REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE LITTLE … · 2018-11-05 · 1. At the close of the...

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE LITTLE INDIA RIOT

ON 8 DECEMBER 2013

ANNEXES


Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-2


Annex A

List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing

S/N Name Occupation Role

1. Dr Michael Tay Ming

Kiong

Forensic scientist Fatal traffic accident

reconstruction expert

2. Dr Marian Wang Forensic pathologist Prepared autopsy

report

3. Dr Yao Yi Ju Toxi-analyst Prepared toxicology

report

4. Wong Geck Woon Bus coordinator Bus coordinator/

“timekeeper”

5. Lee Kim Huat Bus Driver Driver of bus

CB6978T

6. DCP T Raja Kumar Deputy

Commissioner of

Police

Ag Commissioner of

Police on 8

December 2013

7. Ganesan Thanaraj Welder Foreign worker /

passenger on bus

8. Nathan Chandra Sekaran Auxiliary Police

Officer

Auxiliary Police

Officer at scene

9. Raymond Murugiasu Auxiliary Police

Officer

Auxiliary Police

Officer at scene

10. Srisivasangkar A/L

Subramaniam

Auxiliary Police

Officer

Auxiliary Police

Officer at scene

11. ASP Jonathan Tang

Wenhao

Police officer Police Officer at

scene / initial SPF

ground commander

12. SSSgt Mydeen s/o Sahul

Hameed

Police officer First Police Officer at

scene





13. SSgt Mak Chung Kit Police officer First Police Officer at

scene

14. SSgt Chandru Sivadass Police officer Combined

Operations Room

officer

15. SSI Neo Chee Cheng Police officer Duty OC, Division

Operations Team

16. SSgt Yang Yan Ching Police officer Kampong Java

Neighbourhood

Police Centre (NPC)

Counter Duty Officer

17. SC/Sgt Abdul Aziz Bin

Abdul Khalid


scene

18. ASP Yong Wen Wei

Edwin


scene

19. SC/Cpl Arshard Bin Abdul

Murad


scene

20. Mahmood Bin Masdar Auxiliary Police

Officer

Auxiliary Police

Officer / CISCO

supervisor at scene

21. SSgt Azmi Bin Mohamed

Hamzah


scene

22. SSI(2) Akhbar Bin Hj Ali Police officer Police Officer at

scene

23. SSgt Kamisah Binte

Hanafi


scene

24. SI Muhammad Adil Bin

Lawi

Traffic police officer Traffic Police Officer

at scene

25. Sgt Fadli Shaifuddin Bin

Mohamed Sani

Traffic police officer Traffic Police Officer

at scene





26. LTA Neo Mei Shan

Tiffany

SCDF Officer ROTA Commander /

initial SCDF ground

commander

27. LTC Daniel Seet Commander, First

SCDF Division

Commander, First

SCDF Division

28. DC Lim Jew Sai Jackson Deputy

Commissioner of

SCDF

Review of the actions

of SCDF

29. DAC Lu Yeow Lim Commander, Tanglin

Police Division

SPF Ground

Commander /

Incident Manager

30. DAC Koh Wei Keong 2 Deputy Director,

SPF Operations

Department

Acting Director,

Operations on 8

December 2013

31. DAC David Scott Arul Deputy Commander

Special Operations

Command (SOC)

Police Tactical

Commander at scene

32. Kannadasan Murugan Police Officer SOC Intelligence

33. DSP Lim Sin Bin Police Officer

OC Troop KA,

SOC

34. Jennie Yeo Kha Keaw Deputy Executive

Secretary, Building

Construction and

Timber Industries

Employees’ Union

Union representative

35. Bernard Menon Executive Director,

Migrant Workers’

Centre

NGO Representative

36. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker

Foreign worker at

scene





37. Seenuvasan Selvaraja Excavator operator

Foreign worker at

scene

38. M. Govindaraju Singapore Tamil

Community

Representative

NGO Representative

39. Panjacharam Raveentheran Singapore Tamil

Community

Representative

NGO Representative

40. Kannadasan Murugan Site Supervisor

Foreign worker at

scene

41. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker Foreign worker at

scene


scene

43. Russell Heng President, Transient

Workers Count Too

NGO Representative

44. Lim Jit Say Executive Director,

Singapore

Contractors

Association Limited

Representative from

Singapore

Contractors

Association Limited

45. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker

Foreign worker at

scene


scene

47. Chakravarthy Rintu Project Director,

Lum Chang Building

Contractors Pte Ltd

Representative of

foreign worker

employer

48. Pereira C Martin Air Traffic

Controller

Chairman, Tekka

Residents’

Committee





49. Seet Hing Long Engineer Resident, Chander

Road

50. Braema Mathi President, MARUAH NGO Representative

51. K Vataramathi Ramanatha

Kurukkal

Self-Employed,

Wedding Planner

Member of public

52. Fajar Priyanto Employed in IT

industry

Resident, Buffalo

Road

53. Tan Huilinn Housewife Resident, Buffalo

Road

54. Rungnapa Kitiarsa Representative,

Friends of Thai

Workers Association

NGO Representative

55. Supaluk Balcer Representative,

Friends of Thai

Workers Association

NGO Representative

56. Wichai

Sumanatkhajonkulu

Representative,

Friends of Thai

Workers Association

NGO Representative

57. Ho Kin Hong Retiree Resident, Buffalo

Road

58. Lim Choon Kiang Hawker Resident, Buffalo

Road

59. Junaidi Lim Operations Manager Resident, Chander

Road

60. Vincent Wijeysingha Representative,

Workfair Singapore

NGO Representative

61. Kannadasan Murugan Little India restaurant

manager

Little India restaurant

manager

62. Ahamad Abdul Jabbar Chief Chef, Song of

India Restaurant


worker





63. Lim Herh Kim Chairman, Rowell

Court Residents’

Committee

Chairman, Rowell

Court Residents’

Committee

64. Kannadasan Murugan Little India shop-

owner

Little India shop-

owner

65. Gwee Nyuk Liang Cashier Resident, Buffalo

Road

66. Suresh Kumar Kumaresan Director Director of liquor

shop in Little India


owner


owner

68. Wong Ann Lin Bus operator Chairman, Singapore

Schools Transport

Association (SSTA)

69. Tan Jwee Tuan Bus co-ordinator Supervisor of SSTA

time-keepers at Little

India

70. S. Rajagopal Vice-President, Little

India Shopkeepers

and Heritage

Association (LISHA)

Vice-President, Little

India Shopkeepers

and Heritage

Association (LISHA)

71. Shahul Hameed Syed

Yoosufsha

Owner, Y. Shahul

Hameed Glass &

Frame Makers

Little India shop-

owner


manager


manager


worker


worker

74. Shriniwas Rai Lawyer Member of Public





75. Tan Jun How Michael Private bus operator Singapore School

and Private-Hire Bus

Owners’ Association

(S7) Representative

76. Yeo Teck Guan Group Director,

Public Transport

Group, Land

Transport Authority

LTA Representative

77. Lin Shunzhong Auxiliary Police

Officer

Most senior

Auxiliary Police

Officer at scene

78. Malini Naidu a/p

Janarthana Naidu

Auxiliary Police

Officer

Auxiliary Police

Officer involved in

Foreign Worker

Management

79. Kevin Teoh Divisional Director,

Foreign Manpower

Management

Division, Ministry of

Manpower (MOM)

MOM / IMC

representative

80. Yaacob Bin Khamis SCDF paramedic SCDF Paramedic at

scene

81. Ler Seng Ann Group Director

(Conservation &

Development

Services), Urban

Redevelopment

Authority

Little India Task

Force representative

82. SUPT Victor Ho Assistant Director,

Ops Management,

SPF

Assistant Director,

Ops Management,

SPF

83. Hisham Bin Alias Manager of Avery

Lodge

Manager of foreign

worker dormitory





84. Saffarullah S/O Abdullah Security Manager of

Penjuru Dormitory

Security Manager of

Penjuru Dormitory

85. DSP Ho See Ying Commanding

Officer, Rochor NPC

Commanding

Officer, Rochor NPC

86. DAC Daniel Tan Sin Heng Commander, Central

Police Division

Senior SPF

Commander at scene

87. Willy Ng Dormitory Operator Dormitory owner

88. AC Jessica Kwok Director, Police

Licensing and

Regulatory

Department

Director, Police

Licensing and

Regulatory

Department

89. Dr Majeed Khader Senior Consultant

Psychologist, Home

Team Academy

Director, Home

Team Behavioural

Sciences Centre

Prepared behavioural

analysis report

90. SDS Khoo Boon Hui Senior Deputy

Secretary, Ministry

of Home Affairs

Policing Expert

(MHA)

91. Kannadasan Murugan Director Director of shop in

Little India

92. CP Ng Joo Hee Commissioner of

Police

Commissioner of

Police

93. Adam Fashe Huddin CNB Officer Investigating Officer

The names of witnesses who have requested that their names not be published

have been redacted.


Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-10


Annex B

Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing

Witnesses and Exhibits

1. At the close of the public hearing, the Committee of Inquiry (‘COI’) had,

over the span of 5 weeks, heard from 131 witnesses. Of these, 93 material

witnesses appeared before the COI to testify. The evidence of the

remaining 38 witnesses was adduced through conditioned statements.

2. In the course of the public hearing, a number of witnesses also provided

reports and presentations in support of their oral evidence. These

materials have been tendered and marked as exhibits.

3. What is set out below is a summary of the salient points of the witnesses’

evidence given at the public hearing. The COI may not have accepted all

of the evidence as accurate or relevant.

Summary of Evidence of Individual Witnesses

4. Salient points from the evidence of the following individual witnesses are

summarized below:

(a) Dr Michael Tay Ming Kiong (‘Dr Tay’);

(b) Dr Marian Wang (‘Dr Wang’);

(c) Ms Wong Geck Woon (‘Ms Wong’);

(d) Mr Lee Kim Huat (‘Mr Lee’);

(e) Mr Ganesan Thanaraj (‘Mr Ganesan’);

(f) ASP Jonathan Tang (‘ASP Tang’);

(g) LTA Tiffany Neo (‘LTA Neo’);

(h) DAC Lu Yeow Lim (‘DAC Lu’);

(i) Deputy Commissioner of Police T Raja Kumar (‘DC Raja

Kumar’);

(j) Commissioner of Police Ng Joo Hee (‘CP Ng’);

(k) Dr Majeed Khader (‘Dr Majeed’); and

(l) Senior Deputy Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, Khoo Boon

Hui (‘Mr Khoo’).




(a) Evidence of Dr Michael Tay

5. Dr Tay, a Senior Consultant Forensic Scientist with ‘The Forensic Experts

Group’, possesses 24 years of experience in the field of forensic science,

with a special interest in the field of traffic accident reconstruction. He

was commissioned by the Traffic Police to conduct a forensic

examination and scientific reconstruction of the fatal accident on 8

December 2013, involving the bus bearing license plate number

CB6978T (‘the Bus’) and Sakthivel Kumaravelu (‘the Deceased’). Dr

Tay’s findings were presented to the COI in the Traffic Accident

Reconstruction Report.

6. In his evidence, Dr Tay made numerous references to closed-circuit

television video footage (‘CCTV’) obtained from four cameras mounted

on the bus – namely, one front-facing camera, one camera capturing the

interior of the Bus and one camera on either wing mirror of the Bus (the

Bus also had a fifth camera facing out the back of the Bus, but it was not

activated at the time of the accident as it only activates when the reverse

gear is engaged).

7. Dr Tay testified that, from an analysis of the video footage, the Bus had

moved a short distance from its initial stationary position at the bend

along Tekka Lane, before filtering to the right lane in order to overtake

two stationary buses on its left. The Bus then filtered back into the left

lane and slowed down as it approached the junction of Tekka Lane and

Race Course Road, before making a left turn onto Race Course Road. Dr

Tay testified that the Bus was travelling at an average speed of between

5.6 km/h to 5.7 km/h as it moved along Tekka Lane. It then accelerated to

about 10.8 km/h as the driver executed the turn onto Race Course Road,

before coming to a halt after the accident.

8. Dr Tay also testified that CCTV footage from the left-wing camera

showed the Deceased in the lead-up to the accident. CCTV footage

played during the public hearing showed the Deceased initially walking

alongside the door of the Bus as it began moving. The Deceased then fell

behind as the Bus begins accelerating along Tekka Lane. He however

appeared alongside the Bus when it began to slow down as it approaches

the junction of Tekka Lane and Race Course Road. The video footage

showed the Deceased running as he placed his right palm on the left side

of the Bus, near the door.




9. According to Dr Tay, the Deceased began to fall forward some 1.16

seconds after his right palm came into contact with the Bus. 0.6 seconds

later, the Deceased fell face forward onto the road, about 33cm in front of

the Bus and directly into the path of its front left tyre. Dr Tay further

testified that the left front tyre of the Bus ran over the right side of the

Deceased’s chest and thereafter the right side of his neck before finally

running over his head. The collision was observed to have occurred at

21:07:35 hours according to the time stamp on the said video footage.

This timing translates to approximately 9.20pm, Singapore Standard Time

(‘SST’), taking into account a 13-minute discrepancy between the time

stamp on the CCTV footage and SST.

10. Dr Tay also shed some light on the field of view the driver would have

had at the time of the accident. The COI’s key concern arose out of

whether the driver would have or ought to have seen the Deceased

alongside the Bus in the lead-up to the accident. Dr Tay explained that the

driver would have had 3 possible means of detecting the Deceased. First,

through the transparent panels on the door of the Bus. Second, through

the left-wing mirror. Third, through footage captured by the camera

mounted on the left-wing mirror and displayed on the screen in front of

the driver (it was, however, revealed in later testimony that the driver did

not have the screen switched on, on the night of the accident).

11. Dr Tay testified that the Deceased would only have been visible in

footage from the camera mounted on the left-wing mirror in the 4 seconds

just prior to the accident. Elaborating, he categorically stated that during

this critical interval, the Deceased would not have been visible to the

driver through the left-wing mirror itself or through the front door –

A: So the visibility and the detection of the deceased in the left mirror

and through the bus door, I already have mentioned. Here is a summary.

The highest probability for detection was from 07.08 to 07.18, when the

deceased was walking alongside the door of the bus. So the driver could

have, during this time interval, seen part of the head as well as upper

chest of the deceased. This recognition also would be contingent on the

external lighting conditions. The deceased was not visible to the bus

driver in the left mirror [or] through the front door during the critical

period at the T-junction from 07.30 to 07.34, just before the deceased

fell on the roadway.




12. On the likely reasons as to why the Deceased had fallen, Dr Tay testified

that it was likely a combination of at least some of the following factors:

i. The road surface was wet, resulting in a higher probability of the

Deceased slipping;

ii. The Deceased had been running, which made it harder for him to

maintain, as well as to regain, balance;

iii. The Deceased’s left hand was at his waist holding a long umbrella,

which affected his stability while running after the bus;

iv. The Deceased’s right palm was pressed against the left side of the

bus, thereby coupling his running speed to the speed of the running

bus and reducing his stability;

v. The Deceased was following the curved path of the bus and was

not running in a straight line, thus complicating his movement; and

vi. The Deceased’s cognitive abilities, judgment and motor skills were

impaired by alcohol intoxication.

13. Dr Tay also assessed the cognitive workload (viz. the visual and motor

tasks) of the driver – both in the lead-up to, and at the time of, the

accident. Having analyzed CCTV footage which provided an insight into

the prevailing conditions at the time of the accident, he testified that there

were buses parked along Tekka Lane as well as vehicles travelling from

the driver’s right to left along Race Course Road. Additionally, there were

also an estimated “20 to 30” pedestrians in the immediate vicinity of the

Bus as it travelled along Tekka Lane towards Race Course Road. He

explained that many of these pedestrians crossed a few metres in front of

the moving Bus. Others, he said, were walking along the centerline of the

road. Dr Tay further testified that at the junction of Tekka Lane and Race

Course Road, the driver would, in preparing to merge with oncoming

traffic, have focused on finding a suitable gap in the ebb and flow of

traffic. It was thus possible that the driver had not paid enough attention

to pedestrians on either side of the Bus. Dr Tay stressed that these tasks

and assessments (of vehicular and pedestrian traffic) would have been

performed under low light and low contrast conditions as the incident

occurred at night.

(b) Evidence of Dr Marian Wang

14. Dr Wang, a Forensic Pathologist with the Health Sciences Authority,

performed an autopsy on the Deceased on 9 December 2013. She

presented the COI with an Autopsy Report detailing her findings.




15. Dr Wang testified that the autopsy revealed the cause of death to be

multiple injuries, comprising – (a) severe head injury with extensive skull

fractures and lacerated brain matter which mostly extruded from the

cranial vault; (b) fractures of the voice box; (c) multiple rib fractures with

a rupture of the right lung; (d) rupture of the right lobe of liver; and (e) a

fracture of the right shoulder blade. Dr Wang further testified that the

pattern and nature of the injuries were in keeping with that of an

individual who had been run over by the tire(s) of a motor vehicle on the

right side of the chest, right side of the neck and over the head. She

maintained this upon being shown the video footage of the accident.

16. She also testified that based on the extensive head injuries suffered by the

Deceased, death would have been instantaneous; “the injuries [were]

immediately fatal”. Flowing from this, she explained that it would not

have been possible for the Deceased to have cried out for help after he

was run over.

17. Commenting on toxicology results, Dr Wang testified that ethanol was

present in the Deceased’s post-mortem sample of blood at a concentration

of 217mg of per 100ml of blood. She explained that at this level, an

average individual could be expected to be moderately to severely

intoxicated. She elaborated that a moderately intoxicated individual

would experience impaired motor-skills (viz. loss of coordination, balance

and slower reflexes) and impaired judgment (viz. increased risk-taking

behaviour).

(c) Evidence of Ms Wong Geck Woon (Timekeeper)

18. Ms Wong was the timekeeper assigned to the Bus on the night in

question. Her evidence centered primarily on her interaction with the

Deceased on 8 December 2013.

19. In recounting her first encounter with the Deceased at the boarding area

along Tekka Lane near Lamp Post 74R3, Ms Wong testified that some

workers informed her that the Deceased had boarded an already crowded

bus by jumping the queue. Unhappy, the workers further informed her

that the Deceased was drunk. She added that the bus driver, Mr Lee, then

informed her that the Deceased had pulled his trousers down on board the

Bus. Acting on this information, Ms Wong sought the assistance of

another foreign worker “to go up and take a look whether the person had

indeed pulled down his pants.” When the worker confirmed the aforesaid,

Ms Wong boarded the Bus and asked the Deceased “to put on his pants.”




She then remained on the Bus waiting for him to alight as instructed.

After some initial hesitation, she testified that the Deceased disembarked

voluntarily. She maintained that she had not pushed him or touched him

in any way as he alighted.

20. After alighting, the Deceased walked away in the direction of Race

Course Road. Having reached full capacity, the Bus began to move off.

Ms Wong, who was by then at the boarding area along Tekka Lane,

turned her attention to the second bus which had just arrived. As

passengers were boarding this second bus, a worker approached her and

informed her that someone had been run over by the first Bus. Ms Wong

proceeded to the scene immediately.

21. When she reached, a crowd had already gathered around the Bus. She

recounted being struck on the back of her head as she attempted to peer at

the body beneath the Bus. She testified that she was advised to board the

Bus and seek refuge inside as the situation became more “chaotic” and

individuals began “hitting the bus” and taking photographs of her and the

driver. Sensing that the crowd was angry because “an Indian man had

died”, Ms Wong testified that she attempted to engage them in English by

telling “these people not to be so angry”.

22. Heeding the advice of yet to be unidentified Good Samaritan, Ms Wong

sought refuge in the Bus together with the driver. She testified that beer

bottles were thrown into the Bus. She crouched and covered herself with

a raincoat in a bid to shield herself from the projectiles. She recounted

being assaulted by two workers who had climbed into the Bus looking for

the driver. Ms Wong was eventually rescued by SCDF and police officers

who escorted her to an ambulance.

23. In the course of questioning, Ms Wong agreed that both she and the driver

were the target of the crowd’s anger on the night in question. As seen in

the exchange reproduced below, she denied however, being rude to the

workers and talking to them in a derogatory manner –

CHAIRMAN: I have a few questions for you. The first question is

basically a repetition of what had already been said. A good number of

people have told me that there is a long history of you being rude to the

workers, humiliating them and then calling them all kinds of names and

in fact complaints were made against you. Are you aware of that?

A: I don’t know.




CHAIRMAN: Some of the remarks you make towards them are in a

very derogatory manner, relating to their race.

A: I did not.

...

CHAIRMAN: All right. But if what you say is true, why would they go

for you after the accident? I can understand them going against the bus

driver, but why you?

A: I don’t know.

24. Ms Wong conceded however, that she had in the past, raised her voice at

the workers. She explained that this was necessary to ensure that they

complied with her instructions –

A: Sometimes I became hot tempered in the course of my work, so

sometimes I raised my voice at them.

Q1: I see, sometimes you raised your voice at them. I see. So is that why

you think they were angry at you?

A: Yes.

…

Q: Yes. So in performing your job, how would you do it? Would they

always follow your instructions?

A: Some of them would comply with my instructions. Some would not.

Q: Were you strict with them?

A: Yes, to some.

Q: Do you use vulgarities at them sometimes?

A: No.

…

Q: How would you deal with those unreasonable ones?

A: I would raise my voice. I would shout at them.

1 Unless otherwise stated, ‘Q:’ refers to statements made by the State Counsel.




Q: Would they then comply with your instructions?

A: Yes.

Q: I’m going to ask you specifically, Ms Wong, did you, in the course

of your work, use words like “stupid”, “idiot”, when directing the

workers at the boarding area? Did you use words like this to them?

A: No.

Q: Did you have to push them to get in line?

A: No.

25. Apart from her evidence vis-à-vis events on 8 December 2013, Ms Wong

also testified that she would typically observe more drunk workers at

Tekka Lane on the first two weekends of each month. She attributed this

to the fact that workers would receive their salary at the start of the

month. It was also her evidence that the bus drivers had agreed not to

ferry drunken workers on their buses, as there had been previous

instances where these workers had vomited or urinated on the bus. She

explained that as a result of this agreement, drunken workers would not

be permitted to board the buses.

(d) Evidence of Mr Lee Kim Huat (Bus Driver)

26. Mr Lee was the driver of the Bus on the night in question. Like Ms Wong,

he gave an account of the events that transpired on 8 December 2013.

27. Mr Lee said that he had been ferrying workers to and from Little India to

their dormitories every Sunday for the past 12 years. He testified that the

Bus was equipped with 5 video cameras, the images of which were

displayed on a monitor the size of an iPad mini, located “around mouth

level” to the left of the driver. The cameras were meant to aid the driver

in operating the Bus, as they provided a view of the front, rear, left and

right sides of the Bus as well as its interior. Critically, Mr Lee testified

that he had not turned on the monitor on the night in question as he found

the glare distracting.

28. Focusing on the events that unfolded on 8 December 2013, Mr Lee

testified that the Deceased’s unsteady gait as he approached the Bus and

boarded, suggested that he was drunk. He recalled the Deceased

complying with Ms Wong’s direction to disembark. He corroborated Ms

Wong’s assertion that the Deceased alighted voluntarily without anyone




pushing him or touching him.

29. Mr Lee recounted thereafter waiting for a few minutes as the Bus filled to

full capacity. He then closed the doors to the Bus and began driving along

Tekka Lane. When the Bus was about two bus lengths from Race Course

Road, he testified noticing (through the transparent glass doors) the

Deceased alongside the door to the Bus. He waved at Mr Lee in what

appeared to be a signal for the latter to stop and allow him onboard. Mr

Lee however, continued driving down Tekka Lane after signaling that the

Bus was full. He testified that his attention was on the road ahead of him

as there were many pedestrians. He was also paying attention to vehicular

traffic on his left, and as he approached the intersection of Tekka Lane

and Race Course Road, his attention turned to oncoming vehicular traffic

from his right. In the midst of making the left turn onto Race Course

Road, Mr Lee testified that he felt a “bump or jerk as if I was crossing a

hump.” He stopped the Bus immediately and alighted to ascertain what

had happened.

30. Mr Lee saw an “Indian man lying under the Bus, in front of the left rear

wheel.” A huge crowd had begun forming around the Bus. Mr Lee

testified that he did not move the Bus as he was “very scared”. He

explained that he thought that he was not supposed to move anything

after a collision. Further, he assumed that the individual under the Bus

had died –

A: To my mind, since the big vehicle went over him, he must have been

dead.

…

Q: Because you also felt the hump, right? You went over a hump and

then you came down and you saw a man pinned underneath your bus,

right?

A: Yes.

Q: And your bus is such a huge vehicle.

A: Yes.

Q: And to your mind, this person had passed away?

A: Yes.




31. Mr Lee eventually boarded the Bus, seeking refuge within it, when he

realized that both he and Ms Wong were being targeted by the

increasingly aggressive and agitated crowd of individuals around the Bus.

32. Once inside, Mr Lee recalled the Bus being pelted by projectiles. He

eventually hid beneath a dustbin which had been thrown into the Bus. In

the midst of hiding, he recounted overhearing some men asking Ms Wong

“where is the uncle?” He testified that Ms Wong was assaulted by the

men when she told them she did not know where he was. When queried,

Mr Lee agreed that the men were actually looking for him.

33. Mr Lee recounted being rescued by SCDF officers. He testified that

SCDF and Police officers formed a cordon around him as they escorted

him to an ambulance. He was later conveyed to Tan Tock Seng Hospital

for medical treatment.

34. When queried on the level of drunkenness he had observed in Little India

on Sundays, Mr Lee testified that he had not encountered any unruly or

rowdy incidents in the course of his work over the past 5 years. He

however corroborated Ms Wong’s evidence that the bus drivers had

agreed not to ferry drunken workers on their buses.

(e) Evidence of Ganesan Thanaraj (Bus Passenger)

35. Mr Ganesan was a passenger aboard the Bus on 8 December 2013. His

evidence centered on two areas - (1) the events on 8 December 2013, and

(2) his experience as a foreign worker in Singapore.

36. According to Mr Ganesan, he first encountered the Deceased at the

boarding area along Tekka Lane while they were waiting to board the

Bus. He testified that the Deceased appeared to have consumed alcohol.

This impression was based on “his manner of speech … and [the fact

that] he also staggered a little.” Mr Ganesan told the public hearing that

the Deceased made unpleasant remarks about Bangladeshi workers as he

“kept asking if the Bangladeshi workers were better than Indian

workers.”

37. When the Bus arrived, Mr Ganesan shared that the Deceased cut the

queue and boarded ahead of those who had been in front of him. He

recounted that the Deceased eventually disembarked after being asked to

do so by the timekeeper. He was unable to comment on whether the

Deceased had lowered his pants whilst on the Bus, as he “did not see”




this. Pertinently, Mr Ganesan corroborated Ms Wong and Mr Lee’s

assertion that the Deceased alighted voluntarily – “no one had pushed

him. He came down on his own accord.”

38. As the Bus eventually departed, Mr Ganesan observed the Deceased

running towards the vehicle as it turned. He then felt a bump and

concluded that the Deceased had been run over. Mr Ganesan disembarked

and saw a body pinned beneath the Bus. He left the scene of the accident

and returned to the bus boarding area at Tekka Lane, and boarded another

bus to return to his dormitory.

39. In the course of his testimony, Mr Ganesan stated that he had not met the

Deceased prior to the incident on 8 December 2013, and that he did not

know any of the other passengers on the Bus on the night in question.

40. In respect of his experience as a foreign worker in Singapore, Mr

Ganesan testified that he had been working in Singapore since 2003. He

had gone back to India on several occasions upon the completion of his

contract, only to return to work again. Mr Ganesan told the COI that he

liked working in Singapore as “the country is good. It is clean. They

maintain rules and the law. Everything is proper.” When queried on his

satisfaction with working conditions, he stated that the “conditions are

very acceptable. I have no issues with the conditions. That’s why I

continued working in Singapore.”

41. When asked if there was anything he would like to change, Mr Ganesan

highlighted that agency fees were a problem that needed to be addressed.

He explained that high fees had to be paid to agents in India.

42. In explaining the allure of Little India, Mr Ganesan shared that “Little

India serves as a nice place for all foreign workers to meet”. He shared

that he patronized Little India to meet his friends and visit the temple.

43. When asked for his opinion on the cause of the riot, Mr Ganesan

commented that “there was an accident and an Indian worker had been

killed. It was an emotional outburst because of that death.”

(f) Evidence of ASP Jonathan Tang

44. ASP Tang, a Team Leader at Kampong Java NPC, was the first ground

commander at the scene, and oversaw the SPF response in the first phase

of the riot.




45. ASP Tang testified that he first received information about a road traffic

accident along Race Course Road at about 9.27 pm on 8 December 2013.

As he knew the area tended to be “chaotic” on Sunday evenings, he

decided to respond to the accident personally and proceeded to the scene

with his partner.

46. ASP Tang arrived at the scene at about 9.40 pm. Upon arriving, he

noticed a large crowd of approximately 200 people gathered around the

Bus – “my estimate was that there was 100 persons directly in front of

me. On the other side of the bus, there were at least another 100. This

group was also trying to get very close to the bus. As he neared the Bus,

he saw that it was damaged. The windscreen was shattered and the

windows were either shattered or broken. He heard the sound of glass

shattering and realized that various objects such as glass bottles were

being thrown at Bus. It was at this juncture that ASP Tang noticed SCDF

officers attempting to extricate the Deceased from beneath the Bus.

47. He also observed a Chinese lady (later determined to be Ms Wong)

standing inside the Bus, screaming for help in Mandarin. ASP Tang

sensed that the crowd was angry with her –

A: I noticed that there were – tend to be a larger number of items being

thrown towards the part of the bus where she was standing. On top of

that, I also noticed that whenever she was pointing – she was pointing

towards the crowd and she was shouting loudly, and every time she

pointed, when she shouted, there would be a very distinct response from

the crowd. They seemed to be either jeering at her or cheering

something.

…

A: So I noticed this correlation between when she shouts, the crowd will

respond; when she shouts, the crowd will respond. So I figured that they

are reacting to her and they’re angry because of her.

48. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, ASP Tang radioed for backup

and quickly assessed that his first mission was to assist SCDF officers

who were attempting to extricate the Deceased’s body as they were being

harassed and hindered by the crowd. ASP Tang thus gathered his

available resources – 2 SPF Officers and 4 CISCO officers – and directed

them to form a human barrier/cordon between the crowd and SCDF

personnel –




A: When I arrived, civil defence was already doing their extrication of

this person from under the bus … the problem was that they were being

harassed by the crowd, so my mission was to give them that space and

enough time that they need so that they can extricate the body.

…

A: The crowd I noticed, they were very emotional. Some of them were

saying things like, “That is my friend, that is my friend, my countryman.

Why did this happen?” so they were trying to get closer and closer to the

bus. They were trying to get access to the person who was pinned under

the bus.

…

A: So I told CISCO you have to form this human barrier between the

crowd and the SCDF officers so the civil defence officers have enough

space they need to work, because they have all the equipment, all the

heavy equipment and everything.

49. ASP Tang felt that he and his officers were significantly outnumbered –

Q: So just to give us a sense of the situation you had that night. You had

four CISCO officers and two police officers versus a rowdy and

increasingly boisterous crowd of around, you say, 200 people around the

bus?

A: Yes, that is correct.

Q: Would you agree that you were grossly outnumbered at this point?

A: Yes.

50. In a bid to assess the crowd, ASP Tang traversed the ground. As he did so,

he observed that the crowd, which had continued to swell as SCDF

extrication operations were underway, now numbered approximately 400

people. Of these, he determined 50 to 80 of them to be curious bystanders

whilst 100 to 200 of them were actively contributing to the mayhem –

A: … I would put the estimate at around 400.

…

Q: How many of these 400-odd people would constitute this group of

curious bystanders?

A: These would be the ones closest to the bus, probably 50 to 80 of




them.

…

A: The remaining – I would estimate about 100 to 200, they were lining

this Race Course Road along the sides, under the shop houses, and there

were a few here, further back. These were actually throwing things at

the bus, throwing things at the accident site …

Q: So in your estimation you had about 150 individuals whom you

believed were active participants in creating the mayhem?

A: Yes.

Q: And by ‘active’, you mean they were pelting the bus with projectiles?

A: Yes.

Q: They were shouting?

A: Correct.

Q: Whistling?

A: Yes.

Q: And other forms of encouragement?

A: Yes.

…

Q: … are you sure its 150, ASP Jonathan, and not 20 to 25 or even 30

active rioters?

A: I’m quite sure it is 150 – definitely not 20 or 25.

Q: You say “definitely not”?

A: Definitely not 20 or 25.

Q: There’s a big difference between 25 and 30 as opposed to 150.

A: Yes.

Q: So you are certain that it was 150 active rioters?

A: Yes.




51. Although the violence was still targeted at the Bus and its occupants at

this stage, ASP Tang assessed that the situation had the propensity to

develop into a major public order incident. He thus contacted ‘E’

Division’s Operations Room (‘E DOR’) and sought approval for the

activation of Special Operations Command (‘SOC’) troops.

52. Queried on why he had not deemed it appropriate to engage the crowd

with a view to dispersing them, ASP Tang explained that it was simply

not feasible to do so at that juncture, given the limited resources he had at

his disposal –

A: The barrier helped in what I want to accomplish. If there is no

barrier, there wouldn’t have been an extrication, the body could still

have been there… what I did was I formed the human barrier. I said this

is our number one mission. We help SCDF conduct their extrication.

Number two, we get the female Chinese out of the bus to safety. Those

people who are throwing the stones and the rocks and glass bottles, we

will deal with them later. It’s not like we don’t want to deal with this

fellow, you know. But in order to deal with them, I need to split my

manpower. I only have so many people at that point of time. So I assess

that with this amount of people, the best thing we can do is form the

human barrier around the left side of the bus.

…

Q: let me ask you this question then. Did you have enough officers to do

two things; both arrest and form a human shield –

A: No.

…

Q: So at that point, you wanted to effect arrests, but the manpower

constraints you faced forced you to prioritize the protection of human

life over the effects of arrests. Am I correct?

A: Yes, that is correct.

53. Having requested SOC assistance, ASP Tang directed two of his officers

to retrieve a shield and rescue rope from their patrol car. He intended to

use the rope as a cordon to keep the crowd away from the Bus and SCDF

officers.

54. At about 9.45 pm, the SCDF officer-in-charge, LTA Neo, informed him

that the Deceased’s body had been successfully extricated. She sought his

assistance in conveying the body to an ambulance. ASP Tang agreed as it




would have been “very disrespectful of us to just leave the body there.”

ASP Tang testified that the crowd’s anger and agitation intensified when

the Deceased was placed on a stretcher and covered in a white sheet. He

thus directed a group of 9 SPF Officers and 4 CISCO officers to form a

human shield around the SCDF officers as they sought to evacuate Ms

Wong and Mr Lee from the Bus.

55. Having overseen the successful extrication of the Deceased and thereafter

the successful evacuation of Ms Wong and Mr Lee, ASP Tang traversed

the ground yet again in search of scattered or injured officers. It was in

the midst of this search that he was struck by a rock on his temple. The

impact caused a gash that began bleeding. Not seeing any other officers

in sight, ASP Tang joined a group of 10 officers taking cover between the

fire engine and the ambulance. At about 10.18 pm, he attempted to update

E DOR of his location and obtain an update on the number of resources at

the scene. He was, however, unable to reach E DOR as too many officers

were trying to communicate over a single channel, thereby overloading it

and jamming the airwaves.

56. As he stood with his group of officers, ASP Tang realized that they had

become targets for rioters who were now throwing an increasing number

of projectiles at the group. ASP Tang thus determined that he had to re-

group and re-organize his officers so that they could strategize and

outflank the rioters. With this end in mind, he directed them into the

ambulance.

57. ASP Tang said that he and his men had not retreated into ambulance out

of fear –

Q: Did you enter the ambulance because you were afraid, ASP Jonathan

Tang?

A: No.

Q: Am I correct in saying that you went inside the ambulance together

with your officers because at that point in time, as you have told us,

your aim was to regroup your officers?

A: Yes.

Q: And the aim of regrouping was so that you could formulate a new

tactic as to how to handle the riotous crowd?

A: Yes, correct.




58. Upon boarding, ASP Tang directed the ambulance driver to proceed to the

junction of Race Course Road and Bukit Timah Road. Once there, he

directed his officers to form a line at Bukit Timah Road in order to

contain the riot within the confines of Race Course Road. ASP Tang

testified that he remained at Bukit Timah Road until the SOC arrived,

whereupon he and the other officers with him assisted SOC troops in the

dispersal of the rioters.

(g) Evidence of LTA Tiffany Neo

59. LTA Neo was the SCDF officer who oversaw the extrication and rescue

efforts in the immediate aftermath of the fatal accident in question.

60. LTA Neo testified that an SCDF Red Rhino was the first SCDF response

vehicle at the scene, arriving within the 8 minute target response time.

She explained that upon arrival, she observed a large crowd of between

300 to 400 people, with about 100 individuals surrounding the immediate

vicinity of the Bus. She gave evidence that the Red Rhino crew had

already begun extrication efforts with the aid of a hydraulic spreader by

the time she arrived.

61. LTA Neo testified that she proceeded to the rear of the Bus where the

Deceased lay pinned. Recounting what she saw, LTA Neo stated that it

was obvious that the Deceased had already died from his injuries –

A: … I proceeded to the location, I used my torchlight to shine under the

bus and what I saw was a man’s head crushed almost like half, almost

half, and I saw brain matter as well. So this is quite obviously a dead

person.

Q: Brain matter had spilled out?

A: Yes, sir.

62. As the Deceased’s legs were pinned under the rear left wheel of the bus,

LTA Neo assessed that her immediate mission was to free the body. With

the aid of a 10-tonne jack and twp hydraulic spreads, SCDF personnel

managed to lift the Bus, and placed two airbags underneath the wheel to

keep it off the ground.

63. When queried, LTA Neo stated that she had not asked Mr Lee to reverse

the Bus. She explained that moving the vehicle was not standard protocol




– “usually, we will use our equipment to make space around the casualty

rather than to move the vehicle itself… because we may not know by

moving the vehicle will we be causing more damage to the body or to the

person itself. So usually we will make space around the casualty.”

64. Having freed the Deceased’s body, LTA Neo testified that ASP Tang had

agreed to it being removed from the scene. She testified that though it

was not standard protocol to remove a body from the scene of an

accident, the present situation demanded that the Deceased be moved to a

more secure location. She also testified that she instructed her officers to

cover the body with a blanket while it was being removed from the scene

– “the state of the body wasn’t very nice, so – I mean, in terms of

responders, we are quite used to this kind of scene. However, if we were

to just pull the body out like that, members of the public who see this

might be – might get even more emotional … so that’s why I felt we

should at least cover the body and not let them see the state of the body

itself… and also I think to respect, you know, the body.”

65. LTA Neo testified that projectiles were thrown at SCDF officers as they

conveyed the body to an ambulance. At the ambulance, she decided,

against protocol, to house the body in the ambulance, as she wanted to

secure it.

66. Recounting what transpired thereafter, LTA Neo stated that she returned

to the Bus with her officers to rescue the persons trapped within. She

testified that she climbed into the Bus before escorting Mr Lee and Ms

Wong out. As projectiles were being thrown into the Bus, LTA Neo used

her body to shield Mr Lee. With the assistance of the police officers, LTA

Neo escorted Ms Wong and Mr Lee to safety in a nearby ambulance.

67. Having accomplished her mission objectives, LTA Neo then assessed that

the situation was too dangerous for her officers to remain. She thus

ordered them to withdraw from the scene.

(h) Evidence of DAC Lu Yeow Lim

68. Arriving in the second phase of the riot, DAC Lu, Commander of ‘E’

Division, was the primary Incident Manager at the scene.

69. It was DAC Lu’s evidence that he received a call at 9.55 pm on the night

in question, informing him that a mob of 400 people were attacking the

driver of a bus that had been involved in a fatal road traffic accident along




Race Course Road. He was also informed that a few responding officers

had been injured. Given the situation, DAC Lu directed that two SOC

troops be activated. He then left his house at 9.57 pm and proceeded to

the scene.

70. He arrived at about 10.06 pm, dressed in plainclothes, and made his way

to the junction of Hampshire Road and Race Course Road, where he saw

two police officers –

A: … When I arrived, probably between 10.06 and 10.10 pm, I parked

my car, I saw two officers, two of my officers Amos and Jason, running

to their patrol car, opening the boot and taking out shields, helmet. I

went to them, first question, “How many officers have we got?” Second

question, “How many are injured?” The objective is of course to

establish the size of the fighting force I have at the scene. They told me,

“Sorry sir, I don’t know how many officers we have, it is very chaotic.”

I said, “How many are injured?” “As I understand it, probably 3 or 4”. I

said, “Where are they?” They said, “I do not know.” As we were

conversing, projectiles were starting to come in. Projectiles were coming

from two sides.

71. DAC Lu testified that he assessed the situation from where he stood at the

junction of Hampshire Road and Race Course Road. He observed two

broad groups of people. One group of approximately 50 rioters was

standing along Hampshire Road, behind him. This cluster of individuals

was throwing bricks, bottles and stones at DAC Lu and his team. The

second group of individuals, assessed to have been “in the hundreds”,

was standing near the junction of Race Course Road and Kerbau Road.

Recognizing that he and his team of 8 officers were significantly

outnumbered and faced with a violent crowd, DAC Lu decided to hold

his position until the arrival of SOC troops –

A: So that night, I was basically pinned down by two groups of people

who were pelting us with projectiles. The moment we try to leave the

protection of the shield, they will come at us with all means of

projectiles. So it was difficult for us to move, but I decided that we will

hold this position, because we were now at the perimeter of the riot. We

were here, and I was going to stand my ground there.

72. DAC Lu explained that, due to a breakdown in the police

communications sets, he was unable to ascertain how many officers were

on the ground–

A: So, having arrived, and the next thing is to try and determine the size

of the force since the two officers could not tell me. I tried to reach my




operations room. The lines were jammed. I tried to get through the air,

the airways were congested. So I was limited in terms of the comms. All

that I could gather was based on people who were up close and personal,

who I could interview and ask, and based on what I can see in the

immediate vicinity. I did not have comms with people here, here, or here

(indicating). Those were my realities that night.

73. DAC Lu elaborated on his thought process that night –

A: Meanwhile, I was also gathering information on my adversary, as in,

trying to size up their number and basically to understand their

intention. Now, with the benefit of hindsight we knew exactly what

happened, but that night I didn’t have that information. I only knew a

foreign worker had been killed in a fatal accident, and that sparked off

an incident. Top of my mind, the higher order, big picture priority then

was how not to make it worse. We have an accident resulting in a

fatality, an Indian worker, a foreign worker was killed, and that sparked

off an incident. If we had opened fire, for example, and shot or killed

one or more of them, my rationale was that it probably would have

inflamed the sentiments even more and we don’t know what the foreign

workers would do.

…

A: So my guiding principle that night was, where possible, do not

escalate the situation, do not use deadly force unless you have no

choice. Do not do anything that might necessitate or to precipitate the

discharge of a firearm because anybody could have been shot, it could

have been innocent bystanders – even if we were legally right in

shooting somebody, what is the implication for that night. So those were

the considerations that the commander was thinking.

74. To keep SPF Headquarters apprised of the situation, DAC Lu contacted

Deputy Commissioner of Police, T Raja Kumar (Acting Commissioner,

that night) at about 10.27 pm, and provided him with an update. After

ending the call, DAC Lu learnt that a police vehicle had been overturned

and burnt by rioters. Given the limited police resources at his disposal,

DAC Lu assessed that it would be more prudent to hold the ground and

await the arrival of SOC troops.

75. At about 10.45 pm, a column of SOC troops arrived at DAC Lu’s

location, and he instructed its Commanding Officer, DSP Lim Sin Bin, to

clear Hampshire Road of human and vehicular traffic. At about 10.50 pm,

DAC Lu met with DAC Daniel Tan, Commander of ‘A’ Division, and

DAC David Scott Arul, Deputy Commander of the SOC troops (Acting

Commander that night). The 3 Commanders formed a dispersal plan with




a view to dispersing the rioters in the direction of Serangoon Road.

76. Queried on why he had failed to don his uniform and how this affected

his ability to command his men, DAC Lu asserted that time was precious

and he had prioritized reaching the scene sooner rather than later –

A: My priority upon receiving the call was to get to the scene to be with

my officers. I think it is important for the commander to be at the scene

as soon as possible. So I left immediately my house, in my jeans, t-shirt

and a jacket.

Q: Don’t you think that you not being in uniform, that would affect the

command and control at the scene at that time?

A: No, sir. Not being in uniform did not hamper my ability to assume

command and control. My officers, they all recognized me. When I

arrived, they all gravitated to me to seek instructions, and as far as the

rioters are concerned, whether I was in uniform or otherwise would not

make any difference.

…

Q: Yes. But there are also other officers from the other divisions who

were there, like ‘A’ Division, Traffic Police, APOs, they were also

there. Don’t you think that not wearing your uniform may have affected

your command and control at the scene?

A: Unlikely, sir, because they saw me giving instructions to my officers,

and because my officers were all in uniform, they were probably asked

who is this guy, and my officers would have told him, that’s the

Commander of Tanglin Police Division.

…

MR TEE: How many minutes do you take to change into your uniform?

A: A few minutes. But in a riot scenario, a few minutes do make a

difference. It is a trade-off, I accept that. The issue is, I had to prioritize

as commander. Do I want to spend a few minutes changing into

uniform, or spend a few minutes getting to the scene as quickly as

possible? So second point. I was the overall manager … so I as the

incident manager, control resources, but I did not have to lead charges

on my own because I had Commander A with me, I had deputy

commander SOC with me, I had head of operations with me, and other

senior officers at the scene who I could delegate, and to do various

things. And they all knew who I was. So there was never any question

that because I was not in uniform, it somehow hampered my ability to

control the situation. But the facts speak for themselves. If you look at




how the riot evolved, everything was in accordance with my instruction,

there is no issue therefore that because I was not in uniform, somehow it

prevented me from doing my job.

77. Responding to criticism that he was not fully apprised of what was

transpiring along the length of Race Course Road despite being the

Incident Manager, DAC Lu responded–

A: While I was here, if you remember, the bus, the accident, the Red

Rhino was in the accident position, the bus, which is actually quite tall,

and the Red Rhino was blocking my position, I did not have sight of

what was behind here. And because I was pinned down, I could not

move out to have a look. Comms was difficult, as I had explained

earlier, and my men had difficulty getting those information to me. So at

that time, I did not know that all these things were happening there. It

was only after the fact, in the investigation report, then I realized, okay,

concurrently when I was there, these things were happening. It is a fact.

Those are the realities. I did not know that at that point of time.

…

A: My reality on the ground was based on what I saw. My reality on that

night is based on what I perceived.

78. DAC Lu maintained that he had not adopted a cavalier attitude to the riot

–

A: So as you can see, as I was there holding my position, there were a whole

series of activities going on, and I had also to think through what my options

were that night, what I could do, what could I not do, that night. And then

those various options come with attendant risks. I had to evaluate those risks.

If I do this, these are the risks; if I had done this, these are the risks. So as you

can see, it was concurrent activities going on, and the conditions then were not

like this. We are now sitting in an air-conditioned environment having a

conversation, but on that night, it was noisy, there were hundreds of people

milling around, we were under attack constantly, it was like an artillery –

things were coming in, so those were the conditions that forced the

commander to really hunker down and say, “Look, these are the resources”,

four people at that time, what do you do?”

…

A: If you think that [I was] standing there doing nothing, or according to the

committee, doing nothing, is without risk, suggesting we are risk-averse,

nothing could be further from the truth.

79. Responding to queries on why he chose not to engage the rioters with a




view to quelling the violence, DAC Lu explained that he it would have

been fool-hardy to effect arrests with insufficient forces–

A: So I turned the corner, I saw the car on fire. Two of my officers

instinctively went forward to want to engage. We had eight people: the

intention was if you want to engage, we will move in, we will have to

arrest. I wanted to do that, but we had eight officers. Plus me, HOT

Julius and my OO of Kampong Java NPC, a woman officer by the name

of Huiwen. There were 11 of us. If we had gone in to engage, we would

have to arrest. Every time I arrest a rioter, I would have to allocate two

officers to secure because there is no point in arresting somebody if you

can’t secure him. He can run away.

…

A: How many arrests could I have made before I depleted all the 8

officers? Looking at the size of the crowd, 50 easily and in the hundreds

over there. What would have happened if I want to engage?

…

A: Looking at the level of violence, they pelted uniformed officers with

a hailstorm of stones and bricks and bottles. They overturned police

vehicles and set them on fire. I had every reason to believe that they

would turn hostile, intent on hurting police officers. I had every reason

to believe they would do that. So tactically, it is unsound for me to turn

my limited forces of 8 and turn right and engage the crowd and run the

risk of turning your back on the second group of rioters. It is tactically

unsound to turn your back. You do not take your eyes of your enemy.

80. DAC Lu said that his decision to hold the ground in view of insufficient

forces, was in keeping with SPF doctrine –

A: So you have line of sight issues, you can’t see because the bus was

blocking. Comms was a problem, I could not get to my officers. So

therefore, as a commander, you do what you can based on the resources

you have. Every doctrine I learned in the SPF says, you hold your

position until you amass sufficient forces to deal with them decisively.

That’s what we did.

81. DAC Lu then sought to explain that his response would have been

markedly different if he knew SOC troops were not en-route –

Q: Now, let me ask you a question. What would you have done if the

SOC didn’t come? Are you going to wait and wait and wait for the SOC

to come? That is the point that the committee wants to know. You are

just waiting?




A: I can understand where the question is coming from. If I knew for a

fact that the SOC was not coming, then I do not have an alternative.

Holding the position would not be tenable, because reinforcement is not

coming. I would have to go in and engage with firearm if necessary. My

justification would be that no backup force is coming. I’m on my own,

therefore I have to use whatever I had with me to deal with them. That

situation would be forced upon me.

82. DAC Lu also stressed that it was not possible to decisively distinguish

between passive onlookers and active rioters –

A: One of the points which I think has not been made, which I would

like to clarify here, was that it was very difficult that night to distinguish

a passive onlooker from a rioter. They could be carrying plastic bags

and appear to be shoppers, or they could be taking their phone, taking

pictures, taking video, and the next moment, they would pick up a stone

and they would throw at you.

83. On his decision not to fire at the rioters, DAC Lu stated that he did not

think this option feasible as there was no clear target –

A: But the issue is this. They attacked us by pelting because there was

an advantage. They had a stand-off distance that they could hide

because projectiles can be thrown 20, 30, 40 metres. Now, if they had

come face-to-face, that would have been a totally different proposition.

They chose, for their own safety, to pelt us from a distance. That means

in most instances, you couldn’t see who was pelting you. Because there

is this crowd … and things were flying from the back … with people in

front of them, they were throwing stones over their head to hit us. This

is not a case where you had two standard armies squaring off, where you

can clearly see, these are my adversaries and these are my forces. It was

not like that. It was almost like fighting an insurgency. They were

embedded within the civilian population, you don’t have a clear target,

you don’t have a clear line of sight or open fire. Even if you are

justified, my officers, when I asked them later … have you considered

shooting? The answer was equivocal: shoot who? Stones were coming

from behind people, you don’t have a clear line of sight on who is

attacking you. If you had just wildly opened fire into the crowd, you run

the risk of killing innocent people, people who were just curious, or you

could have shot a police officer for that matter. What would have

happened? It would be a totally different COI today, asking very

different questions.

84. DAC Lu testified that SPF doctrine prevented a commander from straying

into the heat of battle –




CHAIRMAN: If you had gone there, then you would have realized there

were other men, and you could have assembled them and taken some

action –

A: If I may be allowed to respond, sir –

CHAIRMAN: -- because you stayed where it was a very protected place

for you, that these things were allowed to go on.

A: If I may be allowed to respond, sir?

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

A: The incident manager cannot be in the heat of battle. This is our

doctrine. It is not just our doctrine, it is the doctrine used by all other –

…

A: … the SPF doctrine does not allow the commander to go to the heat

of battle for a very good reason. If you are fighting the battle yourself,

getting into a tangle, you can’t command because you will have lost

sight of all the resources. Your focus will be fighting the individual in

front of you. No police unit, no military unit asks their manager,

commander or whatever you call it, to go into the heat of battle. We

don’t do that. It is for obvious reasons.

…

CHAIRMAN: You did not know, because you chose not to know.

A: That is not correct, sir.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

A: If I had gone in, say, as suggested, maybe the few of us just gone in

and take a walk, perhaps and try to venture in, think about this. I was

there. If I had decided to go in and take a walk, my officers would have

to follow me.

CHAIRMAN: No.

A: They would be walking into a crowd with another bunch of people

behind us. So if you think about the tactics, for the commander to lead

his only reserve, walk into a crowd to find out what was happening and

run the risk of getting surrounded.

…

A: My assumption, after being struck twice, was that they knew who I




was and they were targeting me. That’s one. Two, the problem is that if

the incident manager or the commander goes in and he is taken out by a

rock or a brick, and your commander is knocked out of action before

SOC officers can arrive, then you have a serious command gap here. So

that’s why it is part of SPF doctrine, the incident manager or the

commander does not get into the heat of battle. Because if you are

fighting hand to legs, you cannot command. So there is a significant risk

for the commander to enter alone into an area you do not have good

intel on, and try to establish numbers when the alternative would have

been to wait for the officers to come to you and give you the

information.

(i) Evidence of DC T Raja Kumar

85. DC Raja Kumar, who was Acting Commissioner on 8 December 2013,

was the first SPF witness to testify at the public hearing. He presented the

COI with a Report detailing the SPF response to the riot.

86. Delving into the chronology of events, the Report canvassed the

following components of the SPF response on the night in question –

i. The receipt of information about the accident at Race Course Road

by SPF;

ii. ASP Tang’s management of the riot in its initial stages and prior to

the arrival of DAC Lu;

iii. The subsequent activation of SOC;

iv. DAC Lu’s command and control of the riot from 10.06 pm, after

taking over as Incident Manager;

v. The police officers’ experience of the rioters’ aggression towards

them;

vi. The arrival of SOC and the formulation of the dispersal plan by the

commanders; and

vii. The process of dispersing the riot and securing Little India.

87. Addressing queries as to the type of resources routinely dispatched to

respond to ‘999’ calls for assistance, DC Raja Kumar explained that the

‘999’ call received by the Combined Operations Room at 9.23 pm on 8

December 2013 had informed them of a road traffic accident, so SCDF

personnel and Traffic Police officers were dispatched to the scene. He

explained that no Divisional officers were dispatched at this juncture as

the report had not indicated any law and order issues. He highlighted that

police officers from ‘E’ Division (led by ASP Tang) were dispatched to

the scene once it became apparent that a law and order situation was fast




developing.

88. In the course of his evidence, DC Raja Kumar also sought to account for

the delay in the arrival of SOC troops at the scene. There were two

reasons - (i) delay in activation; and (ii) delay caused by traffic

congestion.

89. DC Raja Kumar took the COI through the SOC activation protocol in

place at the time of the riot, explaining that the activation of SOC troops

required the concurrence of the Head of Operations and Training (‘HOT’)

at a Divisional level before the matter was referred to the Director of

Operations for his concurrence. The rationale for such a protocol,

stemmed from the “fact that the Special Operations Command resources

are limited and there’s a signature, a high signature that is associated

with its activation and deployment and the Director of Operations is privy

to information that the Land Divisions may not have and he has to then

make an assessment as to whether to deploy a troop or not.” Elaborating,

he shared that the multi-layer approach was intended to act as “a sieve to

make sure that … there is a proper assessment done before the resources

are then committed.”

90. With reference to SOC activation on the night in question, DC Raja

Kumar explained that, in keeping with protocol, ASP Tang’s request for

SOC troops was first approved by ‘E’ Division’s HOT. Upon securing

this concurrence, approval was sought from covering Director of

Operations DAC Koh Wei Keong. As DAC Koh wanted to know more

about the situation, he sought more information before finally approving

the request at 10.03 pm. SOC troops were officially activated at 10.04

pm, 19 minutes after ASP Tang’s initial request.

91. Agreeing that the activation protocol took too long, DC Raja Kumar

informed the COI that it had since been reviewed to shorten the process.

92. DC Raja Kumar then explained that the troop had been on the verge of

entering Race Course Road from Bukit Timah Road, when it was directed

to enter instead via Hampshire Road, where DAC Lu was stationed.

93. Upon re-diverting, the troops were caught in traffic congestion stretching

down Kampong Java Road and Hampshire Road. The lead troop

remained at Hampshire Road whilst the remaining 3 troops resorted to

returning to enter Race Course Road from Bukit Timah Road.




94. DC Raja Kumar testified that the riot was dispersed by the SOC within 50

minutes of their arrival –

A: As events turned out, when SOC arrived there was clearly

effectiveness because the crowd then started backing off and the officers

were then able to successfully clean that whole area and bring the riot

under control in about 50 minutes to an hour.

95. In the course of his evidence, DC Raja Kumar also addressed concerns

pertaining to the policing of Little India prior to the riot. The COI heard

that SOC troops had been deployed in Little India for anti-crime patrols

on 16 occasions in 2013. Troops had also been forward-stationed ahead of

planned events like Thaipusam. The COI was told that, due to a scarcity

of resources, SOC troops could not be stationed at Little India every

weekend.

96. Nevertheless, DC Raja Kumar assured the COI that other measures,

specific to Little India, had been implemented prior to the riot –

A: the reality is that given the scarcity of resources, we have had to

prioritize the deployment of our officers. The threat assessment, in terms

of looking at the situation in Little India, suggested that such over-

deployment was not necessary … Firstly, the crime situation at Little

India has been improving over the years … in terms of major offences,

going down by slightly more than 32 per cent, whereas if you look at the

national figure, the crime rate had actually come down by about 19 per

cent. So you are talking about a lower crime and better crime situation at

Little India, number one. The second thing is that we have also made it a

point to enhance our actions taken on the ground… the number of

summonses increased quite substantially, which means that more

enforcement action is being taken … so that gives you an idea that a lot

of attention was actually paid on Little India in terms of enforcement on

the ground. There are some other things that happened as well. We set

up an NPC, Rochor NPC. It is located in Little India itself, at the

junction near Kampong Kapor. There is an NPC there which is serving

that community and as part of our policing strategy and system, we have

actually increased the strength of the NPC and we formed a crime strike

force with additional personnel given to the NPC to tackle crime-related

issues in that area … so in other words, the crime situation has

improved. Our experience also with the foreign workers at Little India

has been that, by and large, they have been a compliant lot and have not

caused major problems, definitely not on a major riot situation … the

number of Auxiliary Police officers and the number of security officers

that have been deployed has also increased substantially over the years.




97. Moving forward, DC informed the COI that SPF intended to learn from

the incident on 8 December 2013, implement measures to address and

counter issues that have arisen, and, in all, “improve and emerge a better

force.”

(j) Evidence of Commissioner of Police, Mr Ng Joo Hee

98. CP Ng was the last SPF officer to testify at the public hearing. CP Ng’s

evidence focused primarily on his assessment and review of the decisions

and conduct of his officers on the ground on 8 December 2013.

99. Acknowledging certain shortcomings, CP Ng assured the COI that the

police were undertaking a thorough review of the incident to identify

problems and find solutions.

100. Recognizing that communications and “sense-making” were key failings

on 8 December 2013, CP Ng first gave evidence on the measures

implemented by the SPF in the immediate aftermath of the riot –

i. Restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol;

ii. Enhanced police presence in Little India;

iii. Installation of 29 new cameras and temporary flood lights to light

up back lanes and congregation spots;

iv. Installation of a new command and control system that should

address many of the issues faced during the riot;

v. Implementation of body-worn and in-vehicle cameras for frontline

officers; and

vi. Installation of police cameras in public housing blocks nationwide.

101. In his evidence, CP Ng also provided an assessment of the adequacy of

SPF’s response to the situation. He noted that the patrol officers who

arrived on the scene had thought they were responding to a road traffic

accident. He highlighted that “police first responders are neither trained

nor equipped to fight a riot” and were thus out of their depth in

suppressing a rioting crowd of any significant size. He said that the 50

first responders were spread out over an area the length of 3 football

fields.

102. As to the number of officers at the scene, CP Ng testified that there had

been only 54 uniformed police officers present “that were actively facing

the riots.” The remaining officers, he explained, were 62 CISCO officers,

Traffic Police officers tasked with controlling traffic, 16 plainclothes




officers and 3 SOC intelligence officers. He also disclosed that there were

7 injured officers at the scene.

103. On the issue of DAC Lu’s decision to await the arrival of SOC troops

before engaging the crowd, CP Ng testified that he felt DAC Lu had been

right to restrain his officers –

A: Unless and until we can dominate, we will not charge mindlessly at a

raging mob. This was the posture that police riot troops took on New

Year’s Day in 1985 as they held ground, and this was also the posture

that our first responders took three months ago at Little India. Sir, I

think in strategy when you are outnumbered, your must have three

things. You must have A, better stealth; B, better deception; or C, better

technology or training. On Race Course Road, I think stealth and

deception were irrelevant and better technology and training was on the

way in the form of the PTT troops that had already been summoned.

…

A: I agree that the police must show force. But what is unfortunate at

Race Course Road on 8 December is that we were the smaller force and

therefore we cannot – I think the last thing you want to do when you are

outnumbered, is to advertise the fact that you are outnumbered, and I

don’t think we were in a position to show force at that particular point.

We have to wait for force to come before we show it.

…

So in my view, sir, I think the right and the sensible thing to do when we

are outnumbered and find ourselves outmaneuvered, is to hold our

position and wait for reinforcements to arrive.

104. Though disagreeing with the COI’s view that the police ought to have

engaged with the crowd at an early stage, CP Ng agreed that the 18

minutes taken to activate the SOC troop was “excessive” and “the

decision-making ought to have been faster.” The COI heard that arising

out of this experience, CP Ng has instructed that the authority to activate

an SOC troop be devolved to Division Commanders.

105. On the issue of intoxication and the number of liquor licences issued to

businesses in Little India, CP Ng noted that whilst he could not say that

excessive drinking was the cause or even a primary cause of the riot,

“inebriation was the norm amongst rioters on 8 December and that it

had fuelled the violence” that ensued, adding that “beer and whiskey

bottles were the projectiles of choice that night.” Presenting a table




disclosing the number and types of liquor licences granted to addressees

in Little India, CP Ng testified that “it is clear that the number of liquor

licenses operating in Little India have been remarkably stable over the

last five years without any large increases or decreases. So it is certainly

not the case that a large recent or deliberate loosening of alcohol sales in

the area precipitated the violence that was witnessed on 8 December as

some reports suggested.”

106. CP Ng testified that the number of liquor licences in Little India had been

declining in the last 3 years. CP Ng also disclosed that Little India did not

have the highest concentration of liquor shops within Singapore. He

asserted that the problem was not the availability of alcohol per se, but

rather, the excessive consumption of it. In order to reduce consumption,

he said that curbs were needed to target the time and the space within

which alcohol may be consumed – “this means A, restricting the hours

that intoxicating beverages can be sold, and B, confining the places

where it can be imbibed to licensed premises.”

107. Next, addressing the issue of crime in Little India, CP Ng testified that

there was no “tangible indication right up to 8 December to suggest that

law and order in Little India was deteriorating. There was also no

indication to suggest that conditions in Little India [were] conspiring to

an inevitable breakdown of public order, and certainly we had no hint

that there was a riot of the ferocity that we saw on 8 December about to

erupt.”

108. In the course of his evidence, CP Ng also commented on policing

problems and efforts undertaken in Geylang, another migrant worker

enclave –

A: Policing Geylang, for us, is challenging. Very challenging. We pay a

lot of attention to Geylang and we devote a disproportionate amount of

police resources to keeping it orderly and relatively crime free. Unlike

Little India, all the indications of potential trouble are there in Geylang.

Crime numbers are high and disproportionately so and crimes of

particular concern like robbery, rioting, affray remain persistent and

always threaten to run away. Perhaps most worryingly… there is an

overt hostility and antagonism towards the Police in Geylang.

…

A: There is nowhere else in Singapore which is more policed or policed

more intensely than the 20-odd lorongs either side of Geylang road. We

do this because there are clear indications that the Geylang area in




contrast to Little India, is a potential powder keg.

109. Regarding the number of police officers in Singapore, CP Ng said –

A: To project a truly visible police presence on the streets of Little India

and in the lorongs of Geylang, will require, in my own estimation, an

additional 100 to 150 police officers in each of these localities on the

weekends … the deployment of another 300 pairs of boots on the

ground should bring noticeable police visibility to both locations.

…

A: I want to conclude my presentation with some facts and figures on

how we police Singapore in general … works out to one regular police

officer for every 614 persons. This is an exceedingly low ratio, no

matter how you slice it.

…

A: If you look more closely at one of our police divisions, say Ang Mo

Kio or Bedok or Jurong, you will see how thinly policed Singapore is…

so at any one time if you do the math, its one police to 4000 people at

any one time in Singapore. These are very low numbers.

…

A: The Singapore population is now 58 per cent larger than 20 years

ago, but the number of police officers has increased by less than 16 per

cent in the same period. As a consequence, the ratio of police officers

per 100,000 population has reduced by 27 per cent.

110. In closing, CP Ng made a plea for more manpower to better police

Singapore –

A: I want to close my testimony with a plea, a plea not for more money

but for more bodies. Allow me, sir, to A, raise an extra standby PTT

troop. B, put significantly more boots in Little India, in Geylang and in

other hot spots. And C, beef up our first responder resources that ply our

streets and patrol our estates. Sir, in all, I ask for another 1000 more

police officers so that the police can acquire a much needed strategic

depth, so that we can police Little India and Geylang better, so that we

can reinforce our thin lines in the neighborhoods and communities in the

rest of the country, so that we may continue to keep Singapore safe.




(k) Evidence of Dr Majeed Khader

111. Dr Majeed is a Senior Consultant Psychologist with the Home Team

Academy and the Director of the Home Team Science Centre.

Approached by the COI Investigation Team to conduct a behavioural

analysis and a crowd psychology analysis, Dr Majeed formed a

Behavioural Analysis Group consisting of senior psychologists. Dr

Majeed and his team prepared two reports: a behavioural analysis report

dated 21st February 2014 (‘the Initial Report’) and a supplementary

behavioural analysis report dated 18 March 2014 (the ‘Supplementary

Report’).

Initial Report

112. The Initial Report aimed to provide psychological insight into the

incident on 8 December 2013. Both classical and modern theories of

crowds were considered and analyzed. The Initial Report concludes that

the riot was “fuelled by a misperception” by the workers that the

responding forces were against them, and perhaps that the officers were

more interested in attending to the locals on the bus rather than the

deceased Indian national underneath it. The Initial Report also pointed to

alcohol consumption as a possible factor aggravating the situation.

Supplementary Report and Oral Evidence

113. The methodology behind the team’s work was explained in detail in both

the Supplementary Report and Dr Majeed’s evidence on the stand. The

team analyzed a variety of secondary sources, such as available scientific

literature, transcripts of interviews with the deported foreign workers,

videos footage and photographs. In addition, the team also spoke with

first responders and various other subjects of interest, conducted

observational visits, and engaged in an “expert critique session” with

professionals and experts from various fields to “stress-test” their ideas.

114. Dr Majeed testified that crowds are not mindless, not anonymous and not

irrational. They know what they are doing and accordingly, there was a

need to understand their purpose and their goals. This, he testified, was a

critical factor that would impact the ability to deal with the crowd.

115. Dr Majeed identified five probable factors that contributed to the riot on 8

December 2013: (1) a sense of perceived injustice; (2) a sense of street

retributive justice; (3) the use of alcohol; (4) overcrowding and




congestion; and (5) the lack of familiarity with the ‘Singaporean way of

life’. Dr Majeed highlighted however, that his team was of the view that

the riot could not be attributed to a sole or major contributing factor.

Instead, he testified that it was likely the result of a confluence of factors

on the night in question.

116. A summary of Dr Majeed’s responses to questions framed by the

Investigation Team:

i. Why did rioters target the bus driver and timekeeper initially, only

to thereafter turn their attention to the police: Dr Majeed testified

that in the initial stages of the riot, the crowd likely vented their

anger at the bus driver and timekeeper as they believed the two

were responsible for the death of the Deceased, their countryman.

The crowd’s anger then shifted to the first responders when they

were perceived to be taking sides with the bus driver and

timekeeper (by evacuating them from the bus).

ii. Why did the crowd attack police officers who were in groups more

than individual police officers: Dr Majeed testified that the crowd

may have perceived groups of police officers as a greater threat

than individuals. Police officers in uniforms and groups were more

easily identified by the rioters as an “outgroup” sent to thwart their

actions, emphasizing the two groups’ different identities, e.g.

foreign workers versus locals, or authorities versus workers. The

rioters thus formed an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mindset which could have

fueled their anger.

iii. Why did the crowd attack police officers who were geared-up, but

not attack those without gear: flowing from the above, Dr Majeed

testified that police officers in gear may have appeared to be

preparing to use violence against the rioters, thus fuelling the

unhappiness that was already simmering. Dr Majeed further

highlighted that the presence of a weapon increases an individual’s

aggression.

iv. Why SCDF rescue vehicles and ambulances were attacked: Dr

Majeed concluded that this could have occurred when foreign

workers formed the misperception that the SCDF first responders

chose first to tend to the distressed timekeeper instead of the

Deceased beneath the Bus – “the foreign worker then sensed that

the SCDF was taking the side of the locals and aren’t sympathetic




towards their countryman. Therefore, they got frustrated and angry

with the SCDF … the crowd, who was aggressive, may have seen

the SCDF and the police as one united group against them.”

v. Why property was destroyed and why they set fire to police

vehicles and ambulances: Dr Majeed explained that the destruction

and burning of property was not an unusual occurrence during a

riot. Dr Majeed explained that the rioters’ target choices were not

irrational and random, but deliberate. Dr Majeed noted that arson

was an easy act with a high rate of success. He testified that the

rioters may have targeted the vehicles of those whom they

perceived as ‘perpetrators’ (first the bus, and then the emergency

vehicles). Burning or destroying these vehicles was symbolic as it

provided them a means of expressing their anger and frustration at

perceived injustice or wrongdoing.

vi. Why rioters dispersed and reassembled subsequently: Dr Majeed

found it difficult to comment on this issue as his team did not

possess good behavioural evidence to confirm this.

vii. Whether alcohol influenced the riotous behaviour: With the caveat

that the team’s assessment was based on indirect evidence, Dr

Majeed testified that the rioters could have been experiencing what

he termed “alcohol myopia” and “tunnel vision” which in turn

contributed to a fixation on their frustrations. Additionally, Dr

Majeed testified that some of the foreign workers under the

influence of alcohol could have been acting on a sense of

misplaced ‘veeram’, an Indian cultural term similar to ‘bravado’.

viii. Whether the Indian workers were maltreated: Dr Majeed informed

the COI that he did not think there was a case for maltreatment.

ix. Whether the police action of “holding their position” emboldened

the rioters: in the absence of good behavioural evidence, Dr

Majeed addressed the issue on a theoretical level – should you

intervene or should you hold a position? He testified that “this

issue can go both ways.” On one view, holding the line and not

intervening would embolden the rioters as they would perceive

limited consequences to their actions. However, if the police took

action, but ineffective action, this could likewise embolden the

rioters. Dr Majeed explained that when exercised, the manner of

intervention was equally critical – “it is not just what you do, but




it’s the way in which you do it.”

117. Finally, having researched best practices worldwide, Dr Majeed identified

4 principles when attempting to quell a riot - (1) differentiating between

different groups in the crowd; (2) obtaining information about the crowd;

(3) facilitating the legitimate goals of the crowd; and (4) responding with

a graded hierarchy of tactics. Dr Majeed also drew the COI’s attention to

the Swedish model of “dialogue police”, and suggested that it was a

resource that may have some value in the Singapore context.

(l) Evidence of Senior Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,

Mr Khoo Boon Hui

118. Mr Khoo Boon Hui is the current Senior Deputy Secretary of the Ministry

of Home Affairs. A former Commissioner of Police, Mr Khoo was also

the President of Interpol from 2008 to 2012. Mr Khoo gave evidence

about the riot control doctrine in Singapore and its evolution over the

years. Mr Khoo also commented on various issues, such as the ability of

frontline officers to confront riots, SPF’s use of force doctrine, the

effectiveness of warning shots and other challenges that the police faced

in riot control.

119. On the issue of patrol officers confronting riots, Mr Khoo’s evidence was

that there are limits as to how far frontline officers may intervene to

prevent or control a riot:

A: I think front-line officers, they have a lot of ingenuity. Because they deal

with these things every day, they are well trained and well experienced in

intervening, but only at that level where they can try to de-escalate certain

things… they can do immediate things like saving lives, but only to a limited

extent, and when the riot happens, they have to change their mode of

operation.

120. This is because the handling of large-scale riots requires specially trained

and equipped officers that are able to act with “precision and discipline”

when they engage the crowd. Otherwise, rioters would not be deterred by

what they perceive as an “ad hoc group of policemen”.

121. Therefore, in his opinion, frontline officers should contain the unrest

within the incident site as they wait for the specially trained officers to

arrive. The risk in intervening before the arrival of such officers is that it

may lead to the riot spreading, thus requiring more of such specially

trained officers to be brought onto the scene before the situation can be




brought under control.

122. Mr Khoo said that the wait for specialized troops to arrive can be quite

challenging:

CHAIRMAN: To use a common expression, you must nip it in the bud.

A: Yes, yes, you must nip that – well, of course, if you nip it in the bud by

even preventing the riot from occurring, that’s – but faced with a riot, you

have to contain it and wait for specialized troops to come.

CHAIRMAN: Sure.

A: Of course, that is the most difficult time for the people of the ground, when

you are waiting for reinforcements and you have to deal with the things that

are going on, because you will be challenged, you will be seeing things that

are happening and you have a lot of decisions to make.”

123. On the use of force, Mr Khoo’s said that it is not an easy decision for a

ground commander to make:

A: There’s a lot of controversy about this. But my sense is that it must be

commensurate with the level of public order threat, fair and even-handed. Of

course, we all know that it must be governed by the laws and doctrines. I make

this point also: insufficient force or standing by can embolden the crowd. At

the same time, excessive force can inflame the situation and raise ways to

spread. So it’s a dilemma. Every incident manager, police HQ commander

must realise this.

124. Mr Khoo agreed with the Chairman that firing a warning shot may not be

effective. Therefore, the decision to do so should not be taken lightly:

CHAIRMAN: Firing a warning shot in a big congregation is a real problem.

A: Yes. Because the people in front may know what is happening but the

people behind don’t know. So some may be running back, some may be

surging forward, you know, you have all sorts of –

CHAIRMAN: The other psychology is: if you are going to kill me and I’m

going to die, I might as well die fighting you.

A: Yes, of course. There are some people who will react that way. But there is

a place for warning shots if the situation is clear then that could be an option.

But every police officer has to think through all these things before he acts.

125. Mr Khoo said that making arrests in a riot is not straightforward matter –

large numbers of police officers are necessary in order to be effective.




Otherwise, evidence may be lost in the process.

126. Finally, when asked for his views on DAC Lu’s decision to hold a

position at Hampshire Road and Race Course Road while waiting for the

SOC troops to arrive, Mr Khoo said –

A: Again I will preface my comments by saying I was not there and benefit of

behind hindsight, of course, we can say a lot of things. We don’t know what

the situation was, whether there was actually any awareness of what was

happening, but in any riot situation it is very chaotic. If you only see one part

of it, you may assess it in one way. Of course, as an Incident Manager, you

would like to find out from as many of your officers what is happening and if

you cannot get through to them then find some way, maybe you send someone

to call them.

A: So yes, assessment is important. Now whether you move in or not then of

course you must find out, people who are walking through, is it okay? Should

you go in plain clothes? Should you go in uniform? Should you send a bigger

force? These are all very difficult decisions to make and I don’t know how

much time there was, because every Incident Manager also needs to worry

about many other things, you know, like sending information… upwards to

the police command because they may need a different assessment, what to

do. They may be concerned about officers who are being injured, they may be

concerned about safety of their officers. Should I go and risk the lives of my

officers?

A: As I mentioned earlier, are there other means of doing things? Do I know

how many other units have come in and can they help? But whatever it is,

there’s this overall strategy of how you do it, and things may be very messy,

things may have gone out of control in certain things, but in the end, you

know, you make the best of the situation.

Summary of Evidence of Groups of Witnesses

127. This section summarises the evidence of the following groups of

witnesses:

(a) Non-Government Organizations (‘NGOs’);

(b) Foreign workers;

(c) Residents;

(d) Shop-keepers and business owners;

(e) Government Representatives;

(f) Dormitory Operators; and

(g) Transport Operators




(a) Evidence of NGOs, Unions & Associations

128. At the public hearing, the COI heard from representatives of the Migrant

Workers’ Centre (‘MWC’), the Building Construction and Timber

Industries Employees’ Union (‘BATU’), Transient Workers Count Too,

(‘TWC2’), MARUAH, WorkFair Singapore (‘Workfair’), Friends of Thai

Workers Association, and the Singapore Tamil Community (‘STC’).

Apart from testifying, these groups also tendered submissions detailing

their views and recommendations to the COI.

129. As none of the representatives or members of these groups had been

present in Little India on 8 December 2013, much of their evidence

centered on their observations of the general issues faced by foreign

workers in Singapore.

130. Representatives from BATU and MWC discounted dissatisfaction with

living and working conditions as a precipitating factor for the riot –

BATU

Q: Did you get the sense, having spoken to them, that the riot was as a

result of frustrations about living conditions?

A: Not at all. Mostly they are happy with their working conditions over

here.

Q: How about living conditions?

A: For living conditions, mostly they are living in those dormitories

provided by the company; they are quite satisfied.

Q: Just so we understand you correctly, none of these workers that you

spoke to attributed the riot to poor living or working conditions?

A: Yes, none of them have said that … they are happy working here.

MWC

Q: … is there a high level of dissatisfaction with working and living

conditions in Singapore amongst migrant workers?

…

A: … we have outreached to almost 400,000 migrant workers, and our

common sensing from all our interaction with migrant workers is that

generally they are happy. They may have disputes, but that doesn’t




change the fact that they feel Singapore is a good destination to work,

that there’s security and safety for them here, that generally employers

treat their workers well, there are good prospects, there’s an ability to

earn good money, which they can sent home to their families. So

generally that is the sentiment that we get. Of course, the closest

interaction we have is with those who have problems, and even among

those workers, I think the sensing is still they are not – they don’t regret

coming to Singapore, especially when they know that they have a

problem and there is someone there and a process is in place to help

them seek recourse. That only goes further to establish, you know,

Singapore to them as a good place to come and work, where their rights

will be protected … so my general observation is that there is no latest

frustration or tension building.

131. Queried on likely precipitators for the riot, Dr Russell Heng, a

representative from TWC2, testified that, while the enforcement of labour

laws could be improved, “by and large, workers coming to Singapore are

okay with Singapore’s society.”

132. Responding to a question on how Singapore compared to other migrant

worker host countries, Mr Bernard Menon, a representative from MWC,

testified “that a good yardstick would be the number of other countries

that have a similar high reliance on migrant workers, coming to

Singapore to study the way we manage our migrant population. When I

say “coming to study”, I don’t mean coming to study, you know, to put us

down or anything, but I mean coming to study to look for gems of

knowledge that they can go back and implement in their own countries.

133. On foreign worker attitudes towards authority (both regular SPF officers

and Auxiliary Police Officers (‘APOs’)), the COI heard that workers

were, in general, respectful of authority –

TWC2

A: over the years, the foreign workers we deal with, we have found

them to be generally respectful of authority figures in Singapore,

probably even more so than Singaporeans are respectful of authority …

they basically don’t have a problem with the police.

MARUAH

Q: … there needs to be an examination into why the foreign workers

were keen to set alight police vehicles, ambulances and to pelt officers.

Can you elaborate on what that means? Is this reflective of some

underlying resentment towards authority or are there possible other

reasons for this?




A: … is it all because … they do not like police officers, et cetera? I

think we will be very hard pushed to make that direct correlation.

134. Despite the above, Dr Heng and Dr Vincent Wijeysingha pointed to the

treatment of workers by APOs as a potential source of tension.

Recounting a specific incident, Dr Heng shared an instance where a

volunteer with TWC2 witnessed a worker being unfairly issued with a

summons for littering. His experience resonated with Dr Wijeysingha

who had likewise witnessed similar tensions between foreign workers and

APOs.

135. Dr Wijeysingha said he had heard of instances where bus drivers and

time-keepers had behaved in a high-handed manner towards workers.

With the caveat that he “cannot make a definitive diagnosis”, Dr

Wijeysingha also suggested that the authorities’ handling of the fatal

accident on 8 December 2013 could have inflamed emotions that led to a

riot.

136. In this vein, Dr Heng recommended that individuals who frequently

interacted with foreign workers should receive more training –

A: So our recommendation is that for people who need to interact with

foreign workers in Little India in a crowded situation – law enforcement

people, bus drivers, conductors on buses – that in their training, we

might want to sensitize them to a greater awareness of the people they

are dealing with, the foreign workers … their training and their

education should cover cultural awareness, language awareness and an

appreciation of the role migrant workers have in Singapore. By

language awareness, we are not asking that everybody should be fluent

in Bengali or Tamil or other Indian dialects, but an ability to interact

using simple English, sign language, a few key words in these

languages, like Tamil or Bengali, or sometimes learning how to smile

and empathize, and that the police should be seen by foreign workers as

not just law enforcement people but that they should be seen as sources

of information, support and assistance. I think that would greatly

improve the kind of climate we have and would help to prevent the kind

of violent outbreak we have seen.

137. The groups gave different views on the role of alcohol in the violence that

ensued on 8 December 2013. While Ms Yeow, BATU representative,

testified that she thought alcohol had played a role in the riot, Dr

Wijeysingha claimed that “there was no forensic evidence that there were

great amounts of alcohol drunk”. He further decried the “alcohol thesis”

as an attempt to exonerate the Government’s policy on migrant workers.




Representatives from the Singapore Tamil Community likewise asserted

that “the fact that they were drunk, they had taken drinks, … [is] not the

right reason for this riot.”

138. TWC2’s Dr Heng refrained from pinpointing alcohol as the sole

precipitating factor and testified that the riot was likely the result of a

confluence of factors –

A: In broad terms, I think we would say that a riot is a complex thing. A

hundred or more people were involved, therefore it cannot be shrunk to one

factor like alcohol caused it or anger with the Singapore system caused it … so

my feeling is that that night probably was a confluence of all these factors –

some people were drunk and maybe some people may have been angry with

how they were treated in Singapore and then an incident happened that was an

accident, one of their countrymen got killed, and it led to a kind of mentality

where violence broke out.

139. The witnesses listed common grievances faced by foreign workers in

Singapore: high agency fees in source countries, difficulties encountered

in changing employers and dissatisfaction with the enforcement of

Labour Court orders. They acknowledged, however, that there was no

concrete evidence to suggest that these issues precipitated the riot.

140. The witnesses also spoke about how many of the foreign workers they

interacted with decried the actions of the rioters as shameful and wrong.

Mr Menon of MWC said that, in his conversations with foreign workers

since the riot -

A: I think the reaction that I got most was unhappiness, amongst the

workers that we spoke to, with the chaps that were involved in the

riots… I think they felt that the rioters were being a little bit selfish, in

that the ramifications of their actions would affect a far larger group and

that they didn’t consider their – what they were doing, and that now

everybody as a whole has to suffer the consequences of what they did.

141. Ms Braema Mathi of MARUAH likewise shared that “the overriding

emotion that came across was being very ashamed of what had happened.

The second part that came across is that it should not have happened.”

(b) Evidence of Foreign Workers

142. In the course of the public hearing, the COI heard from 8 South Asian

foreign workers. Their evidence centered on their experience in

Singapore, working and living conditions here, and their views on what




caused the riot.

143. In general, the workers testified that they were happy and satisfied

working in Singapore. Save for minor complaints, such as wanting better

bathing facilities in some dorms, they expressed general satisfaction with

the living conditions in their dormitories -

Foreign Worker 1

Q: So how do you find Singapore?

A: I like working in Singapore.

Q: Why?

A: Sir, the country is good. It is clean. They maintain rules and the law.

Everything is proper.

CHAIRMAN: What about your working conditions?

A: Sir, conditions are very acceptable. I have no issues with the

conditions. That’s why I continued working in Singapore.

Foreign Worker 2

A: Sir, staying in Singapore is like staying with your own family back

in India. You can’t do this elsewhere … I have been here for 15 years

now, and I’ve had no problem. I found everything good.

Foreign Worker 3

A: Singapore ranks first for working purposes, for safety purposes and

there are facilities for you to upgrade yourself in education. The

company renews --- does a renewal on your behalf. The company takes

care of your transportation as well as your accommodation. The fact is

we just need to do our work. The rest is taken care of by the company.

Foreign Worker 4

A: I have been here for the past 14 years and Singapore now feels like

my own country. It is peaceful and I like working here because I get

paid a good salary.

Foreign Worker 5

A: I chose to work in Singapore because there are good facilities. I was

told that the dormitories are good. I also have relatives working here.

My work permit expires in July 2014. I hope to extend it because I am




happy working here because I am able to send money back to my

family in India.

144. When asked to rank Singapore as a destination for employment, the

workers unanimously agreed that Singapore placed first. For instance, on

why he ranked Singapore first, Foreign Worker 5 explained that “you get

good salary here and you get good facilities here. From what I have

heard from others, the other countries do not offer that much.” Foreign

Worker 6 similarly testified that he chose to work in Singapore because

his salary here was higher than that offered in Dubai and Malaysia.

145. The workers testified that they had sought employment n Singapore on

the recommendation of friends and family members who had worked here

before –

Foreign Worker 2

Q: … You first came to Singapore 15 years ago, can you tell us why you

chose Singapore over other countries?

A: My elder brother told me that Singapore was a good country … he said that

the law and order was good in Singapore. No problems in making a good

living, nice place to make money.

Foreign Worker 4

A: My brother said Singapore was like our own country and working here was

good, no problems.

CHAIRMAN: What do you say?

A: I say the same.

146. The workers rejected the notion that the riot was triggered by a general

unhappiness and dissatisfaction with working and living conditions. A

number of other reasons were instead proffered. Some suggested that

workers rioted after perceiving that the police and paramedics were more

concerned with the safety of the bus driver instead of the Deceased.

147. Others identified alcohol as a key factor in the riot –

Foreign Worker 6

A: I believe that the riot occurred because many of the foreign workers

involved were drunk. On my weekly visits to Little India I would




always see some foreign workers creating trouble after they had drunk

alcohol. For instance, they would sit along the pavement and refuse to

move even if they were obstructing the way. They would also throw

their beer bottles on the ground. I know they are drunk because they are

unable to walk.

Foreign Worker 3

A: I believe the riot occurred because many of the foreign workers

involved were drunk. If they were sober they would have thought about

their family and would not have behaved in this way.

Foreign Worker 5

Q: Can you tell us what gave you the impression that some of the rioters

were under the influence of alcohol?

A: Because I have seen and in India also I have seen many times.

CHAIRMAN: seen what?

A: Fighting like this. Even in India they do this, drink and fight, and

they also destroy the cars, damage the cars by hitting the cars.

…

A: If there’s a problem between the bus driver and bus conductor,

they’ll do it there. They’ll stop the bus and start hitting the persons. If

an auto meets with an accident with a bus, the bus driver and the auto

driver will fight with each other.

Foreign Worker 4

A: I believe this incident escalated because the rioters were under the

influence of alcohol and that is why they behaved in this manner.

148. Foreign Worker 7 said that pent-up angst and unhappiness with the time-

keeper and bus driver might have contributed to the riot –

A: In the past, my friends have told me that the bus time keepers on the

$2 bus were very rude to Indian foreign workers. I am told that they use

Hokkien vulgarities and scold the workers whilst they are boarding. I

have not encountered this personally, as I do not take the $2 bus

because it is always too crowded. I was told that the crowd’s hatred for

the bus driver and time keeper could have contributed to the incident

escalating to the level that it did.




149. Foreign Worker 8 however, provided a different view of the timekeeper’s

(Ms Wong’s) behaviour –

A: I also learnt of the female bus assistant involved in the incident. I

know her as I travel on that bus whenever I visit Little India. She is very

strict but very helpful. She brings discipline and order to the queue of

the foreign workers waiting to board the bus. When she is on duty, the

workers queue in an orderly manner. When she is not there, drunk

foreign workers cut the queue and board the bus.

150. The workers expressed regret for the riot and unanimously condemned

the actions of the rioters. This shared sentiment was best expressed by

Foreign Worker 5 –

A: I am saddened by the events of 8 December 2013 because Singapore

is a good country. I am also upset because people will forget our

contributions and think that all Indians are trouble makers.

(c) Evidence of Residents in Little India

151. 7 residents of Little India testified at the public hearing. The COI also

heard from the Chairmen of Tekka and Rowell Court Residents’

Committees.

152. Their testimonies centered on, first, the social disamenities caused by the

migrant workers gathering in residential areas within Little India on

Sundays, and second, the efficacy of post-riot measures.

153. Presenting the views of his residents, Mr Pereira C Martin, Chairman of

Tekka Residents Committee, highlighted an array of disamenities caused

by foreign workers congregating in Little India on Sundays –

A: In Little India itself, which has 10 blocks under my charge, we do

have major problems with foreign workers congregating in areas which

residents would like to use for themselves, for example, the void decks,

the playgrounds and various other areas.

…

A: One of the main things that they do which really irks residents is that

… they sit down on the floor, they have their picnics, they have drinks –

which was a very big issue for the residents before this incident– and

they sleep, and they raise their legs on the wall and they lean on the

wall and they stain the walls and stuff like that. I’m sure, if you go

down to any of the blocks in Little India, you can see signs of this. So

the residents are very uncomfortable with that, especially the ladies. I




mean, if they are sleeping in the passageway on the floor, lying flat, and

you’re wearing a skirt and you’re walking by them, it would make

someone feel really uncomfortable, and that’s what the lady folks tell us

all the time.

…

A: We do have reports from our residents that when there is a large

foreign worker congregation under our void decks, we do have ladies

who come and accost them. Okay? And I have Indian resident

committee members who tell me that these Indian ladies are not just the

normal ladies. That’s one. Two, we also have heard of activities such as

hundi activities, money lending activities that go on below the void

deck from foreign worker to foreign worker … we also observe that

when foreign workers do congregate below the void decks, especially in

the area of Buffalo Road, we do have things like fortune-telling

activities as well and we do not know whether these fortune-tellers are

IIs or whether they are locals or whether they are foreigners who are

here on a social visit pass. So you have a hive of activity when you

allow congregation below the void decks and that is what the residents

find totally unacceptable.

…

A: The people who stay there feel uncomfortable about what they are

doing. Lying down on the floor, drinking alcohol in a public area,

sitting down on the floor in a void deck, leaving your litter after you

have finished eating, you know, sitting there and having a conversation

and having things like women and men of dubious character

approaching you, hundi activities which I have spoken about earlier,

fortune-telling activities, these are not activities which Singaporean

indulge in their HDB estates, do they?

…

A: It is a problem for the residents because they do want to have the

same kind of environment which other HDB estates have.

…

A: To the person who doesn’t stay in the area, it will be an – it will

seem an inconvenience and a disamenity … for the people staying

there, it’s a real problem, it’s a real issue. How would you feel if you

were staying in your estate and you can’t go down on the weekend …

or how would you feel if you had kids, small children and they go down

to the play ground and you see men there gathering having a drink? I

mean, it wouldn’t be something that you feel is a disamenity or an

inconvenience; you would feel it is an invasion of your privacy,

actually.




…

A: To put it very bluntly, I understand where the NGOs are coming

from – but it’s very difficult for me to sympathize with their cause

because they don’t stay here. They don’t. They don’t stay in Little

India. So when you don’t stay in Little India and you don’t face the

problems on a weekly basis, I mean, I do not think you will understand

the feeling, the true feelings of the residents who stay there.

154. Not all of the residents who testified shared Mr Martin’s views. Ms Tan

Huilinn, a resident of Block 661 Buffalo Road, testified that the presence

of workers congregating in residential areas did not bother her –

A: To be honest, I don’t feel it affects me, because it’s only once a week

and it’s not even like a full Sunday, it’s only from 5 pm onwards and

the crowd comes in slowly, so it only peaks like I think from 7 pm

onwards. So just avoid going out or downstairs during these hours.

…

[Referring to common areas such as playgrounds and void decks]

A: I don’t see them hogging it. I don’t see the workers hogging it, even

on Sundays, no. I mean, yes, they do hang out in the void decks. They

do hang out in the walkways. Is it a bother? If you are walking through

the crowd, yes, it’s a bother, but if you’re not then its fine. It’s just one

time a week. I can put up with that.

155. Ms Tan said that she felt the workers added to Little India’s atmosphere–

A: I think to a certain extent the workers do bring about some of the

liveliness there, for me, and it’s – yes, its nice, when, you know, there

are festivals like Pongal and all that and you have the workers attending

the concerts and they are cheering and whistling and shouting and, you

know. You know, there is happiness in the air… to a certain extent, they

bring a certain atmosphere to Little India.

156. The COI also heard residents’ views on the bus boarding area in Little

India. Some residents testified that the boarding area, pre-riot, was

extremely disorderly. Ms Tan described it as an “accident waiting to

happen” with large crowds attempting to board buses within a relatively

small, cramped boarding area. Ms Tan also shared that she had previously

seen workers attempting to board a moving bus.




157. On the whole, residents were happy with measures undertaken by the

authorities following the riot, with most indicating that they had seen

improvements to the public order situation in Little India – “there is an

improvement, because by 10 o’clock now the place is quite peaceful,

there’s not so much crowd around you see … before the riot, the condition

in the place there is very chaotic. There are cars blaring the horn, the

noise pollution, you see. So currently by 9 o’clock, it feels very peaceful,

not much noise there now.”

158. In relation to recommendations for the COI’s consideration, the residents

asked for increased police presence in the area. They also supported the

post-riot measures imposed to restrict the sale and consumption of

alcohol within Little India. While not all the residents believed a total

alcohol ban necessary, most agreed that the previous situation, where

even vegetable shops were selling alcohol, was not tenable.

(d) Evidence of Shopkeepers and Business Owners

159. The COI heard from a number of shopkeepers and business owners. Their

evidence centered on their interactions and observations of foreign

workers in Little India both pre and post riot.

160. Various shopkeepers and business owners gave evidence on the

disamenities caused by foreign workers congregating in Little India on

Sundays. A manager of a restaurant in Little India testified that the

corridor in front of his shop would be in a mess every Monday morning –

A: Monday morning we open the restaurant. In front of the – corridor

they vomit and they are leaving all the food in the corridor because they

sit and drink – after closing the restaurant, they sit in the corridor and

drink and they leave food behind, and the early morning when we come

there and sweep all the things …

CHAIRMAN: Do they leave the bottles there also?

A: Yes, bottles, all the food, whatever they consume and sometimes

they vomit, so we wash in the morning.

161. Mr Ahmad Abdul Jabbar, Chief Chef at Song of India Restaurant, gave

similar testimony –

A: They are crowding the place, they are eating on the street, they just

buy the food, they just sit together, they just put everything on the

street, they just litter, they just throw everything on the street, all the –




they just litter there. Like, all – if you see on the – late night on Sundays

you will see the place everywhere there’s a mess. Completely the place

is dirty. All the place you will see the food thrown, this one, everything,

whatever they do, whatever they eat, whatever they drink, they just

throw everything there only.

162. An owner of another restaurant in Little India echoed this –

Q: Do the foreign workers mess up the area around your restaurant?

A: Yes, you are correct.

Q: What kind of mess do they create?

A: They will leave behind the food packets, the balance of the food

packets, they will not throw away their rubbish, they will leave behind

cigarette butts. They will vomit in the area.

CHAIRMAN: And beer bottles.

A: Yes.

163. He also said that he had, on occasion, seen workers fighting amongst

themselves and hitting one another with beer bottles.

164. In contrast, Mr Suresh Kumar Kumaresan and another business owner

who sold alcohol in Little India claimed that they had not seen workers

causing problems.

165. A number of shopkeepers testified that many of the rioters had been

drunk –

Little India restaurant manager

A: The riot took place on a Sunday and those foreign workers were

simply following the actions of a few main rioters. As their brains do

not work properly when they are drunk, these Indian foreign workers

probably did not realize that the situation would turn out this badly.

Jagwinder Singh Nerwal

A: In my opinion, the riot can be attributed to the effects of alcohol and

the social behaviour of the Indian workers.




166. The shopkeepers testified that they had seen a discernible drop in

business in the immediate aftermath of the riot. Mr Kumaresan, owner of

a provision shop along Race Course Road which sold beer and liquor,

testified that 80% of his profits had come from the sale of alcohol. He

also shared that 80% of his customers were Indian workers. In the course

of his testimony, Mr Kumaresan shared that his monthly sales had

dropped drastically since the alcohol restrictions came into force – “prior

to the incident, my per month sales itself went up to S$135,000 to

S$140,000. Now after the incident, my sales is $32,000 to $35,000 only.”

167. Another business owner selling alcohol similarly testified that his

business had been affected since the riot, with an 80% drop in sales every

month.

168. The witnesses said that, although workers still frequented Little India on

Sundays, drunkenness was less of a problem. They attributed this to the

post-riot restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol that are now

in force.

169. Mr S Rajagopal, Vice-Chairman of the Little India Shopkeepers and

Heritage Association, went further to assert that the alcohol ban should be

enforced nationwide –

A: The current measures, all these notices have been put up but it only

spells out Saturdays and Sundays. Come Monday to Tuesday, there’s all

public drinking there. It goes back to the norm … if there is a complete

ban on public drinking, it will be very fruitful sir.

170. A witness who was born and raised in India but now lived and worked in

Singapore drew from his experience growing up in India –

A: My personal feeling is that the riot on that night, that unfortunate incident

that happened that night, was purely a mob reaction to a sudden death that

occurred. So there is this huge wave of sympathy towards a fellow brother or

a comrade, and whether the other people know him or don't know him or

whether the reason what went wrong, it becomes immaterial and then there is

this mob angst that comes up and that's the reaction that showed up over the

night. I do not think or do not feel that it was premeditated or planned or is a

result of any worker inequality or injustice or suffering of that sort.

...

A: It can happen in any political rally, it can happen in any college gathering.

It could happen in a street where -- in a street culture in India, a pedestrian




crossing the road wrongly, if hit by a scooter the mob would attack the

scooter. If the scooter is in the wrong lane or direction and hit by a car, the

mob would attack the car. If the car is hit by a bus, the mob would attack the

bus. It goes by this hierarchy. So it is the law of the underdog.

(e) Evidence from Government Representatives

171. Representatives from the Urban Redevelopment Agency (‘URA’), the

Ministry of Manpower (‘MOM’), and SPF gave evidence on government

policies on the management of Little India and foreign workers.

172. Group Director of Conservation and Development Services of URA, Mr

Ler Seng Ann, told the COI about the work of the Little India Task Force,

a multi-agency committee set-up in October 2006 to improve the physical

environment of Little India. He tendered a Report detailing the

improvements recommended and implemented to date.

173. The COI also heard from Mr Kevin Teoh, Divisional Director of the

Foreign Manpower Management Division of MOM. Mr Teoh testified

that there were 1.1 million non-domestic foreign workers in Singapore.

Of these, 330,000 were Employment Pass and S-Pass holders, and

770,000 were Work Permit holders. Employment Passes were given to

professionals earning a minimum of $3,300. S-Passes were given to mid-

skilled workers earning a minimum of $2,200. Work Permit holders were

general workers earning a salary below $2,200. Of the 770,000 work

permit holders, 400,000 were non-Malaysians from the construction,

marine and process industry, and most came from South Asia.

174. Mr Teoh told the COI about Singapore’s laws protecting the rights of

workers – “these laws look at prompt salary payment, ensuring proper

accommodation, the provision for upkeep maintenance, medical, a safe

and healthy work environment and in the event that the worker is injured,

we have work injury compensation framework. Collectively, these laws

help to protect the rights of the worker.”

175. Mr Teoh told the COI there are 49 purpose-built dormitories which

collectively housed just over 200,000 foreign workers. The remaining

workers were housed in factory-converted dormitories, temporary

quarters situated on work sites, and in rented HDB or private residences.




176. Mr Teoh said that MOM was keenly involved in ensuring that workers

were provided with good accommodation and amenities. To this end,

MOM was considering building more recreational centers for the

workers, equipped with amenities and services.

177. Mr Teoh explained that MOM adopted a two-pronged approach to

educating workers on their rights. First, while in their home country and

prior to their arrival in Singapore, workers are given pre-departure

materials in their native language2 detailing their entitlements, benefits,

salary and employment rights. Upon arriving in Singapore, workers are

again given further materials in their native language informing them of

local laws and social norms. These materials also contain various contact

information for MOM, and NGOs like TWC2 and MWC.

178. Mr Teoh said that MOM most often received employment-related

complaints (e.g. salary disputes, injury claims) and complaints about poor

working and living conditions. While the employer bore the first

responsibility to provide for the workers’ basic needs while investigations

into the complaints were going on, if an employer refused to do so, “this

is where the government is then prepared to provide such facilities.”

Where necessary, MOM would refer some workers to an NGO – “we

have our own provisions. We make space available if the worker requires

it. That’s number one. Number two, we can also work with various NGOs

who are willing to take these workers.”

179. To MARUAH’s question whether workers awaiting the resolution of a

complaint, were allowed to work, Mr Teoh said that MOM had

implemented a ‘Temporary Job Scheme’ under which workers who have

lodged complaints are allowed to continue working if they wished to do

so –

Q: So it’s not true that the workers are not allowed to work or that

there’s a blanket rule prohibiting foreign workers from working whilst

their claims are being investigated?

A: It is not true. There is the Temporary Job Scheme.

180. Mr Teoh also disagreed with Dr Wijeysingha’s claim that workers could

be forcibly repatriated before their claims were resolved – “as part of the

education process, we have provided the employment rights and

obligations, in there we also state with respect to forced repatriation. The

2 English, Tamil, Malay, Bangladeshi, Thai, Bengali, Mandarin.




last checkpoint that the worker has available to him will be at the

immigration counter where he gets his passport stamped for the exit. At

that point, if he chooses to raise any employment-related matters, he can

inform the officer.” Mr Teoh informed the COI that in 2013, there had

been 23 such cases, where workers had informed ICA counter personnel

about an outstanding employment matter. MOM then investigated each

case.

181. On the issue of fees paid by workers to agents, Mr Teoh said that MOM

regulated local agency fees through the Employment Agencies Act – “we

limit the amount of agency fees that the Singapore licence employment

agency can charge to the worker. We limit, we cap it to one month of

salary per year, maximum two months, per worker.”

182. Finally, Mr Teoh testified that MOM did not believe there was

widespread mistreatment of workers in Singapore. Explaining why, he

said – “we say this because of the amount of work that we have done, is

number one. Number two, when we engage the foreign workers

themselves, when we visit the dormitories in our inspections, we ask

questions pertaining to their well-being and whether they want to raise

anything. So plus with the various assistance and the avenues that is

available to them, it will have been brought up. So we don’t believe there

is widespread mistreatment. Secondly, where there are cases of

mistreatment, we are prepared to take action and we have done so. The

situation, we think, from MOM’s perspective, is that generally workers

are treated decently.

183. In a 2011 survey of 3000 foreign workers, Mr Teoh said that slightly over

90% of these workers said that were happy and satisfied with working

conditions in Singapore. 80% indicated that they wished to come back

and continue working. 70% of those surveyed had worked in Singapore

for more than 2 years; of these, 60% had worked in Singapore for more

than 6 years. These, Mr Teoh added, “are indications that I take comfort

in, in that workers do find that Singapore is a place that they wish to

work in and that they are fairly treated, they know where to go to and

therefore they want to continue their employment in Singapore.”

184. Assistant Commissioner Jessica Kwok (‘AC Kwok’), Director of the

Police Licensing and Regulatory Department, SPF testified on the issuing

of liquor licenses. AC Kwok told the COI that the Liquor Licensing

Board was tasked with issuing, transferring, suspending and canceling all

classes of liquor licenses as well as stipulating conditions and restrictions




on the issuance of licences.

185. AC Kwok said that SPF would screen each applicant and proposed venue

for each liquor license applied for. If there are no issues at this stage, the

application would then be routed to the Compliance Management Unit of

the relevant SPF Land Division where an assessment of the terrain and a

site inspection would be made. The crime situation and any other law and

order issues in the area would also be considered. If there are no

concerns, the licence would then be approved after verifying the

applicant’s documents.

186. AC Kwok told the COI that there were 8 types of licences. Each licence

was valid for 2 years. The licenses state whether alcohol may only be

consumed on-site, or also off-site. Where applicable, licenses may also

stipulate certain conditions.

187. AC Kwok testified that the number of liquor licenses in Little India had

“remained stable over the years.” As of 19 March 2014, 331 licences had

been issued to Little India venues, with 20% of these licenses being

issued in 2013. The remaining licences had been issued or renewed in

2012. AC Kwok added that, compared to Chinatown, Geylang and Joo

Chiat, “the number of liquor licenses in Little India is not the highest per

land area.”

188. To the question of why vegetable sellers were permitted to sell liquor, AC

Kwok said that these sellers possessed a ‘shop-use’ permit entitling them

to conduct retail sales. As the permit did not place any restrictions on the

type of goods they were allowed to sell, the shops were permitted to sell

alcohol.

189. Unlike Clarke Quay and Boat Quay, AC Kwok testified that no special

restrictions had been placed on liquor licences in Little India “given the

stable number of liquor licences … and the improving public order and

security situation” in the area.

190. The COI also heard from Superintendent Victor Ho (‘Supt Ho’), DAC

Daniel Tan (‘DAC Tan’) and DSP Ho See Ying (‘DSP Ho’). These

witnesses gave evidence on SPF’s approach to managing foreign workers

at known foreign-worker enclaves, such as Little India, Golden Mile

Complex and Peninsular Plaza. As Director of Operations, Supt Ho

explained that APOs were engaged to perform foreign worker

management duties. This entailed projecting a uniformed presence at




selected areas, engaging and advising foreign workers against unlawful

and anti-social behaviour and conducting enforcement patrols for

regulatory offences, on behalf of the National Environment Agency. In

addition, he clarified that APOs were deployed to deal with social

disamenities and not to deal with public security incidents.

191. DAC Tan and DSP Ho gave evidence on the general policing strategies

employed in areas where foreign workers regularly congregate. DSP Ho

described the additional efforts taken by SPF to police Little India. This

included the deployment of 2 additional Fast Response Cars and the

creation of a community unit which specifically addressed security and

safety issues within the district. SOC troops had also been deployed to

Little India on 16 occasions in 2013, to project a stronger uniformed

presence. DSP Ho also testified that crime in Little India had been on a

downward trend in the years preceding the riot.

192. In her evidence, DSP Ho also touched on the deployment of APOs in

Little India. To previous witnesses’ claims regarding APOs’ treatment of

foreign workers, DSP Ho testified that there had only been 2

substantiated complaints of rudeness by APOs over the past 5 years. She

said that it was possible that foreign workers may dislike APOs because

they issue the workers with summonses, and not necessarily because of

rude or derogatory behaviour.

193. DAC Tan described the additional post-riot measures and deployments

made by SPF in Little India. He testified that additional officers had

regularly been deployed to the area, and that additional lighting and

cameras had been installed to deter crime.

(f) Evidence of Dormitory Operators

194. The COI heard from a number of dormitory representatives.

195. Dormitory operator Mr Willy Ng, testified that living conditions in

dormitories in Singapore “surpass” international standards set by the

International Finance Corporation of the World Bank “in terms of living

conditions, in terms of living space, in terms of amenities.” When asked

how Singapore compared to other countries, he said –

A: By all measures, even way back more than ten years ago when

dormitories started in Singapore, Singapore has always been – has

always maintained a higher standard in terms of living conditions.




…

A: I’d like to say, you know dormitories in other areas peg their

standards to Singapore’s levels of standards.

…

A: In terms of living standards because Singapore – the government, the

stat boards assert certain standards on us operators to maintain. And the

enforcement on the operators is very – is much better than other

countries. So because of that, Singapore standards, basically, from

where I stand and experienced, is the best – that I know of.

196. When asked how the Government ensured that dormitories comply with

these requirements, Mr Ng explained that the Government, as the

landlord, sets out the standards in the land tender document. Further, to

obtain 30 year lease renewals on the land, dormitory operators had to

constantly ensure that new and updated requirements stipulated by the

Government were complied with.

197. Mr Ng testified that he did not think that dormitory conditions in

Singapore were a source of discontent amongst the foreign workers –

CHAIRMAN: Would you say that dormitory conditions in Singapore a

not a source of any discontent or dissatisfaction on the part of the

foreign workers?

A: Definitely not. To most of the workers, the dormitories here are

actually better than where they were living in their – from where they

come from. So it’s – dormitories here are actually a step up in terms of

their living conditions.

198. The COI also heard from the Mr Saffarulah s/o Abdullah, the Dormitory

Manager of Penjuru Dormitory. Mr Saffarulah responded to specific

allegations published in a Hong Kong tabloid newspaper which had

described his dormitory as being “like a prison”. Mr Saffarulah clarified

that, contrary to the tabloid report, there was no barbed wire along the

perimeter of the dormitory, or for that matter, anyway within its

compound - “sirs, our dormitory – there’s no barbed wires, only we have

fencing … gate also don’t have any barbed wire, sir. The whole dormitory

don’t have any barbed wires … The fencing only about 2 metre high, the

requirement by the BCA for the perimeter, perimeter protection.”




199. Mr Saffarulah further testified that all CCTV cameras present in the

dormitory faced the perimeter of the fence “to see any intruders come

into the dormitory” and to monitor activity outside the perimeter –

contrary to the tabloid’s claim that the CCTVs were there to monitor the

workers. He also said that workers were free to leave the premises at will,

24 hours a day, and that there were no restrictions on their movement in

and out of the dormitory.

(g) Transport Operators and Associations

200. The COI heard evidence from representatives of the two bus associations

– the Singapore School Transport Association (‘SSTA’) and the Singapore

School and Private Hire Bus-Owners’ Association (‘S7’) – whose

members operate the private bus services ferrying foreign workers to and

from the Little India area. Mr Yeo Teck Guan, Group Director (Public

Transport) at the Land Transport Authority (‘LTA’) also testified at the

public hearing.

201. The witnesses provided the COI with insights into the general crowd and

traffic situation at the bus boarding areas at Tekka Lane (operated by

SSTA) and Hampshire Road (operated by S7), prior to the Riot. It was

commonly agreed that both locations experienced large crowds waiting

for the buses back to the dormitories. Mr Wong Ann Lin, chairman of the

SSTA, stated that the largest the crowd could get at any one point in time

at the Tekka Lane site was an estimated “200… to 400” passengers. Mr

Tan Jwee Tuan, supervisor of the SSTA timekeepers at Tekka Lane, put

the figure as at “least 500” after 8.00 p.m.. Mr Michael Tan Jun How, the

S7 representative, however testified that the crowd could swell to “one or

two thousand” at the Hampshire Road location.

202. By comparison, only a handful of staff members (comprising supervisors,

timekeepers and traffic controllers) were deployed by the bus associations

to manage the boarding area and co-ordinate the arrival and departure of

the buses. Both associations also stated that these staff members did not

receive any training in crowd control or on dealing with the foreign

nationals who comprised the passengers using the bus services.

203. These witnesses highlighted the difficulties faced by the bus associations

in managing the large crowds waiting for the buses -




Wong Ann Lin

Q: Has there been any feedback from the staff on the ground about

difficulties in managing the large number of people there?

…

A: Yes, we have been told that although there may be few hundred

passengers waiting for buses, but only one bus would come at any one

time, so it's not enough buses to accommodate all these people.

Michael Tan Jun How

A: Now, I think manpower-wise, we don't have the capability to control

the crowd, because we are talking about thousands and thousands of

people.

204. The representatives from both bus associations recommended an increase

in police presence at the bus boarding areas, saying that this would make

it easier to manage the crowds.

205. Mr Tan Jwee Tuan explained what was required of the timekeepers

deployed on the ground -

A: ...So under such circumstances, the workers and passengers would

keep on increasing, the number of passengers would keep on increasing

and some of the workers will stand in the middle of the road and

obstruct our buses from coming in. So in such a situation, sometimes

when the timekeeper they raise their voice to ask them to have to move

aside so that our buses could come in. So they're actually trying to

maintain order. Just now you said that our timekeepers have to be of a

rugged personality. I can only say that if you were to -- I can only say

that if you were to employ a female staff who is quite weak, it would be

a big problem.

Q: Mr Tan, are you saying that you need to have a certain firmness or

strictness in the way you deal with the passengers in order to manage

the challenges of a large crowd?

A: Yes, that is correct, yes.

206. Specifically regarding Ms Wong, Mr Tan Jwee Tuan stated that while she

“speaks louder than most people”, she was “effective” at her job and he

had not noticed her using any “rough language” towards the foreign

workers. Mr Tan Jun How Michael and Mr Wong Ann Lin also testified

that they were not aware of any of their staff members using vulgarities




or racial epithets against the foreign workers.

207. The representatives from both bus associations also recounted that, prior

to the riot, the foreign workers tended not to queue while waiting for the

buses, instead rushing towards the buses as they neared. Mr Wong Ann

Lin recalled one occasion prior to 8 December 2013 when an accident

involving a foreign worker and a bus occurred as a result of this

disorganisation. There were also instances where the workers would

chase after moving buses.

208. The witnesses testified that the bus drivers were most concerned with

drunken passengers vomiting on board their buses. Mr Tan Jun How

Michael stated that the decision whether to allow drunken passengers to

board the buses was left to the driver’s discretion. However, Mr Wong

Ann Lin testified that SSTA had given instructions to their timekeepers

not to allow passengers who were very drunk to board the buses, “for the

safety of the passengers and bus drivers”.

209. The representatives from the two bus associations welcomed the post-riot

measures implemented at the bus boarding areas, consisting mainly of the

introduction of barricades and setting up of queuing areas, and were in

general agreement that both locations were now safer and better-

managed.

210. Mr Tan Jwee Tuan, however, expressed his concern that the earlier cut-off

time for the bus services (9.00 pm, as compared to 11.00 pm pre-riot),

coupled with a reduction in the number of buses allowed to operate on the

routes, could lead to a situation where large numbers of foreign workers

find themselves without means of transport back to their dormitories. Mr

Tan estimated that after 9.00 pm, the number of foreign workers

remaining at Tekka Lane ranged between “500 to 800” people, which

could lead to problems if the available buses were not able to

accommodate these workers:

A: ... If you don't ferry these 800 people home, if they get angry then it

may give rise to another riot.

...

A: At present, you know, it's an anxious time for us because we don't

know whether there will be buses coming to ferry these people. So, to

us, if the acute shortage of buses to ferry these people back, I have this

feeling that when we are working there actually we feel threatened,




because if we don't ferry them back we feel threatened.

211. Mr Yeo Teck Guan testified that, since the riot, LTA had been meeting

regularly with the bus associations and reviewing the operations at the

bus boarding areas. He also explained the adjustments made by LTA in

response to the concerns raised by the bus associations, which included

increasing the number of buses allowed to operate during certain peak

periods –

A: Yes, in the sense that when we first started, we took a decision to --

when we lifted the suspension on the Little India bus service, we went

back to 50 per cent of capacity. So, of course, we were all on the ground

to monitor and after discussion with operators, the week after we

decided that to ease the operation, we added 14 another -- if I'm not

wrong, it was 16 buses. So from50 per cent we went to 56 per cent.

Then subsequently in February, because of the return trips, you know,

some -- because of the peak period -- the peak Sunday effect, what we

did was also warn the operators to add another 12 buses. So these are

the incremental things we did and, of course, as we go along, I

acknowledge that more foreign workers may be coming back to Little

India, so I think at the end of February we also worked with our -- with

the associations to add another 20 buses. So now, on a normal Sunday

there will be 166 buses on the return trip and there will be additional 12

buses.

212. Mr Yeo also testified that he was informed that on the weekend prior to

his taking the stand, the queues were cleared by 9.15 pm. In this regard,

Mr Michael Tan Jun How also stated that the numbers remaining at

Hampshire Road after the cut-off time was “manageable” and that the

buses would be able to transport away these workers within 45 minutes

on average.

213. Mr Yeo Teck Guan also outlined additional measures that LTA intended to

implement at the bus boarding areas in the future, including the

introduction of permanent structures, shelters and facilities to “make the

waiting more tolerable” for the foreign workers.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE LITTLE … · 2018-11-05 · 1. At the close of the...

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