REPORT 2003 - MIFTAH · 2003-12-11 · Looking at international, ... Arab world built on five...

AHDR 2002 challenged the Arab world to overcome three cardinal obstacles to human devel-opment posed by widening gaps in freedom, women’s empowerment and knowledge acrossthe region.

Looking at international, regional and local developments affecting Arab countries sincethat first report was issued confirms that those challenges remain critically pertinent and mayhave become even graver, especially in the area of freedom.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the status of Arab knowledge at the beginning ofthe 21st century, the theme of this second report. Despite the presence of significant humancapital in the region, AHDR 2003 concludes that disabling constraints hamper the acquisition,diffusion and production of knowledge in Arab societies. This human capital, under morepromising conditions, could offer a substantial base for an Arab knowledge renaissance.

The Report affirms that knowledge can help the region to expand the scope of human free-doms, enhance the capacity to guarantee those freedoms through good governance andachieve the higher moral human goals of justice and human dignity. It also underlines theimportance of knowledge to Arab countries as a powerful driver of economic growth throughhigher productivity.

Its closing section puts forward a strategic vision for creating knowledge societies in theArab world built on five pillars:1. Guaranteeing the key freedoms of opinion, speech and assembly through good governancebounded by the law.2. Disseminating high quality education for all.3. Embedding and ingraining science, and building and broadening the capacity for researchand development across society.4. Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production in Arab socioeconomic structures.5. Developing an authentic, broadminded and enlightened Arab knowledge model.

AHDR 2003 makes it clear that, in the Arab civilisation, the pursuit of knowledge isprompted by religion, culture, history and the human will to achieve success. Obstructions tothis quest are the defective structures created by human beings – social, economic and, aboveall, political. Arabs must remove or reform these structures in order to take the place theydeserve in the world of knowledge at the beginning of the knowledge millennium.

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UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMEARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003Building a Knowledge Society

Sales No.: E.03.III.B.9

ISBN: 92-1-126157-0

SPONSORED BY THE REGIONAL BUREAUFOR ARAB STATES

ARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC ANDSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

THE ARAB HUMANDEVELOPMENTREPORT 2003Building a knowledge society

United Nations Development ProgrammeArab Fund for Economic and Social Development

Copyright © 2003By the United Nations Development Programme,Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS),1 UN Plaza, New York, New York, 10017, USA

Image on cover of cast copper statue head from Nineveh, copyright Hirmer Fotoarchiv München

All rights reserved. No part of this publication maybe reproduced,stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,without prior permission of UNDP / RBAS

Available through:United Nations PublicationsRoom DC2-853New York, NY 10017USA

Telephone: 212 963 8302 and 800 253 9646 (From the United States)Email: [email protected]: www.un.org/PublicationsWeb: www.undp.org/rbas

Cover design: Mamoun SakkalLayout and Production: SYNTAX, Amman, JordanPrinted at: National Press, Amman, Jordan

ISBN: 92-1-126157-0

Printed in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United

Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States. The Report is the work of an

independent team of authors sponsored by the Regional Bureau for Arab States.

I

Last year’s inaugural Arab HumanDevelopment Report was by any standard aphenomenon. As the more than one millioncopies downloaded off the Internet so far tes-tifies, its groundbreaking analysis of the re-gion’s development challenges catalysed anunprecedented wave of debate and discussionin both Arab countries and the wider world.Even that understates its true impact: mea-sured by the fierce arguments it continues toprovoke from coffee houses to television talk-shows to parliaments and beyond it is clearwhy Time magazine cited it as the most im-portant publication of 2002. The reason forthis impact is simple but important. As a pio-neering and provocative study produced by ateam of Arab scholars, policy analysts andpractitioners at a time of enormous economic,social and political ferment its central mes-sages -- that reform is necessary and if it is tobe successful and sustainable then change hasto come from within -- carried unique author-ity. The United Nations DevelopmentProgramme is proud to have sponsored it.

In the twelve months since that reportcame out, several Arab countries have takensignificant steps toward grappling with thechallenges it set out. At the same time, how-ever, two other events -- the intensification ofconflict in the occupied Palestinian territoriesand the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces –have complicated matters. The first ArabHuman Development Report carried broadsupport across normal political divides byhighlighting the three deficits afflicting theArab world – freedom, women’s rights andknowledge – and stressing the importance ofdemocracy as part of the solution to bridgingthem. However, reaction to both the events inIraq and the Occupied Territories shows, onceagain, how divided the international commu-nity is on the "how" of such reforms. For

much of the Arab world – and, indeed, globalpublic opinion – military action was not thebest way to promote democratic change.Hence the strong reassertion in this report of akey tenet of its predecessor: lasting reform inthe Arab world must come from within.

This year, the authors go on to consider indetail how such domestically driven reformmight take place with regard to one of thethree cardinal challenges – the knowledgedeficit. Reflecting their sensitivity to recentevents, however, the report first opens with afrank –and for a UN document untypicallyangry – acknowledgment of the additionalchallenges to sustainable reform in the regionthey believe have been created. The reasonsfor this are twofold: first, the frustration of theauthors at the sense that their internal path fordemocratic reform in the region has, to a con-siderable extent, been derailed by the eventsthey describe; second, because of the very spe-cial status of this report -- its power comesfrom the fact that it is not written by normal,internal UN authors, but is the product ofleading Arab intellectuals and policy analystswriting primarily for an Arab audience. Its UNsponsorship gives them a platform and recog-nition for their work which they would nototherwise have but, at the same time, its in-tegrity rests in the fact that these are theirviews rather than parsed and cautious opin-ions of international civil servants. As such, wecommend them to you as the authentic cry ofboth anger and hope of a region grapplingwith change.

In making the core argument that the Arabworld must turn outwards and immerse itselfin the global knowledge stream, however, theauthors make clear they remain firmly com-mitted to engagement. But, they ask, if the out-side world seems to dominate militarily, whatdoes that mean for culture and knowledge?

Foreword by the Administrator, UNDP

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Immersion, yes, but swamped or drowned, no,is their message in providing a comprehensiveassessment of the state of knowledge in Arabsocieties today, the impediments to its acquisi-tion and diffusion, and the prospects of mak-ing learning and research a dynamic driver ofsocial and economic innovation in the future.

The Report argues that the potential fordeveloping the knowledge capabilities of Arabcountries is enormous – not only because oftheir untapped human capital, but also be-cause of their rich cultural, linguistic and intel-lectual heritage. It acknowledges thatoverhauling the region’s antiquated andunder-resourced education systems will not beeasy, but insists that it is critical if knowledgeand economic output are to feed off eachother, creating a virtuous cycle conducive tohuman development. However, the authorsalso underline once again that if these objec-tives are to be met, Arabs need to drive theprocess themselves: promoting local innova-tion as a necessary complement to harnessingknowledge and technology from abroad. The

stark choice facing Arab countries is: con-structively engage with the new world or beleft behind. For those who fear that their cul-ture may be compromised by outside influ-ences, this message of openness may be ascontroversial as the original report.

AHDR 2003 is merely the second step in along journey. Over the next two years, furtherreports will follow on freedom and women’sempowerment, the other two main challengesfacing the region. I hope and believe this lat-est issue will attract as much attention andprovoke as much debate as its predecessor.Even if many of the views taken in this reportdo not necessarily reflect UNDP or UnitedNations policy, we are pleased to be associatedwith a process that is helping stimulate a dy-namic new policy discourse across the Arabregion and the wider world. I would also par-ticularly like to thank Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi,my colleague and Assistant Administrator,who as Bureau Director for the Arab Stateshas been the driving inspiration behind thisimportant project.

Mark Malloch Brown.Administrator, UNDP

UNDP is the UN's global development network. It advocates for change andconnects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help peoplebuild a better life.

III

Our first Report in this series, published inJuly 2002, looked closely at Arab human de-velopment at the beginning of the new millen-nium. It probed its present state, diagnosed itsmost disabling flaws, and advanced concreteproposals for achieving levels of developmentcommensurate with the potential of the Arabregion and the aspirations of new generationsof Arabs. The Report concluded that promot-ing human development in the Arab worldrests on three great tasks: building, using andliberating the capabilities of the Arab peopleby advancing knowledge, freedom andwomen’s empowerment.

Public, media and policy attention to thefirst Report has been gratifyingly wide and vig-orous, prompting a keen debate, both in theregion and abroad, on the central dilemmas ofArab human development Such attention wasnot confined to public discussion circles.Some Arab governments and institutions tookup the Report in their proceedings, criticisingsome findings and assenting to others.

Subsequently, and in line with the recom-mendations of the first Report, several Arabcountries crossed new thresholds, particularlyin terms of empowering women and enhanc-ing their political participation. This secondReport has recorded such accomplishments. Italso documents failures and underscores newchallenges. The region has recently encoun-tered grave threats, and the dignity and rightsof Arabs, especially the right to self-determi-nation, have been grossly violated. Soon afterthe first Report was completed, Israel re-occu-pied the Palestinian Territories. Barely oneyear later, Iraq fell under Anglo-American in-vasion and occupation. In these circum-stances, the challenge of building Arab humandevelopment has undoubtedly become moreperilous, certainly more arduous and possiblymore tenuous.

At this precarious juncture, some ob-servers questioned the wisdom of issuing fur-ther Reports, while others worried that specialinterest groups might exploit their outspokenapproach, to the detriment of Arabs. Indeed,the authors are well aware that their workmight be misused or misinterpreted to servethe purposes of parties - outside as well as in-side - the Arab world whose interests runcounter to an Arab awakening.

The majority, however, argued forcefullythat to leave the initiative to others would bethe more ominous choice. Self-reform stem-ming from open, scrupulous and balancedself-criticism is the right, if not the only alter-native to plans that are apparently beingdrawn up outside the Arab world for restruc-turing the area and for reshaping the Arabidentity. Turning a blind eye to the weaknessesand shortfalls of the region, instead of deci-sively identifying and overcoming them, canonly increase its vulnerability and leave it moreexposed.

It is in this spirit that the second Report isnow issued. Its goal is to activate a dialogueamong Arabs on ways to change the course ofArab history and afford the Arab people thedecent lives to which they aspire and to whichthey are entitled. Written into every line is theunwavering conviction that reform efforts,which genuinely serve the region’s interests,must be initiated and launched from within.

The theme chosen this year is the buildingof an Arab knowledge society, not only be-cause knowledge is the first of the three corecomponents of the original strategy, but alsobecause it is the most instrumental.Knowledge increasingly defines the line be-tween wealth and poverty, between capabilityand powerlessness and between human fulfill-ment and frustration. A country able to mobi-lize and diffuse knowledge can rapidly raise its

Foreword by the Regional Director, UNDPRegional Bureau for Arab States

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level of development, help all its citizens togrow and flourish and take its proper place onthe 21st century global stage.

The Report examines the status of Arabknowledge today in terms of demand, produc-tion and dissemination, and concludes that allthree are ineffectual notwithstanding theabundance of Arab human capital. It contraststhis state with the origins and outcomes of theregion’s rich, enquiring and pluralistic culturaland intellectual heritage, confirming that thelatter provide robust foundations on which tobuild a knowledge society. It however ob-serves that the positive models found in Arabculture lack effective economic social, and po-litical equivalents. The missing links are eitherburied in dust or smothered by ideologies, so-cietal structures and values that inhibit criticalthinking, cut Arabs off from their knowledge-rich heritage and block the free flow of ideasand learning.

There is therefore a pressing need fordeep-seated reform in the organisational, so-cial and political context of knowledge. TheReport identifies several key priorities forchange. An important set of findings is that, increating an Arab knowledge society, the re-form of governance would represent a turningpoint, the renewal of education and the Arabiclanguage a rallying point and the pursuit ofcultural interaction an international meetingpoint.

The Report proposes a strategic visionthat could support a creative Arab renaissancebuttressed by five essential pillars: • Providing and guaranteeing the key free-doms of opinion, expression and associationthrough good governance. • Broadening quality education and makingit available to all.

• Embedding science in Arab society,broadening the capacity for research and de-velopment and joining the information revolu-tion decisively. • Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-basedand higher value-added production.• Developing an enlightened Arab knowl-edge model that encourages cognitive learn-ing, critical thinking, problem solving andcreativity while promoting the Arabic lan-guage, cultural diversity and openness to othercultures.

Undoubtedly, certain arguments in theReport might seem controversial and may beappreciated only after a conscientious reap-praisal. Yet the Report claims neither infalli-bility nor a monopoly of the truth. Its authorswill be satisfied if it prompts open dialogue,constructive criticism, disagreement sup-ported by evidence and consent strengthenedby proof. Such responses would expedite thequest for common goals and the Arab journeyto knowledge and freedom.

AHDR 2003 represents a substantial intel-lectual endeavour in the region to which manypeople have contributed. I am deeply thank-ful to all who participated in its preparation,review and editing. I am especially grateful tothe core team, particularly the lead author, Dr.Nader Fergany, for his resourceful involve-ment at all stages. My sincere thanks also go tothe Advisory Board without whose counselthis Report would not have been possible.Finally, I am indebted to Mark MallochBrown, Administrator of UNDP, for his con-tinued brave support to this series, and to ourco-sponsors, the Arab Fund for Economic andSocial Development, for their sustained col-laboration.

Rima Khalaf Hunaidi

Assistant Secretary General and Assistant Administrator, Regional Director,

Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Development Programme

V

I have the pleasure to collaborate once againwith UNDP in co-sponsoring this secondArab Human Development Report, which ispart of an annual series that aims to sustain adiscussion of specific development challengesfacing Arab countries individually and as agroup.

Undoubtedly, the first Arab HumanDevelopment Report (2002) was an excep-tional effort in all respects. Its distinctiveanalysis of the current state of human develop-ment in the Arab world, the obstacles to itsachievement and the opportunities for tran-scending those challenges attracted great in-terest and generated an extensive debate anddiscussion. It was the first Arab report to at-tempt a comprehensive understanding of theArabs today, as seen through the eyes of Arabscholars, and to explore what Arab societiesthemselves can do to promote their advance-ment. Its significant conclusions received widemedia and policy attention in the Arab worldand in international circles, prompting a spir-ited debate among Arab intellectuals and de-velopment specialists. The Report broughtabout a lively and vigorous discussion. Itspoints of view, whether endorsed or criticised,were seen as bold initiatives for much-neededreform in the Arab sphere, and a manifestationof the Arabs' ability to exercise constructiveself-criticism.

The first Report stressed that human de-velopment centres on the comprehensive andintegrated development of societal institutionsand people who are indeed the real wealth ofnations. It also emphasised that human devel-opment involves enhancing people's optionsfor achieving those human goals that support adignified life, both in the material and moralsense. It further underlined the importance of

freedom in the concept of human develop-ment, stressing the instrumental role of politi-cal, economic and social freedoms.

The authors of AHDR 2003 have chosenfor their theme one of the three main chal-lenges identified by the first Report, theknowledge gap in the Arab world, because ofits organic relationship with human develop-ment, its pivotal role in promoting it and itssignificance as one of the essential pursuits ofhumanity. They underline the large deficiencyin knowledge capacity in the Arab countries,both in the acquisition and production ofknowledge, and point out that only by over-coming this shortcoming in all societal activi-ties can Arab countries succeed and prosper inthe modern age.

The second Report identifies several mea-sures for overcoming the underlying obstruc-tions to knowledge and for employing Arabhuman capabilities effectively in establishingthe knowledge society. The knowledge systemis an expansive and complex one. It entailstransforming knowledge wealth into knowl-edge capital in order to generate new knowl-edge in the physical and social sciences,humanities, arts and popular culture. TheReport also monitors developments in humandevelopment in Arab countries since 2002 andshows that, at the regional and internationallevels, the Arab world has been experiencingsignificant challenges and events which willgreatly reflect on the evolution of human de-velopment. The Report underlines recent de-velopments in the occupied PalestinianTerritories and Iraq in particular, and under-scores that building intrinsic Arab capabilitiesis the only sound course for coping with suchmomentous challenges.

The Report addresses a large number of

Foreword by the Director General and Chairman The Arab Fund for Economic and SocialDevelopment

VI

interrelated issues in some depth. Some ofthese pertain to education, the media, the in-frastructure of communication and informa-tion networks, the production andmeasurement of knowledge and the organi-sational context for its acquisition in Arabcountries. The societal and political contextimpacting on knowledge and the reciprocallinks between the knowledge society andeconomic and societal structures are alsodiscussed.

The Report points out that deficientknowledge capabilities represent a formida-ble impediment for Arab countries in theirattempts to face the challenges of the 21stcentury. These countries cannot make anytangible progress in the long term withoutacquiring the knowledge and the technolog-ical capacities that are indispensable forprosperity in the new millennium. Indeed,the absence of such prerequisites could wellinvite unforeseen disasters. Ingraining andembedding knowledge in Arab societies isthe crux of any attempt to resolve thehuman development crisis in the region.Knowledge is one of the key instruments ofhuman development, be it in institutinggood governance, guaranteeing health, pro-ducing the ingredients of material and moralwelfare, or promoting economic growth. Assuch, knowledge is a vital factor of modernproduction and an essential determinant ofproductivity and competitive capacity.

The Report presents a vision for institut-ing human development and unleashing so-cietal creativity; a vision that aims atreforming the societal context of knowledge

acquisition and consolidating the knowl-edge acquisition system in order to move theregion towards a knowledge-based society.It argues that Arab countries have tremen-dous potential for developing their knowl-edge capacity in view of their – stillunutilised - human capital, and their cul-tural and linguistic heritage. Its vision forliberating this human capital and institutinga human renaissance across the Arab worldrests on five crucial pillars elaborated in itsconcluding chapter.

In co-sponsoring this Report, the ArabFund for Economic and SocialDevelopment and UNDP seek to promote adebate on key questions of knowledge, tohelp diagnose some of the major challengesfacing the Arab states in this area, and to putforward suggestions on ways to achieve anArab renaissance and consolidate the acqui-sition and employment of knowledge acrossthe Arab world. It is hoped that Arab coun-tries will pay close attention to the methodsfor improving and accelerating the diffu-sion, production and application of knowl-edge in all economic, social and politicalfields; and for raising the level of Arabhuman development. We are confident thatArab countries have all the means requiredto achieve this end.

In closing, I wish to extend my sincerethanks to all those who have contributed to,and taken part in the preparation of thisReport, and to our partner, UNDP, for com-missioning it and overseeing its publicationin this distinguished form.

Abdel Latif Youseff El Hamed Director General / Chairman of the Board of Directors

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

VII

Advisory group

Rima Khalaf Hunaidi (Chair), Ahmad Kamal Aboulmagd,Abdul Muniem Abu-Nuwar (United Nations Fund forPopulation Activities), Farida Al-Allaghi, Sami Al-Banna,Turki Al-Hamad, Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri , Abdalla A.Alnajjar, Nabil Alnawwab (Economic and Social Commissionfor Western Asia), Mervat Badawi (Arab Fund for Economicand Social Development), Ziad Fariz, Nader Fergany (Ex offi-cio), Burhan Ghalioun, Rafia Obaid Ghubash, Milad M. Hanna, Taher H. Kanaan, Atif Kubursi, Clovis Maksoud, Gamil Mattar, Roshdi Rashed, Abdelouahab Rezig, Adnan Shihab-Eldin, El Sayed Yassin.

Core team

Farida Bennani, Hoda Elsadda, Nader Fergany (Leader),Fahmi Jadaane, Atif Kubursi .

Editorial team

Arabic Version: Fayiz SuyyaghEnglish Version: Kristin Helmore, Zahir Jamal

Contributing authors

Laila Abdel Majid, Fowziyah Abdullah Abu-Khalid,Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin, Aziz Al-Azmeh, Sami Al-Banna,Tarek Al-Bishry, Hayder Ibrahim Ali, Nabil Ali,Sa'adallah Agha Al Kala'a, Muna Al-Khalidi, Mohamed Al-MiliBaqer Alnajjar, Siham A. Al-Sawaigh, Amr Najeeb Armanazi,

Munir Bashshur, Mohammed Berrada, Hichem Djait,Mohamed Mahmoud El-Imam, Dina El Khawaga, Rukia El Mossadeq, Shawki Galal, Burhan Ghalioun, Abd El Hameed Hawwas, Taoufik Jebali,Taher Hamdi Kanaan, Atif Kubursi, Al-Taher Labib,Clovis Maksoud, Mohammad Malas, Imad Moustapha ,Fadle M. Naqib, Khalida Said, Adnan Shihab-Eldin,A. B. Zahlan, Mari Rose Zalzal .

UNDP RBAS team-UNOPS

Dena Assaf, Ali Al-Zatari, Shafiqa Darani, Abdalla Dardari,Moez Doraid, Ghaith Fariz, Jacqueline Ghazal, Randa Jamal,Zahir Jamal, Hussein Kermalli, Mahwish Nasir, Madi Musa,Maen Nsour (Report Coordinator), Win Min Nu, FlaviaPansieri, Gillman Rebello, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco.

Readers group

Ismail Sabry Abdalla, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Abdul Karim Al-Eryani, Ali A. Attiga, Chedly Ayari, Mahmoud Amin El-Alem, Nawal Faouri, Ziad Hafez, Hassan Hanafi, Michael C. Hudson, Benjamin Ladner,Manfred Max-Neef, Richard W. Murphy, Omar Noman, John Page, Eric Rouleau .

Translation team

Khalid Abdalla, Rania Al-Hariri, Marie-Helen Avril, Doa’aImbaby, Mahmud Suqi .

Report team

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Arab Free Trade AreaArab Human Development IndexArab Human Development ReportAssociation of South East Asian NationsCable News NetworkDubai Media CityEconomic and Social Commission for Western AsiaEuropean Unionforeign direct investmentGulf Cooperation Councilgross domestic productgross national producthuman development indexHuman Development ReportInternational Bill of Human Rightsinformation and communication technologyIsraeli Defense Forcesintellectual property rightsMajor Broadcasting Cable NetworkEuro-Mediterranean Partnership (financial instrument)multinational corporationmean years of schoolingNorth American Free Trade Agreementnon-governmental organisationpurchasing power parityPalestinian Red Crescent Societyquality adjusted mean years of schoolingresearch and technological developmentRegional Bureau for Arab Statestechnology achievement indexTrends in International Mathematics and Science StudyAgreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property RightsUnited Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganisationUnited Nations Children’s FundUnited States Agency for International Developmentvalue added taxWorld Health OrganisationWorld Intellectual Property OrganisationWorld Trade Organisation

AFTAAHDIAHDRASEANCNNDMCESCWAEUFDIGCCGDPGNPHDIHDRIBHRICTIDFIPRsMBCMEDAMNCMYS NAFTANGOPPPPRCSQAMYSR&DRBASTAITIMSSTRIPSUNCTADUNDPUNESCOUNICEFUSAIDVATWHOWIPOWTO

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART I

CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002

INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES

The content of human development

The challenge of human development in the Arab region

Changes in human development since 2001The regional and international environment On the international and regional dimensions of human development in Arab countriesThe impact of the Israeli occupation of Palestine on human development in Arab countries

The human costs of Israeli occupationThe occupation of IraqArab integration

Developments in freedom and good governance as reflected in international databasesLevel of civil and political liberties (1990-2000)Indicators of voice and accountabilityPerceptions of corruption in business transactions

Events influencing human development in Arab countriesExpanding the scope of freedom and establishing good governanceCivil societyThe empowerment of women

Part II- Section one: the concept of an Arab knowledge society

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARABCOUNTRIES

Why focus on knowledge?

The acquisition of knowledge and human developmentKnowledge Knowledge and human developmentSocial determinants of knowledge acquisition

Strong links between the knowledge acquisition system and societal activityA vigorous role for the state and all its institutions

The knowledge societyKnowledge acquisition systems

Arabs and knowledgeA long, mixed history leading to challenges today

Contents

Foreword by the Administrator, UNDPForeword by the Regional Director, UNDP/Regional Bureau for Arab StatesForeword by the Director General and Chairman, Board of Directors, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

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The Arab knowledge civilisation: some significant features The Arab knowledge model today

The demand for knowledgeSources of the demand for knowledge Determinants of the demand for knowledge

PART II- Section two: the state of knowledge in Arab countries

CHAPTER 2

KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Knowledge dissemination and knowledge capitalSocialisationEducation

The quality of educationThe quality of pre-school educationCurricula and education methodologiesEducation policiesMeasuring the quality of educationThe quality of higher educationThe quality of computer science education in Arab universities

Arab mass media: characteristics, constraints and new formsAccess to mediaResources available to the mediaTypical contentNews coverageFeatures of media messages

The environment surrounding the mass mediaModern mass media

Telephone networksCommunication technologiesAccess to modern media

Challenges facing the Arab mediaThe beginnings of free media

TranslationThe state of translation in Arab countries

CHAPTER 3

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Scientific production: natural sciences and technological developmentScientific research and technological development – outputs

Scientific researchPatents

Technological research and development – inputsProducing knowledge workersWorkers in scientific research and developmentExpenditureInstitutions

Production in the humanities and social sciences

Literary and arts productionThe short story and the novelThe cinema Theatre Music

Freedom of research and expression as a condition for knowledge production

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CHAPTER 4

MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Introduction

The adequate measurement of knowledge capital

Towards the better measurement of knowledge capital in Arab countriesA survey of Arab intellectuals on the state of knowledgeInitial approximation of the measurement of knowledge capital

The stock of human capital at the beginning of the 21st century

Historical comparison: Arab countries and the Asian Tigers in the second half of the 20th centuryThe quality of education: findings of international studiesTowards a composite index of knowledge capital

CHAPTER 5

THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION

Innovation systems and technology

Technology transfer, management and adoption in the Arab worldTechnology policies in Arab countries

Organisational issues of knowledge production in Arab countriesLinks between research institutions and productive sectors

Promotion of R&D ResultsIntermediate institutions supporting technological R&D productionThe role of the creative entrepreneur and technological and business incubators

Foreign direct investmentFDI and its role in technology transfer and adaptation in Arab countries

The role of the state and science and technology policiesMissing Partners: National and Pan-Arab Funds for financing R&D Networking of R&D institutions at the pan-Arab and international levels

At the Arab levelAt the international level

PART II- Section three: the cultural, socioeconomic and political context

CHAPTER 6

CULTURE

Intellectual heritageHeritage: a tussle between knowledge building and ideological exploitation

"The Arab mentality"The foundations of Arab intellectual heritageArab historical knowledge outcomes

Heritage and the knowledge society

ReligionReligion, the material world and knowledge

LanguageLanguage and the knowledge society

The crisis of the Arabic languageAdvancement of the Arabic language

Folk cultureFolk culture: between creativity and imitationCraftsThe revival of an awareness of folk culture

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Cultural interaction

CHAPTER 7

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Introduction

Economic structureModes of production

Dependence on the extraction of raw materials in "rentier" economiesCommodity-based production and franchisingPrevalence of low-skill micro-enterprises and informal sector production activities Scarcity of medium-sized and large companies based in the Arab region Lack of competition

Growth, productivity and distributionEconomic growthProductivity in Arab countriesIncome distribution

Class structure

Societal incentivesPromoting an Arab renaissance through democratic values

MigrationThe brain drain

CHAPTER 8

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Governance and lawThe political context for knowledge acquisition

Political systems and the cultural elite Patterns of knowledge production and dissemination in the Arab world

The diversion of knowledge production: separating politics from knowledgeThe role of institutional independence in stimulating the knowledge society

Codifying political power and democracy: a fundamental stage in the establishment of the knowledge societyTowards political systems that serve the knowledge society

The legal context for knowledge acquisition, production and disseminationIrregularity of the legal structureInactive and nominal lawsDeclining efficiency of the judiciary

Freedom of thought, opinion and expression in the structure of the legal systemThe legal protection of freedomGeneral rules for the exercise of freedomViolation of political and legal guarantees for the protection of freedom Repression of freedoms in emergenciesProtecting creativity and intellectual freedom: copyright laws

The regional and global environment

PART II- Section four: a strategic vision- the five pillars of the knowledge society

CHAPTER 9

A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

The state of knowledge in Arab countries and the consequences of perpetuating the status quo

The five pillars of the knowledge society1. Unleashing and guaranteeing the key freedoms of opinion, speech and assembly through good governance2. Disseminating high quality education targeted on educational outcomes and life-long learning

Improving learning in early childhood Universal basic education for all, extended to grade ten at least

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Creating an efficient system for life-long learningRaising the quality of education at all levelsSpecial attention to improving higher education

3. Indigenising science, universalising research and development (R&D) in societal activities and keeping up with the information ageKeeping abreast of the Information Age

4. Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production5. Establishing an authentic, broadminded and enlightened Arab general knowledge model

Delivering pure religion from political exploitation and honouring ijtihad (scholarship)Advancing the Arabic languageRenovating the Arab general knowledge model: the past as inspiration for the future Enriching, supporting and celebrating cultural diversity in the regionOpening up to other cultures

References

Bibliography

Annex1: List of background papers

Annex 2: Designing a questionnaire to sample the opinions of faculty members in higher education institutions

Statistical Tables on Knowledge in Arab Countries

List of boxes

1 The Sheikh of Al-Rabwah, Muhammad ibn Abi Taleb al-Ansari al-Demashqi – The Human Being2 How Do Arabs Feel About the Three Deficits?3 Mohammad Hassanein Heikal

The first Arab Human Development Report: for whom did the bell toll?4 AHDR1 Web Site Statistics5 UNHCHR: War on terror infringing on human rights6 Human Rights Watch Report 2002, Middle East and North Africa: Jenin7 Human Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Sept 2001- April 2003)8 Material Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 19 months (until April 2003)1.1 Edward W. Said - What knowledge?1.2 Collective learning: a means for developing knowledge capital or reinforcing the status quo?1.3 Economic characteristics of knowledge1.4 A Cauldron of Cultures1.5 Ahmad Kamal Aboulmagd: Towards a New Language of Faith2.1 Abdul Aziz Al-Muqaleh – Illiteracy: An Obstacle to Knowledge and Modernisation2.2 Morocco: Conflicting signals on knowledge acquisition2.3 The “Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)”2.4 Use of the creative teaching method in Arab medical schools2.5 The Arab Organisation for Translation3.1 Muhamad Ali’s Experience in Scientific Modernisation3.2 Ali Mustafa Mosharrifah - On the importance of the history of science for a knowledge renaissance3.3 Kuwait: Profile of University Graduates3.4 The Ambition of Creativity in the Arab World3.5 Arab Books: a Threatened Species5.1 Pioneering Successful Non-governmental Initiatives - The Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research5.2 The Arab Fund for Science and Technology Development: The Bold Venture That Almost Succeeded5.3 The Arab Science and Technology Foundation, a non-governmental initiative to support research

and development in the Arab world5.4 The Arab Academy for Science & Technology and Maritime Transport6.1 Ibn Khaldoun - On the fact that scientific education is a skill and a profession6.2 Milad Hanna - Religious Harmony and Knowledge in the Arab World.6.3 Al Kawakibi - Despots and Knowledge6.4 Erudition in the Qur’an and the Sunna (prophetic tradition)6.5 Learning and knowledge in the Holy Bible, Old Testament6.6 Technology in the Arab Islamic Civilisation6.7 About Language6.8 Arab North Africa – Language Duality6.9 Amin Maalouf: Protecting Diversity

168168168169171172172172174175175176

179

182

186

188

1819

202023242525353637424552535657676969727779105106107

107114119120120120121122124130

XV

7.1 Patriarchal Society in Arab Countries 7.2 Al Kawakibi: The Inversion of Values Under Despotism8.1 Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: The Nation and the Authority of a Tyrant8.2 Knowledge and Governance in the Arab World8.3 Imam Muhammad Abduh: Justice and Science8.4 Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy8.5 The effects of globalisation on growth and distribution throughout the world – UNCTAD8.6 Trade and Development: Prebisch’s demands still stand9.1 Mustafa Al-Barghouthi – The Road to the Future9.2 Judge Al-Djorjani: The Dues of Science9.3 Lebanon: A Bright Future for Information and Communication Technology?9.4 Imams (religious leaders) advocate ijtihad (scholarship)9.5 Al Kawakibi, on the need for religious reform9.6 Teaching medicine in Arabic is possible!9.7 Paul Alvarus : Mother Tongues9.8 Ibn Rushd (Averroes): The Need to Learn from the Efforts of Previous Nations9.9 Al-Kindi: Appreciating the truth regardless of the source9.10 Ibn Miskawieh: On lauding cultural cross-fertilisation

List of Figures

1 Democracy is the best form of government2 Rejection of authoritarian rule3 Gender equality in higher education4 Gender equality in employment5 Freedom scores, weighted by population size: the Arab region and other world regions, 1990-2000 (average values)6 Voice and accountability: the Arab region and other world regions7 Perceptions of corruption, Transparency International: position of Arab countries in the sample, 1998 and 20001.1 Bridging the knowledge gap through exponential growth in knowledge acquisition1.2 The knowledge system: a schematic representation1.3 Correlation between Internet penetration and Internet costs -- Arab countries and comparators1.4 PC availability and Internet costs and penetration: Arab countries, OECD and East Asia, 20012.1 Distribution of universities participating in the evaluation according to the overall quality indicator2.2 Detailed evaluation criteria: average values2.3 Number of daily newspapers per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions in the world, 19982.4 Number of radio receivers per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions in the world, 20002.5 Number of television sets per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions of the world, 20002.6 Number of main phone lines per 1,000 persons 2.7 Personal computers: Arab world and other regions2.8 Internet penetration in Arab countries, users as % of population, 20012.9 Number of books translated in Arab countries (per 1 million people) compared to selected countries, 1981-19853.1 Ratio of students enrolled in scientific disciplines in higher education in selected Arab countries and Korea 1990-19953.2 Number of scientists and engineers working in research and development (per one million people)3.3 Number of publications – original writing and translation – per million people in the Arab world and other regions, 19913.4 Relative distribution of published books by field, ten Arab countries and the world, 19963.5 Number of cinema seats per 1000 persons in selected Arab countries and Korea in the second half of the 1990s4.1 Assessment of key features of knowledge acquisition in Arab countries by gender of respondent (%)4.2 Assessment of the knowledge acquisition process in Arab countries by academic level of respondent (%)4.3 Freedom to pursue knowledge and incentives for knowledge acquisition4.4 Mean years of schooling (MYS), population 15 years of age or older, Arab countries compared to selected

countries, 1990 and 20004.5 Mean years of schooling (population 25 years of age or older) by gender, Arab countries and three Asian Tigers, 1960-20004.6 Quality adjusted mean years of schooling (QAMYS), population 15 years of age or older, Arab countries

and selected countries, 1990 and 20004.7 Ranking of Arab countries compared to other countries and regions on the composite indicator of knowledge capital, 20004.8 Correlation coefficient between knowledge capital indicators, knowledge outcomes and other development indicators5.1 Actors and linkages in the innovation system5.2 The Environment for Investment: 14 Arab countries rated, 19995.3 Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects in research and development among Arab countries5.4 Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects among R&D fields7.1 Share of extractive industries in commodity production7.2 Export structure, selected regions.7.3 Annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (%) Middle East and North

Africa and other selected regions, 1970-2000

141142148149152158159160164166171173173174175176177177

1919191928292940414647585859596063646468727278788088888990

9192

939498103108109135135

137

XVI

7.4 Annual growth rate of GDP per worker (%) Middle East and North Africa Region, 1965-19937.5 Gross national product (per worker) in Arab countries compared to South Korea and Argentina, 19977.6 Estimates of poverty in Arab countries in the 1990s7.7 Development of workers’ share of GDP (%), Egypt 1974-1993

List of tables

In the text

1 Number of students from some Arab countries in the United States before and after the September 2001 events3.1 Number of patents registered in the United States from Arab and non-Arab countries during the period 1980-1999/20003.2 Rate of expenditure as a percentage of GNP and sources of R&D funding: Arab states compared with selected

countries, 1990-19953.3 Number of scientific research centres (outside of universities) in Arab countries3.4 Number of scientific and technological research centres (outside universities) in Arab countries, by field of

specialisation and number of countries of location4.1 Percentage of real Arab GDP per capita (1970 and 2001), compared to Asian Tigers5.1 Estimated Net FDI flows, by host country 2000-2001 (millions of dollars)

In the Statistical Annex

(Tables 1-13 listed separately in statistical annex)

138138139140

237173

7474

91102

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

The first Arab Human Development Report(AHDR 2002) addressed the most importantdevelopment challenges facing the Arab worldat the beginning of the third millennium. Thissecond Report continues the process by exam-ining in depth one of these challenges: thebuilding of a knowledge society in Arab coun-tries.

The AHDR series aims at building humandevelopment in the Arab world. As part of acontinuing watch on human development inthe region, this Report therefore opens by sur-veying some of the most salient trends andevents at the global, regional and national levelsthat influenced the process of human develop-ment in the Arab world in 2002-2003. The re-mainder of the Report is a close study of one ofthe three cardinal challenges facing the region:its growing knowledge gap. It starts by outlin-ing the conceptual basis of an Arab knowledgesociety and moves on to evaluate the status ofthe demand for, and the diffusion and produc-tion of knowledge in Arab countries at the be-ginning of the 21st century. It next analyses thecultural, economic, societal and political con-text influencing knowledge acquisition in theregion at this critical junction in its history. Thelast section of this analysis culminates in astrategic vision that delineates the landmarks ofa deep social reform process for establishing aknowledge-based society in the Arab countries.

A ONE-YEAR OVERVIEW OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT:

TWO SETBACKS AND THE STARTOF REFORM

A review of global and regional developmentssince the publication of AHDR 2002 under-lines that the development challenges repre-sented by the three deficits in knowledge,freedom and women’s empowerment remainserious. Those challenges may have becomeeven graver in the area of freedoms, as a resultof these developments.

Following the bloody events of September11 and the loss of innocent lives in violation ofall man-made and divine laws, a number ofcountries have adopted extreme security mea-sures and policies as part of the “war on terror-ism”. These measures and policies, however,exceeded their original goals and led to the ero-sion of civil and political liberties in manycountries in the world, notably the UnitedStates, often diminishing the welfare of Arabsand Muslims living, studying or travellingabroad, interrupting cultural exchanges be-tween the Arab world and the West and cut-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“..over the last year the US government has taken aseries of actions that have gradually eroded basichuman rights protections in the United States, fun-damental guarantees that have been central to theUS constitutional system for more than two hun-dred years.”

A Year of Loss, Re-examining CivilLiberties since September 11

(American) Lawyers for Human Rights.

The bell rung by the AHDR and heard by Arabs andother people the world over carried echoes of all thebells ringing through our lives. It was a call to knowl-edge and learning, an announcement of the last chanceto join the trip to the future, an appeal for cleansing, aninjunction to make way for an urgent priority, and fi-nally a forewarning of imminent danger – urging us tohasten to douse the flames of a still-small fire waiting toengulf the region in a formidable blaze

Mohammad Hassanein Heikal

The late UN human rights chief, Sergio Vieira deMello, emphasised that the ‘war on terror’ was ex-acerbating prejudices around the world, increasingdiscrimination against Arabs and damaging humanrights in industrialised and developing countries.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Development

challenges

represented by the

three deficits in

knowledge, freedom

and women’s

empowerment remain

serious.

2 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003

ting off knowledge acquisition opportunitiesfor young Arabs.

Among the first effects of these measureswas the significant drop in the number ofArab students studying in the United States.Figures available from a number of Arab mis-sions indicate that Arab student numbers inAmerica dropped between 1999 and 2002 byan average of 30 per cent.

One of the worst consequences of free-dom-constraining measures in developedcountries is that they gave authorities in someArab countries another excuse to enact newlaws limiting civil and political freedoms. TheArab countries as a group adopted an ex-panded definition of terrorism, which as-sumed institutional expression at the regionallevel in “The Arab Charter againstTerrorism”. This charter was criticised inArab and international human rights circles,because its expanded definition opens thedoor to abuse. It allows censorship, restrictsaccess to the Internet, and restricts printingand publication. Moreover, the Charter nei-ther explicitly prohibits detention or torture,nor provides for questioning the legality of de-tentions. Furthermore, it does not protect per-sonal freedom, since it does not require a priorjudicial order authorising the wire-tapping ofindividuals or groups (AmnestyInternational).

Israel reoccupied Palestinian territories,inflicting horrifying human casualties and ma-terial destruction, thereby committing whatone well-respected human rights organizationcalled “war crimes” (Human Rights Watch,2002). From September 2000 to April 2003,Israeli occupation forces killed 2,405Palestinian citizens and injured 41,000 others.Most of those killed (85%) were civilians. Alarge proportion (20%) of them were children.UNICEF estimates that 7,000 children wereinjured and that 2,500 persons, of whom 500were children, suffered permanent handicaps.

A coalition led by the United States andBritain invaded and occupied Iraq, introduc-ing a new challenge to the people of Iraq andthe region. The only way to meet that chal-lenge is to enable the Iraqi people to exercisetheir basic rights in accordance with interna-tional law, free themselves from occupation,recover their wealth, under a system of goodgovernance representing the Iraqi people andtake charge of rebuilding their country from ahuman development perspective.

In contrast to efforts to restructure the re-gion from outside, the AHDR series aims tocrystallise a strategic vision by Arab elitesthrough a societal innovation process that en-visages the restructuring of the region fromwithin, and in service to Arab human develop-ment. Such reform from within, based on rig-orous self-criticism, is a far more proper andsustainable alternative.

On the level of internal development inthe Arab countries, progress was achieved inthe advancement of women and in some as-pects of popular participation. Women’s rep-resentation in some parliaments and in seniorpositions in Executive Authorities increased.A number of Arab countries witnessed parlia-mentary elections, some of them for the firsttime in decades. Yet these bright spots, ac-companied briefly by dawning awareness ofthe need for reform, were partly eclipsed bynew setbacks in the areas of freedom of opin-ion, expression and association.

Assessing the present state of regional co-operation, the Report finds that Arab integra-tion continues to fall far behind in achievingwhat the first Arab Human DevelopmentReport called “An Arab Free CitizenshipZone”.

BUILDING THE KNOWLEDGESOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES

THE STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE INTHE ARAB WORLD

A knowledge-based society is one whereknowledge diffusion, production and applica-tion become the organising principle in all as-pects of human activity: culture, society, theeconomy, politics, and private life. Knowledge

“There is strong prima facie evidence that insome of the cases documented grave breaches ofthe Geneva Conventions, or war crimes, werecommitted.”

Report of Human Rights Watch 2002,Jenin: IDF Operations

One of the worst

consequences of

freedom-constraining

measures in

developed countries

was that they gave

some Arab authorities

another excuse to

enact new laws

limiting civil and

political freedoms.

In contrast to efforts

to restructure the

region from outside,

the AHDR series aims

to crystallise a

strategic vision that

envisages the

restructuring of the

region from within.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

nowadays can provide the means to expandthe scope of human freedoms, enhance the ca-pacity to guarantee those freedoms throughgood governance and achieve the higher moralhuman goals of justice and human dignity

Contrasting this type of society with thestate of knowledge in Arab countries, theReport looks carefully at the characteristics ofthe two main components of the knowledgeacquisition system: diffusion and production.

KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION: BLOCKSIN EDUCATION, BRIGHT SPOTS INTHE MEDIA

Key knowledge dissemination processes inArab countries, (socialisation and upbringing,education, the media and translation), facedeep-seated social, institutional, economicand political impediments. Notable amongthese are the meagre resources available to in-dividuals, families and institutions and the re-strictions imposed upon them. As a result,these processes often falter and fall short ofpreparing the epistemological and societal en-vironment necessary for knowledge produc-tion.

Studies indicate that the most widespreadstyle of child rearing in Arab families is the au-thoritarian mode accompanied by the over-protective. This reduces children’sindependence, self-confidence and social effi-ciency, and fosters passive attitudes and hesi-tant decision-making skills. Most of all, itaffects how the child thinks by suppressingquestioning, exploration and initiative.

Impressive gains in the quantitative expan-sion of education in Arab countries in the lasthalf of the 20th century are still modest in com-parison with other developing countries orwith the requirements of human development.High rates of illiteracy among women persist,particularly in some of the less developedArab countries. Many children still do nothave access to basic education. Higher educa-tion is characterized by decreasing enrolment,and public spending on education has actuallydeclined since 1985.

In all cases, nevertheless, the most impor-tant challenge facing Arab education is its de-clining quality.

The mass media are the most importantagents for the public diffusion of knowledge

yet Arab countries have lower informationmedia to population ratios (number of news-papers, radio and televisions per 1000 people)compared to the world average. There are lessthan 53 newspapers per 1000 Arab citizens,compared to 285 papers per 1000 people indeveloped countries.

In most Arab countries, the media operatein an environment that sharply restricts free-dom of the press and freedom of expressionand opinion. Journalists face illegal harass-ment, intimidation and even physical threats,censorship is rife and newspapers and televi-sion channels are sometimes arbitrarily closeddown. Most media institutions are state-owned, particularly radio and television.

The last two years, however, have seensome improvements in the Arab informationenvironment, brought about by dawning com-petition. More independent-minded newspa-pers have appeared, challenging the iron gripof the older, state-supported press on politicalopinion, news and information. With basesabroad, these papers can escape state censor-ship. Some private satellite channels havestarted to contest the monopoly of state chan-nels over the broadcast media. The most im-portant characteristic of this new informationmovement is that it broadcasts in Arabic,thereby addressing the largest segment of theArab audience.

In terms of infrastructure, the newer infor-mation channels benefit from the considerablegroundwork that a number of Arab countrieshave laid. However, the general trend gravi-tates towards the lowest indicators in worldstandards. The number of telephone lines inthe Arab countries is barely one fifth of that indeveloped countries. Access to digital media isalso among the lowest in the world. There arejust 18 computers per 1000 people in the re-gion, compared to the global average of 78.3percent per 1000 persons and only 1.6 per centof the population has Internet access. Theseindicators scarcely reflect a sufficient level ofpreparedness for applying information tech-nology for knowledge diffusion.

Translation is one of the important chan-nels for the dissemination of information andcommunication with the rest of the world. Thetranslation movement in the Arab world, how-ever, remains static and chaotic. On average,

The most important

challenge facing Arab

education is its

declining quality.

The last two years

have seen

improvements in the

Arab information

environment brought

about by dawning

competition.


only 4.4 translated books per million peoplewere published in the first five years of the1980s (less than one book per million peopleper year), while the corresponding rate inHungary was 519 books per one million peo-ple and in Spain 920 books.

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION:MEAGRE OUTPUT, GLIMMERS OFCREATIVITY

Turning knowledge assets into knowledgecapital requires the production of new knowl-edge in all areas: in the physical and social sci-ences, arts, humanities and all other forms ofsocial activity.

Data in the Report tell a story of stagnationin certain areas of knowledge production, es-pecially in the field of scientific research. Inaddition to thin production, scientific researchin Arab countries is held back by weak basicresearch and the almost total absence of ad-vanced research in fields such as informationtechnology and molecular biology. It also suf-fers from miserly R&D expenditure (currentlystate spending on R&D does not exceed 0.2percent of GNP, most of which pays only forsalaries), poor institutional support and a po-litical and social context inimical to the devel-opment and promotion of science. Theregion’s corps of qualified knowledge workersis relatively small. The number of scientistsand engineers working in R&D in Arab coun-tries is not more than 371 per million citizens.This is much lower that the global rate of 979per million. The number of students enrollingin scientific disciplines in higher education inall Arab countries is also generally low, incomparison to countries that have used knowl-edge to take off, such as Korea, althoughamong Arab countries, Jordan, followed byAlgeria have distinguished themselves in thisfield.

In contrast to their weak production in sci-ence and technology, and beleaguered outputin the humanities, Arab societies can boast awealth of distinguished literary and artisticwork that stands up to the highest standards ofevaluation. One reason is that while scienceand technology require substantial social andeconomic investment, Arab artists can, andusually do, produce high-quality work without

significant institutional or material support.Innovation in literature and art works underdifferent conditions from those that foster cre-ativity in research and development An Arabscientist would be highly unlikely to win aNobel Prize in physics without societal and in-stitutional support whereas an Arab novelistmight achieve that distinction in literature inthe absence of such support. There does notseem to be a conditional correlation betweenliterary creativity and affluence, although fi-nancial independence can strengthen an au-thor’s intellectual freedom. Difficultconditions may sometimes provide incentivesand intellectual and political stimuli for cre-ative literature. Yet while artistic creativity it-self defies societal restrictions, the absence offreedoms blocks public access to books andother forms of artistic expression.

Literary production faces other majorchallenges. These include the small number ofreaders owing to high rates of illiteracy insome Arab countries and the weak purchasingpower of the Arab reader. This limited reader-ship is clearly reflected in the number of bookspublished in the Arab world, which does notexceed 1.1% of world production, althoughArabs constitute 5% of the world population.The production of literary and artistic booksin Arab countries is lower than the generallevel. In 1996 it did not exceed 1,945 books,representing only 0.8% of world production,i.e., less than the production of a country suchas Turkey, with a population one quarter ofthat of Arab countries. An abundance of reli-gious books and a relative paucity of books inother fields characterize the Arab book mar-ket. Religious books account for 17% of thetotal number of books published in Arabcountries, compared to 5% of the total num-ber of books produced in other parts of theworld.

The Report’s analysis of the status ofknowledge in Arab countries indicates the

The author and the publisher are forced tosubmit to the moods and instructions of 22 Arabcensors and this prevents a book from movingfreely and easily between its natural markets.

Fathi Khalil el-Biss,Vice President of the Arab Publishers Union

The Knowledge Block: Censorship

The region’s corps of

qualified knowledge

workers is relatively

small.

The number of books

published in the Arab

world does not exceed

1.1% of world

production.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

presence of significant human capital thatfinds refuge in creativity from a restrictive so-cietal and political environment and thatcould, under favourable circumstances, pro-vide a solid structural foundation for a knowl-edge renaissance.

CUMULATIVE KNOWLEDGEOUTCOMES: ENDS AND MEANS

The Report Team polled a sample of Arab uni-versity faculty members about knowledge ac-quisition in the region. Respondents expresseddissatisfaction in general with the status ofknowledge acquisition in their countries (theaverage degree of satisfaction was 38%). Theirsatisfaction with the extent to which Arabknowledge serves human development wasslightly less (the average rating was 35%). Thesurvey confirmed that incentives for knowl-edge acquisition in Arab countries need to bemuch stronger, while freedom to acquireknowledge is subject to many constraints.

Rating the various aspects of the knowl-edge system, respondents argued that the lackof a reasonable measure of freedom in radioand television (30%) was one of the largest dis-incentives to knowledge acquisition. The sameassessment applied to research and develop-ment in the public sector although, in the viewof respondents, the latter area enjoys a higherlevel of freedom, thus suggesting that its prob-lems have more to do with matters of organi-sation and financing.

In order to compare the knowledge capitalof Arab countries with that of other countries,the Report explores a new composite indexconstructed from 10 indicators relating to dif-ferent dimensions of knowledge capital. Thisattempt at measurement faced several limita-tions in data and methodology yet indicatedthat the Arab countries are far behind theleading developing countries, let alone the ad-vanced industrialised countries, in the qualityand quantity of their knowledge capital.

Struck by inconsistent or counterintuitiveresults from applying this index, the ReportTeam also considered seven cumulativeknowledge outcomes or end results (such asexports with a high technological content andother outcomes), and their relationship toother knowledge indicators. The analysis

showed no correlation between the twogroups.

The analysis concludes that the key chal-lenge facing Arab countries does not consistonly of catching up with other countries interms of knowledge indicators; rather, it goesbeyond that to include working hard toachieve similar knowledge outcomes by devel-oping solid institutional structures and bycrystallising the requisite political will, sup-ported by sufficient resources, especially at thepan-Arab level.

IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY:CONSUMPTION VERSUSADOPTION

Arab countries’ experiments with the transferand adoption of technology have neitherachieved the desired technological advance-ment nor yielded attractive returns on invest-ments. Importing technology has not led to itsadoption and internalisation in the host coun-try, let alone to its diffusion and production.

The two biggest gaps accounting for thisfailure have been the absence of effective in-novation and knowledge production systemsin Arab countries, and the lack of rational poli-cies that ingrain those essential values and in-stitutional frameworks that support aknowledge society. These problems have beenaggravated by the mistaken belief that aknowledge society can be built through theimportation of scientific products without in-vesting in the local production of knowledge,and through depending on cooperation withuniversities and research centres in advancedcountries for training Arab scientific cadreswithout creating the local scientific traditionsconducive to knowledge acquisition in the re-gion.

The lack of national innovation systems inArab countries represented, in effect, a wasteof investment in industrial infrastructure and

“Civilised nations must have a cultureassociated with their history of scientificthought. … Our scientific life in Egyptneeds to catch up with our past in orderto acquire the necessary strength, lifeand controls. We in Egypt transfer the

knowledge of others then leave it float-ing without any relationship to our pastor any communication with our land. Itis a foreign commodity that is strange inits looks, strange in its words and strangein its concepts.”

Ali Mustafa Musharrifah: On the Importance of the History ofScience for the Advancement of Knowledge

Incentives for

knowledge acquisition

in Arab countries need

to be much stronger.

Importing technology

has not led to its

adoption and

internalisation in the

host country, let alone

to its diffusion and

production.


fixed capital (buildings, factories, machineryand equipment). Such investments did notbring the wealth that Arab societies hadsought through means other than the deple-tion of raw materials, nor expected social re-turns. Investment in the means of productiondoes not lead to the real transfer and owner-ship of technology but rather to an increase inproduction capacity. Moreover, this is a time-bound gain, one that starts to erode as the ac-quired technology becomes obsolete. Theproducts and services generated by importedtechnology become economically unfeasibleand uncompetitive in local markets, while atthe same time technology and production inthe advanced countries are perpetually re-newed by their own renovation and innova-tion systems. This does not take place in Arabcountries which, with their aging technologies,are stuck at the wrong end of the technologyladder. They must keep purchasing new pro-duction capabilities as and when the technolo-gies of the capabilities they own becomeoutmoded.

At the same time, Arab countries have notsucceeded in becoming important poles of at-traction for foreign direct investment (FDI).None of them figures among the top ten FDI-attracting countries in the developing world.

The transfer, embedding and productionof knowledge that can generate new technolo-gies require an organisational context thatprovides incentives for knowledge produc-tion. Such a context would consolidate link-ages between R&D institutions and theproduction and service sectors and promotenational capabilities for innovation.

THE SOCIETAL CONTEXT FORKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION INARAB COUNTRIES

PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY: CULTURE

The knowledge system is influenced by soci-etal, cultural, economic and political determi-nants. Among the most important of thesedeterminants is culture in both of its aspects:the scholarly culture and the popular culture.Within Arabic culture, intellectual heritageconstitutes an essential component. Languageis the instrumental carrier of this culture andreligion is the main and comprehensive beliefsystem that guides its life. Moral, social andpolitical values govern and direct action in theArabic cultural system.

Religion urges people to seek knowl-edge, despite some anti-development inter-pretations: Undoubtedly, the relationshipbetween religion and knowledge and its pro-duction is organically associated with conceptsdetermined by the nature of religion and itsoverall position towards worldly life. Islamicreligious texts uphold a balance between reli-gion and worldly life, or between temporal lifeand the hereafter. The predominant tendencyin Arab-Islamic civilization is a robust interestin worldly life and its sciences and in encour-aging knowledge and sciences of variousforms.

Developments in the contemporary Arabworld and the national political, social andeconomic problems that appeared followingthe years of independence did, however, leavedeep impacts on the intellectual, scholarly andcultural life of Arab countries. Religion - andits associated concepts and teleology – wereamong the basic aspects influenced by thesedevelopments. An alliance between some op-pressive regimes and certain types of conserv-ative religious scholars led to interpretationsof Islam, which serve the government, but areinimical to human development, particularlywith respect to freedom of thought, the inter-pretation of judgements, the accountability ofregimes to the people and women’s participa-tion in public life. Constraints on political ac-tion in many Arab countries pushed some

This co-existence between Christianityand Islam in the Arab world presents amodel of unity in diversity. It is one of

the reasons for progress, which haspushed humanity to advance throughknowledge acquisition.

Milad Hanna: Harmony of Religions and Knowledgein the Arab World

The eternity of Islam does not mean the“rigidity of its law”. It rather means theability of this law to renew itself andmake innovations in response to themovement of life and the changes of itsforms. The originality and distinction ofMuslims do not mean their isolationfrom the rest of mankind, inward-look-

ing in a closed circuit, surrounded by awall without doors. They rather meancommunication with people, living withthem and – through that – providingthem with the loftier values and grandprinciples, which are based on theIslamic doctrine, law and moral struc-ture.

Ahmad Kamal Aboulmajd

Arab countries, with

their aging

technologies, are

stuck at the wrong

end of the technology

ladder.

Religion urges people

to seek knowledge.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

movements with an Islamic mark under-ground while causing others to don Islamicgarb. Without peaceful and effective politicalchannels for dealing with injustices in theArab world, at the country, regional andglobal levels, some political movements identi-fying themselves as Islamic have resorted to re-strictive interpretations and violence as meansof political activism. They have fanned the em-bers of animosity towards both opposing po-litical forces in Arab countries and “theothers”, accusing them of being enemies ofIslam itself. This has heightened the tempo ofconflict and friction with society, the state and“the others”. This state of “opposition” to and“confrontation” with the West, in particular,reached its peak following the events ofSeptember 11, 2001. In this context, theIslamic religion itself was exposed to a harshwave of libel, slander, provocation and criti-cism, which at times betrayed total ignoranceand at other times, explicit fabrication.

Far from being opposed to knowledge,pure religion unquestionably urges people toseek knowledge and to establish knowledgesocieties. Perhaps the best evidence of that isthe era when Arab science flowered and pros-pered, a time that was characterised by astrong synergy between religion, representedby Islam, on the one hand and science, on theother.

The Arabic language: a heritage, a re-source and a crisis: The role of language in aknowledge society is seminal, because lan-guage is an essential basis of culture and be-cause culture is the key axis around which theprocess of development revolves. Languagehas a central position in the cultural system be-cause of its association with a number of itscomponents: intellect, creativity, education,information, heritage, values and beliefs.Today, at the gates of the knowledge societyand the future, the Arabic language is, how-ever, facing severe challenges and a real crisisin theorization, grammar, vocabulary, usage,documentation, creativity and criticism. Tothese aspects of the crisis, one must add thenew challenges raised by information tech-nologies, which relate to the computerised au-tomation of the language.

The relation between the Arabic languageand the transfer and absorption of technology

involves many issues. Chief among them aretwo central and closely inter-related matters,namely, the arabicisation of university educa-tion and the teaching of the Arabic language.The arabicisation of university education hasbecome vital in order to enable young mindsto develop firm critical and creative faculties intheir own language and to assimilate the risingvolume of scientific knowledge. In addition,failure to arabicise science creates obstacles tocommunication between different scientificdisciplines and slows knowledge exchange.The authors underline that language is one ofthe cornerstones in the human developmentsystem while emphasising that arabicisation ef-forts should be accompanied by greater effortsto teach foreign languages to all.

The teaching of Arabic is also undergoinga severe crisis in terms of both methodologyand curricula. The most apparent aspect ofthis crisis is the growing neglect of the func-tional aspects of (Arabic) language use. Arabiclanguage skills in everyday life have deterio-rated and Arabic language classes are often re-stricted to writing at the expense of reading.The situation of Arabic language teachingcannot be separated from that of classicalArabic in general, which has in effect ceasedto be a spoken language. It is only the lan-guage of reading and writing; the formal lan-guage of intellectuals and academics, oftenused to display knowledge in lectures.Classical Arabic is not the language of cordial,spontaneous expression, emotions, daily en-counters and ordinary communication. It isnot a vehicle for discovering one’s inner self orouter surroundings.

The Report thus underlines that it has be-come necessary to work determinedly onstrengthening the linguistic shields of Arabicand on sharpening its practical attributes,which emphasise its universal character andits ability to assimilate new informational andtechnological developments. This is in addi-tion to consolidating its relationship withworld languages and providing the necessaryeconomic, social and technical conditions forenhancing the language and its creative prod-ucts.

Popular culture, between conformityand creativity: Communal and oral folk cul-ture is a vast repository of experiences and cre-

Language has a

central position in the

cultural system.

At the gates of the

knowledge society

and the future, the

Arabic language is

facing severe

challenges.


ative efforts that have enriched, and continueto enrich, the intellectual, emotional and be-havioural life of people in all societies. Folkculture is generally very rich in its construc-tions, encompassing knowledge, beliefs, arts,morals, law, customs and early industrialknowledge.

Arab folk culture shares all these qualities.Its particular feature is that it expresses twovoices: one, a conformist voice, which urgesadherence to familiar patterns, the other a cre-ative voice, which questions received wisdomand urges the pursuit of knowledge. Arabpopular culture is however not devoid ofknowledge. Biographies, a common form ofstory telling, are often full of historical and ge-ographical knowledge, as well as human in-sight. Romantic tales depicting imaginary idealworlds express popular yearnings, dreams andambitions. These and other forms of oral cul-ture are recurrently recited at group eveninggatherings and meetings, and are a means ofsharing historical knowledge and rules relatedto customs. Many popular stories extol thevalue of information, showing it to be morevaluable than wealth. The high respect com-monly shown for a written text by folk com-munities indicates the value they accord tolearning and knowledge.

Cultural openness, from imitation tocreative interaction: Historically, Arab cul-ture did not constitute a closed system, butrather displayed, at major historical junctures,a profound ability to open up, develop andtranscend itself. It welcomed the experiencesof other nations and incorporated them in itsknowledge systems and way of life, regardlessof the differences and variations that distin-guished Arab societies from those nations andtheir experiences.

The first of the two major external influ-ences which this culture embraced dates backto the age of scientific codification and the en-counter with Greek civilization and sciences –indeed the demand for and importation ofthese sciences – in the third and fourth cen-turies A. H. (on the Islamic calendar) – 9thand 10th centuries A.D.

The second major experience came whenthe modern Arab world encountered Westerncivilization and opened up to science, litera-ture and other aspects of Western culture at

the beginning of the 19th century. The out-come of this encounter was a renovation andmodernization of the Arab cultural heritage,descending from the past, opening wide to thefuture and drawing abundantly on the sinewsof modernization and the rich crop of Westernproduction in all fields of knowledge, science,the arts, literature and technology.

Arabic culture, however, like other cul-tures, finds itself facing the challenges of anemerging global cultural homogeneity and re-lated questions about cultural multiplicity,cultural personalities, the issue of the “self”and the “other”, and its own cultural charac-ter. These and similar questions raise appre-hensions, fears and risks in the minds of itspeople. Concerns about the extinction of thelanguage and culture and the diminution anddissipation of identity have become om-nipresent in Arab thought and culture.

The truth is that Arab culture has nochoice but to engage again in a new global ex-periment. It cannot enclose itself, contentedwith living on history, the past and inheritedculture alone in a world whose victorious pow-ers reach into all corners of the earth, domi-nating all forms of knowledge, behaviour, life,manufactured goods and innovation.Undoubtedly, some currents embedded in thisculture would prefer a policy of withdrawal, ofrejection and hostility to all values, ideas, andpractices brought about by this global culture.This may appear justified in some ways, but anegative policy of “non-interaction” can onlylead to the weakening and diminution of Arabcultural structures rather than their reinforce-ment and development.

Moreover, the global culture has its owndimensions of knowledge, science, and tech-nology, which countries neglect at their ownrisk. Openness, interaction, assimilation, ab-sorption, revision, criticism and examinationcannot but stimulate creative knowledge pro-duction in Arab societies. This is already no-ticeable in many sectors of contemporaryArabic culture where various creative develop-ments reveal the beneficial role played byglobal and human cultural interaction. Thisprocess continues to take place despite alllocal deterrents and external obstacles andnotwithstanding the difficulties of nationaland international politics, where some powers

Historically, Arab

culture did not

constitute a closed

system, but rather

displayed a profound

ability to open up,

develop and transcend

itself.

Arab culture has no

choice but to engage

again in a new global

experiment.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9

pursue total hegemony or choose the path ofcollision and conflict, rather than of under-standing, dialogue, cooperation and alterna-tion in power.

An analysis of the components of Arabicculture indicates that its essence, extendingover three millennia, is capable of supportingthe creation of a knowledge society in the thirdmillennium as ably as it did towards the end ofthe first millennium and in the beginning ofthe second. Furthermore, the strength andrichness of Arabic culture may reinforce thecapacity of Arab societies to deal effectivelywith the torrential currents of globalisation.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: FROMDEPLETING RESOURCES TOCREATING KNOWLEDGE

One of the main features of the productionpattern prevailing in Arab countries, which in-fluences knowledge acquisition, is a high de-pendence on the depletion of raw materials,chiefly oil, and reliance on external rents. Thisrentier economic pattern entices societies toimport expertise from outside because this is aquick and easy resort that however ends upweakening local demand for knowledge andforfeiting opportunities to produce it locallyand employ it effectively in economic activity.A large part of Arab economic activity is con-centrated on primary commodities, as in agri-culture, which remains largely traditional, andin industries specializing in the production ofconsumer goods, which depend heavily onproduction licences obtained from foreigncompanies. At the same time, the share of thecapital goods industry and of industries em-bodying higher technology continues toshrink. Demand for industrial products is neg-atively influenced by the small size of Arabmarkets, the weak competitiveness of Arabeconomies and the absence of transparencyand accountability, which encourages overlap,and sometimes collusion, between politicaland business elites. Lack of competition re-duces productivity and therefore demand forknowledge in economic activity. Instead, com-petitive advantage and the ability to maximizeprofits derive from favouritism in power struc-tures, manifested in money and politics.Resistance to opening up to the outside world

by Arab economies and their lack of exposureto foreign competition, coupled with at timesexcessive protection for local productsthrough import substitution policies, have alsoslowed the advancement of productivity andthe employment of knowledge to that end.

Demand for knowledge has been weak-ened not only by faltering economic growthand productivity in Arab countries during thelast quarter-century but also by the over-con-centration of wealth in a few hands. Althoughsome economies of the world have succeededin the past in achieving economic growthwhile their income and wealth distributionpatterns were skewed, this occurred in a dif-ferent global context, characterized by a largenumber of closed economies throughout theworld. The opening up of capital markets pro-moted by globalisation reduces the chances oflocal growth through concentration. The vastamount of Arab capital invested in industrial-ized countries and, therefore, denied to theArab world, is strong evidence that, in humandevelopment terms, it is not the possession ofmoney and wealth that matters but how pro-ductively such wealth is invested.

Recovery of economic growth in the Arabworld and its main driver – increased produc-tivity – are two prerequisites for the advance-ment of knowledge, but they are not enough.They will be enough only when decision-mak-ers in Arab societies, the business sector, thecivil society and the household sector put thegoal of building the knowledge society at thehead of their priorities and reflect that in alltheir decisions to spend and to invest.

SOCIETAL INCENTIVES: POWERAND WEALTH WEAKEN THEETHICS OF KNOWLEDGE

Political, social and economic conditions playa decisive role in orienting systems of valuesand societal incentives. After independence,most Arab countries came under national po-litical regimes that represented little advanceon the autocratic style of ancient and more re-cent history. Social and individual freedomswere restricted in some areas and were totallyabsent in others, thus affecting the morals andpractical values of people.

In Arab countries, the distribution of

Lack of competition

reduces productivity

and therefore demand

for knowledge in

economic activity.

Demand for

knowledge has been

weakened not only by

faltering economic

growth but also by the

over-concentration of

wealth in a few

hands.


power, which sometimes coincided with thedistribution of wealth, has had an effect on themorals of societies and individuals. The pur-suit of personal gain, the preference for theprivate over the public good, social and moralcorruption, the absence of honesty and ac-countability and many other illnesses, were allrelated in one way or another to a skewed dis-tribution of power and the resulting social dis-parities. Justice, before all else, has been thevictim of this state of affairs.

The oil boom also played its role in erod-ing a number of values and societal incentivesthat would have been helpful in enhancingcreativity and the acquisition and diffusion ofknowledge. With the spread of negative valuesduring that period, creative abilities were ne-glected, and knowledge lost its significance forhuman development. The social standing ofscientists, educated people and intellectualsfell. Social value was measured by the criteriaof money and fortune, regardless of how thosefortunes were gained. Proprietorship and pos-session replaced knowledge and intellectual-ism. Perhaps worst of all, the values ofindependence, freedom and the importance ofa critical mind were also buried.

Repression and marginalisation con-tributed to blunt the desire for achievement,happiness and commitment. As a result, indif-ference, political apathy and a sense of futilityare becoming dangerously common amongbroad segments of the populace. Arab citizensare increasingly pushed away from effectingchanges in their countries.

The Report calls on the state, civil society,cultural and mass media institutions, enlight-ened intellectuals and the public at large toplant those values that encourage action andinnovation in the political, social and eco-nomic spheres. 'Reforming the mind' is indeeda significant requirement for Arab culture, yet'reforming action' is equally urgent.

A centrifugal economic, social and politi-cal environment in the region, coupled withcentripetal factors in other countries led tothe growing phenomenon of an Arab braindrain. The emigration of qualified Arabs con-stitutes a form of reverse development aidsince receiving countries evidently benefitfrom Arab investments in training and educat-ing their citizens. More significant, however, isthe opportunity cost of high levels of skilledoutflows: the lost potential contribution ofemigrants to knowledge and development intheir countries of origin. This double loss callsfor serious action to minimise its dangers:firstly by tapping the expertise and knowledgeof the Arab Diaspora abroad, and secondly byproviding Arab expatriates with incentives toreturn, either on temporary assignments or forgood, to their countries of origin, carrying ahuman capital much larger than that they hadmigrated with. This can be achieved only bylaunching a serious project for human devel-opment that would attract highly qualified mi-grants back temporarily or permanently onproductive and personally fulfilling assign-ments to serve their countries.

Unlike the case of Arab culture, theanalysis of Arab social and economic struc-tures reveals ingrained obstacles to knowledgeacquisition in the Arab world. Only by over-coming those obstacles through reform can aknowledge society be developed.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT:

Oppression, Knowledge and Development

Political obstacles to knowledge acquisition,as the Report argues, are even more severe inArab countries than those posed by theirsocio-economic structures, which are in turnseen to be more obstructive than any featuresof culture.

Political power plays a key role in directingknowledge and influencing its development. It

We have become accustomed to regard-ing abject submission as polite defer-ence; obsequiousness as courtesy;sycophancy as oratory; bombast as sub-stance; the acceptance of humiliation asmodesty; the acceptance of injustice asobedience; and the pursuit of human en-titlements as arrogance. Our inverted

system portrays the pursuit of the sim-plest knowledge as presumption; aspira-tions for the future as impossibledreams; courage as overreaching audac-ity; inspiration as folly; chivalry as ag-gression; free speech as insolence andfree thinking as heresy.

Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi: The Character of Despotism.

Roughly 25% of 300,000 first degree gradu-ates from Arab universities in 1995/96 emigrated.Between 1998 and 2000 more than 15,000 Arabdoctors migrated.

Data provided by A.B. Zahlan.

Arab citizens are

increasingly pushed

away from effecting

changes in their

countries.

The emigration of

qualified Arabs

constitutes a form of

reverse development

aid.

The Arab Brain Drain

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11

fosters knowledge that is favourable to itsgoals and suppresses opposing patterns.Political instability and fierce struggles for ac-cess to political positions in the absence of anestablished rule for the peaceful rotation ofpower – in short, democracy – impede thegrowth of knowledge in Arab soil. One of themain results of that unstable political situationhas been the subjection of scientific institu-tions to political strategies and power con-flicts. In managing these institutions, politicalloyalties take precedence over efficiency andknowledge. Power shackles active minds, ex-tinguishes the flame of learning and kills thedrive for innovation.

The Report calls for the establishment ofan independent knowledge sphere that pro-duces and promotes knowledge free from po-litical coercion. This is possible only bydemocratising political life and knowledgeand ensuring that knowledge can be freely ac-quired and produced.

Laws are needed to guarantee Arab citi-zens the essential rights of knowledge - thefreedom of thought and expression that are aprecondition for knowledge to flourish. Theinternational human rights conventions havebeen signed by most Arab states, but they haveneither entered the legal culture nor been in-corporated into substantive domestic legisla-tion. Yet the problem of freedom in the Arabworld is not related to the implementation oflaws as much as to the violation of these laws.Oppression, the arbitrary application of laws,selective censorship and other politically moti-vated restrictions are widespread. They oftentake the form of legal constraints on publica-tions, associations, general assemblies andelectronic media, which prevent these fromcarrying out their communication and culturalroles. Such restrictions also obstruct the diffu-sion of knowledge and the education of publicopinion.

Yet the more dangerous restrictions arethose imposed by security authorities whenthey confiscate publications or ban peoplefrom entering a country or prevent the sale ofcertain books during fairs while promotingother kinds of books. In committing theseacts, these authorities reach above the consti-tutional institutions and the law, citing thepretext of 'national security' or public order.

Other forms of restriction come from narrow-minded, self-appointed custodians of publicmorality, and from the censorship of books,articles and media events. Creativity, innova-tion and knowledge are the first victims of thesuppression or denial of freedoms.

A global context that poses a challenge:Globalisation in its current form and existinginstitutions is often weighted towards securingthe interests of the rich and powerful nationsand their dominance over the world economy,knowledge flows and, by extension, opportu-nities for development. Without changes thattip the balance of global governance more to-wards the needs and aspirations of developingcountries, including Arab countries, globalisa-tion cannot help these nations to achievehuman progress.

Perhaps the most important example froma knowledge perspective is the insistence byindustrialised countries, the main producersof knowledge at the global level, that knowl-edge should be converted from a public goodto a private commodity through the instru-ment of intellectual property rights, which arelargely owned by the industrialised West. Thisis now happening even in cases where theknowledge originated in developing countriesand was later acquired by institutions in the in-dustrialised world. This trend threatens to cutdown developing country opportunities to ac-quire new knowledge and it especially jeopar-dises productive sectors such as medicine andpharmacology.

In the case of Arab countries in particular,a qualitative jump in the effectiveness of theknowledge acquisition system requires closerand more efficient forms of cooperation at thePan-Arab level.

“If we are not careful, the intellectual prop-erty rights system may introduce distortions thatwould be detrimental to the interests of develop-ing countries.”

Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (London, Sept 2002).

“It is quite clear that the dilemma of Arab de-velopment will not be solved without focusingfully on human development – the development ofthe citizen and his/her role in economic, social andpolitical life.”

Mustafa Al-Barghouthi

Power shackles active

minds, extinguishes

the flame of learning

and kills the drive for

innovation.

Without changes that

tip the balance of

global governance

more towards the

needs and aspirations

of developing

countries, including

Arab countries,

globalisation cannot

help these nations

achieve human

progress.


A STRATEGIC VISION FORESTABLISHING A KNOWLEDGESOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Report pulls together the various threadsof its analysis of the status of Arab knowledgein a concluding strategic vision of the Arabknowledge society, supported by five pillars: 1. Guaranteeing the key freedoms of opin-ion, speech and assembly through goodgovernance bounded by the law: A climate offreedom is an essential prerequisite for theknowledge society. These freedoms are thethresholds to knowledge production, to cre-ativity and innovation, and to invigorating sci-entific research, technical development andartistic and literary expression. Constitutions,laws and administrative procedures need to berefined to remove all restrictions on essentialfreedoms, particularly administrative censor-ship, and regulatory restrictions by securityapparatuses on the production and diffusionof knowledge and all kinds of creative expres-sion. 2. Disseminating high quality education forall: The detailed proposals for reform in edu-cation include: giving priority to early child-hood learning; ensuring universal basiceducation for all and extending it to at least10th grade; developing an adult education sys-tem for lifelong learning; improving the qual-ity of education at all stages; giving particularattention to promoting higher education, andinstituting independent periodic evaluationsof quality at all stages of education. 3. Embedding and ingraining science, andbuilding and broadening the capacity for re-search and development in all societal activ-ities. This can be achieved through promotingbasic research, and establishing a centrally co-ordinated regional creativity and innovationnetwork that permeates the entire fabric of so-ciety and enjoys supportive and complemen-tary linkages in the regional and internationalspheres. 4. Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production in Arab socioeconomicstructures: This calls for a decisive move to-wards developing renewable resourcesthrough knowledge and technological capabil-ities and towards diversifying economic struc-tures and markets. It also requires upgrading

the Arab presence in the 'new economy' andthe consolidation of a societal incentives sys-tem that upholds the acquisition and applica-tion of knowledge for human development incontrast to the current mode in which valuesare centred on material possessions and inseeking access and favour from the twosources of power: money and authority. 5. Developing an authentic, broadmindedand enlightened Arab knowledge model.This would entail:• Delivering true religion from political ex-ploitation and respecting critical scholarship.The components of this reform include re-turning to the civilised, moral and humanitar-ian vision of pure religion; restoring toreligious institutions their independence frompolitical authorities, governments, states andradical religious-political movements; recog-nising intellectual freedom; activating inter-pretative jurisprudence, preserving the rightto differ in doctrines, religious schools and in-terpretations.• Advancing the Arabic language by under-taking serious research and linguistic reformfor translating scientific terms and coiningsimple linguistic usages. This also includescompiling specialised, functional dictionariesand other reference works that monitor com-mon classical-colloquial words for use in chil-dren's programmes and written and audiopublications. This must be matched by otherpersistent efforts to facilitate the acquisition ofArabic through formal and informal learningchannels, and to produce creative and innova-tive writing for young children. • Reclaiming some of the myriad brightspots in the Arab cultural heritage. Thesemust be incorporated in the core of the Arabknowledge model in a manner far above andbeyond the self-centred singing of one's ownpraises. This legacy must be assimilated andunderstood as part of the structure of motiva-tion for developing and nurturing an Arabknowledge system in Arab minds and institu-tions. • Enriching, promoting and celebrating cul-tural diversity within Arab countries. Thiscalls for providing safeguards for the protec-tion of all sub-cultures and for encouragingthem to interact, intermingle, grow and flour-ish.

Constitutions, laws

and administrative

procedures need to be

refined to remove all

restrictions on

essential freedoms.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13

• Opening up to other cultures. Such inter-action would be strengthened by translationinto other languages; promoting an intelligentand generous exchange with non-Arab cul-tures and civilisations; maximising benefitsfrom regional and international organisationsand initiating reform in the world orderthrough stronger inter-Arab cooperation.

As the Report affirms in closing, knowl-edge closely approaches a religious obligationthat Arabs ought to honour and exercise. Itpoints out the way on the Arab journey to adignified and prosperous future. The pursuitof knowledge is prompted by religion, culture,history and the human will to succeed.Obstructions on the road are the work of mor-tals: the defective structures of the past andpresent – social, economic and, above all, po-litical. Arabs must remove or reform thesestructures in order to take the place they de-serve in the world of knowledge at the begin-ning of the knowledge millennium.

“We should not shyaway from welcomingand acquiring the truthregardless of where itcame from, even if itcame from distant racesand nations that aredifferent from us.

Nothing is more impor-tant than seeking thetruth except the truthitself. We should notbelittle the truth, orthose who utter it orbring it.”

Al-Kindy: Welcoming the truthregardless of its source

The pursuit of

knowledge is

prompted by religion,

culture, history and

the human will to

succeed.

This section looks at the period in review (2002-2003) and traces changes in,and impacts on Arab human development arising from trends and developmentsat the national, regional and international levels. In doing so it revisits the statusof the “three deficits” identified in the first Arab Human Development Report(in freedom, knowledge and women’s empowerment) and highlights progressand continuing shortfalls since that report was issued in July 2002.

PART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 15

Changes in human development in Arab countries during 2001-2002

PART I

PART I: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 17

Starting with this second issue, the ArabHuman Development Report (AHDR) seriesinitiates a new practice of including an open-ing section devoted to assessing recent trendsand events that have influenced human devel-opment in the Arab region. The assessment in-cludes events that took place on both theexternal (regional and international) and theinternal (Arab country) levels, and covers theperiod since work began on the previous re-port in the series.

INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIES

THE CONTENT OF HUMANDEVELOPMENT

The concept of "human development" hasgained popularity since 1990 when the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP)adopted the term with a specific connotation,advanced a new index (the HDI) to measureit1, and started publishing an annual report onthe subject.

The human development concept, as it hasevolved over the years, is based on an intellec-tual heritage that places people at the centre ofdevelopment and which culminated in the firstHuman Development Report (UNDP, 1990).The concept maintains that "people are thetrue wealth of nations"2 and that human de-velopment is a "process of expanding people’schoices". Since freedom is essential for the ex-ercise of choice, freedom is a fundamental re-quirement of human development. "Choices"is an expression of the more sophisticated con-

cept of "entitlements" introduced by AmartyaSen3, as an expression of people’s basic rightto these "choices". The concept stipulates thathuman beings, simply by being human, havean inalienable right to a decent living in bodyand soul.

Two important implications flow from thisconcept: first, human development rejects out-right any form of discrimination amonghuman beings on whatever basis: gender, ori-gin or belief. Second, human well being is notlimited to material dimensions but extends tothe individual’s moral participation in societyand to all aspects of a decent life, such asbeauty, human dignity and self-fulfillment.

People’s entitlements are, in principle, un-limited and grow rapidly with humanprogress. Yet at any level of development, thethree main entitlements, in the opinion of theHuman Development Report, are "to live along and healthy life, to acquire knowledgeand to possess resources necessary for a decentlife". Human development, however, does notstop at that minimum but goes beyond it to in-clude other entitlements such as "political,economic and social freedoms, opportunitiesfor production and creativity, the enjoymentof liberty, self-fulfillment, and respect forhuman rights".

Thus, human development is much morethan the development of human resources. Itis a genuinely humane approach to the com-prehensive and integrated development ofhuman beings and societal institutions aimedat achieving the higher goals of human exis-tence: freedom, justice and human dignity.The human development process rests on twoessential foundations: the first is the buildingof human capacities that allow for access to an

Changes in human development in Arabcountries during 2001-2002

PART I

Human development

is a genuinely humane

approach to the

comprehensive and

integrated

development of

human beings and

societal institutions

aimed at achieving

the higher goals of

human existence:

freedom, justice and

human dignity.

1The HDI has undoubtedly been a major improvement over GDP per capita as a measure of development.2The phrase was first used in Frederick Harbison’s famous book, Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations (1973)31998 Nobel Prize winner in economics in recognition of his work on poverty and famines.


advanced level of human well-being.Foremost among these are the capacity to livea long and healthy life, to acquire knowledgeand for all people to enjoy freedom withoutdiscrimination of any kind. The second foun-dation is the efficient utilisation of human ca-pabilities in all areas of human activity as wellas in economic production, civil society organ-isation and political life.

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANDEVELOPMENT IN THE ARABREGION

Arab countries have made significant stridesin more than one area of human developmentin the last three decades. Nevertheless, thepredominant characteristic of Arab realitytoday seems to be the existence of deeplyrooted shortcomings that stand as obstacles tobuilding human development. As noted ear-lier, the first AHDR summarised these short-comings as the three deficits of freedom,women’s empowerment and knowledge.Taking these shortcomings into consideration,as the first AHDR did by exploring an alterna-tive human development index, shows that itmay be premature to celebrate the achieve-ments of Arab countries on the traditional

HDI. Indeed, the challenge of building gen-uine human development remains a very seri-ous one for the vast majority of Arabs. From apositive perspective, the realisation of humandevelopment in the Arab world requires tran-scending these deficits and transforming theminto their opposites: advantages enjoyed by allArabs and assets they can be proud of beforethe rest of the world.

In order to build human development,Arab countries need to embark on recon-structing their societies along three clear prin-ciples:• Full respect for human rights and free-doms as the cornerstone of good governanceleading to human development.• Full empowerment of Arab women, recog-nising their right to equal participation in pol-itics, society and the economy as well as toeducation and other means of building capa-bilities.• Active knowledge acquisition and its effec-tive utilisation in building human capabilities.As a key driver of economic progress, knowl-edge must be brought to bear efficiently andproductively in all aspects of society, with thegoal of enhancing human well-being acrossthe region.

This, in essence, is what it will take to tran-scend the crisis of human development in theArab region. It is, however, by no means theultimate target for Arabs. Meeting the chal-lenges of the future requires building Arabproductive capabilities in the face of the ren-tier nature of Arab economies and societies. Itdemands the reform of governance at the na-tional and pan-Arab levels on a solid founda-tion of freedom. It calls for strengtheningArab co-operation and it entails maximisingthe benefits and minimising the risks of glob-alisation.

The challenge of

building human

development remains

a very serious one for

the vast majority of

Arabs.

"Since MAN (insân in Arabic) is thecream of the world, the essence of theuniverse, the radiating centre in theoceans and the encirclements, the collec-tor of the dispersed contents of the earthand heavens, the descendent, the out-come, the elite and the fruit of existenceand its raison d'etre, it was imperativethat we conclude this book by noting hisapparent characteristics and the wondersof his creation and his manners. We havegiven in it (i.e., the book) a description ofthe three generated ones, the seven re-gions, the seas and their contents, as wellas their characteristics and those of thecountries. Nothing remained except man,who is the goal of all this and to whom be-longs a collection of characteristics, not asingle self. He is the empowered succes-sor on earth and the one charged withcarrying out God's prescriptions. He is acreated being, charged and empowered.

Among his characteristics is that GodAlmighty combined in him the powers ofthe two worlds and qualified him to in-habit the two houses (i.e., the world andthe hereafter). He is just like an animal inhis lust and hunger to develop the earth;and he is like angels in knowledge, wor-ship and guidance. Therefore, in returnfor man's worship and devotion to devel-oping His earth, God nominated him tobe His successor on earth. He preparedhim to sojourn next to Him in HisParadise and the House of his Throne.This man is composed of two oppositethings and two separate substances far re-moved from each other: one of them isgentle, a heavenly soul, enlightened, all-encompassing, live and perceiving. Theother one is dense, an earthly body, infe-rior, dark, dead and insensitive. That iswhy he was called "insan", which is thedual of ins (human)."

BOX 1

The Sheikh of Al-Rabwah, Muhammad ibn Abi Taleb al-Ansari al-Demashqi – The Human Being

Source: "The Choice of Time in the Wonders of the Land and the Sea”, quoted in: Ahmad Sedqui ad-Dajani, 1994.


A large-scale international study (World Values Survey) presents an op-portunity to compare Arab attitudes towards knowledge, good gover-nance and gender equality with those expressed in other regions.

The following results are based on field surveys in a large numberof countries throughout the world, including four Arab countries(Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco) that comprise about half theArab people.

In addition to the Arab region, the surveys provide enough data tocompare the Arab region to eight other country groupings: other (non-Arab) Islamic countries, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, SouthAsia, USA/ Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Latin America, EastAsia, and Western Europe.

According to this survey, Arabs value knowledge and good gover-nance strongly but take an ambivalent stand on gender equality.

Among the nine regions, Arabs expressed the highest preferencefor the role of science in the service of humanity. Arabs also topped thelist of those supporting the statement that "democracy is better than

any other form of government" and expressed the highest level of re-jection of authoritarian rule (a strong leader who does not have tobother with parliament and elections).

On the empowerment of women, the Arabs came third in rejectingthat "a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"while expressing the highest approval that "when jobs are scarce, menshould have more right to a job than women". In other words, Arabsstood for gender equality in education but not in employment. Inhuman development terms, Arabs expressed support for building thehuman capabilities of women but not for their utilisation.

Evidently, Arab public opinion strongly supports the focus ofAHDR1 on the two deficits of freedom/good governance, and knowl-edge. But AHDR1 might have been ahead of Arab public opinion instressing women’s full empowerment in both education and employ-ment according to the paradigm of building human capabilities andutilising them effectively.

BOX 2

How Do Arabs Feel About the Three Deficits?

Source of WVS data: Inglehart, R., Background Paper for AHDR2.

Figure 1Democracy is the best form of government

Figure 2Rejection of authoritarian rule

Figure 3Gender equality in higher education

Figure 4Gender equality in employment


The AHDR was a bell

that rang at the last

minute of the last

hour in the

contemporary Arab

age.

Year

20022003Total

No. ofdownloads

978,000346,000

1,324,000

No. ofcomplete downloads

792,000303,000

1,095,000

BOX 4

AHDR1 Web Site Statisticshttp://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/

In our daily lives, we are accustomed to the sound ofthe bell as a last call. The first ring to reach our earswas that of the school bell calling us to knowledge andlearning. It was followed by other summonses: thetrain bell announcing our last chance to start a jour-ney; the bells of places of worship beckoning us toprayer; the ambulance or fire engine siren telling usthat the usual right of way had changed, and that anew urgency took precedence; the alarms in buildingsalerting us to the danger of fire or attempted burglary.

- The bell rung by the AHDR and heard by Arabsand others the world over carried echoes of all thebells ringing through our lives. It was a call to knowl-edge and learning, an announcement of the lastchance to join the trip to the future, an appeal forcleansing, an injunction to make way for an urgent pri-ority, and finally a forewarning of imminent danger –urging us to hasten to douse the flames of a still-smallfire waiting to engulf the region in a formidable blaze.

- The truth is that the AHDR was a bell that rangat the last minute of the last hour in the contemporaryArab age – ringing within the framework of a historyradically different from anything humankind had ex-perienced before. Indeed, that experience can befairly summarised (despite the precautions imposedon simplification) by noting that the world has passeda number of milestones:

- The first was the French Revolution, late in theeighteenth century, that arrived after aeons duringwhich human beings lived as subjects of emperors,kings, sultans, and princes. It crystallised the conceptof nationhood: a particular people living on territorieswith set borders. This concept gave rise, among otheroutcomes, to the idea of one market that guaranteesthe interest of the group and, as such, the state marketappeared.

- The second milestone was the attempt atGerman Unification, at the end of the nineteenth cen-tury, which redefined the concept of the nation as aunifier of a people connected by kinship, neighbour-hood, language and culture, and the experience of acontinuous history. In this concept, the nation has tiesmore extensive than the borders of territories belong-ing to one people and to a national state. The notionof a wider market materialised to fulfill these more ex-tensive interests, one that might be called "the na-tion’s market" and which, by extension, wassometimes called "the region’s market".

- The third milestone was the shedding by the

United States of its oceanic isolation in the early twen-tieth century. This was a significant indication that theUS, largely self-sufficient though it was, realised that ittoo needed the world as much as the world needed theUS. With this transcontinental meeting – accompa-nied by great strides in energy generation, aviationand communication – the features of one world ap-peared, pointing towards a "world market’.

- The fourth and final milestone was passed afterWorld War II and after the revolution in electronics,space and satellite technology emerged and devel-oped. The crisis of political doctrines that climaxedwith the end of the Cold War in the last decade of the20th century led to a profound shift -- in effect, aglobal transformation. Its thrust has been to convertthe "world market" into a "market world" transcend-ing all national, regional and continental borders.

- The danger and the significance of presenttrends is that the current transcontinental "worldmarket" will indeed turn into a dominant "marketworld", one that will accommodate, absorb, usurp,and dominate without stopping at any physical or po-litical obstacles. This would ultimately lead to a dou-ble impasse:

On the one hand, local and regional identitieswould be incapable of resistance, and would surren-der, leaving the market to govern peoples and nationsand manage world affairs.

On the other hand, the power of law would giveway to that of the market. As such, international rightssymbolised by the United Nations in New Yorkwould cede to the authority of the New York StockExchange. The strongholds of this authority, theInternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank andmultinational firms, would dominate world affairs.The market would become the plotter of intelligenceoperations, the order-giver to armies and fleets, andthe director of missile payloads.

The AHDR probably came out at the last minuteof the last hour to pose a fateful question to the Arabpeople:

- If we want a world owning "the market", thenwhere are we in that world conceptually and actually,in terms of our capabilities and contributions?

- If we accept a market owning "the world", whatwill be our position and role in that circumstance?What will be our orientation and what impacts willfollow?

In short, where are we?

BOX 3

Mohammad Hassanein HeikalThe First Arab Human Development Report: For Whom Did the Bell Toll?


CHANGES IN HUMANDEVELOPMENT SINCE 2001

THE REGIONAL ANDINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Work on the first AHDR (2002) started at thebeginning of 2001; as such its analysis stoppedat the end of the twentieth century. On theother hand, since the first draft of this secondreport was initiated at the beginning of 2003,the timeframe under review in this section islimited to just two calendar years. This is, ofcourse, a very short period in human develop-ment terms. Basic human development indica-tors do not change significantly over shortperiods. Moreover, updating such indicatorsrequires up-to-date databases, resources thatare all-too-scarce in the Arab world, as wassharply underlined in the first report.

In an attempt to maximise informationbased on weak or incomplete data, this sectionadopts a qualitative analysis. It focuses on de-ducing trends inherent in events considered tohave an important bearing on various dimen-sions of human development in the regionaland international context of Arab countries.At the time of writing, trends portend momen-tous alterations that may change not only thestatus of human development, but the veryface and pattern of life in the region for someconsiderable time.

Certain events may take place over a veryshort period of time, yet leave a profound im-pression on human development. Such is thecase with changes in human rights and otherforms of legislation affecting people’s civil lib-erties. This section records several recentevents that have had negative impacts in Arabcountries, notably in the two areas of freedomand good governance and the advancement ofwomen.

Furthermore, qualitative analysis also re-quires sound and comprehensive data. Mostof the databases available to support suchanalysis reflect the viewpoints, if not the preju-dices, of the party gathering the data. To min-imise this problem, especially in relation toArab-related events, the authors have resortedto more than one source besides diligentlymonitoring the mass media during the period

under study, including bulletins and reportsprepared by the Arab Organisation forHuman Rights, and electronic mail lists ofhuman rights violations in Arab countries.

ON THE INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONAL DIMENSIONS OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIES

The first AHDR (2002) may not havegiven sufficient attention to the regional andinternational dimensions of the human devel-opment impasse in Arab countries – at least,this is what a majority of the Arab critics of thereport have felt. The publication of the reportafter the tragic events of September 11, 2001,and their extremely serious aftermath, ampli-fied this feeling, although work on the reporthad started well before those events.

The authors believe that exaggerating theimpediments to Arab development imposedby regional and international challenges is fu-tile and self-defeating. This all-too-frequentresort may provide a comforting escape, yet itis still highly counterproductive. Takingrefuge in externalities weakens the resolve andundermines the capabilities required for self-reliant development. It also leads to underesti-mating the task of self-improvement uponwhich Arab dignity and the national, regionaland international prospects of the region mustbe constructed. Hence, the strategic choice ofthe first report was to focus on the reform re-quired within the Arab world.

The decisive factor in soundly confrontingthe regional and international challenges fac-ing the Arab world will be the quality of Arabcapabilities in various spheres; knowledge,production and politics. Such capabilities andcreative energies, in turn, cannot be unleashedwithout widening the range of people’s free-doms and guaranteeing good governance inpractice. History and logic further indicatethat a strong system of Arab co-ordinationleading to regional integration will be an indis-pensable source of strength and a conditionfor success in these endeavours. This systemcan be seen as "an Arab Free CitizenshipZone", where every Arab would enjoy the fullrights of a national in each and every Arabcountry. Such a system would undoubtedly

The decisive factor in

soundly confronting

the regional and

international

challenges facing the

Arab world will be the

quality of Arab

capabilities in

knowledge,

production and

politics.


strengthen the negotiating capacities of Arabcountries in highly competitive global arenas,and position Arab countries on firmer andhigher ground in the third millennium.

It is now clear that the human impact ofSeptember 11 and its political and securityconsequences have decisively altered interna-tional public opinion and sentiment, and thusthe parameters of the external challenges todevelopment in the Arab region. A new histor-ical era is rapidly unfolding; not only becauseof the high human toll, which was a greattragedy, but also because of the political andsecurity consequences of that cataclysm. Thefateful events of that horrific day woke theworld, especially its rich and powerful coun-tries, from a dream of comprehensive securityand invulnerability. The need to rebuild globalsecurity has become all the more urgent now,yet the proposed means to reach this end vary.Without question, the killing of innocenthuman beings violated all human and heavenlylaws.

Worldwide anti-terrorism policies havebeen largely military and security-oriented innature. The long-term goal of draining theeconomic and political sources of terrorismhas almost faded away.

In the current war against terror, the secu-rity policies and restrictive procedures intro-duced by some advanced countries andadopted in several parts of the developingworld, including the Arab region, have createda situation inimical to human development.Governments, stating considerations of secu-rity and stability, have found a new justifica-tion for their ongoing warnings about theperils of freedom. A flawed yet highly influen-tial rationale has gained ground: if the world’sleading democracies find it necessary to back-pedal on human rights and civil liberties, otherstates much further behind on the road to re-form may be well advised to pause. After all,in the narrow logic of security, governmentswith the most to lose by granting freedom are

thus most justified in ruling with an iron grip.The expedience of that logic has not been loston regressive elements in Arab and other de-veloping countries.

Events befalling Arabs abroad and widelybroadcast in the media intensified popular dis-affection in the region. The US Administrationresorted to establishing and enforcing proce-dures that at times contravened the most basichuman rights, according to the (American)Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights (NewYork, 2002), which found that "over the lastyear the US government has taken a series ofactions that have gradually eroded basichuman rights protections in the United States,fundamental guarantees that have been centralto the US constitutional system for more thantwo hundred years...too often, the US govern-ment’s mode of operations since September 11has been at odds with core American and in-ternational human rights principles."4 Thoseprocedures, which included ethnic profilingand secret evidence, violated civil and politicalliberties, particularly those of Arabs andMuslims. They revoked the right to a just trialbefore civil courts, thus legalising detentionwithout charge and administrative arrestswithout due process.

The US introduced ethnic profiling ofArabs and Muslims, whether they were natu-ralised citizens, legal residents, students or vis-itors. Contrary to a long-established principleunder the law, these people became guiltyuntil proven innocent. Many ordinary peoplewere arrested for no reason except their affili-ation to Arabs or to Islam. The US requiredfingerprint records of visiting nationals from25 Arab states and also instituted registrationwith security forces, which led to administra-tive detentions in some cases.

These measures resulted in reducing thenumber of Arab students in the United States,quite markedly in the cases of some countries(Table 1). Important knowledge acquisitionopportunities for young Arabs were thus cur-

Governments, stating

considerations of

security and stability,

have found a new

justification for their

ongoing warnings

about the perils of

freedom.

4The American Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights report (New York, 2002) documents details of the erosion of civil liberties. Among them:• "The FBI may now be privy to what books an individual checks out at the public library or purchases at the local bookstore.• The USA Patriot Act could result in long-term detention of non-citizens who have never been charged with a crime.• The Justice Department’s list of the young men targeted for government questioning was compiled strictly on the basis of national origin.• The Administration has in fact been using the term "unlawful enemy combatant" - a term not found in international law - as a kind of magic

wand, waving it to avoid well-established standards of the US and international law.• Even if suspected terrorists are eventually tried and then acquitted by military commissions the Administration reserves the right to continue to

detain them indefinitely.• In too many cases, opportunistic governments expressed support for the fight against terrorism, while presenting their own domestic insurg

encies as conflicts perpetrated by terrorist groups analogous to at least Al-Qaeda."


tailed. The harassment of Arabs living abroad,furthermore, created a climate that under-mined the welfare of Arab expatriate commu-nities, damaged the vital process of culturalinteraction between them and host societiesand interrupted valuable scientific, technicaland cultural exchanges between Arab coun-tries and the West.

Perhaps the gravest repercussion of thewar on terror is that it gave ruling regimes insome Arab countries spurious justification forcurbing freedoms through an expanded defin-ition of terrorism, which found institutionalexpression on the pan-Arab level in the "ArabCharter for Anti-Terrorism". This documenthas been widely criticised in Arab and interna-tional human rights circles, since an expandeddefinition opens the door to abuses such ascensorship, restricting access to the Internetand suppressing the printing and publicationof any material construed as "encouraging ter-rorism". Moreover, the Charter neither explic-itly prohibits detention or torture, norprovides for questioning the legality of deten-tions. Furthermore, it does not protect per-sonal freedom, since it does not require a priorjudicial order authorising the wire-tapping ofindividuals or groups (Amnesty International).

THE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELIOCCUPATION OF PALESTINE ONHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIES

The first AHDR concluded that the Israelioccupation of Palestine constitutes a severeimpediment to human development. This oc-cupation distorts policy priorities, retardshuman development and freezes opportunitiesfor growth, prosperity and freedom across theregion, and not in the Occupied PalestinianTerritories alone. The harsh indignities arisingfrom occupation extend to all the Arab peo-ple, yet the worst repercussions are borne bythe Palestinian people themselves.

Occupation denies Palestinians freedomand human dignity and aborts their interna-tionally recognised right to self-determination.Occupation squanders Palestinian resources,

undermines Palestinian human capabilitiesand destroys individual and communal secu-rity and human lives.

The occupation of Palestinian and otherArab lands exerts a direct and continuous bur-den on the economies of affected countriesand diverts resources from development tomilitary and security objectives. The threat ofIsraeli domination also creates a pretext fordeferring political and economic reforms inArab countries in the name of national solidar-ity against a formidably armed externalaggressor5.

Israel’s believed possession of a large arse-nal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),which Arabs consider represents a doublestandard because it is not subjected to an in-ternational watch or a regional or internationaldeterrent, drives the Arab region and sur-rounding countries into an intense arms racethat diminishes resources that could otherwisebe applied to development.

In 2002, Israel’s government, under theguise of the international war on terror, at-tacked almost all Palestinian territories, de-

Occupation distorts

policy priorities,

retards human

development and

freezes opportunities

for growth, prosperity

and freedom across

the region.

5Israel’s might in the region is not to be underestimated. For example, Israel is among the few countries that very likely own nuclear weapons, evenif this is not usually acknowledged (US State Department, from infoplease.com). Israel has refrained from ratifying the Treaty on Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons. The Centre for Non-proliferation Studies affiliated with the "Monterey Centre for International Studies" categorises Israel’s own-ership of chemical weapons as "probable", and its ownership of biological weapons as "possible", given that Israel has not ratified treaties on ban-ning chemical and biological weapons.

The late UN High Commissioner forhuman rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello,noted publicly that the US-led "war onterror" was hurting human rights and ex-acerbating prejudices around the world.

Governments across the globe haveinvoked the "war on terror", announcedby President Bush after the September11,2001 attacks in the United States, to justifyactivities that Sergio Vieira de Mello saidare "damaging human rights in the indus-

trialised and developing worlds."Arabs and Muslims at large are ex-

periencing increasing incidents of racialdiscrimination … singling out, fingerpointing and…in some instances (vio-lence)," he said.

"We must at any cost prevent civiliansfrom becoming what some irresponsiblepeople call ‘collateral damage’," he con-tinued, nothing that "In Iraq … civilianshave suffered enough."

BOX 5

UNHCHR: War on terror infringing on human rights

Source: Reuters Web Site (www.reuters.com), visited on 24/12/200.

TABLE 1

Number of students from some Arab countries in the United Statesbefore and after the September 2001 events

Saudi ArabiaQatarOmanYemen

19995,156338459188

2002/20033,581250345181

% Reduction31%26%25%4%

Country Number of students in the United States

Source: Data collected from Arab Missions by the Permanent Observer Mission of the Arab League to the United Nations.


stroyed farms and homes, disrupted thePalestinian Authority, used unarmed civiliansas human shields, and committed, mostmarkedly in Jenin and Nablus, atrocities andwhat a highly reputed NGO, Human RightsWatch, called ‘war crimes’. (Human RightsWatch, 2002).

In April 2003 the UN Commission onHuman Rights, with a majority of 33 out of 53votes, strongly condemned "the violations bythe Israeli occupation authorities of humanrights in the occupied Palestinian territory, in-cluding East Jerusalem", including "the prac-tice of ‘liquidation’ or ‘extrajudicialexecutions’", and expressed its grave concern"at acts of mass killing perpetrated by theIsraeli occupying authorities against thePalestinian people" (Commission on HumanRights, Resolution 2003/6, Geneva). The reso-lution "reaffirms the legitimate right of thePalestinian people to resist the Israeli occupa-tion." Occupation forces opened fire on am-bulances that month.

The human costs of Israeli occupation

Israeli occupation has wrought death and de-struction in the West Bank and Gaza. By April2003, 2,405 Palestinians had been killed, and41,000 injured as a result of Israeli actionssince September 2000. These are not mere sta-tistics but people whose lives have been de-stroyed, their hopes dashed, their futures

aborted and their families bereaved. Most ofthose killed were civilians (85%) and a signifi-cant proportion were children (20%).UNICEF estimates that 7,000 children havebeen injured.

The conflict has also claimed Israeli casu-alties. Over the period (September 2000 –May 2003), the Israeli defense forces reporteda total of 781 Israelis dead and 5,468 injured(http://www.idf.il) including soldiers, settlersand civilians. The loss of innocent lives is al-ways an unacceptable human tragedy.6

Given that the population of the WestBank and Gaza is about one hundredth thepopulation of the US, the number ofPalestinian deaths resulting from Israeli actionin the past two years is, in proportional terms,comparable to the death of about a quarter ofa million people in the US. The number of in-juries is comparable to four million in the US.

In addition to considerable casualties,Palestinian human development has sufferedfrom the loss of freedom, livelihoods, destruc-tion of basic infrastructure and an alarmingdecline in health conditions. Palestinians weresubject to blatant violations of basic humanrights, including the right to life, freedom,food, education and employment.

It is very difficult to find a historical equiv-alent to the division of the occupied territoriesinto clusters. While it shares a few similaritieswith past segregation policies in the US, it re-sembles most the Bantustan policies enforcedby the former apartheid regime in SouthAfrica.

Collective punishment through closuresand curfews affects nearly three millionPalestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks dividethese territories into 300 separate clusters.Most occupied towns, villages and refugeecamps have suffered from extended curfewsand closures. Nablus, for example, has beenvirtually under continuous curfew during thepast two years. About 15,000 Palestinians havebeen denied freedom of movement throughdetention with 6,000 still in prison, including350 children.

Closures and curfews have also deprivedpeople of basic services and supplies, creating

The number of

Palestinian deaths

resulting from Israeli

action in the past two

years is, in

proportional terms,

comparable to the

death of about a

quarter of a million

people in the US.

"Israeli security forces were responsiblefor extensive abuses, including indiscrimi-nate and excessive use of lethal forceagainst unarmed Palestinian demonstra-tors; unlawful killings by Israel DefenseForces (IDF) soldiers; disproportionateIDF gunfire in response to Palestinian at-tacks; inadequate IDF response to abusesby Israeli settlers against Palestinian civil-ians; and "closure" measures onPalestinian communities that amounted tocollective punishment."

"During its investigation [of IDF opera-tions in Jenin], however, Human RightsWatch documented unlawful and deliber-

ate killings, and the killing or wounding ofunprotected individuals as a result of ex-cessive or disproportionate use of force.Such cases are in violation of the interna-tional humanitarian law prohibitionsagainst ‘wilful killing’ of non-combatants.The organisation also found instances ofIDF soldiers deliberately impeding thework of medical personnel and preventingmedical assistance to the wounded withno apparent or obvious justification ofmilitary necessity… There is strong primafacie evidence that in some of the casesdocumented grave breaches of theGeneva Conventions, or war crimes, werecommitted."

BOX 6

Human Rights Watch Report 2002, Middle East and North Africa:Jenin

Source: Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Middle East & North Africa.

6Other nations also suffered casualties in the conflict: the crushing of the young American peace activist, Rachel Corrie, by an Israeli bulldozer is justone example.


a major humanitarian crisis. They prevent ac-cess to medical care and restrict the movementof medical personnel and supplies. Heart, can-cer and renal patients cannot obtain treatmentor cannot afford it. Pregnant women are cutoff from antenatal care and are forced to givebirth at home or even at checkpoints. Forty-three women delivered babies at checkpoints,nine of whom were stillborn.7 Parents cannothave their children immunised just as healthrisks are multiplying. Children and teacherscannot go to school. Malnutrition is rampantwith 30% of children under 5 suffering fromchronic malnutrition and 21% from acute mal-nutrition.8 Psychological trauma is wide-spread, particularly among children. Families,friends and communities find themselvesphysically isolated, unable to meet and sup-port each other.

While Israeli construction of settlementsand a separation barrier, "the wall", furthertightens Israel’s stranglehold on thePalestinian people, Israeli destruction ofPalestinian property and infrastructure under-mines hope for a viable Palestinian economy.Between October 2000 and April 2002, physi-cal damage amounted to US $ 305 million. Inmid-May 2002, after Israeli incursions intoseveral West Bank towns that left almost 260Palestinians dead, an international donor sur-vey assessed physical damage at more than US$361 million.9 It was one of these incursions(into Jenin) that Terje Rød Larsen, UN SpecialCoordinator in the Occupied Territories de-scribed as "horrific beyond belief" and"morally repugnant." His outcry and that ofthe international community did not restrainthe destruction. By September 2002 the dam-age had nearly doubled to US $728 million.

Israeli actions have deprived large seg-ments of the population of job opportunitiesand income. GNP has been more than halvedand total income losses to the Palestinianeconomy are estimated to be between US $3.2and US $10 billion (in addition to the cost ofdestroyed public and private property). Aboutthree fourths of Palestinians are now living inpoverty (measured at under US $2 a day). The

number of poor people has tripled sinceSeptember 2000. Two thirds of the workforcein Gaza, and half of the workforce in the WestBank, are unemployed. Palestinians are nowmore dependent on food aid than ever before.The World Bank estimates that if the conflictis resolved and the closure lifted, it will stilltake at least two years for the Palestinian econ-omy to restore pre-September 2000 per capitaincome.

Current unemployment rates in the WestBank and Gaza are more than double those

About three fourths of

Palestinians are now

living in poverty

measured at under US

$2 a day.

• 2,405 dead, including 451 children and 265 students: - deaths by live ammunition: 1,455- by heavy weapons: 496- by assassination: 219

• 41,000 wounded, including 7,000 children and 2,981 students.• 2,500 permanent disabilities, with 500 children affected.• 9 journalists killed, including 7 Palestinians. 75 journalists wounded

167 journalists assaulted

BOX 7

Human Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Sept 2001- April 2003)

Sources: - The Palestine Monitor: 28 September 2002 – 17 April 2003)- Health, Development, Information, and Policy Institute- B’Tselem report: Illusions of restraint: Human Rights Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories 29th

September - 2nd December, 2000

- Palestinian Ministry of Health- UN Special Rapporteur of Commission on Human Rights, March 2002- Ministry of Education, 17 January 2002- General Union of Disabled Palestinians- UN Special Rapperteur of Communication Human Rights, March 2002- Information from the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate

• Houses damaged: 11,553• Houses destroyed: 4,985• Schools destroyed: 323• Mosques destroyed: 30• Churches destroyed: 12• Wells destroyed: 134• Trees uprooted: 34,606• Land sequestrated: 1,162 donums*• Land Destroyed: 17,162 donums

BOX 8

Material Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 19 months

(until April 2003)

Source: The Palestine Monitor- Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 3rd June, 2002- Palestinian Humanitarian Disaster, U.S. Agency for International Development, July 10, 2002- Ministry of Education, 17 Jan 2002, Information for Ministry of Education schools- Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace- Al-Mezan 2001- LAW Society, 29th Nov 2001 (figure from beginning of 2000)

*A donum is 1,000 sq. m. of land.

7The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS)8Report by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Johns Hopkins University, 20029Physical and Institutional Damage Assessment – West Bank Governorates, March-May, 2002 by the Donor Support Group, Local Aid CoordinationCommittee, May 2002


that prevailed in the US during the GreatDepression. The decline in GNP in thePalestinian territories is also significantlygreater than the GNP decline during that pe-riod.

Insecurity and desperation are among theunquantifiable, yet profound, human costs ofoccupation. Through affinity, empathy and in-tense media coverage, the Arab public identi-fies with the suffering. Furthermore, itwitnesses, daily, the dwindling credibility ofIsraeli claims to respect for democracy andhuman rights.

THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

At the first draft stage of this report, a coali-tion led by the USA was preparing to wagewar on Iraq ostensibly aimed at ridding thecountry of weapons of mass destruction thatthe coalition claimed Iraq possessed, as well asreplacing a totalitarian regime by a democraticone. As the report was being completed, Iraqfell under Anglo-American occupation, fol-lowing a war led by the United States, GreatBritain and other partners.

This war against Iraq was waged without amandate from the Security Council of theUnited Nations. Answering questions at apress conference in the Hague on March 11,2003 the UN Secretary-General observed that:"If the US and others were to go outside theCouncil and take military action, it would notbe in conformity with the Charter". In theevent, the war was conducted in the face ofstrong popular opposition not only in Arabcountries but also across the world, includingin member countries of the coalition.

Although the full impacts of this war werenot clear at the time of writing, the initialphase of military operations and the entry ofoccupation forces into Iraqi cities, includingBaghdad, had had severe adverse effects onIraq and its people.

Undoubtedly, the heaviest losses sustainedby Iraq were the killing, injury and displace-ment of its citizens. Attack strategies and am-munition, including cluster bombs that didnot distinguish between civilian and militarytargets, led to the killing, mutilation and dis-memberment of a large number of Iraqis, in-

cluding many children, who will carry disabil-ities and disfigurements for life. Shrapnel cov-ered large areas; parts of some bombs have notyet exploded and continue to threaten Iraqicivilians, particularly children. On 19 March2003, Human Rights Watch urged the UnitedStates Secretary of State and the BritishForeign Secretary to refrain from deployingcluster bombs in civilian areas, because of theunexploded ordnance they leave behind,which continues to threaten civilians well afterhostilities cease.10

While the physical destruction has beenenormous, it is the cultural destruction thathas been particularly dismaying. The pillageand plunder of the Iraqi museum, the libraryand the Centre for Iraqi Arts under the gaze ofoccupying forces is a violation of the firstGeneva protocol which stipulates the respon-sibility of occupying forces for the protectionof cultural objects and religious places in orderto preserve the cultural heritage of people whoare subjects of occupation. Also the persecu-tion of Iraqi scientists raises fears about its im-pact on scientific research and technologicaldevelopment in Iraq and more widely in theArab region. These fears are underlined by theunprecedented restrictions imposed on someArab scientists and students in Western uni-versities.

This war has overthrown a totalitarianregime that oppressed the Iraqi people and de-prived them of a wide spectrum of rights andfreedoms. This regime had inflicted on Iraqisall manner of persecution and torture news ofwhich was only whispered about before, whilethe aftermath of such acts is now revealeddaily. The excesses of the previous regime didnot stop at Iraq’s borders; the attack onKuwait in 1990 threatened Arab national secu-rity and caused harm to Arab collective action.The invasion and occupation of Iraq and theconsequent destruction were not restricted tophysical structures but also extended to the in-stitutional infrastructure of services and secu-rity. Chaos spread and large numbers of Iraqislost both livelihoods and security. This has,posed to Iraqis a new challenge of a differentorder, one which they will only be able to meetif they are empowered to determine their ownfuture in accordance with international law; if

Occupation posed to

Iraqis a new challenge

of a different order,

one which they will

only be able to meet if

they are empowered

to determine their

own future.

10Human Rights Watch, A letter to the United States and its allies on compliance with the laws of war, 19 March 2003


they are freed from occupation, and if they areallowed to recover their wealth and helped tobuild a system of good governance fully repre-sentative of the Iraqi people. These are the es-sential circumstances that would enable thepeople of Iraq to carry out quickly the recon-struction of their country from a human devel-opment perspective.

The repercussions of the occupation ofIraq do not stop at Iraq’s borders.Developments in Iraq are bound to have sig-nificant consequences on human developmentthroughout the region. For most Arabs, thewar has been seen as an attempt at restructur-ing of the region by outside forces pursuingtheir own objectives.

In contrast, this series of reports on humandevelopment in Arab countries aims at stimu-lating the formulation of a strategic vision byArab elites through a process of social innova-tion aimed at restructuring the region fromwithin, with the ultimate objective of buildinghuman development in the Arab world. Thatvision of self-determined change is at the cen-tre of the current report on building a knowl-edge society in Arab countries. There can beno doubt that, from a human developmentperspective, internal societal reforms based onscrupulous self-criticism are the most desir-able and sustainable alternative to mappingthe region’s future from outside.

ARAB INTEGRATION

Six successive decades have witnessed someaccomplishments in Arab integration, but thefailures were larger, whether in terms of rais-ing the level of integration and bringing itnearer to its final goals or of building Arabhuman development.

Looking at accomplishments, the 18 Arabstates signatories to the Arab Free Trade Areatreaty (AFTA) have been active in implement-ing its provisions. Trade was liberalized in60% of products traded between states partiesby January 2003. It is expected that all tradebetween states parties will be liberalized byJanuary 2005.

At the level of global integration, elevenArab states acceded to the World TradeOrganization Agreement and five others are inthe process of acceding to it. It is not clear,however, whether the current or future Arabmember states will be diligent in taking advan-tage of the GATT provisions, which allow ac-cession to regional trade arrangements. Doingso would mean that the membership of Arabstates in WTO and AFTA would complementeach other, which would enhance the ability ofArab countries to attract foreign investmentfrom various sources to the whole Arab re-gion.11

There is also a rush to adopt integrationmethods invented to suit the situations of de-veloped societies although these have provedto be a failure in many developing countrygroupings. AFTA, for instance, is limited totrade in goods, which does not lead to the es-tablishment of an Arab common market forservices, capital and labour; nor does it implythe establishment of institutional infrastruc-tures to regulate and control the flow of goodsand services and factors of production.

In view of limited popular participation indecision-making processes at the countrylevel, the Arab integration pattern has beenmarred by the weakness of such participation,namely neglect of the process by which Arabcitizens are made aware of the measures anddecisions which affect them and of which theyare supposed to be the key beneficiaries.Thinking on trade has been limited to dis-cussing the requirements of inter-trade liberal-ization and the resulting damage to existinginterest groups and the struggle over excep-tions from the liberalization process. Littlethought has been given to the role of integra-tion in enhancing productive efficiency andcompetitiveness at the pan-Arab and globallevels.

In sum, the situation of Arab integrationstill falls short of the "Arab Free CitizenshipZone" called for by the first Arab HumanDevelopment Report.

For most Arabs, the

war has been seen as

an attempt at

restructuring the

region by outside

forces pursuing their

own objectives.

A vision of self-

determined change is

at the centre of the

current report.

11This cannot be guaranteed in the cases of individual accession to global arrangements or association agreements with the European Union, for in-stance, without an Arab regional arrangement in the form of a customs union or a common market, because in the case of individual associationthere will be little incentive for foreign firms to locate their industries in the associated Arab country in view of the abolition of trade restrictions be-tween that country and the associated industrial countries.


DEVELOPMENTS IN FREEDOMAND GOOD GOVERNANCE ASREFLECTED IN INTERNATIONALDATABASES

This section is based on freedom and goodgovernance indicators as accessed through in-ternational databases.12 The authors recognisethe disadvantages of relying on such interna-tional sources, yet are obliged to turn to themfor lack of better alternatives from the regionon this crucial dimension of human develop-ment. It is to be hoped that such Arabic alter-natives will develop in the future, possiblyinspired by this series of Arab HumanDevelopment Reports.

LEVEL OF CIVIL AND POLITICALLIBERTIES (1990-2000)

The first AHDR (2002) measured freedom byusing values of the indicator developed byFreedom House, which at that time stopped at1998. At the time of writing this report, the in-dicator was available only up to 2000/2001(Freedom House, 2002). It should be notedthat freedom scores, as developed by Freedom

House, are far from perfect measures and mayreflect certain biases inherent in their source.Yet they constitute the only database currentlyavailable for measuring essential freedomsover time.

Figure 5 shows that while the generaltrend saw freedom rise worldwide, in mostArab countries it fell, with an apparent declineduring the early 1990s. Arab countries, on av-erage, continued to evince the lowest levels offreedom among the world regions compared.

In fact, according to this indicator, fiveArab countries were among the ten least freecountries in the world during 2000/2001.

INDICATORS OF VOICE ANDACCOUNTABILITY

International databases also provide indica-tors of voice and accountability (Kaufmann etal., 2002), which are among the essential re-quirements of good governance and which thefirst AHDR used to illuminate its case. Figure6 illustrates that, despite a slight improvementin Arab countries between the two years con-sidered, when it comes to voice and account-ability, the Arab region still ranks lowest in theworld.

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION INBUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

Figure 7 presents the latest evaluations of per-ceptions of corruption in business transactionsworldwide according to TransparencyInternational (2002). The lowest values of thisindicator are the worst (i.e., the most corrupt).

The figure does not indicate a noticeableimprovement in the position of Arab coun-tries in comparison to other world regionsevaluated between the years 1998 and 2002.However, the position of one country, Egypt,improved slightly.

EVENTS INFLUENCING HUMANDEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIES

This section documents important events in-fluencing Arab human development on the

Arab countries, on

average, continued to

evince the lowest

levels of freedom

among the world

regions compared.

12Specifically, the ‘Freedom Score’ published by the US-based "Freedom House". For technical and practical reasons, the first Report made use of thisindicator, despite some important reservations. These reasons include a long time series and a detailed database on various political and civil free-doms. In the absence of other comparable sources, the score is maintained here.

Figure 5Freedom scores, weighted by population size:the Arab region and other world regions, 1990-2000 (average values)


national level and examines their effects, bothpositive and negative. It focuses on two areas:widening freedoms and establishing good gov-ernance, and the empowerment of women.(Improvements in the field of knowledge ac-quisition, while also crucial, require a longertime horizon for assessment).

Probably the most far-reaching changethat could have significantly improvedprospects for human development in mostArab countries -- had it been adopted andlaunched effectively -- is the wide-ranging re-form initiative declared by Saudi CrownPrince Abdullah at the beginning of 2003. Theinitiative covers the following dimensions:

"Self-reform and the development of po-litical participation as two basic spring-boardsfor building Arab capabilities and makingavailable all the conditions conducive to com-prehensive Arab revitalisation; the strengthen-ing of Arab co-operation and joint Arabcapabilities; attaining the requirements forpositive involvement in the arena of worldcompetition; and the achievement of sustain-able development." (Documents of the ArabSummit, March 2003, Al-Ahram, Cairo, inArabic).

This initiative was to be presented to theArab Summit during its March 2003 ordinarysession in Bahrain. However, an urgent sum-mit (held in Sharm El-Sheikh) took place be-fore the Bahrain meeting and its communiquélacked any reference to this initiative.Evidently the extraordinary circumstancesunder which the Sharm El-Sheikh summit washeld, namely the looming invasion of Iraq, re-sulted in an agreement to postpone this initia-tive, at least for the time. As a result, theinitiative was deferred to the next ordinarySummit, to be held in Tunisia.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OFFREEDOM AND ESTABLISHINGGOOD GOVERNANCE

While underlining the generally low rating ofArab countries on freedoms and the virtualabsence of good governance, the first AHDR(2002) celebrated positive improvements inthese key areas in two Arab countries:Morocco and Bahrain.

Encouraging developments in Bahrain

seem to have continued. The State SecurityAct, a statute and symbol of coercion in thecountry, was repealed. It was also announcedthat the country will guarantee the freedom toform non-governmental scientific, cultural

1997/98-2000/2001 (average values)

Figure 6Voice and accountability:the Arab region and other world regions

Figure 7Perceptions of corruption, Transparency International: position of Arab coun-tries in the sample, 1998 and 2000


and professional societies as well labourunions, and that strikes are a legitimatemeans of defending the rights of workers.Moreover, the establishment of "politicalsocieties" was permitted. The scope of free-dom of speech was widened with the assis-tance of the judiciary. The Prince of Bahraindeclared that the country had been trans-formed into a constitutional monarchy. Thefirst legislative elections in more than 20years were held, despite boycotts by somepolitical movements. The government re-signed after the announcement of the elec-tion results, and the legislative council,comprising elected and appointed mem-bers, held its first session on 24 December2002. Less encouraging was the issuance of adecree (47 of 2002) allowing the confisca-tion or banning of any publication consid-ered to hold the official religion incontempt, or criticising the king or the poli-cies of the government. (Human RightsWatch, 2001).

In Morocco legislative elections, judgedto have been honest, were held. They werenotable for a quota reserved for women onnational lists, which contributed to a largenumber of women winning seats. The gov-ernment changed afterwards.

Positive developments in the field offreedom and good governance included theissuance by the Sudanese President of a de-cree permitting opposition parties to engagein political activity, provided that they keepto peaceful approaches.

In a development that protects the rightsof the Berber minorities in Algeria, the"Amazig" language was classified as a na-tional language and will be taught in the ed-ucational curriculum.

Djibouti permitted the establishment ofopposition parties and political pluralism. Anumber of opposition newspapers were al-lowed in Syria and Tunis while Egypt andSyria moved to authorise private (non-gov-ernmental) broadcasting stations to operate.

Parliamentary elections were also held inYemen in April 2003 – the third such elec-tions since unification in 1990. About 1400candidates competed in 301 electoral con-stituencies under relatively peaceful condi-tions and with a 70% voter turn-out. At the

end of the month, results were declared in280 constituencies. One woman won.

A number of detainees in Syria, Tunisia,Libya, Yemen, and Morocco were releasedand several Government officials in Libyaand Egypt were tried and convicted uponcharges of corruption and profiteering.

Qatar held a referendum in April 2003on a permanent constitution that allows fora consultative council composed of 45 mem-bers, two-thirds of whom are elected, withthe right to question ministers and expelthem with a two-thirds majority. This pre-liminary constitution did not allow the es-tablishment of political parties. The Princepreserved the authority to appoint the primeminister and cabinet.

Yet in most Arab countries the march offreedom continued to encounter obstacles.

In one Arab country the deaths of de-tainees as a result of suspected torture per-sisted; 11 cases in total were recordedduring 2001, all of whom had been detainedfor public law offences (The ArabOrganisation for Human Rights, in Arabic,2002). The extraction of confessions undertorture and the trial of opposition membersaffiliated with Islamic movements before ex-ceptional courts were also documented oc-currences (ibid). The harassment of Islamicactivists accelerated with the aim of restrict-ing their participation in legislative elec-tions. In addition, demonstrations weresuppressed (including those protesting eco-nomic decisions made by the government).

In another Arab country, laws and pro-cedures curtailing freedom, notably pressfreedom and Internet access, were enacted.A law stipulating the addition of furtherfirm restrictions on freedom of assemblywas issued; and the arrest of activists againstnormalisation of relations with Israel contin-ued. Legislative elections were postponed.However, towards the end of 2002 promiseswere made to conduct elections in thespring of 2003, to allocate a quota forwomen in the legislative council and to"raise the ceiling" of freedom for the mediaand unions.

In a third Arab country, the prince madea statement prohibiting the existence of po-litical parties.

In most Arab countries

the march of freedom

continued to

encounter obstacles.


In yet another country, the President ofthe Republic reduced the mandate of mem-bers of parliament, and the level of participa-tion in elections (May 2002) decreased to lessthan 20%. In two provinces with minority con-stituents, it fell to just 2%. Freedom of speechand expression remained under severe restric-tion, while a presidential statement charac-terised those criticising their country’s policiesas "traitors" punishable under the law. Thepersecution of human rights activists persistedand reportedly more than 1,000 political pris-oners went on a hunger strike to demand theirrelease (Arab Organisation for Human Rights,in Arabic, 2002). The Constitution wasamended to allow the current President to re-main in office for a fourth term: (the formerConstitution stipulated only three terms).

The Al-Jazeera satellite channel was sub-jected to a number of injunctions restrainingits activities in several Arab countries on a va-riety of claims.

Emergency laws were extended in a num-ber of Arab countries, in one instance for threeconsecutive years. Moreover, the trial of civil-ians before military tribunals and exceptionalState Security Courts persisted in six Arabcountries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia,Lebanon, and Palestine).

Some Arab countries opted to impose con-straints on popular expressions of support forthe Palestinian resistance by harassing its ac-tivists, and even confronted popular demon-strations with violence. Security forces’suppression of demonstrations against the oc-cupation of Palestine in an Arab countrycaused the killing of one university studentand the serious wounding of ten others.

The issue of freedom in Arab countries hasbecome a casualty of the overspill from theAnglo-American invasion of Iraq. The con-flict between popular sentiments and officialpositions has led to security forces respondingwith force, tear-gas bombs and rubber bulletsto quell popular demonstrations against thewar on Iraq in more than one Arab country.Five men were killed in two Arab countries;two members of a people’s assembly were ar-rested in a third country despite their parlia-mentary immunity.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society organisations in many Arab coun-tries suffered more legal and practical con-straints.

In one Arab country, a law on NGOs waspassed which was widely regarded as restrict-ing their activities. It came after the SupremeConstitutional Court had ruled the previouslaw unconstitutional, for formal reasons.

In another country, an association for citi-zen rights was closed by an order from theMinister of the Interior, after it allegedly com-mitted financial and administrative violations.A number of activists in professional unionswere arrested, apparently for being involved inresisting normalisation with Israel.

In a third country, the President of theAssociation for Human Rights and somehuman rights activists were tried under thecharges of introducing and distributing publi-cations without permission, as well as spread-ing false news abroad.

THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

The cause of women’s empowerment, and thatof freedom in general, was dealt a strong blowwhen the elected legislative council in an Arabcountry rejected a government proposal aimedat allowing women to exercise their politicalrights. Moreover, the constitutional court inthis country refused two challenges filed bytwo women activists demanding politicalrights for women.

In Bahrain, women won the right to voteand to stand for election to municipal and leg-islative assemblies. This important constitu-tional victory, however, was dampened by thefailure of women candidates in both elections– seemingly for reasons of a societal nature.

On a more positive note, in a historicalprecedent resulting from the allocation ofquotas for women on national lists, Morocco’srecently elected Parliament convened withthirty-three women members, the largest num-ber ever.

Other affirmative action for women in-cluded Djibouti’s decision to allocate quotasfor women in legislative councils (a minimum10% share for both men and women in partyelectoral lists was established) and similar

The issue of freedom

in Arab countries has

become a casualty of

the overspill from the

Anglo-American

invasion of Iraq.


steps in Jordan allocating a minimum of sixseats for women.

More broadly, the ruler of the UnitedArab Emirates affirmed the right of womento engage in political activity. In Qatar, awoman won, for the first time, a seat in alocal council and, at the beginning of 2003, awoman was appointed minister of educa-tion. The Kuwaiti government adopted adraft law allowing women to join the secu-rity forces. In the Sultanate of Oman,women were allowed to drive taxis and tocarry passengers of both sexes. In Yemen awoman was appointed as a State Ministerfor Human Rights and one woman entered

Parliament in a 2003 election. And in a sud-den development early in 2003, Egyptjoined other Arab countries in allowingwomen to serve on the Judiciary by appoint-ing a female attorney-at-law as the firstwoman judge on the SupremeConstitutional Court and appointing twowomen as commissioners before that court.

The political emancipation of Arabwomen called for in the first AHDR evi-dently still has a long way to go; yet the newprogress made in this period is evidence of agreater receptivity to women’s empower-ment at the executive levels of governmentsand state institutions.

The core challenges to

human development

in Arab countries, as

epitomised in the

"three deficits", are

still critically

pertinent.

Evidently, the core challenges to human development in Arab countries, as epitomised inthe "three deficits" identified by the first AHDR, are still critically pertinent. Arguably, thosechallenges are even graver than before, especially with respect to freedom. World and regionaldevelopments unfavourable to Arab human development have exacerbated these negativetrends.

The second part of this report aims to make a continuing contribution to Arab human de-velopment through a detailed study of one of the three cardinal deficits – knowledge. Thisstudy culminates in a strategic vision for building the knowledge society in Arab countries.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 33

The Report starts, in Chapter 1, with a conceptual discussion of knowledge as itrelates to Arab countries. It defines what is meant by knowledge and sets out ananalytical framework for examining the current status and cultural, social,economic and political context of knowledge acquisition, the main subjects ofthis Report. The chapter contrasts the requirements of a knowledge society withthe characteristics of Arab societies, historically and at the present time. Thediscussion identifies the key challenges that later chapters take up in detail.

Section one: the concept of an Arabknowledge society

PART II


This series of Arab Human DevelopmentReports (AHDR) was designed so that the firstissue, published in June 2002, offered a com-prehensive treatment of human developmentin Arab countries according to the definitionadopted by the series and recapitulated in PartI of this issue. Subsequent issues were to exam-ine, in depth, specific challenges that are of es-sential importance to human development inthose countries. This practice starts with thissecond issue of the series, dedicated to thetopic of "knowledge".

This chapter lays out the conceptual basisfor exploring issues of knowledge and defineswhat is meant by the "knowledge society".Subsequently, it discusses briefly some ques-tions raised as a result of contrasting the char-acteristics of the "knowledge society" withthose of present-day Arab societies. Thesequestions, and the challenges they pose, will befurther tackled in subsequent chapters of thisReport. It ends by highlighting a major chal-lenge to knowledge in Arab countries, namelythe need to create strong, effective and increas-ing societal demand for knowledge supportedby adequate purchasing power.

WHY FOCUS ON KNOWLEDGE?

Knowledge is recognised as a cornerstone ofhuman development, a means of expandingpeople’s capabilities and choices and a tool forovercoming human poverty. In the 21st cen-tury, knowledge is also increasingly a dynamicfactor of production and a powerful driver ofproductivity and human capital. The firstAHDR identified a serious shortfall in knowl-edge acquisition, absorption and use as one ofthree cardinal deficits undermining human de-velopment in Arab countries. This secondReport starts where the first left off and takesan in-depth look at the causes and conse-

quences of the relative backwardness of theArab region in this vital arena.

The first AHDR highlighted how weakknowledge bases and stagnant knowledge de-velopment condemn many Arab countries tofragile productive power and reduced develop-ment opportunities. It is now a commonplacethat the knowledge gap, rather than the incomegap, determines the prospects of countries intoday’s world economy. In addition, a consen-sus is emerging that the gap between develop-ing and developed countries in the capacity toproduce knowledge is wider than the knowl-edge gap itself. This calls for serious efforts toregenerate knowledge production in the devel-oping world.

The Report assumes that countries with de-ficient knowledge capabilities have much togain by moving towards the "knowledge soci-ety" since the developmental returns on knowl-edge acquisition increase in societies suffering aknowledge deficit. Such societies can take ad-vantage of the abundant stock of knowledge,experience and best practice available world-wide. They can learn from the mistakes andprofit from the achievements of early knowl-edge leaders. In a comparative perspective, forArab countries, the need to invest in knowl-edge is great and the dividends that can be re-alized are proportionately large.

Conceptual framework: knowledge, humandevelopment and the knowledge society inArab countries

CHAPTER 1

For Arab countries, the

need to invest in

knowledge is great

and the dividends that

can be realized are

proportionately large.

It isn’t knowledge as a product or com-modity that we need; nor is it a matter ofremedying the situation by having big-ger libraries, a greater number of termi-nals, computers and so forth, but aqualitatively different knowledge basedon understanding rather than on au-thority, uncritical repetition, mechanicalreproduction. It is not facts, but how

facts are connected to other facts, howthey are constructed, whether they re-late to hypothesis or theory, how one isto judge the relationship between truthand interest, how to understand realityas history. These are only some of thecritical issues we face, which can besummed up in the phrase/question, howto think?

BOX 1.1

Edward W. Said - What knowledge?


THE ACQUISITION OFKNOWLEDGE AND HUMANDEVELOPMENT

KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge consists of data, information1, in-structions, and ideas, or the sum total of sym-bolic structures possessed by individual humanbeings or by society at large. These symbolicstructures guide individual and institutionalhuman behaviour in all walks of life and in allspheres of public and private activity.

Knowledge includes, for instance, the sym-bolic structures which are acquired throughformal education and experiences learnedfrom work and life. It also encompasses facts,

stories, pictures and any mental construct in-forming human behaviour, whether docu-mented, oral or implicit. The institutionalknowledge of a society includes history, cul-ture, strategic orientations and organisationalforms.

Consequently, knowledge can be explicit(recorded in one form or another) or implicit(in the form of spontaneous behavioural pre-scriptions, for example). Moreover, the pro-duction of knowledge is not limited to thestandard forms of science and scientific re-search, it also spans knowledge embodied inthe various forms of artistic and literary ex-pression and in both popular and formal cul-tures2.

Knowledge transcends the mere acquisi-tion of information. Indeed, information over-load in the age of the Internet, mediasaturation and fast communication can some-times smother true knowledge. The explosionof readily available data, opinions, articles,documents and other types of content trig-gered by the digital revolution can be over-whelming and requires a process of selection,extraction and judgment in order to retrieveuseful and usable knowledge. Moreover, whileknowledge ranks higher than information onthe scale of human values, it is one step lowerthan wisdom, which entails a commitment tohigh human ideals such as freedom, justice andhuman dignity.

In all human systems, only a small amountof total organised knowledge is recorded. Inhuman systems where the acquisition ofknowledge is weak, the extent of unrecordedand implicit knowledge residing in individualand collective knowledge models, in the cul-ture and in spontaneous prescriptions forhuman conduct, is still often substantial.

One of the quintessential, and seeminglycontradictory, characteristics of knowledge isthat it grows with use. Knowledge is one of thefew human resources that does not perish, butrather proliferates through consumption.

It is useful to draw a distinction, on the

In all societies there is a number, large orsmall, of people who possess some knowl-edge. The challenge of building knowl-edge capital within a human system,however, resides in converting individualknowledge to collective knowledge.

A large amount of knowledge exists inthe minds of individuals in the form of an-swers to the questions: how and why?This constitutes a knowledge model on theindividual level. A higher order type ofknowledge is acquired through conceptuallearning, which can change knowledgeframeworks and thus the world-view of in-dividuals. Conceptual learning can be dis-tinguished from lower order procedurallearning, which simply leads to changes inactions. A change in the knowledge modeloccurs when new actions, embedded innew knowledge frameworks, are estab-lished. Generally speaking, it can be saidthat individual knowledge models arisefrom a world-view (Weltenschaung) of thesystem embedded in the general knowl-edge model internalised by system mem-bers.

This discussion raises questions as tothe content of the dominant knowledgemodel in the Arab world and whether it re-inforces or hinders human development.

Most human systems possess commonknowledge models that aim to protect thestatus quo and to entrench it in the form ofconservative societal institutions, knowl-edge transmission mechanisms, and re-ward systems. Such models determembers of these societies from challeng-ing the status quo and deprive them of op-portunities for learning. From adevelopmental point of view, such learn-ing is not useful and could be harmful. Anexample of this type of learning in Arabcountries is the widespread culture ofmyths and the supernatural.

Controversy often springs up aroundwhat could be deemed useful versus harm-ful learning. The controversy, in fact, re-flects the differing social interests behindthese viewpoints. The only way out of thisimpasse is to adopt a decisive criterion.

In this case, it is suggested that the cri-terion be the extent of contribution tobuilding human development, accordingto the definition adopted by this Report inPart I. This is the measure by which the el-ements of the Arab knowledge model mustbe judged, so that those features enhanc-ing human development may be identifiedand fostered.

BOX 1.2

Collective learning: a means for developing knowledge capital orreinforcing the status quo?

Knowledge is one of

the few human

resources that does

not perish, but rather

proliferates through

consumption.

1The conversion of data to information requires processing such as evaluation and analysis.2It is accepted that many technologies embedded in popular knowledge provide brilliant solutions to local problems. Consider, for example, the useof palm-tree stems in reinforcing buildings and roofs in Arab desert environments, which surpasses "modern" technologies in combating the harsh-ness of the tough desert climate. This is also evident in the case of popular medicine in developing countries, especially in Latin America, where in-digenous cures can have real commercial value. Several multinationals have rushed to possess this popular ‘know-how’, and convert it intomonopolised knowledge through patents. 3The term "capital" is not limited to financial assets. The term in English means "man-made means of production" (Oxford Dictionary of EconomicTerms, 1997).


level of society, between knowledge wealth andknowledge capital3. Knowledge wealth is thesum total of knowledge assets, or symbolicstructures in society; knowledge capital is thatpart of knowledge wealth used in producingnew knowledge, which in turn leads to the fur-ther growth of knowledge wealth.

The knowledge wealth of a given societyextends, at least in principle, to the general,and ever-renewable, stock of human knowl-edge. However, two types of impedimentshamper the free use of this stock. First, aspectsof the institutional structure and the societalcontext of the knowledge system in the societyitself can present internal obstacles. Second,features of the international context of knowl-edge acquisition can interpose barriers, as willbe outlined in a later section.

Effective knowledge is knowledge that iswidely disseminated, absorbed and used. Themost fundamental driver of that process, on theindividual or the societal levels, is learning.Individual and collective learning are two ofthe most important capabilities for buildingknowledge capital.

KNOWLEDGE AND HUMANDEVELOPMENT

In the broad concept of human development,acquiring knowledge is a fundamental humanentitlement. People, simply by virtue of beinghuman, have a right to knowledge as a publicgood. At the same time, knowledge acquisitionis also a means of achieving human develop-ment, since it enables people to enlarge theircapabilities and widen their horizon of choice.Moreover, in the present phase of humanprogress, the acquisition, absorption and pro-duction of knowledge drive social and eco-nomic transformation. Knowledge can liberateindividuals and societies from human povertyin a given cultural context and elevate them tohigher planes of human existence. Thus, inhuman development terms, knowledge ismulti-dimensional: an inherent human facultyand a basic human right, a human product andthat which enhances what it means to behuman in the first place.

In the developing world, knowledge ac-quired and expressed through education and

learning, research and technological develop-ment, and literary and artistic forms in bothpopular and formal cultures -- together withthe effective use of such knowledge in societalactivities - will not only increasingly expand thefrontiers of human potential. It will also be themeans to enlarge the scope of human freedomsand to guarantee those freedoms through goodgovernance and the promotion of equity andhuman fulfilment. Knowledge will thus servethe loftier goals of freedom, justice and humandignity.

As noted previously, knowledge has be-come an essential factor of production, and abasic determinant of productivity. There is astrong connection between knowledge acquisi-tion and the productive capacity of a society.This connection figures prominently in highvalue-added production activities, which areincreasingly based on knowledge intensity, andwhich lead to the rapid obsolescence of knowl-edge, technology and skills. Such activities arethe mainstay of competitiveness worldwide,they will create the wealth of the future andthey therefore constitute a major gateway to de-velopment for developing countries.

Yet in most developing countries, theknowledge system faces a dual crisis. On theone hand, the system itself suffers from the

BOX 1.3

Economic characteristics of knowledge

Knowledge has special features that de-termine its economic character.

Knowledge is non-spatial. It can tra-verse distances and borders at highspeed, especially when digitised.Knowledge is also durable. It does notperish by being transferred from itsowner to whoever demands it. Thismeans that it can exist endlessly withoutany need for further production.

Some types of demand stimulate thereproduction of knowledge itself, at anadditional cost to meet particular needsor preferences. Such preferences includereducing the cost of knowledge, or thetime taken for its production, or itscloser adaptation to the particular cir-cumstances and resources of a society orits environmental requirements.Developing countries have a particularstake in expressing this latter preference,or taking adaptation into their ownhands.

In practice, much knowledge istransferred to developing countries informs originally developed for rich coun-tries. This can reduce the value of knowl-edge transfers, and waste scarceresources. Such arrangements often bur-den poorer countries with additional andsometimes unjustified requirements, asin the case of conditions governing fran-chises. They can also impose require-ments for expertise or capital assets notavailable locally. This reduces the bene-fits to developing countries of technol-ogy transfers owing to high transactioncosts and the absence of domestic sys-tems that would allow such countries toderive the maximum benefits from im-ported technology.

Hence the value of knowledge doesnot necessarily lie in its abstract contentbut rather in how much it can contributeto finding solutions to problems affect-ing a society at a particular time.

Source: Mohammed Mahmud Al-Imam, background paper for AHDR2.

Knowledge is

multi-dimensional:

an inherent human

faculty, a human

product and that

which enhances what

it means to be

human.


backwardness of the society of which it is aninseparable part, and its efficiency and impactare limited by restrictions emanating from itssocietal context. In some less developed soci-eties, rooted constructs, concepts and pre-cepts may actively hinder humandevelopment. Those symbolic structures needto be challenged by other knowledge struc-tures that stimulate or enhance human devel-opment. Moreover, the elements of theknowledge system in developing countries aretypically dispersed in various individual andnon-formal forms. Dispersion makes it diffi-cult to assess and manage knowledge wealth,let alone amalgamate scattered assets into aneffective knowledge system built on firmknowledge capital.

On the other hand, the principal hope forovercoming underdevelopment and achievingcompetitiveness in developing countries isprecisely a mobilised, well-organised and wellfunctioning knowledge system. No other de-velopment investment promises greater expo-nential returns in an era of knowledgeintensity and knowledge-driven competition.Cutting this Gordian knot is one of the mostformidable challenges facing developing coun-tries today.

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OFKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION

The global stock of knowledge is renewableand grows ceaselessly. Yet its human, culturaland economic potential will not blossom inany country where the social climate does notactively encourage knowledge acquisition, dis-semination, production and use. A system ofknowledge can be sustained or stunted by thesocial soil in which it grows and by the sur-rounding regional and global environment.These conditions influence whether educa-tion, learning, R&D and literary and artisticexpression flourish or fail and thereforewhether productivity and human develop-ment prosper or not.

Regional issues take on special significancefor Arab countries, whose small markets logi-cally point towards greater regional integra-tion. The dominance of the global economyposes different challenges. Experience sug-gests that attempts by each Arab country to

belong to the world on its own usually result inthat country assuming a marginal and depen-dent position.

A society that does not clearly incentiviseknowledge acquisition and use through educa-tion, technical research and development andall kinds of literary and artistic expressiontraps itself on the lowest rungs of learning. Asociety that does not value knowledge highlydoes not provide for the knowledge acquisi-tion system the necessary resources and socialenvironment for its effective activity. The out-come is lower productivity and lagging humandevelopment.

The four most significant aspects of the so-cietal context affecting Arab knowledge sys-tems are: links with societal activities,especially production; the role of the state; theregional context; and the international envi-ronment. The first and second aspects are dis-cussed next; the regional and internationalcontexts are taken up in chapter 8.

Strong links between the knowledgeacquisition system and societal activity

In a well functioning knowledge system, theenterprise sector (both public and private) andgovernment and civil society organisations aredynamically connected. Such linkages energisethe system and maximise its role in advancingproductivity. For example, the modern con-ception of technological development de-mands a symbiotic link between societalactivity sites and research institutions. Thiscontrasts with the older, one-way view thattechnology is an application to society of sci-entific discoveries in research institutions. As asecond example, the best education, especiallyin technical fields, cannot play a vigorous soci-etal role without a strong connection to labourmarkets, firms, factories and enterprises.

A vigorous role for the state and all itsinstitutions

This second aspect is particularly important indeveloping countries, where the "knowledgemarket" is traditionally notorious for failure.Knowledge, in the language of economics, is apublic good whose producer does not neces-sarily capture all the returns on the initial in-vestment. It is also non-rivalrous: its use byone party does not prevent others from using

In most developing

countries, the

knowledge system

faces a dual crisis.

A society that does

not clearly incentivise

knowledge

acquisition and use

traps itself on the

lowest rungs of

learning.


it. As such, the returns to knowledge produc-tion accrue to society as a whole rather thanexclusively to its producer.

Where knowledge is concerned, the rela-tive weakness of the profit motive discouragesprofit-oriented enterprises from investing inknowledge production, especially in develop-ing countries. Leaving knowledge acquisitionentirely to the for-profit sector in less devel-oped countries thereby risks reducing the sup-ply of knowledge and depriving weaker socialgroups of its benefits. At the global level, thismarket failure can actively retard knowledgeacquisition by developing countries and, ashappens at the national level, leave the weakersocial categories in those countries facing thegreatest knowledge deprivation. The WorldBank Report on Knowledge for Development(1998) emphasises these matters in more thanone respect and concludes by stressing the de-cisive role of the state in developing countriesin fostering efficient knowledge acquisition.

It is true that the for-profit sector plays amajor role in the knowledge acquisition sys-tem in developed economies. However, therole played by the state remains pivotal, partic-ularly in fostering basic research and educa-tion, areas that do not yield quick, tangibleprofits in developing countries yet which areindispensable to any vital knowledge acquisi-tion system in the long run. In most developedcountries, the role of the state was strongestduring periods of nation building, a phase stillin progress in most developing, particularlyArab, countries.

The role of the state is especially decisivein developing countries undergoing economicadjustments that excessively curtail the state’ssocietal functions and services. At the sametime, newer approaches to economic growthand development recognise that state activismdoes not stop at merely overcoming "marketfailure" but extends to taking initiatives in thepublic interest and becoming actively involvedin knowledge acquisition and public innova-tion.

Ultimately, how dynamically a society par-ticipates in knowledge acquisition and how ef-fectively such knowledge serves humandevelopment depends on societal structures:

cultural, social, economic, and political. Thepresence and efficiency of key societal institu-tions are also key factors, as will be discussedlater.

THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

It is now understood that the cognitive assetsof society -- knowledge and expertise -- andnot its material assets -- raw materials or finan-cial and physical capital -- increasingly deter-mine its productivity and competitiveness.

The term "knowledge society" refers tothis current phase in the evolution of humanprogress, as it is unfolding in advanced soci-eties.

Specifically, the knowledge society is or-ganised around the dissemination and produc-tion of knowledge and its efficient utilisationin all societal activities: the economy, civil soci-ety, politics, and private life, in a continuousquest to advance human development.

In such a society, knowledge plays a para-mount role in shaping social structures; in in-fluencing the performance of the economy,society and polity; and in changing the occu-pations and life-styles of its citizens as theknowledge content of their daily lives intensi-fies steadily. In a knowledge society, the num-ber of workers in the knowledge system, aswell as their share of the total work force, rises.In addition, the ratio of work time devoted toknowledge-intensive activities increases for allworkers.

In economic terms, building the knowl-edge society in Arab countries means shiftingtowards a knowledge mode of production inplace of the rentier mode of production4 thatcurrently dominates most parts of the region.

In a knowledge society, societal institu-tions belonging to the knowledge system, ei-ther as producers or disseminators, are many,varied and interconnected. The knowledge so-ciety guarantees a social context conducive tothe vitality of the knowledge system.Eventually, a "knowledge culture" evolves,embodying values motivating the acquisitionand use of knowledge. This culture is sup-ported by effective societal incentives for dis-seminating and producing knowledge. In

State activism does

not stop at merely

overcoming "market

failure" but extends

to taking initiatives in

the public interest .

The cognitive assets

of a society, and not

its material assets,

increasingly

determine its

productivity and

competitiveness.

4This applies to countries where economic value is basically derived from depleting raw materials, either directly in oil-producing countries, or indi-rectly in others through dependence on aid and expatriate workers’ remittances from the former.


short, a virtuous circle develops between theeffectiveness of the knowledge system and theextent of support it receives from the societalcontext.

In other words, the challenge of knowl-edge acquisition consists of transforming soci-ety from a system that comprises someknowledgeable individuals to a societal systemfully anchored in the production and dissemi-nation of knowledge and its efficient utilisa-tion in advancing human development

As noted earlier, societies possess a hugeamount of knowledge scattered in individualreservoirs in institutions, in people’s mindsand in a variety of media. Less formalisedknowledge assets are implicit in the sponta-neous activity of individuals and the popularculture of the society. Nevertheless, a rationalsocietal leadership can mobilise uncoordi-nated institutions and dispersed knowledgethrough a deliberate societal programme. Thepotential dividends are handsome and willserve the strategic purpose of building humandevelopment.

To put this challenge in one sentence, theknowledge society means instituting knowl-edge as the organising principle of human life.

To put it in a regional context, it can be said,without prevarication, that Arab countries arefar removed from such a society.

Indeed, the divide between developingcountries, including Arab countries, andknowledge societies is large and wideningrapidly. Chapter 4, on the measurement ofknowledge, reveals this gap clearly as reflectedin the different performances of Arab coun-tries and the East Asian "Tigers" in accumu-lating human capital.

Some analysts (e.g., Az-Zayyat, in Arabic,2003) go so far as to maintain that if develop-ing countries are to catch up with agile knowl-edge societies, they will have to pursue a pathof exponential growth, (Figure 1-1). Adoptingsuch a path is a tall order: it requires accelerat-ing the dissemination, production and utilisa-tion of knowledge in developing countries atrates faster than those which historically pre-vailed in today’s knowledge societies. Thissteep gradient should be taken to indicate theseriousness of the challenges developing coun-tries face if they seek to build the knowledgesociety starting from initial conditions today.

KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITIONSYSTEMS

The conversion of knowledge wealth toknowledge capital and the efficient use ofknowledge capital in producing new forms ofknowledge requires two connected societalprocesses. The first is the dissemination ofavailable knowledge, whereas the second is theproduction of new forms of knowledge in allfields: natural sciences, social sciences, the hu-manities, arts, literature, and all other societalactivities. The efficiency of both activities restson vigorous and efficient societal institutionsand social processes.

These are complex systems reflecting thespecificity of society, history, culture, and in-stitutions. The success of these systems de-pends on the fluent exchange of knowledgeamong all units that produce and utiliseknowledge such that the productivity of eachunit, and of the societal system as a whole, isoptimised.

The societal processes and institutionsused in building and utilising knowledge capi-tal in the dissemination and production of

The knowledge society

means instituting

knowledge as the

organising principle of

human life.

Figure 1.1Bridging the knowledge gap through exponential growth in knowledge acquisition


knowledge vary and interact, especially inprofit-seeking enterprises, which are expectedto contribute effectively to knowledge acquisi-tion, and in particular to technological devel-opment in a free market economy.

As a result of this multiplicity, the effi-ciency of knowledge dissemination and pro-duction depends on the organisational contextthat surrounds such processes and institutionsand supports the relationships among them.The coherence of this organisational context isan important factor in building the knowledgesociety.

In less advanced societies, the organisa-tional context surrounding the disseminationand production of knowledge is inefficient.Yet such organisation is the key to knowledgemanagement, transfer, indigenisation and pro-duction. Both the state and the enterprise sec-tor have a high stake in the efficiency of theseorganisational relationships.

Even so, the organisational context is onlyone component among the complex societaldeterminants of a successful knowledge sys-tem. It is the closest component to the func-tioning of the system itself. But it depends, inturn, on other important structures, whichmight seem farther away from the system butwhich have a stronger impact, positive or neg-ative, on the formation of knowledge capitaland knowledge wealth. The crucial structuresgoverning the societal context of the knowl-edge system, particularly from the perspectiveof the Arab world, include the prevalent cul-ture, socio-economic structure, and politicaland legal context. All of these exist in an influ-ential regional and global environment.

Culture embraces several components,such as intellectual heritage, religion, and lan-guage. The socio-economic structure pertainsto modes of production, growth and wealthdistribution and to the societal incentive sys-tem associated with that structure. The politi-cal and legal context governs the processesand institutions of knowledge disseminationand production; especially important in thisrespect is the status of the key freedoms ofspeech, opinion and assembly.

All of these components are surroundedby, and subject to the regional and global envi-ronment of knowledge acquisition. This two-tier environment is especially relevant where

Arab countries are concerned in light of esca-lating regional challenges and acceleratingglobalisation.

Figure (1-2) illustrates the elements of theknowledge system and the societal contextthat affects it as discussed in this Report. Thenumbered elements correspond to theReport’s chapters.

The diagram shows three rings that sur-round the heart of the knowledge system,knowledge capital, which is discussed inChapter Four. All elements of the system aresubject to two environments – the regionaland the international – that influence them.Knowledge capital is circled by the two ringsof knowledge acquisition - dissemination(Chapter Two) and production (ChapterThree). This knowledge acquisition subsystemis in turn surrounded by the organisationalcontext for knowledge (Chapter Five). All theforegoing elements are surrounded by the cul-tural context (Chapter Six) and the socio-eco-nomic structure for knowledge (ChapterSeven). The last ring, the political context,and the regional and international environ-ment, are discussed in Chapter Eight.

The establishment of a knowledge societyin the Arab world, in the conceptual setting il-

Figure 1.2:The knowledge system: a schematic representation

Organisation is the

key to knowledge

management,

transfer,

indigenisation and

production.


lustrated here, poses considerable challenges,which are taken up in the Report.

ARABS AND KNOWLEDGE

A LONG, MIXED HISTORYLEADING TO CHALLENGES TODAY

The Arab world has a long and mixed historyof knowledge acquisition. The first AHDR(2002) concluded that Arab countries havefallen far behind in acquiring knowledge, thisnow being one of the three main deficits im-peding their human development at the begin-ning of the 21st century. Nevertheless, historytells us that Arabs, in previous epochs, con-tributed substantially to the production ofknowledge and by extension to enriching theglobal stock of human knowledge. From thisperspective, building the knowledge society inArab countries reclaims one of the brightesttreasures of Arab history.

This historical paradox raises an essentialquestion: how can the Arab world truly inter-nalize knowledge acquisition? How can the re-gion move beyond merely importing scientificand technological products in the form ofgoods and services from companies and insti-tutions abroad?

This question has preoccupied manyscholars, intellectuals, politicians and othersover the last two centuries. It represents thelargest challenge facing the contemporary

Arab world, which has not succeeded yet in in-digenising knowledge as a social institutionand an authentic cultural dimension.

The question is actually a cognitive chal-lenge that concerns most developing coun-tries. But in order to avoid over-generalisationit is useful to clarify some distinctive featuresof the Arab world, both inherited and ac-quired. Some of these features could help,while others could impede the successful indi-genisation of modern knowledge.

THE ARAB KNOWLEDGECIVILISATION: SOMESIGNIFICANT FEATURES

Islamic culture cannot be properly understoodwithout investigating its scholarly character.

History shows that, with the beginning ofthe Abbasid state, a scholarly renaissance com-menced, one hardly less important than thatwhich transformed Europe during the 17th

century. To understand this scholarly renais-sance, some factors must be kept in mind.

The first is the role of the political and so-cial authorities of the day in encouraginglearning and providing the material require-ments and the human capital for knowledgedevelopment. The reputations of the AbbasidCaliphs, who established libraries and obser-vatories, were built precisely on this role. Thisstate of affairs continued even after the disin-tegration of the caliphate and the division ofthe Islamic world into competing states, eachwith its own centres of scholarship. These newdevelopments led to the creation of the "schol-arly city" with its various and rival colleges.Looking at Baghdad during the mid-third cen-tury of the Islamic era reveals a city of thrivingscholarship, with scholarly institutions repre-senting various groups.

The second factor stemmed from the ma-terial and cultural needs of the new commu-nity. The vast new state, teeming with multiplecultures and systems, called out for develop-ment and unification. These two challengesprompted the resort to scientific scholarship.The extraction of groundwater, the digging ofcanals, the establishment of cities, the exten-sion of roads, the organisation of ministries(diwans), the levying of taxes, the survey oflands and other activities led to the unification

"The rich legacy of Islamic civilizations,historians argue, is due in part to its ex-ceptional absorptive quality and relativetolerance for different cultures and eth-nic traditions of civilizations from south-ern Europe to Central Asia."

"Not merely translators, theAbbasids collected, synthesized and ad-vanced knowledge, building their owncivilization from intellectual gifts frommany cultures, including the Chinese,Indian, Iranian, Egyptian, NorthAfrican, Greek, Spanish, Sicilian andByzantine. This Islamic period was in-deed a cauldron of cultures, religions,learning and knowledge—one that cre-ated great civilizations and influencedothers from Africa to China. This

Golden Age has been hailed for its openembrace of a universal science, no matterthe source—believing that there was nota "Christian science," "Jewish science,""Muslim science," "Zoroastrian science"or "Hindu science." There was just onescience for the Abbasids, who were ap-parently influenced by numerousQur’anic references to learning aboutthe wonders of the universe as a way tohonor God. Thus, reason and faith, bothbeing God-given, were combined, mutu-ally inclusive and supportive. Islam wasanything but isolationist, and Abbasidsconnected to all cultural traditions, be-lieving as they did that learning was uni-versal, and not confined to their owndomain."

Vartan Gregorian, Islam: A Mosaic Not a Monolith

President’s Essay, 2001 Annual Report, Carnegie Corporation.

BOX 1.4

A Cauldron of Cultures

Building the

knowledge society in

Arab countries

reclaims one of the

brightest treasures of

Arab history.


Scholarship was never

marginal in the

Islamic-Arab city, or in

the popular culture.

Translation is closely

connected to scientific

research and

creativity.

of calculation systems and the utilisation of al-gebra and geometry. Sciences were applied tosolving practical problems. Moreover, reli-gious duties, such as fasting, praying, and Hajj(the holy pilgrimage to Mecca) were accompa-nied by astrological research, which had agreat impact on the progress of astronomy.The science of timing and the new social occu-pation of the "timer" led to the assimilation ofscientific research in traditional culture. Thedevelopment of mathematics and algebra wasspurred by the appearance of new ministriesand another new social occupation -- that ofthe scribe. Other examples of applied studycan be cited in medicine, chemistry and me-chanical engineering. Indeed, science and itsapplications became a part of social practice,through teaching and research. Scholarshipwas never marginal in the Islamic-Arab city, orin the popular culture. It was one of the mainattributes of Arab culture even at the time ofdecline.

The third factor contributing to the scien-tific renaissance was that it was preceded by arenaissance in the humanities and the socialsciences: specifically, in scholastic theology,linguistics, history, jurisprudence, religious ex-egesis and other disciplines. The rise of thesescholarly fields paved the way for the develop-ment of mathematical and other sciences. Tocite one example, Kitab al-‘Ain, by al-Khalilbin-Ahmad, was the first lexicographic workin history. This work required scrupulousknowledge of phonetics as well as of the prin-ciples of combinatorial mathematics in orderto draw up tables of words. In fact, severalstudies in the humanities raised questions thatrequired drawing on or developing scientificanswers. The rise of the humanities provided alarge audience to those concerned with sci-ence and with language tools and it preparedthe Arabic language to receive new forms ofknowledge.

This explosion of learning included allbranches of knowledge at the time; it did notfavour some to the exclusion of others. Thus,it included theoretical branches and the appli-cations related to the needs of the new com-munity. In this way, learning became anessential component of the popular culture,and was not confined to matters of religion,language and literature. An appetite for

knowledge became one of the hallmarks ofArab culture. It was evidenced by several an-thologies exhaustively classifying old and newforms of scholarship, and it permeated popu-lar culture as well.

The establishment of this new scholarlyculture began with the transfer of the scholar-ship of the ancients, especially the Greeks. Buton examining the scientific translation move-ment, particularly in astronomy and mathe-matics, another profound attribute becomesclear. Translation is closely connected to sci-entific research and creativity. The objective ofthe translation movement was not to establisha scientific library to enrich the palaces ofcaliphs and princes, but to fulfil the needs ofscientific research. Without fully understand-ing this phenomenon, none of the outcomes ofthis movement, which undertook the most ex-pansive translation of practical texts in history,can be appreciated.

The translators themselves were leaders ofthe scholarly movement; indeed, some of themwere among its universal authorities, such asal-Hajjaj bin-Mattar, Thabit bin Qurrah, andQusta bin Luqa. Moreover, the choice ofbooks and the timing of this choice wereclosely related to what was being researched.To take just one example, when Thabit binQurrah translated several books fromApollonius – the finest and most difficult writ-ing in Greek geometry – he needed them in hisnew mathematical research, especially that re-lated to calculating areas and sizes. The con-nection between scientific translation andadvanced scientific research is not only an his-torical fact, but also explains why researchersactive in astronomy and mathematics under-took so much translation in those fields. Italso illustrates some of the attributes of lin-guistic translation.

A far-reaching result of this meeting be-tween two currents of study -- one in the hu-manities and languages, the other in scientificresearch -- was the rise of the scientific Arabiclanguage. This new medium took two simulta-neous paths, translation and creativity, re-flected in the invention of new sciencesunknown to the ancients. Perhaps the mostimportant attributes of the new knowledgeproduced by Arab culture at this time were: 1)A new mathematical rationality; 2)


Experimentation as a pattern of proof.The new rationality may be described in

two words, algebraic and analytic, while theintroduction of experimentation, by al-Hassan bin al-Haitham as a criterion of proofin physics research, profoundly influencedboth the material and human sciences. Takentogether, these historical currents illustratethat the Arab scientific renaissance produced,in its own time, a knowledge society in the fullsense of the term.

Oddly, lessons learned from this history ofindigenous and acquired knowledge duringthe early Arab scientific and linguistic renais-sance were not enlisted when the moderniza-tion of science became a central question inthe Arab world. Attempts at scientific mod-ernisation by Muhamad Ali and Gamal AbdelNasser during the 19th and 20th centuries re-spectively neither drew nor built upon thislegacy. Instead, leaders turned to imitatingwhat the West offered. Neglecting this her-itage and settling for the pragmatic importa-tion of science and technology from 19thcentury Europe – an approach that still domi-nates the minds of officials and reformist intel-lectuals today -- was a missed opportunity,historically, and likely created a significant im-pediment to establishing a knowledge societyin the modern Arab world

THE ARAB KNOWLEDGE MODELTODAY

The modern Arab world is the scene of myr-iad intellectual currents each with its own so-cial, political and ideological direction andsources. As in all other societies, these cur-rents may meet intermittently without beingsubsumed into a single primordial frame ofreference. There are Islamic fundamentalistsand Islamic reformists. There are progressive,leftist, nationalist, liberal, technocratic andother intellectual movements. These move-ments are all variously reflected in writings onpolitics, history, society, economics, philoso-phy and science.

Such diversity of thought, though ostensi-bly a strength, also reflects a continuing crisisof identity and often results in conflict. This isthe case despite the fact that Arab writers andintellectuals tackle common core issues --

backwardness and advancement, authenticityand modernity, the self and the other, theArabs (Muslims) and the West. Such topicshave persisted in writings and studies on Arabhistory, society and politics for more than acentury. Indeed, to many, it appears that intel-lectual life in the Arab world has revolvedaround itself for several centuries withoutgoing beyond the self towards more produc-tive and valuable fields of knowledge. Whenintrospection succumbs to introversion, thewellsprings of creativity begin to run dry. Asignificant part of Arab intellectual endeavourseems to seek refuge in ideological headlinesthat either take the form of slogans to glorifyand effect a nostalgic revival or that encourageself-pity, blame others for adversity and donot do justice to Arab societies.

These characteristics of intellectual outputdo not reflect any innate "inadequacy" in the"Arab mentality". Rather, they mirror a socio-political feature that is very common in con-temporary Arab history, and which has aprofound impact on culture, namely: – thedominance of the polity over intellectualproducts and their public reception.

The "self", the "other" and related con-cepts are deep structures requiring a closestudy of Arab sociology, history, and econom-ics. Their depths are not easily fathomed amida shifting reality. Yet it is clear that purveyinggeneral ideological statements, reducing com-plex reality and a rich past to a simple proces-sion of glories and disgraces and veneratingthe heroic acts and struggles against humilia-tion of a few, do not yield accurate knowledge.One such (and all-too-common) example issimplifying the events of modern Arab historyinto a gallery of crude opposites: the authenticversus the inauthentic, local versus foreign,continuity versus rupture. Arab history in ef-fect is narrated as though it had been solelyone of alienation and corruption at a timewhen the Arab world had, in fact, witnessedvaluable scientific, intellectual and culturalproduction, had experienced democracy, andhad undergone momentous socio-politicalshifts. Failing to see history and heritage as liv-ing, ongoing and self-renewing humanprocesses, where the march of progress isnever complete, is misleading and thereforeharmful to present and future generations.

The Arab scientific

renaissance produced,

in its own time, a

knowledge society in

the full sense.

The modern Arab

world is the scene of

myriad intellectual

currents each with its

own social, political

and ideological

direction and sources.


It is worth noting the considerable intel-lectual contributions to social reform of the pi-oneers of the contemporary Arab renaissancethrough three schools in Egypt, Greater Syriaand Arab North Africa. The Religious Reformschool: Jamal ad-Din al Afghani, MohammadAbdou, Abdelrahman Al Kawakibi,Abdelhamid Bin Badiss, Chakib Erslan, AllalAl Fasi; the Liberal school: Refa’a al Tahtawi,Ahmad Lutfi Essayed, Qassem Amin, TahaHussein, Keireddin Al Tunisi, Al Yazigi andAl Bustani; and the Secular school: ShibliShmayyel, Farah Antoun and Salama Moussa.

At this point in history, Arab countriesface societal obstacles to knowledge produc-tion arising from ideological conflicts betweendifferent political currents. The conflict overthe Islamicisation of knowledge is an example.This is because few Arab intellectuals are will-ing to focus on substantive issues relating tohistory and reality at the same time. Yet sub-stantial gains would accrue to knowledge pro-duction from pursuing serious research onSharia’a sciences, adopting a reformist scien-tific view. In fact, none of the characteristicsor historical developments of Arab countriesshould be exempt from rational study.

Undoubtedly, there are certain structuralimpediments that constrict knowledge pro-duction in Arab countries. The cultural con-flict between political currents over theIslamicisation of knowledge is one example.This conflict is tied to intellectual reluctanceto discuss history and present-day reality to-gether. Yet no essential characteristic or as-pect of Arab society should be excluded froma scientific perspective. The question of re-search into history and heritage and the appli-cation of scientific and reformist approachesto that work, hold one of the keys to the pro-duction of knowledge and, therefore, to theknowledge society itself. Such questionsshould be the subject of collaborative thinkingand study, not dissension or rancour.

In the final analysis, the Arab knowledgemodel, or the "Arab mentality", is a project,not a fixed construct. It is a model in theprocess of formation and, as such, it offers anhistoric opportunity that should not bemissed. Arab countries will do well to indi-genise science and knowledge as foundationsof the Arab knowledge model in the continu-

ing process of its formation.

THE DEMAND FOR KNOWLEDGE

This chapter has previously considered someof the economic qualities of knowledge; thissection analyses in more detail the issue of thedemand for knowledge, the low level of whichin Arab countries is one of the most serious re-strictions on the production and diffusion ofknowledge in society.

Undeniably, knowledge supply can be areal constraint in developing countries, espe-cially those where autocratic and absoluteregimes restrict freedom of expression and thecirculation of knowledge, ideas and informa-tion that are critical of authority. Yet there aregood reasons to believe that the lack of de-mand for knowledge also curtails prospects

The "Arab mentality",

is a project, not a

fixed construct. It is a

model in the process

of formation.

The current language of faith separatestwo worlds, both of which have been cre-ated by Allah, namely the World of theTexts (The Qur'an and the Sunnah) andthe World of Life, with all human andnon-human beings in it.

The first key of the new language offaith is that Muslims should know that be-lief in the metaphysical world does notnegate the role of the mind; that the ap-plication of Islamic law is not enough tomake one dispense with addressinghuman problems in all their social andeconomic dimensions; that Islam was notbuilt on the ruins of the heritage ofmankind; and does not strive to destroyand demolish the experience of peoples.Its basic function is to add to them the el-ement of guidance and rationality and ori-ent them towards what is good formankind. In this new language of faith,new readings of the ancient teachingsmust emerge.

All the texts – at the top of which arethe verses of the Holy Qur'an – are notanother world to be added to this one.They are indeed witnesses to Allah's cre-ation by Allah's own words. A Muslim isrequired to ponder on the Qur'an,, buthe/she is also required to walk on the sur-face of the earth and ponder on the signsof Allah in mankind and in the furthestregions of the earth.

The law of Islam is not a systemwhich is separate from people's ambitionsand interests. It is – with all its sources –rather a means to realize those ambitions

and protect those interests. All of it is jus-tice and all of it is mercy. "Any questionthat goes out of justice into injustice, fromfairness into inequity and from mercy toits opposite is not part of Islamic law,even if it was made part of it by interpre-tation".

Muslims are not separate frommankind at all. They are carriers of a mes-sage to mankind. As Muslims, they arewitnesses to nations, but they remain onthe same horizontal line with the rest ofnations and peoples. Nobody owes thema favour, nor should they be haughty orconceited in dealing with others.

The comprehensive nature of Islamdoes not mean that the texts deal withevery question of life, large or small. Thatis not only impossible, but also unaccept-able, considering the freedom whichIslam left to the human mind to move, in-terpret and decide.

The fact that Islam is eternal does notmean a "rigidity of its law". It means thatit is able to renew itself and to innovate inresponse to the movement of life and itschanging modes. The originality ofMuslims and their excellence do notmean that they should be isolated fromthe rest of mankind, inward-looking in aclosed circuit surrounded by a wall with-out doors. It means communication withpeople, living with them and, throughthat, conveying to them the loftier valuesand great principles upon which the doc-trine of Islam, its law and ethical structurerest.

BOX 1.5

Ahmad Kamal Aboulmagd: Towards a New Language of Faith


for building knowledge societies in thesecountries

It may seem surprising that problems ofdemand are encountered in disseminating5 acommodity whose main characteristics arethat it is non-rivalrous6 and infinitely ‘expan-sionable’ 7, as well as aspatial -- weightless8. Acloser examination of the characteristics ofknowledge demand in Arab countries revealswhy such problems remain widespread.

SOURCES OF THE DEMAND FORKNOWLEDGE

Sources of demand for knowledge vary inevery community. Families demand knowl-edge as a way to invest in the human capital oftheir members, and to make social and eco-nomic decisions within the family. The state,civil society, and business sectors, public aswell as private, demand knowledge in order toperform their respective functions. This de-

mand grows stronger in proportion to the de-gree of rationalism in decision-making and thevalue placed on learning. In general, themajor drivers of dissemination and demandare the institutional components of the knowl-edge system.

DETERMINANTS OF THE DEMANDFOR KNOWLEDGE

From a purely economic perspective, purchas-ing power substantially influences the demandfor knowledge on the open market. Low in-comes and the high price of knowledge, or thegoods and services that embody knowledge,tend to curtail demand. In the Arab world, themajority of people have low incomes, whilethe cost of knowledge acquisition is high, es-pecially if the commodity is directly importedor is produced locally using imported compo-nents. The price of knowledge rises with itstransaction costs, which can be heavy. Rentspaid to the producers of knowledge, to thosewho incorporate knowledge into commoditiesand services and to those who operate localmonopolies9 all bring up its cost.

Figure 1.3 shows the effect of cost onInternet penetration, which is a major meansof spreading access to knowledge. It is quiteclear that, in the Arab region, as in the worldat large, the high cost of accessing the Internetis inversely linked to its diffusion.

The restrictive impact of high Internet ac-cess costs on the extent of its availability is il-lustrated in figure 1.4. High costs and therelatively limited availability of personal com-puters in the Arab world are reflected in lowInternet usage compared to developed coun-tries and South East Asia.

Generally speaking, demand for a com-modity is shaped by the extent to which pre-vailing consumption patterns and their pricesgenerate an appetite for particular goods andservices. Some Arab countries are noted fortheir conspicuous consumption while basicneeds often remain unsatisfied and costly tofulfil, because governments reduce the basic

Figure 1.3Correlation between Internet penetration and Internet costs -- Arab countries and comparators

Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2002.

5Among the well-known examples is the limited dissemination of open-source software, such as "Linux", despite the fact that this operating systemis free, effective and easily available. The impression that the software is difficult or unstable is not necessarily correct. 6Non-rivalrous means that the consumption of knowledge by one person does not reduce its availability to others.7Infinitely ‘expansionable’ means that, no matter how high the cost of initial production, the cost of subsequent use is low.8Aspatial or weightless refers to the ability of knowledge to cross borders, in particular if digitised.9 Consider, for example, the high costs of cellular phone services.

The price of

knowledge rises with

its transaction costs,

which can be heavy.


services they provide and the competition failsto provide better or more cost-effective alter-natives. Not surprisingly, demand for knowl-edge, as embodied in goods and services, isdeclining. Imagine, for example, how publicdemand for Internet access competes with de-mand for health care.

In the case of knowledge, the characteris-tics and preferences of its potential users (de-cision-makers within families, the productionsector, state and civil society institutions)largely determine the extent of demand. Arabfamilies have always put great value on educat-ing their children to the highest possible levelin an attempt to raise their social status.Families have often been prepared to bear thehigh costs of education even if this severelystrained their resources. This is evident whenone considers the rising trend towards privatetuition and private schooling in the region. Onthe other hand, in Arab countries, decisionmaking within community institutions is oftenin the hands of older, authoritarian genera-tions. In taking decisions, these generationsmainly rely on traditional considerations thatreflect their narrow affiliations and loyaltiesmore than the broad scientific rationalism thatrequires decisions based on hard knowledge.In the last three decades, this problem hasbeen compounded by the ascendance ofmoney and power in the structure of societalincentives.

Reference has been made previously tohow knowledge system institutions create de-mand for knowledge simply by playing theirnatural role. A vicious spiral of deterioratingknowledge supply is set in motion in commu-nities with a poor knowledge system, curbingthe direct demand for new knowledge. This isone of the most fundamental factors in the de-cline of knowledge in developing countries.The inadequacy of the knowledge system indi-rectly decreases the demand for it. Developingcountry decision-makers frequently complain,and rightly so, of the feeble support they re-ceive from knowledge institutions when theyturn to them for help.

Another shortcoming in the societal con-text in Arab countries that constrains knowl-edge demand is the widespread assumptionthat knowledge is not as effective as power orinfluence in solving social, economic and po-

litical problems -- or that it is simply beyondreach. Hence, decision-makers end up limitingthemselves to deploying "traditional" meth-ods and mechanisms. This is a further illustra-tion of the weakness of developing countryknowledge systems.

Coercion may succeed in suppressing orcontaining demand for knowledge more thanany economic or social impediment. Certainly,when freedom is curtailed, knowledge is anearly casualty and those who seek it apply itsparingly or learn to live without it.

Finally, another constraint is censorship ofthe Internet. This global media miracle, whichoriginally arose to transcend borders and over-come distances, has fallen under the control ofthe censor in Arab countries. In Iraq for in-stance, it was not possible to access theInternet until mid-2000. Even after that, ac-cess remained limited. In one rich Arab coun-try, the government closed 400,000 web sitesafter initially allowing access to the Internet in1999. The increase in Arab Internet users in2001 saw both restrictions on access and cen-sorship of the Internet grow stronger oncemore (World Markets Research Centre, 2002).

The brakes on knowledge demand thathave been cited here will be further discussedin Chapter 8, which addresses the political andlegal contexts of knowledge.

Source: World Economic Forum, 2002.

Figure 1.4PC availability and Internet costs and penetration:Arab countries, OECD and East Asia, 2001

There is a widespread

assumption that

knowledge is not as

effective as power or

influence in solving

social, economic or

political problems.

Coercion may succeed

in suppressing or

containing demand

for knowledge more

than any economic or

social impediment.


About the journey towards the knowledge societyThe following chapters of the report outline a cognitive journey that follows the contours of theconceptual framework briefly introduced in this chapter, a few of whose most important aspectswere highlighted in their relationship to history and the Arab reality. The destination of this jour-ney is a strategic vision for building the knowledge society in the region. This vision identifies thelandmarks of societal reform, which precede the establishment of the knowledge society in Arabcountries (Chapter Nine). The journey to this destination passes through two waypoints. The first(Chapters Two - Five) is an assessment of the present state of knowledge acquisition, dissemina-tion and production, in Arab countries at the beginning of the 21st century. The second (ChaptersSix - Eight) is an analysis of the features of the societal context affecting knowledge acquisition inthe region at the present time, which considers culture, socio-economic structures and politics.Emphasis is placed on guaranteeing freedom under the rule of law, and the discussion culminatesin a survey of the regional and international environment for knowledge acquisition.

KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 49

Chapters 2 – 5 constitute an evaluation of the state of knowledge in the Arabworld. Chapter 2 focuses on the dissemination of knowledge in Arab countrieswhile Chapter 3 investigates knowledge production. Chapter 4 represents anattempt to measure the status of Arab knowledge in a comparative perspectiveand Chapter 5 assesses the organizational setting for knowledge acquisition inthe region.

Section two: the state of knowledge inArab countries

PART II


This chapter attempts to describe and analysethe process of knowledge dissemination inArab countries. It considers the role and stateof Arab education, and its most crucial chal-lenge, quality. It reviews the main features ofprint and broadcast media forms, the extent ofpublic access to them and the impact of theirpolitical and societal surroundings on their in-dependence and effectiveness as conductorsand sources of knowledge. The chapter furtheranalyses the emergence and early achievementsof modern media forms based on ICT, newtechnology and new patterns of public expres-sion. It concludes with an overview of the stateof translation in the region.

KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATIONAND KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL

Knowledge dissemination is about more thanthe mere transfer of information and data, al-though such transfer, through multiple chan-nels, should be an integral part of the process.The real challenge is how to turn this informa-tion into a strong reserve of knowledge that willimpact the production of new knowledge andtransform it into knowledge capital that con-tributes to human development. Knowledge isdisseminated chiefly through socialisation, thedifferent stages of education and by the massmedia and the translation industry. This chap-ter looks at the characteristics, achievementsand limitations of the main channels for dis-seminating knowledge in the Arab world. Likeother investigations in this field, this attempt iscompromised by an acute lack of accurate andreliable data, and thus conclusions regardingthe situation in Arab countries are inevitablysubject to this limitation.

SOCIALISATION

Socialisation is the process by which the indi-vidual acquires knowledge, skills, attitudes andvalues; and establishes motives, principles andpatterns that affect her or his adaptation to thenatural, social and cultural environment.Although socialisation is a learning process thatextends throughout the different stages of thelife of an individual, childhood is the most sen-sitive and impressionable stage. Despite thefact that children are the core and crux of thisprocess, they are rarely regarded as effectiveand influential individuals. Nonetheless, thistraditional vision has been changing graduallysince the early 1980s as a result of social, psy-chological and anthropological studies thathave asserted the importance of the child’s ex-perience, and the way (s) he learns and acquiresknowledge throughout the socialisationprocess.

There are three styles of child rearing; au-thoritarian, permissive and firm. Researchshows that children who have been brought upby firm parents demonstrate greater psycholog-ical and social adaptation. Also, they achievebetter academic results and have higher self-es-teem (Buri, 1998).

Studies also indicate that the most commonstyle of child rearing within the Arab family isthe authoritarian accompanied by the over-protective. This adversely affects children’s in-dependence, self-confidence and socialefficiency, and leads to an increase in passiveattitudes and the deterioration of decision-making skills, not only with respect to behav-iour, but also to how the child thinks. For,starting in early childhood, the child becomesaccustomed to suppressing her or his inquisi-tive and exploratory tendencies and sense ofinitiative. (al-Sweigh, in Arabic, backgroundpaper for the report)

Knowledge dissemination in Arab countriesCHAPTER 2

Studies indicate that

the most common

style of child rearing

within the Arab family

is the authoritarian

accompanied by the

over-protective.

Starting in early

childhood, the child

becomes accustomed

to suppressing her or

his inquisitive and

exploratory

tendencies.


EDUCATION

The first AHDR acknowledged that Arabcountries had made great strides in the quanti-tative expansion of education in the latter halfof the 20th century. It however also observedthat the general condition of education is stillunfavourable compared to the achievementsof other countries, both developing and devel-oped. The report concluded that Arab educa-tion falls far short of human developmentneeds.

It is a fact that the quantitative expansionof Arab education remains incomplete. Highrates of illiteracy, especially among women,persist. Children continue to be denied theirbasic right to elementary education. Highereducation is characterised by decreasing en-rolment rates compared to developed coun-tries, and public expenditure on education hasdeclined since 1985.

However, as the previous Report also em-phasised, the most serious problem facingArab education is its deteriorating quality(AHDR, 2002, 47-51). The emphasis here,therefore, will be laid on that crucial aspect ofeducation and its impact on knowledge.

The quality of education

The most important challenge in the educa-tional arena is the decline in quality, which un-dercuts a basic goal of human development,namely to enhance the quality of people’s livesand enrich the capabilities of societies.Allocating insufficient resources to educationcan certainly reduce its quality. Yet there areother elements that also affect educationalquality, chief among which are education poli-cies, teachers’ and educators’ working condi-

tions, curricula and educational methodolo-gies.

The quality of pre-school education

Early education, centred on the child and thefamily, is an investment that has long-termeconomic and social returns. The child’s brainin early childhood is known to be flexible andmuch more sensitive to its surroundings thanthat of older children. This brain develops ac-cording to the experiences it encounters in itsexternal environment. The sensuous parts ofthe brain reach the peak of their growth whenthe surrounding environment is rich in stimu-lants, notably for the senses of touch, sight,hearing, smell and taste. Developing the capa-bilities and improving the intellectual capaci-ties of the child requires close attention to thepedagogic methods adopted within the familyand inside nurseries and kindergartens.Naturally, this should go hand in hand withproper health care and decent livelihoods in asociety where the values of freedom and jus-tice prevail.

Despite major efforts to improve pre-school education in some Arab countries, thequality of education provided in many kinder-gartens in the region does not fulfil the re-quirements for advancing and developingchildren’s capabilities in order to help so-cialise a creative and innovative generation. Inmost cases, these kindergartens focus mainlyon teaching children reading and writing,without paying enough attention to their inte-grated growth. This can be achieved by pro-viding sufficient and effective educationalmaterials and instruments, qualified teachersand educators, as well as an environment con-ducive to sharpening the child’s senses andimproving his or her physical, emotional, so-cial and intellectual abilities. A positive pre-school environment is characterised by someessential qualities for children’s healthygrowth, such as opportunities for play and ac-cess to a free space that allows them to move,express themselves, choose, take decisionsand enhance their self-respect, which leads toself-confidence. A healthy environment is alsocharacterised by an approach to learning thatis interactive, not didactic, i.e., the childshould interact with his or her surroundings,and with other children and adults as well.

The most serious

problem facing Arab

education is its

deteriorating quality.

The quality of

education provided in

many kindergartens in

the region does not

fulfil the requirements

for advancing and

developing children’s

capabilities.

Modern Arab history shows that illiteracyhas invariably helped to keep traditionalanti-development regimes in power. Forinstance, in Yemen during the 1940s a re-gressive regime was able to make igno-rant parents invite rulers to kill theirenlightened children who were accusedof sorcery and selling Islam to foreigners.I do not think that the situation haschanged a lot in the early 21st century –and not only in Yemen, but in all Arabcountries, with one or two exceptions.Any extremist bigot can still set tens of

thousands of illiterate people against anyenlightened person, prevent the eradica-tion of illiteracy and make it a strong bul-wark against all projects to modernizeeducation and culture.

There is no hope of bringing about ahealthy educational and democratic envi-ronment conducive to knowledge incountries where illiteracy is allowed togain near-absolute control and to destroyevery serious attempt to escape from thetunnel of alienation in the modern age.

BOX 2.1

Abdul Aziz Al-Muqaleh – Illiteracy: An Obstacle to Knowledge andModernisation


In order to evaluate the level of education,it is necessary to assess teachers’ abilities to in-teract with, motivate, and encourage studentsto innovate and think critically and creatively.Information published on these qualificationsand abilities is scarce and limited to personalobservations and general impressions.Undoubtedly, there are a large number of ex-perienced and highly qualified teachers whoplay a vital role in making the educationalprocess succeed.

However, there are some factors in manyArab countries that adversely affect teachers’capabilities, such as low salaries, which forceeducators to take on other jobs that consumetheir energy and cut into the time they can de-vote to caring for their students. Other con-straints are also significant, particularly a lackof facilities; poorly designed curricula; and theindifferent quality of teacher training. Mostpresent-day educators have graduated frominstitutions that follow an approach to teach-ing based on rote learning, which is not espe-cially conducive to critical thinking. Finally,many Arab countries face the problem of over-crowded classes. These factors limit the abili-ties and curtail the desire of teachers tointeract creatively with their students.

Curricula and education methodologies

Typically, educational material is contained inthe curriculum, which comprises a body oflessons that is ideally a synthesis of the best ofwhat decision-makers and authors agree to beworthwhile and necessary for the learningprocess. In purely formal terms, curricula inmost Arab countries do not appear to begreatly different from what many countriesaround the world are adopting.

During the last decade several Arab coun-tries have embarked on educational reformprogrammes that concentrate particularly onrevising and making modifications to the con-tent of curricula and syllabi. When it comes tothe sciences, content is not usually a contro-versial matter, save for some themes that areperceived to touch on religious beliefs such asthe theory of evolution or on social taboos,such as sex education. But the humanities andsocial sciences that have a direct relevance topeople’s ideas and convictions are supervisedor protected by the authorities in charge of de-

signing curricula and issuing schoolbooks.Consequently, such subjects usually laud pastachievements and generally indulge in bothself-praise and blame of others, with the aim ofinstilling loyalty, obedience and support forthe regime in power. It is not unusual to findschoolbooks in many Arab countries with apicture of the ruler on the front page, even inthe case of textbooks in neutral subjects suchas science and mathematics.

Some researchers argue that the curriculataught in Arab countries seem to encouragesubmission, obedience, subordination andcompliance, rather than free critical thinking.In many cases, the contents of these curriculado not stimulate students to criticise politicalor social axioms. Instead, they smother theirindependent tendencies and creativity (MunirBashour, background paper for AHDR 2).

Generally speaking, the assigned curric-ula, starting from preliminary school or evenbefore, embody a concept that views educa-tion as an industrial production process,where curricula and their content serve as

Researchers argue

that the curricula

taught in Arab

countries seem to

encourage

submission,

obedience,

subordination and

compliance, rather

than free critical

thinking.

Most Moroccan families cannot afford tosend their children to kindergarten. Someof these families enroll their children atlow-cost mosque schools, where they aretaught reading, writing and religion byteachers who are not qualified to educateyoung children and to take care of them.Families, which cannot afford even thislow-cost alternative, entrust their youngchildren to the care of a family member,often an uneducated older brother, orleave them to play in the street if they areover 6 years old.

In 2000, school enrolment of girlswas low, reaching an average rate of just45% in the three educational stages.

Schools need much improvement,particularly in certain rural areas ofMorocco. In the northern region ofTangiers-Tatouan, for instance, there aremore than 45 students in each classroomon average. In respect of higher educa-tion, it is estimated that 40% of graduatesremain unemployed. Moreover, 50% ofuniversity students drop out of universitybefore completing their studies.

More encouraging statistics can befound in the rapid spread of “cyber-cafes”, which increased from 500 in 1999to 2500 in 2001, a 500% jump. Websites

also recorded a dramatic increase of700% during the same period. Revenuefrom the services of communication com-panies tripled between 1997 and 2001,from 6 to 16 billion dirhams.

In order to deal with the problems ofeducation, the 2000-2009 decade was de-clared as “The Education and TrainingDecade in Morocco”. The state is calledupon to give education at all levels its fullsupport and attention. The plan for thedecade requires the government toachieve set targets, e.g.:• By September 2002, all children aged6 years or more were to be enrolled in thenearest school.• By September 2004, all children ofage should be enrolled in the first year ofkindergarten.• By 2005, 80% of children enrolled inkindergartens should continue in schooluntil they complete elementary educa-tion.

As a result, the rate of enrolment for6 year olds increased from 37% in 1997-1998 to 91% in 2001-2002. The rate ofenrolment of children aged 6-11 in-creased from 69% to 90 % during thesame period.

BOX 2.2

Morocco: conflicting signals on knowledge acquisition

Source: Country report prepared for the Second Arab Human Development Report (AHDR2).


moulds into which fresh minds are supposedto be poured.

There are various means for conveying in-formation: lectures, seminars, workshops, col-laborative work, laboratory work and manyothers. In Arab countries, however, lecturesseem to dominate. Students can do little butmemorise, recite and perfect rote learning.The most widely used instruments are school-books, notes, sheets or summaries.Communication in education is didactic, sup-ported by set books containing indisputabletexts in which knowledge is objectified so as tohold incontestable facts, and by an examina-tion process that only tests memorisation andfactual recall.

Education policies

Education policies in many Arab countrieslack an integrated vision of the educationprocess and its objectives. Furthermore, thesepolicies are characterised by inconsistency anda lack of direction. Problems, such as those re-lating to the content of the curricula, forms ofexamination, evaluation of students, and for-eign languages cannot be settled without for-mulating a well-defined vision of educationalgoals and necessities.

The policies governing foreign languageeducation in Arab countries illustrate the ab-sence of a well-defined vision for institutingmechanisms that would encourage masteryand dissemination of knowledge and science.Indeed, promoting and enhancing the Arabiclanguage as the medium for acquiring and in-digenising modern sciences is the surest way toachieve this goal. Giving importance to Arabicdoes not however entail neglecting foreign lan-guage acquisition: on the contrary it requiresthe pursuit of both tracks at the same time.

The state of foreign language teaching inArab countries is an example of the absence ofclear-cut education policies and reveals a com-plicated and confused situation. In reality,only one Arab country (Lebanon) has main-tained, since its independence, the teaching ofa foreign language starting from the firstgrade. In 1995, Lebanon permitted the teach-ing of mathematics and science in foreign lan-guages in government schools. In thegovernment schools of Arab North Africancountries, the foreign language (French) main-

tained its place despite many attempts atArabisation. But French is not taught in pub-lic schools before the third grade in eitherMorocco or Tunisia, and not before the fourthin Algeria. Some other countries postponedlearning a foreign language to the last two orthree grades of primary education, as in thecases of Iraq and some Gulf countries.Recently, other countries, such as Egypt, Syria,Libya and Yemen have realized the impor-tance of providing foreign language teachingas early as possible and are increasingly imple-menting this trend, where foreign languagesare being integrated in the later stages of pri-mary education instead of secondary educa-tion. In Jordan government schools haverecently started teaching English commencingin the first grade.

Noteworthy in this context is a trend thatemerged in Egypt: the establishment of publicand private “multi-language schools” thatcharge relatively high tuition fees. The syllabiimplemented incorporate two foreign lan-guages instead of one, together with mathe-matics and science in a foreign language. Thenumber of these schools has increased duringrecent years from 195 to 575. In addition,since 1980, a new type of foreign school hasemerged, one under foreign supervision thatteaches curricula not administered by ArabMinistries of Education. The result has beenchaos in terms of the types of certificates re-ceived by students in the same country.

Measuring the quality of education

Evaluating the quality of education in theArab world is extremely difficult owing to in-sufficient information and data. These diffi-culties are compounded by the completeabsence of any standardised measurements forcomparison among Arab countries on the onehand, and with the rest of the world on theother, particularly over time. The followingare some features identified from studies con-ducted in this field of analysis.

Indicators of the quality of achievement inelementary education are available based onspecialised studies conducted in some Arabcountries including Oman, Egypt andBahrain. These studies are of limited value asthey have been neither designed nor con-ducted on a comparable basis and do not sup-

Communication in

education is didactic,

supported by set

books containing

indisputable texts and

by an examination

process that only tests

memorisation.

The state of foreign

language teaching in

Arab countries is an

example of the

absence of clear-cut

education policies.


port comparative conclusions. However, theirfindings offer significant insights into the qual-ity of elementary education in the Arab coun-tries where the studies were conducted.

In Oman, so far, four studies have beenconducted to evaluate educational achieve-ment in the fourth, sixth, eighth, and ninthgrades in Arabic, mathematics, science and lifeskills. Two findings about these grades standout: (Nader Fergany, in Arabic, 2002)• Grade averages in all subjects are below ex-cellence, or the so-called 90/90 rule (whichstipulates that at least 90% of the studentsshould obtain at least 90% in a standard exam-ination that measures how far the skills taughtare acquired). • Girls outperform boys in all subjects.

In Egypt, a wide field survey revealed thatmastery of the basic skills of reading and writ-ing, and mathematics, which is supposed to beacquired through elementary education, islow, about 40% and 30% respectively.

In Bahrain, an evaluation of educationaloutcomes at the end of the first stage of pri-mary education (Ministry of Education,Bahrain and Almishkat Centre for Research, inArabic, 2001), showed a low level of studentachievement reflected in a lack of mastery ofessential skills. The grade average in Arabic hit43.7%, with a standard deviation of 24.2 on ascale of 0-100. In mathematics, the grade aver-age was 44.9% with a 22.8 standard deviationon the same scale. In neither subject does stu-dent performance remotely approach mastery.

Student scores in the two subjects coverthe whole range of grades, which indicatesthat examinations could indeed distinguishthe different achievement levels on the onehand. On the other hand, frequency distribu-tions of the scores established the commonbell curve of examination grades in a largesample (the further away from the average thegrade is, the smaller the percentage of studentsbecomes).

However, grade frequency distributionthat deviates from the standard distribution isalso important. For example, compared to thedistribution of mathematics grades, the distri-bution in Arabic shows a higher frequency inthe lower grades, and less frequency in themiddle. These findings demonstrate that thestudents’ grades in Arabic tend to be lower

than in mathematics.When it comes to comparative studies

with other countries of the world, only oneArab country, Kuwait, participated in the“Third International Mathematics andScience Study, 1995” (Trends in InternationalMathematics and Science Study, 1996). It in-cluded students who were at the end of ele-mentary education from 41 countries in theworld (class 8). Kuwait’s participation ishighly commendable and a good example forother Arab countries to follow, especially sinceit took place a few years after the invasion ofthe country and the consequent physical andemotional impact on its education system.

Yet Kuwait is an exception for other rea-sons. It has sufficient financial resources aswell as a small population. It spends gener-ously on education and has made outstandingprogress in its quantitative expansion.Nevertheless, Kuwaiti students came at thebottom of the list and ranked 39th in terms ofachievement in mathematics and science, withgrade averages of 392 and 430 respectively.This is 121 points in mathematics and 86 inscience below the world averages (513 and516). Compared to Singapore, which wasranked first, with a grade average of 643 and607 respectively, Kuwaiti students’ achieve-ment fell below this average by 251 points inmathematics and 177 in science.

Noticeably, unlike those countries toppingthe list, Kuwaiti student achievement in math-ematics was lower than in science, and more socompared to the world average. It is a well-es-tablished fact that mathematics is a crucialbasis of knowledge for the sciences of the fu-ture. It is worth noting that, in this evaluation,countries such as Bulgaria, Thailand, Spainand Iran ranked above Kuwait. The examplepoints to an important conclusion: ultimately,the quality of education does not depend onthe availability of resources or on quantitativefactors but rather on other characteristicsclosely related to the organisation of the edu-cational process and the means of delivery andevaluation.

Three Arab countries (Jordan, Tunisia andMorocco) took part in the Trends inMathematics, and Science Study (TIMSS,1999). In mathematics, Tunisia was ranked29th with 448 points. Jordan was ranked 32nd

Ultimately, the quality

of education does not

depend on the

availability of

resources or on

quantitative factors,

but on characteristics

related to the

organisation of the

educational process

and the means of

delivery and

evaluation.


with 428 points. Morocco came 37th with 337points. It should be noted that Singapore wasranked first with 604 points while SouthAfrica was last with 275 points. In Science,Jordan was ranked 30th with 450 points,Tunisia 34th with 430 points and Morocco 37th

with 323 points. Taiwan topped the sciencelist with 564 points while South Africa wasranked last with 243 points.

The quality of higher education

Although higher education institutions haveexisted in the Arab world for more than tencenturies (most of which were established in amajor mosque such as Al-Azhar, Al-Qairawanand Al-Zaitonah, or with funding from chari-ties or waqf), modern Arab colleges and uni-versities are young. Three quarters of Arabuniversities were established in the last 25years of the 20th century. Fifty-seven per centof them are no more than 15 years old. Thisobservation is important: higher education in-stitutions, universities in particular, take a longtime to consolidate their institutional struc-ture, and to perfect their role in the dissemina-tion and production of knowledge (NaderFergany, in Arabic, 1998b, 18-19).

The quality of education provided inhigher education institutions in Arab coun-tries is affected by many factors, chief amongwhich is the lack of a clear vision, and, asnoted earlier, the absence of well-designedpolicies regulating the educational process.Higher education, particularly in its inception,faced resistance from several quarters. The pi-

oneer modern universities were establishedthrough the efforts of civil society and the sup-port of nationalist forces with dreams ofprogress and prosperity. These endeavourswere affected from the very beginning by thecolonial presence in most Arab countries atthe time. This period witnessed conflicting in-tentions and competing interests that led to arupture in the original course taken. The gen-eration of the renaissance strived to institu-tionalise the basis for academic research inArab countries. Some of their attempts suc-ceeded, but were not sustained.

One of the main features of many univer-sities in the Arab world is their lack of auton-omy, i.e., they fall under the direct control ofthe ruling regime. Nevertheless, universitiesare often the arenas for political and ideologi-cal conflict, the more so because of restrictionsimposed on political participation in generaland the promotion of political currents thatowe allegiance to the regime. These contextualfeatures have adverse effects on the degree offreedom allowed for education and research.

This lack of autonomy has resulted in a sit-uation where universities are run according tothe requirements of the governing politicallogic, and not a plan or a wise educational pol-icy. Some universities, for example, are over-crowded on account of the uncalculatedincrease in enrolment rates, simply becausethe announcement of enrolment numbers inuniversities has become a political gesture toappease society.

The quality of higher education is also in-fluenced by an ongoing decline in expendi-ture, reflected in inadequate facilities forstudents and faculty. Quantitative expansionin higher education came at the expense ofquality. University libraries are in a sorry state,laboratories are old and cannot accommodatethe increasing numbers of students, andclasses are over-crowded, thus creating a widedistance between students and teachers.Moreover, faculty members in many Arab uni-versities earn meagre salaries, and thereforecannot devote themselves fully to teaching orresearch.

The quality of computer science educationin Arab universities

The UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States is

One of the main

features of many

universities in the

Arab world is their

lack of autonomy.

University libraries are

in a sorry state,

laboratories are old

and cannot

accommodate

increasing numbers of

students, and classes

are over-crowded.

In order to address deficiencies in mea-suring the quality of education, theUNDP Regional Bureau for Arab Statesis conducting a project for “EvaluatingEducational Quality in the Basic andMiddle Stages in Mathematics andScience in the Arab World”. The projectsponsors the participation of five Arabcountries in TIMSS 2003, in which 54other countries are taking part, includingfive other Arab countries. TheInternational Association for theEvaluation of Educational Achievementconducts this study impartially. Thestudy was previously conducted in 1995and 1999. The project will collect generaldata on curricula, classroom instruction,student achievement and teachers’ per-formance in a manner that allows for

comparisons of findings with interna-tional standards. It will set a standardisedscale for ranking countries based on in-ternational criteria. The study is expectedto give the participating countries the op-portunity to measure achievement inmathematics and science through the ex-amination of prevailing trends in primaryschools (fourth grade) and middleschools (eighth grade). By the end of theproject, participating countries will re-ceive a report benchmarking the perfor-mance of their national plans andpedagogical policies, as well as of theschools taking part, against internationalstandards. They will also receive interna-tionally comparable results on students’performance in mathematics and science,and general reference data.

BOX 2.3

The “Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)”


sponsoring a project to improve the quality ofuniversity education in Arab countries, whichincludes a component concerned with evalu-ating the quality of education in some vitallyimportant scientific disciplines. The projecthas completed an evaluation of the quality ofcomputer science education in Arab universi-ties Sixteen universities - 12 public and 4 pri-vate - in 12 Arab states, namely: Algeria,Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, the UnitedArab Emirates and Yemen participated.

The evaluation of computer science edu-cation has been completed for all participatinguniversities except Kuwait University whichwithdrew just before the external assessmentstarted.

The evaluation (which is conducted inthree stages: training, self-evaluation and ex-ternal evaluation by Arab and internationalevaluators) is based on 5 major criteria formeasuring performance, namely: academicstandards; teaching and learning; student pro-gression; learning resources; and quality assur-ance and enhancement1, in addition to 11other detailed criteria.

The project revealed important resultsconcerning the academic standards of pro-grammes. While all participating programmes– except one – achieved “approval”, i.e., con-fidence in the academic level of the pro-gramme, that approval was in the category of“approved/satisfactory” and no programmehad an academic level high enough to earn“approved with commendation”, i.e., the levelof distinction by international standards.

Reports pointed to a number of issues thatrequire redress with respect to all the compo-nents of academic standards, i.e., curriculaand prescribed materials, methods of studentevaluation and the students' level of achieve-ment. For instance, a comparison of the con-tent of the curricula evaluated with that of the

international test in computer science, as de-termined by the American ETS2, indicated anoverall compatibility exceeding 70% in onlyeight universities. In terms of complete com-patibility with each one of the five main partsof the international test, the majority of theuniversities’ curricula reflected over 70% com-patibility only in the two traditional subjectareas of programming fundamentals and soft-ware systems. Just one-third of the participat-ing universities had curricula judgedcompatible with the other three subject areas(computer organization and architecture, the-ory of computer science and computationalmathematics, and special subjects).

The creative teaching method (teachingthrough problem-solving) is one of themost important methods of teachingmedicine of the past 25 years. It started atthe School of Medicine of McMasterUniversity of Canada in 1976 and has,since then, been adopted by many med-ical schools throughout the world as ateaching strategy and school curriculum.

The creative method is basically ateaching strategy characterized by the useof medical problems as a framework forteaching students problem-solving skillsand proactive learning. In this method,the teaching process revolves around thestudent, not the teacher, as is the case inthe traditional method. The student him-self is responsible for his/her learning,which –it is believed- is a preparation forlifelong learning and self-development.Proactive self-learning removes the stu-dent from teaching methods based onrote learning and the passive reception ofknowledge, thereby increasing his/herability to understand and absorb in-depth learning. This teaching methodalso leads to the student's acquisition ofimportant skills, such as the ability tocommunicate well and to work as a teammember in addition to the ability to ana-lyze and use the scientific method in solv-

ing health problems in their different or-ganic, social and psychological perspec-tives. In this method, both student andteacher find the teaching process interest-ing. The student's role is to analyze, re-search and derive information andsolutions, while the teacher's role differsfrom the traditional role of merely dis-pensing information. The teacher’s newrole is to stimulate the learning processby motivating students and pushing themto think by posing questions and generalconcepts.

There are three medical schools inthe Arab world, which play a pioneeringrole in using this teaching strategy,namely: Al-Jazeerah University in WadMadani, Sudan; The Suez CanalUniversity in Ismaeliyah, Egypt; and TheArabian Gulf University in Bahrain. Allthree started at approximately the sametime (1979-1982) and continue to adoptthis teaching philosophy with continuousdevelopment of curricula. These threeschools act as a stimulus to the develop-ment of medical education in the Arab re-gion through their Centres for theDevelopment of Medical Education,which have trained many faculty mem-bers in various Arab countries.

BOX 2.4

Use of the creative teaching method in Arab medical schools

Source: Arabian Gulf University, Bahrain.

1Academic Standards. This major criterion reflects the confidence of evaluators in three areas: curriculum design and the level of prescribed mater-ial; accuracy and effectiveness of student evaluation methods; and actual student achievements.

Methods of teaching and learning. This represents the result of evaluation of the methods used in teaching and learning, in terms of diversity,efficiency and relevance to the programme goals.

Student Progression. This depends on the efficiency of the systems and the arrangements used to guide and support student advancementthrough the school years.

Learning Resources. This depends on the availability and efficiency of human and financial resources needed for learning, such as the faculty, li-braries, laboratories and communications. The latter 3 criteria come under a more comprehensive criterion, namely, "learning opportunities avail-able", although each one is evaluated separately.

Quality assurance and enhancement. This depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal arrangements and systems regularly avail-able to supervise the performance of the programme through the stages of its implementation and the ability of these systems to take the necessarymeasures for its correction and improvement.2Educational Testing Services.


The evaluation indicates that private uni-versities, generally, did better than publicones. At the university level, the overall qualityindicator value varied from 42% to 91%, an av-erage of nearly 60%. A majority of the partici-pating 15 universities (eight out of 15) werebelow average (Figure 2-1).

According to the applicable criteria, theevaluation concludes that the overall qualityindicator is below the "pass" level for eightuniversities and close to the "good" level forthree. Results indicate that the academic levelof faculty members is a strong point in the re-gion, while the sufficiency of available faculty

members and the mathematics component in

members and the mathematics component inthe curriculum represent weak points, whichdeserve attention, figure 2-2. It is not surpris-ing, therefore, that well-qualified faculty mem-bers are nonetheless unable to diffuse andproduce knowledge efficiently on account oftheir small numbers, compared to students,and the meagre resources available to them.

The evaluation concludes by proposing sixareas as strategic priorities for the develop-ment of computer science programmes in theregion, through the concerted efforts of uni-versities and with support from regional initia-tives, projects and forums. These areas are:methodologies for the design and develop-ment of programmes and curricula; the role ofofficial accreditation organisations; the devel-opment of the size and capabilities of faculties;the development of the capabilities of librariesand communication systems, quality assuranceand enhancement; and cooperation in the pro-vision of traditional and electronic librarysources, both Arabic and Arabicized. (The lat-ter are needed for programmes that are taughtin Arabic, which currently represent one-thirdof all programmes). The evaluation stronglyrecommends that the latter measure be takenup in parallel with enhancing the English lan-guage skills of students. The evaluation alsocalls for an expanded stage of investment andexpenditure on higher education linked di-rectly to goals and indicators of quality.

ARAB MASS MEDIA:CHARACTERISTICS,CONSTRAINTS AND NEW FORMS

Print and broadcast media are a vital means oftransferring, and sometimes producing,knowledge. Since their inception, they haveplayed a central role in knowledge dissemina-tion, one that has undergone many changes asa result of scientific and technical develop-ment. In early times, printed materials werethe most common medium, but had limited in-fluence among communities with high rates ofilliteracy. The advent of radio opened newhorizons for knowledge dissemination, dis-pensing as it did with literacy as a requirement.Ultimately, television surpassed all conven-tional mass media in terms of impact.

What is more important, from the per-

Categories of Quality

Figure 2.2Detailed evaluation criteria: average values

Figure 2.1Distribution of universities participating in the evaluationaccording to the overall quality indicator

Private universities,

generally, did better

than public ones.


spective of building human development andthe knowledge society, is the relationship be-tween the mass media, freedom and progresson the one side and increased demand andsupply of knowledge on the other. The morefreedom enjoyed by the media and the deepertheir involvement in human development is-sues such as good governance, knowledge andwomen’s empowerment, the stronger the soci-etal incentives for creating a knowledge soci-ety become.

The global revolution in communicationthat is rapidly changing the world into aknowledge-based economy is transforming themeans of knowledge dissemination. A contem-porary society that does not rely on digitalelectronic networks to exchange informationis unimaginable. For most major corporations,the information and communication industryhas become an essential strategic support inensuring dominance in international markets.In addition, satellite channels, especially in theArab world, are now a source for the produc-tion and creation of values, symbols and taste.

Access to Media

Arab media forms and the means of accessingthem, as well as their structure and content,exhibit several shortcomings that reduce theireffectiveness in building a knowledge society.Among these, poor public access to informa-tion is a serious disability. This can be illus-trated by comparing the ratio of the Arabpopulation to the volume of information avail-able to citizens, and the comparable ratio inother regions of the world.

In general, Arab countries have lower in-formation media to population ratios (numberof newspapers, radio and television sets per1000 people) compared to the world averageand the average of middle-income countries.Indeed, in this respect, the Arab world is notmuch better off than low-income countries insome areas.

The low number of newspapers per 1000people, 53 newspapers in the Arab countriesversus 285 in the developed countries, indi-cates two significant gaps. First, Arab citizensdo not generate a large demand for newspa-pers due to low literacy rates and the high costof newspapers compared to income. Second,the decline in the quality, independence, and

professionalism of Arab journalism make itsproducts unattractive to broad categories ofArab readers.

In audio and visual media, the availabilityof radio and television sets in Arab countriesas a whole is also below the average in middle-income countries and the world as a whole.

Access to information media varies fromone Arab country to another. The number ofnewspapers per 1,000 people in Arab coun-tries varies from one newspaper in Somalia to

Figure 2.3Number of daily newspapers per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions in the world, 1998

Source: World Bank, 2002.

Figure 2.4Number of radio receivers per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions in the world, 2000


Arab countries have

lower information

media to population

ratios compared to the

world average.


374 newspapers in Kuwait, which exceeds theaverage in high-income countries. In contrastwith the ratios of newspapers, Lebanon, whichhas the highest ratio when it comes to radio re-ceivers (678 radio receivers per 1,000 people),is still well below the average of the high-in-come countries, which boast 1,280 radio re-ceivers per 1,000 people. However, the ratiosof television sets in Arab countries are closerto the ratios of newspapers. Oman, which hasthe highest ratio among Arab countries (563television sets per 1,000 people), is close to theaverage of high-income countries (641 televi-sion sets per 1,000 people). But middle-in-come Arab countries have far fewer televisionsthan other middle-income countries in theworld, where the average number is 275 televi-sion sets per 1,000 people. For instance, thenumber of televisions per 1,000 people doesnot exceed 67 sets in Syria, 198 in Tunisia, and189 in Egypt.

The number of Arab satellite channels hasalso increased. There are now about 120 chan-nels transmitted through Arabsat and Egypt’sNilesat. More than 70% of these channels arestate enterprises and broadcast in Arabic. Feware in foreign languages. A handful of privatesector satellite channels (about 15% of allchannels) broadcast in Arabic from outsidethe region. A smaller number of private sectorchannels (10%) broadcast in Arabic from in-side the region. In short, official Arab satellite

channels dominate the microwaves.

Resources available to the media

In varying degrees, Arab media personnel inmost Arab countries encounter serious diffi-culties in gaining access to information, docu-ments, data and official and unofficial newssources. Authorities often hinder their effortsciting official secrecy or national security.Many countries have a list of prohibited top-ics, such as the publication of court hearings,decrees or other matters that are said to touchon state security.

The media in most Arab countries lackmultiple, independent sources of information.They principally depend on foreign informa-tion sources, especially Western news agen-cies. Although all Arab countries have theirown news agencies, these agencies are state-owned and oriented to serve and promotestate policies. Most of them also suffer from alack of human, financial and technological re-sources and do not have correspondents out-side their own countries. However, it may beworth mentioning here the exceptions thatstand out among Arab news satellite channels.Some news satellites have succeeded in secur-ing exclusive coverage of major events. TheUS-based CNN, for example, broadcast bul-letins incorporating some of Al-Jazeera’s cov-erage of the events of the war in Afghanistan.Other satellite channels have started buildinga network of correspondents outside the re-gion, as in the cases of Abu Dhabi, MBC andAl-Arabia.

In general, Arab news channels lack spe-cialised agencies that are able to cover the-matic news topics, such as economics, sports,the environment, health, women and science,despite the significance and popularity ofthese topics amid the current information ex-plosion.

Many Arab media institutions do not haveinformation centres housing libraries orarchives. The few archives that exist are old-fashioned and far behind the tremendousboom in information technology. Elsewhere inthe world, such centres have become the back-bone of in-depth media services, incorporat-ing the flow of events and news within ageneral context, in order to help the audienceunderstand developments and take an in-

Figure 2.5Number of television sets per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions of the world, 2000


Official Arab satellite

channels dominate

the microwaves.

Media in most Arab

countries lack

multiple,

independent sources

of information.


formed stand on them. A few capable information centres affili-

ated to some Arab media institutions continueto lead the field. For example, Egypt’s al-Ahram Information Centre and other suchcentres, namely Annahar, Al Bayan, AlKhaleej, Al Hayat and Al Sharq Al Awsatkeep up with successive developments in in-formation technologies.

Typical content

The role played by the media in different Arabcountries is very similar, albeit in varying de-grees. A review of media programmes and re-search indicates that light entertainment is themost common offering, and is predominantlysuperficial, repetitive in content, and pro-motes values that encourage consumerism anda depreciation of work. This is particularly ev-ident during Ramadan, which sees an increasein game shows feeding popular dreams of easyriches.

The Arab world has two cultural satellitechannels (Nileculture & Tanweer -- Egypt)and two religious channels (Almajd and Iqra’-- Saudi Arabia), in addition to several educa-tional channels in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, aswell as a special information channel, the NileInformation Channel. The region also receivesinformation services from some land-basedtelevision stations. Nonetheless, Arab televi-sion at large is not a vibrant force for knowl-edge or culture.

Some Arab news satellite channels, no-tably Al-Arabia, Al-Jazeera, and Al Manarhave brought new content and form to thescreen by airing free debates. They have thusspurred many Arab ground and satellite chan-nels to provide more space for a diversity ofvoices and viewpoints and to allow more free-dom of expression on political, social and cul-tural issues usually hidden behind a curtain ofsilence. These new talk shows, though at timessensational and vociferous, have neverthelessraised audience awareness, and could effect aradical change in the Arab public scene in thelong run, opening it up to a culture of plural-ism and dialogue.

News coverage

The Arab citizen’s trust in media is affected –

to a great extent – by the level of news cover-age in different mass media. Despite attemptsto improve news services – due to competi-tion between news satellite channels and to theextraordinary developments in communica-tion technology that have turned the worldinto an electronic global village – a number oftrends continue to hamper effective news cov-erage in Arab countries.

The main focus is still on official news andon senior political officials. Certain news val-ues predominate, notably those favouringcelebrities, idiosyncratic behaviour, humourand conflict. These values control the newsthat makes the front pages of newspapers, andoccupy prime time on radio and television.More space and time is allocated to news ofthis kind than to other content. News of inter-est to the majority of the population, andwhich relates to their daily concerns or whichcould enrich their scientific and culturalknowledge, is scarce. Despite more opennessthat allows the media to address certainevents, some news items are suppressed ordealt with in a manner not equal to their im-portance. News stories can sometimes be over-stated or understated and on occasion presentvery different accounts of the same event, asthe case of Arab media coverage of the fall ofBaghdad shows.

News reports themselves tend to be narra-tive and descriptive, rather than investigativeor analytic, with a concentration on immediateand partial events and facts. This is generallytrue of newspapers, radio bulletins and tele-vised news. The news is often presented as asuccession of isolated events, without in-depthexplanatory coverage or any effort to placeevents in the general, social, economic and cul-tural context.

Needless to say, this type of news coveragedoes not help the ordinary citizen to compre-hend events, increase his or her awareness andknowledge or develop a considered and in-formed point of view on national, regional andinternational issues.

Features of media messages

An analysis conducted on samples of contentfrom Arab media in many Arab countries (AliAl-Qarni, Arab Media Discourse, 1997), anddozens of studies conducted at country levels,

Some Arab news

satellite channels,

have brought new

content and form to

the screen by airing

free debates.

News reports

themselves tend to

be narrative and

descriptive, rather

than investigative or

analytic.


characterise the common features of Arabmedia messages, with some exceptions, as fol-lows:

Authoritarian: Authority heavily controlsthe media discourse, imposing its own topics,directives, values, details, preferences, andtiming.

Unidimensional: The discourse mostly ex-cludes the other point of view, keeping it awayfrom the public mind.

Official: The majority of Arab media insti-tutions are incapable of taking action or re-porting on events until they receive officialdirection, even if this entails ignoring an im-portant event for a certain period of time. Thisof course discredits the media in the eyes of itsaudience.

Sacred: In many cases, a sacred aura is be-stowed on the discourse, one that might notexist in other regions. This aura is not neces-sarily religious, but reflects the determinationwith which the objective of a particular dis-course is being pushed.

One of the dilemmas facing Arab media isa continuous conflict between the impulse to“seek more freedoms and independence” andto “preserve the national interest”. This delib-erately exaggerated conflict should not ob-scure the fact that the search for morefreedoms is an indigenous, national and posi-tive effort that ultimately helps achieve the na-tional interest.

THE ENVIRONMENTSURROUNDING THE MASS MEDIA

Legalised restrictions on freedom of the pressand freedom of expression in Arab countriescurtail the independence and vitality of themass media. In practice, the harassment of thepress under the law is an all-too-frequent vio-lation of freedom of expression, with newspa-pers sometimes facing closure, seizure,confiscation and sequestration. Furthermore,journalists are not given sufficient guaranteesto perform their job and are liable to arrest,compulsory detention and severe penalties oncharges related to publishing and the expres-sion of critical opinions. Some journalists havebeen threatened with assassination, physicalassault and intimidation. Reports issued bythe Arab Journalists Federation as well as in-

ternational and national human rights organi-sations provide plentiful examples of such per-secution.

Governments also impose restrictions onissuing newspapers and establishing new tele-vision channels. These restrictions sometimestake the form of impractical requirements,such as requiring large capital deposits as acondition for establishing a corporation, orrestricting ownership of television channels tosatellite (as opposed to terrestrial) stations.

At the same time, it must be acknowledgedthat some newspapers and journalists pursueirresponsible practices and disregard theethics of their profession. Tabloid journalismpurveying sex, crime and sensation in pursuitof advertising profits and sales has becomewidespread in some Arab countries.Violations of citizens’ right to privacy have in-creased, and many people are subjected toslander, libel, defamation and abuse.

The momentous events facing the Arab re-gion undoubtedly pose large challenges to themedia, particularly since they have now be-come important tools in conflicts and wars.This was evident in the case of the occupationof Iraq. Some media, including a number ofArab ones, have risen to these new challenges,displaying new levels of objectivity andcourage. Others have dropped in public esti-mation for providing biased or one-sided ac-counts. Reporting on modern theaters ofconflict often, incurs harassment and dangersfor journalists, who sometimes suffer casual-ties, especially when the aggressor has some-thing to hide from the public eye. Eightjournalists, seven Palestinean and one British,have been killed under Israeli occupation inless than 2 years. During the invasion of Iraq,Al-Jazeera correspondent, Tareq Ayoub, waskilled in an attack on the network’s offices inBaghdad.

MODERN MASS MEDIA

The core platform on which a modern infor-mation system rests is built around its associ-ated technologies, equipment, computernetworks, software, databases and communi-cation systems. In most societies, this infra-structure serves to educate and enlighten thepublic, improve the management and co-ordi-

The harassment of

the press under the

law is an all-too-

frequent violation of

freedom of

expression.


nation of research and development, promotethe increased effectiveness and efficiency ofpublic and private institutions, and supportinformed and streamlined decision-making.

The communications infrastructure in anycountry is the backbone of attempts to benefitfrom the broad applications of the communi-cation revolution, especially multimedia ser-vices. This infrastructure includes telephonelines, television cables, satellite installations,fibre optic lines, computers and peripherals,information networks and media and culture-based industries.

Telephone networks

Telephone networks are access roads leadingto the information highway. They are one ofthe most important indicators of informationavailability. Some Arab countries have suc-ceeded in improving their infrastructure inthis regard, while still lagging behind interna-tional levels. The number of lines in Arabcountries is about 109/1,000 persons, while itamounts to 561 in developed countries. Thereis only one telephone for every 10 Arab citi-zens, while in developed countries the ratio is1/1.7 persons. (See Figure 2.6 for a worldcomparison).

The Arab Joint Economic Report indicatesthat some tangible improvements in commu-nication services have taken place in Arabcountries. Phone density increased in the1990s, and some countries have convertedtheir networks into digital systems.

There are four international and regionalprojects in communication and informationtechnology of particular importance in theArab world. Most Arab countries are takingpart in these projects with the goal of develop-ing the information and communication sec-tor. They are:• The Cable Project: 300,000 km long, andconnecting more than 100 countries including14 Arab states;• The Fibre Optic Cable project: 27,000 kmlong, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, andJordan are participating;• The Simoueh III Project: started opera-tion in 1999 with Egypt, Morocco, andDjibouti participating;• The Africa Project: This involves allAfrican Arab countries and Saudi Arabia.

Yet despite some advances in telephony,overall, public demand for telephone lines inthe region outstrips supply, while connectionsare unreliable and service remains generallypoor when compared to developed countries.

Communication technologies

Arab countries have made considerable stridesin communication technology, and a numberof networks have been digitised. With the cre-ation of Dubai Internet City in 1999, an inte-grated electronic business, research anddevelopment society, UAE demonstrated thatit had made rapid progress in ICT. The cre-ation of Dubai Media City (DMC) marks an-other milestone on the road towards providinga modern infrastructure for an advanced Arabmedia. DMC has already attracted some majorTV channels, including Al-Arabia, MBC,CNN and Reuters TV.

In satellite communication, the modernArabsat network delivers content from varioussources across the Arab world. The system de-livers a large portfolio of media and informa-tion products and services to all Arabcountries and parts of Europe as well.

Computer availability is one of the basicstandards against which to measure access toinformation technologies through new techno-logical media. Here, the figures indicate a se-vere shortage in all Arab countries. There are

Figure 2.6Number of main phone lines per 1,000 persons(*)

(*) The average is taken as the country-specific likely average (based on population size in 2000) of basic phone dataextracted from UNDP HDR 2002. Data on 173 countries (out of a total 179) includes 19 Arab countries.

There are less than

18 computers per

1,000 persons in the

region, compared to

the global average of

78.3.


less than 18 computers per 1,000 persons inthe region, compared to the global average of78.3 computers per 1,000 persons. This ishardly an appropriate base for using informat-ics to spread knowledge and increase demandfor it, or for accessing the vast array of scien-tific research networks, universities and otherknowledge sources that throng the Internet.

Access to Modern Media

Statistics indicate that the number of Internetusers in Arab countries in 2001 reached 4.2million, i.e., 1.6% of the Arab population com-pared to just 1% in 2000, a considerable in-crease even though Internet penetration in theArab region is still limited in a comparativecontext.

The low number of Internet users in Arabcountries is due to a number of factors, themost important of which are: computer andInternet illiteracy, the high cost of the linesused and high personal computer prices andaccess fees. Several initiatives have been takento deal with these problems, including mea-sures to increase competition among serviceproviders, reduce subscription fees and lowertelephone line costs. Other initiatives focus onteaching computer skills on a large scale, as isnow the case in many schools and universities.

CHALLENGES FACING THE ARABMEDIA

Evidently, the Arab mass media faces rootedexternal and internal constraints on its role intransmitting knowledge and encouraging itsacquisition. These challenges are intensifiedby the rapid development in communicationand information technologies and the globalknowledge explosion that have given themedia in other parts of the world a central rolein building knowledge societies. To sum up, inArab countries:• People do not have sufficient access to themedia and information technologies, com-pared to world rates and to other countries inthe region, and in proportion to the popula-tion of the Arab world. • The social and intellectual benefits of massmedia and communication are diluted by gov-ernment restrictions on content and by super-ficial market preferences.• The public relates to the media as a passiverecipient, rather than an active participant.

In other words, cost, political culture andsocietal context militate against knowledgediffusion through new technologies.

The information and communication poli-cies of most Arab countries are similar, inas-much as they place the media under thedominant political authorities and institutions

Figure 2-8Internet penetration in Arab countries, users as % of population, 2001

Source: World Markets Research Centre, 2002.

Cost, political culture

and societal context

militate against

knowledge diffusion

through new

technologies.

Figure 2.7Personal computers: Arab world and other regions



and employ media channels for political pro-paganda and entertainment, at the expense ofother functions and services.

Within the Arab media establishment it-self, deficiencies such as lack of planning, lackof information, documents and research and ahigh degree of centralisation impair the organ-isation, relevance and flexibility of media ser-vices. In-depth awareness of audience habitsand preferences with respect to information,especially outside the capital and major cities,is also lacking.

State ownership of the media is the norm,particularly in the case of radio and television.(Lebanon, where these mass media servicesare run by private organisations, is the excep-tion.) Newspapers in the region can be state-owned or jointly owned. Some countries, suchas Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon,allow parties to issue newspapers. Yet thesepublications are subject to specific controlsand limitations, particularly for individuals.For these reasons, many individuals andgroups have resorted to issuing newspapersfrom foreign countries such as the UnitedKingdom, Cyprus and France.

The revolution in communication technol-ogy has made it possible for some individualsand corporations to launch private satellitechannels in Arabic from foreign countries.Egypt recently permitted the broadcasting ofprivate Egyptian satellite channels from withinthe country. The conditions governing mediaownership in Arab countries raise many ques-tions about the real opportunities available toArab citizens for exercising their right to issuenewspapers, attain information, expressthoughts and opinions and monitor govern-ment institutions. Another point of concern isthe selective homogeneity of Arab media con-tent, considering that diversity of informationis an important prerequisite for the attainmentof knowledge.

Globalisation has led to an intense debateabout the viability of state-owned media, andthe ability of governments to sustain their mo-nopoly in an age of free information. This di-rection of change could potentially supportmedia freedom and people’s right to commu-nicate. Some Arabs fear that reducing the roleof the state may, however, favour the expan-sion of the role of multinational corporations

(MNCs). This question goes to the heart of theindependence of the Arab media, since one ofthe main obstacles facing Arab attempts toown communication technologies is the mo-nopoly of major MNCs in the production andmarketing of these very technologies.

Arab countries, therefore, need to co-op-erate closely to raise the performance and in-dependence of the media as a vital conduit ofknowledge transfer and as a means of increas-ing the transparency of government and pub-lic services.

The Beginnings of Free Media

The last two years have, however, seen someimprovements in the Arab information envi-ronment, compared to dominant trends inpast decades. While there is still some way togo towards creating an informed, open andknowledgeable public, observers discern anew, more enquiring and therefore morehopeful spirit in the media.

Despite the continuing dominance ofmonolithic official media channels marked bya single political point of view, the Arabicpress has entered a new stage characterised bydawning competition. Newspapers and infor-mation media that have enjoyed a monopolyover Arab readers for a long time are encoun-tering new challenges. Arabic newspapers –some published abroad, such as “Al-Hayat”,“Asharq Al-Awsat” and “Al-Quds Al-Arabi”– and some published at home, such as“Annahar”, “Assafeer”, “Al-Khaleej”, and“Al-Bayan” are producing highly professionaljournalism and enjoy a margin of freedommuch larger than that of the official press.With their political and intellectual advantagesand their greater financial resources, thesenewspapers attract a large number of the bestArab writers.

The official press can no longer ignore itsnew competitors. The challengers have man-aged to cross borders and overcome censor-ship barriers, using the Internet to reachfarther than paper-based media. Newspapers,such as “Tishreen” of Syria and “Al-Ittihad”of the United Arab Emirates, have gone as faras to open public dialogue forums throughtheir web sites.

These changes have not been limited tothe press. Television has also undergone re-

The Arabic press has

entered a new stage

characterised by

dawning

competition.

The conditions

governing media

ownership in Arab

countries raise many

questions about the

real opportunities

available to Arab

citizens for exercising

their right to

knowledge.


markable changes during the past two years.Private Arabic channels are able to competefor news items and pictures with the strongestinternational television establishments, as wasdemonstrated clearly during the Anglo-American war on Iraq. These private channelshave instilled a new spirit in Arabic television,helping to change thinking and proceduresamong some Arabic satellite stations, many ofthem government-run, such as the “AbuDhabi Television Station”, the “Nile NewsChannel” and other official channels in NorthAfrican Arab countries. There is no doubt thatindependent Arabic channels have managedto break the monopoly of the big channelsover images and news. Some analysts haveventured to conclude that although the inter-national coalition won the military battle inIraq, the Arabs may have won the informationbattle. Whether this is speculation or fact,there is clearly a larger role for the Arab cam-era to play in presenting the world through itslens.

Although the political environment sur-rounding the Arab media is not the mostfavourable to knowledge development, someactors have succeeded in creating informationand documentation centres, such as those es-tablished by “Al-Ahram”, “Al-Bayan”, “Al-Hayat” and “Asharq Al-Awsat”. These offerArab researchers opportunities previously notavailable to reap the benefits of the informa-tion and digital revolutions.

The creation of Arabic Internet newspa-pers marks an important further step towardsa more inclusive and pluralistic media open toyoung talent. Several of these newspapers playa positive role in publicising Arab issues in theinternational arena, through their networkswith newspapers managed by internationalnon-governmental organisations. Some, how-ever, still lack credibility with the Arab publicand need time to mature: their content oftensuggests an inability to distinguish betweenchaff and grain.

The hope is that these beginnings willwiden the margins of political freedom in theArab world, raise the quality of its media andstrengthen the important relationship betweengood governance and the knowledge society.The most important characteristic of these re-cent developments is that the new media use

the Arabic language, and are therefore startingto reach the largest segment of the Arab pub-lic. This contrasts with the prevailing situationwhere Arabic newspapers, which are pub-lished in foreign languages, still enjoy a widerreadership than those published in Arabic.Some of the former, such as the “Al-AhramWeekly” in Cairo, “The Daily Star” and“L’Orient Le Jour” in Beirut, and “GulfNews” in UAE have achieved a high degree ofexcellence.

TRANSLATION

Translation is a means of seeking knowledge.It represents an interaction among civilisationsthrough the transfer from one language intoanother, by humans or machines, written ororal, with the goal of achieving scientific andcultural objectives. The question facing Arabcountries is: how can translation become anasset in building knowledge? How can it bemobilised to enhance the frame of mind of in-dividuals and increase the intellectual and cul-tural reference of society? How can itcontribute new values, new ways of thinkingand new forms of empowerment? Certainly,translation creates opportunities for the acqui-sition and transfer of knowledge within theframework of global communication networksbuilt up by communication culture. It opensup spaces for mutual interaction and influ-ence, and protects societies from becomingpassive recipients of imported knowledge, es-pecially when those societies cease to be pro-ducers of knowledge themselves.

Developed and developing countries alikeare moving fast to acquire the ever-increasingquantity of knowledge in its original language.Today, English represents around 85% of thetotal world knowledge balance. Thus, moreand more knowledge-hungry countries arepaying attention to translation from sourcesother than English. Efforts in this regard arenot restricted to recent or contemporaryknowledge, but extend to heritage, history,classical literature and other extant knowl-edge. Countries mastering these sources arebecoming encyclopaedic global knowledgebanks and authoritative centres of referenceon world information and terminology. Newcorporations specialised in translation have

There is clearly a

larger role for the

Arab camera to play

in presenting the

world through its

lens.

The new media use

the Arabic language,

and are therefore

starting to reach the

largest segment of

the Arab public.


been established and there have been signifi-cant initiatives by official institutions, such asthe UK WORDBANK, which employs 550professional translators. According toNewsweek, translation costs in 1989amounted to $20 billion. There are more than100,000 translated titles published in theworld every year. The total number of publica-tions, authored or translated, exceeds 830,000titles annually, and the market for translationcontinues to boom.

Consider the case of Japan: at the outset ofits phase of advancement (the Meiji era), Japanset about transferring all scientific and culturalknowledge into Japanese, in addition to send-ing outstanding students to learn advancedsciences from the West. Japan has also con-cluded agreements with major internationalpublishing houses to publish a Japanese edi-tion of each scientific publication immediatelyafter its publication in its original language. Itis estimated that 1,700 titles are translated an-nually. Now, Japan translates 30 million pagesa year.

The United States has set its sights onbeing the global reference point and data bankof the world. Despite the fact that almost 85%of the world’s scientific production is inEnglish, the US makes it a point to translate allscientific publications, as well as the culturallegacy of world civilizations.

The state of translation in Arab countries

For Arab societies, translation is a formidablechallenge and a vital requirement that necessi-tates the organisation and planning of effortswithin the framework of an ambitious and in-tegrated Arab strategy.

The history of translation in the modernperiod began in both Egypt and Lebanon fordifferent reasons, and thus it followed differ-ent courses. In Lebanon, translation started asan attempt to protect the Arabic languagefrom Ottoman “Turkisation”. In Egypt itstarted during the era of Muhamad Ali andtook the form of an active social movement.Sheikh Rifaa Al-Tahtawi managed to maketranslation a social institution, which con-tributed to the achievement of a national pro-ject, and which aimed at bringing about anoverall revival of science and industry. This ac-

tivity, though, was obstructed and eventuallyfailed.

Most Arab countries have not learnedfrom the lessons of the past and the field oftranslation remains chaotic. In terms of quan-tity, and notwithstanding the increase in thenumber of translated books from 175 per yearduring 1970-1975 to 330, the number of bookstranslated in the Arab world is one fifth of thenumber translated in Greece. The aggregatetotal of translated books from the Al-Ma’moon era to the present day amounts to10,000 books - equivalent to what Spain trans-lates in a single year (Shawki Galal, in Arabic,1999, 87)3.

This disparity was revealed in the first halfof the 1980s when the average number ofbooks translated per 1 million people in theArab world during the 5-year period was 4.4(less than one book for every million Arabs),while in Hungary it was 519, and in Spain 920.(Figure 2.9.)

There are no accurate statistical data re-garding the academic level of these transla-tions. But a marked shortage of translations ofbasic books on philosophy, literature, sociol-ogy and the natural sciences is quite evident.Meanwhile, translations of some titles of muchlesser importance exist. A crucial policy forthe future will be to organise the selection of

The aggregate total

of translated books

from the Al-

Ma’moon era to the

present day amounts

to 10,000 books -

equivalent to what

Spain translates in a

single year.

The Arab Organisation for Translationwas established in Beirut, Lebanon inDecember 1999 as an international, non-governmental, independent and special-ized agency.

The Organisation aspires to accom-plish a qualitative and quantitative ad-vance in translation activity to and fromthe Arabic language in various branchesof knowledge, to introduce science intocontemporary Arab culture, to stimulatedemand for translated books and to de-velop a plan for promoting translation inthe Arab world.

The Organisation adopts the con-cept of "translation-research", whichaims to transmit knowledge rigorouslyand accurately and to support translationwith research on technical terms, intro-ductory material and annotation in orderto create a better understanding of the

text. In this manner, it strives to build anenvironment of trust which encouragesresearchers and students to accept trans-lations, thus overcoming widespread andjustifiable reservations about many cur-rent translations, especially those drivenby commercial motives.

The Organisation is guided in what itselects for translation by what it deemsnecessary for scientific and intellectualadvancement. The selection results froma wide and thorough process of consulta-tion, surveys and proposals tabled at thepan-Arab level, which pass through sevenspecialized committees dealing with re-spectively: Foundations of ScientificKnowledge; Contemporary ScientificCulture; Philosophy; Social and HumanSciences; Applied Sciences andTechniques; Arts and Literature; andLanguages and Lexicons.

BOX 2.5

The Arab Organisation for Translation

Source: General Director, Arab Organisation for Translation.

3This number was erroneously stated as 100,000 in AHDR1.


books for translation in order to fulfil Arabacademic research needs. Such a policy is re-quired to make translation an effective force inadvancing research and knowledge in the re-gion.

Figure 2.9Number of books translated in Arab countries(per 1 million people) compared to selected countries, 1981-1985

Source: Unesco, 1995.

This chapter shows that the dissemination of knowledge in Arab countries is beset by many dif-ficulties. Chief among these is the absence of a strategic vision and societal incentives that providea solid foundation for knowledge dissemination through education, media, publishing and trans-lation. These channels have the potential to be major shapers of a cultural and scientific climateconducive to knowledge adaptation and production. Yet in all three, quality, excellence and in-dependence, which remain the most important dimensions of a knowledge society, have suffered.This trend has to be reversed through conscious policy-making. The following chapter discussesknowledge acquisition on higher levels of society, focusing on the production of knowledge.

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 69

The production of knowledge, the focus of thischapter, takes place at an advanced stage ofknowledge acquisition in any society and is thewidest, if not the only, gateway to the worldknowledge society. The quantity and quality ofknowledge produced by a society is evidence ofits ability to add to the world reserve of humanknowledge and to renew the wellsprings of itsown creativity.

What is the status of Arab scientific, tech-nological, literary and artistic productiontoday? What are the factors that have shapedthe current situation? This line of enquiryholds the essential keys to the development ofknowledge producing societies in the region.

This chapter seeks to evaluate the amountof knowledge produced in the Arab world. Italso analyses how far the conditions requiredby a knowledge society (qualified researchworkers, innovative institutions, supportivepolicies) are present in the region. In doing so,it investigates the quality of scientific researchand technological development, and the prod-ucts of creativity in the humanities, social sci-ences and the arts. The two central questionsthat all Arab countries must answer are: whatin the past and present points to a brighter fu-ture for the advancement of knowledge pro-duction in Arab countries, and what are themeans that will enable countries to own sci-ence, rather than merely importing some of itsapplications and results?

The history of scientific developmentshows that science cannot be developed with-out institutions dedicated to this purpose andwithout promoting the vocation of scientistsand scientific applications. Moreover, scientificculture can only pass from one society to an-other, whether by means of translation or thetransfer of scientists and know-how, if the req-uisite infrastructure and institutions for em-bracing science and owning it are in place.

Europe would not have been able to utilise sci-entific knowledge at the beginning of the in-dustrial revolution had not scientific education,on the one hand, and scientific culture, on theother, permeated society through many chan-nels.

Knowledge production in Arab countriesCHAPTER 3

The first attempt at scientific modernisa-tion in the Arab world was made byMuhamad Ali in the first half of the 19th

century. This attempt, as well as othersthat followed it, encountered severalstumbling blocks.

Two illusions thwarted the attemptand they continue to trap many develop-ing countries. The first was the belief

that scientific production could be trans-ferred without planning and building astrong infrastructure for research, andwithout laying the foundation of a scien-tific and technological culture in societyat large. The second, an outcome of thefirst, was the erroneous belief that basicresearch is dispensable for financial rea-sons.

BOX 3.1

Muhamad Ali’s Experience in Scientific Modernisation

Source: Roshdi Rashed, in Arabic, background paper for AHDR2.

Civilised nations must have a culture as-sociated with the history of their scien-tific thought… Our scientific life inEgypt needs to be attached to our past inorder to acquire the necessary strength,vitality and controls. We in Egypt trans-fer the knowledge of others and leave itfloating without any relationship to ourpast or any contact with our land. It is acommodity that is foreign in its features,foreign in its words and foreign in itsconcepts. If we mention theories, we as-sociate them with faceless names that wehardly know. If we talk about concepts,we use intimidating words that driveaway thoughts and unsettle the mind.

We have first to publish the scientificbooks authored by Arabs and translatedby Europeans, like the books of al-Khwarizmi and Abu Kamel in algebraand arithmetic, those of Ibn al-Haythamin physics, of al-Buzjani, al-Bayroni, al-Battani and other leaders of scientificthought and talented researchers… Wemust pay attention to honouring our an-cient scientists and researchers. This willprompt us to imitate them and follow intheir footsteps.

*The first professor of mathematical physics and thefirst Arab Dean of the Faculty of Science, CairoUniversity.

BOX 3.2

Ali Mustafa Mosharrifah* - On the importance of the history ofscience for a knowledge renaissance

Source: Roshdi Rashed, background paper for AHDR 2.


SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION:NATURAL SCIENCES ANDTECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ANDTECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT– OUTPUTS

Up-to-date and accurate information aboutthe outcomes of research and development(R&D) in the Arab region is hard to come byin the absence of comprehensive statistics onspecialised sectors or research topics. Yet cer-tain outputs can be measured through scien-tific publications, patents and inventions.

Scientific research

Based on the number of scientific publicationsper million people (26 research papers in1995), Arab countries fall within the advancedgroup of developing countries, which includeBrazil (42), China (11) and India (19), al-though they are still far removed from the pro-duction levels of developed countries, such asFrance (840), the Netherlands (1,252) andSwitzerland (1,878).

The scientific publication movement inthe Arab world experienced a substantial in-crease in the last three decades of the 20th cen-tury. The number of papers published byArab scholars in specialised global periodicalsincreased from 465 papers in 1967 to nearly7,000 in 1995, i.e., by 10% annually. This in-crease was, however, modest in comparisonwith some developing countries, such asBrazil, China and East Asian Tigers such asKorea. Calculating the rate of increase in pub-lished scientific papers per one million peoplemakes an instructive comparison with thesecountries. Based on that indicator, the numberof scientific papers per one million people inthe People's Republic of China in 1995 was 11times what it was in 1981. In South Korea, itwas 24 times greater. In Arab countries, how-ever, it was only 2.4 times greater, increasingfrom 11 papers per one million people in 1981to 26 papers in 1995.

At the institutional level, only 26 Arab sci-entific institutions published more than 50 re-search papers each in 1995, while only fivesuch institutions published more that 200 pa-

pers. Most of these publications were in applied

fields, such as medicine, health and agricul-ture. Medicine, health and life sciences ac-counted for 32% of the total R&D productspublished by Arab countries in 1995 andchemistry accounted for 19% of total researchproducts for that year. When one adds tothese fields the papers published in agricul-ture, engineering and associated fields thetotal products of applied research represented90% of all publications. Publications in basicsciences, astronomy, chemistry, physics andmathematics did not exceed 10% of total re-search (Amr Armanazi, background paper forthis report).

These rates have important implications.Despite the increase in the number of pub-lished Arabic research papers in specialisedglobal periodicals, Arabic research activitycontinues to be far from innovative. Most of itis applied research and only a small portion isrelated to basic research. Research in ad-vanced fields, such as information technologyand molecular biology, is almost non-existent.

Among the indicators for measuring thequality of research in general is the number ofreferences made to it. The higher the level of aresearch paper and the more it adds to humanknowledge the more references it attracts. Thefirst Arab Human Development Report indi-cated that only one paper each in Egypt, SaudiArabia, Kuwait and Algeria in 1987 wasquoted more than 40 times, while in theUnited States 10,481 papers were quotedmore than 40 times and in Switzerland 523 pa-pers (First Arab Human Development Report,2002, p. 67).

Patents

Indicators of the number of patents in Arabcountries confirm the weakness of R&D activ-ity, which lags far behind that of developedcountries and other countries of the develop-ing world. Table 3-1 indicates the number ofpatents registered in the United States duringthe period 1980-2000 for some Arab coun-tries, compared to patents registered from se-lected non-Arab countries. It should be notedthat a large number of patents registered inArab countries are by foreigners. (AmrArmanazi, background paper for the Report).

Arabic research activity

continues to be far

from innovative.

Research in advanced

fields, such as

information technology

and molecular biology,

is almost non-existent.


Scientific publications and patents are use-ful but insufficient indicators of scientific re-search and technological developmentactivity. They do not indicate the full spectrumof innovation activity, which is more related todevelopment support products. National in-novation, in general, includes the develop-ment of new products, production processesand services and the development of moderntechnologies for sectors where technologyplays an important role in performance and in-creases efficiency. Indicators related to inno-vation processes, such as the design andengineering of products, production processesand software, are not readily available.Innovative capabilities can, however, begauged by demonstrating the widespreadpresence of innovations in national and for-eign markets that can be counted and evalu-ated. On that criterion, there are virtually noArab innovations on the market, a fact thatconfirms that Arab scientific research has notyet reached the innovation stage.

TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCHAND DEVELOPMENT – INPUTS

Producing knowledge workers

Higher education fuels the knowledge societyand produces those who will work in it.National scientific research and developmentactivities, as well as industries, need highlyqualified graduates and researchers with en-quiring and trained minds and flexible skills.

Statistics indicate a sustained increase inthe number of students in higher education in-stitutions in Arab countries over successiveyears, with a noticeable increase in the numberof female students. These statistics indicate,however, that only a small number of studentsand graduates have opted to specialise in basicsciences, engineering, medicine and other sci-entific subjects. The low rate of graduates,both researchers and technicians, in scienceand technology disciplines undercuts effortsto build balanced human capacity in the fieldof science and technology. There is also a needfor larger numbers of graduates of intermedi-ate technical institutes to enlarge the pool ofworkers with technical know-how and skills ofa practical nature.

Training in Arab countries in general isdriven by supply rather than demand and thefocus is on quantity, not quality. With a fewexceptions, higher education systems respondweakly to labour market needs related to sci-ence and technology. This situation is not ex-pected to change noticeably, barring a strongpush on the demand side from industry, busi-ness and national institutions and in the con-text of coherent and comprehensive scienceand technology policies, which clearly empha-sise these urgent orientations. Upgrading thelevel and quality of training also depends onan increase in funding. Higher education insti-tutions generally underscore that they lack re-sources, a complaint borne out by statisticsrelated to per capita expenditure, with somevariations between Arab countries. Theunder-funding of higher education impactsnegatively on science and technology in partic-ular, because these fields require the provisionand renovation of costly special facilities,equipment and materials. Meagre facilities in-evitably lead to a marked decline in the level ofgraduates in science and technology fields,which in turn limits the ability of research cen-tres and productive firms which employ thesegraduates to achieve advanced levels of scien-tific and technological performance and ac-complishment.

In general, the ratio of students enrolled inscientific disciplines in higher education inArab countries is small, compared to ad-vanced countries in the field of knowledge,such as Korea, although Jordan, followed byAlgeria, are distinguished among Arab coun-tries in this field. See Figure 3.1.

TABLE 3.1

Number of patents registered in the United States from Arab and non-Arab countries during the period 1980-1999/2000

Training in Arab

countries is generally

driven by supply rather

than demand and the

focus is on quantity,

not quality.

The under-funding of

higher education

impacts negatively on

science and

technology in

particular.

Arab Countries Other Countries

CountryBahrainEgyptJordanKuwaitOmanSaudi ArabiaSyriaUAEYemen

No. of Patents6771552517110322

CountryKoreaIsraelChile

No. of Patents16,3287,652147

Source: Abdulkader Djeflat (March 1999) and Omar Bizri (April 2000).


Workers in scientific research anddevelopment

The data available on the number of R&Dand technical workers in the region and by in-dividual countries is scarce and incomplete.

There are, however, a number of telling indi-cators of the present situation:• The total number of full-time researchersin Arab countries, including those pursuingthe equivalent of full-time research amongteaching staff, is around 35,000. Half of thisnumber works in Egypt.• There is an average of 3.3 researchersholding masters and doctoral degrees for every10,000 persons in the Arab work force (1996statistics). This is a very low percentage, repre-senting 3% to 10% of the rates of the same in-dicator in developed countries.• There are only 50 technicians for every onemillion citizens, another very low figure whencompared to the 1000 technicians per millioncitizens in developed countries. • Women and their talents are significantlyunder-represented in scientific research insti-tutions in Arab countries. In Egypt the per-centage is relatively higher than in other Arabcountries. Nevertheless, across the region,considerable potential exists for investingmuch more in women scientists, engineers,and technicians. (Amr Armanazi, in Arabic,background paper).

Figure 3.2 indicates the low ratio of scien-tists and engineers working on research anddevelopment in Arab countries compared toother regions of the world.

The number of countries on which dataare available was 91 countries (out of 179), ofwhich only 5 were Arab countries.

Expenditure

Stimulating research and development re-quires the political will to indigenise scienceand establish the necessary infrastructure.This calls for greater R&D outlays than thefractional sums Arab countries currently in-vest, which do not exceed 0.2% of GNP, al-though this ratio varies from one country toanother. For comparison purposes, the ratiosspent by developed countries vary from 2.5%to 5%. Furthermore, 89% of expenditure onR&D in Arab countries comes from govern-mental sources, while productive and servicesectors spend only 3%, as against more than50% in developed countries. (See Table 3.2)

The low level of investment in research by

Figure 3.1Ratio of students enrolled in scientific disciplines in higher educationin selected Arab countries and Korea, 1990-1995

Source: Based on data from the World Bank, 1998.

Figure 3.2Number of scientists and engineers working in research and development(per one million people)*Regions of the world, 1990-2000

Source: UNDP, 2002.

In Kuwait, 44 per cent of university grad-uates receive their degrees in the human-ities, 18 per cent in public administrationand 12 per cent in Islamic law.Graduates in natural sciences, engineer-ing, medicine, pharmacology, health and

nursing represent just 26% of the totalnumber of graduates.

Furthermore, 67 per cent of all grad-uates in higher education are women.This is partly due to the fact that manymale students study abroad.

BOX 3.3

Kuwait: Profile of University Graduates

Source: Country Report prepared for AHDR 2.

* The average number in the region is calculated as a weighted average (population number in 2000) for data on the number of scientists and engi-neers working in research and development by country.


the productive sector, both public and private,is a clear indication of the poor environmentfor, and weak level of innovative activity inArab countries, considering that governmentspending largely covers only salaries.

As these figures illustrate, societal aware-ness of the far-reaching importance of sup-porting scientists and science is extremelyweak. The enormous gains in knowledge thataccrue from a vital local R&D establishmentshould not be held hostage to social indiffer-ence. Leadership is required to motivate Arabsocieties to take responsibility for research andinnovation. In developed countries, enter-prises, wealthy individuals, foundations andnon-profit organisations all finance such re-search.

In the long run, boosting public and pri-vate investment in R&D activity will raise theadded value of products, processes and ser-vices generated from such research, providedthat new research is translated through inno-vation activities into commercially marketableresults. Successful commercialisation wouldmake it possible to invest a portion of the re-sulting profits in financing future innovationactivities. This would generate a sustainable fi-nancing dynamic, which would continuouslyreplenish R&D. It would transform R&Dfrom a drain on state and private sector bud-gets to a profitable investment, supporting thegross national product and driving the wheelof economic and social development.Encouraging the private sector to financeR&D does not, however, imply that the stateshould relinquish its important responsibilitiesin this field. Scientific research, especiallybasic research, cannot be a captive of the mar-ket. States play a large role in ensuring policyconditions conducive to institutional research,and in incentivising the private sector, throughtax and other instruments, to invest in re-search and innovation.

Institutions

There are essentially three categories of Arabinstitiutions that focus on research and knowl-edge development. The first are higher educa-tion institutes and their affiliated researchcentres; the second are free-standing spe-cialised centres of scientific research; and thethird are R&D units with links to industry.

According to some estimates, there are atotal of 588 such entities in the region.

There are 184 Arab universities, all withactivities associated with higher education andscientific research and promotion. Scientificresearch in higher educational institutions andsome associated centres is often academic incharacter, although there are visible moves insome Arab countries (Algeria, Iraq, Qatar,Libya, Egypt and Morocco) to link a portionof research projects to societal needs.

The specialised scientific research centresassociated with some universities vary in size,means and productivity, but most of themfocus on agricultural, health and engineeringresearch. (The total number of centres special-ising in industry, energy and petrochemicalsdoes not exceed one-third of the number ofcentres specialising in agriculture). Accordingto available estimates, there are some 126 ofthese affiliated centres in all Arab countries.(Taha Tayeh Al-Nu’aimi, ScientificInstitutions in the Arab Homeland and theirImpact on Scientific Research Activity, 2000.)

In the second category, there are approxi-mately 278 scientific research centres and or-ganisations outside universities, includingcentral research organs (national research cen-tres and institutes) and those connected withministries or industrial and agricultural firms.Table 3.3 indicates the distribution of thesecentres in the various Arab countries.

The great majority of these centres spe-cialise in agriculture, water resources, health,nutrition and the environment. Centres spe-cialising in biotechnology or electronics do not

Leadership is required

to motivate Arab

societies to take

responsibility for

research and

innovation.

Scientific research,

especially basic

research, cannot be a

captive of the market.

TABLE 3.2

Rate of expenditure as a percentage of GNP and sources of R&Dfunding: Arab states compared with selected countries, 1990-1995

Region or group

of countries

Average expenditure

(% of GNP)

Percentage share of funding sources

United States, Japan and Sweden

Germany, France,United Kingdom,Italy, Australia andCanada

Greece, Portugaland Spain

Turkey and Mexico

Arab states

3.1

2.4

0.7

0.4

0.2

Government Industry Other

20-30

38

54

65-73

89

55-70

52

35

14-31

3

4-10

10

11

5

8

Source: Subhi Al-Qasim, 1999.


exceed 3 percent of the total.The third category of R&D institutions is

the research and development units associatedwith productive enterprises or established asindependent units. These units are small innumber and their performance is below ex-pected levels. There are no specific data abouttheir total number, but it is estimated thatthere are some 16 units belonging to the pri-vate sector and concerned with industry. (AmrArmanazi, background paper for this report.)

The amount of R&D activity in the organ-isations and centres outside universities seems,in general, to be the same level as that carriedout in the universities and the centres associ-ated with them. University-based research it-self is often either purely academic or narrowlyapplied in orientation, and is mainly driven bysupply. In both arenas, research projects oftenlack clear objectives, a firm results orientationand a sense of urgency linked to producinghigh-impact developmental outcomes within atime-bound plan.

Possibly the most telling sign of weaknessin Arab scientific R&D agencies is their inabil-ity to transform research results into invest-ment projects. This vital orientation is usuallyeither missing in research plans in the firstplace, or is simply beyond the knowledge, ex-pertise, and facilities these institutions canmuster.

PRODUCTION IN THEHUMANITIES AND SOCIALSCIENCES

The human sciences have historical traditionsdating back to the time before the indepen-dence of the Arab countries, as is the case withstudies of history and civilization, for instance.Social sciences as full-fledged disciplines,however, did not emerge and take hold inthese countries until after independence whenuniversities and research centres were estab-lished to teach and research these sciences. Inother words, social sciences did not exist in theArab world before the 1960s, with a few ex-ceptions, mainly Egypt. In some countries,such as the Arabian Gulf countries, they didnot emerge until a decade later.

The status of human and social sciencesdiffers from one Arab country to the next inthe level of their development, scholarshipand social and political returns. There is notenough accurate data to draw an Arab map oftheir distribution. There are, however, generaltrends, which can be monitored on the basis ofpartial indicators. While Iraqis and Syrians,for instance, made excellent contributions tothe study of history and civilisation, Egyptiansmade advanced contributions in the field ofeconomic and political sciences, compared toother Arabs. Research traditions in sociologyand anthropology seem stronger in the ArabMaghreb, in terms of both theory and method-ology (Al-Taher Labib, background paper forthis report).

The emergence of specialised research andtraining in these fields is tied to the rise of themodern nation-state, the national projects itproposed and the difficulties it faced in itsearly stages. From the outset, social sciencesand human sciences dealing with "nationalhistory" were subject to political and bureau-cratic steering. Directives to "find practical so-

Research projects

often lack clear

objectives, a firm

results orientation

and a sense of

urgency.

TABLE 3.3

Number of scientific research centres (outside of universities) inArab countries

Country

AlgeriaBahrainDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMorocco

No. of centres

3011732295918316

Country

OmanPalestineQatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen

No. of centres

21337314152439

Source: Al-Nu’aimi, 2000.

Total 280

TABLE 3.4

Number of scientific and technological research centres (outsideuniversities) in Arab countries, by field of specialisation andnumber of countries of location

Research field

Agriculture and water resourcesIndustrialConstruction and developmentHealth, nutrition and environmentSpace and remote sensingEnergyBasic and pure sciencesInformatics, computer and communicationsBiotechnologiesElectronicsOther

No. of centres

271231668421120

Percentage

763484317221154454

No. of Arab countries of

location

15147111012644315

Source: calculated from data by Al-Nu’aimi et al., 1988.


lutions" defined their mission. This pragmatictrend incurred for certain disciplines, particu-larly sociology, an unjust reputation for beingpurely empirical, with no theoretical structure.That prejudice continues today. It also led tothe emergence of certain "specialisations"with direct practical goals, such as "social ser-vice", a trend that spread throughout universi-ties in countries of the Arab East, but whichdid not affect most of the Maghreb countries.

Many Arab scholars in the human and so-cial sciences draw attention to a paradox intheir situation. They note that, for Arab acad-emics, students and researchers in particular,higher barriers have, in the course of events,actually accompanied the globalisation ofknowledge, despite its promise of freer flowsof knowledge, ideas and people. Undeniably,strained relations between some Westerncountries and Arab countries at different timeshave had an impact on the development of thehuman and physical sciences. This obstaclepartly accounts for a regression in knowledgeof foreign languages among university stu-dents and graduates who have remained intheir own countries. A new kind of monolin-gual professor and researcher has started togradually replace the kind of bilingual acade-mic who in the past dominated most Arab uni-versities and research centres. It has alsoaffected Arab participation at internationalscientific meetings and, consequently, theArab presence in international scientificgroups and networks. (Al-Taher Labib, back-ground paper for this report.)

A form of Arab self-containment hobblesco-operation with international partners inthe humanities and social sciences. The em-phasis on the "specificity" of Arab societies, acommon preoccupation in Arab countries, hasplayed a negative role in this respect, leadingto a neglect of anything that is not "related toour reality" and a narrow focus in research onlocal or purely Arab subjects. This tendencyhas sometimes deprived Arab scholars of acomparative perspective and the capacity tolink the particularities of their context to gen-eral structures and trends in the wider world.There is no accumulated tradition of Arabscholarship on the "Other". Institutions con-cerned with the study of other societies are al-most non-existent. This is a striking

incongruity, given the external challengesfaced by Arab countries.

Meanwhile, this form of insularity also af-fects Arab students pursuing research abroad,the majority of whom concentrate on researchtopics about their own countries or region.Few Arab PhD theses earned outside the re-gion deal with the society in which the re-searcher temporarily resides. On the otherhand, students and researchers who come tothe Arab world, often do so to become moreclosely acquainted with the Arab world and tostudy it.

As a result, there is no accumulation of anArab stock of scientific knowledge about "theOther". While Arab scholarship is becomingmore inward looking, this tendency is not re-lated to the will of scholars as individuals, butrather to a whole tradition and set of politicalchoices.

Difficulties in the cognitive relationshipwith the "Other", and those arising from com-munication in Arabic, have thus limited howfar Arab research is integrated into interna-tional networks. This, in turn, places restric-tions on the universal dimension of research inArabic. There are only a handful of Arabscholars and researchers who regularly writein foreign languages, whether English orFrench, and who commonly address issues ofglobal interest.

It must, however, be said that Arab re-searchers, for all their concentration on Arabissues, have yet to establish a single dynamicArab network or scientific group. A few scien-tific societies and professional associationshave sprung up in disciplines such as econom-ics, sociology, philosophy and history. But onthe whole, Arab production in the social andhuman sciences remains an essentially individ-ual effort and there are no circles or institu-tions that consistently work on bringing Arabresearchers together and supporting them inan organised manner.

Thus, Arab researchers in the humanitiesand social sciences frequently work in a vac-uum. They are integrated with neither globalnor Pan-Arab groups. This isolation has led inseveral cases to observable frustration that hasbegun to turn into a general mood, reflected ina withdrawal into individual pursuits and akind of indifference, not only to public affairs

There is no

accumulated tradition

of Arab scholarship on

the "Other".

While Arab

scholarship is

becoming more

inward looking, this

tendency is not related

to the will of scholars

as individuals, but

rather to a whole

tradition and set of

choices.


but also to questions of knowledge per se. Freedom of intellectual expression may be

a more central issue in human and social sci-ences than in natural science because of thevery nature of the study rather than the natureof the intellectual. In the Arab world, the for-mer sciences are subject to many factors thatlimit freedom of thought. In addition to socialand cultural limitations inherited and inter-nalised, there is the intervention of politics andlaws associated with politics, which directly orinvisibly draw red lines for research in the hu-manities and social sciences.

Freedom of thought and of expression,and the laws to guarantee them, are primaryenabling requirements for quality scholarshipand intellectual development. These require-ments ought to be seen not only in a politicalperspective, but also from the standpoint ofknowledge. Serious work is needed to per-suade Arab governments that restricting intel-lectual freedom is tantamount to deprivingsociety of its capacity to generate the meaning-ful, innovative and productive knowledge thatis a precondition for survival and success inthe 21st century.

LITERARY AND ARTSPRODUCTION

Literary production, as a field of knowledge,transcends material reality, yet a powerful in-trinsic relationship remains between the cre-ative imagination and reality. A work ofimagination is both mirror and lamp. It re-flects reality and illuminates it at the sametime. Literary knowledge is intricately tied tosocial dialectics. It is a form of knowledgeinasmuch as it draws on reality and is inspiredby it. It then transfigures that reality in a man-ner that surpasses what is and looks forward towhat can be.

It is important to distinguish between thestatus of literature and the arts and the statusof scientific research and technological devel-opment. Compared to the extent of knowl-edge production in the sciences, Arab societieshave produced a wealth of distinguished liter-ary and artistic work that stands up to high

standards of evaluation. The main reason forthis divergent performance lies in the essentialdifference between the prerequisites for liter-ary and scientific production. While it is im-possible for an Arab scientist to win the NobelPrize in physics without having access to thebasic requirements of scientific research –such as a serious political commitment to sup-porting R&D and a social context that valuesscience and scientists and offers requisite facil-ities, including laboratories, qualified workteams and sufficient financing – it is possiblefor an Arab novelist to win the Nobel Prize forLiterature without institutional or materialsupport. There is no causal connection be-tween prosperity and good literary produc-tion. In some instances, difficultcircumstances and intellectual and politicalchallenges can actually motivate artists andstimulate literary creativity. Yet while censorscannot defeat creativity itself, they canlengthen the gauntlet to be run in putting cre-ative products into the hands of the public.1

Nevertheless, Arab authors and artists facegreat difficulties of their own. While there maybe no conditional relationship between liter-ary creativity and prosperity, yet, for this cre-ativity to flourish and grow and benefit thesurrounding environment, artistic expressionneeds a climate of freedom and cultural plu-ralism. It also benefits from strong financialand institutional support. These circum-stances are not available to most Arab creativeartists. In general, Arab artists in all fields (lit-erature, plastic arts, music, theatre, and cin-ema) work without support from institutions.Success or failure, sustained or sporadic pro-duction, depend largely on the personal cir-cumstances of each artist.

THE SHORT STORY AND THENOVEL

The rise of the Arab novel and short story arelinked to the beginnings of the modern era.They have come to represent a new creativediscourse parallel to the movement of societyand expressive of its struggles and crises. Inthe second half of the 20th century, the Arab

Restricting intellectual

freedom is tantamount

to depriving society of

its capacity to generate

the meaningful,

innovative and

productive knowledge

that is a precondition

for survival and success

in the 21st century.

A work of imagination

is both mirror and

lamp.

1A paradox of Arab censorship: the novel which won the prize for creativity in the Arab cultural capital in 2002 was banned from distribution in thatsame capital by the censor. In another case, the novels of the author who won the first prize in the largest book exhibition in the region in 2002 weresubsequentry banned.


novel and short story achieved a qualitativeand quantitative presence as accepted artforms. All Arab societies now contribute toproducing both forms, with no substantial dif-ference between countries at the centre andthose on the periphery.

Poetry, on the other hand, which is the dis-tinctive literary genre of the Arabs, has beentouched by the winds of change. The move-ment of modern Arab poetry testifies to this.Moreover, while poetry once dominated Arabculture the modern Arab literary tradition haswidened to accommodate the novel and shortstory as well.

There are no accurate statistics on the ac-tual amount of literary production in the Arabworld; and the conflicting figures that areavailable call for prudent treatment. For ex-ample, sources note that between 1990 and1995 in Lebanon, approximately 564 worksfor children were published, compared to 730in Egypt (Faisal Hajji, in Arabic, 1995).However, there are many books for both chil-dren and adults without registered numbers,as a visit to Egypt’s National Library wouldconfirm, which renders the process of trackingbooks very difficult. Turning to UNESCO sta-tistics on the volume of world publicationsshows that, in 1991, Arab countries produced6,500 books compared to 102,000 books inNorth America, and 42,000 in Latin Americaand the Caribbean, (Figure 3-3.) Book pro-duction, including literary production, inArab countries is evidently far from vigorousin comparison to the size of the populationand with other countries.

Book production in Arab countries wasjust 1.1 percent of world production, althoughArabs constitute 5% of the world's popula-tion. The publication of literary works waslower than the average level of book produc-tion. In 1996, Arab countries produced nomore than 1945 literary and artistic books,which represents 0.8% of international pro-duction. This is less than what a country suchas Turkey produces, with a population aboutone-quarter that of the Arab countries. Ingeneral, Arab book production centres mainlyon religious topics and less on other fieldssuch as literature, art and the social sciences(see figure 3-4). A look at book distribution oraccessibility shows that, despite the existence

Our civilisation, with all its deep histori-cal and human roots, is a civilisation oftext par excellence. Other deep-rootedcivilisations are also civilisations of textsand codes, not only of images. Textualcreativity continues to be present in us asone of the inputs of the question of ad-vancement, progress and development inour Arab societies, which are still goingthrough the labours of social liberation,as one of the presumed important out-puts of the stages of political liberation,crowned with independence. Since weare in the knowledge era, where knowl-edge and sciences are boundless and en-compass all, we live by the group, asrepresented by civil society institutions,not by individualism. Our era is one ofinstitutions, not of the noble knight whocarries a magic wand, which turns dirtinto gold. Amid this huge explosion ofknowledge, the Arab world is required toreconsider what human advancementmeans today and to benefit from hu-mankind’s accumulated achievements inknowledge, achievements which demon-strate that the world is a call for exis-tence, not non-existence. How creativeare societies that continually recreatetheir own crises?

Man in our current era cannot livelike Albert Camus’ “stranger” who leadshis own life in cold neutrality and totalindifference; or as Heidegger says, “asthough human beings were thrown intoexistence”, or like Shakespeare’s hero,Hamlet, equivocating without any actionon his part; or perhaps like Qais (themad man in love with Layla), satisfiedwith mentioning Layla without havingher with him. Which half of Kafka’s cupdo we want, while we look at the status ofcreativity in the Arab world: the full halfor the empty half? Perhaps Ibn Arabishowed us the way, when he said: "Youthink that you are a small planet, whilethe whole world is embodied in you.”

Obstacles to creativity, or, let us say,the glow of creativity in Arab societiesare numerous. They are not isolated orindividual but are the outcome of ex-tended and multiple interactions withthe various issues and crises of Arab soci-eties. Creativity and knowledge areeclipsed by more urgent issues, such asbread for the poor, literacy, unemploy-ment and the low status and marginalisa-tion of women. Ignorance becomes a taxpaid by the poor, and creativity regressesto the backbenches. It is associated only

with occasions on which we may needcreativity to beautify an ugly face fromamong life’s visages.

Another obstacle to creativity in theArab world is its collision with the “pro-hibited”, which prevents a free discus-sion and debate on issues of politics, sexand religion. Yet talking about one of thetaboo issues of this “trinity” does notnecessarily imply hostility towards soci-ety or irreverence. It is not a form of tact-lessness or impudence or blasphemy.

When talking about women’s cre-ativity, a question to ask is: Are womenabsent or “absented” from the intellec-tual and creative scene? Are they a totemstanding on the dividing line betweenwhat is sacred and what is tainted? Arethey viewed in the collective conscienceas ceremonial objects or, even worse, ashandicapped individuals whose subjec-tive outpourings call for society’s help?This often seems to be so, although stud-ies indicate that the first creative text inhistory was produced by a woman, i.e.,the text of Enheduana's Hymns toInanna in Ur, beseeching her and callingher the resplendent light and theGuardian of Heavenly and Earthly laws.

We, therefore, welcome studies onthe feminine intellect that do not make itthe monopoly of women but expand thesubject in order to unleash society’s cre-ative energies and establish humanrights, democracy and human justice forboth women and men. We seek to befree from oppression in our social struc-tures, which leads to negative attitudestowards life itself that find pleasure inharming the trees, the stones and theroads. Our involvement in creativity andwork and our attachment to humanitar-ian causes are only one expression of ourneed for protection and safety, which wehad found in the mother’s womb, an inti-mate place neither antagonistic norpainful. Our involvement carries the gladtidings of new births into life, bridgingthe gap between developed societies atthe “end of history” in creativity andknowledge acquisition and the globalisa-tion of human development, which re-mains a challenge for developingsocieties that are still trying to find theirfeet as the least advantaged in the worldarena. But we always raise hope.

Refqa Muhammad Doudeen

BOX 3.4

The Ambition of Creativity in the Arab World


of 270 million Arabic speaking Arabs in 22countries, the usual published number of anygiven novel or short story collection ranges be-tween 1,000 and 3,000 copies. A book thatsells 5,000 copies is considered a bestseller.Once again, there are no accurate statistics onthe market reality or on the actual scope of dis-tribution, yet all indicators suggest that the lit-erary book market is modest, even foracclaimed writers such as Naguib Mahfouz orYoussef Idris.

A small readership, generally only among

the educated elite, is one of the most acutechallenges facing creative writers in the Arabworld. High illiteracy rates in some Arabcountries and the declining purchasing powerof today’s Arab readers are undeniably realfactors influencing the size of this readership.

However, would literate Arab citizenswho can afford to buy some books for them-selves and their families purchase literature toread in their leisure time? There are no accu-rate statistics on the types of books preferredby Arab readers, but according to many pub-lishers and observers, the bestsellers at theCairo International Book Fair are religiousbooks, followed by books categorised as edu-cational. This observation reflects on the edu-cational process itself. Issues such as thealmost total absence of reading classes inschools, apparently the result of "not havingenough time to teach the basic curricula", andneglect of the modern Arab literary heritageshould give knowledge advocates food forthought.

Arab writers often feel remote from theirassumed audience. Moreover, the absence of adirect relationship with the readers’ marketundercuts their financial independence, an im-portant guarantee of that degree of freedom insociety that most creative writers require.Nonetheless, some Arab authors have beenable to reach a wide base of people throughfilms and the mass media (the press, the radio,and television). Many authors are also practis-ing journalists, a profession which helps themto reach readers and to introduce their worksto them.

Creating scripts for films is another popu-lar resort for writers. The Egyptian cinema, forexample, contributed to introducing NaguibMahfouz’s works to the public during themid-20th century. The author wrote or collab-orated in writing screenplays for many popu-lar films. Radio and television have alsocontributed to the popularisation of literaryworks, especially those literary genres, such ascolloquial poetry, that do not lend themselvesto publishing. While such opportunities arenot equally available to all authors, their im-portance as venues for making literary worksaccessible to the general public should not beunderestimated. (Jacquemond, 2003).

Faced with an anaemic local market, cre-

Arab writers

often feel remote

from their

assumed

audience.

Figure 3.3Number of publications – original writing and translation – per million peoplein the Arab world and other regions, 1991

Figure 3.4Relative distribution of published books by field,ten Arab countries and the world, 1996

Source: UNESCO Statistics Institute, March 2003.

Source: UNESCO Yearbook, 1999.


ative writers cherish the translation of theirworks into foreign languages. Following theaward of the 1988 Nobel Prize for Literatureto Mahfouz, a great change occurred in the in-ternational status of contemporary Arab litera-ture. Translations of Arabic literatureexperienced an unprecedented boom in thelast decade, and Arabic novels and short sto-ries have started to appear on the comparativeliterature syllabus in universities around theworld. Yet in spite of this widening distribu-tion in new markets, Arabic literature stillneeds active support to achieve the interna-tional renown it deserves.

THE CINEMA

There are film-makers across the Arab world,there are qualified and skilled artists and tech-nicians in the cinema industry and there is ad-equate equipment for film production. Yet insome Arab countries cinema production doesnot exist or is very limited. Egypt is the onlyArab country that actually has a film industry.Film production started at the beginning ofthe 20th century, a few years after the inven-tion of the cinema. It had evolved into a full in-dustry by 1919. Important institutions wereestablished, which had a great impact on thisnew art. Since then, the Egyptian cinema hasdeveloped an audience and a market in Egyptand in Arab countries alike.

The first Syrian film came out in 1928, butby 1968 no more than 20 films had been pro-duced. In Lebanon film production started in1929, but the country did not turn out morethan 100 films until 1978. In the 1960s, partic-ulary after the Arab defeat in 1967, a new cul-tural and critical movement evolved aimed atconnecting the cinema with national cultureand societal problems. New cinema produc-tion appeared in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria andMauritania: the films of this new wave gener-ally rejected the commercialism of the main-stream industry.

Some Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria,Algeria and Iraq took important initiatives inthe 1960s to support cinematic production.However, they lacked a well-defined culturalpolicy. As a result, film making receded con-siderably in the 1980s, and all but disappeared

Arab book publishing is in crisis. Thenumber of new publications is fallingand the number of copies of each issueprinted is becoming smaller, reachingonly a few hundred readers in manycases. This trend threatens to make thebook industry economically unfeasible.Big publishing houses are avoiding thepublication of serious scientific and cul-tural books, which would contribute toin-depth knowledge.

This may seem paradoxical, sincethe number of Arabic publishing housesspringing up in countries previouslywithout book industries is increasing.But most publishing houses actually con-fine their activities to small productionruns of university textbooks, often ofpoor quality, or to the production ofquick-circulating popular books onephemeral topics.

The book crisis stems from several fac-tors:

Censorship and the recession ofdemocracy and freedom of expressionThe distribution of any book in Arabcountries requires a prior permit fromlocal censors. The strictness of censor-ship varies from one country to another.While the book industry flourishes insome countries, such as Lebanon andEgypt, strict laws are often being flouted,depending on the prevailing political sit-uation. These laws are, however, appliedrandomly and strictly against certain ti-tles and authors classified as violating re-ligion, public morals, the regime orfriendly countries. Censorship in Arabcountries adopts different standards.What the censor in one country consid-ers banned, another censor in the sameor a different country considers accept-able. In most cases the censor exerciseshis/her role based on state instructions.He/she reads the texts searching for cer-tain words.

Authors and publishers are hard putto accommodate the whims and instruc-tions of 22 Arab censors. As a result,books do not move easily through theirnatural markets. Censorship in this wayadversely affects creativity and produc-tion.

Low readershipThe Arab Publishers Union notes thatreaderships in Arab countries are declin-ing, despite the increasing number of ed-ucational institutions of all forms. This isattributed to several factors:• The curtailment of active political lifeand the failure of major intellectual pro-jects: The state often dictates what read-ers may read and what authors maywrite.• Unimaginative educational systems:many schools and colleges rely on dicta-tion rather than motivating students tosearch for information in books andother sources.• Purchasing power: economic stagna-tion, declining purchasing power and theincreasing cost of living, have left the av-erage Arab citizen preoccupied withbasic issues of livelihood. Books are be-coming luxury items for educated elitesand for under-funded scientific institu-tions, schools and universities. The smallnumber of public libraries, their meagreacquisitions and limited catalogues exac-erbate the problem.• The lack of cultural developmentplans that encourage reading and instilthis habit in individuals from childhoodwhatever their social background.• Competition from the mass media:given these other factors, Arab citizensrely more on other, less expensive andless knowledge-based information mediato acquire information or entertainment.

The infrastructure for bookdistributionA lack of major specialised book distrib-utors with wide distribution networks,(as enjoyed by newspapers and maga-zines) further hampers book productionand circulation. Books are usually onlyavailable in a limited number of book-shops in major cities, reflecting weak de-mand. These bookshops offset theirfinancial losses by selling popular peri-odicals, stationery, gifts and other items.

Intellectual property rights violationsPlagiarism and violations of copyrightalso undercut book publication. In mostArab countries, deterrent laws, whichprotect the rights of the author and thepublisher, are either absent or are not en-forced.

BOX 3.5

Arab Books- A Threatened Species

Fathi Khalil al-Biss, Vice-President, Arab Publishers Union


when economic crises and security challengesparalysed the region’s political economy. Onthe other hand, other Arab countries have leftthe film market entirely to the private sector,which became the sole player in production,importation, distribution, the construction ofcinema theatres, the setting of prices and thelevying of taxes. A few other countries do notencourage a film market at all and ban publicshows and halls. It may be noted parentheti-cally that the new cinema in Arab NorthAfrican countries would not have flourishedhad it not been technically, artistically and fi-nancially supported by producers from theWest, particularly France and Belgium, andhad some European countries not openedtheir cinema and television markets to thenewcomers.

This trend has appeared recently in theeastern parts of the Arab world as well, andthere were at one time some important exper-iments in Egypt, which relied on funding fromArab institutions.

Arab films have won awards at interna-tional festivals, particularly the Cannes FilmFestival in France. The Algerian film,"Chronicles of the Years of Fire" won theGolden Palm award at that Festival. ALebanese film, "Hors la Vie" by MarounBaghdadi, won the Jury award in 1991. TheEgyptian director, Yusuf Shahin, won theGolden Palm award for his work in the film in-dustry when his film, "The Fate", was enteredin the 1997 competition. And the Palestinian

film, "A Divine Hand", by director ElijahSuleiman, won the Jury award in 2002.

Although Arab films are earning a distin-guished position in the international arena, thesituation of the Arab cinema industry remainswell below its potential and depends on indi-vidual initiatives.

The challenges to Arab cinema are thoseof the market. The cinema is a popular artform with mass appeal, and the film market istied to several strata within the audience. Inthe absence of shrewd cultural policies, stan-dards of taste have been pegged to favourcommercial and light films. Distributors havecome to control the market for Arab films,with the aim of garnering quick profits. InEgypt, when the state withdrew its support forthe cinema industry, film production recededfrom 60 per year to between 15 and 20. As aresult of the general decline of the industry,many cinema theatres were closed down. At atime when the population of Egypt is nearing70 million, only 165 cinema theatres are still inbusiness, including those situated in "CulturalPalaces". The international rate, by contrast,is one theatre, seating 250 people, per every100,000 persons. Moreover, the difference inthe availability of cinema seats from one Arabcountry to another is considerable. See figure3.5.

THEATRE

Conditions surrounding the art and produc-tion of theatre in different Arab countries varyenormously. Some countries have no theatricalmovement at all. Others have a history of the-atre that dates back to the beginnings of themodern state, especially Egypt, Syria andLebanon. In these countries, theatre haspassed through phases of recession and pros-perity, depending on political, economic, andsocial conditions.

During the 1960s in Egypt, for instance,government institutions supported theatricalactivities that reflected the state’s ideologicalorientation. With the transformation of politi-cal direction in the 1970s, the NationalTheatre turned into a bureaucratic institution,with few exceptions. Lebanon was the centreof an active theatrical movement during the1950s, which produced some distinguishedSource: UNESCO Statistics Institute, March 2003.

The challenges to

Arab cinema are

those of the market.

Figure 3.5Number of cinema seats per 1000 persons in selected Arab countries and Koreain the second half of the 1990s


works, but this movement withered after theoutbreak of civil war in the 1970s. The 1980s,on the other hand, witnessed the rise of com-mercial theatre in several Arab countries. Thistrend was profit-driven, and favoured audi-ence entertainment and distraction at the ex-pense of serious drama. Tunisia, however, hasa distinguished theatrical tradition, with fourindependent troupes, supported by the state,which have succeeded in establishing a high-quality theatrical movement. Iraq had a verygood theatrical movement, which was de-stroyed at the beginning of the 1990s after theimposition of international sanctions.

MUSIC

Arabic music, as a creative knowledge prod-uct, is a branch of oriental music. The Arabiclanguage imparts to Arabic song a specialcharacter that makes the Arabic musicalphrase distinctive. In Arabic arts, music comessecond only to poetry. Its importance derivesfrom its association with poetry and songs.Singing was the rhythmical recitation of po-etry, based on the unity of Arabic culture,which depended on shared features of Arabicart in all its forms, including improvisation,musical keys and rhythm.

The 20th century carried the winds of de-velopment to Arabic vocal music through con-tact with the Western world and as a result ofthe upgrading of the linguistic structure of thesong. This in turn brought genuine contempo-rary music that gave a rhythmical expressionto the written Arabic image. Music was also in-fluenced by the development of musical in-struments and techniques, as well as bysurrounding educational, social and culturalconcepts. This changing environment is char-acterised by new technology for realising vari-ous creative products, which mix human andtechnological instruments of expression.These new forms pave the way for techno-mu-sical products and reflect the impact of globaltrends on local cultural traditions and behav-iour.

In short, while knowledge production inthe arts shows signs of real vitality and quality,

it is small and disproportionate to the size ofthe Arab world with its human and natural re-sources. Moreover, artistic production is stilllargely the outcome of individual initiatives, orconditions favourable to particular artists.Arab institutions and societal structures rarelyplay an effective role in supporting the artsand creative artists.

FREEDOM OF RESEARCH ANDEXPRESSION AS A CONDITIONFOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

Freedom is a muscle which, when exercised,grows, and when neglected, atrophies. Non-democratic political systems which do not ex-press the interests of the people, whichsuppress freedom and which ultimately let in-dividuals lose their ability to act and take ini-tiatives, are weak hosts to creative ideas andknowledge production. 2

Most laws governing higher education anduniversity scientific research institutes includestatutes and regulations that curb the indepen-dence of these institutions and place themunder the direct control of the ruling regimes.This leads to the curtailment of academic free-doms, and encourages academics and re-searchers to avoid embarking on creative orinnovative endeavours that may lead to con-troversy or political problems. Such laws effec-tively kill the spirit of enquiry and creativity inresearchers. But distinction still remains, andArab universities host many excellent re-searchers; however, their distinction is usuallythe consequence of individual efforts or per-sonal circumstances, rather than of institu-tional support and, as such, this does notestablish an academic tradition or a researchorientation

The visual and performing arts have a di-rect connection to the public, and thereforehave a special status among other forms of art.If freedom of speech is vital to the health ofthe arts and creativity in general, it is an essen-tial prerequisite for these highly "public" arts,which are about communicating freely withpeople, activating awareness and developingfree critical thinking. The art of the theatre, for

2Undoubtedly, significant scientific production has been achieved under oppressive regimes, particularly in the natural sciences and technology, mostspecifically those concerned with armaments, through strong support from national authorities. The benefits of such knowledge production, however,were not universal to all in these societies and production itself was not sustained. The most important example of that is the former Soviet Union.

Arab institutions and

societal structures

rarely play an effective

role in supporting the

arts and creative

artists.

Freedom is a muscle

which, when

exercised, grows, and

when neglected,

atrophies. Non-

democratic political

systems are weak

hosts to creative ideas

and knowledge

production.


example, is a collective art practised in a pub-lic place. One of its basic requirements is theavailability of a space that allows a group ofpersons to practice this art freely and to com-municate with the audience directly. If restric-tions are placed on freedom of assembly orcommunication with people, the theatre losesa primary condition for its vitality. Wise cul-tural policies can prevent this loss.

The cinema, though not a live medium,also speaks to the soul and mind of the audi-ence. It projects feelings, ideas, and visionsthat can enrich the audience’s life experiencesand provide insight into its surrounding real-ity, history or inner worlds. However, not allArab countries pay due attention to the cin-ema as an expression of culture and creativity.At the same time, cinematic production is notonly an artistic endeavour, but also an indus-try, investment and a market. That dimensionof the medium is also widely neglected by thestate and dominated by private distributors.Since the cinema is a wide-reaching popularart, the societal power structures in Arabcountries have formed an ambivalent relation-ship with the medium: they may prohibit orprevent its production, but have no qualmsabout its consumption for commercial profit.

Arab film production is subject to com-mercial rules and regulations that treat the cin-ema as a consumer commodity. There are nospecial tax incentives for the cinema thatrecognise it as an art form and a tool of knowl-edge. In fact, some Arab countries imposehigh taxes on the cinema, and treat it as an en-tertainment commodity on the same level asnight-clubs and cabarets. The same logic is ap-plied to theatrical performances: very hightaxes are imposed on theatre tickets, a costthat undermines the sustainability of privatetroupes.

The degree of social freedom also affectsthe accessibility of literary works, and the ex-tent of their circulation amongst Arab coun-tries. Publishers face severe obstacles to thedistribution of books in the Arab world forseveral reasons, most important among whichare the laws and regulations governing themovement of books across Arab countries.The Arab book is often treated as a bannedcommodity, and is usually subject to censor-ship and bureaucratic procedures that place

exorbitant costs on publishers. These laws in-evitably hinder book publishing and circula-tion. As a result, some Arab scholars resort toshopping in bookstores in France or theUnited Kingdom to gain access to Arab liter-ary works, an option hardly available to mostunder-paid researchers.

Censorship substantially hinders the cre-ative process. Though no society in the worldis completely free from some form of declaredor hidden censorship, the types of official cen-sorship in Arab countries exact a heavy toll onthe arts in general. Authorities that imposecensorship over the arts vary. Some socialgroups assume the role of the censor over lit-erary and artistic production by protesting inthe press over what they consider infringe-ments of socially appropriate standards. Thesegroups sometimes even resort to the courts tostop a film or confiscate a book. Members ofthe same profession may also practise a formof censorship over each other. But the mainthreat to free literature and art in Arab soci-eties is the dead hand of the state censor onideas that are not compatible with its politicaldirection, or that may stir social unrest, or mo-bilise people over a political or social issue.Regimes that do not permit political diversityor social plurality create fertile ground for therise of extremism and regressive thinking thatis hostile, not only to the arts and artists, but tosocial progress as a whole. Ironically, tighten-ing the state’s grip on literature and the artsloosens the reins on regressive currents op-posed to human development.

Censorship regulations vary from one artform to another: the more popular the art andthe greater its ability to communicate directlywith the audience, the harsher these restric-tions are. In the theatre in Egypt, for instance,a script is subject to revision by the censor as acondition for receiving a permit to perform.Rules of censorship over the theatre are looselyphrased and permit various interpretations ac-cording to the leanings of the censor and theruling regime. Usually, the rejection of a text isjustified by claiming that it violates publicmorality and the supreme interests of the state(Sayyed Ali Isamail, in Arabic, 1997). In thisway, censorship effectively suppresses criti-cism or innovation, and thus contributes todeepening the current crisis of Arab theatre.

The main threat to free

literature and art in

Arab societies is the

dead hand of the state

censor.

Censorship regulations

vary from one art form

to another: the more

popular the art, the

harsher these

restrictions are.


Cinema production, in Arab countries, isalso subject to censorship laws and regulationsthat place many obstacles before creativity andthe treatment of vital subjects. In addition, be-cause cinema producers cannot cover their ex-penses exclusively from the local market,many take into account the censorship lawsnot only of the producing country, but ofother Arab countries as well.

Arab censorship bridles Arab artistic cre-ativity and denies Arab artists their native in-spiration. A fundamental social function of theartist is to challenge social, political, and ideo-logical orthodoxies and expose the uncon-tested received wisdom dominating a society.Innovation and critical questioning of the sta-tus quo are the very sources of creativity. Arabartists are confronted with unbending social,political and ideological frameworks that areabove accountability, and that treat innovationand change as signs of disintegration and un-rest. Moreover, some dominant intellectual el-ements in the Arab world hold nostalgically tothe past, and are ambivalent about the presentand the future. These elements fear innovationand oppose it fiercely. Thus, the Arab artist issurrounded by ideological and social currentsthat view and treat art with suspicion and issubject to the control of political regimes thatsweep social challenges under the carpet inorder to maintain their dominance.

Fear of innovation and change is also oneof the driving forces behind policies that stiflethe creative capabilities of school and univer-sity students. A social culture that encouragesand appreciates art, creative writing and music

sees to it that these subjects are widely taught.There are entire generations of Arabs whohave not learnt how to play a musical instru-ment, and who have not read literary worksbecause they were not accustomed to do so inschool. Creative pursuits taken for granted indeveloped country schools have simply beenneglected in the Arab world, with damagingresults to the creative potential of its people.

Finally, it is important to point out thatstrained international relations create certainobstacles to knowledge creation. The uneasein Arab relations with some Western countriesin modern times has negatively affectedknowledge production. When an Arab writercriticises his or her society, he or she is oftenaccused of promoting the interests of foreignpowers against the interests of the nation, be-cause (so the argument goes) by exposing theweaknesses of society, the writer is supplyingthose powers with ammunition for attackingArab countries. At the same time, Arab writ-ings critical of Arab countries have been mo-bilised to aid self-serving policies towards theArab world. The hijacking of Arab art, litera-ture or research to serve vested interests pre-sents its own problems for Arab scholars,scientists and creative artists and, ultimately,diminishes the impact of their work for humandevelopment at home and abroad.

In short, a new Arab renaissance requires anew policy environment that liberates humancapabilities in the sciences and arts by activelypromoting freedom, creativity and innovation.Without that prerequisite, the Arab knowl-edge society will remain an elusive dream.

When an Arab writer

criticises his or her

society, he or she is

often accused of

promoting the

interests of foreign

powers.

This chapter suggests that Arab countries possess significant human capital, which under newcircumstances, could serve to lead, support and sustain a knowledge renaissance centred onknowledge production. It observes that an unsupportive policy and institutional environment forscientific research, an archaic environment for developing and encouraging education and a hos-tile environment for scientific and artistic freedom and creativity could negate such progress.

MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 85

This chapter attempts a quantitative measure-ment of the state of knowledge in Arab coun-tries, focusing on knowledge capital, the coreof the knowledge production process. Ideally,the chapter would provide the most accurateassessment possible of the state of knowledgein Arab countries at the beginning of the 21stcentury. Yet in practice this attempt faces manyserious difficulties. The first is the poor data-base on knowledge, particularly on the qualityof human capital accumulated through educa-tion. Another data gap relates to the quantityand quality of knowledge production in Arabcountries: the information base on these as-pects is woefully short on accurate and up-to-date data comparable across time and space.These gaps underscore that the establishmentof such databases is one of the most pressingpriorities in building the Arab knowledge soci-ety.

INTRODUCTION

Measuring knowledge is not easy - either con-ceptually, methodologically or practically.Knowledge consists of abstract, symbolic struc-tures in the human mind that are almost impos-sible to grasp, even on an intellectual level, letalone when it comes to concrete measurement.Measurement becomes even more difficultwhen considering knowledge capital, the deter-minants of its growth and its effectiveness onthe societal level. So a resort to approximatemeasurement becomes inevitable in order toarrive at a first approximation of knowledgecapital, its growth rate and characteristics andparticularly the infrastructure for its formationand development.

Knowledge, whether looked at as a system,wealth or capital, is a multidimensional andcomplex phenomenon. As a result, the com-prehensive measurement of knowledge must

involve a relatively large number of indicatorsthat would be difficult for the human mind todeal with simultaneously. To surmount thischallenge, known statistical methods for con-structing composite indices can be adopted.However, simplicity comes at a cost. Suchmethods are sometimes criticised for reducingcomplex phenomena to a single compositeindex that over-simplifies its subject’s manifolddimensions and masks the information contentof constituent indicators.

Consequently, this chapter adopts both ap-proaches. It examines some basic indicators ofknowledge acquisition in Arab countries thatare especially relevant to building a knowledgesociety, as compared to other countries and re-gions of the world. But it also explores the con-struction of composite indices of knowledgeacquisition that depend on the availability, andcredibility, of various data.

Knowledge capital contains elements thatare not readily quantifiable. Its measurementought, therefore, to combine quantitative withother qualitative and subjective elements, espe-cially when it comes to literary and artistic pro-duction. The Report team aimed to present apilot opinion poll on those issues conductedamong faculty staff members at Arab universi-ties, as a sample of Arab intellectuals. Althoughthe survey was designed to minimize difficul-ties to the extent possible, it still encounteredobstacles typically faced when conducting re-search in Arab countries. Nevertheless, the at-tempt yielded useful information summarisedlater in this chapter.

In principle, it is advisable to take the qual-ity of the elements of knowledge capital intoconsideration. The Mean Years of Schooling(MYS) indicator, for example, is a useful yet in-sufficient measure of human capital, the solidnucleus of knowledge capital. The MYS shouldrather be weighed by a measure of the quality

Measuring knowledge capital in Arabcountries

CHAPTER 4

Measuring knowledge

is not easy - either

conceptually,

methodologically or

practically.


of educational attainment (derived, for exam-ple, from international studies of educationalattainment). This balancing is important sinceeconometric analysis indicates that the quan-tity of educational attainment is not as stronglyassociated with economic output as its quality.Indeed, economic output becomes increas-ingly sensitive to educational attainment whenthe quality of education is taken into consider-ation (Fergany, 1998). In the case of scientificoutput, measured by the number of publishedarticles in peer-reviewed journals, for exam-ple, quantity could be weighed by the fre-quency of citation, assuming multiple citationsof a certain article are an indicator of itsknowledge value.

The following attempt at measurementalso compares Arab countries, individuallyand collectively, on the different criteria ofknowledge capital, to other relevant countriesand country groups in the world. The coun-tries and groups taken for comparison includecountries considered important from the com-parative knowledge perspective. Those coun-tries include, where the data permits, Chinaand India, large nations with ancient civilisa-tions, and the principal ‘Asian Tigers’ i.e.Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. All thesecountries are known to have adopted a knowl-edge-based approach to development, withrecognised success.

It is necessary to comment once again onthe paucity of data on most aspects of knowl-edge in Arab countries. This deficiency is amajor obstacle to the accurate and compre-hensive measurement of Arab knowledge ingeneral and Arab knowledge capital in partic-ular. Turning to international databases didnot resolve the problem since data on Arabcountries is generally scarce. For example, inthe most important international database oneducational attainment, indicators of MYS in1990 were available for only 11 Arab coun-tries. The number fell to 9 countries in 2000.

Measures of the quality of educational at-tainment were not available except for a singleArab country in each of the two years, (Jordanand Kuwait, respectively).

Data on expenditure on R&D relative toGDP at the end of the 20th century were avail-able for only two Arab countries; the numberof scientists and engineers was available for

only five Arab countries. Except for six Arabcountries, the percentage of high-technologyexports of total manufactured exports was notavailable.

THE ADEQUATE MEASUREMENTOF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL

The adequate measurement of knowledgecapital requires considering the followingthree main aspects of knowledge acquisitionwith their corresponding basic elements:a. Knowledge Dissemination: essentiallythrough education, translation of books, massmedia (press, radio and TV), cinema housesand theatres.b. Knowledge Production: in two dimen-sions: Inputs: knowledge workers, expendi-ture on R&D (quantity and structure), andR&D institutions. Output: including scientificpublishing (quantity/quality), patents, thepublication of books, literary (novels, storiesand poetry) and artistic expression (drama,cinema and music).c. Infrastructure for Knowledge Capital:includes ICT infrastructure, R&D support in-stitutions, and professional organisations ofknowledge workers.

Adequate measurement, naturally, re-quires accurate, up-to-date and comparableinformation on all these fields in Arab coun-tries as well as in the countries of comparison.The Report originally set out to explore howfar Arab and international databases wouldallow for sufficient measurement of all thesedimensions of knowledge capital. For reasonsalready stated, this initial ambition was setaside for more modest goals.

TOWARDS THE BETTERMEASUREMENT OF KNOWLEDGECAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Measuring knowledge capital and its charac-teristics and following up on their develop-ment and limitations are of special importancein Arab countries. The elements of knowledgecapital are key in determining the ability to ac-quire knowledge and thus in building humandevelopment itself. Knowledge capital, itscharacteristics and development, are at thecore of knowledge acquisition. For reasons

Economic output

becomes increasingly

sensitive to

educational

attainment when the

quality of education is

taken into account.

Knowledge capital, its

characteristics and

development, are at

the core of knowledge

acquisition.


noted, the current attempt to measure Arabknowledge capital is neither complete norcompletely adequate. Yet it is important tomake a serious start in this direction and to ex-plore approaches and measures that, if takenfurther, would significantly strengthen themeasurement of this crucial phenomenon.

The initial contours of some proposals areevident. To start, all periodic statistical opera-tions (censuses and specialised surveys) shouldinclude elements for measuring human capital(i. e., educational attainment and experience1).Efforts to quantify human capital should becomplemented by good measures of its qual-ity. This is attainable either by expanding theparticipation of Arab countries in interna-tional studies of the quality of educational at-tainment or – even better – by conductingArab comparative studies on the quality ofhuman capital. The latter, unlike internationalstudies, would benefit from proficiency in theArabic language assessed.

Good measurement of human capital isimportant yet insufficient. To arrive at an ade-quate measurement of knowledge capital as abuilding block of human development, con-sideration should be given to conducting spe-cialised studies, both quantitative andnon-quantitative, in various other depart-ments of knowledge.

The prospects for better data on knowl-edge acquisition in the Arab countries wouldimprove if pan-Arab or international organisa-tions undertook to collect and evaluate suchdata, ensuring its maintenance, credibility andcomparability.

A SURVEY OF ARABINTELLECTUALS ON THE STATEOF KNOWLEDGE

As noted earlier, the Report team sought topoll a number of faculty members in Arab uni-versities, representing a sample of Arab intel-lectuals across the region, on knowledgeacquisition issues. Annex 2 includes a brief de-scription of the design of the questionnaireand survey. At the time of writing, however,the team was able to ascertain such views inonly seven Arab countries (Bahrain, Lebanon,Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco).

In four countries, the number of intellectualswho responded to the questionnaires was lessthan the targeted 96, bringing the total num-ber of replies to only 383. This reduced thebenefits of the exercise.

Thus, in presenting the results of this sur-vey, it is emphasised that the sample used wasnot selected by a standard probability method,which would support generalised attributionsto the Arab intellectual community at large.This does not, however, negate the usefulnessof the responses. Each response is undeniablysubjective, but the value of a subjective viewon knowledge issues increases with the in-crease of the knowledge capital of the individ-ual concerned. In the case of university facultymembers in particular, their views acquiremore importance because of their ability tocontribute to the formation of human capitalthrough their higher education functions.From a statistical point of view, subjectivitywas restricted by canvassing the views of hun-dreds of faculty members of Arab universities,thus increasing the objectivity level of thesample1.

The sample responding to the question-naire was almost equally divided between menand women (56% men). Most of them werePhD holders (63%), and one-third master'sdegree holders (33%). The majority of them(58%) were specialised in humanities and so-cial sciences.

The respondents generally expressed dis-satisfaction with the status of knowledge ac-quisition in their countries (the average ratioof satisfaction was 38%). Satisfaction with theextent to which knowledge acquisition serveshuman development was even lower (35%).These assessments clearly reflect the urgentneed to stimulate knowledge acquisition inArab countries.

In characterising the knowledge acquisi-tion process in their countries, the respon-dents came up with low rates in theirevaluation, as indicated in figure 4.1.• On a scale from 0-100% respondents ratedfreedom to pursue knowledge in their variousfields at 41%.• Conditions for knowledge acquisition intheir fields of scholarship satisfied the right toknowledge at 33%.

1Research in some Arab countries indicates that experience takes precedence over educational attainment as a determinant of earnings. This impliesan indirect recognition of the poor quality of educational attainment in the region.

Prospects for better

data on knowledge

acquisition in Arab

countries would

improve if pan-Arab or

international

organisations

undertook to collect

and evaluate such

data.

Respondents generally

expressed

dissatisfaction with

the status of


in their countries.


• Incentives to acquire knowledge were con-sidered just 30% satisfactory.• The extent to which knowledge acquisi-tion in their disciplines serves human develop-ment was rated only 30%.• The degree to which knowledge acquisi-tion reflects cultural diversity scored 30%.• The extent to which Arab knowledge acqui-sition takes into account the global state of theart was judged 30%.• Improvements in knowledge acquisition intheir branches of learning during the past 10years were rated only 28%.In short, according to the majority of scholarsin this sample, and with the reservations indi-cated, Arab knowledge systems are neither

sufficiently free nor adequately incentivised.Arab knowledge pursuits do not serve humandevelopment adequately, nor do they reflectthe cultural diversity of Arab society. Localknowledge development and acquisition donot capture or keep up with the global knowl-edge explosion. Finally, in the Arab world,knowledge acquisition rates compared tothose of other regions have improved rela-tively slowly.

The questionnaire included questionscomparing the status of different knowledgeareas in the Arab world to their equivalents incertain non-Arab countries, including India,China and the East Asian Tigers. Respondentsto the questionnaire clearly had difficulty an-swering these questions. Many answered with:"don’t know". Indeed, only one-third of all re-spondents addressed questions requiring com-parisons with non-Arab countries.

Women respondents were more criticalthan men, attaching less value to ongoingknowledge activities and evincing more con-cern over the absence of adequate incentivesfor knowledge development and acquisitionacross the spectrum of Arab endeavours.

Holders of a master's and PhD degree,were more critical of the status of currentknowledge acquisition than holders of lowerdegrees. PhD holders rated Arab knowledgeperformance lowest compared to India andthe East Asian tigers, see figure 4.2.

Respondents from scientific disciplinesgenerally took a dimmer view of the state ofArab knowledge than those from the socialand human sciences. The latter group’s assess-ment tended to be lower relative to the com-parator countries. Many of the respondentslacked knowledge of translated books, re-flected in the number of "don’t know" re-sponses to this question across all categories ofthe survey.

Figure 4.3 reflects the respondents’ evalu-ations of the extent of freedom in key areas ofknowledge compared to their assessments ofincentives for its acquisition. The scale 0% –50% reflects the low overall estimate of bothfreedom and incentives.

Respondents evidently judged that the ex-tent of freedom, low as it is, is higher in gen-eral than levels of incentives to acquireknowledge, particularly in higher education,

Arab knowledge

systems are neither

sufficiently free nor

adequately

incentivised.

Figure 4.2Assessment of the knowledge acquisition process in Arab countriesby academic level of respondent (%)

Figure 4.1Assessment of key features of knowledge acquisition in Arab countriesby gender of respondent (%)


research and development and arts produc-tion. This suggests the existence of obstaclesto knowledge acquisition in Arab societies be-yond questions of freedom. Two areas ofknowledge activity, radio and television, wereclearly judged to be very circumscribed interms of freedom. Cinema and theatre produc-tion, on the other hand, did not appear as con-strained. Thus, relatively low levels ofproduction in the latter two areas could be at-tributed to organisational and financial prob-lems; the same observation applies to scientificresearch and technological development inpublic sector projects.

Most respondents thought that Arabcountries are weak in technological researchand development, particularly compared tothe East Asian tigers, despite their opinionthat there is no restriction of freedom in thisarea: the discrepancy points to other (societal)obstacles. On improvements in knowledge ac-quisition over the past ten years, the lowest as-sessment was given to basic and secondaryeducation, the two areas most consistentlyfaulted by Arab university faculties.

Respondents considered that the most im-portant impediment to knowledge acquisitionin Arab countries is the deficient knowledgesystem itself. They focused on a general lack ofresources and facilities and weak teaching sys-tems, followed by poor governance and man-agement, stressing restrictions on freedom andon civil society. They also evinced keen inter-est in seeing society provide better materialand moral rewards for contributions to knowl-edge acquisition.

INITIAL APPROXIMATION OF THEMEASUREMENT OF KNOWLEDGECAPITAL: HUMAN CAPITAL

The paramount importance of education andlearning in the knowledge system has beenhighlighted in Chapter 1. This pivotal relation-ship suggests that human capital, which is thesum total of knowledge, capacities and skillsacquired by human beings through educationand practical experience, represents a rela-tively solid nucleus of knowledge capital.

Databases on human capital are wellstocked since educational statistics are rela-tively accessible and are regularly available.

Yet those statistics have their weaknesses: theytend, on the one hand, to exclude knowledgeacquisition through practical experience onwhich acceptable measures are available onlythrough specialised field surveys. On the otherhand, readily available educational statisticsrelate generally to the quantitative aspects ofeducation, such as enrolment. Data related tothe quality of education, on the contrary, aremuch less plentiful and often less credible,since they normally relate to inputs to the edu-cational process (spending levels, number ofschools, classrooms or teachers), or to inter-mediate indicators (e.g., the proportion ofpupils to teachers, classrooms or laboratories).

Capturing the real outcomes of the educa-tional process, reflected in the knowledge, ca-pacities and skills students actually acquire,requires specialised field surveys, preferably ofa comparative nature. Such studies would helpascertain the relative position of educationaloutcomes in one society as compared to othersimilar or competitive cases.

Efforts to measure the quality of Arab ed-ucation are still limited – in itself an indicationof a crisis in education in the Arab countries –and thus only a few, scattered measures of thequality of educational outcomes are available.They are found in international studies, whichare marred in turn by their own shortcomings.For example, they exclude language from theirtestable fields. Moreover, very few Arab coun-

The most important

impediment to


in Arab countries is

the deficient

knowledge system

itself.

Figure 4.3Freedom to pursue knowledge and incentives for knowledge acquisition


tries have participated in such studies (Jordanand Kuwait were the only Arab countries thattook part in one of two international studiesconducted at the beginning and in the middleof the 1990s, respectively).

The stock of human capital at thebeginning of the 21st century

The MYS (for populations older than a mini-mum age limit, usually 15 or 25 years2) is themost common indicator for measuring thestock of human capital through education. It isnot, however, free of drawbacks. Apart fromthe shortcomings of averages – the most dan-gerous of which is neglecting the question ofdistribution within the society concerned – themost significant limitation of this indicator isits confinement to formal education It ex-cludes non-formal education and the acquisi-tion of knowledge through experience. Buteven in this confined domain, the MYS, as anindicator of human capital, neglects the qual-ity dimension. This at a time when evidence isaccumulating to the effect that quality, ratherthan quantity, is the more important determi-nant of productivity enhancement andprogress through knowledge acquisition andinnovation.

Figure 4.4 illustrates the position of Arabcountries with available MYS data at the be-ginning and end of the 1990s, relative to seven

comparison countries with available MYSdata as well. It also shows averages for all Arabcountries and for sub-groups of the countriescompared.From the figure it is clear that:

First: Arab countries fall far below thecountries in the comparison, the Asian Tigersin particular.

Second: the MYS of all countries includedhave improved between 1990 and 2000. Theimprovement, on average, appears larger inthe Arab countries than in the comparatorcountries as a whole or even in the AsianTigers. The improvement, however, should beweighed against the fact that the lower the ini-tial position of a country’s MYS, the easier it isfor it to make gains on the scale. In otherwords, the countries compared preceded theArab countries in raising their MYS to a peaklevel at which point further improvement be-comes harder.

HISTORICAL COMPARISON: ARABCOUNTRIES AND THE ASIANTIGERS IN THE SECOND HALF OFTHE 20th CENTURY

This next section traces the development ofeducational attainment in Arab countries inthe last four decades, focusing on a compari-son with the Asian Tigers. For a more validcomparison, the criterion used here is theMYS for people 25 years of age or older.

Literature on the "Asian Miracle" has ac-cumulated in recent years. From an Arab per-spective, the "miracle" factor is quite intensesince in conventional economic developmentterms Arab countries used to fare better rela-tive to the Asian tigers. But in 1970 Arab GDPper capita was half that in East Asia: by theopening stages of this century it dropped toless than one seventh of GDP per capita inthat region. This is due to the significant im-provement in economic performance in EastAsian countries since the 1970s when therewas a decline, albeit slight, in Arab countries(table 4.1).

One of the most important developmentallessons of the Asian experience is the criticalrole that early and intensive investment inhuman capital played as the foundation of de-

In 1970 Arab GDP per

capita was half that in

East Asia: by the

opening stages of this

century it dropped to

less than one seventh

of GDP per capita in

that region.

2The latter age limit (25 years) takes into consideration educational attainment levels among the older groups of the population. This age range tendsto "penalise" Arab countries, since education is widespread among younger Arabs whereas illiteracy is still rife among older age groups.

Figure 4.4Mean years of schooling (MYS), population 15 years of age or older,Arab countries compared to selected countries, 1990 and 2000

Source: Barro and Lee, 2000.


velopment. Does the disparity in human capi-tal formation between Arab and East Asiancountries account for their divergent develop-ment fortunes?

To try and answer this question, one of therichest international databases on educationalattainment (Barro and Lee, 2000) was used.Through it, the MYS in nine Arab countrieson which data was available throughout thecomparison period (and comprising about twothirds of the Arab population in the year 2000)was compared to the MYS for three pioneerAsian Tigers.

Figure 4.5 illustrates the large gap in thelevel of human capital formation betweenboth groups (Arab countries and AsianTigers) since 1960, disaggregated by gender.

Arab countries, obviously, did not manageto narrow the gap that separates them fromEast Asia in this respect. Rather, the gapwidened, as the difference in educational at-tainment in general grew larger: from 3.02years in 1960 to 5.26 in 2000. The gap was rel-atively wider among females, increasing from1.87 to 5.42 years over the same period, de-spite the fact that the distance between thetwo groups on the individual progress lines, asshown in the figure, is less in the case of fe-males. This is because the Arab countries withhigh levels of educational attainment among

their female population were among the lesspopulated oil producing countries.

The level of human capital formation inthe three Asian Tigers was substantially higherthan that in the Arab countries at the begin-ning of the comparison period (1960). In addi-tion, improvement in educational attainmentin the first group was faster, noting that educa-tional expansion becomes increasingly harderto achieve when higher levels of educationalattainment are reached.

Moreover, the gap between the twogroups would have appeared even wider hadthe averages included values for the Arabcountries on which no data had been available.With the exception of a few low-populationcountries such as Lebanon, this category com-prises the majority of less developed countriesin the region and other countries with rela-tively low educational attainment.3

The comparison at hand reveals one of themost important "secrets" accounting for thesuccessful East Asian development experi-

Does the disparity in

human capital

formation between

Arab and East Asian

countries account for

their divergent

development

fortunes?

3Countries with no available data: Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen, Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,Oman, Qatar, Lebanon and Palestine.

TABLE 4.1

Percentage of real Arab GDP per capita (1970 and 2001), compared to Asian Tigers

Year Arab countries East Asian Tigers

19702001

97

1852

Source: UNDP, Calculations by the Human Development Report Office.

Figure 4.5Mean years of schooling (population 25 years of age or older) by gender, Arab countries and three Asian Tigers, 1960-2000


ence: early and intensive investment in educa-tion, accompanied by sustained and rapid im-provement of its level.

The quality of education: findings ofinternational studies

As mentioned earlier, the number of Arabcountries with comparative measurements ofthe quality of educational attainment dwindlesto only one in each of the two internationalstudies available. To benefit from this scant in-formation, it was assumed that the average rel-ative score for both countries in the twostudies applied to all Arab countries at theend of the 20th century.

However, before continuing with theanalysis on the basis of this assumption, it isworth noting that this average is attributed totwo countries where the quality of educationcan be expected to be better than the averagefor all Arab countries. Jordan, for example, isknown to have a relatively better educationalsystem and a high societal motivation for edu-cation. Kuwait, with its relatively generousspending on education, also stands out amongthe Arab countries.

Thus, it can be said without exaggerationthat the average quality of educational attain-ment in Jordan and Kuwait is expected to sur-pass that in the majority of Arab countries,particularly the countries with limited educa-

tion budgets and those with disadvantageouslegacies in education. This means that the rel-ative position of the Arab countries, as a resultof applying the average quality indicator ofJordan and Kuwait to all Arab countries, is aprojection brighter than the present Arab real-ity.

Figure 4.6 illustrates the relative positionof Arab countries between 1990 and 2000 ona human capital composite index. In additionto the MYS, the index takes into considerationthe quality of educational attainment (by mul-tiplying the MYS by a coefficient for the qual-ity of educational attainment). Compared tofigure 4.4, the figure shows an increasing di-vergence between Arab countries on the onehand and the comparator countries in generalon the other hand. In other words, taking thequality of human capital into account accentu-ates the relative backwardness of the Arabcountries vis-à-vis the other countries in thiscomparison, notably the Asian Tigers.

It is reiterated that the comparison at handand the inferences drawn are rather weakowing to the scarcity of data on the compo-nents of the composite index, especially on thequality of educational attainment.

TOWARDS A COMPOSITE INDEXOF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL

This section seeks to characterise knowledgecapital in Arab countries within the compara-tive framework adopted. Although the multi-ple facets of knowledge enjoin the use ofmultiple indicators, data availability on any in-dicator, in Arab countries and the world atlarge, was a major criterion for including thatindicator in the analysis. Taking into accountthe earlier discussion about measuring knowl-edge capital adequately, it was decided to con-sider ten indicators relating to different facetsof knowledge capital.

The following are the ten indicators onwhich data were available worldwide and forArab countries around the year 2000:1. The quality-adjusted MYS 2. Daily newspapers (per 1000 people)3. Radios (per 100 people)4. TV sets (per 1000 people)5. Scientists and engineers (per million people) 6. Patent applications filed (per million peo-

Taking the quality of

human capital into

account accentuates

the relative

backwardness of the

Arab countries.

Figure 4.6Quality adjusted mean years of schooling (QAMYS), population 15 years of ageor older, Arab countries and selected countries, 1990 and 2000


ple)7. Book titles (per million people)8. Telephone mainlines (per 1000 people) 9. Cellular mobile subscribers (per 1000 peo-ple) and 10. Internet hosts (per 1000 people).

Table A-10 in the statistical annex givesthe values of those ten indicators, which wereavailable on 109 countries, including eightArab countries and five of the countries cho-sen for comparison. There were, however, nogood data available on all indicators for all thecountries. The percentage of the countrieswith non-available data varied from one indi-cator to the other; all countries had data avail-able on information infrastructure whereasmore than a quarter of them had no data avail-able on some basic indicators, e.g., scientistsand engineers engaged in R&D, the number ofbook titles, and even on the core indicator, thequality-adjusted MYS.

To overcome these limitations in the basicdata, statistical means for estimating the miss-ing observations, based on the values of thoseavailable, were resorted to. The result was acompleted array of data; Table A-11 of the sta-tistical annex shows the completed data set,with imputed values for missing observationsframed.

The ‘Borda’ rule was applied to the com-pleted data array. The rule consists of assign-ing an overall rank to each country throughsumming its ranks on each of the ten indica-tors. This overall rank represents a valid "so-cial welfare function". The result of thisprocedure is given in Figure 4.7, where thelowest rank is the best.

In general, the figure indicates the rela-tively low position of the Arab countries in-cluded in the analysis (the average overall rankfor the eight Arab countries included is 69).

Yet a striking disparity is evident in the rel-ative positions of individual Arab countries.Dividing the index into four groups, stagnant,intermediate, aspiring and leading, puts Koreaamong the leaders while only one Arab coun-try, Kuwait, falls within the aspiring group.Other Arab countries for which data was avail-able occupy intermediate or stagnant posi-tions. (Several Arab countries without datawould undoubtedly have fallen into the lowerpositions on the knowledge capital contin-

uum). More importantly, the conclusions implied

by the figure cast considerable doubt on boththe indicators used and the prototype compos-ite index itself. For example, India, with its nu-clear capability, space programme andotherwise recognised technological capacity inmore than one sphere, occupies the tail of thecomposite index along with some Arab andother countries notwithstanding the fact thatthere is a significant gap between these coun-tries in terms of their scientific and technolog-ical capabilities.

This prompted an enquiry into the knowl-edge outcomes which signify the presence ofknowledge capabilities and a comparison be-tween them and the composite index just dis-cussed.

The knowledge outcomes considered in-cluded the following:• High technology exports (as a percentageof total commodity exports)• Nuclear facilities (ownership of a nuclearreactor)• Existence of a space programIn addition to:• Technology Achievement Index (TAI) val-ues (UNDP), as well as some standard devel-opment indicators:• Arab Human Development Index (AHDI)rank• Human Development Index (HDI) value

Dividing the index into

four groups, stagnant,

intermediate, aspiring

and leading, puts

Korea among the

leaders while only one

Arab country, Kuwait,

falls within the

aspiring group.

Figure 4.7Ranking of Arab countries compared to other countries and regions on the com-posite indicator of knowledge capital, 2000


• Per capita GDP (in PPP, US dollars). Data on these indicators are given in Table

A-13 of the statistical annex.Analysing the relationship between the ten

knowledge capital indicators utilised in theprototype composite index and these knowl-edge outcome indicators, (Figure 4.8 andTable A-14 in the statistical annex), demon-strates a relatively weak correlation betweenboth groups of indicators, with the exceptionof human capital (quality and quantity) wherethe correlation with knowledge outcomes isrelatively strong.

The question now is: what do we eventu-ally conclude from this measurement attempt?

A valid, simple yet perhaps overly simpleconclusion is that the indicators used are sub-stantively inadequate and that data scarcity is amajor impediment to adequate measurement,aggravating the substantive deficiency of theindicators.

The Report team’s preferred conclusion,however, is that cumulative knowledge out-comes offer decisive insights into how knowl-edge advances are achieved. It is evidentlypossible for societies to make substantial ad-vances in knowledge even when their standardindicators of knowledge capital are modest –as in the cases of large countries such as Indiaand China. This suggests that valuable knowl-edge achievements might depend crucially onmatters that involve: political will and leader-ship; the capacity to raise and mobilise mater-ial, technical and human resources; and thedrive to focus national efforts on attaining anindigenous societal renaissance that is bothpeople-centred and patriotic. Motivated soci-eties can lift themselves by their bootstraps toachieve large knowledge outcomes ostensiblybeyond their means.

Cumulative

knowledge outcomes

offer decisive insights

into how knowledge

advances are

achieved.

Motivated societies

can lift themselves by

their bootstraps to

achieve large

knowledge outcomes

ostensibly beyond

their means.

Figure 4.8Correlation coefficient between knowledge capital indicators, knowledge outcomesand other development indicators around the year 2000

4ownership of a reactor


Despite the methodological and other challenges encountered in this attempt at measure-ment, it is quite evident that Arab countries lag behind the more advanced developing countriesin building knowledge capital. The comparison is even more disquieting relative to the perfor-mance of the world’s front-runners in knowledge capital formation and knowledge production.

Arab countries should, however, not take this as discouragement. Rather, these insights sign-post another way forward, one that may lie much less in catching up with others on standardknowledge indicators, and much more through concentrating on knowledge outcomes. With ro-bust and intellectually distinguished institutional structures, and with political determination sup-ported by sufficient resources, particularly on the pan-Arab level, it may well be possible toemulate some of the striking knowledge outcomes of other developing countries whose conven-tional knowledge indicators do not surpass those found in the Arab world.

THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 97

This chapter discusses the organisational con-text in which knowledge is acquired in Arabcountries through the transfer and adaptationof technology. The discussion considers issuessuch as: the importance of national innovationsystems; policy and institutional prerequisitesfor establishing a knowledge economy; and thevital role of entrepreneurs. It reviews the expe-rience of Arab countries in transferring andadapting technology in the past, and assessesthe role of foreign direct investment (FDI) andbusiness incubators in contemporary Arabmarket economies.

INNOVATION SYSTEMS ANDTECHNOLOGY1

Innovation is the ability to manage knowledge,as embodied in technology, in a creative way inresponse to market requirements and the needsof society. Dynamic national innovation sys-tems are the key to the efficient management oftechnology transfer, absorption, adaptationand diffusion in knowledge economies. Thebasic concept behind such systems is that ittakes multiple actors to innovate and produceknowledge. Innovation does not depend solelyon how individual enterprises, universities andresearch institutions perform, but also on howthey interact with one another, and with thepublic sector. Effective innovation systems areflexible networks capable of using existingtechnologies and knowledge capital to createnew forms of technology that raise productivity

and growth, increase competitiveness in worldmarkets and serve human development.

As indicated in figure 5-1, an effective in-novation system is a complex whole. Moreover,its success is heavily influenced by social valuesand culture and by prevailing economic, legaland political systems and structures. The stateplays a particularly important role in develop-ing public policies and directions and in estab-lishing institutions and systems capable ofdiffusing innovation in society. The state is re-sponsible for establishing a favourable eco-nomic environment, an effective educationaland training system and an advanced commu-nication structure. It provides critical supportsto the economy and industry by replenishingfactors of production and it encourages the de-velopment of markets that can absorb theproducts of firms and enterprise

Where do Arab countries stand vis-à-vis in-novation systems of this kind?

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,MANAGEMENT AND ADOPTIONIN THE ARAB WORLD

With few exceptions, the experience of indi-vidual Arab countries in technology transfer,management and adaptation has not met initialexpectations, although technology transfer hasalways been a top national priority. Arab coun-tries recognised, at an early stage, that theirsocio-economic development required movingtowards industrial (including agricultural in-

The organisational context of knowledgeacquisition

CHAPTER 5

It takes multiple

actors to innovate and

produce knowledge.

With few exceptions,

the experience of

individual Arab

countries in

technology transfer,

management and

adaptation has not

met initial

expectations.

1Technology has a life cycle which starts with its birth in research and development laboratories, and continues through its testing and empiricaladoption, at which point it is called emerging technology. It eventually reaches the stage of maturity with actual use and, over time with the emer-gence of more modern technologies, it becomes “old” or obsolete technology.

Technology management includes several processes starting with technology testing, followed by acquisition and use. The adaptation of technologyis the stage that follows the import of technology, when local human resources and institutional structures are able to control and fully understandtransferred technology, at which point it becomes possible to employ this technology effectively in realising the purposes of the society. Technologydevelopment is a more advanced stage that makes it possible to invent new technologies locally, by which new and globally competitive productscan be manufactured. This includes the unpacking of bundled technology, reverse engineering, local development and adapting technology to theenvironment and human development. An even more advanced stage in this chain is the generation of technology, which includes the activation oftechnological research and development, the management of the national innovation system, the adoption of patents and intellectual property rightsand the stimulation of human development through the application of new technologies.


dustries) and export-based economies. Thisperception, in principle, was correct, yet it wasnot translated into effective policies.Industrialisation policies, in particular, cen-tred merely on the acquisition of factories andproduction technology (purchase contracts),and on the training of local labour to producegoods in acquired factories using acquiredmeans of production. The erroneous beliefwas that this step in itself would constitute atechnology transfer that would be a prelude tothe indigenisation of technology.

Initially, such factories used technologiesand production processes that kept up with(or lagged only slightly behind) the interna-tional state of the art at the time. This allowedfactories to meet all or some of the local mar-ket’s needs for a period of time. But these sim-ple acquisition policies, which did notrecognise the importance of managing andadapting these technologies, left the produc-tion sector highly vulnerable since the tech-

nologies it depended on became obsolete overa short period of time. Once caught in thistrap, most Arab countries responded by pass-ing and enforcing protection laws, which in-evitably, and unrealistically, prolonged the lifeof those early production units. Spread out inthe economy, these industrial dinosaurs even-tually become a drain on national resourcesand a major impediment to socio-economicdevelopment.

As the crisis of development in Arab coun-tries grew worse, reflected in the severe deteri-oration of national infrastructure and publicservices, and as the gap between them and theadvanced countries widened, many aban-doned their failing industrial policies. Theyturned instead to liberalising the economy andtrade and enacting laws to encourage foreigndirect investment (FDI).

Some countries, such as Tunisia andEgypt, espoused wide-ranging FDI-friendlypolicies. They created a host of legal and fi-nancial incentives to entice multinational com-panies to open subsidiary branches on theirsoil so that Arab production systems could bepart of a vertical integration process reachingup to the international economy and openingup two-way flows of knowledge and technol-ogy. For the first time, a dilemma that had longbeen intractable – the transfer and adoption oftechnology – seemed to have been resolved.

Arab governments that took this approachbet on the idea that open trade, economic andindustrial policies would encourage the ad-vanced world to invest in the growth of the re-gion, strengthen national infrastructures andcreate an environment conducive to free flowsof technology. They believed this new coursewas superior to the previous acquisition-basedapproach and part of the logic of globalisation.Indeed, the new laws and investment opportu-nities did stimulate a financial and economicrevival in most of the Arab countries that ap-plied this approach. However, this revival wasuneven across the region and within countriesits benefits were not equally spread; moreover,it proved to be short-lived.

The windfall that Arab countries experi-enced from these policy changes was tempo-rary because they were not actively andeffectively involved in the global productionand export movement. Growth quickly

For the first time, a

dilemma that had long

been intractable – the

transfer and adoption

of technology –

seemed to have been

resolved.

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ManagingNational Innovation System, Paris, 1999, P.23.

Figure 5.1: Actors and linkages in the innovation system


reached a stagnant point and then receded.More significantly, the open door policies thatwere implemented were not conducive to thereal transfer and adaptation of technology.

Reflecting on their experiences with FDIand with vertical integration, Arab countrieshave come to realise that their expectationsmay have invited another disappointment.Whether the extended production chain in-volves the manufacture of spare parts, elec-tronics components or garments, the commonexperience is that multinational companies re-serve the knowledge- and skills-intensive com-ponents of the production process forthemselves and leave developing country part-ners to produce at the low end of the technol-ogy tree.

In Tunisia, for example, the new policiesled to the establishment of companies verti-cally integrated with the European car indus-try, on the face of it a sound development.However, a closer look shows that the newcompanies specialise entirely in the low-tech-nology stages of the car industry, such as theproduction of seats and electrical systems. Yetthis experience can also be judged from abroader perspective: integration on theseterms represents only an entry point to tech-nology acquisition and transfer, and to becom-ing an active part of the global productionsystem, one that avoids protectionist policiesthat are eventually harmful to the host econ-omy.

TECHNOLOGY POLICIES IN ARABCOUNTRIES

Experts estimate that more than 45% of the in-crease in per capita income in the West in re-cent years is attributable to technologicaladvancement. Investment in R&D brought inthe highest gross investment returns, com-pared to investments in other sectors. (ImadMustapha, background paper)

Some Arab researchers maintain that Arabindustrial and technology acquisition policiessince the mid-20th century have been largelyineffectual (Antoine Zahlan, in Arabic, 1999).Although Arabs invested more than US $2.5trillion in gross fixed capital formation be-

tween 1980 and 1997, chiefly in factories andinfrastructure, the average gross domesticproduct per capita actually declined duringthat period.2 This indicates that those sub-stantial investments did not promote real tech-nology transfers; what was transferred werethe means of production and not the technol-ogy. Agricultural production in the regionrepresents a striking example of a sharp de-cline in productivity and poor use of moderntechnologies: more than 50% of the Arablabour force work in this sector, yet valueadded from it accounts for just 10% of ArabGDP.

Evidently, Arab countries have not at-tained a level of development that would en-able them to adapt the technologies they haveimported at different times. In the absence ofnational science and technology policiesgeared to the creation of national innovationsystems, this is hardly surprising. Practicallyspeaking, the absence of such systems in Arabcountries means that past investments in in-dustrial infrastructure and fixed capital havebeen wasted. Those investments have yieldedneither gains in technology, nor increases inproductivity or social returns.

Investment in the means of productiondoes not mean a real transfer and ownership oftechnology; it only means an increase in pro-duction capacities – a gain enjoyed for a lim-ited period of time and one which quicklystarts to vanish as the acquired technology be-comes obsolete. Products and services gener-ated by this technology become economicallyunfeasible and uncompetitive in local markets,while at the same time technology and produc-tion in the advanced countries renew them-selves and accelerate forward, thanks to thedynamism of their national innovation sys-tems. The Arab world, which is obliged topurchase new production capabilities when-ever the technologies it owns become obso-lete, is currently – and expensively – stuck atthe wrong end of the technology ladder, a sit-uation which drastically reduces Arab invest-ment returns.

The common

experience is that

multinational

companies reserve the

knowledge- and skills-

intensive components

of the production

process for

themselves.

The Arab world, which

is obliged to purchase

new production

capabilities whenever

the technologies it

owns become

obsolete, is currently –

and expensively –

stuck at the wrong

end of the technology

ladder.

2It is only fair to point out that a large portion of gross investments in Arab countries went to infrastructure projects which, in most cases, were ur-gently needed and which do not necessarily bring in quick economic returns.


ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES OFKNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION INARAB COUNTRIES

The current state of knowledge institutionsand networks in the Arab world is far removedfrom what is required to establish an effectiveArab innovation system. While this state per-sists, major problems will recur in the transferand adaptation of technology and in knowl-edge production. The following paragraphshighlight some salient differences between thecurrent and the ideal situation in innovationand knowledge production.

LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCHINSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCTIVESECTORS

Promotion of R&D Results

The vigorous promotion of scientific researchand the active utilisation of research results indevelopment are among the most importantcriteria for measuring how far R&D institu-tions have achieved their goals and succeededin diffusing new knowledge in society. Yet thepromotion of R&D results faces major diffi-culties and obstacles in most Arab countries.Among the reasons are weak links betweenR&D institutions and the production and ser-vice sectors and the absence of, or markedgaps in, vital innovation “brokers” such as re-search institutes and think tanks that occupyan intermediary position between R&D andproduction and marketing.

Industrial R&D institutions are weaklylinked to production priorities and the knowl-edge level of basic industrial technologies re-mains low. Moreover, many R&D centres lackdesign and modelling abilities and demonstra-tion and experimentation units. These institu-tions also suffer from poor planning andorganisational capabilities and lack appropri-ate methods for managing technology, innova-tion and diffusion. Academicism in research isanother significant flaw. There is a trend inmany R&D institutes to reward and promoteresearchers on the basis of academic researchand published scientific papers rather than forpurposeful applied research and its contribu-tion to solving problems faced by the produc-

tion sectors. Research projects of interest to in-dustry, firms, enterprises and services thathelp industry absorb and develop importedtechnologies and advance their innovation ac-tivities are few and far between.

As a result, many accomplishments ofArab R&D institutions remain incomplete, be-cause they do not reach the stage of invest-ment. Some Arab countries have taken initialsteps to adopt effective mechanisms for theuse or promotion of R&D results. Chiefamong these is the introduction of “contractresearch” in universities and research centres,a modality that ties research more closely tomarket demand. This approach has increasedthe ratio of completed research projects in uni-versities for the benefit of recipient sectors,helped to identify appropriate local substi-tutes, penetrated the industrial secrets sur-rounding some industrial components,enhanced the performance of some produc-tion units and overcome obstacles to manufac-turing. The size of this experiment, however, isstill extremely limited. In Egypt, for instance,the number of research contracts the results ofwhich have been marketed in this way wasabout 142 during the period 1971-1997.Projects completed on demand from recipientfirms did not exceed 43 during the same pe-riod (Amr Armanazi, background paper forthe Report).

Intermediate Institutions SupportingTechnological R&D Production

In addition to the direct links between R&Dcentres and universities on the one hand (sup-ply side), and production firms on the other(demand side), R&D efforts can gain forceand find their way to production firmsthrough various intermediary institutions andstructures, both governmental and private,which can offer key technical, professionaland support services in one or both directions(supply and demand), according to their spe-cialisation. These structures include industrialR&D centres linked to specific production ac-tivities, design bureaux, contract research in-stitutes and business incubators. In Arabcountries, industrial R&D centres are almostnon-existent, and design bureaux are limitedalmost entirely to the construction sector.

In the absence of the sophisticated and

Industrial R&D

institutions are weakly

linked to production

priorities and the

knowledge level of

basic industrial

technologies remains

low.

Many

accomplishments of

Arab R&D institutions

remain incomplete,

because they do not

reach the stage of

investment.


value-adding services normally associated withintermediary institutions, such as design engi-neering, project engineering, production engi-neering, process engineering and qualityengineering, R&D remains largely decoupledfrom the process of technological change. Apromising change in this respect is the growthof business incubators, which are starting toplay an increasing role in Arab countries.

No knowledge economy can take off with-out substantial, targeted and risk-tolerant in-vestment. Such investment requires asupportive financial and banking system. Thisincludes the development of venture capitalsystems of all kinds to help kick-start new in-dustries based on knowledge and moderntechnology. Investment banks, developmentcapital banks, venture capital funds for inno-vation and grants for the employment of scien-tists and researchers in industry and theprivate sector are much needed intermediaryinstitutions in Arab countries. These financingentities provide critical links between R& D,production and services.

The Role of the Creative Entrepreneur andTechnological and Business Incubators

Many Arab countries are moving quickly to es-tablish free market economies. Reaping the re-wards and efficiencies of the market, however,requires two basic conditions: competitivenessand the encouragement of a critical mass ofcreative entrepreneurs ready to accept risks inseeking new areas of technology generationand goods and services production. Neithercondition is a common feature of Arabeconomies. The realisation of both requireschanges throughout the entire fabric of soci-ety, from systems of upbringing and societalvalues to the public policy environment andthe supporting institutional infrastructure, in-cluding educational and financial institutions.The dominant value and educational systemsin Arab countries remain largely risk-averse.There is little recognition that entrepreneursare natural and necessary innovators in theeconomy. Moreover, financial institutions inArab countries are still not limber enough torespond quickly to new opportunities, partic-ularly when it comes to providing funds forsmall and micro-enterprises. In the West,many new and value-adding projects start

small, particularly in the field of informationand communication technology. Venture cap-ital plays a substantial role in catalysing tech-nological change by supporting start-up firmsand businesses.

Business incubators are relatively newstructures for supporting innovation in smalland medium-sized enterprises and for encour-aging pioneering creative developers who lackthe necessary means to develop and markettheir research and technological innovations.The basic concept behind incubators is thatthe authors of a new project or innovative ideaneed sponsorship and a learning environmentin which to grow and acquire the means forsuccess. Incubators provide a controlled envi-ronment, services, including skills and advice,and materials that fledgling enterprises needto take off. In short, incubators connect talent,technology, capital and know-how to leverageentrepreneurial talent, accelerate the develop-ment of new knowledge-based businesses andthus speed up the commercialisation of newtechnology.

Arab countries have taken more and moreinterest in business incubators since initial at-tempts and trials started in Jordan and Egyptin 1989 and 1994 respectively. Recently,Tunisia (1999) and the Emirates (Abu Dhabiin 2000) have started their own projects of thiskind. In other Arab countries incubators haveappeared in technological capacity-buildingplans or in various support programmes forsmall and medium sized enterprises.

The experiments of Jordan and Egypt pro-vide further examples of the development ofincubators in Arab countries. The Social Fundfor Development in Egypt, originating in aUNDP initiative in 1992, established a majornetwork of incubators as part of its pro-grammes for the development of small enter-prises and income generation. The EgyptianIncubators Association, a non-governmentalorganisation established in 1995 for this pur-pose, implements the incubator programme.The Association has conducted feasibilitystudies for 37 business incubators and tech-nology support and services centres in variousEgyptian governorates. Nine have alreadybeen implemented. In Jordan, the JordanianTechnology Group has established 17 inde-pendent companies in various technological

No knowledge

economy can take off

without substantial,

targeted and risk-

tolerant investment.

Financial institutions

in Arab countries are

still not limber enough

to respond quickly to

new opportunities.


fields.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

It was noted earlier that the traditional indus-trialisation policies of Arab countries did notlead to the transfer and adaptation of technol-ogy, nor did they push the wheel of develop-ment forward. New Arab policies forencouraging foreign direct investment (FDI)may not lead to this goal either unless theytake into account the basic conditions for thecreation of a knowledge-flow environmentthat would contribute to developing innova-tion systems in Arab countries. The basic andmost important factor in the process of tech-nology transfer and adaptation remains theR&D sector, which drives the process fromthe initial stage of flawed transfers throughadaptation and then on to technology genera-tion and effective participation in the worldtechnological system. Understanding thattoday R&D is the weakest link in Arab innova-tion systems is the first step in overcoming pre-sent-day impediments to knowledgeproduction.

Until Arab countries develop and seam-lessly connect the elements of their innovationsystems, technology transfer and developmentthrough FDI will remain capped by certaintechnological limits. Countries will not be ableto transform their rentier economies into highvalue-adding economies, let alone knowledge

economies that would allow human develop-ment to take root in the Arab world.

FDI and its role in technology transfer andadaptation in Arab countries

Arab experts continue to debate the meritsand demerits of FDI as an international tech-nology transfer channel. Some point to thefailures of vertical integration with global in-dustrial chains. Others argue that Arab coun-tries have not done enough to take advantageof such chains, and the FDI they funnel, or tocreate local capacities and environments con-ducive to the transfer and indigenisation oftechnology. They note, for example, that, aspartners, Arab countries have been incapableof negotiating effective management contractsor responsive technology licensing agree-ments.

It remains a fact that Arab countries haveso far met with little success in attracting FDI.It would be optimistic to expect to see anyArab countries listed among the top ten recip-ients of FDI worldwide, given that currentglobal patterns favour the wealthier countriesand East Asia; certainly none is. But not oneArab country appears in the top ten among de-veloping countries either. Table 5.1 illustratesthe anaemic level of FDI in some Arab coun-tries in the period 2000 - 2001.

The table makes it clear that FDI levels inthe region are very low. Morocco comes highonly as a result of selling 35% of the shares ofthe Morocco Telecommunication Company toa foreign investor for US$ 2.7 billion, whichhelped to raise its inflow in 2001. Yet this isobviously neither a recurrent nor sustainabletrend.

The investment environment in Arabcountries remains an obstacle to FDI inflows.Figure 5-2 shows that in 1999 this environ-ment was well below the optimum level in allthe Arab countries in the sample.

Tunisia and Egypt have tried to link FDIflows to technology transfer by adopting poli-cies that promote that connection. For exam-ple in Tunisia, all investments geared towardsenergy preservation, research developmentand marketing of new capacities are entitled toa 10% discount on import taxes. In addition,value-added tax (VAT) on imported goodsand materials that have no local substitute is

TABLE 5.1

Estimated Net FDI flows, by host country 2000-2001 (millions of dollars)*

Country

AlgeriaBahrainEgyptJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMoroccoOmanQatar Saudi ArabiaSyriaSudanTunisiaUnited Arab EmiratesYemen

2000

43835812353916298-14220123252-1884270392779260-201

2001

119692510169-40249-10126584923720205574486-156-205

* Net FDI flows in five cases (Kuwait in 2001, Libya in 2000 and 2001, Saudi Arabia in 2000, United Arab Emirates in2001, and Yemen in 2000 and 2001) were actually negative.Source: World Investment Report (2002) UNCTAD.

Until Arab countries

develop and

seamlessly connect

the elements of their

innovation systems,

technology transfer

through FDI will

remain capped by

certain technological

limits.


suspended.Tunisia’s philosophy is to invest in human

resources. The state’s active investment policyis guided at the highest governmental and na-tional levels. Top priority has been given totraining Tunisia’s human resources and labourforce (one quarter of the country’s generalbudget is earmarked for education and train-ing). The focus of training is on technologicalspecialisations, particularly information andcommunication technologies. As an Arabcountry which launched a national initiative toupgrade its technological level, and which es-tablished a special organisation for FDI pro-motion, Tunisia is a good example of what anArab state can accomplish in this field.

FDI actually receded globally in 2001,with the bulk of its flows confined to channelsbetween the US, Western Europe, theNAFTA region and South East Asia. WhileArab policy makers and experts continue withtheir debate on the benefits and risks of FDI,the fact remains that Arab countries are frac-tional players on the margins of this globaleconomic activity. Whether FDI leads to thetransfer and adaptation of technology, or sim-ply stimulates job opportunities, new dynam-ics in the economy and the movement oftechnology in the Arab region, any talk aboutexpanding Arab countries’ participation in thegeneral trend remains notional at this time.

Arab policymakers often speak about at-tracting international investments by grantingfirms tax incentives and promoting their coun-tries’ comparative advantages, yet they fre-quently ignore the fact that FDI flows are alsorelated to a number of other equally vital fac-tors that are part of the national innovationsystem, as identified in Figure 5.1. That figureillustrates the various factors that positively oradversely affect FDI in the fields of technologyand industrialisation, particularly the availabil-ity of flexible, trained and highly skilled work-forces.

Very likely, economic growth based onR&D, rather than simply on FDI, holds outthe principal hope for accelerating develop-ment in the region and narrowing the gap be-tween Arab countries and the technologicallyadvanced world. The reason is that growthnever occurs merely as a result of the accumu-lation of resources (the conventional approach

adopted in the past in Arab countries), but asa consequence of the enhancement of produc-tivity and of increasing the value added in pro-duction.

In this context it is worth noting that mostcommercial activities in Arab countries areconfined to trade between industries abroadand consumers (import agencies) inside the re-gion. Notwithstanding calls in the WTO formore trade between the North and the Southbased on mutual benefit, this pattern of tradeonly benefits one party in the trade formula.The commercial relationships that give mo-mentum to development and that play a majorrole in technology and knowledge transfer arethose that involve inter-industry trade. Sincethis kind of trade is much stronger amongstindustrial countries, and is almost non-exis-tent between them and Arab states, the cur-rent trade patterns of Arab countries will nothave much effect on technology transfer.

A further reality to be borne in mind isthat when multinational companies make di-rect investments in developing countries, theynormally keep their core technology andknowledge within the company itself.

Economic growth

based on R&D, rather

than simply on FDI,

holds out the principal

hope for accelerating

development in the

region.

Source: the Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999.

Figure 5.2The Environment for Investment: 14 Arab countries rated, 1999


Knowledge and know-how transfers and tech-nology diffusion are seldom if ever part oftheir primary strategies. This simply under-scores once again why Arab countries need tostrengthen their national innovation systems inorder to take more advantage of technology-carrying FDI and technology imports.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE ANDSCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYPOLICIES

Arab countries need to realise that technologytransfer and adaptation entail re-thinking theirunderstanding of the role of their technology-earmarked investments. This requires a shiftaway from their customary tendency to investin tangible assets (machinery, facilities and in-frastructure) and towards investing in intangi-ble assets (knowledge and human resources).Without significantly increased investment inthe latter, Arab countries will not be able tocreate successful national innovation systemsor approach the achievements of other devel-oping countries that have put the ideas, skillsand abilities of their people first.

R&D institutions and research activitiesare subject to many influences originating withgovernments that can either facilitate or ob-struct their healthy development, efficient per-formance, impact, and objectives.Government policies and legislation that bearon the financial, tax and legal environment forresearch are one set of important factors.Another set are national policies relating toconditions of employment, general infrastruc-ture, education, health and social security.Policies related to development sectors, suchas industry, agriculture, communications, in-formation and energy comprise a third set;while import-export policies and state-spon-sored measures to raise public awareness ofthe importance of science and technology canalso be influential.

Add to this the role of the state in buildingscientific and technological infrastructure, es-tablishing and financing independent and uni-versity-affiliated R&D centres and theirprogrammes, and supporting the education,training and skills development of researchpersonnel, and it is clear that governmentshave large responsibilities for promoting

knowledge. Indeed, the role of the state takeson greater significance wherever local scien-tific, technological and innovation capacitiesare weak, as is the case in most Arab countries.Cogent and comprehensive national and re-gional science and technology policies aretherefore a top priority in the Arab world.

Concentrated efforts have been made inthe past to formulate such science and tech-nology policies, with varying degrees of com-pleteness from one country to another. Theprime movers were generally government au-thorities, research centres and universities,and the resulting plans usually reflected the in-terests and requirements of the supply side,rather than of those parties on the demandside (the business sector, the state and civil so-ciety). Most of these plans have therefore re-mained vague, unpublicised andunder-utilised. Those Arab countries that didsucceed in formulating coherent science andtechnology policies were still held back forlack of strategic and operational plans. Egypt,Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates, all of which have taken steps tolaunch initiatives in science and technologywith specific and well-defined goals, havebeen exceptions to this pattern.

Several Arab countries have establishedcentral organs to plan and design scientific re-search policies. Some of them were chargedwith the task of coordinating the work of spe-cialised research institutions, while otherswere associated with their own research cen-tres. In other cases, Ministries of HigherEducation and Scientific Research assumedthe task of designing scientific policies.However, these institutions rarely settleddown to a stable programme of work; somewere eventually abolished and others suc-cumbed to structural weaknesses, which com-promised their results. Scientific concepts andpractices remained rigid, and were not influ-enced by the new thinking that took place indeveloped countries during the 1980s and1990s. Successive waves of change bypassedan inward-looking Arab scientific and techno-logical establishment, leaving it isolated fromthe dynamic global mainstream.

Governments have

large responsibilities

for promoting

knowledge.

Successive waves of

change by-passed an

inward-looking Arab

scientific and

technological

establishment, leaving

it isolated from the

dynamic global

mainstream.


MISSING PARTNERS: NATIONALAND PAN-ARAB FUNDS FORFINANCING R&D

Governments continue to bear the biggestburden of financing scientific and technologi-cal institutions in an environment where ab-solute spending on R&D is insufficient.While recent increases in government expen-diture on the various levels of education inmany Arab countries are laudable, the volumeof expenditure on scientific and technologicalactivities also needs to be boosted signifi-cantly. Yet governments have difficulty meet-ing these additional financing requirementsthemselves. The strongest justification for es-tablishing specialized financial institutions totake up the slack in funding is the importanceof stimulating qualitative changes in the scien-tific and technological policies and activities inArab countries and promoting demand for theoutputs of Arab scientific and technologicalinstitutions. These are tasks that dedicatedfunding agencies can best address.

More than 25 years after the unsuccesfulattempt to create an Arab Fund for Scienceand Technology Development and followingseveral country and national efforts in thatvein, the region is still in need of specialized fi-nancial institutions for scientific and techno-logical development. There are someexceptions, however, such as the Institute forScientific Research in Kuwait and KingAbdul-Aziz City in Saudi Arabia.

Without underestimating what some insti-tutions (such as the Arab Fund for Economicand Social Development and the Islamic Bankfor Development, for example) have been ableto provide in this area, their priorities and thestructure of their technical organs have not en-abled them to play an influential and decisiverole in bringing about the required qualitativeleap. At the same time, international special-ized agencies, such as UNESCO, are not setup as funding agencies and moreover face con-straints in staffing that handicap their effortsto play such a role effectively.

While regional and international assis-tance, both technical and financial, to someArab countries has grown in recent years, mostof this assistance has been directed towards re-orienting economic policies, restructuring the

economy and developing infrastructure, in ad-dition to humanitarian assistance and socialservices. In education, aid to the region hasconcentrated on reforming and developingbasic education, particularly increasing therate of enrolment at schools and the teachingof girls in rural areas. Only a very small part ofregional and international resources has beenallocated to scientific and technological devel-opment, and most of that has gone towardsprojects concerned with the preservation ofthe environment.

Thus, the many justifications for an ArabFund for Science and TechnologyDevelopmen, put forward more than 25 yearsago, remain valid. Rapid changes in technol-ogy as a driver of economic development havecreated additional justifications that make theestablishment of national and regional fundseven more imperative to help Arab countriestake advantage of new opportunities and po-tentials. The Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch for instance, is a promising exampleof what can be achieved.

Among their purposes and priorities, theseproposed funds could help to:• Formulate policies and create machineryto encourage increased demand for the out-puts of Arab science and technology institu-tions.• Encourage qualified Arab scientific andtechnological institutions to become regionalcentres of excellence and more competitive atthe global level.• Support studies, research and projects,which focus on finding scientific and practicalsolutions for enhancing the quality of institu-tions in education, science and technology.• Enable general and university educationinstitutions to benefit from the enormous pos-

The many

justifications for an

Arab Fund for Science

and Technology

Development, put

forward more than 25

years ago, remain

valid.

The Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch is a pioneering example of an ac-tive and successful non-governmentalfoundation established with support andencouragement from a government. TheFoundation was established in 1978 onthe initiative of the current Emir ofKuwait, when he was Prime Minister, andthe Kuwait Chamber of Commerce andIndustry. Under a Bill of the Emir, joint-stock Kuwaiti companies offer 5% (later

reduced to 2% then 1%) of their annualnet profits to the cumulative resources ofthe Foundation, whose assets have nowreached around one billion dollars. TheFoundation spends money on scientificactivities in Kuwait and the Arab worldfrom the proceeds of these funds. Perhapsits most famous activities are the five an-nual Kuwait Scientific Awards given toArab scientists every year.

BOX 5.1

Pioneering Successful Non-governmental Initiatives - The KuwaitInstitute for Scientific Research

Source: Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Background Paper For AHDR2.


sibilities of information and communicationtechnology and connect learning and scientificresearch activities and outcomes to economicdevelopment.

NETWORKING OF R&DINSTITUTIONS AT THE PAN-ARABAND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

Networking is key to the success of scientificand technological work because it enablesmany actors to contribute to raising theknowledge and value-added content of prob-lem-solving research. Studies reveal that inmany cases nearly half the inputs needed tosolve a scientific problem come from unex-pected sources. Productive scientists usuallybelong to several networks, which providethem with channels for enhancing their knowl-edge and experience. Some Arab R&D institu-tions have made efforts in the past twodecades to develop institutional networks toincrease performance and support productdevelopment, but achievements at the countryand pan-Arab levels have been limited, whileinitiatives at the international level haveproved stronger.

At the Arab level

Networking among R&D institutions at thepan-Arab level is generally limited and, whereit occurs, is often temporary and not sustain-able.

Significant indicators of collaboration in-clude scientific publications. In 1995, for in-stance, the number of scientific publicationsby scientists from Morocco, Algeria andTunisia amounted to 1,205 papers. Of thisnumber, 769 papers included contributionsfrom outside the country, but only seven in-cluded contributions from a researcher in an-other Maghreb country. Out of those sevenpapers, only one publication did not include acontribution from a Western country. It is ob-vious that scientists from the Maghreb coun-tries have been deeply integrated into theinternational scientific community, but do notseem to be as integrated into their national orregional scientific environment. Scientific co-operation at this level has been infrequent,both through exchanges of experience and in-formation.

The situation in member states of the GulfCooperation Council is not materially differ-ent. In the same year, the ratio of publicationsthat included contributions from researchersin one or more members of the Gulf

In 1976, a serious attempt was made tocreate an Arab Fund for Science andTechnology, which almost succeeded.Several positive factors were in place atthe time, including the availability of rela-tively adequate financial resources deriv-ing from lucrative oil export proceeds andthe then-prevailing belief in the impor-tance of joint Arab action.

The Conference of Arab StateMinisters in charge of the Application ofScience and Technology for Developmenthad recommended in its meeting held inRabat in 1976 the establishment of anArab Fund to provide assistance in the fi-nancing of scientific and technological ac-tivities.

The Outstanding Ministerial Follow-up Committee established by theConference entrusted the Arab Fund forEconomic and Social Development, theKuwait Fund for Economic Developmentand the Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch with the task of carrying out atechnical feasibility study and of prepar-ing a draft agreement to establish an"Arab Fund for Scientific andTechnological Development".

The document establishing the pro-posed fund set the main goal of the Fundas "the creation of an organ to help Arabstates in their efforts to overcome thebackwardness of their scientific and tech-nological capacities, their dependence andtheir marginal activity and to promote thededication of these capacities to the ser-vice of economic and social develop-ment."

The project set out a plan to translatethis goal into a number of objectives,proposing that they include the provisionof financial and technical assistance to:• Develop appropriate policies in thefields of scientific and technological devel-opment• Exploit the scientific and technologi-cal capacities, which are already available• Promote the consolidation and develop-ment of these capacities• Intensify the use of services that sci-ence and technology can offer to the vari-ous branches of production

• Encourage the appropriate transfer ofscientific and technological knowledgefrom abroad and set the terms and condi-tions upon which such transfer will bebased• Support private initiatives on inter-Arab cooperation in the field of technol-ogy.

The feasibility study indicated thenthat the range of purposes and functionswas very large. It was, therefore, necessaryto establish work priorities in light of thepriorities of member states. It was alsoproposed that, with regard to the methodschosen to support scientific and techno-logical projects, the Fund should adopt aflexible policy, including the provision ofscholarships and financial subsidies, tech-nical services and loans.

It was also proposed that the Fundshould focus its efforts on high-impactprojects under specific programmes andnot on financing institutional support. Itshould assume a complementary role inrelation to subsidies and loans providedby others. It was also proposed that theminimum capital required as a target forthe Fund should be 150 million Kuwaitidinars. The amount should be regarded asan endowment asset dedicated to theFund's purposes. The capital would notbe touched but instead invested in safe fi-nancial assets. The income accruing fromthis investment would constitute the ac-tual resources placed at the disposal of theFund to carry out its activities.

Despite the availability of relativelyadequate financing in some Arab coun-tries at the end of the 1970s and the de-clared commitment of these countries tocontribute to the Fund's capital, politicaldifferences over the management of theFund's operations and its headquartersprevented its establishment at that time.As the region’s development prospectsbegan to change at the beginning of the1980s, and with diminishing financial re-sources accruing from oil exports and thefatigue that afflicted joint Arab action, en-thusiasm for the Fund diminished and itsestablishment was abandoned.

BOX 5.2

The Arab Fund for Science and Technology Development: The Bold Venture That Almost Succeeded

Source: Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Background Paper For AHDR2


Cooperation Council was 3% of the total num-ber of publications. Those including a jointcontribution from an Arabic source were only15% of the total. This chiefly reflects the factthat universities and research centres in theGCC countries employ large numbers of re-searchers from other Arab universities, whilethe larger part of joint contributions comesfrom outside the Arab countries altogether.

In countries of the Arab East (other thanGCC member states) the ratio of joint contri-butions, including by scientists from devel-oped countries, was 25% of the total.Considering that the volume of R&D activitiesin any Arab country is limited to begin with, itis only logical to assume that networking withother Arab scientists would partially compen-sate for a low overall level of activity.Moreover, since Arab countries face a largenumber of common technological and techni-cal challenges that can be solved through ef-fective cooperation, the importance ofcollaborative research hardly needs to be un-derlined. In the vital area of water sciences, forinstance, there is a wide spectrum of problemsthat could be dealt with through joint re-search. Such activities are still weak, however,and can be substantially strengthened if frag-mented efforts in every Arab country arebrought together and lubricated by an ex-change of experiments and experience.

On the international front, an opportunitycurrently neglected by Arab R&D institutionsis to network with Arab scientists and techni-cians living abroad and, through them, withthe R&D centres and universities in whichthey work or with which they have ties. Thereare currently several institutional frameworkssupporting this pattern of networking. One ofthem is "TOKTEN", a programme estab-lished by UNDP in the late 1970s and whichcontinues to operate.

At the international level

How far Arab R&D institutions benefit fromnetworking with the scientific and technologi-cal community in developed countries ulti-mately depends on their capacity to plan,organise and manage such networks in waysthat meet Arab needs and goals. Failure to en-ergise communication and international coop-eration can be attributed in most cases to the

absence of institutions with clear objectives.Other factors are the lack of a critical mass ofresearchers on national levels in areas of prior-ity for the international R&D community, in-sufficient research funding and poor

One recent promising initiative is the cre-ation of the Arab Science and TechnologyFoundation, established in 2000, in theEmirate of Sharjah, with the aim of build-ing a coalition of Arab scientists living inthe Arab world and those residing abroadwho occupy leading positions in overseasscience and technology institutions anduniversities. The Foundation aims to be-come an all-embracing Arab foundation,providing scholarships within the frame-work of a full scientific review by scien-tists. The Foundation has secured funding

to meet recurrent and programme costsand launched its activities, which includedtwo expanded scientific meetings in 2000and 2002 that brought together a largenumber of Arab scientists and researchersfrom Arab countries and abroad.Foundation priorities include the estab-lishment of sustainable relationships withWestern laboratories and the funding ofjoint research projects by scientists fromthe Arab world and from abroad, aided byArab researchers living overseas.

BOX 5.3

The Arab Science and Technology Foundation, a non-governmentalinitiative to support research and development in the Arab world

The Academy is a unique institute in theregion, one originally established to trainpeople in the field of maritime transportthat has now developed into a distin-guished university for science and tech-nology.

The Academy was established in 1972in Alexandria, Egypt as a regional projectoffering maritime education and trainingto seamen in three disciplines: navigation,maritime engineering and business stud-ies, in addition to the training of sailors. Inits first 12 years, its student body grewfrom 733 students in 1972 to over 2500 in1984.

In subsequent years, the Academy di-versified its syllabus to cover new fields,such as engineering and management, inorder to become self-financing. Its namewas changed to the Arab Academy forScience & Technology and MaritimeTransport, and it adopted a collegiatestructure which includes the College ofEngineering & Technology, the College ofManagement, Technology and MaritimeTransport and the College of Technology.These colleges grant a bachelor's degree intechnology.

The College of Maritime Transportand Technology was provided with an in-tegrated complex of simulators used forvarious maritime sciences and the protec-tion of the marine environment from oilpollution. It combines in one building the

following simulators, laboratories andmajor equipment: a simulator for the man-agement of oil spills, oil pollution controlsystems, oil analysis laboratories, a simula-tor for the management and piloting ofships, and simulators for the transporta-tion of liquefied gas. It also houses aCentre for Geographical InformationSystems and a Multi-media Centre.

In addition to its three colleges, theAcademy includes other institutes, centresand programmes, which contribute to itsaccomplishments: the Institute ofAdvanced Administration, the Institutefor Productivity and Quality, the HigherInstitute for Professional and AppliedStudies, the Institute for EducationalResources, the Institute for InternationalTransport and the Centre for Logisticsand Community Service.

The Academy's role transcends theboundaries of the Arab world. In the past30 years, the Academy provided trainingopportunities to 257,000 students from 58Arab, African, Asian and other states. Ithas thus moved beyond its regional iden-tity to become an interregional universityof science & technology and marine trans-port, with recognized technological capa-bilities and facilities.

In 1999, the Academy was awardedthe ISO 9001 Certificate, having devel-oped and implemented a quality system inall its bachelor's degree programmes.

BOX 5.4

The Arab Academy for Science & Technology and Maritime Transport

Source: Amr Armanazi, Background Paper For AHDR2.

Source: Arabian Gulf University.


prioritisation of research objectives in terms ofnational goals.

During the period 1992-1995, several co-operation programmes were instituted be-tween scientific and technological institutionsin European countries and collaborating insti-tutions in Arab countries, supported by theEuropean Union. Arab-European scientificand technological cooperation received newmomentum following the BarcelonaConference on Euro-MediterraneanCooperation in 1995, which resulted in thelaunching and financing of new programmes,most importantly the activities carried outwithin the MEDA Programme, the financialinstrument of the Euro-MediterraneanPartnership. These programmes aimed to sup-port technological research and development,redress problems resulting from the wideningof the scientific achievement gap, activate ex-changes of experience in scientific sectors andpolicies (to enable Mediterranean partners tonarrow the gap between them and theirEuropean neighbours), support technologytransfer and help build scientific and techno-logical capacities through increased contribu-tions to joint research projects.

Figure 5.3 indicates the distribution of co-operation projects among participating Arabcountries. The data shows that Morocco par-ticipates in 28% of these projects, Tunisia in25% and Egypt in 17%.

Figure 5.4 indicates the distribution of co-operation projects by field. It illustrates thatmost cooperation projects relate to natural re-sources (51%), agriculture (21%) and health(14%). Projects related to modern technologyare limited in number: information and com-munication technology (8%), materials andproduction technology (2%) and biotechnol-ogy (0.4%).

Evidently, joint Euro-Arab R&D activitiesin the modern sciences, such as biotechnologyand new materials, are few and far between.Among the most prominent programmes ofscientific and technological cooperation be-tween the Arab region and the West are theprogrammes carried out within the frameworkof an agreement concluded between Egyptand the United States of America in 1995 for aperiod of five years. The framework was re-newed for another five-year period with effectfrom 2000. This agreement aims to enhancescientific and technological capacities, pro-mote cooperation between scientific and tech-nological communities in both countries andprovide opportunities for scientific contacts.

Research has concentrated on biotechnol-ogy, industrial technology, environmentaltechnology, standards and measures, informa-tion technology and energy. More than 70 re-search projects were funded in the latter fieldsin the period 1995-2000. Research institutionsin Egypt and more than 30 US research insti-tutions cooperated in the implementation ofthese projects, some of which produced re-sults that aroused the interest of the industrialsector, paving the way for negotiations totransform the results of these research projectsinto products.

Joint Euro-Arab R&D

activities in the

modern sciences, such

as biotechnology and

new materials, are

few and far between.

Source: Al-Bizri, 2000.

Figure 5.3Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects in researchand development among Arab countries


Chapter five observes that Arab countries’ experience with the transfer and adaptation of knowl-edge through technology, and their efforts to organise and make effective use of their own accu-mulated human and natural capital, have, on the whole, been disappointing. Weak nationalinnovation systems and institutional frameworks largely account for this outcome and for rela-tively meagre technology returns on FDI. The general absence of coherent, action-oriented scien-tific and technological policies is a further constraint. The chapter concludes that it is not possiblefor Arab countries to benefit from the fruits of global knowledge production and technology with-out investing in local production, local knowledge workers and local knowledge traditions.Current indicators of research production and economic output tell this story plainly enough.This chapter completes the assessment of the status of knowledge in Arab countries. Starting withChapter Six, the Report takes up an analysis of the societal context affecting knowledge acquisi-tion in the Arab world.

It is not possible for

Arab countries to

benefit from the fruits

of global knowledge

without investing in

local production, local

knowledge workers

and local knowledge

traditions.

Source: Al-Bizri, 2000.

Figure 5.4Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects among R&D fields

CULTURE 111

Chapters 6-8 concentrate on impediments to knowledge in the Arab world. Thisanalysis takes in: a) culture, itself subdivided into heritage, religion andlanguage; b) the dominant socio-economic structure, including modes ofeconomic production, growth and income distribution; and class structure,attitudes and values; and c) politics, including political systems, the role of elites,the corruption of knowledge by politics; the importance of codifying knowledgefreedoms under the law; the relationship between good governance and freedomof thought and expression; and the regional and global environment forknowledge transfers and development.

Section three: the cultural, socio-economic and political context

PART II

CULTURE 113

The production of knowledge is driven bystrong and increasing societal demand and thepolitical will to secure the resources necessaryfor stimulating a vital and capable knowledgesystem. This includes building high calibrehuman capital as a base, and ensuring an envi-ronment of policies and institutional structuresconducive to the system’s effective functioning.Important as they are, these factors are in turnaffected by societal, cultural, economic and po-litical determinants which also have a bearingon the knowledge system – for knowledge doesnot evolve in a social vacuum but rather in aparticular society that has a reality, a historyand a regional and global context. It is this lastelement that has a special significance for theArab world in this phase of its history.This next section of the Report, therefore, dealswith fundamental elements of the societal con-text that affect the knowledge system and thatare expected to play a significant role in the es-tablishment of the knowledge society in Arabcountries. Chapter 6 considers the relationshipbetween culture and knowledge acquisition,and delves into some of the issues that havebeen briefly touched upon earlier in the Report(in Chapter 1 in particular). The chapter analy-ses the various components of the Arab intel-lectual heritage, religion and language, and folkculture.

The term "culture" generally refers to allhuman contributions to ideas, perceptions,customs, socio-political systems and economicconstructs. It also encompasses literary, artisticand technological innovations throughout his-tory. It almost overlaps with the term "civilisa-tion", and has innumerably more specificdefinitions. The most common and useful defi-nition of culture refers to the status of intellec-tual progress, of individuals and societies,reflected in intellectual, value-related, innova-tive and artistic accomplishments that are cor-

related with progress in the thinking patternsand behaviours of a particular civil group.Arab culture can be perceived from two per-spectives: formal culture and folk culture.Formal culture is construed to mean the com-plete array of intellectual tools, comprehensiveconcepts, systems and values that govern thesystem of thought and action, and the percep-tions and practices of the individual and soci-ety. In this definition, and in an Arab culturalcontext, intellectual heritage represents a basiccomponent of culture, language is said to bethe carrier of culture; religion is the major com-prehensive belief system that directs the life ofthis culture; and values (moral, social and polit-ical) are the judges of the actions directedwithin it. Those are the fundamental elementsof Arab culture for the purpose of this analysis.Of course, there are other cultural, knowledge-based, scientific or conceptual elements deriv-ing from other sources that could also be addedto those three elements. But intellectual her-itage, religion and values, and language standas the most decisive, determining and instruc-tive elements of formal Arab culture. It is thosethree that ought to be taken into account firstwhen looking at knowledge production as astep towards building a knowledge society inArab countries.

INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE

Arab "intellectual heritage" is a major compo-nent of Arab culture. An Arab knowledge soci-ety must connect with the defining sources ofknowledge upon which this society is built.Arab intellectual heritage constitutes a livingmembrane in the cultural body of Arab society,yet it remains a "historical" phenomenon, i.e.,the entirety of its facts go back to objective his-torical conditions. Change, development andtranscendence underlie the entire process of

CultureCHAPTER 6

Intellectual heritage,

religion and values,

and language stand as

the most decisive,

determining and

instructive elements of

formal Arab culture.


this heritage’s formation, movement and des-tiny.

If it is assumed that the human being is thestarting point and the origin of this heritage, itcan also be assumed that the religious text,from the viewpoint of some, remains outsidethe scope of history, but is nonetheless identi-fied as one of the fundamentals that interactswith historical realities and responds to theirneeds. As for the elements of the heritage it-self, they are embodied in all forms of intellec-tual, scientific, spiritual, literary, materialistic,man-made and artistic life that the makers ofthis heritage have.

All those forms of life are manifest in thehistorical Arab knowledge experience, datingfrom the pre-Islamic era, (traditionally desig-nated as the period of "Jahiliyya" by the ArabIslamic heritage), up to the age of Westernmodernity, beginning in the early 16th cen-tury. In the middle of the 19th century, withthe advent of printing and communicationwith the West, modern Arabs re-discoveredtheir intellectual heritage in all its compo-nents: linguistic, literary, historical, scientificand philosophical.

HERITAGE: A TUSSLE BETWEENKNOWLEDGE BUILDING ANDIDEOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION

Concurrent with the emergence of Arab"modernity" was the emergence, in reality andin consciousness, of the Arab heritage. Theconcept of Arab heritage became an importantdimension of the modern problematique ofculture and civilisation and the Arab past andfuture. It is with this concept that all of thebasic stances and questions concerning the

"historical personality" – the "Self", "the civil-isational Self", cultural specificity, identity,tradition and modernity, and Islam andmodernity – were connected. These issues, inaddition to many other binary opposites, oc-cupied shifting positions that were at timesconflicting, harmonious or complementary.Indeed, they became related to the modern re-ality of Arabs, to the challenges of advance-ment and progress, and to attempts to dealwith "crisis", "backwardness", or "defeat" orother situations that call for inspiration fromideas or forces conducive to progress and re-vival.

The result was that the issue of Arab intel-lectual heritage has never been purely a theo-retical or scientific question in the strictmeaning of the word. Rather, it has been, to agreat extent, an ideological issue. It relates notonly to religion, the sacred and the Arab pastbut also to new practical causes that requirepurposeful acts, political or national conces-sions, and interest-related aims that are dis-tinct from the pure scientific view.

In being connected with and at the sametime contradictory to knowledge, Arab intel-lectual heritage nowadays raises basic knowl-edge problems. Its link with knowledge comesfrom its connection with language, religion,sciences and culture. Its contradiction withknowledge arises because heritage is not usu-ally viewed from a scientific standpoint but israther closely surrounded by emotion, pas-sion, desire, wishes, glorification and some-times a disregard of reality and discomfitingfacts. In other words, ideological leaningsoften permeate approaches to this heritage.

It is therefore important to distinguish be-tween awareness of cultural heritage on theone hand, and the humanities and history,with all their branches of study, on the other.The reason is that history is based on method-ology, on an objective approach and on main-taining an intellectual distance from the past.The goal of any historian of a great civilisation,while sympathising with and understandingthe subject of research, should always be thequest for facts. The temptation to fall in lovewith the heritage must always be resisted.

Nevertheless, the exploitation of Arab in-tellectual heritage for ideological reasonsshould not be exaggerated. Modern interest in

Dexterity in science, progress and mas-tery can only be attained through the fac-ulty of knowing its principles and rules,examining its problems and deducing itsbranches from its main streams. Until thisfaculty is owned, no skill can be achieved.The Andalusians have lost interest in sci-ence because of the deterioration of theircivilization for hundreds of years. Of allsciences they have kept and preservedonly the art of the Arabic language and lit-

erature. Jurisprudence has completelydisappeared and no trace of it is leftamong them. Intellectual activity is evenworse off among them. And that is all aresult of the worsening condition of edu-cation, a consequence of the deteriorationof their civilization; and the fact that theirenemies dominate them. They have beenmore concerned with subsistence thanwith what is beyond it.

BOX 6.1

Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), On the fact that scientific education is askill and a profession

The issue of Arab

intellectual heritage

has never been purely

a theoretical or

scientific question.

Rather, it has been, to

a great extent, an

ideological issue.

Source: Roshdi Rached , in Arabic, background paper for AHDR 2 .

CULTURE 115

the Arab heritage has not been motivated byideology alone; it has also taken the form of anextensive effort that started at the end of the19th century to revive and publish this her-itage. Orientalists first initiated this revival,which was then undertaken by Arabs them-selves who expanded it further into scientificand non-scientific spheres. There is also a sub-stantial body of cultural studies, which haveexamined this heritage in accordance with ac-cepted and rigorous research methodologies.There is a wealth of Arab scholarship in thesefields, in addition to scholarship carried out inthe West at institutes and universities special-ising in oriental, Arab and Islamic studies.Those studies cover all fields of Arab heritage– language, literature, religion, culture, scienceand art – and they genuinely contribute to theexploration of its intellectual, spiritual andhuman dimensions. Thanks to such studies,the relationship between Arab culture andArab heritage has been made accessible to in-tellectual and human understanding, ratherthan being left as a passionate ideological rela-tionship or a shallow expedient resorted tounder compelling historical circumstances.

Indeed, this objective approach to knowl-edge deriving from Arab heritage is the mostuseful approach for Arab countries now andfor building the knowledge society in the fu-ture. Yet such knowledge also requires a com-prehensive historical view of the substance ofthis heritage. First, it is necessary to addressthe issue of the "Arab mentality", an obstacleto understanding Arab heritage that has per-sisted for a long time. Al-Jahiz, for example,believed that all Arab thought was gained onlythrough natural disposition, inspiration andintuition and never by affectation and dissim-ulation.

"The Arab mentality"

Early Orientalists tended to claim that thementality guiding Arab heritage is charac-terised by a simplistic analysis of particularsand is incapable of complex constructions andabstraction. Hence, it is the kind of mentalitythat lacks the competencies necessary for realinnovation (for a critique of such viewpointssee Abdul Razek, in Arabic, 1966). A wide de-bate ensued recently about the nature of the"Arab mentality" and its knowledge mecha-

nisms. An association was also made betweenthis mentality and an Arab "character" that isgoverned by instinctive desires, emotion, pas-sion and an overwhelming individualism orthe destructive absence of rationalism.

Contemporary Arabic literature is repletewith accounts of the "Arab self", the "Arabcharacter" or the "Arab identity". Those textsvary in approach and include harsh self-criti-cism or analysis, in some cases, or apprecia-tion, commendation, glorification, andpresumption of superiority, efficacy, perfec-tion and homogeneity in others. Yet the fea-tures of any rich human portrait appearaccented or diminished depending on theangle of view. Contemporary accounts are fullof ostensible Arab cultural characteristics dis-torted by one interpretation or another. Theseaccounts are generalisations, and selectiveones at that. They are erroneously based onabstracting a fixed and formed Arab "mental-ity" from ever-changing cultural, intellectual,socio-economic and political contexts.

In the course of its actual historical forma-tion and advancement, the "Arab mentality"has never been restricted to what is purely"Arab", but has rather been open to global in-tellectual, psychological, social and human in-teractions. Thus, products of this mentalityhave been varied, rich, and developed; itsmethodologies have been multiple and di-verse. Historical and ideological factors, more-over, have been decisive in directing thosemethodologies to various ends. The so-calledArab mentality has at different points in his-tory been traditional and imitative, rationaland innovative, analogical (in jurisprudence)and figurative, rhetorical, scientific and exper-imental, intuitive and Sufi, or transcendentaland mystical.

The question of the "Arab mentality",then, should be seen in the context of objec-tive reality and within the flow and flux oftime. This mentality is not a single constructwith a fixed "essence" and unchanging traitsoutside history. It is not a myth outside objec-tive reality. Rather, it is a dynamically evolvingsynthesis of the rich diversity of cultural andsocial influences that, under particular histori-cal conditions and at different times, havegone into forming this "mentality" in thecourse of a specific civilisation. As Arab his-

Contemporary

accounts are full of

ostensible Arab

cultural characteristics

distorted by one

interpretation or

another.

The question of the

"Arab mentality",

then, should be seen

in the context of

objective reality and

within the flow and

flux of time.


tory advances, changes and varies, so too the"Arab mentality" encompasses and expresseschange. (For more on this issue see, Al-Jabri,[in Arabic, 1991]; Al-Aroui, [in Arabic; 1970],and Tarabishi, [in Arabic, 1996])

Renewal, innovation and knowledge pro-duction certainly depend on the major ele-ments and values that are rooted andemployed in the cultural system. This wouldmake the Arab mentality a system that is de-veloped and open to knowledge, action andcreativity; one that has acquired the compe-tencies for production, progress and innova-tion utilising and expressing this knowledge.

The foundations of Arab intellectualheritage

Arab intellectual heritage, embodied in theArab historical experience in its golden age,i.e., since the beginning of the Islamic perioduntil just after the era of Ibn Khaldoun (early1400s AD, early 800s AH), relies upon a set ofknowledge, scientific and cultural foundationsand formations. It is by those foundations andformations that the Arab intellectual heritageis defined in history. The Islamic "Revelation",undoubtedly, constituted a primary knowl-edge base, one that guided the intellectual andspiritual proceedings and the worldly life ofthe Arabs who exemplified Islam and carriedit across geographical borders and among hu-mankind. Likewise, the "Revelation" was thestarting point of the School that favoured theimitation of the tradition to which early reli-gious scholars, jurists, traditionalists andscholars, in addition to the masses of believers,adhered. Although the "Revelation" was infact addressed to the human mind for it tocomprehend, and therefore to human reason,Muslims in the first and second centuries ofHijra (the Prophet’s emigration from Mecca toMedina), with some notable exceptions, didnot give reason much attention. Its function,then, was confined to understanding, inter-preting and attributing religious texts, ordrawing attention to their linguistic connota-tions.

Yet interaction with other human civilisa-tions and the spread of Islam across other na-tions and cultures, together with the transferof the old scientific and philosophical her-itage, combined to elevate the position of "rea-

son". Eventually, a new intellectual poweremerged and managed to make reason synony-mous with, or the twin brother of, the text, ifnot precedent to it in questions of theory ornature. Soon afterwards, the contradiction be-tween text-thesis and reason-antithesisbrought about a third construction, basically asynthesis of both, which became highlyrenowned and widely disseminated.

The deterioration of political, socio-eco-nomic and scientific life, and the decline of thecentral state and its social institutions after thecollapse of the Abbasid Caliphate, produced atendency towards asceticism, abandonment ofthe worldly life and immersion in the teachingsof Sufism and ecstatic communion. Thesetrends nurtured a tendency that sought to re-place communication with the world, societyand human beings with communication withGod and the Absolute. And once the centralstate had fallen, in the middle of the 7th cen-tury AH (the 13th century AD), the Islamiccivilisation retreated and gave way to a newkind of human association, to use IbnKhaldoun’s term. "Arab reason" moved to-wards mysticism and its supernatural, tran-scendental sciences. It was released from thosepursuits only at the dawn of the 19th centurydue to a number of historical factors includingcommunication with Western modernity.

Evidently, this liberation was limited be-cause a sub-culture that encourages supersti-tion has remained to the present day and willcertainly thrive in popular environments. Sucha subculture needs to be uprooted. One of themost effective means of doing so would be topopularise cultural values that respect scienceand scientific research.

In the Arab historical experience, theRevelation, reason and their synthesis, as wellas inner consciousness, ecstatic communionand mysticism, were respectively the episte-mological basis of Arab thought until thedawn of the modern age. Each principle hasserved as the starting point for the develop-ment of one or more branch of Arab culturalexpression.

The Arab mentality (is)

a system that is

developed and open

to knowledge, action

and creativity

The "Revelation" was

addressed to the

human mind for it to

comprehend, and

therefore to human

reason.

CULTURE 117

Arab historical knowledge outcomes

Revelation, for example, has been the startingpoint for the sciences of theology and legisla-tion, such as Qura’nic Sciences and Exegesis,the science of Hadith terminology, Islamic ju-risprudence, and also, to some extent, Muslimtheology, Monotheism and ScholasticTheology. Each discipline in turn arose in re-sponse to historical challenges and needs atdifferent times. Those needs of the time had todo with the understanding of religion and itsbeliefs, the practice of religious acts of devo-tion, the enforcement of religious dealings andthe application of religious provisions in allfields of life. It is thus not strange to find dis-parities and discrepancies in the understand-ings, perceptions and independent juridicaljudgements that eventually culminated in anumber of different schools of jurisprudencebased on elements deriving from differentprinciples.

Moreover, the interpretation of the reli-gious text did not stop at one approach; on thecontrary it initiated diverse methods ofthought: the linguistic method; the rhetoricalmethod; the rational method; the traditionalistmethod; the school of ecstatic communion orSufism; and the Zahirite school (interpretingthe Qura’an according to its literal meaning).These diverse approaches to understandingthe religious text testify to its richness, varietyand depth. Similarly, the multiplicity ofschools of jurisprudence attests to the diversityof principles for arriving at independentjudgement. Some schools disclose the widelatitude, others the narrow boundaries laiddown before the believers. Most important ofall, what the varied nature of this legal heritageconfirms is that its contents are not ultimatelyfixed, but are closely tied to historical subjec-tive conditions and to the living relationshipbetween the "text" and changing reality.

As for Reason, it was the starting point forthe sciences of the Arabic language, the sci-ence of Scholastic Theology and the body ofphilosophical sciences that were called "the in-tellectual sciences". These include logic andphilosophy, as well as the natural, medical, en-gineering and mathematical sciences passed-down to the Arabs from the "predecessors",i.e., the Greeks in particular. Few as theywere, the Arab intellectual sciences were not

originally entrenched in ancient Arab culture;indeed, they were dubbed "intruding sci-ences" by the Arabs themselves. Yet they rep-resent a historical manifestation of this culturethat has been blurred with the passage of timeand with the renewal and advancement ofmodern knowledge. Their historical value inthe advancement of human civilisation is un-questionable.

The synthetic method, which combinedthe two poles of Arab thought, the imitation oftradition and the exercise of innovative reason,and which characterised the scholastic per-spective of the Ash’arite school, was the start-ing point of wide cultural activity. Themethod produced an eminent group of greatreligious intellectuals, who were active in theperiod from the third century AH (the ninthAD) to the current cycle of Arab Islamic civil-isation. The impact of this method remainedevident in the intellectual thought which ac-companied the age of modernity and the mod-ern renaissance.

As noted earlier, with the fall of the centralstate and the eclipse of scientific rationalism,inner consciousness and ecstatic communionbecame the principles of a spiritual life that ex-pressed the yearnings of the self towards theSupreme Absolute. This movement was thebasis of all subjective and communal Sufi ex-periences, which filled Arab and Islamic cul-tural life. Whatever their individual features,the sciences of Ultimate Reality, whether spir-itual or philosophical, rational or irrational, re-flected a rich intellectual life with a highspiritual value that echoed throughout theEast and West, touching upon human spiritu-ality in traditional and in modern times. This isnot surprising as those sciences are closely tiedto the metaphysical and existential dimensionsof humankind. Yet because they are intimatepersonal experiences, they could not becomethe founding principles of a collective knowl-edge system.

On the other hand, the supernatural cul-ture, which was related to astronomy, astrol-ogy, the science of Talismans and even to someforms of religiosity, and which held a distinc-tive position after the great age of IbnKhaldoun, belongs to the backward stages ofArab intellectual heritage. It is well knownthat modern enlightened movements have

The interpretation of

the religious text did

not stop at one

approach; on the

contrary it initiated

diverse methods of

thought.

The multiplicity of

schools of

jurisprudence attests

to the diversity of

principles for arriving

at independent

judgement.


contributed decisively to the withdrawal andelimination of this culture in modern times.

In summary, Arab consciousness arises atthe confluence of multiple historical currentsflowing through and from its cultural inheri-tance. That consciousness has displayed itselfin diverse forms and in different areas. It hasbeen traditional, bound by the limits of thetext and the traditional arbiter. It has alsobeen innovative and intellectual as in the caseof the scholastic theologians, jurists, philoso-phers and scholars of the "intellectual" andnatural sciences. It has been synthetic, com-bining reason and the imitation of tradition;and it has been mystical, as in the deep Suficonsciousness open to the Absolute acrossspace and time, yet closed to society with itsworldly horizons. Finally, it has been cloakedin the supernatural, which in reality signifiedan absence of consciousness and an abandon-ment of the scientific and intellectual basisthat underpinned the Arab classical culturalexperience (Jada’an, in Arabic, 1998).

HERITAGE AND THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

What is that part of the Arab intellectual her-itage that remains steadfast and alive throughhistory? And what is that part that can, orought to be upheld, built upon and employedfor the sake of active involvement in theknowledge society and in knowledge produc-tion? Undoubtedly, Arab intellectual heritagehas undergone many changes and develop-ments and quite a number of its componentshave been superseded by the progress ofknowledge and science. Yet some fields ofknowledge and sciences have progressed far-ther than others (Centre for Arab UnityStudies, in Arabic, 1985). The conventional re-ligious sciences have remained unchanged andhave failed to produce results in the field of re-ligion. Moreover, as these sciences by customassociated the notion of science with "reli-gious science" or only with knowledge "use-ful" to religion, they also failed to contributeto advancing the fields of natural knowledge.On the other hand, the Arab intellectual sci-ences, i.e., the philosophical and natural sci-ences have pioneered a number of valuableand solid methodological approaches at the

comprehensive human level. Amongst themost important are:• Increasing the tone of rationalism in reli-gious thought.• Fostering objective rationalism in philoso-phy.• Founding a new analytical mathematicalrationalism.• Establishing experimentation as a patternof proof in knowledge.• Introducing values as principles in think-ing.

Heritage, in the sense discussed here, hasbeen a dynamic contributor to thought. Theprofound and varied cultural influences,methods and values deriving from that her-itage and living on in the present, which can bebuilt upon in creating the Arab knowledge so-ciety, are subsumed in language, religion andvalues (moral, social and political).

These building blocks represent what canbe termed "formal culture" in contradistinc-tion to "popular culture". What is the status ofthese building blocks? And how would theycontribute to establishing a successful knowl-edge society in the Arab context?

RELIGION

The approaches of Islamic thinkers and thevarious intellectual currents underlyingIslamic religious experience vary greatly inboth their nature and objectives. This is evi-dent when one considers the different ap-proaches of philosophers, theologians, Sufis orfundamentalist thinkers. But there is somekind of consensus among Islamic thinkers todefine religion (Islam) as a multidimensionalsystem of beliefs that embraces the spiritualand the material, the divine and the earthly,the heavenly soul and mortal worldly deeds.Therefore the definition advanced by Al-Tahanoui ("Terminology in Arts and Sciences,"1996) exactly reflects this multidimensional-ity: religion, according to him, is a divine dis-pensation that inspires rational mortals tofocus at one and the same time on betteringtheir lives on earth while earning their place inthe afterlife. This definition confirms the vitalrelationship between religion as a belief linkedto the religious absolute and to reality, in all itsflux and flow, as governed by the religious ab-

Heritage has been a

dynamic contributor to

thought.

There is some kind of

consensus among

Islamic thinkers to

define religion (Islam)

as a multidimensional

system of beliefs that

embraces the spiritual

and the material, the

divine and the earthly,

the heavenly soul and

mortal worldly deeds.

CULTURE 119

solute through a cognitive system and itsmethods of induction, deduction and judge-ment in relation to the primacy of the Qura’anand Sunna (traditions of the Prophet) and toother judgements as derived from the analogi-cal, adjudicative, public interest and ratiocina-tive methods.

Yet this section is not aimed at consideringthe nature of religion, ideas, or subjective andhistorical facts. Rather, it considers how reli-gion relates to knowledge production in aknowledge society. Its focus on Islam as op-posed to other religions is to be expected sinceIslam is the major religion in most Arab coun-tries. Moreover, Islam was a major inspirationfor Arab civilisation. However, this focus im-plies no detraction at all from the value andimportance of Arab communities that em-brace a religion other than Islam, especiallyChristians who have a recognised and digni-fied position in modern and classical Arab cul-ture. Indeed a multitude of religious groupshave played a very significant role in the for-mation of this culture and in the production ofscience and knowledge.

RELIGION, THE MATERIALWORLD AND KNOWLEDGE

The relationship between religion and knowl-edge is closely linked to the concept of theessence of religion and its comprehensive atti-tude towards worldly life. Reading religiousIslamic texts reveals a balance between bothreligion and worldly life, and between life onearth and in the afterlife. The recurring focusis on the importance of enquiry, contempla-tion, science and sound reasoning, and what-ever relates to the continuity of humankind onearth. There is emphasis on contemplation ofboth the heavenly and earthly kingdoms andon subduing the universe for the good of hu-manity.

Historically, some Muslims drifted fromthis innate balance by interpreting the princi-ples of science and reason in the light of"Religious Science" and forms of knowledgeuseful for religion. By limiting and narrowingthe concept of science in this way, they did notadvance the openness of the intellectual andnatural sciences. Other Muslim groups be-lieved that worldly life, being transient, had no

claim on their attention and so pursued the af-terlife on earth. They turned to the life of as-ceticism and Sufism, abandoning worldlypreoccupations. The nature of their choicesdiminished the influence of worldly sciencesand the pursuit of material and intellectualknowledge and science. Nevertheless, themajor tendency of early Arab civilisation ex-pressed itself as a keen interest in the worldand in acquiring scientific knowledge and inthe encouragement of knowledge in all its as-pects. Indeed, the production of knowledgewas prolific, as witnessed by the Islamic Arabheritage in linguistic, literary, intellectual,physical and other disciplines.

In the modern age, the intellectuals of theArab Renaissance recognised the diminutionof science and knowledge as the main reasonfor the backwardness of the Arabs and thedegradation of their civilisation. Thus, theywere anxious to espouse the rational princi-

This Christian-Islamic

co-existence in the

Arab world represents

a model of unity in

diversity.

All the Abrahamic religions arose andflourished in the Arab region. Judaismemerged with the Prophet Abraham in thecity of Or, in Iraq, then moved toPalestine, then Egypt and came back toSyria and Babylon in a long and well-known historical journey. ThenChristianity emerged in Palestine and con-tinued in the Arab East up to the presentday. There are many Christian communi-ties in the Arab world that represent allthree major branches of Christianity:Orthodox, Catholic and the group ofProtestant sects. The most famous amongthem are the Coptic community (most ofwhose members are Orthodox) in Egypt,the Maronites (Catholic) in Lebanon, theSyriac in Syria and the Assyrians in Iraq.There are also Armenian minorities, whomigrated from their original country andfound refuge in the Arab region.

Most Arab communities of Christianfaith are generally on very good terms withMuslims. They have lived under Islamicrule for centuries and their relations withArab Muslims are excellent, althoughthere remain some problems that can beeasily solved.

The point that is worth emphasisingin the context of this report is that theseArab Christian communities have beenpartners in the shaping of the Arab-Islamic civilization. It is an established his-

torical fact that they contributed, duringthe time of the Abbasid Caliphate, to awide-ranging movement of translationinto Arabic of literature that precededIslamic civilization, benefiting that move-ment with their knowledge of the Greeklanguage, in addition to their originalAssyrian, Syriac and Coptic languages.Their contributions helped to transferpre-Arabic heritage and formed a culturalbridge to it, thus maintaining the continu-ity of knowledge from ancient to moderntimes.

The knowledge available to hu-mankind today is a cumulative knowledgetransferred and enhanced through thetranslation movement, which flourished atthe height of Islamic civilization and wasaugmented and enriched by the knowl-edge provided by that civilization itself.

The Christianity that developed in theArab world co-existed with Islam throughsuccessive eras and produced knowledge.Indeed, whatever knowledge humankindachieves, in whatever field, is but an accu-mulation of knowledge through successivecivilizations and a tributary of worldhuman development as a whole.

This Christian-Islamic co-existence inthe Arab world represents a model ofunity in diversity, which is one of thesources of human progress and advance-ment through knowledge acquisition.

BOX 6.2

Milad Hanna - Religious Harmony and Knowledge in the ArabWorld.


ples behind the surge of global knowledge andscience and combine the values of Islamiccivilisation with those of modernity (Hourani,1967).

Religious texts were a significant tool inthe process of justifying this new combinationand encouraging the advancement of knowl-edge and science and their applications. The

latter, after all, are considered a major factor inthe comprehensive development of humanityand a form of worship of God on earth.

However, the course of development inthe modern Arab world, and the national, po-litical, social and economic problems that re-curred from the years of independence untilthe end of the twentieth century, had a pro-found impact on the intellectual, scholarly andcultural life of Arab countries. Religion, andits attendant concepts and objectives, was es-pecially affected by these trends. A major phe-nomenon that appeared in the religiousIslamic sphere in the last decades of the twen-tieth century gave political aims precedenceover any other objectives: social, economic ormaterial. This development resulted in the es-calation of conflict and confrontation with thesociety, the State and "the other".

"Opposition" and "confrontation" withthe West reached their climax especially afterthe tragic events of September 11, 2001. Intheir aftermath, Islam itself faced an onslaughtof defamation, slander and criticism in themedia, reflecting ignorance of Islam in mostinstances and in some cases the tendentious-ness of commentators.

It is important to reiterate here that Islamis a system of religion and worldly life at thesame time. It is difficult to separate surgicallythe "political" from other transactions amongpeople in Islamic teaching. Moreover, the pre-vailing Islamic sect in Arab countries has nei-ther a clergy nor a defined church or religiousauthority. Hence the separation of church andstate is not an issue. What qualifies an indi-vidual to have a say in religious affairs is his orher knowledge, and not an affiliation with a re-ligious institution. Authority in worldly affairsis civil, based on people’s selection of a rulerfrom among several candidates.

Nevertheless, the collusion between somerepressive regimes and certain types of conser-vative religious scholars has resulted in certaininterpretations of Islam that serve the interestsof those regimes. Such interpretations repre-sent serious impediments to human develop-ment, particularly when it comes to freedomof thought, accountability of the ruling au-thorities and women’s participation in publiclife. Furthermore, suppressing political action

Islam is a system of

religion and worldly

life at the same time.

Knowledge is a firebrand from God’slight. God created light for enlightenmentand for generating strength. He madeknowledge as an example revealing goodand uncovering evil, generating warmth insouls and nobility in the mind.

A tyrant never fears religious knowl-edge or the After World, as he thinks suchmatters cannot harm him, but rather dis-tract the minds of people interested inthem. If any of those thus distracted

became knowledgeable and famousamong common people, the tyrant wouldalways find a way of using him for his sup-port by shutting up his mouth with scraps.

But the tyrant would shiver in fear ofworldly knowledge such as theoreticalwisdom, intellectual philosophy, the rightsof nations, civil policy, history, literaryrhetoric and other knowledge that piercesthe veil of ignorance and enlightens peo-ple.

BOX 6.3

Al Kawakibi (1854-1902) Despots and Knowledge

Source: The Character of Despotism, pp 50-51.

The Qur’an 1

Allah witnesses that there is no deity ex-cept Him, and the angels and people ofknowledge know that He is the One andmaintains justice in all Creation. (Surah 3-Ali‘Imran, 18)

Say, "Are those who know equal to thosewho do not know?" (Surah 39- az-Zumar,9)

Allah will raise those who have believedamong you and those who were givenknowledge, by degrees. (Surah 58 - al-Mujadalah, 11)

And say, "My Lord, increase me inknowledge." (Surah 20- Ta Ha, 114)

Nun. By the pen and what they inscribe.(Surah 68- al-Qalam,1)

The Sunna

“If anyone travels on a road in search ofknowledge, Allah will cause him to travelon one of the roads of Paradise. The an-gels will lower their wings in their greatpleasure with one who seeks knowledge,the inhabitants of the heavens and theEarth and the fish in the deep waters willask forgiveness for the learned man. Thesuperiority of the learned man over thedevout is like that of the moon, on thenight when it is full, over the rest of thestars. The learned are the heirs of theProphets, and the Prophets leave neitherdinar nor dirham, leaving only knowl-edge, and he who takes it takes an abun-dant portion." (Sunan Abu Dawud, Book25, Number 3634)"Spread knowledge and you will congre-gate so that the un- knowledgeable willknow. Knowledge does not vanish savewhen it is hidden."

BOX 6.4

Erudition in the Qur’an and the Sunna (prophetic tradition)

"And if anyone longs for wide experi-ence, she knows of things of old, and in-fers the things to come; she understandsturns of speech and the solutions of rid-dles; she has foreknowledge of signs andwonders and of the outcome of seasonsand times" (Wisdom of Solomon, 8:8)

"Apply thine heart unto instruction,and thine ears to the words of knowl-edge." (Proverbs, 23:12)

"And by knowledge shall the cham-bers be filled with all precious and pleas-ant riches." (Proverbs, 24:4)

BOX 6.5

Learning and knowledge in the Holy Bible, Old Testament2

1The Qura’an, translated and revised by Saheeh International, Riyadh, 1997. 2Electronic Text Centre, University of Virginia Library, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin

¯¯ ¯

¯

¯ ¯

¯ ¯ ¯

¯¯

CULTURE 121

in many Arab countries has driven some"Islamic" movements underground andpushed others to work under an Islamic cover.In the absence of peaceful and effective politi-cal channels for dealing with injustices in theArab world, at the country, regional andglobal levels, some political movements identi-fying themselves as Islamic have adopted ex-treme interpretations of Islam and violence asmeans of political activism. They have advo-cated belligerence towards both other politicalforces in Arab countries and "the Other", par-ticularly the West as relations have grownmore tense, accusing both of being the ene-mies of Islam itself. Not only are such inter-pretations inconsistent with pure religion; theyalso divide societies, taking them further awayfrom the requirements of the knowledge soci-ety.

In summary, for religion to regain its rolein the development and production of knowl-edge, the time has come to proclaim those pos-itive religious texts that cope with currentrealities and the hoped-for future rather thanthose related to specific historical develop-ments that Islam underwent in one era or an-other. These positive texts focus on a numberof basic values that link the aims of religionwith the development and growth of life: thesuccession and continuity of humankind onearth, the creation of paradise on earth and theenjoyment of the earth’s bounties, respect forhuman beings and their cognitive faculties -curiosity, reason, science, the senses, visionand feelings; and building a good and re-spectable nation. Certainly, these are all valuesthat motivate the search for knowledge and itsproduction from a religious point of view.Religion urges people to seek knowledge andto work towards the realisation of its foundingprinciples firmly, effectively and with determi-nation. Neither arrogance nor careless disre-gard of humanity has any place in obeying thatcall.

Three fundamental conditions need to befulfilled so that religion can take its properplace in the Arab knowledge model and be-come an effective force for knowledge. Thefirst is to return to the moral, civilised and hu-mane vision that stands behind the essentialobjectives of Islam. The second is to free reli-gion from the sway of politics and to free reli-

gious institutions from political authorities,governments and radical religious movements.The third is to acknowledge intellectual free-dom by reviving scholarship (ijtihad) and theprotection of the right to differ.

LANGUAGE

Language is perhaps the most distinctive anddefining feature of any human society. The riseof all civilisations was always accompanied bya linguistic renaissance. Some cultural histori-ans also believe that no human conflict existswithout an implicit linguistic clash. Languageis the living medium that expresses the realityof a society, and the basic tool that determinesthe relationship between human beings andthis reality. Language is the lens throughwhich human beings apprehend the world. Itis the decisive attribute that forms their iden-tity and gives society its unique character.Identity is the outcome of meanings created byindividuals through language, and the charac-ter of a society is the outcome of the interac-tion of internal linguistic discourses shaped byhistorical variables, and reflecting the facets of

It would seem unnecessary to discuss anobvious factor such as the role played bythe Islamic religion in the renaissance ofArabic civilisation, since without Islamprobably no such renaissance would havetaken place.

The blossoming of science and cul-ture in Islamic civilisations was the resultof the increasing quality of material life inMuslim cities. The urban life of thesecities, the material prosperity, the variedlocal industries, the local and internationaltrade, and the flourishing science and cul-ture, were all linked together, while noneof the aspects of life in the cities wouldhave flourished without a developingtechnology. And if Islam was the force be-hind the rise of cities, as is frequently as-serted, then it was also the force behind allaspects of the prosperity of these cities,and hence the technological efforts associ-ated with urban life.

It is estimated that there exist at thepresent time, in spite of destruction andmany losses, nearly a quarter of a millionmanuscripts, mostly in Arabic, in the vari-ous libraries of the world. And this doesnot include unrecorded collections.

The admirable flexibility of theArabic language enabled the Muslims tocoin and extract scientific and technologi-cal vocabularies capable of expressing themost complicated scientific and technicalideas.

The state enabled scientists and engi-neers to spend all their time on research,inventions and writing.

As is natural in the history of civilisa-tion in general, Muslim scientists and en-gineers received the heritage of theirpredecessors, but this grew into their ownscience and technology through a continu-ous process of invention, research and de-velopment.

There can be no doubt that institu-tions – academies, libraries, observatories,etc. – played a major role in the continuingvitality of Islamic science. These, togetherwith the readiness of students to travelhundreds of miles to learn from acknowl-edged scholars, ensured that the wholecorpus of knowledge was kept intact andtransmitted from one place to another,from one generation to the next, with con-tinual expansion and enrichment.

BOX 6.6

Technology in the Arab Islamic Civilisation

Source: Ahmad Y. Al-Hassan and Donald R. Hill, 1986, Islamic Technology; an Illustrated History, UNESCO, Paris – Cambridge University Press.

The time has come to

proclaim those

positive religious texts

that cope with current

realities.


agreement and conflict of the societal system. Such statements on the importance of lan-

guage in human society are even more applic-able to the knowledge society, whether theyconcern expectations of its promise or chal-lenges to its creation. The Arabic language isundoubtedly the most prominent feature ofthe Arab culture. If the knowledge society, asdelineated in the current report, is the sourceof hope for Arab human development, theArabic language system is one of the decisiveunderpinnings for building that society andshaping its success.

Language is the device by which the indi-vidual conceives the surrounding world andexpresses his or her individual and social iden-tity. Accordingly language can be defined asthe vital player in reviving activity and em-bodying new genres of creation in the culturalsystem of knowledge-based communities.Language is pivotal in the realm of informa-tion technology, the tool that all modern sec-tors use, and the foundation on which modernhuman communication is established. In addi-tion, language articulates the worlds andworldviews of finance, trade, politics and themass media.

The Arabic language precedes all manifes-tations of Arab culture and its human arte-facts. In the Arab historical experience, Arabicis also connected with two basic matters thatare closely associated with both the existenceand future of Arabs. The first connection iswith "identity"; the second is the question ofthe "sacred". The Arabic language is the dis-tinctive feature that distinguishes the Arabidentity. It is the language of the holy Qura’an.And it was the rallying point for the intellec-tual, spiritual, literary and social activities in-carnated in an entire human civilisation,

namely the Arab Islamic civilisation.

LANGUAGE AND THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

As one of the fundamentals of culture, lan-guage plays an essential role in the knowledgesociety, not least because culture is theseedbed from which the development processsprings. Language is instrumental in the cul-tural system, linking intellect, creation, peda-gogy, media, tradition, values and beliefs.Language is instrumental in information tech-nology, instructing the microprocessors thatdrive that technology and its artificial intelli-gence. Language is the tool used by all disci-plines of knowledge, including philosophy,the human and natural sciences and the arts.The knowledge society, in which educationand learning are lifelong endeavours, dependson language, whether natural human lan-guage, software and programming languages,or biological genetic language. Language isnecessary to build communication skills thatare essential to knowledge dissemination. It isthe instrument by which the powers of capital,trade, politics and ideology dominate the massmedia, the public and the culture industry ingeneral. Language and cognitive discourse oc-cupy a prominent position in all spheres thatserve regimes, organisations, institutions, andmarket interests.

The crisis of the Arabic language

Notwithstanding the seminal importance oflanguage, Arabic today, on the threshold of anew knowledge society, faces severe chal-lenges and a real crisis in terms of theorisation,teaching, grammar, lexicography, usage, docu-mentation, creation, and criticism. The rise ofinformation technology presents another as-pect of the challenges to the Arabic languagetoday.

The central aspects and symptoms of thislinguistic crisis can be summarised as follows:First, there is a marked absence of linguisticpolicy at the national level, which diminishesthe authority of language centres, limits theirresources, and eventually results in poor co-or-dination among them. Second, the Arabisationof the sciences and the various disciplines hasnot proceeded according to expectations.

The Arabic language is

the distinctive feature

that distinguishes the

Arab identity.

Language is that which translates themeaning borne in our minds.Ibn Khaldun, Prolegomena

Most of the blemishes of our life canbe traced to linguistic failure that incitesdisunity, blurs the truth, wastes effort,and impedes sublimity of the soul, body,mind, and heart.Amin El-Khouly

It seems that there will be no solu-tion to the dilemma of language neither

in mathematics nor in logic, but the keyto the linguistic secret is in biology. Noam Chomsky

If language is truly a mirror of themind, it must reflect not just the algo-rithms of syntax but the mind as a whole,the complete set of rules by which ahuman being, in Lakoff’s words, "givesform and sense to his universe, wherewithout them there would be none."Jeremy Campbell, Grammatical Man

BOX 6.7

About Language

CULTURE 123

Third, there is a chronic deficiency in transla-tion efforts in the sciences and the humanities.Fourth, linguistic theory suffers from stagna-tion, isolation from modern philosophicalschools and methodologies, and a lack ofawareness of the role language plays in mod-ern society. Fifth, the situation of the Arabiclanguage is further complicated by the dualityof standard and colloquial Arabic. Sixth,Arabic electronic publication is weakened bythe scarcity of advanced Arabic software.Finally, the Arabic language continues to suf-fer from the duplication of research and devel-opment projects and the absence ofco-ordination among them, conflicting diag-noses of the ills afflicting the language, and theconspicuous absence of a clear vision of lin-guistic reform.

The crisis of the Arabic language is no lesscentral and no less dangerous or complicatedthan the other crises facing the Arab world,particularly on the verge of a radical shift inthe importance given to knowledge. Yet crisisis also opportunity. Moving towards theknowledge society will force countries to ad-dress the challenges facing the Arabic lan-guage in order to harness its latent powers andaddress other challenges. The most significantopportunities include:• The revolution in modern linguistics,which has ushered in several scientificmethodologies3. These can help address manydifficulties besetting the Arabic language.• Massive technological development in"language engineering", in which the languagesystem, with its extreme complexity, consti-tutes a rich subject for new approaches to theart of manipulating sophisticated systems.• The Internet, which has become a re-source for teaching and learning the Englishlanguage and could become a platform forpromoting the use of Arabic in multiple for-mats.• Increased awareness of the importance oflinguistic diversity. World awareness of thisproblem has reached new levels, so much sothat UNESCO has drawn attention to a crisisof linguistic diversity and the risk of extinctionthat threatens several languages. • New and viable initiatives in some Arabcountries in the theory of literature and lexi-

cography; and recent successes in the digitalprocessing of Arabic, especially in the do-mains of morphology and grammar, and theuse of computers to create a modern Arab the-saurus.

Advancement of the Arabic language

But these options on their own, or together,are not sufficient to resolve the crisis of Arabicand render it responsive to profound contem-porary developments in culture, knowledgeand education, or to recent global challenges.There is another aspect of the problem; themany-faceted relations between Arabic andthe system of knowledge acquisition, notably: • The relation between the Arabic languageand thought.• Arabic and access to sources of knowl-edge.• Arabic and the communication and assim-ilation of knowledge.• Arabic and the utilisation of knowledge. • Arabic and the generation of new knowl-edge.

Language and thought: understanding thenature of the relationship between systems oflanguage and thought requires exhaustiveanalysis on the psychological, pedagogical,and social levels. This aspect of language hasnot received due attention from Arab re-searchers; certainly, classical linguists did nottackle this problem and did not present any-thing that substantially contributes to the de-velopment of Arabic thought.

A number of reasons account for the gap.First, Arabic thought has refrained from en-gaging with multidisciplinary issues, which areof great importance within the knowledge so-ciety. For example, Arab philosophicalthought, especially in theology and philoso-phy, has been isolated from other disciplines,despite the marked attention paid by tradi-tional scholastic theology, philosophy, and tra-ditional jurisprudence to language, concepts,and terminology. Next, research efforts in psy-cho-, socio-, and especially neuro-linguisticshave been marginal. In reality, strengtheningthe relation between the Arabic language andthought needs a concerted institutional effortby specialists in psycho-linguistics in order toreveal the relations between the characteristics

3New methodologies cover statistical, anthropological, reproductive, textual, computerised, bio-neurological, hypothetical, mathematical and logical,functional, lexical, and empirical methodologies).

The crisis of the Arabic

language is no less

central and no less

dangerous than the

other crises facing the

Arab world.


of Arabic, its morphological, grammatical, lex-ical, and rhetorical resources, and the mainfunctions of the brain. Establishing a researchcentre specialised in the fields of Arabic lan-guage in relation to information technology,neuro-technology, and genetic engineeringwould significantly advance the frontiers ofknowledge in this field.

Language and access to sources of knowl-edge: The contemporary knowledge explo-sion, with its at times overwhelminginformation overload, poses a challenge toArab thought. It would be easy to succumb toa sense of defeat before the sweeping hurri-cane of data and information blowing in fromthe global information society. A bold re-sponse requires devising a new software tool-kit to process texts and to make access toknowledge more efficient, whether in Arabicor other languages. The most important ofthese tools are: automatic tools for indexing,extraction and abridgement; and intelligenttools for research into the body of texts inorder to understand the depth of their inher-ent structures and extract their intrinsic con-tents. The application of artificial intelligenceand electronic document management tech-niques and developing an Arabic inferencetool would be key supports in this new re-search.

Access to sources of knowledge in lan-guages other than Arabic is mainly connectedwith translation. Translation into Arabic is stillextremely scarce and is not keeping pace withthe global knowledge explosion. This lag em-phasises the importance of developing elec-tronic translation. Of course, there are several

levels of translation: rough translation used toconvey impressions of a subject, which is cur-rently taking place on the Internet in a verymodest way; and faithful translation of texts.The state of electronic translation globally is along way from the level of faithful and accu-rate translation.

Language and the assimilation of knowl-edge: The relationship between Arabic andthe communication and assimilation of knowl-edge involves two major considerations: theArabisation of university education and theteaching of Arabic.

The Arabisation of university education isno longer simply a matter of nationalism; it hasbecome a prerequisite for developing the toolsof thinking and the creative faculties of youngminds and for assimilating the rising volume ofknowledge. For example, the failure toArabise the sciences is an obstacle to commu-nication among different scientific disciplines.Despite the evident importance of the issue,efforts at Arabisation are still faltering underopposition from many academic quarters. Theprincipal objection to teaching sciences inArabic is that it would prevent Arab studentsfrom having access to the original sources ofscientific knowledge that are mostly in foreignlanguages. Yet modern students are increas-ingly accustomed to resorting to differentsources of knowledge and research anyway. IfArabisation efforts run parallel to efforts tostrengthen the teaching of foreign languages inall scientific disciplines, this objection recedes.

It is relevant to observe here that facilitywith the English language is waning across theArab world. With the exception of a few uni-versity professors and educated individuals,real proficiency in English has ebbed, prevent-ing many Arab researchers from publishingtheir research in international scientific jour-nals. This trend also explains the wide reluc-tance to make presentations at scientificgatherings in English, or to participate in sem-inars or even Internet user groups.Paradoxically, this decline makes developingthe methodologies of teaching Arabic manda-tory. For the dominant language acquisitiontheories now hold, contrary to past thinking,that a good command of one’s mother tongueis an essential tool for learning foreign lan-guages.

In the 1980s, Algeria intensified its ef-forts to substitute Arabic for French asthe dominant language of the country.Its Arabisation policy, which has been inplace for more than two decades, partic-ularly in education, communications andjustice and in many public administra-tion institutions, has been effective inseveral respects. Yet some consider thatthe conversion from French to Arabic ofan entire generation of mainly French-speaking professionals has led to a loss ofknowledge and capability. Arabisationhas been less effective in economic, tech-

nological and administrative fields whereFrench continues to dominate. Books,newspapers, radio and TV programmesare published or broadcast either inFrench or in Arabic (some also in Berberlanguages) with relatively few transla-tions. This language segmentation hasreduced communication among differ-ent spheres of society.

Tensions resulting from this lan-guage duality appear to have relaxed inrecent years, paving the way towardsmultilingualism in different areas of edu-cation and communications.

BOX 6.8

Arab North Africa – Language Duality

Translation into Arabic

is still extremely

scarce and is not

keeping pace with the

global knowledge

explosion.

Source: Country Report prepared for AHDR 2.

CULTURE 125

Arabisation requires a fresh look at wordstructures and encouraging more productionin Arabic in different scientific disciplines aswell as supporting current efforts in the devel-opment of electronic translation. It also callsfor more use of what ICT can provide by wayof building databanks of terms and helping inthe conceptual decomposition of Arabicwords. When translating non-Arabic termsinto Arabic, the new term should convey accu-rately and completely the meaning and con-cept of the original term.

The teaching of Arabic also suffers froman acute crisis, both in curricula and method-ology. The most apparent symptoms of thatcrisis include: concentration on the superficialaspects of teaching grammar and morphology,rather than on the core concepts of texts andtheir respective holistic structures; inattentionto semantics and meaning; neglecting thefunctional aspects of language use, such as im-proving linguistic skills in everyday use; limit-ing language classes to writing rather thanreading; abstaining from using conventionallexicons, (which are admittedly difficult owingto the juxtaposition of new and old entries andexplanations without distinctions); and the in-adequacy of pedagogical research in languageteaching.

Indeed, the problem of teaching theArabic language is not detached from the stateof classical Arabic at large. This languagetoday is no longer the "language of conversa-tion". It is rather the language of reading andwriting and their official manifestations (reli-gious sermons and political, administrative orsocial addresses). Moreover, it is the languageof the educated and the intelligentsia, oftenused to display their knowledge in lectures. Inother words, classical Arabic is not the lan-guage of cordial, spontaneous expression,emotions, feelings and everyday communica-tion. It is not a vehicle for discovering one’sinner self or outer surroundings. It goes with-out saying that the problems of classicalArabic start when one enters school, where itis taught as a concept or an independent sub-ject. In other words it is taught in the firstplace as an object of thinking, analysis, classifi-cation, evaluation, and inference. All this flowsfrom the traditional school and its principlesof reading, reciting, narrating, rote learning,

and the avoidance of creativity and initiative.This is a state of affairs that can only lead tothe production of knowledge that is stagnantand lifeless. True, since the modern Arab en-lightenment, the Arabic school has been con-nected with the experimental rationalEuropean school, and is thus more open torich and accelerated knowledge and method-ologies. Nevertheless, the prevailing method-ology that the Arabic school follows inteaching the language still emphasises memo-risation rather than the acquisition of dy-namic, renewable knowledge.

Language becomes more vital, vivid, andcreative in its renewable, active, civilised andhuman domains inasmuch as it draws its depthand richness from the heritage it preserves. Itis hardly possible to distinguish, except inform, between the language of a society on theone hand and the cultural structures, scientificand practical intellectual concepts, and ap-plied methods of that society on the other. There-birth of the Arabic language through themeasures discussed in this chapter is the coreand crux of a new Arab renaissance centred onknowledge and human development.

This is why linguistic research is vital. It re-quires establishing language centres, new dic-tionaries incorporating words common toboth colloquial and classical Arabic, func-tional scientific dictionaries (written andaudio-based) for basic education, specialisedfunctional dictionaries, the Arabisation of sci-entific terms, the gradual simplification andrationalisation of grammar leading to a medianlanguage that neither lapses into the colloquialnor replicates the rigid old structures that aredifficult to use. Again, ICT and the Internetcan contribute significantly to modernisingthe teaching and learning of Arabic in bothcontent and methodology. This entails movingforward with research into computer lan-guages and reading theory in addition to thepedagogical, psychological and social dimen-sions of languages.

Language and the utilisation of knowl-edge: the link between language and the use ofknowledge can best be seen from the perspec-tive of problem solving. Problem solving en-compasses the ability to make an accuratediagnosis and compare available choices tofind solutions. In other words, it demands ra-

Facility with the

English language is

waning across the

Arab world.

The prevailing

methodology that the

Arabic school follows

in teaching the

language still

emphasises

memorisation rather

than the acquisition of

dynamic, renewable

knowledge.


tional analysis. To reinforce the definitionaland descriptive power of the Arabic language,it is essential to consolidate and enhance glos-saries of terminology, thesauruses and spe-cialised lexicons in social and scientific fields.To improve its capacity to frame logical analy-sis, Arabic discourse needs to update its basicsof proof, methods of persuasion and argumen-tation and use of logic. Other measures for therenewal of Arabic include initiating a freshformulation of its grammatical rules, and en-hancing its communication capabilities by ex-panding its functional use in every day life,which would make Arabic a more supplemedium for living social dialogue.

Language and the generation of knowl-edge: The role of language in the generation ofmodern knowledge, especially in the humansciences, is also critical. These sciences con-tribute to the identification of new researchmethodologies distinct from those of the phys-ical sciences. If Arabic develops close relationswith modern and informational biochemistry,for example, the language can enhance scien-tific creation. It can also contribute to literaryand artistic creation, and indeed to all of thearts of the Arabic language.

Two distinctive features of the Arabic lan-guage are its unique capacity to derive wordsand terms flexibly from its lexicon and itsprodigious vocabulary of synonyms and mean-ings. This flexibility and wealth play a real andeffective role in producing knowledge in dy-namic and changing contexts requiring newanalysis, description and definition.

Linguistic development and societal con-text: Yet linguistic development and reformare not only related to the internal elements ofthe knowledge acquisition system, as in theearlier discussion. They are also related to thesocial context, where language exercises itspublic functions and to the linguistic-social in-teraction becomes significant on both the eco-nomic and political levels, regionally andglobally.

The state has an important role in support-ing linguistic development on a number of keyfronts: formulating linguistic policies, provid-ing financial resources by which the languageacademies can perform their duties, directingthe official mass media to confront languageissues, or supporting the development of

Arabic educational and linguistic pro-grammes. Such efforts, supplemented by thoseof non-governmental organisations, would ad-vance the protection and development of theArabic language. Moreover, the expected roleof Arabic within the regional context must betaken into account. The Arabic language –with its organic relation to the Qura’anic text –is a major entry point for the study and revivalof heritage. It is also the main pillar of Arabsolidarity, national unification and Arab cul-tural unity. Further still, Arabic is the bulwarkagainst fragmentation emanating from"Information Age Orientalists" who defendthe multiplicity of Arabic dialects. Finally, theArabic language has a significant role in link-ing Arabic culture to other Islamic countries’cultures. It also has another important role toplay in the international context in con-fronting cultural globalisation and the movetowards rejecting linguistic and cultural speci-ficities. In other words, the Arabic language isdisposed and able to be an effective party incultural dialogue. And, although there is noreason to believe that the Arabic language isthreatened by extinction, it is necessary towork determinedly on strengthening its lin-guistic shields and enhancing its practical andsubjective characteristics that confirm its in-ternational profile and receptivity and its abil-ity to assimilate new informational andtechnological developments. It is also essen-tial to strengthen its relationship with otherlanguages.

The renewal of Arabic will of course gainstrength if the conditions and resources neces-sary to support Arab culture as a whole –moral, economic and technical - are put inplace.

FOLK CULTURE

Until recently, folk culture did not receivemuch recognition in most contemporary Arabintellectual and cultural accounts. The ten-dency has been to view it as a blemish on cul-ture, not an achievement, an historicalbackwater, a synonym of myth, or a defect informal thought.

This prejudice has receded in recentdecades amid the rediscovery that folk culturehas a significant role in Arab cultural, social

The re-birth of the

Arabic language is the

core and crux of a

new Arab renaissance

centred on knowledge

and human

development.

Two distinctive

features of the Arabic

language are its

unique capacity to

derive words and

terms flexibly from its

lexicon and its

prodigious vocabulary

of synonyms and

meanings.

CULTURE 127

and economic life. The relationship betweenArab folk culture and formal culture has beenestablished as a profound reciprocity of influ-ence and effect. Holistic accounts of Arab cul-ture see the two forms as equally authenticcomponents of an integrated pattern.

Folk culture is, in fact, a huge repository ofexperiences and creative efforts that have en-riched the intellectual, emotional, and behav-ioural life of all Arabs. It is rich in itscomponents, as it consists of knowledge, be-liefs, art, ethics, law, conventions, industrialknowledge and the popular creations ofBedouins and rural and urban dwellers. Folkculture is the creation of shepherds, farmers,artisans, and craftsmen who produce that cul-ture outside of formal educational establish-ments and institutions. This culture, however,has also expanded to reach other social, cul-tural, and scientific groups. It also permeatesold Arab history and has deep roots in the re-gion. Varied as its forms and origins in differ-ent Arab societies are, folk culture nonethelesshas elements of similarity and unity.

Folk culture is communal and oral andthese two attributes account for how knowl-edge is produced and propagated in tradi-tional societies. Production springs from thedemands of the group. Transmission is by wayof social interaction and relationship.Surprisingly, such processes often take placeefficiently and do not run counter to the ac-quisition of rational knowledge, as might beimagined.

Folk culture comprises: concrete folk cul-ture, folk knowledge and representations, folkconventions and traditions, and artistic folkexpression (music, performing arts, visual arts,drama and linguistic expression).

Each category is blended with an artisticexperience that is intrinsically connected tothe style and practices of a particular commu-nity life. Therefore, some have no relation tothe process of acquiring knowledge directly;rather, they are forms of entertainment, suchas storytelling and the narration of biogra-phies.

FOLK CULTURE: BETWEENCREATIVITY AND IMITATION

Yet these forms are not devoid of knowledge.

Biographies, for example, are full of historical,geographical and humanistic knowledge.Imaginary worlds appeal to the creativehuman instinct for empathy and personal ex-tension. Both forms are popular means of ex-changing historical knowledge or rules relatedto customs. Many folk tales commend thevalue of knowledge and place it in a positionsuperior to property. The high respect com-monly shown for a written script by folk com-munities indicates the degree of their respectfor knowledge, its value and importance.

Commonly, the culture expresses twovoices: one, a conformist voice that calls forthe imitation of traditional practices; theother, forward looking that advocates creativ-ity, curiosity rationality, and the pursuit ofknowledge. Some simple and even thoughtfulproverbs originating in the nomadic area ofNajd convey this latter outlook: "Ignorance isa lethal malady" and "Need provides thetool", not to mention others such as"Knowledge is illumination", "Be in quest forknowledge even in China". By the same token,the conformist elements of the culture havetheir own observations and stories. A well-known example concerns the individual whohas been allowed to open all the doors in a hallexcept one; driven by curiosity, he pushes thatdoor open and is punished with exile. Englishreaders are familiar with the popular saw,"Curiosity killed the cat", which expresses asimilar caution.

Traditional community celebrations whena young boy graduates from the ‘Kuttab’ (thetraditional school for memorising and recitingthe Holy Qura’an and the basics of arithmeticand other disciplines) indicate the high stand-ing of knowledge in popular culture. Theyoung graduate is treated to a great processionthrough his village accompanied by eulogiesand prayers. A banquet follows and inaugu-rates a new chapter of social esteem for the lat-est possessor of knowledge. The communityfurther ensures that, until the age of twelve,the boy continues to be schooled in elemen-tary social disciplines: manners, rules of soci-etal relations and ethics as well as in thefundamental skills for acquiring knowledge inwhatever craft he has learned.

The relationship

between Arab folk

culture and formal

culture has been

established as a

profound reciprocity of

influence and effect.

Many folk tales

commend the value of

knowledge and place

it in a position

superior to property.


CRAFTS

This principle of learning also applies to craftsand jobs, which need physical stamina or anintensive specialised skill. Thus, a boy is moti-vated to acquire the required learning andtechniques through a direct apprenticeshipwith his master. The "master" or tutor gradu-ates the phases of practical work for the ap-prentice according to the stages of his learningand actual progress. That is why it is not un-usual to find boys in grazing communitiesherding flocks of cattle or, in agrarian commu-nities, taking part in irrigation, running water-wheels and so on. Of course, they also performa good part of the routine work required bythe crafts or industries they have embraced.

Some crafts and jobs require more time, aswell as mental and physical maturity, to mas-ter. Other tasks that do not require physicalstrength, such as scouting human and animalstrails, tracking the positions of celestial bodies,and practicing folk medicine, still require dex-terity, skill and knowledge to achieve profi-ciency. Occupations that require physicalstrength, such as masonry, blacksmithing, car-pentry, weaving, and pottery also entail notonly practice but skills in using tools and in-struments, some of which are mechanically so-phisticated. Indeed, craftsmen often devisetheir own work tools.

Significantly traditional occupations andcrafts are highly prone to deterioration, de-cline, and withdrawal from people’s everydaylives. This runs counter to the common as-sumption that the abstract and speech compo-nents of a folk culture disappear before itslivelihoods. Field inspections reveal the de-cline of these crafts and occupations togetherwith their associated knowledge and skills.

Behind the decline in Arab folk craftsstands a change in modes, tools, and relationsof production. Demand for the products ofthose crafts and occupations, which called forexperience, dedication, specialised skills andmastery, has withered because inferior mass-produced goods have replaced them at lowercost. With the decline of returns on theirproducts, these craftsmen have given up theirtools and their apprentices; and the traditionalcycle of learning through the reproductionand communication of skills, expertise, and

knowledge has been broken. What remainsare mainly those types of crafts that require nocommitment or specialisation, and that are notthe main source of a livelihood. The decline oftraditional crafts as a source of employment,income and skills development, in both devel-oped and developing societies, is well docu-mented. But it assumes special importance inthe Arab region, which suffers the highestrates of unemployment in the world and agrowing deficit of knowledge in both new andtraditional forms.

THE REVIVAL OF AN AWARENESSOF FOLK CULTURE

Folk culture provides artistic, musical and lit-erary inspiration for several modern Arab artforms. Contemporary artistic solutions, tech-nical methods, and creative forms and imagesare sometimes found in folk legacies andblended with modern performances and taste.Certain musical composers who take a schol-arly approach draw directly from traditionalmusical compositions following a scientificmethodology that results in innovative andcreative music. Acknowledgements and evi-dence of folk influences can also be foundamong the plastic arts and in painting, sculp-ture, pottery, the cinema and other modern artforms.

All this points to the fact that folk culturecan be a major element in the production ofartistic knowledge and a source of cultural cre-ativity. For example, Egypt’s experience inmobilising folk culture as a stimulus for con-temporary creativity underlines two points:

First: The adoption of a cultural strategypointing in two directions. In the first direc-tion, folk culture moves out of its confinementand migrates towards the larger cultural struc-ture, taking up new space there. An enrichingdialogue and hybrid relationship with othercultural components thus begins. In the sec-ond direction, the contemporary culturalstructure moves towards the space of folk cul-ture to bring the highest achievements andcultural creations to the broad mass of people.

Second: This cross-fertilisation can paylarge dividends in building both cultural di-versity and strength. Interaction, amalgama-tion and new syntheses will inevitably drive

Traditional

occupations and crafts

are highly prone to

deterioration, decline,

and withdrawal from

people’s everyday

lives.

Behind the decline in

Arab folk crafts stands

a change in modes,

tools, and relations of

production.

CULTURE 129

new and advanced Arab cultural products,rooted in social pluralism and national iden-tity, and capable of offering a rich alternativeto cultural globalisation.

The seeds of this future harvest have al-ready been planted in a number of "festivals"held in Arab countries. Their host cities havebecome the centres of communication, inter-action, synergy and new cultural energy:Salalah in Morocco, Sosa and Kartaj inTunisia, the Cairo International Book Fair,Ganadriya in Riyadh, Jarash in Jordan, Karienin Kuwait, Baalabak in Lebanon, and others.There are also cultural events and symposiasponsored by civil institutions, such asAbdelhameed Shoman in Amman, and thecultural gatherings in Beirut, Abu-Dhabi, andother cities. All these manifestations are vividevidence of an Arab cultural interaction,which holds folk culture in high esteem andplaces it in a visible position domestically andinternationally. The state, the private sector,and the civil society should make the continu-ation of this new fusion their first priority insupporting modern Arab cultural develop-ment.

CULTURAL INTERACTION

Historically, Arab culture was never a closedsystem. Through all historical turning points,it exhibited openness and growth. Going be-yond the cultural ego, it accepted the experi-ence of other nations and assimilated them inits knowledge systems, customs and dailypractices in spite of the differences and dis-similarities among those nations and their ex-periences.

The first of the two major experiences thattouched Arab culture goes back to the age ofscientific recording and the encounter withGreek civilisation and its disciplines of knowl-edge. This was the age of seeking out new dis-ciplines and importing them into the culture,especially in the third and fourth centuries ofHijra, the ninth and tenth centuries AD. Here,an outstanding process of translation of mostof the Greek scientific and philosophic her-itage took place (Ibn El-Nadeem, in Arabic,1964; Badawi, in French, 1968; Walzer, 1962).This heritage was profoundly assimilated and

then reproduced in new forms of creation.This interaction with the ancient heritage wasthe first step towards producing science,knowledge, and culture. The second major ex-perience occurred in the 19th century when themodern Arab world encountered Westerncivilisation and opened up to its sciences, arts,knowledge and technology. The outcome ofthis was the renovation and modernisation ofthe Arab cultural heritage. The Arab worldembraced the future and contributed its ownprolific production in all branches of knowl-edge, sciences, arts, literature, and technology.

In both the east and west of the Arabworld, cultural production continues to showa profound interaction between Arab intellec-tuals and creative artists, and the global cul-ture and its different philosophies andintellectual movements. This interaction is re-vealed in the translation of literary, scientificand philosophical works from their source lan-guages into Arabic. Of course, translation ef-forts into Arabic are woefully insufficient,compared to those into other languages, sincethe total body of such translations, as noted ina previous chapter, amounts to about onebook per million Arabs according to UN-ESCO statistics. Arabs continue to translatethe works of other cultures, not as exercises intranslation, but to study, analyse and criticisethose works as knowledge, while seeking outtheir influence and inspiration.

Regional, geographical and linguistic con-texts have to a great extent influenced the in-terests of Arab intellectuals. Arabic culture inthe western part of the Arab world reflects anexplicit interaction with French literature andculture owing to the proximity of the sub-re-gion to France and its historical experiencewith France and the French language. In theeastern part of the Arab world, interaction isgreater with the scientific, literary and culturalproduction of the Anglo-Saxon and Americanworlds. In addition, similarities and commonhuman and political factors between Arabcountries and those of Latin America, as wellas other developing regions, have led someArab writers and intellectuals to welcome thecreative works produced by artists andthinkers in those countries.

All prominent names in global culturehave found their place in the Arab contempo-

Historically, Arab

culture was never a

closed system.

Cultural production

shows a profound

interaction between

Arab intellectuals and

creative artists, and

the global culture and

its different

philosophies and

intellectual

movements.


rary culture. All global ideologies and method-ologies the human and social sciences, includ-ing inter alia structuralism, functionalism,phenomenology, stylistics, deconstruction –the list is endless – have found both commit-ted adherents and ardent critics in Arab cul-ture. Hence, Arab contemporary culture isgenerally explicit in its openness to human cul-tures and the interaction with the contents,concepts and methodologies common in thosecultures. The single exception to such open-ness is the imitative school of tradition, whichis slavishly tied to the past and its legacy.However, some representatives of even thatschool accept, in varying degrees and withincertain limits, some of the products of moder-nity.

Yet despite all these marks of openness,Arab culture today finds itself deeply chal-lenged by aspects of global culture: the unbri-dled power of mass communication and thegigantic power of the global economy andglobal finance. It is, like many other cultures,confronting the problems of an emergingmonolith while also concerning itself with cul-tural multiplicity, cultural personalities, theproblem of the "self" and the "other", and theproblem of its own cultural character. Theseand similar terms and concepts reveal the ob-sessions and anxieties of Arabs. Fears aboutthe extinction of their language or their veryculture itself, or about the diminution and dis-persal of their identity, have become over-whelming obsessions that increasingly hauntthe Arabic intellect and Arab society.

The way out will be the way through. Theonly historical possibility for Arab culture is togo through this new global experience. For itcannot exile itself, feeding only on its past, itshistory and its intellectual heritage in the newworld of overwhelming powers that dominateknowledge, products, technology and globalculture.

There is nothing that can justify Arab cul-ture, in light of its rich historical experienceand heritage, seeking to escape from the newconditions. Undoubtedly, some currents em-bedded in this culture would prefer a policy ofrejection, indifference, isolation, and hostilityto all values, ideas, and practices from outside.This is an understandable response to a globalculture that is not impartial in most cases: un-derstandable, but not acceptable. Withdrawal,even if it were feasible, would only lead to theweakening, decline, and fading away of thestructures of Arab culture, rather than theirflowering and further development.Moreover, as this chapter has argued, the mostauthentic values and ideas in current Arab cul-ture, especially in the fields of language, reli-gion, and values, are quite capable of holdingtheir own against the challenges of globalisa-tion without retreating from, or rejecting thefuture.

The global culture has its own dimensionsof knowledge, science, and technology, whichcountries neglect at their own risk. Openness,interaction, assimilation, absorption, revision,criticism and examination cannot but promptcreative knowledge production in Arab cul-ture. It is time to give the most enlightened,the most rational, objective and balanced, themost productive and the most humane im-pulses and currents of Arab culture their due,perhaps overdue, place in shaping and drivingthe next Arab encounter with the infinitely ex-panding world of knowledge.

Arab contemporary

culture is generally

explicit in its openness

to human cultures...

The single exception is

the imitative school of

tradition, which is

slavishly tied to the

past and its legacy.

Arab culture cannot

exile itself, feeding

only on its past, its

history and its

intellectual heritage.

The formidable power lent to Man bymodern science and technology may beput to diametrically opposed uses, somebeneficial and some destructive. Naturehas never been so abused as it is today,yet we are in a much better position thanever before to protect it: not only be-cause of our ability to influence environ-mental problems but also because ourawareness of them is greater than in thepast.

This does not mean our power to dogood always gets the better of our abilityto do harm, as is shown by only too manyexamples: take the depletion of theozone layer, for instance, and the many

species still threatened with extinction.I might have referred to other fields

besides that of the environment. I chosethat because some of the dangers we en-counter are similar to those involved inglobalisation.

In both cases there is a threat to di-versity. Just as animal and plant speciesthat have lived for millions of years arenow dying out before our very eyes, inthe same way, if we are not careful, wemay witness the disappearance of manycultures that have hitherto managed tosurvive for hundreds or thousands ofyears.

BOX 6.9

Amin Maalouf: Protecting Diversity

Source: Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, 2001, pp 128-129.

CULTURE 131

This chapter has indicated that there is no contradiction between the defining elements ofArab culture as analysed here and knowledge acquisition.

It concludes that the soul of Arab culture, which has permeated three millennia, has what ittakes to build the Arab knowledge society in the third millennium, as effectively as it did at theend of the first millennium and the beginning of the second. Indeed this well-stocked and well-knit culture can be a source of strength in coping with the challenges of globalisation. The nexttwo chapters turn to other key dimensions of building the Arab knowledge society: the Arabsocio-economic structure and the political structure on the national, regional and global levels.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 133

The process of knowledge acquisition interactswith, and is influenced by, the social and eco-nomic structure of a society. Knowledge is firstand foremost a social product, yet in knowl-edge societies it is also a fundamental economicfactor. This chapter considers whether Arabsocio-economic structures are geared towardsencouraging or inhibiting knowledge acquisi-tion as a means of achieving human develop-ment. It is impossible in practice to separate the socialand economic structures of a society fromother societal dimensions that affect knowl-edge acquisition, especially the political con-text, which is all-encompassing. The analysis inthis chapter intersects with the discussion ofpolitics and knowledge in the next chapter andmay be seen in the light of that discussion aswell.

INTRODUCTION

The economic and social infrastructure of a so-ciety, on the one hand, and its knowledge sys-tem on the other influence each other througha number of linkages.

The first linkage concerns the pattern ofproduction and the level of technology used bythe production sector, including the level ofskilled labour, entrepreneurship, equipmentand systems. Production patterns, workforcecharacteristics and technology levels are amongthe most important determinants of socialstructures, which, in turn, orient the attitudesand attributes of a social culture. It is no exag-geration to say, as Schumpeter did, that thework in which human beings spend most oftheir waking lives has a profound impact ontheir intellectual outlook; and that the placepeople occupy in the production process heav-ily influences their worldviews and attitudes to-wards daily affairs. Work, after all, is what

determines the space within which one can actand influence matters and events (Schumpeter,1957, Part I).

The second linkage runs in the opposite di-rection. It concerns how social and economicinstitutions influence the type and level ofknowledge and technology that the productionsector develops, which in turn shapes patternsof production, growth rates, living standardsand the capacity to sustain growth andprogress. The most influential institutions inthis respect are those that affect how sources ofincome are divided and how economic sur-pluses are allocated. Incomes can be generatedby salaries, wages and profits resulting fromwork in productive activities; or they can comefrom rent produced by properties and un-earned wealth. Depending on the source of in-come, economic surpluses can be allocatedeither to "futile investment", exemplified byprestigious properties and other assets whichhave little or no influence on the building ofproductive capacities and, thus, on economicgrowth, or to "productive investment" in thecreation of assets and enterprises that increaseproductivity and economic competitiveness. Bydefinition, the latter are the kinds of assets andenterprises that embody innovative ideas andcreate new productive assets and knowledge-intensive technologies. Such productive invest-ments are those that most strongly impacteconomic growth and the building of a knowl-edge society.

Investment in new productive assets is aprime mover of, and incentive for technologicalprogress, because it is through such investmentthat the sciences and scientific theory are con-verted into technological applications. Thisconversion also tests the extent to which scien-tific discoveries and inventions are economi-cally useful. The reverse is also true: advancesin scientific knowledge open up opportunities

Socio-economic structureCHAPTER 7

Work is what

determines the space

within which one can

act and influence

matters and events.

Investment in new

productive assets is a

prime mover of, and

incentive for

technological

progress.

for technological innovation, which attractsinvestment in the production of new goodsand services or enhances productivity and effi-ciency in the production of existing goods andservices.

A third factor is that all production sys-tems are characterised by an inner logic, whichdetermines the direction and nature of theirdevelopment. The system represented by thehand mill, for instance, leads to an economicand social situation where the use of thesteam/mechanical mill is a necessity, whichneither the individual nor the community canchange. The widespread use of the mechanicalmill leads, in turn, to the creation of a new eco-nomic and social context, which creates newoccupations for new groups with new ideas.

How agents of change function in a societyis, however, more difficult and complicatedthan suggested above. Social formations andstructures and the intellectual and psychologi-cal patterns and orientations that reflect them,which are formed at a certain stage and whichreflect a specific production system, do notmelt away and disappear as quickly as thatstage of production itself. Some of these struc-tures solidify and remain in existence for gen-erations or centuries beyond the stage atwhich they were formed. It is notable in thisregard that the transfer of a production sys-tem developed in one society to a different onedoes not necessarily lead to the rapid changein the social and cultural context associatedwith that production system in the importingsociety.

This is why the superstructure of Arab so-ciety (including general culture, values and be-havioural patterns) is still influenced by theproduction patterns and relationships thatprevailed in the past (Muhammad Jaber al-Ansari, 1998).

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

MODES OF PRODUCTION

In knowledge societies, economic activitiescreate demand for knowledge and incentivesfor its dissemination and production. Theeconomy also represents one of the most im-portant sources of investment in knowledge. If

intensive knowledge is not an essential deter-minant of economic output and its distribu-tion among factors of production, societaldemand for knowledge will not exist and itwill not be possible to build an effectiveknowledge system. In advanced economies,knowledge accounts for a significant part ofthe value added to production, and the con-stant generation of new knowledge drives aprocess of continuous improvement in knowl-edge-based products and services, which helpsto sustain economic growth.

It is possible to distinguish five main fea-tures of the dominant mode of production inArab countries that affect knowledge acquisi-tion.

Dependence on the extraction of rawmaterials in "rentier" economies

First is the overwhelming dependence on theextraction of raw materials, chiefly oil, in whatare often referred to as "rentier" economies:The GCC countries and Libya, Iraq andAlgeria are almost completely dependent onoil. Other Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Sudanand Yemen) depend on crude oil as a primary,though not exclusive, source of gross eco-nomic product. In other Arab countries, oildependence is reflected in aid and workers’ re-mittances from oil-producing countries. Insome cases, the rentier nature accrues from aidfrom industrialised countries.

In rentier modes of production, economicreturns do not necessarily accrue from hardwork and high productivity, particularly in po-litical systems that constrain freedoms and donot encourage people to be industrious.Rather, the economy turns on the exploitationof raw materials and the use of foreign exper-tise in the absence of local knowledge capabil-ities. This, indeed, has been the historicalpattern in many Arab countries.

Rentier economies rely heavily on foreignexpertise as this approach provides quick andeasy economic returns. By contrast, creatingindigenous knowledge requires considerablecommitment, effort, time and financial re-sources. Yet in the long run, such a hands-offapproach eventually weakens the demand forlocalised knowledge, retards the developmentof local production and postpones the effec-tive utilisation of knowledge in economic ac-


All production systems

are characterised by

an inner logic that

determines the

direction and nature

of their development.

In rentier modes of

production, economic

returns do not

necessarily accrue

from hard work and

high productivity.

tivities.The first consequence of the rentier system

is that large and easy rents encourage a mind-set oriented towards spending and acquisition.Such a mindset is seldom interested in risk-taking or in addressing the difficulties associ-ated with stimulating or managing investmentand production in societies whose organisa-tional and economic structures are still fragileand inefficient.

The extraction of raw materials in Arabcountries began in the colonial period, andwas undertaken by foreign companies with ex-ports to the industrialised West in mind. Thispattern of production was associated with re-liance on foreign expertise. With a few majorexceptions in the oil industry and in water de-salination, particularly in Saudi Arabia andKuwait, almost all Arab countries entrustedmost knowledge-intensive aspects of the ex-traction of oil and other natural wealth – andindeed of other economic activities as well – toforeign corporations, generally on a full con-tracting, or turn-key basis.

The consequences of this abdication aresevere. Foreign experts are costly, their knowl-edge is seldom transferred and absorbed lo-cally and at times their approaches mayconflict with national interests. Worse, over-reliance on foreign expertise in high-skill areasreduces the demand for locally producedknowledge and prevents the growth of skilledArab knowledge enterprises.

Commodity-based production andfranchising

Most production in Arab countries is based ontraditional primary commodities in agricultureand other sectors and does not call for ad-vanced skills or technology. Another area ofrelative concentration is the manufacture ofconsumer goods under franchising or licens-ing arrangements with foreign firms.Meanwhile, the share in manufacturing of cap-ital goods with high knowledge content re-mains small. This industrial pattern limits thelocal demand for knowledge and perpetuatesreliance on knowledge imports under licens-ing arrangements. It could be said, in fact, thatcommodity-based production and franchisingstimulate knowledge development abroad andstifle it at home. As a result, knowledge sys-

tems in Arab countries remain dysfunctionaland Arab economic activities remain knowl-edge-poor.

Features of this production mode are ap-parent in the Arab commodity manufacturingstructure, dominated by extraction industries(Figure 7.1).

The same production mode is evident inthe structure of Arab exports, compared withother regions of the world. (Figure 7.2).

The same Figure shows that the MiddleEast and North Africa region, as classified bythe World Bank, occupies the lowest levelsamong world regions, even compared to the


Figure 7.1Share of extractive industries in commodity production

Source: League of Arab States, 2002 (in Arabic).

Figure 7.2Export structure, selected regions

Source: World Bank 2002.

Commodity - based

production and

franchising stimulate

knowledge

development abroad

and stifle it at home.

least developed countries, in both the percent-age of manufactured exports and the share ofhigh technology exports as an indicator ofknowledge intensity in economic output.

Prevalence of low-skill micro-enterprisesand informal sector production activities

Many Arab micro- and small enterprises clingto traditional modes of production that arelow in knowledge content in the modernsense, and which do not contribute to the gen-eration of new knowledge. In Egypt, for exam-ple, the 1996 census showed that practically allsuch enterprises (98%) employed two or fewerindividuals, while the percentage of enter-prises employing more than 100 workers wasless than 0.1% (Nader Fergany, 1998). InJordan, the percentage of enterprises employ-ing less than 50 workers was 94% (The WorldBank, 2002).

It is important to stress that the absence ofknowledge-based production in these enter-prises is not related to their size or to the typeof economic activity in which they engage. It israther a consequence of the weakness of theknowledge system itself and of low knowledgeutilisation in the surrounding economy.Conventional economic activity, per se, is notan obstacle to knowledge acquisition and util-isation. The missing factor is an effective soci-etal system for knowledge acquisition. In fact,there are examples in the region where inten-sive knowledge production has taken place inconventional economic sectors, such as agri-culture, and where such production has notonly increased value added but also con-tributed significantly to the knowledge acqui-sition system in society at large. Elsewhere inthe world, some of the most intensive forms ofknowledge utilisation and production are car-ried out in highly innovative micro- and smallenterprises (for instance, Silicon Valley in theUnited States and its fast-growing equivalentin Bangalore, India).

Scarcity of medium-sized and largecompanies based in the Arab region

Unlike the case of south-east Asia, whereJapanese and global multinational corpora-tions established integrated bases for indus-trial production in those countries capable ofexporting to world markets, the investments

of multinational corporations in Arab coun-tries were limited to secondary activities withlittle effect on the creation of national skills orthe adoption of technology. Such foreign in-vestment was characterised by a vertical rela-tionship between Western industrial centresand individual Arab countries, and was en-couraged by very weak horizontal relation-ships between the Arab countries themselves.This so-called hub-and-spoke pattern reflectsin part the failure of economic cooperationand integration efforts in the Arab region.

Lack of competition

Healthy competition still eludes Arabeconomies where entrenched monopoliesdominate several sectors. Uncompetitive firmsdo not seek out knowledge but instead con-centrate on maintaining their traditional com-mercial footholds. In addition, a lack oftransparency and accountability has created acertain overlap between political and businesselites. This further reduces the competitivepressure to enhance the use of knowledge ineconomic activities in Arab countries, sinceprofits are mostly derived from access topower rather than through economic effi-ciency and performance.

Lack of competition marginalises the roleof productivity, and consequently the need forknowledge in economic activity. In the recentpast, in many Arab countries, the public sectorloomed large in the economy with macro poli-cies relating to employment, pricing and man-agement that reduced the efficiency of bothpublic and private economic activity. Whensome Arab countries moved towards free mar-ket economies, the legal frameworks and insti-tutions necessary to prevent monopolies andprotect competition were seldom in place,with the result that private monopolies some-times replaced public ones.

At the same time, limited inter-Arab coop-eration has led to the narrowing of marketsand to inward-looking economies vulnerableto monopolies. Vigorous inter-country eco-nomic cooperation, which could create incen-tives for innovation and excellence and ademand for knowledge to support productioncapacity, has not taken off in the region.

The lack of foreign competition in general,coupled with import substitution policies, has


Many Arab micro- and

small enterprises cling

to traditional modes

of production that are

low in knowledge

content.

Healthy competition

still eludes Arab

economies where

entrenched

monopolies dominate

several sectors.

also narrowed markets. Yet it is worth notingthat in a few cases openness, through interna-tional trade – in the heartlands of rentiereconomies such as Dubai, Bahrain and Kuwait– has helped to stimulate the growth of eco-nomic capacities capable of competing be-yond national borders.

GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY ANDDISTRIBUTION

Economic growth

When societal conditions favour knowledgeacquisition, a virtuous cycle develops betweenlevels of economic output and rates of growthand productivity on the one side, and knowl-edge acquisition on the other. High outputand fast growth rates allow resources to be in-vested in knowledge acquisition. At the sametime, intensive investment in knowledge ac-quisition leads to the production of newknowledge, which then accelerates economicgrowth. Conversely, weak output and slowgrowth lead to under-investment in the knowl-edge system and in its application in society.Ultimately, whether a society allocates re-sources to knowledge acquisition in theamounts needed to bridge the knowledge gap(Chapter 1, Figure 1.1) depends crucially onits decision-makers. Currently, in Arab coun-tries, both economic growth and productionare stumbling, as demonstrated by WorldBank figures on the Middle East and NorthAfrica region.

Despite the popular perception that Arabcountries are rich1, the volume of economicproduct in the region is rather small. OverallGDP at the end of the 20th century (US $604billion) was little more than that of a singleEuropean country such as Spain (US $559 bil-lion) and much less than that of anotherEuropean country, Italy (US $1,074 billion)(UNDP 2002).

Compared to the relatively high rates ofeconomic growth during the oil boom of the1970s, growth in combined Arab gross domes-tic product in the last quarter of the 20th cen-

tury was extremely modest. (See Figure 7.3.)The figure indicates that the growth rate in

gross domestic product in the Middle East andNorth Africa region was modest during thelast two decades of the past century, falling toless than half its levels in the 1970s (during thefirst oil boom). Indeed, in the 1980s it wasnegative. Moreover, the gross product growthrate in the region in the 1970s was well belowthat achieved in the East Asia and Pacific re-gion; and less than that of low- and middle-in-come countries worldwide.

Productivity in Arab countries

Declining productivity is one of the majorchallenges facing Arab countries. Accordingto World Bank data (World Bank, 1998)2,rates of productivity (the average productionof one worker) in Arab countries were nega-tive to a large and increasing extent in oil-pro-ducing countries during the 1980s and ‘90s(see Figure 7.4). The gross national productper worker3 in all Arab countries is less thanhalf that in two advanced developing coun-tries: South Korea in Asia and Argentina inLatin America. (See Figure 7.5).

Dividing Arab countries into three groups


1This illusion has been accentuated by the concentration of Arab wealth in a limited number of lightly populated Arab oil-producing countries, andthe adoption of those countries as representative of all Arab states.2From tables 1, 3 and 1a in the source, with the work force in Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Somalia and the Sudan estimated as apercentage of the population (from the Arab Joint Economic Report, 1998), and on the assumption that the production per worker in Libya, Iraq,Djibouti and Somalia was $5000, $3000, $100, and $700 respectively.3As a preliminary indicator of productivity dictated by the more up-to-date data from one major source, and where the estimate of the labour force indeveloping countries is reduced to exclude women and children, particularly in informal economic activity, the estimate of productivity in this manneris expected to be higher than actual productivity.

Despite the popular

perception that Arab

countries are rich, the

volume of economic

product in the region

is rather small.

Declining productivity

is one of the major

challenges facing Arab

countries.

Figure 7.3Annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (%)Middle East and North Africa and other selected regions, 1970-2000

Source: World Bank, 1993, 2000 and 2002.

according to the contribution of oil to theirGNP, with each group representing aboutone-third of the Arab labour force, yieldsclearer indicators of the low productivity ofthese countries.

Productivity in the nine richest Arab coun-tries in terms of oil resources – the first group– barely exceeds half the productivity of aworker in two comparator countries. The pro-ductivity indicator in the medium oil-rich

countries (Tunisia, Syria and Egypt) is aboutone-sixth that of the comparator countries,while in the oil-poor countries (Jordan, Sudan,Somalia, Morocco, Yemen, Djibouti, Lebanonand Mauritania) it is less than one-tenth.

This means that excluding oil rents fromthe picture would reduce apparent levels ofproductivity in Arab economies much morethan a simple overall comparison indicates.

More important than the level of produc-tivity is the change in productivity over time.Based on the data in the World DevelopmentReport for 1998/99, it is possible to comparethe GDP indicator4 per worker in ten Arabcountries with that of some faster growingcountries5 over a relatively long period of time(1980-1997).

This comparison shows that productivityincreased annually by 15% in China, 8% inKorea and 6% in India. By contrast, thegrowth rate of productivity in the best per-forming Arab country did not exceed 4% (re-spectively, according to value: it was 3-4% inOman and Egypt, 2-3% in Tunisia, Mauritaniaand Morocco, 1-2% in Jordan and Algeria andless than 1% in the United Arab Emirates andSaudi Arabia).

Revitalising economic growth in the Arabregion is a necessary condition for initiating aknowledge renaissance. Yet growth alone isnot sufficient. A national consensus is re-quired among public, private and civil societydecision makers on the overriding importanceof building the knowledge society. This con-sensus would amount to a new social contractreflected in all Arab spending and investmentdecisions.

Income disribution

In any society, the distribution of income andwealth – and hence power – has an impact oneconomic growth and on the allocation of re-sources for knowledge acquisition. Thoughglobal experience shows that some economieswere able to achieve economic growth underconditions where wealth was accumulated bya few, this occurred in an economic environ-ment that was relatively closed. Globalisationand its open economies make growth in situa-tions of economic polarisation more difficult.


Figure 7.4Annual growth rate of GDP per worker (%)Middle East and North Africa Region, 1965-1993

Source: (based on World Bank, 1995).

Figure 7.5Gross national product (per worker) in Arab countriescompared to South Korea and Argentina, 1997

Source: Calculated from World Bank data, 1998.

4which reflects productivity better than GNP.5The indicator used here is the total of productivity rates in the two periods, calculated from the data provided in tables 3 and 11 in the source, whichgive the growth rates of the labour force and the GDP in both periods (1980-1990 and 1990-1997).

Excluding oil rents

from the picture

would reduce

apparent levels of

productivity in Arab

economies.

The volume of Arab capital invested in indus-trialised countries and not at home demon-strates this. Wide economic divides result ininstability, low productivity, extensive unem-ployment and further deterioration in the dis-tribution of income, wealth and power.Grossly unequal distributions of income,wealth and power adversely impact opportu-nities for knowledge acquisition by undercut-ting sustainable economic growth.

In turn, the skewed distribution of in-come, wealth and power undermines humandevelopment by fettering human capabilitiesand thwarting popular participation, itself oneof the main elements of human welfare. Thesecircumstances deny the poor opportunities toenlarge their capabilities or to influence deci-sions affecting their lives and thus lift them-selves out of poverty. Under these conditions,a society cannot accumulate high-qualityhuman capital, one of the most important re-quirements for a dynamic knowledge system.

Unfortunately, the data base on the extentand features of poverty and income distribu-tion in Arab countries is extremely weak.There is almost no data at all on the distribu-tion of wealth, and information on income dis-tribution and the extent and characteristics ofpoverty is minimal, which diminishes the clar-ity of the picture of poverty and income distri-bution in the region.

Some researchers estimate that poverty iseven more widespread and income distribu-tion is more unequal than indicated by inter-national datasets, due to technical difficultiesin poverty assessments as well as data scarcity.In light of different indicators, there is concernthat both determinants of welfare are growingworse: it is estimated that poverty is increasingand income distribution is becoming more un-equal. Estimates of poverty in Egypt in the1990s, for instance, vary between 30% and40%, which means that Egypt alone con-tributes nearly 10% to the overall poverty ratein the region. And this does not take into ac-count Iraq or Morocco, let alone Sudan,Somalia and Djibouti. Based on country sur-veys in the 1990s, estimates of poverty varyfrom 21% in Jordan to 30% in Yemen, 45% in

Djibouti and 85% in the Sudan (UNDP,1997). Figure 7.6 provides indicators of theextent of poverty in the 1990s, based on anumber of criteria. It indicates that poverty inArab countries is more widespread than isusually reported in international data bases,particularly those compiled by the WorldBank and the International Monetary Fund.

Even when field surveys of income and ex-penditure (which constitute the basic sourcefor estimates of income distribution) exist,such surveys suffer from defects that diminishtheir credibility, particularly with regard to theparameters of income distribution, as a resultof bias in the collected data.6 In Egypt, for in-stance, relying on the results of income and ex-penditure surveys in the first part of the 1990sleads to an improvement of the Gini coeffi-cient7 – i.e., income distribution becomesmore equal. But this does not correspond tothe overall economic situation, particularlyunemployment and poverty criteria and theobservations made of wealth distribution dur-ing the same period. The Gini coefficient wasestimated in 1997 at about 37% (Datte et al.,1998), compared to 28% in 1995 (WorldBank, 2000). This is a huge increase in a shortperiod of time, which indicates an acceleratedworsening of income distribution. Labour’sshare of the value added declined from nearly40% in 1975 to nearly 25% in 1994 (see Figure


Grossly unequal

distributions of

income, wealth and

power adversely

impact opportunities

for knowledge

acquisition by

undercutting

sustainable economic

growth.

Poverty in Arab

countries is more

widespread than is

usually reported in

international data

bases.

6Like the problem of "cutting the right tail" of income or expenditure distribution, which occurs in societies where surveys do not record the ex-tremely high values of expenditure or income. It prevails in societies or historical eras in which high incomes are derived primarily from activities thatare socially unacceptable or legally prohibited. "Cutting the right tail" produces values for the characteristics of income distribution that are moreequal than the real values.7A numerical measure related to a graphic device that depicts the degree of income or wealth inequality. (Journal of Economic Education)

Figure 7.6Estimates of poverty in Arab countries in the 1990s

Source; Nader Fergany, 2002.

7.7), which indicates a deterioration of GNPdistribution in favour of wealth returns.

The question of distribution has, however,a composite effect on knowledge acquisition.In some societies, the accumulation of wealthin select circles that are willing to make phil-anthropic contributions to support knowledgeactivities and endow knowledge-producing in-stitutions has had a salutary effect on knowl-edge acquisition in the society as a whole. Inother societies, however, (perhaps closer tothe Arab situation) the very wealthy – with afew exceptions – seek only to accumulatewealth quickly through easy profits, particu-larly from speculation and property holdings,and to indulge in ostentatious consumption.In such societies, the skewed distribution ofincome and wealth reduces the society's op-portunities for advancement in knowledge ac-quisition.

It is only fair, however, to recognise thatbefore the rise of autocratic regimes, Arab so-cieties were noted for their substantial philan-thropic activities, through non-governmentalorganisations and Islamic endowment funds,particularly in health and education, includinghigher education. Autocratic regimes, how-ever, with their restrictions on non-govern-mental organisations and their control ofMuslim endowment funds, have long dis-rupted such effective non-governmental work.

The oil welfare state, on the other hand, spentgenerously on people and on public services,yet did not promote strong non-governmentalmovements in support of knowledge acquisi-tion.

Creating a knowledge society requireswealthy Arabs, states, institutions and individ-uals, to provide substantial and sustained sup-port for the diffusion and production ofknowledge. This entails creating a societal en-vironment and developing tax and financialpolicies that facilitate the establishment andactivation of civil society organisations thatsupport knowledge acquisition and respond tothe call of national duty.

CLASS STRUCTURE

Class structure strongly influences the knowl-edge system. Wealth can play a positive role insupporting knowledge development and dis-semination if a portion is invested in theknowledge system. Another favourable soci-etal condition is the existence of a large edu-cated middle class, able to appreciate andcultivate various forms of knowledge andblessed with the financial security that allowsit to participate in sharing knowledge and inproducing it (Galal Amin, 2002).

Yet the middle class in Arab countries ison the wane, contracting under pressure fromrising poverty and the uneven distribution ofincome and wealth. This contraction has beenaggravated by a gradual decay in knowledgepursuits, particularly in Arabic. The enervat-ing influence of mass media entertainment andmass artistic production, the homogenisingimpact of global culture, the declining qualityof education and the general erosion of soci-etal incentives for knowledge acquisition areall contributing factors.

SOCIETAL INCENTIVES

In their studies of current Arab knowledgesystems and intellectual movements, a largeand varied group of Arab thinkers across theregion has consistently attached great impor-tance to both reason and knowledge. Many ofthem have sought to justify the adoption ofthese two values, arguing that classical Arabcivilisation exalted reason, experiment, hu-


The middle class in

Arab countries is on

the wane, contracting

under pressure from

rising poverty.

Figure 7.7Development of workers’ share of GDP (%), Egypt 1974-1993

Source: Nader Fergany, 1977 and 1998.

mankind’s development on earth and the wisehusbanding of nature in its conceptual valuesystem.

Yet other researchers studying modernArab culture have inferred that it is beset withirrational tendencies and that it underesti-mates the value of work, manual crafts and ap-plied sciences. A number of these thinkershave gone on to assert that most of the social,political and economic problems in the con-temporary Arab world spring from the misuseof reason and a consequent incapacity to han-dle the process of creative knowledge produc-tion.

Attempting to look objectively at the Arabvalue system, it becomes apparent that politi-cal, social, and economic conditions haveplayed a decisive role in shaping values and so-cietal incentives. After independence, mostArab countries came under political regimesthat represented little advance on the auto-cratic style of the past. Social and individualfreedoms were restricted in some areas, andwere totally absent in others. One need onlynote the characteristics of autocracy as sharplydelineated by Al-Kawakibi and his successors,and how such autocracies corrupt people’smorals and values and inhibit creativity anddevelopment (Box 7.2).

Traditional Arab social structures,whether represented in patriarchal societies orin tribes and clans, were not less harmful tomodern human values. The values of citizen-ship, law and normal human rights – in addi-tion to religious rights – all gave way to thementality of the tribe.

In Arab countries, the distribution ofpower, which sometimes coincides with thedistribution of wealth, has had an effect on themorals of societies and individuals. The pur-suit of personal gain, the preference for theprivate over the public good, social and moralcorruption, the absence of honesty and ac-countability and many other illnesses, are allrelated in one way or another to a skewed dis-tribution of power and the resulting social dis-parities. Justice, before all else, has been thevictim of this state of affairs.

Compared to the 1960s, Arab communi-ties today are witnessing a deterioration in so-cietal incentives, which has a bearing oncreative work and the development of knowl-

edge. Art, thought and knowledge are evalu-ated by whether they are "sinful or permissibleby religion". The criteria for judgment are fi-delity or heresy rather than beauty and ugli-ness, or right and wrong. Moreover, amongthe impoverished mass of people, the values of


In a valuable analysis of Arab society,Hisham Sharabi diagnosed the character-istics of those relationships that hinderand distort progress in Arab countries. Heconcludes that Arab society is caught upin a vicious circle, where the “patriarchalcollective self” reproduces itself in orderto perpetuate the patriarchal pattern ofauthority and social relations.

Arab society is not a traditional soci-ety in the true sense of the word, neither isit a modern society. It is, rather, a confus-ing mixture of both. One of its aspects ismanifest in a set of traditional social rela-

tions, values and structures emanatingfrom a patriarchal society allied with an-cient tribal, family, religious and sectarianrelations. The other aspect reflects a set ofmodern social relations and structures.The confusion is increased in Arab societybecause it suffers to a large extent from re-liance on foreign political, economic andcultural influences. Sharabi tries to ex-plain Arab patriarchy through its ap-proaches to modernism. He suggests thefollowing comparison between patriarchyand modernism on the basis of six majorcomponents:

The essence of the new patriarchy inArab society is the patriarchal family, theimportance of which can be grasped byunderstanding new patriarchal structuresand their basic internal relations, particu-larly those relating to authority, hegemonyand dependence, which reflect and are re-flected in the structure of social relations.

The father, the ideal new patriarchalpersonality, constitutes the central instru-ment of oppression. His power and influ-ence are based on punishment.Oppression in the mind of the family isalso associated with widespread irrationalattitudes among the general public. Thisassociation facilitates the perpetuation ofthe status quo and leads people to subcon-sciously oppose change. The scientificmind, which explains phenomena withreference to causes that are subject to test-ing and proof, has not taken root in thecollective personality. Metaphysics andmagic continue to dominate the psycho-logical environment of the individual.Therefore, rationality is not the principlethat governs individual behaviour or so-cial work in general. Two sectors in the so-ciety coexist side by side, one of them is

sorcerous and the other is scientific.Traditional structures coexist with mod-ern structures, and a dependent, primitiveeconomy exists next to a modern, rationaleconomy.

Arab societies are managed by manydespots of varying degrees of patriarchy:the head of the household, the elders inthe family, tribal chieftains, school princi-pals, council chairmen, heads of state andother father figures. In such societies therecan be only small scope to develop initia-tive and innovation in individuals who areunder the control of these petty despots.Hopes that Arab educational systemswould overturn the influence of patriar-chal upbringing on individuals have beenfrustrated. On the contrary, the traditionalpatriarchal culture has penetrated the ed-ucational system in most schools, reinforc-ing students’ submission to various formsof authority and stifling individual andcreative initiatives. Even in schools unbur-dened by the weight of traditional society,such as foreign private schools, the en-couragement of individual initiative andcreativity are the exception rather than therule.

BOX 7.1

Patriarchal Society in Arab Countries

COMPONENT Modernism Patriarchy

KNOWLEDGE

FACT

LANGUAGE

GOVERNMENT

SOCIAL RELATIONS

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

IDEA – MIND

SCIENTIFIC – REVOLUTIONARY

ANALYSIS

DEMOCRATIC – SOCIALIST

HORIZONTAL

CLASS

SUPERSTITION – BELIEF

RELIGIOUS – NARRATIVE

RHETORIC

NEW PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY

VERTICAL

FAMILY – TRIBE – COMMUNITY

Source: Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, The Distorted Change in Arab Society, Oxford University Press, 1988. Chapter 2,pp. 17-18.

asceticism and other-worldliness prevail.Deprivation has caused them to transpose thelives they desire, but cannot lead, to the after-life. Yet their non-material values have notprevented the appearance of an ostentatiouslyluxurious lifestyle among the affluent, drawingon the authority of scripture where it says:"Remember your share in life".

The oil boom also played its role in erod-ing a number of values and societal incentivesthat would have been helpful in enhancingcreativity and the acquisition and dissemina-tion of knowledge. With the spread of nega-tive values during that period, creative abilitieswere neglected, and knowledge lost its signifi-cance for human development. The socialstanding of scientists, educated people and in-tellectuals fell. Education became incapable ofproviding the poor with the tools and abilitiesthey need for social mobility. Social value wasmeasured by money and fortune, regardless ofhow those fortunes were gained.Proprietorship and possession replacedknowledge and intellectualism. Perhaps worstof all, the values of independence, freedomand the importance of a critical mind – valuesby which people can actively exercise choiceand lead conscious lives – were also buried.The aftershock of this collapse continues toweaken and undermine Arab societal incen-tives today. As a result, indifference, politicalapathy and a sense of futility are becomingdangerously common among broad segmentsof the populace. Arab citizens are increasinglypushed away from effecting changes or takingdecisions in the interest of their countries.

The modern productive person is no

longer the model citizen. Instead, Arab soci-eties now offer choices that people shouldrefuse to make. The question as to who is bet-ter: the productive or the religious citizen isone such false antithesis. The question shouldinstead be: can the Arab citizen be both pro-ductive and religious? And what will it take tocombine those two traits? Such soul-search-ing is, however, far from the norm. Work hasceased to be a precious value, and many stilltalk about ‘rizq’, or a livelihood, as a blessingfrom God. Popular proverbs and sayings de-note a return to the view that production, in-centives and rewards are subject to fate anddestiny. Thus, current values are shrinking theboundaries of the human will. Status inheritedremains a more powerful value than status ac-quired.

Fine speeches about ancestral glory aremuch in evidence. This narrow homage to thepast is held in higher esteem than attempts torebuild institutions or reinvent the social con-tract. Meanwhile, personal relations andfavouritism outweigh merit and efficiency inboth the public and private spheres. This suf-focating social climate stifles creativity, inno-vation and the acquisition of knowledge. Itweakens the sense of community and incites adestructive form of individualism driven byenvy and hostility, rather than by the healthyentrepreneurial spirit found in industrialisedcountries. It dismantles corporate teamworkand production, and undercuts collegial ex-changes of experiences. The rise and preva-lence of ideologies in the Arab world in thesecond half of the 20th century also led to thedominance of dogmatic tendencies and radi-calism and to increased repression by authori-ties. This has given rise to introvertedideologies and ideas of cultural specificity, dif-ference and the rejection of the "other" onboth the local and global levels.

Severe restrictions on independentthinkers who could have contributed substan-tially to Arab creative knowledge cut societiesoff from legitimate intellectual dissent. At thesame time, a form of historical analysis andwriting serving the vested interests of somepolitical and social systems is resurfacing. Inthe meantime, freedom of thought has beenrestricted and outstanding and free thinkershave been oppressed. This is taking place


Arab citizens are

increasingly pushed

away from effecting

changes or taking

decisions in the

interest of their

countries.

Status inherited

remains a more

powerful value than

status acquired.

“We became accustomed to regardingabject submission as polite deference; ob-sequiousness as courtesy; sycophancy asoratory; bombast as substance; the sur-render of basic rights as nobility; the ac-ceptance of humiliation as modesty; theacceptance of injustice as obedience; andthe pursuit of human entitlements as ar-rogance. Our inverted system portrayedthe pursuit of simple knowledge as pre-sumption; aspirations for the future asimpossible dreams; courage as overreach-ing audacity; inspiration as folly; chivalry

as aggression; free expression as imperti-nence; free thinking as heresy; and patrio-tism as madness. ”

“In your helplessness you accept amiserable life, and you call it content-ment; you abdicate responsibility for yourdaily existence, saying ‘God will provide’and you believe yours is not to reasonwhy because what befalls you is God’swill. But, in God’s name, this passivity isnot the proper status of humankind. ”

BOX 7.2

Al Kawakibi (1854-1902): The Inversion of Values Under Despotism

Source: The Character of Despotism, p.126, p.118.

amid the contraction of domestic economiesand the psycho-political constriction of na-tional development induced by regional crises,the most prominent of which centre on gover-nance, Arab unity and the Palestinian prob-lem. Together, these trends portend a cultureof near-despair and rejection.

These value-related issues in Arab societyform a vicious circle that stands in the way ofcognitive development, open-mindedness anda positive approach to life and knowledge.They militate against human development andan Arab cultural and economic renaissance.

A society that does not value knowledgeand innovation highly does not give theknowledge system the required elements orthe environment it needs to flourish. Hope isnow attached to the emergence of a strong andvibrant middle class, with well-educated mem-bers who have distinguished expertise andpossess a vision that looks forward to a betterand more humane life. The state, civil society,cultural and mass media institutions, enlight-ened intellectuals and the public at large are allcalled upon to plant those values that encour-age action and innovation in the political, so-cial and economic spheres. Each one of thesespheres needs to be the base and instrument ofproduction and innovation in culture andknowledge. Each needs to build a system ofvalues that encourages respect for hard workand productivity and stimulates the capacity toinnovate using what is created by the local so-ciety or by humanity as a whole.

Promoting an Arab renaissance throughdemocratic values

The acquisition of knowledge is a differentmatter from the acquisition of material wealth.Quantitative economic advancement is associ-ated with the accumulation of wealth that al-ready exists through the process of capitalformation. Such wealth may be concentratedin a few hands, whether in the state or the pri-vate sector, depending on the prevailing eco-nomic model. Qualitative advancement,however, is associated with the developmentof a society’s knowledge base, with the contin-uous replenishment of that base through newknowledge and with the free flow of knowl-edge to all members of society, such that everycitizen, regardless of social position, economic

level or age group, has an opportunity to con-tribute to knowledge development and to ben-efit from its outcome.

Such free flows of knowledge within soci-ety require a democratic value system and theelimination of corruption, which divertsknowledge, ideas and information in order toserve the personal interests of a few and hin-ders their movement for the good of society.Free flows of knowledge also call for the freemovement of people who are the vessels ofthat knowledge. This, in practice, requires re-specting the human rights of Arab workersmoving from one country of the region to an-other to enable them to interact positively withall groups in their host societies.

Arab citizens must be accorded the fulldignity due to them as human beings. Theirinitiative, innovation and public participationmust be encouraged and rewarded. Their rightto different opinions and beliefs has to berecognised. Freedom from discrimination ofall kinds must be upheld for all citizens, espe-cially women and children, the groups thatsuffer the most iniquitous restrictions today.Modern Arab society has not given sufficientattention to women’s empowerment. The in-terpretation of laws and the production ofknowledge have not advanced sufficiently toguarantee Arab women their economic, socialand cultural rights, consistent with interna-tional conventions and without encroachmenton Islamic law.

Effective measures must also be taken toeliminate traditions, laws and customs, whichentrench narrow traditional loyalties to thetribe and the clan in Arab societies and to re-place them with the concept and practice ofcitizenship, without which there can be no in-novation.

In economic life – which is closely associ-ated with political and social philosophy – thevalue of justice must be introduced, becausethe values of freedom, democracy and equalitywill not bear fruit without justice. It is justicethat makes the values of integrity, accountabil-ity and peoples’ welfare – which are the basisof a sound ethical community life – possible,viable and effective.

In short, the reform of the Arab knowl-edge model has to move in lockstep with thereform of Arab social values. The restoration


Free flows of

knowledge within

society require a

democratic value

system and the

elimination of

corruption.

Modern Arab society

has not given

sufficient attention to

women’s

empowerment.

of rationality, scientific methods and open-mindedness cannot proceed without the reno-vation of political, social and economic valuesand their wide diffusion as creative principles.The new core values that will drive the Arabrenaissance are freedom, justice, respect forhuman dignity and basic human rights, in-tegrity, the pursuit of public welfare, account-ability, pluralism and the ethics of dialogueand political alternation.

MIGRATION

Arab countries have witnessed two great out-flows of international emigration that have sig-nificantly affected local knowledgeacquisition. The first was directed to oil-richArab countries and took the form of tempo-rary labour migration. Nevertheless, restrictivepolicies and circumstances in both the coun-tries of destination and origin, and recurrentpolitical upheavals and armed conflicts, oftenimpeded real human exchanges among Arabcountries except in some cases where Iraq isconcerned. The level of education and skillsamong these temporary migrants varied fromone country of origin or destination to an-other. Many "oil" migrants, however, endedup working in the education sector and serviceindustries.

The second outflow went to Westerncountries and was characterised by a higherfrequency of settlement in the countries ofdestination. Within that second flow two cur-rents can be distinguished: the first originatedin North Africa and set out for Europeancountries, especially the former colonial pow-ers. It encompassed all levels of education andskill, but was dominated by unskilled labour.The second current is more significant fromthe knowledge perspective, as it entailed theemigration of highly qualified Arabs to dozensof Western countries. Settlement in the coun-tries of destination dominated that current.

Emigration to other societies endows mi-grants with new knowledge and experience.Under favourable conditions, those withwhom they mix also acquire knowledge. Arabmigration to Arab countries, especially whencentred on education, has certainly made valu-able contributions to knowledge, most of all inthe countries of destination. Migration be-

tween Arab countries, despite serious difficul-ties at times, has also contributed to strength-ening Arab ties.

However, in general, institutional arrange-ments for intra-regional migration and thegeneral policies of both countries of origin anddestination did not foster the best possible re-turns to migrants or to their home and host so-cieties. Most Arab conventions designed toregulate emigration, protect migrants’ rightsand ensure optimal developmental outcomesremain little more than ink on paper, eventhough such conventions do not rise to thelevel of protection embodied in internationaltreaties.

THE BRAIN DRAIN

Arguably, emigration of highly qualified Arabsto the West has been one of the most seriousfactors undermining knowledge acquisition inArab countries. It is no exaggeration to char-acterise this outflow as a haemorrhage. Thetrend is large-scale and is steadily accelerating.Data to adequately document the extent of thephenomenon is not readily available, but someindications that point to the extent and gravityof the brain drain are given below (Zahlan,background paper for the Report).

It is estimated that by the year 1976, 23%of Arab engineers, 50% of Arab doctors, and15% of Arab BSc holders had emigrated.Roughly 25% of 300,000 first degree graduatesfrom Arab universities in 1995/96 emigrated.Between 1998 and 2000 more than 15,000Arab doctors migrated.

Apart from the sheer scale of emigrationand its growth over time, looking into the mo-tives of emigrants reveals obstacles to buildingArab knowledge societies that are perhapsmore serious than the brain drain itself.Surveys of highly qualified Arabs living abroadindicate that their principal reasons for leavingrelate to the absence of a positive societal envi-ronment and facilities that would allow themto play their role in the knowledge system andin the development of their countries. Ideallythis role should be performed under condi-tions that permit individual fulfilment and adecent standard of living. The denial of livableconditions to a host of highly qualified Arabsdrastically undermines any attempt to create


The restoration of

rationality... cannot

proceed without the

renovation of political,

social and economic

values.

Between 1998 and

2000 more than

15,000 Arab doctors

migrated.

knowledge societies in Arab countries. Theiremigration perpetuates weaknesses in both theproduction of knowledge and the demand forit, since the activities and pursuits of suchhighly qualified personnel would have signifi-cantly increased both supply and demand hadthey remained in their countries.

Ironically, the Arab brain drain constitutesa form of reverse development aid since re-ceiving countries evidently benefit from Arabinvestments in training and educating their cit-izens. More significant, however, is the oppor-tunity cost of high levels of skilled outflows:the lost potential contribution of emigrants toknowledge and development in their countriesof origin.

The extent of that loss calls for serious ac-tion: firstly to tap the expertise and knowledge

of the Arab Diaspora abroad and secondly toprovide Arab expatriates with incentives to re-turn to their countries of origin either on tem-porary assignments or for good. If they docome back, they will do so with a larger stockof knowledge capital than that with whichthey left. Yet this will not happen unless en-abling conditions at home are in place – con-ditions that are conducive to fulfilment in theirpersonal, professional and public lives andthat allow them to contribute to national de-velopment. Creating such conditions is not aneasy task. It requires a serious project inhuman development in Arab countries, seri-ous enough to attract emigrants back to par-ticipate in the task of creating a knowledgesociety and to share in the honour of seeing itmaterialise.


Ironically, the Arab

brain drain constitutes

a form of reverse

development aid.

Contrary to the assessment regarding the state of Arab culture, the analysis in this chaptershows that Arab social and economic structures are obstacles to knowledge acquisition. This re-quires a longer-term approach than that prescribed in the case of Arab culture, a challenge thathas to be taken on if a knowledge society is to emerge in the region.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 147

Politics is the final, and perhaps the most influ-ential, frame of reference in analysing howknowledge is acquired in Arab countries. Asemphasised earlier, the vitality of a knowledgesystem depends on the political environment inwhich it grows. Among the most importantconditions are intellectual freedom and diver-sity protected by the rule of law, other institu-tional foundations of good governance and apolitical context that supports the efficient dis-semination and production of knowledge.Where do Arab countries stand in relation tothis model?The global explosion of knowledge has notonly accelerated global economic integration.It has given rise to regional blocs around theworld that challenge the new internationalorder for the purpose of extracting maximumgains for individual groupings of countriesseeking to join the global economy on advanta-geous terms. New ties within the EuropeanUnion (EU), the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) and the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are justthree examples of a changing world map. Howis knowledge acquisition in Arab countries af-fected by regional and global politics? What re-gional and global policies would help Arabcountries create knowledge societies in theArab world under these conditions?

GOVERNANCE AND LAW

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FORKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION

Knowledge is the totality of symbolic structuresheld by individuals or owned by society and itguides human behaviour at all levels of societyand in all fields. Politics, on the other hand, isthe science of managing the public affairs of a

society through material and non-materialmeans, including knowledge as just defined.

The ruling power plays a key role in direct-ing knowledge and in influencing its develop-ment or retardation. Since a ruling powerworks to foster knowledge patterns compatiblewith its orientation and goals, it inevitably re-sists or even suppresses other patterns that con-tradict its general direction. Knowledgeconflicts in the Arab world are often versions ofpolitical conflicts in societies where both thesanctioned knowledge paradigm and that con-testing it are motivated and sustained by thedeep and opposing ideological objectives ofruling powers and their opponents.

Glancing through the many strategic re-ports of political parties, associations or blocsacross the region provides abundant evidenceof this polarised split. Some documents adoptthe official knowledge paradigm and are seenas supporting the prevailing political power,whether or not their authors are actively associ-ated with it; other publications take a challeng-ing stance in flat opposition to that power andits version of knowledge and values.

Political systems and the cultural elite

Cultural elites across the Arab region are eitherallied with, or stand in opposition to the politi-cal authorities in power, adopting a worldviewof knowledge that may coincide with one polit-ical trend or another. In most cases, however,their knowledge pursuits take an academicpath. These groups opt to produce and developknowledge irrespective of its use in one politi-cal field or another. They have set themselvesup as stewards of knowledge, attempting to se-cure its growth through the positions many oc-cupy in universities and scientific researchcentres. Their academic isolation poignantlyreflects the knowledge crisis created by the cri-sis of political power in the Arab world.

The political contextCHAPTER 8

Knowledge conflicts in

the Arab world are

often versions of

political conflicts.

The ruling power plays

a key role in directing

knowledge and in

influencing its

development or

retardation.

Political authorities have failed to accommo-date them. Instead, authorities have focusedon assimilating those intellectuals, academicsand scientists who are prepared to shore up aknowledge system consistent with their domi-nant goal of controlling society’s socio-eco-nomic, political and cultural capabilities.

The isolation of Arab cultural elites has, ofcourse, allowed political systems to margin-alise them while polarising society and reward-ing sycophants. Thanks to the latter, culturaldisputes and debates are often overshadowedby attempts to legitimise the prevailing politi-cal system. The result is that Arab regimestend to underestimate the positive power ofknowledge, having grown accustomed to hav-ing their fears about its transformative effectscalmed. Their view of knowledge is strictly ex-pedient: knowledge is simply another meansto consolidate their power and plans.

Neutral academics have either spoken outagainst their alienation at home, or have beencompelled to emigrate abroad to pursueknowledge without political pressure or con-tainment. Although the Arab brain drain ap-pears to be financially motivated, it reflects adeep crisis in the role of knowledge in present-day Arab countries. The stark choices facingindependent intellectuals and scholars are

quite painful: to commit "treason of theclerks"1 by declaring allegiance to politicalregimes, or to seek exile outside their coun-tries of birth.

Yet a few Arab intellectuals do reach andinfluence the holders of political power.Observers of the Arab intellectual scene notethat the Arab scholar-activist influencespower, not so much by the weight of scholar-ship or independent thinking, but to the ex-tent that he or she infiltrates power circles. Ithas been pointed out that the dilemma of theArab public intellectuals is that in order to beinfluential they must somehow connect withthe patronage networks of rulers and high of-ficials. In the absence of a public spherebounded and protected by the rule of law, theArab intellectual walks a fine line betweenprinciple and expediency. More often thannot, when authoritative advice on policychoices is required, for a variety of historical,economic and political reasons, Arab rulersand think tanks often continue to preferknowledgeable outsiders to local intellectuals(Hudson, 2002)2

On the other hand, a group of neutralArab academics resorts to "intellectual migra-tion" at home or is actually forced to emigratein search of new and broader horizons to de-velop their knowledge, without political pres-sures or containment. While the Arab braindrain is commonly understood to be moti-vated by financial considerations, it in practicereflects a deeper crisis among knowledgeworkers in the Arab region. These workersare, in effect, resisters of an unacceptable ac-commodation with ruling authorities.

In between these two groups stands acommitted corps of intellectuals that seeks toapply knowledge to serve their communities,guided by their strategic thinking and their af-filiation with different civil society organisa-tions. This group has recently started toexpand amongst the Arab intellectual elite,along with the increasing vitality of Arab com-munities and civil society organisations.


The isolation of

cultural elites has

allowed political

systems to marginalise

them while polarising

society and rewarding

sycophants.

In the absence of a

public sphere bounded

and protected by the

rule of law, the Arab

intellectual walks a

fine line between

principle and

expediency.

1In I927, the French essayist Julien Benda published his famous attack on the intellectual corruption of the age, La Trahison des Clercs. The treasonin question was the betrayal by thinkers and intellectuals of their vocation to pursue the truth.2"On the Influence of the Intellectual in Arab Politics and Policymaking", Michael C. Hudson, paper presented to the conference on the Role of theIntellectual in Contemporary Political Life, Georgetown University, April 26-27, 2002.

A nation that has no say in its own affairsis never consulted on its interests and itswill has no effect on its public welfare.Rather, is subjected to one ruler whosewill is the law and whose desire is theorder, who rules as he pleases and doeswhat he wants. Such a nation is one thathas no stability and cannot go along astraight path. It vacillates between happi-ness and misery and between knowledgeand ignorance. It alternates betweenwealth and poverty and between glory andhumiliation.

If its ruler is ignorant, uncouth, of vileintentions, greedy, lustful, cowardly, un-

certain, stupid, villainous and unprinci-pled, he will plunge the nation into theabyss, place a veil of ignorance in front ofits eyes and reduce it to poverty and desti-tution. He will rule people despotically,deviating from the road of justice andopening the way to aggression, causing thepowerful to usurp the rights of the weak.The system will then be destroyed. Valuesand manners will also be corrupted, thenation's esteem will be lowered and des-peration will prevail. As a result, acquisi-tive eyes will be focused on the nation andinvading nations will strike at its belly withtheir claws.

BOX 8.1

Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897)The Nation and the Authority of a Tyrant

It is not Allah that hath wronged them, but they wrong themselves.(Qur'an: Ch. 3, Al Imran, verse 117)

Source: Complete Works, Part II, Political Writings,

Study and Examination by Dr. Muhammad Amarah, Arab Foundation for Studies and Publications, Beirut 1981, p.329.

PATTERNS OF KNOWLEDGEPRODUCTION ANDDISSEMINATION IN THE ARABWORLD

The production of academic knowledge in theArab world takes place along the followingpattern: • Official institutions sponsored by politicalauthorities produce "party" or institutionalknowledge and employ cultural workers andframeworks that legitimise their power.• Knowledge networks are connected to theArab world’s political parties or blocs, such asthe Al-Ahram Political Studies Centre or theCentre for Arab Unity Studies.• Research centres connected to civil soci-ety, such as the Cairo Human Rights Centre,are rooted in specific issue campaigns.Various types of associations and federationsfall into this cluster, such as the associationsfor channelling youth requests for employ-ment in Morocco, or environmental preserva-tion associations.• "Professional" research centres are set upeither by researchers with former links to po-litical regimes who seek to establish a strategicvision of international or Arab issues, or byacademics under the banner of "providingcustomer services". These centres have be-come popular venues for the production ofknowledge and depend largely on external fi-nancing.• Foreign research centres include theFrench Institute for the Near East, formerlythe Centre for Studies and Research in Jordan,Lebanon and Syria and the Centre for Studiesand Research on the Contemporary MiddleEast (CERMOC) in Egypt. These establish-ments produce publications similar to those ofnational institutions and often serve as sanctu-aries for national knowledge producers seek-ing academic outlets free from censorship.

Open discussion in the Arab press on thedistinction between the academic researcherand the political activist, and on the natureand objectives of externally financed scientificresearch at many of these centres, has helpedto create more social space for knowledge pro-ducers.


A major reason for the halting, if not ar-rested progress of learning and culturaladvancement in the Arab world may havebeen the failure of most Arab regimes, orso-called Arab systems, to relate to knowl-edge, in its multiple dimensions.

Obviously, contemporary rulers andthose of yesteryear neither are, nor were,the "philosopher-kings" of Plato'sRepublic. And they were not expected tobe in the first place. Yet in more simpleand practical terms, from this governancegap there flowed a number of conse-quences:• the rise of rulers from closed, semi illit-erate backgrounds inclined to reject anyparticipant in government who advocatedthe advancement of learning, or the en-hancement of the quality of educationand culture as objectives of statecraft, orwho were committed to the exercise ofacademic freedom.• disbelief among regimes in the need toseek cultural change based on those en-lightened human values embodied in theArab Renaissance of the 19th and early20th century – values that have been re-jected and crushed since the 1920's by aresurgence of religious extremism and ar-bitrary and self-serving interpretation. • the negation of freedom of thoughtand expression in public education, in-cluding higher university levels, which ac-counts for the near absence of investmentin research, particularly scientific re-search. The prevalence of state ideologiesand autocratic approaches that have led toobscurantism and lack of innovation andof adequate standards for proper educa-tion. This in turn has reduced openness tomodern technological advances and for-ward-looking intellectual discourse anddebates. • the absence, generally, as a corollary ofabsolutist governance, of critical thought.The obvious consequence of intolerant re-ligious interpretations of values and idealswas the freezing of thinking into dépasséideologies that permeated the minds andsouls of a significant majority of so-calledintellectuals. To such systems of values,any challenging ideas were consideredpunishable heresies. Many revolutionaryphilosophies were denigrated as "self-pro-claimed” concepts that did not stand thetest of history and time. This attitude con-tributed to defeats in almost every field -political, diplomatic and military -whereby dependence on foreign assis-

tance and science became nearly total. Theglorification of leaders and their systemsled to rulers being equated with the na-tion, which rendered abject submissioncompulsory, and thus the persecution offree thinking admissible. Witness the end-less numbers of jailed dissenters.Leadership was not questioned and theauthority of the day, no matter how cor-rupt or despotic, was above accountabil-ity. • hostility to creative literature, not tomention creative philosophic writing,which was unwelcome and often cen-sored. Intellectual openness to new hori-zons of modern culture was next to nil,new ideas were held to be unwelcome anddestructive and only entered Arab soci-eties through limited windows of opportu-nity.

The above might be considered aharsh caricature were its consequencesnot reflected in two major measurablefacts:• regression in literacy and reading, asevident in the decline of Arab writing andpublishing. • The emigration of creative artists that re-ject conformity. Introversion in the artsbecame reflected in strange forms of unin-telligible surrealism, when not imprisonedin naturalistic landscapes.

A strange polity was born where ex-cessive consumerism sometimes com-bined with an utter lack of imaginationand inventiveness.

Thus, the distressful spectacle of anArab world where immense wealth was il-licitly managed by despotic systems accu-mulating obscene fortunes whileproduction, except of oil, sank, as did theArab share of international trade. Thepeople continued to live in a state of igno-rance and indescribable poverty, hardlybenefiting from this accumulated wealthand unaware of even their most elemen-tary rights to rebel or revolt, rights deniedthem by an oppressive force, the objectiveally of neo-colonial exploitation. See Iraq!

In conclusion, the political outcomeof this situation, in the present context, isat one and the same time a sense oftremendous frustration, and a search for"purity" through invitations - at this stagemerely invitations - to soul-searching andself-criticism.

Ghassan Twainy

BOX 8.2

Knowledge and Governance in the Arab World

The diversion of knowledge production:separating politics from knowledge

The vigorous analyses, varied interrelation-ships and often contradictory nature that typ-ify such patterns underline the multipleloyalties criss-crossing Arab knowledge pro-duction. This is in addition to the tendency ofstates and political parties to manipulateknowledge selectively for political ends. Addto this the fact that the knowledge efforts ofthe intellectual vanguard are scattered and itbecomes clear that there are some fundamen-tal obstacles to the creation of a well-knit Arabknowledge society. The most serious obstacleis the exploitation of knowledge to serve polit-ical ends, internal or external. Overcomingthis calls for a fresh look at the knowledge mapand those who interfere in it. The goal shouldbe to institutionalize knowledge in a domainseparate from politics, thereby ensuring its in-dependence.

Political instability and fierce struggles foraccess to political positions in the absence ofan established rule for the peaceful rotation ofpower – in short, democracy – obstruct thegrowth and maturation of knowledge in Arabsoil. A major consequence of the unstable po-litical situation is that questions of securitydominate the agenda of ruling regimes. Thisinevitably leads regimes to allocate substantialinvestments to sectors that guarantee the sys-tem’s security. Spheres of social activity thatdo not yield direct and rapid returns are thefirst casualties when government budgets areskewed towards security measures. In theArab region, culture, knowledge and scientificresearch are exceptionally vulnerable to bothpolitical and financial neglect. Comparing sci-entific research allocations in Arab countrieswith equivalent spending in the industrialworld, or even in other developing countries,underlines this distortion.

Another far-reaching and more profoundconsequence of this state of affairs is thatknowledge activities are deprived of humantalents. Educated citizens migrate towardsbureaucratic, military, security and adminis-trative occupations that provide significantlyhigher social and material rewards than scien-tific research and education can offer.

A further grave consequence of the domi-nant model is that branches of political au-

thority come to control all spheres of social ac-tivity, and to intervene in the affairs of scien-tific, technical, technological and literaryinstitutions. Very often, such authorities directknowledge workers to serve their own limitedgoals and impose work programmes, ideologi-cal constructs and slogans in exchange for re-source allocations. Direct intervention bysecurity or political agencies in appointmentsto scientific, intellectual and literary positionsis the most blatant form of such interference,which of course disrupts knowledge develop-ment. It means that for the sake of securingpolitical dominance over knowledge institu-tions, efficiency criteria are sacrificed.Appointments driven by political allegiance,nepotism or private interest sooner or laterlead to the corruption of scientific researchand technical institutions, and eventually tothe destruction of knowledge itself.

In summary, Arab scientific research insti-tutions are largely at the mercy of politicalstrategies and power conflicts. Political loyal-ties take precedence in the management ofthese institutions and both efficiency andknowledge suffer. Power curtails the intellec-tual and political scope of scholars and thepublic alike – which in turn shackles goodminds, extinguishes the flame of learning andkills the drive for innovation. These factorshave impoverished Arab scientific and techni-cal systems and left them at their weakestwhen the need to liberate and leverage knowl-edge has never been stronger.

New foundations are needed to create arobust and coherent knowledge society. Far-sighted sociological and legal analyses haveemphasised the importance of taking the poli-tics out of knowledge by founding an indepen-dent political economy in the Arab world.Co-existence would be the first rule of thepolity under this reformation. Politicianswould hold public office in a balanced con-cord with other spheres, without seeking tooppose or stifle them. Studies further suggestthat an independent knowledge sphere mustalso be established in parallel to the politicalsphere. It would focus on producing and de-veloping knowledge free from political coer-cion, with the goal of embedding knowledgein society. Neither act of separation, whichwould truly liberate both spheres of influence,


The goal should be to

institutionalize

knowledge in a

domain separate from

politics, thereby

ensuring its

independence.

Power curtails the

intellectual and

political scope of

scholars and the

public alike – which in

turn shackles good

minds, extinguishes

the flame of learning

and kills the drive for

innovation.

is possible except by democratising politicsand knowledge production.

In other words, democratic transforma-tion in the Arab world is a fundamental condi-tion for the independence of knowledge,taking into account that such a transformationrequires synergy among economic, politicaland cultural actors. Whatever level of impor-tance is accorded to individual actors, politi-cal power ranks high in comparison to otherelements. This fact implies two challenges forsociety: the first is to establish an independentand self-limiting political sphere, while thesecond has to do with codifying and harmonis-ing democracy so that both politics andknowledge are independent, yet complemen-tary realms.

Founding an independent polity in theArab world is supremely important for the es-tablishment of the knowledge society. Yet inthe absence of institutional rule, little progresscan be made towards that goal.

The role of institutional independence instimulating the knowledge society

Institutional independence is another facet ofthe rule of law. It is the normal outcome of es-tablishing political power legally through cod-ification, and politically by democratisation.The fact is that the spirit of the rule of law isnot confined to the arrangement of lawswithin the state but is also embodied in thestate’s protection of rights and duties, and themaintenance of the dignity of human beings.Political authority requires a certain level ofaccumulated legal and institutional strength tolead society into democratic transformation.

The absence of sustained institutional in-dependence is a common feature across theArab nation. Arab polities cannot be charac-terised reliably by degrees of progress in insti-tutional governance. For example, it is notfeasible to set up comparisons on the basis ofthe type of regime (monarchy/republican), orthe extent of community participation (refer-endums/elections), or the degree of active in-volvement in the international human rightssystem. This is because each element has to bemeasured against the practical progress ofArab regimes in establishing political poweron the basis of a constitution and public re-spect for its legitimacy. Such legitimacy is

often in question, and Arab regimes continueto be driven by the imperatives of survival andsecurity, to the detriment of the balance re-quired in their relations with the governed.

CODIFYING POLITICAL POWERAND DEMOCRACY: AFUNDAMENTAL STAGE IN THEESTABLISHMENT OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

Fate has not decreed that political power inthe Arab world should permanently excludeparticipation by citizens. Whether participa-tion is encouraged or not depends on the willand policies of regimes. Amid conflicts anddisputes over state legitimacy the power of de-mocratisation and codification has beenunder-appreciated. Progress on those frontswould make all people, governors and gov-erned alike, subject to the rule of law and helpthe institutional state to evolve. That, in turn,would secure the coexistence of all spheres ofsocietal activity in the Arab world under theumbrella of equality. Moving in this directionwill entail strengthening some key, yet stillfragile, constitutional provisions and tighten-ing lax laws that favour power structures.

Towards political systems that serve theknowledge society

Overcoming the fragility of the constitutionalstructure has certainly become essential. Thisrequires creating a legal and political culturethat is capable of directing and guiding politi-cal practice. The effectiveness of this culture,which has to be built on both democratic par-ticipation and opposition, will flow from itscapacity to produce methodological conceptsand tools sharp enough to understand Arabpolitical reality and analyse the structures ofpower in Arab societies. Attaining this balancerequires that Arab intellectuals drop ideology,resist compromises with the status quo and re-ject nostalgic indulgence in heritage.

Arab intellectuals must be actively in-volved in building the conditions for democra-tic societies and especially in defending theimportance of their legal dimensions and thelimits of political power. The intelligentsiashould campaign for institutional rule, the ab-sence of which will impede the rise of the


Amid conflicts and

disputes over state

legitimacy the power

of democratisation

and codification has

been under-

appreciated.

knowledge society. Intellectuals and acade-mics have a clear stake in seeing due indepen-dence established in the respective spheres ofknowledge and politics, which would lead toknowledge becoming at last a free entity.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT FORKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION,PRODUCTION ANDDISSEMINATION

Freedom of thought and expression areamong the fundamental principles for shapingfree, innovative societies, businesses and indi-viduals. They are the essence of independentpublic opinion. For example, the protectionof innovation though intellectual propertyrights stimulates intellectual production andinvestment. The protection of people’s rightsof free speech and opinion stimulates creativethinking. Yet are Arab legal systems and insti-tutions qualified to protect such basic rights?

Irregularity of the legal structure

While the law is, in principle, the very basis ofcitizens’ rights to knowledge and to freedom

of thought and opinion, Arab laws suffer fromseveral structural defects that severely limittheir effectiveness and credibility.

Firstly, Arab laws do not always capturereality, but rather remain theoretical, whichweakens their usefulness. Secondly, the gapbetween nominal or de jure acceptance of lawsand actual enforcement or implementation isextremely wide. This gap is quite marked inpublic legislation, especially that related to is-sues of freedom and knowledge.

This large gap creates a duality that im-pedes progress. On the one hand, there is apositivist legal system that fails to interact withsociety – not surprisingly in a society that im-plements laws only when forced to. And onthe other hand, there is a society that repro-duces its values and systems in line with itsown notions, democratically legalising andconverting those notions to a state of re-spectability

That people often cannot exercise theirrights through participation and are furtherprevented from exercising them by "legal" op-pression certainly contributes to freezing bothreality and the laws. Thus, the most hopefulcourse for legal development lies in a dynamicinteraction between the realms of "law" and"reality".

Inactive and nominal laws

The majority of the Arab states have signedthe international human rights conventions3–all of them refer to respect for fundamentalfreedoms – yet those conventions have neitherentered the legal culture nor have they beenincorporated into the substantive legislation ofthose states. The conventions have remainednominal, as is apparent from the fact that theyare rarely raised before the judiciary for imple-mentation, even though they are all bindingand enjoy priority relative to local laws. It ispresumed that a judge would implement theseconventions if a lawsuit were presented beforehim or her4, which in practice rarely happens.

Furthermore, these conventions havenever been used, at the level of legislation, as alever; they could be used as tools to urge Arablegislative authorities to enact new laws or toamend unfair ones. This has not happened.


The majority of Arab

states have signed the

international human

rights conventions–

yet those conventions

have neither entered

the legal culture nor

been incorporated in

substantive

legislation .

3Most Gulf States have not yet signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights.4Some Arab legal systems have introduced in their procedural laws an explicit stipulation that judges are under obligation to apply the internationalconventions whenever such are brought up before them.

These two glorious, fundamental ele-ments, justice and science, are inseparablein human existence. Should one of themreach a country, the other would followsuit immediately; and when one leaves thecountry, the other will follow on its heels.One can hardly lift a foot or put it downwithout the other accompanying it. This iswhat history tells us. The chronicles ofstates in which the beacon of justiceburned bright and where the light of sci-ence shone tell us how their people en-joyed both lights at the same time and flewto the heights of happiness with these twowings. Once the times turned around, de-stroying one of the two foundations, theother one quickly followed, falling to theground. The afflicted state would fall intothe abyss. The atmosphere would becomepitch-dark, with thick black clouds andveils of ignorance blocking mortal sight.

The secret of this is now clear. If sci-ence spreads in a nation, it will enlightenthe ways for its people. Their roads willbecome brightly lit and they will clearlydistinguish between good and evil, be-

tween what is harmful and what is useful.It will be firmly established in their mindsthat equality and justice are the primarycause of lasting happiness. They will thenseek them, feeling that no price is toohigh. They will also know that injusticeand oppression are synonymous with de-struction and misery. Were justice to havea firm foothold in a nation, it would pavefor it the roads to peace of mind and soul.Every person would then know his or herrights and duties. Their thoughts wouldthen become sharp and their senses gen-tle. Their hearts would be strong in bring-ing what is useful to them and warding offwhat is harmful. They would immediatelyrealise that what they have achieved is noteternal and that what they have acquired isnot lasting unless they support one an-other in building true knowledge, and un-less education becomes universal,embracing all members of society. Theywould all rush to acquire the sources ofknowledge and spread it to all parts of thenation.

BOX 8.3

Imam Muhammad Abduh(1849-1905): Justice and Science

Source: Muhammad Abduh, 1990, p.25.

Declining efficiency of the judiciary

The judiciary is one of the fundamental guar-antors of the protection of people’s rights andfreedoms. In turn, its independence and trans-parency are the primary guarantee of its goodperformance. While most Arab states have un-derlined the principle of power separation, re-ality often exposes a relationship betweenjudicial powers and political powers, at leastwith respect to appointments and promotions.When judges who collaborate with the execu-tive branch are rewarded with high executivepositions the independence and credibility ofthe judiciary decrease. Moreover, suspensionof laws by judges – at the behest of politicalauthorities – and the spread of corruptionhave caused the judiciary, as an institution andas individuals, to lose the moral immunity theyonce enjoyed.

At the same time, it must be stressed thatjudges in Arab countries face an exceptionallydifficult task under circumstances that reducetheir efficiency. The high number of cases tobe heard and inadequately equipped court-rooms with poorly trained support stafflengthen the time needed for outcomes andhamper efforts to serve the public interest.While public faith in the judiciary is not ashigh as it once was, the institution, especiallyat its higher levels, remains vital for the peopleand stands between them and the excesses ofpolitical power.

Yet respect for the judiciary did not in-crease when some Arab countries created ex-ceptional courts that denied people the rightto regular civil hearings, due process and theright of appeal to higher courts. The latterright is important because the higher the courtthe more independent and respectful of dueprocedure it is likely to be.

Consequently, seeking the judgement ofthe law and the judiciary has become a mar-ginal resort for resolving disputes in someArab societies. The public’s growing lack ofconfidence in a judiciary that seems to be be-coming more dependent, together with a lackof popular awareness about what the law pro-vides for, may explain why so few cases con-

cerned with the denial of freedoms - eco-nomic, political, cultural and social – are beingbrought before Arab courts.

Restoring the judiciary’s credibility and re-building its independence are urgent prioritiesfor guaranteeing the freedom of thought andexpression inherent in the knowledge society.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT,OPINION AND EXPRESSION INTHE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGALSYSTEM

The legal protection of freedom

Freedoms are not confined to political andcivil freedoms; they embrace economic, socialand cultural freedoms as well. Without free-dom of thought, opinion and expression –which head the list of fundamental rights in-dispensable to the knowledge society – the ex-ercise of other freedoms would remain a mereabstraction.

International conventions and Arab con-stitutions and laws sanction freedom as a nat-ural human right. Most Arab states havesigned the international conventions5 that pro-tect freedom, and have unanimously agreed toendorse freedom in the substance of their con-stitutions6. They have further introduced intheir laws clauses that bear on the protection7

of freedom as part of legal controls thattighten or relax according to the type ofregime: controls may vary between censorshipand declaring a state of emergency.

The problem with freedom in Arab coun-tries is not related to the implementation oflaws8, but to their violation. It has to do withthe spread of oppression and the erratic natureof the measures used. It also has to do with thehegemony of censorship and its use by politi-cal powers to tighten their grip on those veryfreedoms that they have ostensibly recognised.

General rules for the exercise of freedom

The exercise of freedom, in societies that re-spect it, is subject to well-defined generalrules, wherein a balance is struck between the


Restoring the

judiciary’s credibility

and rebuilding its

independence are

urgent priorities.

The problem with

freedom in Arab

countries is not

related to the

implementation of

laws, but to their

violation.

5Such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and others.6Except for Saudi Arabia, which has not drafted a constitution per se, and the single-party states.7For example, the press and publishing laws in the Arab states provide that the freedom of issuing newspapers, printing and publishing is guaranteedaccording to those laws and that it is exercised within the framework of the constitution’s principles, the provisions of law and the profession’s codeof ethics. The same applies to the freedom of founding associations and organising general assemblies.8Those laws must be completed and adapted to the needs of Arab societies.

requirements of justice and law on the onehand and those of the public good as agreedupon by all social groups on the other. Thusthose rules are perceived positively. Moreover,the legal system in those societies places lawsin the hands of a fair judiciary that refers tothose laws in the settlement of disputes. In thisframework the law has a double role: to pro-vide the basis for resolutions in disputes and toinculcate the values it protects, penalising of-fenders against those values. People’s appealsto the rule of law and the judiciary attest totheir confidence in the proper performance ofthe legal system.

What determines how well freedom ofthought, opinion and expression are protectedin practice are the general rules for enforcinglaws and ensuring public compliance and thedegree to which such compliance serves thepublic interest. If the legal restrictions that en-force compliance with the law are statedclearly in the text of the law, are compatiblewith the constitution and conventions and thespirit of the legislation, and are implementedby the relevant legal authorities, then these re-strictions are effective and useful. Otherwise,they become harmful and oppressive.

In the Arab world, restrictions imposed onfreedom take the form of legal constraints onpublications, associations, general assembliesand electronic media, which prevent thesefrom carrying out their communicative andcultural roles. Such restrictions also obstructthe dissemination of knowledge and the edu-cation of public opinion, notwithstanding citi-zen’s rights as secured by the law and theinternational charters.

Restrictions on freedom vary in degreefrom one state to another. They range fromprohibiting the publication of new politicalnewspapers to banning the circulation of oneor more issues of existing journals, administra-tive seizure of newspapers and publicationsand advance censorship of periodicals.Penalties meted out to journalists, publishinghouses and news agencies used to be a smallfine; they now range from provisional suspen-

sions to outright closure.Regulations governing the freedom to

form associations that were laid down in thecolonial period endorsed the rule of free as-sembly, provided that the founding organisersinformed the competent authorities of the as-sociation’s creation. The situation today isthat, except for those older laws, all otheramendments governing freedom of associationmade in the post independence and nationalliberation era are restriction-oriented.9

Yet the more dangerous restrictions arethose imposed by the security authoritieswhen they confiscate publications or ban peo-ple from entering the country or prevent thesale of certain books during fairs while pro-moting other kinds of books. In committingthese acts, these authorities reach above theconstitutional institutions and the law, usingthe pretext of national security – a criterionseldom clarified by them. Other forms of re-striction come from classes of citizens them-selves, who, as noted in chapter three, appointthemselves the custodians of public morality,and press for the censorship of books, articlesand media events.

To escape this censorship-freedom contra-diction, the rule of law should be enforced, asit guarantees freedom and shrinks the role ofcensorship. Yet, as noted earlier, Arab lawsand legal institutions suffer from several struc-tural problems and many have lost their effec-tiveness and credibility. The restoration andeffective application of the law in the interestof public and individual freedoms dependcritically on addressing these problemsthrough significant reforms.

Violation of political and legal guaranteesfor the protection of freedom

Most constitutions have political and legalguarantees for the protection of freedom.Such political guarantees are reflected in therule of law and exemplified in the principles ofpeople’s sovereignty, equality and right toscrutinise the government’s policies and workand express their views on them. The legal


Authorities reach

above the

constitutional

institutions and the

law, using the pretext

of national security.

9Originally, the formation of associations did not require a license from the administrative authorities; it only required that the association be pro-claimed before those authorities. Now, laws governing associations require, upon proclamation or declaration of an association, that a temporary ac-knowledgement of recognition be delivered by the administrative authorities. Once the proclamation or the declaration text fulfils all the measuresprovided for in the same associations law, a final acknowledgement is delivered to the association, within a specified period. This acknowledgementrepresents a "license" that legitimises the work of the association. Should the authorities fail to deliver this acknowledgement within the specifiedperiod the association may operate in accordance with the objectives outlined in the relevant laws. However, by delivering the temporary and not thefinal acknowledgement, the administrative authority becomes able to revoke it whenever it likes, which is the core of the problem.Examples of this are the 1909 associations law of Lebanon and the statement of the minister of the interior issued on 17 January 1996; the associa-tions law of Morocco of 23 July 2002 amending and complementing the 15 November 1958 law on the right to form associations. The same provi-sions apply to the association of general assemblies.

Penalties meted out to

journalists, publishing

houses and news

agencies used to be a

small fine; they now

range from provisional

suspensions to

outright closure.

guarantees are embodied in respect for theprinciple of the separation of authorities, theprecedence of the law and in subjecting states-men and public officials to a common judi-ciary. Legal guarantees are also embodied inclauses regulating interior affairs. These guar-antees, however, are violated and become in-active during times of war and emergency inthe Arab world. Their suspension results in in-tensifying repressive measures – the sole co-or-dination framework found between Arabministers of the interior in their successivesummits.

Repression of freedoms in emergencies

The relative expansion in the sanctioning oflaws providing greater freedom in Arab coun-tries is a positive sign, yet its value is dimin-ished when contrasted with practices inenacting such laws. This often reveals a failureto reconcile the interests of the governmentwith the rights of the people and the exigen-cies of state security with the principles of free-dom. The positive trend is furtherundermined when the pressures of securitylead political authorities to curb freedoms thatthey believe threaten the status quo.

Arab countries live in a state of maximumsecurity under the Arab-Israeli conflict.However, internal security procedures cannotalways be justified in that context. In fact,those procedures often eliminate all compo-nents of civil liberty, opposition and criticismin the name of mobilisation.

Some Arab countries have declared a stateof emergency10. This act suppresses freedom,and shelves the political guarantees invested inthe rule of law and the institutions that safe-guard public and individual freedoms. A stateof emergency releases the State from constitu-tional accountability under the rule of law andlegal accountability through the judiciary. Itcurtails respect for the rule of the separation ofauthorities by sanctioning direct interventionin the affairs of the judiciary and it freezes thelegal guarantees that protect individuals fromstate aggression.

Freedoms that are hostage to matters of se-curity, to censorship and to self-appointed

watchdogs of public morality are freedoms de-nied. The first victims of this denial are cre-ativity, innovation and knowledge.

The stifling legal context that has devel-oped from the crisis of law in the region willcramp Arab minds, inhibit local knowledgeproduction and drive good Arab scholars andthinkers abroad, intensifying the region’sknowledge deficit. Overcoming that crisis is acentral part of the challenge of building theknowledge society.

Protecting creativity and intellectualfreedom: copyright laws

Authors are the fountainhead of literary andartistic creativity. With the ascent of knowl-edge as a major factor of production and thearrival of digital publishing, the issue of au-thorship and copyrights has extended beyondits closed world and has become relevant to allfields: cultural, social, economic, political,commercial and others. The growing value at-tached to individual intellectual, artistic andcreative production and the high returns onintellectual investments in development, cou-pled with the growing vulnerability of intellec-tual works to blatant or concealed piracy andplagiarism, make copyright protection an im-portant tool of public policy in the new knowl-edge societies. Copyright has become theconcern of administrative, legislative, judicialand executive authorities.

In the international context, copyright is-sues have assumed great importance for devel-oping countries acceding to the WTO with itsarticles relating to intellectual property rights(IPRs) and trade. Thus, developing countries,including some Arab countries, have moved topromulgate laws conforming to internationalconventions on intellectual property rightsand to ensure their full implementation. Whilea few Arab countries, Morocco (1916, 1970)11,Egypt (1954)12 and Lebanon (1999)13 havespecific IPR laws, most other Arab states stilllack such specialised legislation. Their laws re-flect only some articles in this respect; civilcodes, for example, cover certain aspectsunder property, while publication laws em-body some others.


Freedoms that are

hostage to matters of

security, to censorship

and to self-appointed

watchdogs of public

morality are freedoms

denied.

The crisis of law in the

region will cramp

Arab minds, inhibit

local knowledge

production and drive

good Arab scholars

and thinkers abroad.

10Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan.11Law promulgated on 23 June 1916. Another law was promulgated on 24 January 1943. Pursuant to said law, the African Office for Copyrights andthe African Office for Men of Letters and Authors were founded. A decree was issued on 7 March 1965 concerning the formation of the MoroccanOffice for Copyright. The IPR law was promulgated on 29 July 1970.12Law No 354 on Intellectual Property Rights. It comprises 51 articles.13Law No 75, the second law, after the 1924 Law on Copyright.

The Bern Convention on the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic Works14 and theInternational Copyright Convention15 consti-tute the international legal framework16 ofcopyright. The regional Arab Convention forCopyrights and national copyright legislation(in Egypt and Morocco) are derived fromboth. There are only six Arab countries in theBern Convention (by ratification, accession oracceptance) – Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon,Mauritania, Libya and Egypt. As regards theInternational Convention on Copyright, fiveArab countries have acceded, namely,Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, andSaudi Arabia17.

Disregard for intellectual property protec-tion comes at a price for individual authors,published scientists and creative artists whohave a right to recognition for their originalwork. It affects the national economy becausevalue adding knowledge ceases to be pro-duced when it is easily stolen. And it under-cuts international cooperation andunderstanding in the global information agewhen national laws do not meet internationalstandards of protection.

Arab countries have taken some steps toprotect copyright as regards literary, scientificand artistic works in a unified manner18. ArabMinisters of Culture ratified in their confer-

ence held on 5 November 1981 the ArabAgreement on Copyright Protection19.

The Agreement had been subject to somecriticism. It is claimed that it does not rise tothe level of advanced countries’ legislation anddoes not embody the realities of Arab (andIslamic) countries in particular, and develop-ing countries in general. To ensure its applica-bility, the Agreement had to employ flexibilityas a first step. Nevertheless, further steps havenot been adopted since, which renders theAgreement imperfect and in need of review.

All Arab countries, except the occupiedPalestinian territories and Comoros, partici-pate in one international intellectual propertyrights organisation or another; 19 Arab coun-tries (exceptions: Syria, Palestine andComoros Islands) are members of WIPO; 15Arab countries (exceptions: Saudi Arabia,Somalia, Qatar and Yemen) are members ofthe Paris Union; ten Arab countries (excep-tions: Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,Syria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Yemen)are members of the Bern Union.

Yet the development of IPR laws in theArab world is subject to the same variability asother laws. In only a few Arab countries dosuch laws explicitly stipulate the moral rightsof the author20. Moreover, numerous literary,scientific and artistic works in Arab countries


14Dated 9 September 1886. At the beginning, only one Islamic country, Tunisia, signed, on 5 December 1887. Several needs generated reviews of thisConvention and reconsideration of new developments as follows: the Convention was complemented in Paris on 4 May 1889; amended in Berlin on13 November 1908. It was further complemented in Bern on 20 March 1914; re-amended in Rome on 2 June 1928 and Brussels on 26 June 1948.The Convention was then signed by 35 countries, inter-alia, five Arab and Islamic countries. Amidst the economic, social and political developmentsand transformations in the last half of the 20th century, the Convention was amended at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, in Paris on 24 July 1971 andchanged in 1979 (the Convention is managed by the WIPO which replaced in 1971 the World Intellectual Property Offices). The number of countries,up until the 1 January 1994, that acceded, ratified or accepted the Convention amounted to 105, including six Arab countries and seven Islamic coun-tries, inter-alia, Malaysia.Article 2 of the Convention stipulates: "Literary and Artistic Works" shall include any production in the literary, scientific and artistic work regardlessof the mode of expression, such as books … etc." for more information, see (Ash-Sharqawi, in Arabic, 1995, 31-35, 49-52, 141).15Ratified by the International Governmental Conference on Copyright, Geneva, 18 August - 6 September 1952 (the International GovernmentalCommittee reviewed it for the benefit of developing countries, at UNESCO, Paris, 5-24 July 1971. The Convention was enforced as of 10 July 1974).The number of Islamic countries that acceded to the 1952 Convention up until the beginning of March 1993 had been limited, with only five ArabIslamic countries acceding.16Other international agreements and conventions include: The Hague Convention for International Deposit of Industrial Drawings and Designs issuedon 6 November 1925; The London Document (1934); The Hague Document (1960); The Additional Monaco Document (1961); The SupplementaryStockholm Document (1967) amended on 28 September 1979; the law on the implementation of the Convention (1 April 1994); The LucarnoAgreement on International Classification of Industrial Drawings and Designs. In the commercial field, TRIPS tackles intellectual property rights andtrade. Furthermore, "industrial rights" have been examined in the Madrid Accord that highlights strict measures against forged or fake data aboutproducts. There are other agreements, such as the International Agreement on the Protection of Performers, Sound Record Producers and BroadcastCorporations; the International Agreement on the Protection of Sound Records Producers against illegitimate production of their records. For moredetails, see Ibid., 15 …).17Up until 1997; it is likely that other countries have recently acceded to one of the two conventions or both.18According to Article 21 of the Arab Cultural Unity Charter (1964), Arab countries are asked to adopt legislation to protect intellectual property (lit-erary, scientific and artistic) within the sovereignty of each country separately.19The Agreement is a blend of some of the legislative provisions set forth in the Bern Convention and the International Convention on Copyright.20Example: Copyright or the right to notice; the right to "parenthood" (authorship), the right to work, the right to title determination, the right toamendment, the right to regret or withdrawal.Copyright is an exclusive right. Most legislations name this right "copyright, the right to transmission or publicity". This right is vested in the authorwho alone can authorise others to use his work in any form. The legislations of some Arab and Islamic countries expressly stipulate this right, I.e.,Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, and Turkey.Concerning the right to parenthood (authorship), i.e. the affiliation of the creative work to its creator, the legislations of some Arab and Islamic coun-tries stipulate this right: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Arab Republic of Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the Sudan, Senegal, Pakistan, Iran andBangladesh.As regards the right to work or to complete the work, i.e., the author’s right to oppose any manipulation, omission or attempt to deform his work,some laws in Arab and Islamic countries enshrine this right, i.e., Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,Senegal, Pakistan, Iran and Bangladesh.The right to title entails the author’s right to the original title specified. As regards the right to amendment, it entails the author’s right to introduceamendments to the work after publication. Only Egypt, Libya and the Sudan recognised this right.The right to regret or withdrawal entails the author’s right to recall the published work. Only Egypt, Libya and the Sudan recognise this right. (Ibid.,168-173).

Disregard for

intellectual property

protection comes at a

price for individual

authors, published

scientists and creative

artists.

still swing between protection, applicationand codification21.

Copyright concerns all segments of societyand includes all creators, innovators andthinkers in literary, scientific and artistic fieldsat all social, economic, commercial, legal, po-litical and cultural levels.

If Arab countries are to realise an eco-nomic, cultural and social renaissance, thosethat have not drafted national legislation oncopyright – the most fundamental instrumentfor protecting and stimulating knowledge pro-duction – must do so. Moreover, laws need en-forcement: they must be implemented bypractical, preventive procedures and intensivepublic education. Two basic common valuesneed to be respected before freedom andknowledge can be converted into rights pro-tected by law. First the sanctity of human be-ings as the essential and protected centres ofsociety must be accepted. This is a fundamen-tal value that should not be undermined.Second, society must value knowledge, schol-arship and intellectual effort by elevating themto their rightful position. The absence of thesetwo values is a systemic problem: coercion anddisregard for people are dominating values inpresent-day Arab society. Moreover, somesegments of the intellectual elite lack an effec-tive political platform while others are se-duced by the glamour of power and money,with the result that ordinary people neithertrust in nor recognise the importance ofknowledge production.

THE REGIONAL AND GLOBALENVIRONMENT

Arab regional co-operation can be an impor-tant asset in managing closer global integra-tion, enabling Arab countries as a group topool their capabilities and experience in orderto maximise the rewards and mitigate the risksof globalisation. Globalisation offers impor-tant opportunities to acquire knowledge fromworld stocks and to stimulate the performanceof the domestic knowledge system, particu-larly in the fields of education, research andtechnological development.

But the global context also poses potentialchallenges to knowledge acquisition in Arab

countries. These challenges include exposureto fluctuations in global economic relationsthrough world trade and foreign direct invest-ment; the limited impact of both trade and in-vestment in Arab knowledge acquisition;unfairly restrictive IPR agreements; and therisk that weak production capacity in develop-ing countries, including Arab countries, willcondemn them to an inferior role in the globalproduction system, with negative conse-quences for knowledge acquisition. Strongerregional cooperation can help Arab countriesnegotiate such issues, whether involving tech-nology transfer and indigenisation, IPRs orpharmaceutical and drug prices, from posi-tions of greater advantage. Moreover, the fieldis open to Arab co-operation with other devel-oping countries in research, knowledge devel-opment and know-how exchanges.

Knowledge is increasingly becoming a pri-vate commodity at the international as well asat the national level. This growing link be-tween knowledge production and profit, cou-pled with greater selectivity in knowledgeflows to points outside the rich world, may ac-tually inhibit knowledge production, espe-cially the forms of knowledge required bydeveloping countries and societies. A clear ex-ample is the production of affordable drugs tocombat diseases that devastate poor countries(tropical diseases, HIV-AIDS). Between 1975and 1996, 1,223 new drugs were marketedworldwide, only 13 for tropical diseases. In1998, global spending on health-related re-search amounted to US $70 billion: of thistotal, just US $300 million was for HIV-AIDSand only US $100 million for malaria (UNDP,HDR, 2001, 109-110).

Such issues could negatively impact theprices and production of drugs, especially inEgypt and Jordan, and underline why devel-oping countries need to acquire the requisiteknowledge and negotiating skills to betterleverage their intellectual property rights in in-ternational forums. Stronger Arab coopera-tion would increase the region’s bargainingpower.

Globalisation, in its present form, risks en-trenching the dominance of the powerful overthe weak in terms of knowledge and wealth. Itis often pointed out that the distribution of


Laws need

enforcement: they

must be implemented

by practical,

preventive procedures

and intensive public

education.

Society must value

knowledge,

scholarship and

intellectual effort by

elevating them to

their rightful position.

21Lectures, speeches, sermons; articles on political, economic or religious items; industrial drawings and designs; carpet-related works; architecturalwork, etc. (Ibid, 286).

world income and wealth has worsened sincethe mid 1970s. The goal must rather be tomake globalisation a force that helps develop-ing countries achieve human progress.Structurally, globalisation, as it is unfoldingtoday, allows for the free movement of people,goods and services selectively in a manner thatoften secures the interests of the strongerparty. In terms of labour markets, for exam-ple, this leads to the migration of skilled devel-oping country personnel to the industrialisedcountries, which causes a double loss for thecountries of origin. Arab countries are espe-cially vulnerable to such outflows, as ChapterSeven noted.

Concerns that the world economic systemwill inflict severe penalties on developingcountries that fall behind in the race forknowledge are justified. In 1998, the WorldBank President noted in his introduction tothe Bank’s report on "Knowledge forDevelopment" that "the globalisation of trade,finance and information flows increases com-petition in a manner that raises the danger ofretarding the poorest countries and societies atan accelerating pace" (The World Bank,1998).

Negotiations on the mechanisms andagreements that underpin globalisation aretending to bolster the interests of the strongerparties, the industrialised countries. An obvi-ous example is the insistence of these coun-tries, notably the United States, onmaintaining agricultural subsidies to their ownfarmers while pressing developing countries todo away with such measures. The use of envi-ronmental and social policy conditionalitiescan also become a way to debar developingcountries from industrial country markets.Themisuse of intellectual property rights cantransform knowledge from a public good intoa private commodity when products originat-ing in developing countries are usurped bylarge firms and producers, as has happened inthe case of pharmaceuticals and some other in-dustries.

The introduction of market principles andmechanisms to govern the supply of services,especially educational services, affects the de-velopment of knowledge in developing coun-tries and could lead to unfair competitionbetween local and foreign suppliers, therebyweakening the diffusion of knowledge.

Lastly, current global governance arrange-ments do not compensate developing coun-tries for losses they incur through adverseterms of trade and exchange. Despite the largeliterature that exists on the harmful impactsfor developing countries of the migration oftheir most highly educated and skilled peopleto the West, none of the proposals made forhelping these countries to recoup their losseshas found a receptive audience in the industri-alised world.

In this context of increasing global in-equality, the acquisition of knowledge has be-come one of the key fields where "economiesof scale" and "economies of scope" have as-sumed great importance. Evidence of this canbe found in mounting co-operation betweenEuropean countries in higher studies pro-grammes, in technological agreements withinand with other regional blocs and in synergyand mergers among giant multinationals in re-search and technological development.Certainly, so-called "big science"22 exceeds


Negotiations on the

mechanisms and

agreements that

underpin globalisation

are tending to bolster

the interests of the

stronger parties.

22Some fields of research and sophisticated technological development require vast institutional and funding capacity that far exceeds the potentiali-ties of any country separately, even advanced countries. These fields include nuclear physics, space, and new energy development. Some advancedcountries have pooled all their potentialities in these fields in specialised centres. An early effort of this kind was CERN in Geneva, one of the world’slargest research centres in molecular physics. The latest is the International Space Station. Arab countries can follow similar models in the fields of re-search and development that exceed the potentialities of one single country.

Concerns that the

world economic

system will inflict

severe penalties on

developing countries

that fall behind in the

race for knowledge

are justified.

Intellectual property systems may, if weare not careful, introduce distortions thatare detrimental to the interests of develop-ing countries. Developed countriesshould pay more attention to reconcilingtheir commercial self-interest with theneed to reduce poverty in developingcountries, which is in everyone’s interest.Higher IP standards should not bepressed on developing countries without aserious and objective assessment of theirimpact on development and poor people.We need to ensure that the global IP sys-tem evolves so that the needs of develop-ing countries are incorporated and, mostimportantly, so that it contributes to thereduction of poverty in developing coun-tries by stimulating innovation and tech-nology transfer relevant to them, whilealso making available the products oftechnology at the most competitive prices

possible.TRIPS has strengthened the global

protection offered to suppliers of technol-ogy, but without any counterbalancingstrengthening of competition policiesglobally. Therefore, it may be unwise tofocus on TRIPS as a principal means of fa-cilitating technology transfer. A wideragenda needs to be pursued…

Because the IP system does little tostimulate research on diseases that partic-ularly affect poor people, public fundingfor research on health problems in devel-oping countries should be increased. Thisadditional funding should seek to exploitand develop existing capacities in devel-oping countries for this kind of research,and promote new capacity, both in thepublic and private sectors.

BOX 8.4

Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy

Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights

London, September 2002.

the potentiality of any Arab country sepa-rately.

In the case of Arab countries, a major leapin knowledge acquisition requires more pro-found and highly efficient forms of co-opera-tion at the Arab level. There are severalreasons for this proposition:

Naturally, co-operation among countriesto acquire knowledge contributes to the in-crease of their capacity collectively. This ad-vantage increases if some of the countries havecommon characteristics, a common languageand common challenges, as in the Arab world.

Among Arab countries, there are widevariations in R&D components, especiallyhuman and financial resources. Integrationwill help to ensure that research and develop-ment flourishes on a regional scale and will liftthe weaker Arab countries up as full partners.

Current literature on knowledge empha-sises that a strong synergy among the elementsof the knowledge system is a key prerequisite.However, as the first AHDR pointed out,components of the knowledge system at theregional and national levels in the Arab worldare not optimised in relation to one other. A


The difference in the positions of developingcountries and advanced countries in the worldeconomy, as a result of globalisation, raisesquestions about the ascendance of the unfet-tered market growth model after the collapseof the Soviet Union.

The "Trade and Development" report is-sued by UNCTAD in 1997 referred to severalobservable and disturbing trends in this re-spect, which are paraphrased below:

Titled "Globalisation, Growth andDistribution," the report stresses that the es-sential characteristic of the world economysince the early 1980s has been the free play ofmarket powers by dismantling restrictions onlocal markets and opening them to world com-petition. This has become the new "invisiblehand" at work in an environment where stateregulation has been weaker than in decades.The notion that world competition wouldbring about faster growth and eliminate hugedisparities in incomes and living standards hasproved to be rather optimistic.

In fact, the world economy slowed downduring the same period in comparison with thegolden era of growth from the end of WorldWar II to the mid 1970s. World growth settledat a rate of about 3% from the mid 1980s, fol-lowed by a further drop as a result of the Asiancrisis, particularly in Japan, and the end of theboom enjoyed by the United States and Europein the late 1990s.

Income distribution worsened from theearly 1980s. In 1965, the ratio of individual in-come in the seven wealthiest countries to indi-vidual income in the seven poorest countrieswas 1/20. In 1995 it rose to 1/39. The increas-ing disparity between countries was accompa-nied by a similar polarizsation within them.The share of the wealthiest increased at the ex-pense of the poorest, and the pauperisation ofthe middle classes became a characteristic ofincome distribution in many countries.

The report attributes these negative trendsto the rapid liberalisation of economies in amanner that favoured certain social classes, inthe advanced and developing countries alike.Capital was strengthened at the expense oflabour: the share of profits rose while the shareof labour dropped. Among wage earners, theshare of highly qualified groups and traders in-creased at the expense of producers. And as aresult of speedy financial liberalisation, publicand private debt increased in the developingand developed countries, which led to higherreal interest rates than before. This is clearerin the developing countries in particular wherethe distribution of wealth is more concentratedand the tax burden on the poorer classes isgreater. The increase in public debt meant theredistribution of wealth in favour of thewealthy. There is growing evidence that slowergrowth and increasingly skewed distributionare becoming permanent features of the world.

According to the report, a more worryingobservation, from the perspective of futuregrowth, is that the concentration of income andwealth in the hands of the few was not accom-panied by a rise in investment, which normallystimulates faster growth. Hence, in this pat-tern, the chances of combating unemploymentworldwide and alleviating poverty in develop-ing countries – let alone eradicating it – areslim.

The report attributes this discrepancy be-tween the high incomes of the wealthy and lowinvestment rates mainly to the hasty liberalisa-tion of finance worldwide and the absence ofwell-sequenced national policies for regulatingcapital accounts. This trend encouraged specu-lation and volatility in financial markets as un-fettered capital flows chased quick profitsaround the world, imposing high interest ratesand breaking the relationship between financeand productive investment.

The report presents a policy package for

transforming rising profits for the few intohigher rates of investment in a manner suffi-cient to support a "social contract that couldjustify the present increasing discrepancy, andreduce it in the end through raising people’s in-come and living standards."

These policies include, at the level ofstates, providing more incentives for investingprofits in improving job-creating productioncapacity, increasing real wages, closing non-productive channels of wealth accumulation,restricting luxury spending, forging integrationbetween local growth factors – through capitalaccumulation and increased local technologycapacity – on the one hand, and gradual andcalculated integration into the world economy,on the other. In individual countries, thesepolicies need to be tailored to the level of de-velopment and the capacities of industries andinstitutional structures. They should be ac-companied by new and serious standards of eq-uitable employment and income and access ofthe poor to capital, services and other assets,which in many countries requires agrarian re-form.

At the global level, complementary policyaction is required from the stronger powers inthe world economy. These policies should aimto introduce checks and balances in globalisa-tion to minimise its harmful side effects on de-veloping country growth. Areas for attentioninclude trade liberalisation, which has beenslower in the case of goods where developingcountries enjoy a comparative advantage. Richcountries still protect their agricultural prod-ucts and impose restrictions on imports of tex-tiles from poorer countries. Another priority isto remove selectivity in global labour markets:while most restrictions on the movement ofcapital and highly qualified individuals are di-minishing, restrictions on the movement of un-skilled workers are becoming stricter.

BOX 8.5

The effects of globalisation on growth and distribution throughout the world – UNCTAD

Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1997

collaborative Arab knowledge system at theregional and national levels would create newand more efficient synergies.

Another factor is that political conditionsin the Arab region, notably the Israeli occupa-

tion of Palestinian territories and the situationin Iraq, necessitate a more profound degree ofArab co-operation, not only from the perspec-tive of progress but also for the purpose of na-tional security.


It is a sign of troubled times when, in the search forsolutions to the most pressing policy challenges of theday, it is considered necessary to look to earlier gener-ations for guidance: a Marshall Plan - this time to fightglobal poverty; a Tobin tax to check financial volatil-ity; and a Keynesian spending package to combat de-flationary dangers spring readily to mind. The sourceof the trouble is the gap between the rhetoric and thereality of a liberal international economic order.Nowhere is this gap more evident than in the interna-tional trading system. Even as Governments extol thevirtues of free trade, they are only too willing to inter-vene to protect their domestic constituencies that feelthreatened by the cold winds of international compe-tition. Such remnants of neo-mercantilist thinkinghave done much to unbalance the bargain struck dur-ing the Uruguay Round.

Since the third session of the WTO MinisterialConference, held in Seattle, a renewed effort has beenmade to address the concern of developing countries,culminating in a different kind of bargain beingstruck at Doha. Developing countries, by agreeing toa comprehensive programme of work and negotia-tions, demonstrated their commitment to tacklingglobal political and economic threats; in return, theyexpect that development concerns will be central tothe negotiations. The challenge is now to translate anexpanded negotiating agenda into a genuine develop-ment agenda.

One voice from the past stands out in the searchfor a more balanced trading system. In his statementto the first United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development in March 1964, Raul Prebisch, then itsSecretary-General, called on the industrial countriesnot to underestimate the basic challenge facing devel-oping countries in the existing system:

"We believe that developing countries must notbe forced to develop inwardly—which will happen ifthey are not helped to develop outwardly through anappropriate international policy. We also deem it un-desirable to accept recommendations which tend tolower mass consumption in order to increase capital-ization, either because of the lack of adequate foreignresources or because such resources are lost owing toadverse terms of trade."

Prebisch understood that recommending "thefree play of market forces" between unequal tradingpartners would only punish poorer commodity ex-porters at the same time as it brought advantages tothe rich industrial core. His agenda to attack the per-sistent trade imbalance and create the essential exter-nal conditions for accelerating the rate of growthincluded new modalities of participation for develop-ing countries in the trading system which would guar-antee price stabilization and improved market accessfor primary exports, allow greater policy space to de-velop local industries and reduce barriers to their ex-ports, establish more appropriate terms of accessionto the multilateral system and reduce the burden ofdebt servicing. Although the participation of devel-oping countries in the trading system has since gonethrough important changes, the minimum agenda putforward by Prebisch remains the basis for rebalancingthat system in support of development.

BOX 8.6

Trade and Development: Prebisch’s demands still stand

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 2002.

Political obstacles to knowledge acquisition by Arab countries may well be more severe thanthose raised by their socio-economic structures. Those structures were themselves judged more ofa hindrance to knowledge acquisition than any supposedly innate cultural traits. Thus, the factorsto be reckoned with in creating the Arab knowledge society become more significant as one movesfrom one societal context to the next. Bold thinking about the separation of politics from knowl-edge has become crucial.

Unquestionably, freedom requires substantial reinforcement. And good governance needs tobe established in order to ensure the sustained expansion and promotion of freedom. Arab co-op-eration has to be renewed and scaled up in order for Arab countries to meet the world on moreequal ground and to knit the sinews of the region. Finally, this chapter emphasises that Arabs needto take a positive, yet vigilant, approach to globalisation as both a source of, and a constraint onknowledge acquisition.

A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 161

The last chapter in this Report outlines a strategic vision built on five pillars ofthe future Arab knowledge society. Its chief goal is to frame a forward-lookingand action-oriented discussion on knowledge in Arab countries that takes intoaccount their particular features and circumstances and that leads to specificoperational proposals for the advancement of Arab human development.

Section four: a strategic vision- thefive pillars of the knowledge society

PART II


This final chapter continues the practiceadopted in the first AHDR (2002) of chartingmajor milestones towards a better future forArab countries built on human development.

The chapter does not purport to offerready recipes for building human developmentin each and every Arab society. Rather, it drawsfrom the preceding chapters a number of com-mon directions that Arab societies could con-sider to achieve that goal. The term "society" isused deliberately, rather than "country" or"state", in order to emphasise that the "soci-ety" concerned could be part of an Arab stateor a group of states or the entire Arab world.

Building human development calls for so-cial innovation, a process that can only be ledand undertaken by the people of each Arab so-ciety themselves, for themselves. The Reporttherefore stops at delineating the main featuresof what could be considered a strategic vision1

for the task of building human development.This vision needs to be taken up, nurtured anddebated by human development advocateswithin Arab society, recognising and paying at-tention to dissenting views. Where the vision isadopted, a consensus on priorities needs to beaccompanied by decisions for implementingthe strategic vision under the specific condi-tions of that society. Indeed, this process con-stitutes the first stage of social innovation. Itcan stimulate the emergence of a societal move-ment for unleashing innovative human poten-tial and utilising this potential in buildinghuman development.

The future map of the Arab world must bedrawn from within the region. No externallyderived construct can elicit the conviction andguarantee the support of the Arab peoples inthe long run. The present attempt by Arab in-tellectuals to articulate a strategic vision of the

Arab knowledge society is a contribution tosuch internal efforts to reshape the underpin-nings of Arab human development.

THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE INARAB COUNTRIES AND THECONSEQUENCES OFPERPETUATING THE STATUS QUO

Knowledge in Arab countries today appears tobe on the retreat. Ingrained structural impedi-ments stand in the way of building the knowl-edge society in the region. Current political andsocial orientations diminish the role played byknowledge in Arab societies, as previous sec-tions of this Report have indicated. Whileknowledge in the region stumbles, the devel-oped world is racing towards knowledge-inten-sive societies. This trend will further accentuatethe asymmetry of world knowledge develop-ment and endow a few countries with near-su-premacy in knowledge production andconsumption. Based on their present perfor-mance, Arabs would remain in a marginal posi-tion in this next phase of human history. Thisposition would be the logical consequence of adecline that has lasted for seven centuries,while much of the world made enormousprogress in developing knowledge and humanwelfare. Continuing with this historic slide is anuntenable course if the Arab people are to havea dignified, purposeful and productive exis-tence in the third millennium.

Without a strong and growing contempo-rary knowledge base of their own, Arab coun-tries will be absorbed into the internationalknowledge society as passive consumers ofother countries’ proprietary knowledge, tech-nology and services. Without mastery of thecapabilities that knowledge brings, they will re-

A strategic vision: the five pillars of theknowledge society

CHAPTER 9

Knowledge in Arab

countries today

appears to be on the

retreat.

Without a strong and

growing knowledge

base of their own,

Arab countries will be

drawn into the

international

knowledge society as

passive consumers.

1 Which, by definition, does not rise to the level of a "strategy".

main incapable of establishing their own spaceand growth under the often one-sided and re-strictive trade, investment and intellectualproperty rights regimes of a world that is oldand new: old in terms of human struggle andnew in terms of its rules of engagement. Onthe other hand, Arab countries can avert thispassive fate by indigenising knowledge andtechnology and developing the necessary ab-sorptive, adaptive and innovative capacitiesand structures, which offer them the opportu-nity to participate proactively in the vigorouslygrowing global knowledge society from a posi-tion of dignity and strength.

Yet individual Arab countries are unlikelyto go far in that direction on their own. StrongArab co-operation that approaches regional

unity through "a Free Arab Citizenship Zone"will not only bolster the negotiating powers ofArabs in the world arena and help reduce mo-nopolistic pressures; it will help Arabs to ben-efit from opportunities created byglobalisation and to manage its risks.

THE FIVE PILLARS OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

The strategic vision outlined below rests onfive pillars, the building blocks of which werelaid down in the preceding chapters and insections of the first AHDR.


Regional unity

through "a Free Arab

Citizenship Zone" ...

will help Arabs to

benefit from

opportunities created

by globalisation and

to manage its risks.

The Arab peoples and states are facing fatefulchallenges at a time of accelerating changeswhich do not wait for those who are slow orlax in defending their interests.

It is quite clear that the dilemma of Arabdevelopment will not be solved without fo-cusing fully on human development – the de-velopment of the citizen and his/her role ineconomic, social and political life.

This calls for the achievement of fourgoals, which are interdependent and indis-pensable.

First, the formation of the political citizenand his/her participation through the diffu-sion and deepening of democratic values andpolitical participation, beginning with the ruleof law, independent judiciary, equality beforethe law, freedom of political action andthought, freedom of the press, political plu-rality and free democratic elections. Add tothat the freedom of civil society institutionsfrom governmental control and the freedomto organize, innovate and develop in society atlarge. Political participation, from a develop-mental point of view, means the freedom ofcitizens to take part in policy-making and con-tribute to the determination of economic andsocial decisions affecting them.

The second goal is the comprehensive de-velopment of education, beginning with pre-school education and going through highereducation. This will not be achieved withoutopening opportunities for learning to all seg-ments and classes of society, whether throughcompulsory education or through the estab-lishment of national funds to provide loansfor university education in which studentsenjoy equal rights regardless of their eco-nomic, social and political backgrounds. Thisgoal cannot be fully achieved without the de-

velopment of a plan to develop scientific re-search centres and encourage research.

The third goal is quality health care forall. This does not mean flooding countrieswith private commercial hospitals and spe-cialized centres for the elite, but developing acomprehensive system of high-quality pri-mary health care, health insurance and socialsecurity, mother-and-child care, care for thepoor and people with special needs and fullconcentration on the principles of preventionand healthy life styles instead of wasting re-sources on medical-biological approaches,which have proven their failure. This entailsbelieving in the simple rule that health is notsimply the treatment of illness, but the re-moval of its causes.

The fourth goal consists in taking the ini-tiative and moving from being reactive toproactive in all walks of life. Democracy, par-ticipation and freedom are rarely given. Theyare most often wrested in the struggle of thosewho believe in them. This requires that citi-zens take on the challenges of demandingtheir rights and calling for sound policies. Thesame applies to Arab countries in their inter-national relations. Nobody is going to securetheir interests for them unless they take theinitiative and work for these interests.

Perhaps human development in the Arabworld will not be realized without solving thedilemma of effective participation by youthand women. Youth constitutes two-thirds ofthe Arab world's population. They are mostlydenied opportunities to participate and thefreedom to innovate and take the initiative.Most women are still marginalized. These twosegments of the society constitute a hugehuman reservoir.

The Palestinian people are perhaps fac-ing the most vicious challenge in their struggleto end aggressive occupation and settlementand to win what all other peoples already have– freedom, genuine independence, sover-eignty and the right to their own territory,borders, destiny and future.

A just peace and effective development inour region will not be realized unless thePalestinian people establish a real state withfull sovereignty and until the Palestine refugeeproblem is solved in accordance with UnitedNations resolutions. The idea of an indepen-dent state cannot be transformed into anothertransitional stage in the form of autonomywithout borders or sovereignty. We havelearned from experience that avoiding real is-sues, such as ending the occupation and set-tlement and the issues of Jerusalem andrefugees is only a prescription for more suffer-ing in the future.

While the Palestinian people are strug-gling to build a national home, citizenship,and real democracy, they have succeeded - inthe midst of a ferocious struggle against occu-pation, and despite huge human sacrifices - inbuilding pioneering human developmentmodels, which are copied in many countries.This is due to their positive creative spirit andtheir rejection of frustration and despair.

The Palestinian struggle is not a conflictbetween two parties negotiating a differenceover percentages. It is the crucial issue of peo-ple who seek to achieve what has beenachieved by all peoples on the face of theearth: freedom, independence, self-determi-nation and a dignified life in peace and secu-rity. This is the natural basis for humandevelopment anywhere in the world.

BOX 9.1

Mustafa Al-Barghouthi – The Road to the Future

1. UNLEASHING ANDGUARANTEEING THE KEYFREEDOMS OF OPINION, SPEECHAND ASSEMBLY THROUGH GOODGOVERNANCE

Recent history shows that it is undoubtedlypossible to achieve significant scientific andtechnological advances under oppressiveregimes, particularly in natural and micro-sci-ences, and more particularly in the design andmanufacture of armaments through strongsupport and substantial funding by nationalauthorities. Enlightened dictatorships havealso hosted knowledge breakthroughs in tech-nical areas, such as economic production, as inthe case of South Korea in an earlier period.

But in such cases knowledge gains rarely,if ever, extend into the human and social sci-ences, the arts or literature. Moreover, gainsfrom targeted knowledge production do notreach all segments of the societies concerned.In other words, knowledge does not permeatethe entire society and does not improve peo-ple’s welfare. An example of this in the Arabworld is Iraq; in the wider world, North Koreasuggests itself as another case.

Moreover, such knowledge production isnot sustainable because society does not havethe capacity to continue to provide the neces-sary resources so long as other elements of thesocial structure remain weak. The most in-structive example in this regard is the formerSoviet Union, which collapsed because,among other reasons, it was unable to meetpeople’s basic requirements or to continue tofund its military industries.

From the perspective of human develop-ment, scientific advances under oppression arerelated to the curtailment of social freedomsand choices, which runs counter to the veryconcept of human development itself.

If Arabs aspire for advanced knowledge inall spheres of creativity and innovation, free-dom is a must. If Arabs seek human develop-ment through knowledge, freedom is the firstand all-defining step.

Thus, freedom and knowledge are centralequations of human development. Freedom of

opinion, speech and assembly are the key free-doms that guarantee other forms of human lib-erty. A climate of freedom is an essentialprerequisite of the knowledge society. Thesefreedoms ensure the vitality of scientific re-search, technological development, and artis-tic and literary expression, all of which aremeans of producing knowledge. They cannotbe restricted or curtailed except under verylimited circumstances provided for by law,(that is, after the law is reformed to take intoaccount the provisions discussed below), andby the International Bill of Human Rights(IBHR).

The true protection of key freedoms willinvolve ridding constitutions, laws and admin-istrative procedures of every restraint on free-doms of opinion, speech and assembly; it willalso require a guarantee that legal provisionsand procedures comply with the IBHR. Inpressing these changes through, lawmakers,jurists and peoples’ representatives in Arabcountries should not hesitate to model theirlegislation on that of countries with august tra-ditions in the protection of freedoms2.

There can be no guarantee of freedomswithout the stable rule of law as the only basisfor governing all human conduct. Moreover,the execution of the provisions of the law pro-tecting freedoms must be in the hands of anupright, efficient and genuinely independentjudiciary. It is also imperative to end the era ofadministrative control and the grip of securityagencies over the production and dissemina-tion of knowledge3 and the various forms ofcreative activity that are the foundations forthe knowledge society in Arab countries.

The legislative, executive and judiciarypowers of the Arab world have a weighty re-sponsibility to guarantee freedom. But that re-sponsibility does not stop with them. Officialand unofficial religious circles have alsosought to muzzle freedom of opinion andspeech through censorship, banning and libel.It is necessary to recall here a host ofQura’anic injunctions that condemn thesepractices: "Let there be no compulsion in reli-gion." (Al-Baqarah, 256), and "wilt thou thencompel mankind, against their will, to be-


A climate of freedom

is an essential

prerequisite of the

knowledge society.

There can be no

guarantee of freedoms

without the stable rule

of law.

2This may help them atone somewhat for the preoccupation of some with inventing laws and procedures limiting freedoms in previous eras. 3Among the crudest forms of this restriction is the limitation of the freedom of researchers in collecting data through fieldwork, which stifles seriousscientific research and hobbles solid scholarship in the social sciences and humanities. Not less crude, though, is the banning of views and informa-tion opposing the ruling regimes in the official mass media.

lieve?" (Yunus, 99). Indeed, if creed is basedon free choice, it is only logical that freedom ofopinion and speech should not be forced. Inthat regard, it is helpful to remember"…"Invite [all] to the Way of thy Lord withwisdom and beautiful preaching; and arguewith them in ways that are best and most gra-cious." (An-Nahl, 125) and "Wert thou severeor harsh-hearted, they would have brokenaway from about thee…" (Al ‘Imran, 159).

These texts provide the authority for amore tolerant and less narrow-minded view ofthe role of key human freedoms, as sanctionedby Revelation itself.

Knowledge in itself is neutral. It can beused by those in power to serve the interests ofauthority or it can liberate the weak, the uned-ucated and the deprived. Science, like art,needs enlightened patrons and champions toassure its independence. Those who carry outscientific research cannot afford its costs, yetscience cannot be left solely under state au-thority. For too long, political regimes havesought to control research and educational in-stitutions, particularly those of higher educa-tion, and to manipulate scientists either byreward or intimidation. The hijacking of sci-ence by politics is indeed one of the reasonsfor the decline of the knowledge system inArab countries. It has opened the sector, itsprogramme and priorities to domestic and for-eign interference.

This does not mean, however, that theArab knowledge system should turn in on it-self, a move that would set back knowledge ac-quisition. It rather points to intensifying Araband international co-operation in knowledgeacquisition along disinterested scientific andintellectual principles. It also underlines theessential roles of non-governmental R&D or-ganisations at the national, regional and inter-national levels and the importance ofpublic-private partnerships for the advance-

ment of research and education. This Report has exposed the harsh, and se-

verely polarised, societal environment sur-rounding science and scientists in the Arabworld. The difficult choice facing many scien-tists and scholars in these countries is whetherto be "intellectuals", i.e., thinkers, adoptingscience and knowledge as a means of liberat-ing the weak and advancing the nation; or tobe affiliated with the status quo, the rulingregime or even foreign interests in one degreeor another. Scientists and scholars who enlistin current power structures, in the region orabroad, enjoy significant financial and politicalbenefits. "Intellectuals" on the other hand,often lack recognition and remuneration andare frequently marginalised by the authori-ties4.

It is natural that those who opt to be dedi-cated intellectuals and socially responsible sci-entists are few, and that those who persevereon this path are even fewer. Yet the results ofthis quandary have cost Arab societies dearly.They have, in effect, caused these societies toforfeit the noble mission of science and knowl-edge as a means of liberation and progress,and have thus brought about the decline ofhuman development in the region.

In other words, society has a massive stakein guaranteeing intellectual freedom. The ex-pansion of freedom in Arab countries begins,first and foremost, with a dedicated effort byits first beneficiaries, i.e., the intellectuals andthe producers of knowledge. So long as thesegroups are silent, complacent or indifferentabout their own scope, the cause of intellec-tual freedom will lack credible advocates. Thebattlefield for freedom is large. It is the theatreof courageous, groundbreaking and some-times fierce societal engagement by intellectu-als and producers of knowledge. Individualactions matter, but an organised campaigncentred on avant-garde knowledge organisa-tions is likely to be more successful.

Freedom, as a human entitlement, requiressocietal structures and processes that create itand protect it at the same time, while nurtur-ing its growth and advancement. Those struc-tures and processes are epitomised in systemsof good governance and embodied in the con-


The hijacking of

science by politics is

one of the reasons for

the decline of the

knowledge system in

Arab countries.

The battlefield for

freedom is large. . It is

the theatre of

courageous,

groundbreaking and

sometimes fierce

societal engagement

by intellectuals.

4The choice is perhaps most difficult in the social sciences and the humanities, with their potential for manipulating minds and masking reality. Yetserious social science is a difficult profession and one that is unrewarded in backward societies. The true scholar in this field seeks to spread his/herideas for which there are no outlets save the mass media, which are often muted under heavy authoritarian control.

I would not have given scholarship itsdue, if, whenever a temptation presenteditself, I used scholarship for my own ends.If scholars preserve scholarship, scholar-ship will protect them. If they glorify

scholarship, it will become august. Butthey have abused scholarship and in sodoing they have debased themselves.They have smeared its face with greeduntil it frowned.

BOX 9.2

Judge Al-Djorjani (290-366 A.H.): The Dues of Science

certed efforts of the state, civil society and theprivate sector. Good governance is based onthe following tenets (First AHDR):• It protects freedom in a manner that en-sures the expansion of people’s choices.• It is built on full representation of all thepeople.• It is fully institutional.• Its institutions function with efficiencyand complete transparency. • Its institutions are subject to effective ac-countability, under the division and balance ofpower, directly by the people at large throughperiodic, free and upright elections to parlia-mentary representation.• Just law, protecting freedom and rights,prevails equally over all.• A just, efficient, and totally independent ju-diciary implements the law.

When all of these elements of good gover-nance are in place, freedom cannot perish, butif even one is absent, it remains at risk.Noticeably, the peaceful rotation of power isboth safeguarded and guaranteed by these un-derpinning tenets.

Good governance guarantees the rational-ity of decision-making, which in the first in-stance serves human development. It alsoincreases the demand on knowledge by all so-cial sectors, which pushes the knowledge sys-tem forward.

Since Arab governance is quite far re-moved from the prescribed model, its charac-ter as a prerequisite for freedom would seemto make the latter unfeasible, if not impossible.But a more appropriate reading of this link isthat neither good governance nor freedom willbe achieved without a long, hard and dedi-cated struggle. Yet history, demography andthe majority of Arab people are on the rightside of that struggle, and the opponents of thisgrowing movement would do well to weighthe consequences of further delaying themarch towards greater freedom in the region.

2. DISSEMINATING HIGHQUALITY EDUCATION TARGETEDON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMESAND LIFE-LONG LEARNING

A Greek saying (Protagoras) underscores thatman is the measure in all things. Human de-

velopment embodies this principle from be-ginning to end. Human beings are the creatorsand carriers of human development andknowledge is the capability that empowersthem to be both. Yet if knowledge is to be ac-quired for this purpose, Arab countries willhave to undertake deep and serious reform ofthe educational system. The following guide-lines point to the chief priorities:

Improving learning in early childhood

Seeds planted in early childhood will influencethe quality of knowledge that a society har-vests more radically than any comparable in-vestment, while encouraging the blossomingof new generations of intellectually open, ac-tive and talented citizens.

This objective can be achieved by extend-ing education to the early stages of childhoodand into Arab households. This entails broad-ening educational systems to focus on the cul-tivation of talents during the early years of life.It is crucial, however, to ensure that educa-tional systems are not heavy-handed and donot place additional fetters on the growth ofhuman talent at this critical stage, since childdevelopment depends on rich mental andemotional stimulation (first AHDR).Recourse should be made to the best interna-tional practices and experiences in early child-hood learning, in parental education and insound principles and techniques of pedagogicnurturing. Another thrust is to provide freshand stimulating educational materials for in-fants and young children inside the family,using ICT, audio-visual media and other mod-ern learning tools.

Universal basic education for all, extendedto grade ten at least

This step begins with eliminating all forms ofdeprivation from basic education, notablythose suffered by weaker social categories:girls and the poor.

Extending this approach will require cre-ative solutions leading to the development ofan alternative educational system that can pro-duce more efficient and higher quality educa-tion, and at an appropriate cost. This is an areaopen to more research, as well as to more so-cial and financial investment, including thescrutiny and reallocation of public budgets.


If knowledge is to be

acquired for this

purpose, Arab

countries will have to

undertake deep and

serious reform of the

educational system.

Seeds planted in early

childhood will

influence the quality

of knowledge that a

society harvests more

than any comparable

investment.

Creating an efficient system for life-longlearning

An institutional system for adult education(continuous education) that is highly flexibleand ever developing is required to achieve twogoals: to combat effectively all forms of illiter-acy; and to furnish graduates of the educa-tional system with opportunities to enlargetheir knowledge, sharpen their skills and de-velop the new capabilities demanded by acompetitive and constantly changing employ-ment market.

Women merit priority in adult learning,not least because among those many who suf-fer from illiteracy in the Arab world womenare the most affected. To speak of creating theknowledge society in the Arab world is to un-derstand that high illiteracy rates among adultArabs, especially women, are intolerable. A se-rious campaign to stamp out illiteracy in theregion within the next decade is a task for allArab countries and joint Arab organisations.This task will require solid planning, qualifiedand sufficient personnel and the necessary re-sources to establish effective adult educationschemes in every Arab country. With literacystandards falling in the regular educationalsystem, those graduating from that systemshould also be eligible for remedial coaching.Such an important project is a natural andproper sphere for joint Arab cooperation.

Raising the quality of education at all levels

The quality of education, a long neglectedpriority in Arab societies, is as important as theavailability of education in building the foun-dations of knowledge. Improving quality willinvolve inculcating basic capacities for self-teaching and developing people’s cognitive,analytic and critical faculties, all of which spurcreativity and innovation. It implies a pro-found reform of Arab educational systems,particularly education methods, which need tobecome more student-centred, through teamsand projects, and more self-evaluating in all di-mensions of learning.

Quality assurance also requires adoptingindependent and periodical evaluation ofquality at all levels of education, particularlythrough comparisons among Arab countriesand with reference to developed countries aswell.

Special attention to improving highereducation

Higher education acquires special importancein building advanced knowledge and skills, es-pecially in connection with R&D.

Higher education institutions produce theknowledge workers in a society, notably itsR&D scientists, technologists and researchers.They can, if suitably endowed, also becomecentres of state-of-the-art research and knowl-edge production themselves. Yet the presentstate of Arab higher education prevents itfrom contributing effectively to the creation ofa knowledge society.

Four main complementary policies are ur-gently needed for a serious reform of highereducation: 1. Governance: The continued responsibilityof the state should be affirmed and recast suchthat higher education is liberated from thedomination of both government and the un-regulated profit motive. The government’s re-sponsibility for higher education does notrequire higher education institutions to begovernment owned. In several cases, indepen-dent boards with quadripartite representation(the state, business, civil society and academia)could govern higher education through pub-lic-private partnerships. The profit motiveshould be regulated to ensure that the publicinterest is served, and the creation of non-gov-ernmental, non-profit educational organisa-tions ought to be encouraged vigorously.

An independent Arab organisation for theaccreditation of higher education programmeswould be a major step in this direction. TheUNDP/RBAS project on quality assurance inArab higher education institutions, whose ini-tial results were summarised in Chapter 2,could serve as the nucleus of such an organisa-tion.2. Restructuring: A versatile and flexible sys-tem consistent with rapid and ceaseless changein the market for knowledge and jobs shouldbe established in higher education. Such a sys-tem should turn out graduates who are capa-ble of continuous self-teaching and of takingtheir full part in societal progress. Versatilityand flexibility are two characteristics that willenable the higher education system to respondto fast changing local and global needs.

In order to achieve versatility, the basic


High illiteracy rates

among adult Arabs,

especially women, are

intolerable.

The government’s

responsibility for

higher education does

not require higher

education institutions

to be government

owned.

programmes of higher education institutionsshould not be replicas of old courses. More at-tention should be paid to scientific fields andorganisational structures that promote knowl-edge. Such fields include natural sciences andtechnology development, which receive littleattention in the existing educational system.Higher education should provide individualswith learning opportunities for life.

In view of the accelerated obsolescence oftechnical skills in the modern world, highereducation should provide recurrent educationto individuals. Collaboration with the state,private business and civil society holds the key.

Versatility also means an emphasis on theproductive function of higher education insti-tutions. This function can boost both the fi-nancial and research resources of theinstitution. Autonomous, multidisciplinary re-search-and-development centres should becreated, in active partnership with the state,business and civil society.

Flexibility, on the individual level, meansthe freedom to drop out and return to varioushigher education institutions. On the institu-tional level, flexibility means that the structureof institutions and the content of the pro-grammes they offer are continually revised byreview boards to guarantee a quick responseto local and international developments. Asnoted, quadripartite representation in the gov-ernance of higher education institutionswould be of great value in supporting this typeof flexibility.3. Expansion: A great gap still exists betweenArab countries and advanced nations in thespread of higher education. This means that,for developing countries, there is no realtrade-off between spending on higher or basiceducation. Both are sorely needed. Buildingthe knowledge society in the Arab world re-quires the expansion and reform of higher ed-ucation.

Two important considerations should gov-ern the expansion of higher education: first, itis necessary to end discrimination againstweaker social groups, especially youngwomen. Next, account must be taken of thefailures of uncalculated expansion in existinginstitutions, which have led to a tremendousdrop in quality. Higher education institutions,old and new, should enjoy high quality, diver-

sity, and flexibility, and should focus on thefields and institutional forms required for sci-entific and technological progress. 4. Quality: A powerful shake-up to improvequality in Arab higher education is long over-due. Quality should be improved in presentinstitutions and no new institutions, public orprivate, should be created unless they can pro-vide better standards of quality. Independentaccreditation organisations should be enlistedto help ensure the quality of higher educationprogrammes.

Rapid and committed implementation ofthe above would substantially raise the qualityand outcomes of Arab higher education.Other priorities that are central to such changeare: sufficient and sustained funding for qual-ity education and quality research; improvedaccess to knowledge for students throughICT; and enhanced remuneration for teachingand research staff. None of these measureswill however succeed without the overhauland development of curricula at all educa-tional levels, coupled with appropriate teach-ing methods that develop critical thinking andcreativity.

3. INDIGENISING SCIENCE,UNIVERSALISING RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT (R&D) INSOCIETAL ACTIVITIES ANDKEEPING UP WITH THEINFORMATION AGE

The limited achievement of Arab countries inthe fields of science and technology is an out-come of several factors: the illusion that im-porting technology as embodied in productsand services is equivalent to aquiring knowl-edge; policy neglect of basic research in the re-gion, reflected in its under-estimation andunder-funding; rentier science and technologyimportation; the weakness of national knowl-edge systems, and, on the regional level, insuf-ficient Arab co-operation. A seriousprogramme to confront the current crisis mustfollow a dual strategy: internal reform in everyArab country, on the one hand, and deepeningco-operation among Arab countries in R&Don the other.

The process of adapting and localisingtechnology starts with leadership reflected in a


For developing

countries, there is no

real trade-off between

spending on higher or

basic education.

A powerful shake-up

to improve quality in

Arab higher education

is long overdue.

cogent national science and technology policyto attract private investors and a supportivefiscal and regulatory regime to encourage en-terprise development. It requires the expan-sion and sustained financing of local R&D intarget technology sectors and substantial pub-lic and private investment in human resourcesand professional skills development, especiallyin mathematics, the sciences, ICT and man-agement. It calls for technology managementpolicies for selecting, adapting, creating andcommercialising technologies in response tomarket signals and opportunities for competi-tiveness. It entails organisational changeswithin industries and firms to internalise inno-vations, raise value added and instill flexibility.Above all, local technology development re-quires a closely networked national innovationsystem to tie key public, private and interna-tional actors together.

Successful adaptation and localisationtakes place over a long period of maturation.Nevertheless, late-starters can benefit fromglobal technology by participating in globalproduction chains on the basis of competitiveedge. At the same time, they should focus onbuilding agile workforces and sustaining eco-nomic, social and technical innovation inorder to convert acquired products andprocesses into new, useful and marketabletechnologies that serve national and regionalhuman development. Vision, creativity andrisk-taking are indispensable to that process.

As part of this process, Arab governmentsmust support Arab R&D centres and technicalconsultancy firms so that they can grow andoffer services comparable to those sought byArab countries from firms abroad.

Most of what is produced in the Arabworld is not competitive with what interna-tional markets offer, due to quality and costconsiderations. It is essential to accelerate thestandardisation of specifications and qualitycontrol in the region and to subject all Arabproducts to those standards.

At the same time, the link between humanpower and educational institutions on the onehand, and human power and professional as-sociations in Arab countries on the other, ismuch weaker than the minimum required forthe efficiency of the R&D system. This re-quires establishing and strengthening all forms

of pan-Arab connectivity in all fields of R&Ddevelopment, utilising ICT formats and chan-nels for fast communication.

At the national level, the goal should be topull together scientific and research systems asa prerequisite for coming together at the re-gional level in order to benefit from collabora-tion and economies of integration and scale.To that end, countries need to develop long-term policies on scientific research, reprioritis-ing their budgets to increase funding for R&Dand creating triangular cooperation betweenR&D institutes, universities and industry.Central to such policies is the realisation thatvarious components feeding into R&D mustbe developed simultaneously. These compo-nents include educational systems and stan-dards, basic and applied research institutions,ICT infrastructure, services and informationsystems, funding institutions, professional so-cieties, consulting services, technical supportsystems and science education for studentsand the public at large.

Policies to strengthen the weak articula-tion between these components of the knowl-edge system would help Arab countries toconsolidate their national knowledge basesand to sustain higher rates of growth andhigher rates of technology acquisition.

Technological development in Arab coun-tries should centre on technologies needed inthe region, and those where Arabs enjoy a de-gree of competitive advantage. Technologiesrelated to oil and natural gas, their by-prod-ucts and to improving their environmental im-pact are one such group. ICT, renewableenergy technologies, such as solar energy andwind, and water desalination are others. Theestablishment of regional "centres of excel-lence" in R&D, with research focus areas se-lected according to country-specific needs orcompetitive advantages, is a high priority. Thebenefits that could accrue from these orienta-tions would, of course, be maximised throughclose and effective Arab co-operation.

The efficient implementation of these pol-icy directions requires essential contributionsby the state in building the knowledge society.The basic functions of the state include prior-ity setting, designing policies, enacting lawsand procedures, providing tax incentives, allo-cating resources and facilities. The state can


Arab governments

must support Arab

R&D centres and

technical consultancy

firms so that they can

grow and offer

services comparable

to those sought by

Arab countries from

firms abroad.

Most of what is

produced in the Arab

world is not

competitive with what

international markets

offer.

also initiate innovation: it could make a majorcontribution by instituting R&D as a funda-mental activity in public, private, state andcivil society organisations and enterprises.

Civil society and actors at the householdlevel can play an influential role in establishingand supporting an effective non-governmentalinstitutional structure to stimulate knowledgeefforts throughout society as a whole. A stepforward would be to modernise and energisethe traditions of zakat (alms giving) and wakfs(religious endowments) to build human devel-opment.

Some specific suggestions for public andprivate action, already tried with some success,include: creating national business councils toprovide a common interface with multina-tional firms and investors; financing R&D, ei-ther through grants to non-profitorganisations or through soft loans to profit-seeking enterprises, payable only when theR&D activity increases business revenues; al-locating a percentage of business profits,whether public or private, to finance R&D ac-tivities within the enterprise and/or in societyat large; outsourcing non-core processes infirms to reduce fixed costs that cannot be re-covered over short production cycles; andpromoting the start-up and operations of ven-ture capital firms and business incubators.

Keeping abreast of the Information Age

The Arab world needs to join the ICT revolu-tion much more decisively. Yet certain specialArab features call for a special model for ICTdevelopment. Perhaps the most important ofthese is the dimension of language, particu-larly after the spread of the Internet. Indeed,the Arabic language can become one of theconstitutive elements of an Arab informationbloc that could effectively meet the informa-tion challenge faced by Arab countries.

The Arab world is facing the challenge ofICT at a time when it is also confronting anacute economic crisis, a situation requiringmaximum care in allocating and rationalisingthe use of resources. Required as well is astrong commitment to sharing information re-sources on both the national and regional lev-els. At the national level, action to populariseICT as a tool for knowledge acquisition shouldfocus on (a) boosting literacy, especially

among women; (b) lowering monopolistic bar-riers for Internet providers and telecommuni-cations developers; (c) lowering other costsaffecting access to the Internet; (d) overcom-ing restrictions on ICT access by gender, eco-nomic capability, geographic location or socialconditions; (e) using ICT as a tool for life-longlearning.

At the regional level, a strong pan-Arab in-formation policy could be founded on the fol-lowing strategic principles:• Adopting a supra-sectoral approach, i.e.,policies that respond to the growing integra-tion of the information, media and telecom-munications sectors.• Adopting a cultural approach to the infor-mation industry while recognising the com-puterisation of the Arabic language is a basicspringboard for Arab ICT development andapplications.• Emphasising Arab information integra-tion, especially the principle of sharing re-sources and data.• Giving priority to the utilisation of ICT inthe fields of education, training, and publichealth and building an infrastructure for theArab cultural industry.


The Arab world needs

to join the ICT

revolution much more

decisively.

Lebanon is moving to make ICT a forcefor development. The Government hasmade steady efforts to improve local infor-mation and communication technologyservices. Out of many programmes beingcarried out, two notable programmes be-came operational in 2001: the student in-formation system of the LebaneseUniversity and the wide area network(WAN). Both programmes aim at improv-ing services offered to students and facultyby providing easy access to informationand the ability to perform administrativework electronically from anywhere. Otherprojects include a UNESCO-supportedprogramme to improve scientific and en-gineering education through ICT and gov-ernment initiatives to apply ICT toe-government and the management ofstate activities.

Considerable attention has beengiven to promoting the wider use of infor-mation and communication technology atnational level, including rural areas andconnecting them to international organi-zations. Lebanon signed, for instance, an

agreement in February 1999 to benefitfrom the Euro-MediterraneanInformation Society (EUMEDIS), whichis a regional programme financed by theEuropean Union. The programme seeksto narrow the information and technolog-ical gap in the region through the estab-lishment of pioneering regional projectsand networks. The areas of interest coverfive main sectors: education; electronictrade and economic cooperation; health;cultural heritage and tourism; and indus-try and innovation.

A new Lebanese national and re-gional technological centre commencedits operations in October 2001. It acts as afacilitating network for projects and anopen space for high technology compa-nies. On the financing front, theInvestment Development Foundation hascompleted a feasibility study to evaluatethe best way to offer necessary facilitiesand incentives to direct foreign and localinvestments in the information and com-munication technology sector.

BOX 9.3

Lebanon: A Bright Future for Information and CommunicationTechnology?

Source: Country report prepared for AHDR 2.

• Developing concrete regional action plansfor ICT development, with visible, high-levelgovernment, donor and private sector support.

4. SHIFTING RAPIDLY TOWARDSKNOWLEDGE-BASED PRODUCTION

In Arab countries, even in non-oil countries,the socio-economic structure is dominated bya rentier mode of production and behaviour.In this mode, economic value depends on de-pleting exhaustible natural resources.Moreover, contrary to popular impressions,most Arab countries and most Arabs are notrich. The first AHDR noted that all Arab GDPcombined does not exceed that of a singlemedium-sized European country such as theNetherlands or Spain.

Furthermore, the distribution of economicreturns, whether from income or wealth, is notby any means motivated by merit or need;rather, it is often based on narrow loyalties andfavouritism. Such a value system does not en-courage productive work, let alone knowledgeproduction. Add to this the restrictions onfreedoms and the penalties for expressing in-dependent opinion discussed previously, andthe formidable gauntlet that Arab knowledgeproduction must run becomes quite apparent.

Arab countries, therefore, have littlechoice but to pursue deep reforms in their so-cial and economic structures in order to laybetter foundations for the knowledge society.The central goal will be to shift to a highervalue added structure of production.

In economic terms, that shift would beginwith:• Moving quickly to the upstream or down-stream ends of processing in the oil and nat-ural gas industry, which require higher skillsand generate more value-adding activities thanpresent turnkey operations.• Recognising that total reliance on non-re-newable oil rents is a rapidly diminishingprospect, and thus investing state resources indiversifying economic structures and marketsand developing renewable resources throughknowledge and technological capabilities.

This shift will require a stronger Arabpresence in the new economy where valueadded is higher and grows faster. As economicactivities grow, they create new knowledge as a

basis for economic value, thus establishing adynamic virtuous cycle between knowledgeand growth.

Such a transformation, in turn, calls for theintensification of R&D efforts and a sharpfocus on technology. Higher education institu-tions can spearhead this technological shift, aswas the case with universities in Brazil andMalaysia, for instance. The state, the businesssector and higher education institutionsshould unite to build consultancy and technol-ogy-launching centres and to create an atmos-phere conducive to knowledge productionthrough innovation. This large task ought tobecome a major ‘societal project’ in every Arabcountry.

A successful transition to new patterns ofknowledge production is contingent on estab-lishing all pillars of the knowledge society setout in this chapter.

5. ESTABLISHING AN AUTHENTIC,BROADMINDED ANDENLIGHTENED ARAB GENERALKNOWLEDGE MODEL

Effective contribution to human knowledge isnot foreign to Arabs or to Arab civilisation, asseveral aspects of this Report have, hopefully,demonstrated. Nevertheless, regaining thiseroded capacity will mean consciously over-coming legacies from the era of decline thatstill cling on stubbornly today. The establish-ment of an authentic, broadminded, and en-lightened Arab general knowledge modelrequires essential reforms in the societal con-text in Arab countries. These reforms aresummed up in the following five actions:

Delivering pure religion from politicalexploitation and honouring ijtihad(scholarship)

Pure religion is innocent of any negative dis-position towards knowledge acquisition. TheArab scientific renaissance in the past is cleartestimony to that; in fact, at that time a strongsynergy developed between religion (Islam)and science as pointed out in Chapter 1.

Nonetheless, what applies to pure religiondoes not necessarily apply to religious institu-tions and religious interpretations. There hasbeen enlightened and regressive religious in-


Arab countries,

therefore, have little

choice but to pursue

deep reforms in their

social and economic

structures.

A successful transition

to new patterns of

knowledge production

is contingent on

establishing all pillars

of the knowledge

society.

terpretation, the latter increasing after thedoors closed on true scholarship.

Over the 20th century, religion, as an Arabinstitution, lost its institutional distinction andrelative independence. This happened withthe rise of modern, centralised states that grewand expanded at the expense of relatively in-dependent civil society institutions – a processthat ran from the mid-19th century until themid-20th century. These states then took largeleaps towards domination during the secondhalf of the 20th century.

With these last leaps, the modern centralstate became, and remains, virtually the onlysocietal organisation, pushing non-govern-mental institutions into the margins of society.The state’s approach to these institutions hasvaried: some were simply abolished, as in thecase of the endowments, others were sub-jected to control and close monitoring, as inthe case of NGOs. A third group was an-nexed, as in the case of universities.

Thus, religious institutions became eitherstate-affiliated, as mosques managed by thestate over the past 20 years in particular, or an-nexed to the state, as was the case with Al-Azhar, religious institutes and Sufi groups.The state and its other agencies evolved as thesource "guiding" the outlook of religious insti-tutions on social and political reality. In effect,that outlook then defined the standpoint fromwhich religious jurisprudence proceeded andaccording to which religious interpretationsare issued.

This resulted in the ousting of religiousthought incompatible with, or actively op-posed to state influence over pulpits. Yet it isprecisely such ousted religious thinking thathas had the greatest appeal to people, that hascome closest to their hearts and influencedtheir religious consciousness on the spiritual,intellectual and sometimes the political levels.

Emphatically, the restoration of the inde-pendence of religious institutions would rein-state their genuine role and strongly empowerreligion as the protector of the people’s inter-ests.

As stressed in the Report, pure religion(Islam) provides great incentives for knowl-edge acquisition. It is the political, and evencommercial, exploitation of religion that havecontributed to weakening the quest for knowl-

edge in Arab countries.This conclusion is not directed solely, as

some may imagine, at certain fanatical politicalIslamic movements. It applies as well to someArab governments, societal forces and evencertain traditional religious institutions, whichhave used religious exegesis to secure their do-minion or reproduce their hold on the Arabpeople. The essential point is that the exploita-tion of religion, for objectives far removedfrom its sublime purpose and soul, can nolonger be tolerated if Arab society is to free it-self to build a living knowledge society.

In Arab countries where the political ex-ploitation of religion has intensified, toughpunishment for original thinking, especiallywhen it opposes the prevailing powers, intimi-dates and crushes scholars. Penalties canamount to accusations of heresy, a license tokill offenders or the separation of spouses.Small wonder, then, that scholarship shrinksin the repressive grip of religion pervertedfrom its true course.

Another aspect of the dominant climate ofbelief that calls out for action is the culture ofmyths, widespread in Arab countries. It oftenleads to the publication of worthless booksand tabloid journalism, cloaked in religion yet


In Arab countries ...

tough punishment for

original thinking,

especially when it

opposes the prevailing

powers, intimidates

and crushes scholars.

The exploitation of

religion, for objectives

far removed from its

sublime purpose and

soul, can no longer be

tolerated.

Abu Hanifa: "This is the best I have seen;nonetheless, he who provides betterwould be accepted by me."

Malik: "I am but a human being who botherrs and says correct things, so look intomy opinions."

Ibn Hazm: "It is not permissible for any-one to imitate a live or a dead person;everyone has the right to practise scholar-ship as much as he can."

Jalal Ed-Din As-Syouti: "A Response toThose Who Became Idle and Did NotRealise that Scholarship is, in Every Age,a Duty.” (Title of work)

BOX 9.4

Imams (religious leaders) advocate ijtihad (scholarship)

All Orientals, be they Buddhists, Muslims,Christians, Jews or otherwise, urgentlyneed sages who are not swayed by thefoolishness of the stupid and the careless,nor by cruel, ignorant rulers. We needsages who revive the investigative study ofreligion, thus restoring the lost aspectsthereof, and refining it from any false im-purities – which normally attach to anyold religion. Thus, each religion needs in-novators who restore it to its pure, uncon-

taminated origins that can reinstatehuman will and human happiness; thoseorigins that mitigate the misery of despo-tism and slavery; those origins that pro-vide insight into correct methods ofeducation and learning, and that prepareits followers for the basics of good up-bringing and stable morality – all of whichmakes people human, and with whichpeople become brothers and sisters.

BOX 9.5

Al Kawakibi, (1884-1902), on the need for religious reform

Source: The Character of Despotism, pp 97-98.

far removed from it. Texts that prey on super-stition close the minds and spirits of men andwomen who have been denied education –and even of some educated classes – to gen-uine understanding and knowledge.

Advancing the Arabic language

Language is the reservoir of knowledge ingeneral, and a people’s mother tongue is themain medium for their creativity and knowl-edge production. Historically, the Arabic lan-guage has proved itself capable of expressingand addressing the deepest, finest, most com-plex and most nuanced aspects of knowledge.As this Report has emphasised, the majormovement of translation into Arabic wasclosely linked to, and motivated by, an emi-nent scientific school fully capable of produc-ing knowledge.

Such a language has the structures, flexi-bility and potential to propel Arabs into theage of information and knowledge-intensityand to sustain their position there. Yet gravedangers beset the Arabic language today andthreaten to extinguish the great opportunity itrepresents for Arabs to build their own knowl-edge societies.

Advancing the Arabic language entailsmoving on several fronts. The present dis-course on the Arabic language has becomesterile. It should be succeeded by a more com-prehensive, profound and discriminating per-

ception of the Arabic language system,whether concerning its interdependent inter-nal elements, or their strong relationship withother systems in society. Moving towards theknowledge society is an opportunity to speedup linguistic reform, taking advantage of newdevelopments in linguistic science.

The Arabisation of university education isa further priority, not for reasons of national-ism per se, but as a prerequisite for developingnative tools of thought, analysis and creativity.Arabisation of higher studies will also acceler-ate the social assimilation of rapidly changingand advancing knowledge, a marked feature ofthe knowledge society. Moreover, so long asthe sciences are not taught in Arabic, it will bedifficult to build bridges between the variousdisciplines. But it is absolutely critical that ef-forts to Arabise knowledge proceed in tandemwith the improvement of foreign languageteaching in all fields of knowledge. Both av-enues of knowledge acquisition must be keptopen.

Promoting Arabisation also requires a newoutlook on the mechanisms of word-construc-tion; encouraging writing in Arabic in variousscientific fields; supporting machine transla-tion and using information technologies tobuild terminology banks and to analyse theconceptual structure of Arabic words so thatforeign terms pass into Arabic with maximumfidelity to the concepts they contain.

Perhaps the best way to advance theArabic language in general is through workingto construct a simplified Arabic standard.Some specific suggestions follow:• One proposal in this regard is to initiate acreative composition movement for youngchildren: a movement conducted byrenowned, capable writers able to tame, sim-plify and modernise the language without sac-rificing its inherent values. Success would givenew generations of Arab writers and readers avibrant medium for producing Arab workswith new vistas and inspiration. • Related to this, the inauguration of seriousresearch in Arabic language studies, prefer-ably on the pan-Arab level, is a key priority.Arabic linguists should participate with spe-cialists in other disciplines to:

• Compile specialised, functional dictionar-ies and thesauruses. These could be espe-


Medicine is, perhaps, as many see it, themost difficult discipline to teach inArabic. Yet in 1919 the Arab MedicalInstitute was reopened in Damascus aftera committee passed a draft law comprising12 Articles, one of which provided thatteaching be conducted in Arabic.

The Faculty of Medicine then pro-duced a thesaurus of medical terms inArabic, consisting of 14,534 terms. Thisdictionary was critically reviewed by thePresident of the Arabic Academy, andprofessor of endocrinology at the Facultyof Medicine at the time. Recommendedamendments and additions were thencompiled in a large volume containing1,102 pages and published in 1983.Eventually, the Unified (Arabic) MedicalDictionary was compiled in co-operationwith the WHO regional office.

During the period 1970-1991 the

Faculty of Medicine, DamascusUniversity, graduated 1,442 specialists, allof whom had studied medicine, and pur-sued graduate studies, in Arabic.

More than one Arab conference hasbeen held to consider teaching medicinein Arabic:• The Regional Convention for theArabisation of Medical Teaching in ArabCountries (Cairo, 17-20 June 1990). Outof this convention emerged The StandingCommittee for the Follow-up onArabisation in medicine.• The Conference on the Arabisation ofMedicine and Medical Sciences in theArab World (Bahrain, February 1993).

The proceedings of these conferenceswere strongly in favour of teaching medi-cine in Arabic, without neglecting foreignlanguages, and recommended Arab co-operation in this regard.

BOX 9.6

Teaching medicine in Arabic is possible!

Source: The Conference on the Arabisation of Medicine and Medical Sciences in the Arab World (Bahrain, February 1993).

The best way to

advance the Arabic

language in general is

through working to

construct a simplified

Arabic standard.

cially useful in the production of materialsfor children and educational curricula, inaddition to specialised scientific materials.• Cast scientific terminology in Arabic andcoin derived terms free from obscurities.• Conduct research to facilitate Arabicgrammatical rules and simplify their termi-nology. • Write general books on Arabic grammartranscending national curricula to presentmodels that show how to teach correct lan-guage without excessive reliance on rules.• Facilitate the acquisition of correct Arabicvia various formal and non-formal learningchannels.• Encourage the computerisation of theArabic language.• Enrich the Arabic content of informationnetworks and websites.

Renovating the Arab general knowledgemodel: the past as inspiration for thefuture

Among the ironies of the present Arab realityand the reasons for its knowledge deficitstoday is the fact that the creativity and thirstfor knowledge that produced ancient renais-sances has not been allowed to live on in pre-sent-day society. Current tendencies do notspur Arabs to assume their place in the globalknowledge society or reclaim their best histor-ical influences. On the contrary, those influ-ences only surface briefly in ceremonies andcelebrations, reflecting empty pageantry, andare either quickly forgotten or relegated tomuseums and the pantheon of memory.

A resolute and concerted effort is requiredto revive, in a forward-looking manner,sources of illumination in the Arab knowledgeheritage, and to encourage those sources to ir-radiate the Arab general knowledge model,particularly through the mass media and insti-tutions of modern education. This effort hasnothing to do with nostalgia. Rather, it is aboutstimulating the genuine comprehension andre-assimilation of those cultural values, mind-sets and intellectual currents that can nurture amodern Arab knowledge renaissance.

Enriching, supporting and celebratingcultural diversity in the region

From the perspective of the International Billof Human Rights (IBHR), a respected per-spective in itself, minorities enjoy inalienablerights that protect their cultural and religiousspecificity. In addition, the IBHR had becomeinseparable from the legal structure of themany Arab states that have ratified the inter-national conventions and charters concerned,which makes its provisions binding.

However, above and beyond safeguardingrights – a supreme human end –cultural diver-sity offers any society incomparable advan-tages when it comes to building knowledge."A single flower does not a garden make, nordoes a single bird bring spring." Beauty andbounty are the result of diversity. Cross-fertili-sation gives birth to strong offspring, whetherin nature or in knowledge.

Each Arab country represents an extraor-dinary cultural and knowledge mix that,through cross-fertilisation among ethnic, reli-gious and social groups, could contribute tothe enrichment of Arab societies across the re-gion. An Arab Free Citizenship Area encour-aging the interaction of all symbolic structures,ideas and their human carriers in the Arabworld would realise dividends even larger thanthose ensuing from the integration of com-modities and capital. Entrance to the worldknowledge society from this strengthenedbase would substantially enhance both whatArabs can contribute to, and what they can ac-quire from the new age.


Christians love to read the poems and ro-mances of the Arabs; they study Arab the-ologians and philosophers, not to refutethem but to form a correct and elegantArabic. Where is the layman who nowreads the Latin commentaries on the HolyScriptures, or who studies the Gospels,prophets or apostles?

Alas! All talented young Christians

read and study with enthusiasm the Arabbooks; they gather immense libraries atgreat expense; they despise Christian liter-ature as unworthy of attention. They haveforgotten their own language. For everyone who can write a letter in Latin to afriend, there are a thousand who can ex-press themselves in Arabic with elegance.

BOX 9.7

Paul Alvarus5: Mother Tongues

Source: (Menocal, 2002, 66).

5Respected Christian luminary of Cordoba in the mid-9th century. Quote is from his famous polemical work, The Unmistakable Sign (Menocal. 2002,66-67).

A resolute and

concerted effort is

required to revive, in a

forward-looking

manner, sources of

illumination in the

Arab knowledge

heritage.

Opening up to other cultures

No civilisation in history has ever flourishedwithout interacting creatively with other cen-tres of human advancement, past or contem-porary.

The Arab-Islamic culture at its zenith wasa role model for borrowing and assimilation,followed by generous giving when it estab-lished its distinguished knowledge edifice.What is known nowadays as "Western"knowledge is itself an accumulation of humancontributions throughout history, to which theArab world contributed when the Arab-Islamic civilisation flourished, and afterwardsthrough the Library of Alexandria. As worldcitizens, as contributors to the global stock ofknowledge and as seekers of new knowledge,the Arab peoples can, and should, embrace allopportunities to understand and relate toother cultures in the West and in the develop-ing world.

Translation into Arabic and otherlanguages

Translation is a wide bridge for transferringand localising knowledge. As argued else-where, the Arabisation of learning and a re-turn to a vigorous movement centred ontranslating works from other languages holdthe keys to rapid knowledge acquisition andassimilation. This movement is also linked toindigenising science and technology and re-building Arab R&D. The Arab world needs toregain its historical prowess in translation aspart of opening itself to new cultures and as aprerequisite for building the knowledge soci-ety.

Translation from Arabic is a differentissue; it is currently limited to a few literaryworks and essentially depends on personalconnections and chance. Important transla-

tions from Arabic await a critical mass of qual-ity knowledge production by Arabs, as was thecase historically in Andalusia.

In advancing cultural interaction, Arabsliving abroad and the citizens of other coun-tries of Arab origin – many of whom are highlyqualified – can be indispensable connectorsbetween the Arab world and other societies.Expatriate Arabs often benefit from relativelyfree societies and enjoy better access to knowl-edge and ideas than their counterparts in theregion. They can be among the outriders of anetworked Arab knowledge renaissance. ButArab countries must undertake to support theArab Diaspora consciously through explicitchannels. This can take various forms: estab-lishing up-to-date, computerised rosters of ex-patriate Arabs; creating attractive, regularmeans of communication through the use ofICT; and providing facilities for Arab expatri-ates to visit and work in all Arab countries, aswell as supporting Arab culture in countriesthat host Arab emigrants.

Arab countries can also establish know-how transfer programmes that allow expatri-ate Arabs to undertake short, intensiveconsultancies and business advisory services.Models for such programmes exist in the workof UNDP and other international organisa-tions. Arab countries can also sponsor ICT vir-tual networks among expatriate Arabs andthose desiring to benefit from their knowledgeand expertise in Arab countries. The fosteringof organisations specifically designed to bringexpatriate Arabs together will institutionalisetwo-way ties between emigrants and theircountries of origin.

An intelligent way to benefit from non -Arab civikisations

This Report has adopted a wide definition ofknowledge as the arterial system that connectsall human actions and symbolic structures inhuman cultures. It has therefore not limitedknowledge to scientific production alone buttaken a broader view encompassing all the sci-ences, arts, literature and even values, habitsand customs in both formal and folk culture.

Civilisational cross-fertilisation is a sureway to enrich knowledge on both sides of theexchange. Yet Arabs today seem content toaccept a passive, one-way relationship with


No civilisation in

history has ever

flourished without

interacting creatively

with other centres of

human advancement,

past or contemporary.

The Arab world needs

to regain its historical

prowess in

translation.

If we find that the nations which precededus had a vision and consideration for ex-isting things, depending on the require-ments of proof, we must look into whatthey said on that and what they wrote intheir books. Anything of what they said,which complied with the truth, we wouldtake, feel happy with and thank them for.

What did not comply with the truth, weshould point to, warn against and giveprevious nations an excuse for (learnedpeople are legally excused if they makemistakes)… Thus, we find that we arelegally bound to look into the books ofprevious nations.

BOX 9.8

Ibn Rushd (Averroes), (1126-1198 AD):The Need to Learn fromthe Efforts of Previous Nations

Source: (Ibn Rushd, 1999, P.93.).

just one external point of reference and to re-main on the receiving end of cultural flowsfrom the West. This is the very antithesis ofhealthy cross-fertilisation because it leads tothe adoption of a poor copy of the other cul-ture.

Relations between Arabs and the West, es-pecially after September 11, have come underintense strain. As noted in this Report, Arabs,Muslims and Islam have since been subjectedto defamation and misrepresentation, a reflec-tion in many instances of ignorance and insome cases an expression of unjustified abuse.

While this appears to be growing intomore than a difference of opinion, Arabsshould not close up to the outside world.From the standpoint of cross-fertilisation andknowledge, American society represents amore enduring source of ideas, cultural re-sources and values than any single political ad-ministration, which is bound to changethrough democratic processes. Differences atthe political level, no matter how intense,should not be allowed to eclipse this all-im-portant fact and to shut the door on culturaldialogue.

The West includes, but is more than theUS. Europe represents a pole of values, knowl-edge and culture that has geographic (theMediterranean) and historical and cultural ties(especially through Spain) with the Arabs,which need to be invested in for the good ofboth parties. Cultural, and especially scientificand technological transfers and exchanges, aspart of these relations, will further the estab-lishment of the knowledge society in Arabcountries.

Arabs need to open up to all cultures, notsolely the West. The experiences of the Asiancircle and other non-Arab neighbours offerimportant opportunities for interaction basedon a deep common understanding and mutualrespect.

Taking full advantage of what regional andinternational organisations offer andparticipating in global governance

Regional and international organisations canplay an important role in cultural cross-fertili-sation between Arabs and other civilisations.Yet Arab countries, as a group and individu-ally, do not benefit from such organisations ef-

fectively, or make optimal use of their servicesor play a significant role in their governance.Moreover, the structure of such organisations,where performance has deteriorated in aunipolar world, has reduced the benefits todeveloping countries of the noble goals ofthese institutions. To the extent that develop-ing countries, including Arab countries, letdisunity and division undermine their repre-sentation in international organisations, in-cluding the UN, their structures and serviceswill continue to be dominated by other blocsand power interests. Arab countries need toenergise their financial, political and technicalcontributions to regional and international ac-tivities, and thus develop a stronger interna-tional image while reaping the benefits ofcloser co-operation and unity through suchbodies. This is especially important with re-spect to those organisations that can con-tribute to building the knowledge society inthe Arab world.

The international architecture of globalgovernance is often weighted preponderantlyin favour of the interests of the rich and pow-erful nations. Without changes that tip thebalance of these structures more towards theneeds and aspirations of developing countries,including Arab countries, globalisation cannotbecome a locomotive of human developmentor a force for the spread of knowledge in theworld.

So long as Arabs remain divided amongthemselves and in disarray, they will not beable to contribute effectively to the rebalanc-


Arabs need to open

up to all cultures, not

solely the West.

Arab countries need

to energise their

financial, political and

technical

contributions to

regional and

international

activities.

"We must not shy away from appreciatingthe truth and adopting it regardless of itssource, even if it came from people whoare far away from us and different from

us. There is no greater reason to seek thetruth than truth itself. One should not be-little the truth or belittle the person whosaid it or conveyed it."

BOX 9.9

Al-Kindi, (175-260 AH): Appreciating the truth regardless of thesource

"I have selected this title for the book,Gawidan Khurd (Eternal Wisdom, inPersian), to tell the reader that the mindsof all nations are essentially but one. They

do not differ from one another from coun-try to country; they do not change withtime, and they do not grow old and frag-ile."

BOX 9.10

Ibn Miskawieh, (325-421 AH): On lauding cultural cross-fertilisation

Source: Ibn Miskawieh, Gawidan Khurd (Eternal Wisdom)¸ p.147 b, in Frantz Rosenthal’s: Methods of Muslim Scientistsin Scientific Research, in Arabic, Dar Ath-Thaqafa, Beirut, 1980.

Source: Ibn Rushd ( Averroes ), “The Final Say on the Determination of the Relationship between Islamic Law andWisdom” (quoted in Abed Al-Jaberi, 1999).

ing of systems of global governance and thusnudge these systems into playing their role infacilitating the creation of knowledge soci-eties. Indeed, the present situation can onlyleave Arabs on the receiving end of an interna-tional order that is frequently inequitable andunresponsive to their own objectives in free-dom and knowledge.

Building a knowledge society across theArab world is the only way to lead the regioninto a renaissance that can change its presentcourse and help all Arab countries to positionthemselves on a new and much more hopefulcurve of development in the region and con-tribute to a new world for humanity at large.This will require the reengineering of Arab co-operation, and wide restructuring in Arabcountries, basing both on full public participa-tion, a key element that has been missing sofar. Lack of voice and representation in re-gional initiatives has greatly reduced the effec-tiveness and sustainability of joint Arab action.

Bold restructuring by Arab leaders and in-stitutions needs to be supported by sustained,

well-designed and efficiently implementedprogrammes of action for establishing theknowledge society, following the guidelinessuggested in this chapter. Committed Arab co-operation can create a Free Arab CitizenshipZone open to all people of the region and areal opportunity for Arabs to participate inglobalisation from a position of dignity andstrength.

Knowledge lights the lamps that point outthe way on the Arab journey to the future.Nothing in religion, culture and history blocksthose beacons. On the contrary, Arab heritagedeclares that knowledge must shine throughall the endeavours of humankind. What hasblotted out that light is the work of mortals:the defective structures – political, social andeconomic - that have hidden knowledge fromthe Arab people and eclipsed its full possibili-ties. Yet what human beings have wroughthuman beings can remove, and must, so thatthe flame of Arab learning can once againburn bright and long in this new Millenniumof Knowledge.


Knowledge lights the

lamps that point out

the way on the Arab

journey to the future.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 185

Annex 1: List of Background Papers

(Author name, paper title, number of pages)

IN ARABIC:

Al-Taher Labib, Scientific Production in theHumanities and Social Sciences, 14

Baqer Alnajjar, the Impact of theContemporary Social and EconomicFormation on Innovation, 7

Taoufik Jebali, Artistic Production andInnovation: Theatre, 6

Hayder Ibrahim Ali, The System of Incentivesand Innovation in the Arab World, 5

Khalida Said, The Arabic Language andKnowledge Acquisition, 26

Dina El Khawaga, Governing and the Legaland Procedural Context for the Productionand Acquisition of Knowledge, 39

Roshdi Rashed, The Arab World and theInternalization of Science, 23

Rukia El Mossadeq, Towards a PoliticalGovernment in the Service of the KnowledgeSociety, 13

Sa'adallah Agha Al Kala'a, Artistic Productionand Innovation, Music, 21

Sami Al Banna, The Conceptual Framework,54

Siham A. Al-Sawaigh, the System ofUpbringing (Education) and its Relationshipwith Knowledge Acquisition in ArabSocieties, 26

Shawki Galal, Transfer of Knowledge andTranslation in the Arab World, 29

Tarek Al-Bishry, Observations (Comments)on Religion and Knowledge, 8

Taher Hamdi Kanaan, Entrepreneurship andArab Economic Development, 12, ( trans-lated)

Atif Kubursi, The Necessary Conditions forthe Transition to a Knowledge Based Society,14 (translated)

Abd El Hameed Hawwas, Popular Cultureand Knowledge Acquisition, 15

Aziz Al-Azmeh, Arab Intellectual Heritage, 22Aziz Al-Azmeh, The General IntellectualPattern (Paradigm) in the Arab Countries, theArab Mind, 6

Imad Moustapha, The OrganizationalContext for Acquiring Knowledge: Transfer,Administration and Internalization ofTechnology, 22

Amr Najeeb Armanazi, Scientific Productionin Natural Sciences and TechnologicalDevelopment, 40

Fadle M. Naqib, Knowledge and Economicgrowth, 12

Fowziyah Abdullah Abu-Khalid, Poetry in theArab World, 17


Annex 1: List of background papers

ANNEX 1: LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS 187

Clovis Maksoud, Introduction to the ArabHuman Development Report 2003, 19

Laila Abdel Majid, Information Media in theArab States and the Transfer of Knowledge,57

Mari Rose Zalzal, Freedom and Knowledgebetween Ordinary and Condensed Time, 14

Mohamed Al-Mili, Cultural Diversity andAcculturation, 18

Mohammed Berrada, Literary Production andInnovation: The Short Story and Novel, 6

Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin, Religion andKnowledge Acquisition, 8

Mohamed Mahmoud El-Imam, Demand forKnowledge, 51

Mohammad Malas, Artistic Production andInnovation: Cinema, 12

Muna Al-Khalidi, Health and Environment inthe Arab World, 7

Munir Bashshur, Contemporary EducationSystems in the Arab Countries: TheirContribution to Knowledge Acquisition, 38

Nabil Ali, Arabic Language and theKnowledge Society, 16

Hichem Djait, Knowledge in the Arab World:The Problem of the Intellectual Heritage, 13

IN ENGLISH:

Inglehart R., Arab Development: the WorldValues Survey, 10

A. B. Zahlan, The Arab Brain Drain and thePromotion of a Knowledge Based Society, 53

Taher H. Kanaan, Entrepreneurship and ArabEconomic Development, 8

Atif Kubursi, The Necessary Conditionsfor the Transition to a Knowledge BasedSociety, 14

Atif Kubursi, The Socio-economic Context ofArab Society and Economy, 23

A questionnaire was designed to explore theopinions of small samples of Arab intellectualsof different ages and both sexes about incen-tives and obstacles to innovation in the Arabcountries and the extent to which knowledgeproduction and societal institutions in the areain question contribute to the promotion ofknowledge acquisition. The survey was con-ducted under the auspices of UNDP offices inthe Arab countries which host them. The sur-vey also sought to explore the opinions of 96Arab intellectuals active in public life chosen,for convenience, from members of faculties atthe universities in each country. (To ensurefair representation, it was stipulated that 48cases would be surveyed from the biggest andoldest universities, and 48 from the small andrecently established universities.) It was alsodecided that the sample would be distributedaccording to three criteria: sex, academic spe-cialization and academic level as follows: halfrepresenting the humanities and social sci-ences, and the second half other sciences. Halfmen and half women. One quarter from eachof the following four academic levels:Assistants - tutors - teachers- primary acade-mic level, associate professors - the middleacademic level and professors - the highestacademic level. Hence, the intersection of thefour criteria would be represented in 32 cells,for which it was suggested that the samplecover three items in each one.

Given that the survey addressed a sampleof highly qualified academics, it was not ex-pected that problems which other field sur-veys usually encounter in the Arab countrieswould arise since the respondents were wellable to respond the questionnaire by them-selves. As such it was assumed that the wholeprocess would be limited to sample selection,sending the questionnaires to the chosen intel-lectuals and ensuring the retrieval of com-

pleted forms. However, the report team onlysucceeded in obtaining the results of the sur-veys from 15 out of 22 Arab countries. Onlythree Arab countries ( Tunisia, Algeria, andMorocco) succeeded in completing the survey,while the results from the other four countrieswhich responded to the questionnaire fellshort of the survey goal: twenty responsesfrom Bahrain, Lebanon, and Sudan, and 39from Egypt only.


Annex 2: Designing a questionnaire to samplethe opinions of faculty members in highereducation institutions.

ANNEX 2: DESIGNING A QUESTIONNAIRE 189

Elements of opinion survey of Arab intellectualsArab Human Development Report 2003Building a Knowledge Society in Arab Countries

Country: ............................................General guidelines----------------------

Please circle the right answer when there is more than one option. Please answer briefly, write clearly, and put thenumbers in the defined boxes.

Name (optional).......................... age: ............ year sex: male femaleHighest degree: Bachelor Master PhD Scientific Branch: .......................... Specialization:................Rank in the academic profession: faculty assistant ( tutor, assistant teacher ) First level for faculty (Teacher)

Intermediate Level (associate professor) Highest Level (Professor)

What is the extent of your satisfaction with the state of knowledge acquisition in your country( 1%- 100% ) ....%What is your evaluation of the extent to which knowledge acquisition serves economic development in yourcountry (1% - 100 ) ................%What is in your opinion the most important obstacle to innovation in your country? ....................................... ........................................................................................................................................................................................Other comments about knowledge acquisition in your country ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Other comments about knowledge acquisition in the Arab countries ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Please evaluate the fields which are embodied in the columns against the nine criteria given in the rows:

Field: (these were the knowledge acquisition/diffusion/production areas selected for the survey).

Criteria: (in each case, concrete criteria illustrative of the field in question were indicated to guide respondents.)

The extent of sufficiency of the right to knowledge in society (1%- 100%)..... ..... ....... The extent of sufficiency of the incentive system for knowledge acquisition in society (1% - 100%) ... ... ...The extent to which the field serves human development (1% - 100%) .... .... ..... ....The extent to which cultural diversity in the society is reflected in the field (1% - 100%) .... .... .... The extent to which the field keeps pace with the global state of the art in knowledge (1%-100% ) .... ...... ..The extent of improvement in the field over the last ten years (1% - 100% ) ..... ...... ....

How do you compare the situation in the Arab countries in this field with that in India*?China?

East Asian Tigers?

* 1% to 100% or more than 100% if you think the situation in your country is better. You can put the sign" - " to denote " don't know"

STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 191

Table A-1

Table A-2

Table A-3

Table A-4

Table A-5

Table A-6

Table A-7

Table A-8

Table A-9

Table A-10

Table A-11

Table A-12

Table A-13

Net enrolment ratios (%) in pre-primary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Net enrolment ratios (%) in primary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Net enrolment ratios (%) in secondary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Gross enrolment ratios (%) in tertiary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Pupils per teacher ratio by education level,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNI,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Relative distribution of tertiary education students (%) by levels of higher education, Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Percentage of females among tertiary education students (%) by levels of higher education, Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Mean years of schooling (25 years or older) by gender, Arab countries and three Asian tigers, 1960-2000Values of indicators on knowledge capital in 109 countries, around the year 2000Reported and imputed values of indicators on knowledge capital in 109 countries, around the year 2000Ranking of 109 countries on knowledge capital indicators, around the year 2000 (sorted by total ranks)Values of knowledge outcomes and other development indicators in 109 countries, around the year 2000

Statistical Tables on Knowledge in Arab Countries


Arab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOmanPalestineQatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen

Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea

2.7836.89

1.790.32

10.545.74

29.2166.0364.92

59.064.54

34.5225.47

5.31

8.9011.8860.77

0.93

75.8944.73

2.7635.52

1.760.40

10.005.73

26.8335.4863.62

34.213.96

32.4524.84

4.80

8.0315.7160.820.76

76.0744.71

2.7736.22

1.780.36

10.285.74

28.0565.7564.28

46.874.25

33.5125.165.06

8.4713.7360.790.85

75.9744.73

Table A-1NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000

Country Males Females Total

* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.

Source: UNESCO 2003. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).



98.7992.5659.5834.8594.96

100.0093.2368.1270.82

63.0478.9765.6098.9194.7660.02

48.6095.8899.1577.9475.84

91.80

100.0096.71

95.5995.4849.8726.2989.5585.6693.9364.5671.08

59.3769.8164.5799.3895.7555.78

40.7588.8597.1478.5644.82

94.67

100.0097.91

97.2393.9854.7830.5992.3293.0693.5766.3770.95

61.2174.4865.0999.1495.2457.95

44.7492.4398.1778.2460.71

93.16

100.0097.27

Table A-2NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN PRIMARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000







57.2676.93

81.2939.6173.4049.2367.21

32.7458.3274.6574.55

39.2165.8663.3852.08

87.3594.46

59.8386.63

76.6526.0478.4650.2373.34

27.0458.7779.2781.64

35.9269.9572.1421.07

88.8694.24

58.5281.64

79.0332.9975.8749.7270.24

29.9458.5476.9078.01

37.5967.8667.4636.98

88.0894.35

Table A-3NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN SECONDARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000






19.601.260.39

17.4626.7613.0135.2251.74

10.59

26.9613.6819.59

7.14

19.58

16.65

41.7590.28

31.130.920.33

9.4930.6329.9838.1550.58

8.04

24.8946.1625.35

6.56

19.00

4.58

59.3851.97

14.9825.20

1.090.36

39.0013.5728.6221.0836.6751.175.609.34

25.9527.6622.44

6.856.09

19.3012.1010.77

7.45

50.3071.69

Table A-4GROSS ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN TERTIARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000







26.8720.9725.9335.6724.0014.8221.8815.7014.388.36

18.2519.1922.0229.0510.48

29.8223.5420.4118.6216.55

26.66

23.82

28.4017.8134.7731.9722.9821.39

13.7818.698.44

44.9928.7625.0831.0713.1211.99

26.7222.9123.2116.5729.84

19.7843.0013.3932.23

18.0614.2710.9721.4116.9519.74

11.0111.817.08

26.7916.9717.9331.6110.1612.73

23.0414.6719.1412.8114.11

17.11

10.3722.13

Table A-5PUPILS PER TEACHER RATIO BY EDUCATION LEVEL,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000

CountryPre-primaryeducation

Primaryeducation

Secondaryeducation





3.663.503.404.05

5.09

1.92

4.525.19

9.27

3.537.82

2.122.887.613.80

Table A-6PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNI,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000

Country 1999/2000






94.4864.2931.0594.92

78.8398.3488.8364.94

92.76

92.76

92.80

83.42100.0085.07

51.77

77.7558.69

5.5235.7168.954.40

20.890.00

10.4732.56

2.06

7.24

4.67

10.840.00

14.92

47.49

19.6540.29

0.000.000.000.68

0.281.660.702.50

5.19

0.00

2.53

5.740.000.01

0.73

2.601.02

Table A-7RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION STUDENTS (%) BY LEVELS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000

CountryLower than first university degree

First university degree

Higher degrees





33.7723.73

47.1167.9653.3550.59

43.13

45.96

55.64

49.28

22.07

58.1235.10

56.4757.25

67.98

39.2245.23

33.05

53.69

94.78

40.13

13.26

54.8835.57

24.6253.6432.3941.98

31.12

20.00

36.66

49.28

6.25

22.10

51.1123.83

Table A-8PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES AMONG TERTIARY EDUCATION STUDENTS (%) BY LEVELS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000

CountryLower than first

university degreeFirst university

degreeHigher degrees

60.0141.8846.84

34.0551.4167.6651.7248.62

42.30

46.5271.8555.93

47.20

48.29

20.75

57.3035.18

Percentage offemales in higher

education




MALES

FEMALES

Average

TOTAL

Average

Average

AlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitSudanSyriaTunisiaHong KongKoreaTaiwanArab countriesHong Kong, Korea and TaiwanAlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitSudanSyriaTunisiaHong KongKoreaTaiwanArab countriesHong Kong, Korea and TaiwanAlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitSudanSyriaTunisiaHong KongKoreaTaiwanArab countriesHong Kong, Korea and Taiwan

Table A-9RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION STUDENTS (%) BY LEVELS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000

Source: Barro, R. J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000)."International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications". Harvard University,

April 2000 (http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.htm, visited on 24 October 2002).

5.746.276.325.418.347.192.477.125.14

10.0911.549.325.61

10.733.705.813.763.256.356.891.354.383.268.839.427.693.468.884.726.095.054.347.377.051.915.744.209.47

10.468.534.549.80

4.935.755.585.157.316.682.206.754.60

10.0011.239.045.01

10.452.895.262.892.835.486.401.053.682.578.648.996.932.758.383.915.574.244.006.426.541.625.213.589.33

10.098.033.889.41

3.955.054.914.456.726.061.855.924.069.18

10.478.644.349.782.074.562.241.934.005.870.682.791.987.528.086.142.057.483.014.873.573.205.395.991.264.353.028.379.257.443.208.63

2.974.124.223.385.335.261.495.063.508.539.368.073.578.881.323.161.671.292.525.310.422.031.466.426.765.561.466.392.143.782.932.343.945.280.953.542.487.518.036.872.517.64

2.343.523.122.704.134.601.024.262.837.978.267.482.727.980.862.361.330.961.703.760.281.441.015.395.425.121.065.331.553.122.211.832.934.290.642.861.926.736.816.371.886.67

1.773.202.022.034.113.430.823.371.857.137.226.271.956.920.491.430.630.621.662.440.150.960.654.134.383.600.594.151.082.441.321.332.913.030.482.171.255.665.775.041.265.55

1.532.371.161.193.363.340.672.661.486.826.235.861.356.160.231.080.010.331.192.060.080.670.403.443.382.630.203.180.821.820.570.762.292.880.371.670.915.114.764.390.764.68

0.501.860.300.642.582.340.582.131.136.785.815.230.675.720.790.940.000.160.791.340.040.550.263.103.162.190.222.900.651.420.000.401.702.410.311.340.714.904.433.800.394.30

1.191.730.000.352.112.260.541.620.946.654.584.640.564.800.760.890.000.080.651.420.040.350.132.832.041.840.192.060.971.370.000.211.402.590.290.990.544.743.233.320.383.40

Gender Country/Region 200019951990198519801975197019651960


ArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOther

AlgeriaArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBeninBoliviaBotswanaBrazilBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCanadaCentral African Rep.ChileChinaColombiaCongoCongo, Dem. Rep.Costa RicaCroatiaCzech Rep..DenmarkDominican RepublicEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEstoniaEthiopiaFinland

Table A-10VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THE YEAR 2000

3.0163.0

5.0447.0762.056.0

1.05.0

525.09.0

70.0123.0136.090.02.02.0

10.0285.0

1.0222.066.053.024.0

0.352.0

231.0424.0631.082.038.021.0

118.0387.0

0.3720.0

57.0213.0152.0525.0467.0104.0

4.0269.0498.0

8.060.093.0

182.0350.0

4.03.0

6.0g677.0

3.0221.0112.0169.0

7.00.3

249.0365.0g378.0720.0105.0100.086.0

100.0363.0

4.0550.0

4.4324.1135.8

994.57a55.5

595.4

1.4

127.3629.2

0.4

3.5744.8

94.9

125.9

2.2366.0694.7

1218.52727.4120.6b

83.320.8

105.22332.1

7.12533.3

7.9158.4

6611.12524.1

13731.43038.5

1.62552.58494.6

14.862.0

187.73544.3

0.8

1767.7

129.048.129.9

0.6

151.52968.6

20577.6

24.617.810.6

19031.40.1

21045.6

7111308332016052735

5122962307

174171

1681289

1721

300947

370459

34

533149413173240

140493

192164

105289218639516254

631451010

11620

316398

94

32715

523227221712

13538727244758595

293122675480

5640

241681224

1376753

2350

296793108675156444543

3371

1631077

83354333581124375271336803

1141178419324464693195

1496

3812323

293296

279

174160

2552740

257137

1592

98

4683

94115254309

52704048

1741

455

2.34.9

5.74.4

0.7

5.00.72.43.22.1

1.56.00.74.04.72.02.21.33.1

4.62.13.32.32.2

5.2

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),2000***

0.37.40.8

85.759.00.20.30.2

29.40.00.21.55.22.20.30.00.3

77.40.34.90.11.10.30.31.93.7

15.462.90.90.30.30.1

28.40.3

102.3

Internethosts

(per 1000people),

2000***+

Numberof

tele-phones

mainline,(per 1000people),2000***

Number ofbook titles(per million

people),1990s****

Patentapplica-

tionsfiled (permillionpeople)1997**

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(per million

people), 1990-

2000***

Televisionsets (per

1000 peo-ple),

1998**

Radios(per 1000people),1997**

Dailynews-papers

(per 1000people), 1996**

QualityAdjustedMYS 15+,

2000*


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherComparatorArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOther

FranceGermanyGhanaGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIrelandIsraelItalyJapanJordanKenyaKorea, Rep. OfKuwaitKyrgystanLatviaLesothoLithuaniaMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaliMexicoMoldovaMongoliaMoroccoMyanmarNetherlandsNew Zealand


493.0586.0

6.0557.0

61.03.0g24.0

809.0302.0

4.017.015.0

658.0702.0737.0526.058.04.0

567.0249.0

2.0166.010.0

142.057.04.05.0

213.01.0

142.032.045.083.00.3

670.0563.0

579.0611.012.0

532.057.09.0

46.0583.0372.032.031.0

149.0420.0482.0474.0586.092.010.0

464.0244.0

77.0303.0

10.0321.0255.0

3.04.0

199.03.0

125.0133.056.050.06.0

618.0500.0

660.2951.7

0.4383.7

42.04.1

1035.214.00.6

210.3

328.2562.9

442.3cd5.1

652.8cd115.385.7

907.5

1107.3

6.8

229.02.9

70.3271.2

13.04.8

1422.4

1902.62141.41767.07777.6

11.81.1

21.3345.7

3010.510.121.36.0

21955.35057.31589.73288.5

1627.42783.3

5123.111259.624741.57242.7

13076.51635.94418.9

290.6

363.35889.5

10553.210.9

5699.99246.6

26862873

1045103

931249

158

5902132157013224960

2139214574

1090

2031387

12

154

213334468

24902197

60158099

466126

590

431437

691361574033184867075221

34649145

49225

459250

212

16612

26129763

1607

543508

937948238477

7955

386684689121156265699520878955287104

103366011271049

513200192249420

5432574015124195

978990

21831114

15333

355

792186

2428

150290104578

589

393374

15247

8932153

1581

9760272610

306216

3.95.21.64.11.50.82.05.14.82.12.12.34.85.74.85.43.41.86.22.9

1.8

1.43.50.33.8

0.85.05.8

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),2000***

19.124.8

0.310.50.50.30.3

34.310.40.30.10.3

29.729.517.836.5

0.10.18.51.80.4

10.70.34.80.80.30.33.10.35.70.40.10.10.3

101.990.6

Internethosts

(per 1000people),

2000***+

Numberof

tele-phones



people),1990s****

Patentapplica-


Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(per million

people), 1990-

2000***

Televisionsets (per

1000 peo-ple),

1998**


Dailynews-papers

(per 1000people), 1996**


2000*


Notes:- Quality adjusted MYS15+: Calculated by multiplying the mean years of schooling and the average test scores.

The average test scores is the average of the test scores data available from both sources (Barro & Lee, 1997 and TIMSS).

Test scores used from Barro & Lee, 1997 refer to the years 1990-91 & 1993-98.Countries were categorised by level of mean years of schooling and missing data of average test scores was filled by the average test scores available for

other countries in the same category.- Source of Population (in millions), 2000 used to compute Patents applications filed per million people and Number of book titles per million people was the HDR 2002,

- Book titles data for Qatar and Malawi were considered missing because the figures refer to School textbooks, Children's books or government publications only.

- Missing data for Cellular mobile subscribers and Internet hosts from HDR 2002, and referred to as "less than half the unit shown" by the symbol (.), was replaced by 0.25.

+ Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified for all countries except Malta, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Nigeria, Benin and Burundi.

Their data refer to a year before 1990.

^ Patent applications filed figures are for residents and non-residents of the the country. Missing figures for residents are considered zero.

OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

NicaraguaNigeriaNorwayPakistanPanamaPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSenegalSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTajikistanThailandTogoTunisiaTurkeyUgandaUkraineUnited KingdomUnited StatesUruguayUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamZambiaZimbabwe


18.00.3

751.02.0

145.050.084.0

174.0665.0112.022.064.026.02.0

684.0205.0612.0190.0609.023.0

717.0644.0

2.00.3

50.011.06.0g

246.08.0

16.0727.0398.0132.0

2.0217.010.09.0

23.0

31.04.0

532.022.0

151.067.040.0

282.0430.0175.0218.0137.022.04.0

484.0314.0386.0114.0421.040.0

682.0727.0103.036.092.09.0

90.0g280.0

3.0206.0589.0700.0278.067.0

108.032.08.0

18.0

11.51107.8

75.618.2

497.2218.6351.5249.1186.2

583.91725.0

125.11483.1246.3

1425.82537.9

1.5129.7

1.1132.643.812.4

126.71868.1

240.7def204.240.3

159.1c

7112.75.7

59.731.347.1

843.010668.7

1297.1331.4

52.1

2160.59413.85223.5

13723.5

2851.31397.0

13068.215673.9

4059.886.7

18.3423.1

2135.6659.8

2495.1835.8121.8

1096.7104.3351.3

9.21743.6

20315

409578

229156

1460158313933397

2

218217062161992

1562188

45073058

2966010210212430325

212126784103

1754194274

19066

57988

187144108413542233420262

4113

34840235612550692

53153570

285236

1819828627

49064584724127518547

13730

28522391598

299273159523304319418321142253822580406317333209932

1000278142232218223180128884

1436214660746546810712193

3024

5882362

079

11375

30010557

54

36018519932

10029

445337

2020634

31111

254

329215293

3206

41219

1.9

5.91.64.74.04.65.22.6

0.70.74.2

2.13.53.65.85.42.4

3.31.42.12.21.5

4.86.14.0

3.4

2.32.3

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),2000***

0.30.3

101.10.35.40.40.38.86.21.92.20.20.20.3

45.27.0

11.04.4

11.30.1

67.336.70.30.31.10.30.31.10.30.7

28.2295.2

16.30.30.70.30.10.3

Internethosts

(per 1000people),

2000***+

Numberof

tele-phones



people),1990s****"

Patentapplica-


Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(per million

people), 1990-

2000***

Televisionsets (per

1000 peo-ple),

1998**


Dailynews-papers

(per 1000people), 1996**


2000*


(a) Not including school textbooks or yearbooks.(b) Partial data(c) First editions only. (d) Not including pamphlets.(e) Not including government publications and university theses but including juvenile titles for which a class breakdown is not available .(f) Not including school textbooks.(g) Data refer to 1999.

Sources:* MYS: Barro and Lee, 2000. "International Data on educational Attainment: Updates and Implications,

CID Working Paper no. 42, April.Test Scores: Barro and Lee, 1997. "Schooling Quality in a Cross-section of Countries", August.Test Scores: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (1996), Science (Mathematics)

Achievement in the Middle School Years: IEA’s Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS),

TIMSS International Study Centre, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA, November."** World Bank, 2000. "World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty", Oxford University Press,

New York.*** UNDP, 2002. "2002 Human Development Report", Oxford University Press, New York.**** UNESCO, 2002. UNESCO Web site (www.unesco.org).



ArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

AlgeriaArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBeninBoliviaBotswanaBrazilBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCanadaCentral Arican Rep.ChileChinaColombiaCongoCongo, Dem. Rep..Costa RicaCroatiaCzech Rep.DenmarkDominican RepublicEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEstoniaEthiopiaFinlandFrance

Table A-11REPORT AND IMPUTED VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THE YEAR 2000

3.0163.0

5.0447.0762.056.0

1.05.0

525.09.0

70.0123.0136.090.02.02.0

10.0285.0

1.0222.066.053.024.0

0.352.0

231.0424.0631.082.038.021.0

118.0387.0

0.3720.0493.0

57.0213.0152.0525.0467.0104.0

4.0269.0498.0

8.060.093.0

182.0350.0

4.03.06.0

677.03.0

221.0112.0169.0

7.00.3

249.0365.0378.0720.0105.0100.086.0

100.0363.0

4.0550.0579.0

4.4324.1135.8

1020.3994.6

55.5-204.0595.4

1284.41.4

482.4-51.7127.3629.2

0.4-165.1

3.5744.8-32.694.9

139.4125.9-51.2

2.2366.0694.7

1218.52727.4

120.683.320.8

105.22332.1

7.12533.3660.2

7.9158.4

6611.12524.1

13731.43038.5

1.62552.58494.61848.0

14.862.0

187.73544.31921.9

0.81159.51767.71858.8129.048.129.9

1490.40.6

2478.9151.5

2968.620577.62025.4

24.617.810.6

19031.40.1

21045.61902.6

-59.7711.0

1308.03320.01605.02735.0

51.02296.02307.0

174.0171.0

-190.5168.0

1289.017.021.0

-212.13009.0

47.0370.0459.0290.534.0

-473.1533.0

1494.01317.03240.0

277.6140.0493.0

19.02164.0-243.83340.82686.0

105.0289.0218.0639.0516.0254.0

6.0314.0510.010.0

116.020.0

316.0398.0

9.04.0

32.0715.0

5.0232.0272.0217.012.0

135.0387.0272.0447.0585.095.0

293.0122.0675.0480.0

5.0640.0601.0

241.0681.0224.0

1376.0753.0

23.050.0

296.0793.0108.0675.0156.0444.0543.0

33.071.0

163.01077.0

83.0354.0333.0581.0124.0375.0271.0336.0803.0

1141.0178.0419.0324.0464.0693.0195.0

1496.0937.0

38.0123.023.0

293.0296.0

27.09.0

174.0160.0

2.055.027.040.0

257.01.03.07.0

159.02.0

98.076.146.0

8.03.0

94.0115.0254.0309.0

52.070.040.048.0

174.01.0

455.0218.0

2.34.92.65.74.42.40.73.65.00.72.43.22.14.22.42.41.56.00.74.04.72.02.21.33.14.14.64.62.13.32.32.23.32.45.23.9

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),

2000

0.37.40.8

85.759.00.20.30.2

29.40.00.21.55.22.20.30.00.3

77.40.34.90.11.10.30.31.93.7

15.462.90.90.30.30.1

28.40.3

102.319.1

Internethosts

(per 1000people),

2000

Numberof

tele-phones

mainline,(per 1000inhabi-tant),2000


people),1990s

Patentapplica-

tionsfiled (permillionpeople)

1997

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(per million

people), 1990-2000

Televisionsets

(per 1000people),

1998

Radios(per 1000people),

1997

Dailynews-papers

(per 1000people),

1996


2000


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherComparatorArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

GermanyGhanaGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIrelandIsraelItalyJapanJordanKenyaKorea(Rep. of)KuwaitKyrgystanLatviaLesothoLithuaniaMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaliMexicoMoldovaMongoliaMoroccoMyanmarNetherlandsNew ZealandNicaraguaNigeriaNorway


586.06.0

557.061.03.0

24.0809.0302.0

4.017.015.0

658.0702.0737.0526.058.04.0

567.0249.0

2.0166.010.0

142.057.04.05.0

213.01.0

142.032.045.083.00.3

670.0563.0

18.00.3

751.0

611.012.0

532.057.09.0

46.0583.0372.032.031.0

149.0420.0482.0474.0586.092.010.0

464.0244.0

77.0303.0

10.0321.0255.0

3.04.0

199.03.0

125.0133.056.050.06.0

618.0500.0

31.04.0

532.0

951.70.4

383.7-187.7

42.04.1

-166.11035.2

14.00.6

210.32331.4328.2562.9442.3

5.1-18.4652.8115.385.7

907.51954.01107.31103.7

6.8352.3229.0

2.970.3

271.2727.6

13.04.8

675.11422.4

-57.811.5

1107.8

2141.41767.07777.6

11.81.1

21.3345.7

3010.510.121.36.0

21955.35057.31589.73288.5-371.41627.42783.3

352.15123.1

11259.624741.57242.7

13076.51635.94418.9

290.62725.5363.3

5889.510553.2

10.92139.65699.99246.6-615.5878.7

7112.7

2873.0-371.21045.0

103.0-392.3-132.0

93.01249.0

158.0-175.4590.0

2132.01570.01322.04960.0

197.8-307.62139.0214.0574.0

1090.0973.6

2031.0387.0

12.0-161.8154.0-170.1213.0334.0468.0119.4

-147.82490.02197.0203.0

15.04095.0

580.099.0

466.0126.0

5.090.0

431.0437.0

69.0136.0157.0403.0318.0486.0707.052.021.0

346.0491.045.0

492.025.0

459.0250.0

21.02.0

166.012.0

261.0297.063.0

160.07.0

543.0508.0190.066.0

579.0

948.0238.0477.0

79.055.0

386.0684.0689.0121.0156.0265.0699.0520.0878.0955.0287.0104.0

1033.0660.0112.0710.049.0

513.0200.0192.0249.0420.0

54.0325.0740.0151.0241.095.0

978.0990.0285.0223.0915.0

311.014.0

153.033.0

3.055.0

792.0186.045.124.028.0

150.0290.0104.0578.0

58.09.0

393.0374.0

15.0247.0

8.093.021.05.03.0

158.01.0

97.060.027.026.010.0

306.0216.030.024.0

588.0

5.21.64.11.50.82.05.14.82.12.12.34.85.74.85.43.41.86.22.92.83.61.83.22.72.91.43.50.33.83.12.52.50.85.05.81.92.65.9

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),

2000

24.80.3

10.50.50.30.3

34.310.40.30.10.3

29.729.517.836.5

0.10.18.51.80.4

10.70.34.80.80.30.33.10.35.70.40.10.10.3

101.990.60.30.3

101.1

Internethosts

(per 1000people),

2000

Numberof

tele-phones



people),1990s

Patentapplica-


1997

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(per million

people), 1990-2000

Televisionsets

(per 1000people),

1998


1997

Dailynews-papers

(per 1000people),

1996


2000


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

PakistanPanamaPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSenegalSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTajikistanThailandTogoTunisiaTurkeyUgandaUkraineUnited KingdomUnited StatesUruguayUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamZambiaZimbabwe

Percentage imputed


2.0145.050.084.0

174.0665.0112.022.064.026.02.0

684.0205.0612.0190.0609.023.0

717.0644.0

2.00.3

50.011.06.0

246.08.0

16.0727.0398.0132.0

2.0217.010.09.0

23.0

0.0

22.0151.067.040.0

282.0430.0175.0218.0137.022.04.0

484.0314.0386.0114.0421.040.0

682.0727.0103.036.092.09.0

90.0280.0

3.0206.0589.0700.0278.067.0

108.032.08.0

18.0

0.0

-148.7106.675.618.2

497.2218.6351.5249.1186.213.9

136.81139.9583.9

1725.0125.1

1483.1246.3

1425.82537.9

165.41.5

129.71.1

132.643.812.4

126.71868.1240.7204.240.3

159.1-96.0

-144.4-8.3

25.7

5.759.731.347.1

843.010668.7

1297.1331.4

52.11685.42160.59413.85223.5

13723.51286.32851.31397.0

13068.215673.9

420.14059.8

86.7473.5

18.3423.1

2135.6659.8

2495.1835.8121.8

1096.7104.3351.3

9.21743.6

15.6

78.0428.9229.0156.0

1460.01583.01393.03397.0730.4

2.0-320.82182.01706.02161.0992.0

1562.0188.0

4507.03058.0

29.0660.0102.0102.0124.0303.025.0

2121.02678.04103.01908.01754.0194.0274.0

-194.2-248.1

22.9

88.0187.0144.0108.0413.0542.0233.0420.0262.0

41.013.0

348.0402.0356.0125.0506.092.0

531.0535.070.0

285.0236.0

18.0198.0286.027.0

490.0645.0847.0241.0275.0185.047.0

137.030.0

0.0

98.0299.0273.0159.0523.0304.0319.0418.0321.0142.0253.0822.0580.0406.0317.0333.0209.0932.0

1000.0278.0142.0232.0218.0223.0180.0128.0884.0

1436.02146.0607.0465.0468.0107.0121.093.0

0.0

23.062.0

0.079.0

113.075.0

300.0105.057.0

5.04.0

360.0185.0199.032.0

100.029.0

445.0337.0

20.020.063.04.0

31.0111.0

2.054.0

329.0215.0293.0

3.0206.0

4.012.019.0

1.8

1.64.74.04.65.22.64.13.12.80.70.74.23.73.72.13.53.65.85.42.42.23.31.42.12.21.53.14.86.14.02.73.42.52.32.3

25.7

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),

2000

0.35.40.40.38.86.21.92.20.20.20.3

45.27.0

11.04.4

11.30.1

67.336.70.30.31.10.30.31.10.30.7

28.2295.2

16.30.30.70.30.10.3

0.0

Internethosts

(per 1000people),

2000

Numberof

tele-phones



people),1990s

Patentapplica-


1997

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(permillion

people), 1990-2000

Televisionsets

(per 1000people),

1998


1997

Dailynews-papers

(per 1000people),

1996


2000


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparator

FinlandSwedenSwitzerlandDenmarkNorwayUnited KingdomNetherlandsJapanNew ZealandAustraliaGermanyCanadaAustriaUnited StatesSingaporeBelgiumIrelandKorea (Rep. of)FranceEstoniaIsraelCzech Rep.SloveniaItalyHungaryLatviaGreeceSpainSlovakiaLithuaniaBulgariaPortugalPolandHong Kong

Table A-12RANKING OF 109 COUNTRIES ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL INDICATORS AROUND THE YEAR 2000 (SORTED BY TOTAL RANKS)

6.07.0

13.014.03.05.0

10.021.019.024.017.029.02.0

26.09.0

22.012.018.023.027.08.0

25.015.04.0

28.039.020.016.036.042.549.011.038.0

1.0

12.04.01.02.0

13.58.06.09.0

16.015.07.05.0

21.03.0

18.017.025.022.011.030.019.027.026.020.028.034.013.524.033.032.031.023.035.010.0

3.010.02.01.0

15.07.0

26.035.011.019.021.023.020.045.014.012.05.0

28.027.04.0

40.013.08.0

32.018.022.036.09.0

31.016.029.047.033.0

107.0

3.010.06.04.0

19.038.022.029.015.037.041.049.0

7.064.014.016.02.0

34.046.0

5.025.032.08.0

55.031.011.017.033.023.018.028.012.063.072.0

6.02.09.08.04.0

14.015.01.0

18.07.0

11.010.029.03.0

19.016.023.022.013.020.031.037.021.036.040.041.042.032.028.025.039.030.034.081.0

6.015.014.09.0

11.05.0

12.03.0

18.07.0

10.02.0

16.01.0

37.017.032.038.08.0

24.039.027.036.023.028.020.025.019.033.026.034.013.031.029.0

2.014.08.05.0

15.03.0

10.011.09.04.0

12.06.0

21.01.0

18.020.024.0

7.013.025.036.019.046.017.026.023.038.051.533.037.034.058.035.027.0

4.05.09.0

12.02.0

10.013.03.0

23.016.511.032.015.024.0

8.031.035.0

6.022.029.518.020.026.041.027.021.034.042.028.046.019.049.038.0

1.0

11.06.09.5

25.54.0

21.015.09.55.08.0

12.03.0

27.02.0

28.016.018.5

1.036.049.0

7.024.039.020.018.541.032.043.538.051.029.062.013.014.0

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),

2000

2.08.0

12.09.04.0

19.03.0

13.05.06.0

20.07.0

10.01.0

11.017.015.031.021.018.016.024.026.022.029.027.028.025.033.039.043.534.030.014.0

Internethosts (per1000

people),2000

55.081.083.589.590.5

130.0132.0134.5139.0143.5162.0166.0168.0170.0176.0184.0191.5207.0220.0231.5239.0248.0251.0270.0273.5279.0285.5295.0316.0332.5335.5339.0350.0356.0

TotalRank

Numberof

tele-phones

mainline(per 1000people),

2000

Numberof book

titles(per mil-lion peo-

ple),1990s

Patentapplica-


1997

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(permillion

people), 1990-2000

Televisionsets

(per 1000people),

1998


1997

Dailynews-papers

(per1000

people),1996

QualityAdjusted MYS15+, 2000


OtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

UruguayCroatiaArgentinaKuwaitRomaniaRussian FederationCosta RicaMoldaviaUkraineBelarusChileMalaysiaMacedoniaVenezuelaMexicoPanamaTurkeyBrazilChinaArmeniaSouthAfricaSaudi ArabiaColombiaThailandEcuadorAzerbaijanDominican RepublicMongoliaEl SalvadorBoliviaPhilippinesUzbekistanLesothoPeruIranSri LankaKyrgystan


45.032.040.030.048.072.061.066.076.088.033.035.058.034.042.541.031.044.054.088.037.055.060.062.565.059.052.064.047.053.050.098.080.062.577.070.598.0

37.029.044.041.048.043.040.054.045.038.042.046.039.058.055.051.036.047.057.050.056.053.049.065.562.560.059.075.062.572.078.570.589.570.552.078.569.0

49.025.041.063.039.043.037.042.059.030.066.046.017.052.070.064.072.058.053.055.061.050.060.057.068.071.062.024.065.034.076.074.0

6.069.048.044.067.0

79.077.076.070.058.073.039.021.065.036.078.074.0

9.080.069.083.067.075.085.020.059.084.088.081.089.030.044.013.097.094.086.061.01.0

87.0101.057.024.0

26.033.046.063.035.05.0

50.057.024.017.056.074.055.067.064.054.058.071.053.038.043.045.059.079.575.012.060.052.089.070.073.027.044.062.048.068.049.0

54.048.544.021.056.030.035.042.022.041.057.064.053.063.051.062.045.040.048.558.072.050.059.055.043.052.078.085.04.0

74.075.047.093.067.066.079.088.0

31.050.028.030.056.045.065.022.016.060.049.043.078.039.053.059.081.042.051.573.057.055.032.072.044.0

109.082.087.041.029.084.040.0

107.064.066.077.094.0

16.537.036.0

7.014.040.045.053.058.029.543.033.080.025.044.052.039.063.548.078.567.055.061.051.050.073.059.073.060.056.547.0

100.090.5

109.071.070.084.0

34.031.017.056.030.054.052.055.053.040.035.043.560.045.037.022.079.087.523.063.087.558.089.047.547.571.086.065.081.072.025.561.092.033.076.042.059.0

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),

2000

23.041.032.047.045.543.545.559.055.596.038.042.053.555.535.036.050.037.0

103.053.540.096.050.050.078.596.052.0

103.0103.096.062.078.578.559.078.5

103.059.0


people),2000

394.5403.5404.0428.0429.5448.5469.5471.0473.5475.5497.0500.5502.5518.5520.5524.0558.0565.0576.0577.0579.5601.0607.0621.0622.5633.0634.0641.0649.5650.5657.0657.0681.5683.0683.5689.0691.0

TotalRank

Numberof

tele-phones


2000

Numberof book


ple),1990s

Patentapplica-


1997

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(permillion

people), 1990-2000

Televisionsets

(per 1000people),

1998


1997

Dailynews-papers

(per1000

people),1996



ArabOtherArabArabArabOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherArabComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

EgyptTajikistanJordanSyriaTunisiaBotswanaMoroccoHondurasNicaraguaGuatemalaMalawiAlgeriaIndiaNigeriaVietnamZimbabweMadagascarGhanaSierra LeoneCongoSenegalTogoIndonesiaUgandaCameroonBurkina FasoMyanmarBeninPakistanZambiaKenyaCongo, Dem. Rep.MaliCentral African Rep.EthiopiaHaitiBangladeshBurundi


73.0107.057.098.085.546.051.068.574.056.088.093.591.0

107.080.070.591.085.598.068.567.078.075.084.080.098.0

107.082.598.082.591.0

107.0103.0103.0107.093.5

103.098.0

68.080.065.561.067.064.076.077.083.573.5

100.573.581.5

100.581.587.0

106.088.0

100.595.085.591.583.5

106.096.5

100.596.593.585.593.589.5

109.0106.0106.0100.591.5

100.5106.0

75.091.084.051.056.0

101.079.087.0

102.0108.038.086.077.081.0

103.097.083.096.054.0

100.078.093.094.080.088.095.085.092.0

105.0104.098.090.089.099.082.073.0

109.0106.0

93.027.0

108.068.092.082.096.091.0

109.095.026.0

100.098.062.071.051.053.050.040.056.052.066.090.043.060.045.042.048.0

102.099.054.0

106.035.047.0

107.0104.0103.0105.0

51.047.066.086.076.0

100.077.095.065.078.097.094.072.091.061.0

104.092.0

107.0106.085.093.079.599.087.0

102.090.096.069.082.0

101.0105.0109.098.084.0

103.0108.083.088.0

73.046.086.082.060.096.065.080.061.071.0

109.076.083.084.087.091.094.577.098.099.589.097.069.092.090.0

102.0103.0101.081.068.094.570.099.5

106.0106.0106.0104.0108.0

54.088.561.063.074.585.569.547.062.0

102.068.069.592.574.596.0

100.080.071.067.091.088.576.085.590.083.0

108.099.095.098.092.597.048.0

105.0101.079.0

104.0106.0103.0

63.581.554.081.568.073.075.056.569.066.0

100.065.062.076.596.083.093.585.096.090.593.596.076.5

104.092.0

107.087.0

104.078.586.088.5

100.0107.0104.0107.0100.088.5

100.0

74.080.046.068.084.050.066.090.091.098.0

100.077.083.064.067.078.057.094.0

107.082.0

105.599.085.097.096.073.0

103.0108.095.075.093.0

101.0109.0105.570.0

102.0104.069.0

Country Group

Cellularmobile

sub-scribers

(per 1000people),

2000

78.578.5

103.078.578.548.0

103.078.562.057.078.578.578.578.578.562.078.578.578.578.596.078.5

103.078.578.578.578.5

108.578.5

103.0103.078.578.578.578.578.578.5

108.5


people),2000

703.0726.5730.5737.0741.5745.5757.5770.5778.5804.5805.0813.0818.5819.0821.0823.5828.5832.0845.0846.0848.0854.5860.5861.5866.0897.0897.0901.5903.5904.5913.5918.5930.0934.0940.0960.5979.5991.5

TotalRank

Numberof

tele-phones


2000

Numberof book


ple),1990s

Patentapplica-


1997

Scientistsand

engineersin R&D

(permillion

people), 1990-2000

Televisionsets

(per 1000people),

1998


1997"

Dailynews-papers

(per1000

people),1996



ArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOther

AlgeriaArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBeninBoliviaBotswanaBrazilBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCanadaCentral African Rep..ChileChinaColombiaCongoCongo, Dem. Rep..Costa RicaCroatiaCzech Rep..DenmarkDominican Republic

EcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEstonia

Table A-13VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTCOMES AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THEYEAR 2000

5308123772559

2569326765293616027544

27178990

2424718476255710976591

170327840

1172941739766248

825765

86508091

13991276276033320336354497

10066

0.6970.8440.7540.9390.9260.7410.4780.7880.9390.4200.6530.5720.7570.7790.3250.3130.5120.9400.3750.8310.7260.7720.5120.4310.8200.8090.8490.9260.7270.7320.6420.7060.826

9732

89

83

16786062533491

104953

96317240

111

23

1037499248

0.2210.381

0.5870.544

0.553

0.277

0.3110.411

0.589

0.3570.2990.274

0.3580.3910.465

0.2440.2530.2360.253

010100000000100001011000000000100

111110101000110001011101001100100

0.33.04.05.0

12.01.00.35.0

11.0

21.0

9.06.0

1.011.00.31.0

21.02.0

44.08.0

12.019.00.31.02.06.0

17.0

Country Group

GDP percapita(PPP$),2000

HDI value,2000

AHDIrank

TAIvalue,1999

Space programs*

NuclearFacilities*_

High-technology

exports (% of total

goodsexports),

1999


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherComparatorArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArab

EthiopiaFinlandFranceGermanyGhanaGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIrelandIsraelItalyJapanJordanKenyaKorea(Rep. of)KuwaitKyrgystanLatviaLesothoLithuaniaMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaliMexicoMoldovaMongoliaMorocco


6682499624223251031964

16501382114672453

2515312416235830435884

2986620131236262675539661022

1738015799

27117045203171065086840615

9068797

9023210917833546

0.3270.9300.9280.9250.5480.8850.6310.4710.6380.8880.8350.5770.6840.7210.9250.8960.9130.9330.7170.5130.8820.8130.7120.8000.5350.8080.7720.4690.4000.7820.3860.7960.7010.6550.602

1017

15

7129648756

248069

10117

151868

3870

83598645

79

0.7440.5350.5830.1390.437

0.2080.4550.4640.2010.2110.260

0.5140.4710.698

0.1290.666

0.396

0.389

00110000000100010100000000000000000

01111100001111011100100101000101000

27.022.018.02.05.04.03.01.0

24.024.0

5.07.00.3

42.029.011.030.0

2.033.0

0.34.06.0

7.03.02.0

52.0

28.02.00.30.3

Country Group


HDI value,2000

AHDIrank

TAIvalue,1999

Space programs

NuclearFacilities

High-technology

exports (% of total

goodsexports),

1999


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

MyanmarNetherlandsNewZealandNicaraguaNigeriaNorwayPakistanPanamaPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSenegalSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTajikistanThailandTogoTunisiaTurkeyUgandaUkraineUnited KingdomUnited States


102725657200702366896

2991819286000479939719051

1729064238377

113671510490

2335611243173679401

194723530

242772876935561152640214426363697412083816

2350934142

0.5520.9350.9170.6350.4620.9420.4990.7870.7470.7540.8330.8800.7750.7810.7590.4310.2750.8850.8350.8790.6950.9130.7410.9410.9280.6910.6670.7620.4930.7220.7420.4440.7480.9280.939

46

51107

590355433301944

89

43

1346

12

103

52949367

1211

0.6300.5480.185

0.5790.1670.3210.2710.3000.4070.4190.371

0.158

0.5850.4470.4580.3400.4810.2030.703

0.240

0.337

0.255

0.6060.733

00000000000001000000000000000010011

01000110011111000011110110010010011

26.05.00.30.35.01.02.01.0

26.08.07.04.03.00.37.0

58.07.0

12.04.0

10.03.0

26.026.0

0.3

30.00.33.07.00.3

29.032.0

Country Group


HDI value,2000

AHDIrank

TAIvalue,1999

Spaceprograms

NuclearFacilities

High-technology

exports (% of total

goodsexports),

1999


OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther

UruguayUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamZambiaZimbabwe


0.8310.7270.7700.6880.4330.551

0.8310.7270.7700.6880.4330.551

21

47

8476

0.343

0.220

000000

101100

2.0

0.3

1.0

Country Group


HDI value,2000

AHDIrank

TAIvalue,1999

Space programs

NuclearFacilities

High-technology

exports (% of total

goodsexports),

1999

Notes* "1" means "exist" and "0" means does not exist._ A country is identified to have a nuclear capability (taking the value "1") if it has either power reactor(s), constructed or under construction, or research reactor(s), constructed or under construction, or both.

Sources:AHDI:HDI value &GDP per capita (PPP$)

TAI value &High-Technology exports

Nuclear facilities

Space Programs

Arab Human Development Report, 2001.

UNDP, 2002. "2002 Human Development Report", Oxford University Press, New York.

UNDP, 2001. "2001 Human Development Report", Oxford University Press, New York.

Compiled by Ted Flaherty, 19 September 1996 (www.cdi.org\issues\proliferation\reactab.html) from:"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty". Arms Control reporter (1996), pp.602.A.7-602.A.10."World List of Nuclear Power Plants". Nuclear News, September 1993, pp. 43-62.

Indicator was identified through an internet search.

REPORT 2003 - MIFTAH · 2003-12-11 · Looking at international, ... Arab world built on five...

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