolable or notis disputed.

3) In general, abortion must be considered morally wrong and it shouldbe subjected to legal restrictions.

4) In exceptional cases, going beyond the cases traditionally consideredas indirect abortion, abortion must be considered morally licit.

5) Law should lay down conditions permitting abortion in difficult cases.

Of course, there was no vote on these points. And it would not even be fairto say they represented a consensus, since many present never spoke. Butthese seem to indicate the main trend of the discussion—they contain themessage toward which the entire drama seemed to be directed.

Some participants remarked to me privately that they considered theinvited papers non-representative. Their feeling was that opinion generally,especially in France, is much less ready to accept abortion than would haveappeared from the program's presentations. My own feeling was that thosemanaging the program were quite fair to me. My only question wouldconcern the order of papers and discussions, which did not permit discussion of Monsignor Heylen's very arguable theses and which curtailed veryseverely discussion of all the ethical-legal issues. But I would rather think


this resulted from bad planning than from bad faith on the part of theColloquium's arrangers.

One final point. The papers and discussions included some much moreextreme statements than anything I have summarized. I did not wish toemphasize these extreme remarks, for that would give an unfair impressionof the general trend of discussions, which were much too extensive tosummarize easily in a brief article. However, I ought to mention a fewof the more extreme remarks, just to provide some example of the varietyof opinions expressed.

M. Andre Perreault, Secretary General of the Institute of Sexology andFamily Studies, Montreal, argued in a contributed paper that sinceprocreation should be free and responsible, there was a doubt whetherany child that was not freely and responsibly procreated had any right toexist. His entire paper seemed to apply to abortion the same principlesmost commonly appliedby those who favor contraception. Yet M. Perreaultconcluded his paper by saying he was not urging a certain solution to theabortion question.

At least twice persons intervening in discussion from the floor suggested that since man constitutes reality by human meaning-giving, adeveloping individual not desired by its parents might by definition beregarded as non-human. One intervention along these lines was by noless a person than Father Pierre de Locht, a theologian and leader of theofficial Belgian Catholic family life movement. He suggested that unless acouple desire consciously to generate a child, any product of generationmight by definition not be human.

This kind of argument arises from a simplistic use of phenomenologicalphilosophy, according to which reality is not simply discovered by thehuman mind, but is constituted by the mind's operations. I do not thinkmany phenomenologists would imagine the process of constitution ofobjects to be as arbitrary as Father de Locht's suggestion required! Inany case, some special limits have to be recognized in the case of persons,who are more than other objects in the world. And no one can prove thateach living human individual is anything less than a person from the verybeginning.

Setting aside extremist arguments, I think it fair to conclude that the


general tenor of the Louvain Colloquium is pointing tow&rd a reversal ofmoral judgment on the abortion issue comparable to that which manyhave made on the question of contraception. In fact, the justification ofabortion follows remarkably similar lines, and an underlying reason for thisis that the chief arguments in both cases exclude the notion that there areany acts intrinsically evil—that is, any acts so wrong that they can in noexceptional case be right.

Arguments going so far as this clearly carry a certain implausibility.Not only contraception and abortion would be sometimes justified, but noact could be absolutely wrong: not even infanticide, suicide, euthanasia,genocide, torture, terror, prostitution, slavery, or racial discrimination.

In particular, it is important to notice that once the traditional distinction between direct and indirect abortion is definitely set aside, no argumentproposed in justification of abortion fails to justify infanticide as well. Theonlyapparent exception would be attempts to draw an arbitrary line beforewhich the developing individual is regarded as less than a person withhuman rights. But arguments along these lines are not a real exception,for one can as well draw that arbitrary line after birth as before. Somehave actually argued that the live-born child is not automatically a person,and that he becomes so only after some learning from the surroundingsociety.

The traditional distinction between direct and indirect abortion clearlyneeds to be investigated and explained more fully. But certainly this distinction does not correspond to that between a general rule against abortionand exceptions permitting it in difficult cases. The traditional Christianethics held that the ultimate meaning of human life transcends our understanding. Hence, we must not limitour thrust to the goods we comprehend;we must remain open beyond what we can calculate. Absolute norms prohibiting any direct attack upon innocent life are negative in their expression, but their meaning is the very positive respect Christians should havefor the dignity of each life—since only God knows its ultimate meaning.Indirect abortion was not permitted as an exception to a general rule, butsuch procedures were recognized as cases in which the will's intentionremained toward the good of life and open to its transcendent meaning,since the death of the infant was seen as an unwanted and incidental sideeffect of a quite distinct act.


While one can agree with Father Enda McDonagh, Monsignor Heylen,and Cardinal Suenens concerning the necessity for an affirmative respectfor life and for positive efforts toward helping those who now resort toabortion, one may question whether the acceptance of abortion in exceptional cases will further these goals. More likely, a permissive attitudetoward abortion will lead to its progressive increase, because the moralthrust against life in exceptional cases will carry through to the generalityof cases.

Some might wonder whether these discussions concerning abortion are

inaugurating a repetition of the course of events through which theCatholic Church has passed concerning contraception. Certainly there aresimilarities, including an essential dependence in argumentation. But thecourse of events cannot be the same. Too much has already happened duringthe past five years. If Catholics faithful to the traditional Christian preceptin defense of innocent life wish to do anything, they must act quickly.This applies to Bishops and to the Holy Father himself.

While there may not be such a broad basis of popular support for achange in the traditional teaching on abortion as there is in the case ofcontraception, those who favor the change and who recognize the implications of their earlier positions are working very hard to find or togenerate a ffsensus fidelium" that would approve abortion in exceptionalcases—exceptions which need by no means be thought of as rare occurrences.

The ethics of general rules and exceptions is what is technically called"situation ethics." Historically, this theory derives from various Protestanttheologians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Faced with thedifficulties of fundamentalist faith in the moral teaching of Sacred Scriptureand with the decline of the cultural environment which had supportedChristian morals with secular sanctions, Protestant theologians searchedfor an ethical theory compatible with Christian faith. All naturalistic andmaterialistic theories were obviously impossible. The moral theology ofthe Catholic Church seemed incompatible with their Christian understanding of salvation by faith and the grace of God alone. And so they adaptedthe most humane ethical theory to be found: the idealistic humanism ofKant and others in the German philosophical school.

Not that this philosophical ethics was taken directly. Thinkers as diverse


as Kierkegaard and Barth, Bonhoeffer and Tillich reacted to and adaptedthe philosophical ethics. But Kant himself had developed his thought bytransposing Christian morality into purely human terms. The title of one ofKant's chief works was: Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. WhatI believe happened was that the well intentioned efforts of Protestanttheologians failed to restore Christian morality in its integral form. Thus,situation ethics is a deformed, mutilated version of Christian morality, aChristian morality that has not fully recovered from the rationalism ofthe German idealists.

I believe that the Pope and Bishops faithful to the tradition coulddiscern and clearly declare the incompatibility of situation ethics withCatholic faith. Yet I do not see signs indicating that any clear declarationcan be expected. What should Catholics think in the event no such declaration is forthcoming, in the event abortion rapidly gains moral approval(in "exceptional" cases) while the Holy See and the bulk of the Bishopsremain silent ?

I think that in this event Catholics who are faithful to the traditional

Catholic teaching must refuse to believe what they seem to see. For itwill appear to them that the Church itself is sinking. However, believersin earlier times were subjected to similar stresses. Remember, in the firstplace, the dark day suffered by the earliest Christians—the day Christ layin the tomb. And then there were the very confused decades of the greatschism, decades when it appeared certain that the papal office would besubordinated to Church councils or to civil politics. Nevertheless, onlyafter that trial did the papacy attain the place in the Catholic Church itnow has. Without the effects of the schism, the Catholic Church mightnever have entered into modern times.

In brief, Catholics faithful to their tradition must believe that the

providence of God, which sees far beyond our comprehension, is workingtoward the good in all our present troubles. I do not mean to suggest thatthe acceptance of abortion as a moral solution (in "exceptional" cases) isafter all a progressive step. Personally, I cannot conceive the Catholic

Church approving as Christ-like a will bent, however reluctantly, upon theslaughter of the innocent.

But if God wills the unity of believers, then he must will the removal


of obstacles to that unity. On the Catholic side are many such obstacles,not the least of which may be a kind of pride in the integrity of faith, apride that ill becomes us who can claim no credit for what is purely adivine gift. Also, we Catholics have not always taught well and implementedwith energy the great moral truths we have received so undeservedly. Wehave perhaps too often been satisfied to behave as the cautious steward whoburied the talents he should have invested.

Still, I must say frankly that I believe the Catholic Church has hadand has fulfilled the providential mission of keeping intact the whole ofQiristian doctrine and moral teaching. Perhaps at this moment God willsto perfect both Catholic and Protestant Christian faith. In the process,perhaps Providence finds it useful to permit many Catholics to adoptsituation ethics—so many that the Church itself seems to be losing herstability, abandoning her fidelity to tradition, in effect sinking under thesea of human opinions that beat upon the damaged hull of the ship of faith.

Thus, although we must not believe it, perhaps we must experiencesomething very like the sinking of the Catholic Church. Out of this experience alone, it may be, can come the clarity by which all Christianstogether will come to see that situation ethics is not a new and improvedChristian morality, but is a mutilated form of Christian morality, a moralitywhich must either recover its integrity or degenerate into a purely naturalistic ethic.

Certainly, situation ethics does tend toward naturalism. In some of itsmore recent developments, it is indistinguishable (except in language)from utilitarianism. On the other hand, there are a few Protestant and

Catholic moralists who are already drawing back from the extreme implications of situation ethics.

If Catholics who remain faithful to the tradition of their Church must

suffer the experience of water rising about their knees, they should notcease to believe for all that. We must be willing to suffer with Christ ifwe would hope to rise with him. Therefore, if the ship seem to sink, weshould remain hopeful. After Friday and Saturday, Sunday.

Reprinted fromTheAmerican Ecclesiastical Review Vol. CLIX ... · four aisles, shadowless lighting,...

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