IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (Before a Referee)

THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,

v.

ADAM JAMES ELLIS, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case# SC-14-700

TFB File #s 2010-00,876 (lA), 2012 -00,405 (I A), 2012-00,682(1A)

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO THE FLORIDA BAR'S COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, Respondent, by and through the undersigned attorney, and answers The

Florida Bar's Complaint thusly:

1. Admitted.

2. Admitted.

3. Admitted, albeit without personal knowledge.

4. Admitted.

5. Admitted, with caveat. "The plea of nolo contendere admits the facts for the purpose

of the pending prosecution and to that extent has the same effect as a plea of guilty,

but unlike a plea of guilty it cannot be used against the defendant in a civil suit as an

admission of the facts charged in the indictment when accompanied by a protestation

of the defendant's innocence." Vinson v. State, 345 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1977) Citing Wharton's Criminal Procedure, V.4, P.772, S1903. Respondent asserts that he is

completely innocent of any wrongdoing whatsoever, and entered his plea merely as a

"plea of convenience," not as an admission of guilt.

6. Admitted.

7. Admitted.

8. Admitted.

9. Denied. Respondent did not engage in any criminal conduct, and none of

respondent's conduct reflects adversely on his fitness as a member of the legal

profession.

10. Denied.

11. Admitted.

12. Admitted in part. Respondent was at a bar having drinks, not a restaurant.

Furthermore, there was no organized "party," merely some attorneys who happened to

wander in, together with some non-attorney members of the community as well.

13. Admitted, with caveat. Respondent does not recall the presence of two companions.

14. Admitted.

15. Denied.

16. Admitted, with caveat. Ms. Sweat's supervisor contacted Respondent's supervisor,

and the two supervisors reached an agreement whereby Respondent would apologize

to Ms. Sweat in writing, inter-alia, and Ms. Sweat would not pursue the matter

further. Ms. Sweat then breached the agreement months later after she was no longer

employed as an Assistant State Attorney by filing a complaint with the Florida Bar.

17. Denied. Respondent was specifically told that he was not reassigned to a satellite

office as a result of his actions, but rather to appease Ms. Sweat's supervisor, who did

not care for Respondent. Respondent was not required to write a letter of apology,

but agreed to do so in an effort to help calm the situation. Respondent was not

required to undergo counseling.

18. Denied. Respondent's conduct had absolutely nothing to do with his status as a

member of the legal profession. Further, Respondent's conduct falls squarely within

protected speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

19. Denied. Respondent is not aware of any form of sexual harassment cognizable

outside Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is specifically limited to

unlawful employment practices. "Sexual harassment is behavior. .. that would not

occur but for the sex of the employee ... ifthe nature of an employee's environment, however unpleasant, is not due to her gender, she has not been the victim of sex

discrimination." Morton v. Steven Ford-Mercury of Augusta, Inc., 162 F. Supp.2d

1228 (D. Kan. 2001) (emphasis added) Citing Gross v. BurggrafConstr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (1 O'h Cir. 1995). At no point did Respondent and Ms. Sweat maintain any type of employment relationship. Respondent and Ms. Sweat were employed by different

agencies and reported to different supervisors during the time of the event in question.

Respondent and Ms. Sweat had little, if any, professional contact at all. Further, there

was nothing sexual about the photo in question, and the poorly-conceived joke would have applied equally well to a male were the situation reversed. Finally, very little, if

anything that happens in bars after hours can reasonably be said be prejudicial to the administration ofjustice, and the event in question is no exception -it bears no relation to the administration ofjustice or fitness to practice law.

20. Denied.

21. Admitted.

22. Admitted.

23. Admitted in part. Respondent did refuse the Deputy's instructions, but respondent

lacks any independent recollection of his friends reaching an agreement with the

Deputy.

24. Admitted, albeit without personal knowledge.

25. Admitted.

26. Admitted.

27. Admitted.

28. Denied.

29. Denied. Respondent acted within his rights and was illegally arrested by an officer

who perjured himself in his sworn, written statement ofprobable cause.

30. Denied.

WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully requests this Court dismiss the instant

complaint against him.

Joseph Turner Respondent's Counsel 748 Jenks Ave. Panama City, Florida 32408

(850) 913-9661 Fla. Bar# 0014835 duijoetumer@gmail. com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that this document has beE-filed with the Honorable John A. Tomasino, Clerk ofl the Supreme Court ofiFlorida, using theE-filing Portal and that a copy has been furnished by United States Mail via certified mail, return receipt requested to Complainant's counsel, Olivia Paiva Klein, Bar Counsel, 651 E. Jefferson St, Tallahassee, Fl 32399 and at her email address ofl oklein@flabar.org on this 23rd dayof1April2014.

~~~7 Joseph Turner

Respondent's Counsel

NOTICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL AND DESIGNATION OF PRIMARY EMAIL

ADDRESS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the trial counsel for Respondent in this matter is Joseph Turner, whose address, telephone number, and primary email is address are as follows: 748 Jenks Ave., Panama City, Florida 32401, (850) 913-9661, and duijoeturner@gmail.com.