Remedial Law Third Batch of Cases

7/27/2019 Remedial Law Third Batch of Cases

1/21

1

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226 January 31, 2000(Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-315-MTJ)

GLORIA LUCAS,complainant,vs.JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC, Branch 9, Manila,respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a verified complaint1dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of

the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative toCivil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment".

Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order2dated

February 26, 1997 granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Order3dated January 13, 1997, which

dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.

Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a motion for

reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. Sheadded that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed bythe Rules on Summary Procedure,

4the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to

cause an injury to complainant.

Further, complainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is in blatant disregard of the established rules onprocedure, and it is an instance where the doctrine of IPSA LOQUITORmay once again may be applied by the Court todiscipline judges.

On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint. In her Commen t5dated

September 16, 1997, she admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even if the same is a prohibited motionin an ejectment case. She explained, however, that it was granted in the interest of justice.

In her Comment, respondent stated:

The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13, 1997 dismissing the complaint for ejectmentfor failure of the plaintiff to appear for preliminary conference and more importantly her lawyer, Atty. Jose Suing,who was duly empowered to appear for preliminary conference by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney.

Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of attorney's fees, Atty. Suing filed a Motionfor Reconsideration on January 17, 1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a sudden excruciatingstomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary called the Court but to no avail until finally the call camethrough and she was informed that the case was dismissed. Over the objection of the defendant that the Motionfor Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading which this Presiding Judge is fully aware of under the Rule onSummary Procedure, the Motion for Reconsideration was nonetheless granted in the interest of justice. Thequestion is poised. Are the actuations of judges to be governed strictly by the Rule on Summary Proceduredespite their belief in good faith that in special cases, its observance would result in a miscarriage of justice? This

Presiding Judge does not think so. Judges are supposed to responsible Public Officials and should be able toperceive and discern circumstances which might lead to miscarriage of justice, thus, negating the very purposeand essence of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a straight jacket and itis believed it was never meant to be that. This is the reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5 (g) ofRule 135 which is one of the inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and control its process and orders soas to make them conformable to law and justice. Ignorance of the law, to the mind of the undersigned, is the actof a judge in taking legal steps or adopting procedure unknowingly aware that they are contrary to establishedRules which should be known to the judge. This Presiding Judge in this particular case was fully aware of theRule on Summary Procedure. She fully knew that the Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading butshe still considered it because to deny it would result in a miscarriage of justice. It was not a capricious, whimsicaland despotic act when viewed in the light of this circumstance.1wphi1.nt

With respect to the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was compounded by the failure to issue a

writ of execution, it bears stressing that the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality because theplaintiff was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day period, that is, on January 17,1997. But even if it is argued validly that the Motion for Reconsideration being a prohibited pleading did notinterrupt the running of the period of appeal, still the said Order did not gain finality as far as defendant GloriaLucas is concerned because as the record shows, it was she who received the Order, not her lawyer, Atty. Sulit.

The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report andrecommendation after the case was docketed as an administrative matter. On August 25, 1997, OCA in a Memorandum,submitted the following findings:

After a careful perusal of the records of the case, we find that respondent Judge Fabros abused her discretion ingranting the Motion for Reconsideration.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt1


2/21

2

Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law as she knowsthat a motion for reconsideration of judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained thatalthough there is already a judgment dismissing the case, she granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration inthe interest of justice since the reasons stated in the motion for reconsideration are meritorious.

Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law and that when the law is clear andunambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could not free her from

liability.

Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other judicial remedies like appeal .6

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for graveabuse of discretion. The Court, however, finds this recommendation without factual and legal basis.

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on SummaryProcedure.1wphi1Thus,

Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowedin the cases covered by this Rule.

x x x x x x x x x

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

x x x x x x x x x

This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held bythe Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the RevisedRules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeksreconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case."

7Here, the order of dismissal

issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not ajudgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibitedpleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judgecommitted no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion forreconsideration subject of the present complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1226_2000.html#fnt6


3/21

3

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division,1

promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CAG.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 andallowed the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *

It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed bythe deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.

There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipalityof Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina GabrielGonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the

deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.

The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manilaon the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages,including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. Thesignatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:

PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawingkanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam atipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages)pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril,1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalimng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwangpanig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat atbawat isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harapng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa'tdahon ng testamentong ito.

At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpayaand Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures alsoappear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" andunderneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.

The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance withthe rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid;that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel,and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel,and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein privaterespondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na akingpinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, werebequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, aftersatisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the willof the deceased on the following grounds:

1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative

2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;

3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentarycapacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative

4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the partof the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.

Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a quorendered judgment,the summary and dispositive portions of which read:


4/21

4

Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:

1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased wasprocured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of someother person for her benefit;

2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of

the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;

3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of thedeceased was not executed and attested as required by law;

4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not thepurported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her threeattesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.

WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of thedeceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.

From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on

appeal was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, uponconsideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will inquestion was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attestingwitnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence ofthe deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.

Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration3of the aforesaid decision and such motion was

opposed4by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda,

5and on

August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution6denied the motion for reconsideration

stating that:

The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wigand testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signedon several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumentalwitnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.

The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation ofthe evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is noreason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside.

7

In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretionand/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. TheCourt, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 torequire the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of theallegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment

8of private respondent

thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973,9the question raised being factual and for

insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.

Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration10

which privaterespondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition

11filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply

followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.

The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:

I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as requiredby law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness

II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the winExhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.

III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residencecertificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".

IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words"Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in thesame occasion.

V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could havedictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.


5/21

5

VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically presentwhen the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnessesCelso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.

VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof thatthe win was improperly executed.

VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses(subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejectingsaid testimonies.

IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usualcourse of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.

X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the allegedlast will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.

It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content.Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, thefactual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule

has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA(L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA737, 743)12

and Tapas vs. CA(L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393),13

and in the more recent cases of Baptisiavs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:

... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settledthat the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising theerrors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, thisCourt, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court ofAppeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of itsfindings of fact ...

Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewableon appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because itspremises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings arecorrect. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court ofAppeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts asset forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals arecontrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidencebecomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.

Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments oferrors.

Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document,Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumentalwitnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must

be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may beadmitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a goodstanding in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According topetitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered.Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent underArticle 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is furtherurged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it hasunder the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect tothe qualifications of witnesses.

We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of awitness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. TheseArticles state:

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf ordumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 ofthis Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to hisgood standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness inorder that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in


6/21

6

Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from hisanswers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony ,or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and writeto the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We rejectpetitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, hisreputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of thewitness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.

We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be giventhe same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization mustbe supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation fortrustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization arecharacter witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of thePhilippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that saidpetitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any waydisqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).

In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of awill or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulingslaid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicableto instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, CelsoGimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by therespondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitionerhas not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them isbelow 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.

It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at theend thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by hisexpress direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and ofone another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of awitness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereasArticle 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the

term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition tobeing competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.

Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one maybe a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that theinstrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one wasa family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was thedriver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher toa grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of aperson do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, etal., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).

Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the

Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 whichsays "may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that theword "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs.Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence atthe time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly anddistinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those whotestify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasissupplied).

In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al. , 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of thesame Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and notblind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision isreproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative tothe beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the

attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must becredible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few ofwhich we may cite:

A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. HistoricalSoc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases,Vol. 10, p. 340).

As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal ofClark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).


7/21

7

Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, onecompetent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs.First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. ( Ibid, p. 342)

The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two crediblewitnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent totestify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined

as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate, Smith vs. Goodell101N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)

Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses that is, suchpersons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity,interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, orrendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs.Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. ( Ibid. p, 343)

In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that isArt. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from thebelief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beateriodel Santissimo Rosario de Molo,No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as awitness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trialcourts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decidewhether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to becompetent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualificationsunder Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatorythat evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they arehonest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary isestablished otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must becredible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that itwas fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "crediblewitnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.

Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings offact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in

finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as toenable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines underthe typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesseswere all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note ordocument to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15,1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trialcourt gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that thegrave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by thepetitioner had been explained away.

Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of theappellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win considerand discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the

evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraisoand bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it wascoincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty.Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as therewas no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day andthat Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply basedon the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will butthat it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as thetestimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's housewhich was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in therespondent Court's decision.

The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained

residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issuedalso at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising inthese facts and that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the executionof the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified thatthey would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.

We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by thedeceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from theNavotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to MatildeOrobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia)


8/21

8

passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before theyproceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.

It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed onApril 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if shereally wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be herwitnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he

believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is,therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpayaincluding the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged byIsabel Gabriel herself."

As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residencecertificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assailsas contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing thenames of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office byIsabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that hereceived such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the,respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty.Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.

But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prioroccasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such dataappear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses onApril 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And sinceExhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is apublic document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document isevidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. Tocontradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs.Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.

Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under thetypewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses wereall present in the same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence

found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. dateissued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued onFebruary 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers,dates and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty.Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was theappointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties inparagraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "

It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of aspecial proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitionercontends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document toAtty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had beensuffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the

execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondentappellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise andreview, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her willwithout any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record.Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs ofthe movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. Shewas the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the IntestateEstate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by herand in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without anynote or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.

Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, accordingto the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15,

1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of theappellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physicallypresent when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya andMaria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of theappellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobiacould not have been present to witness the will on that day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit havinggiven piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even ifApril 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed theexecution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same.Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing topreclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."


9/21

9

In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15,1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, thedocumentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly andconvincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the willby signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. Theattestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves inpermanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the

attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending theexecution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may stillbe proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).

As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undueimportance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of therespondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the othertwo witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is atworst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution andattestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcelydetracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not thephotographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. "Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumpingtherefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only oneoccasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and MariaGimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identificationof some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."

Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the crossexamination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon theinsistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was whollyunnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasionon April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which donot require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.

Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respectivetestimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions,

evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriterused by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the willwas typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the nameof the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.these are indeedunimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that bythemselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. delaCruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding witheach other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Humanexperience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long seriesof questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as notall those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions, theyshould not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).

It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondentappellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the courseof the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court ofAppeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence hasfound that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance ofwhich have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularlywhen they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesseshes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. Inthe instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts andcircumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trialcourt's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court'sconclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not havewitnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a

conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumpingtherefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to supportthe conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made anappointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court toreverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.

Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals isconclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that amongthe exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) whenthe presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel,together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the


10/21

10

office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, IsabelGabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter'soffice and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what shewanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language knownto and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; thelawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; thatthereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia,

Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of the document in thepresence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the endof the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of IsabelGabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at thebottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of IsabelGabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of theattestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and CelsoGimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his NotarialRegister. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G",depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on saidoccasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlieradvised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he didnot know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with IsabelGabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the dateappearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date inquestion."

It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated thewill, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible.This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review,thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note ordocument to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictatedher will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note ordocument. This fact jibes with the evidence which the trial court itself believed was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel wasof sound disposing memory when she executed her will.

Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's

wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the thirdprovided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel;the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount foreach legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning ingeneral terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor ofappellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in whichjudgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court ofAppeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of bothappellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).

Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumeratedabove. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on

record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern nomisapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule thatthe decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by thisTribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The aboveholding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments oferror and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.

The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court actedproperly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for theexercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err inreversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceasedIsabel Gabriel.

We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record isunassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed onApril 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same inthe the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, afterfinishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarialregister. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived atthe office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turnout good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted thata picture be taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.

Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of thewill, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses


11/21

11

who constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer whoprepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them aredisinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and thetestatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, thatthey were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that theSupreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs againstthe petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


12/21

12

[G.R. No. 80739. August 2, 1992.]

GRACIA R. JOVEN, Peti t ioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as PresidingJudge of the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City, Roberto Paguia & Fernando Lasala, Respondents .

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; MUNICIPAL COURTS; EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF FORCIBLEENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER; RULE WHEN QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP WAS INVOLVED THEREIN. Therespondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on theprincipal ground that a question of ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following observationsfrom Chief Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court: [Moran, Comments on the Rules ofCourt, 1980 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 317 citing Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 759-760.] It would be a mistake to suppose thatan action involves a question of title merely because the plaintiff may allege in his complaint that he is the owner of theland. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to show the character of his (sic) prior possession, so hemay allege ownership in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case, and the insertion of such an allegation in thecomplaint cannot by any possibility place the cause beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrates court, provided it otherwisesufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the restoration of possession as against an intruder who hasseized the property within the period of one year. Much less can the defendant in such an action defeat the jurisdiction ofthe magistrates court by setting up title in himself. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the factor whichdefeats the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the necessity to adjudicate the question of title. Thecircumstance that proof of title is introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership is made by either or both of theparties is not material.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT DEFEATED BY INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MORTGAGE. There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the said Rule, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courtsand Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer except where thequestion of ownership is involved or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceedP20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. [All types of ejectment cases are now covered by the 1991 RevisedRules on Summary Procedure.] However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership was involved in theejectment case filed by the petitioner simply because she alleged in her complaint that she was the original owner of thesubject properties. That the petitioner instituted a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage is not a valid reasoneither for defeating the summary remedy of ejectment. On the contrary, it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment

case did not involve the question of title as this was the subject of the annulment case before the Regional Trial Court ofLucena City. The Rule on Summary Procedure was clearly applicable because the ejectment case involved only therestoration of possession of the subject land and not its ownership.

3. ID.; RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS; MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in holding thatthe motion for reconsideration was not covered by the prohibition under Section 15 (c). [Now Sec. 19 (c) of the RevisedRule on Summary Procedure, effective Nov. 15, 1991.] The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeksreconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case. [Justice Leo D. Medialdea,Outline-Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases and Jurisdiction of Courts.] The decision dismissing the petitionersejectment case for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Review thereof could therefore be sought bythe petitioner through her motion for reconsideration and this motion, which was not pro forma, had the effect ofsuspending the running of the period to appeal.

4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; RULE ON THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVERTHE MORTGAGED PROPERTY; GOVERNING LAWS. Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,provides that in case of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the court may issue as a matter of course a writ ofpossession in favor of the purchaser even during the redemption period, provided that a proper motion has been filed, abond is approved, and no third person is involved. Section 6 of the Act provides that where an extrajudicial sale is made,"redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six,inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Sections464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules ofCourt, which in turn were replaced by Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section35 provides that "if no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, isentitled to a conveyance and the possession of property, . . . . The possession of the property shall be given to thepurchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the

judgment debtor." To give effect to his right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of the courts and ask for awrit of possession. He cannot simply take the law into his own hands and enter the property without judicial authorization.We have consistently held that he need not bring a separate and independent suit for this purpose. Nevertheless, it isessential that he ask for and be granted a writ of possession in order that he may be legally installed in the property hehas bought. Section 63 (b) of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, requires that in case ofnon-redemption, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale shall file with the Register of Deeds either a final deed of saleexecuted by the person authorized by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed of mortgage or his swornstatement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The Register of Deeds shall thereupon issue a new certificate in favor ofthe purchaser after the owners duplicate certificate shall have been previously delivered and canceled.

5. ID.; ID.; THE BUYER IN A FORECLOSURE SALE BECOMES THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE PROPERTYPURCHASED IF IT IS NOT REDEEMED DURING THE PERIOD OF ONE YEAR AFTER THE REGISTRATION OF THE


13/21

13

SALE. In F. David Enterprises v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, this Court held: It is settled that the buyer in aforeclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one yearafter the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at anytime following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. Thebuyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond inaccordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if theproperty is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner.

Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.In the case at bar, there is no showing that after the lapse of the redemption period without the petitioner havingredeemed the lands, DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership of the subject properties. Neither has it filedwith the Register of Deeds a final deed of sale or a sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. Thecircumstance that the properties are still in the name of the petitioner shows that DBP has also not yet obtained a newcertificate of title in its name. And neither does it appear that DBP, on the basis of its purchase of the lands at theforeclosure sale, ever secured a writ of possession to authorize its entry into the said lands. Not having done any of these,DBP had as yet not acquired any perfected right of possession that it could transfer to the private respondents. And as thepetitioner continued in actual possession of the subject premises, she could undoubtedly maintain an action for forcibleentry against the private respondents when, not being armed with a court order or a writ of possession, they simplyentered and took possession of the subject lands.

6. ID.; ID.; FORCIBLE ENTRY; ISSUE THEREIN LIMITED TO THE PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL POSSESSION OF REALPROPERTY. The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is,possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actualcondition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand,violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches of the peace and criminaldisorder which might ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy. Another purpose is to discourage those persons who,believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action inthe courts to assert their claims.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS THEREOF. Under Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, there is forcible entry whenone in physical possession of a land or building is deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation,threat, strategy or stealth. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or conditionunder which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possessionthereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser does not haveto institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The

act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force overthe property, and this is all that is necessary. [Mediran v. Villanueva 37 Phil. 752, cited in Moran, comments on the Rulesof court, Vol. 3, 1980 Ed. p. 322-323; Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1986 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 366.]

8. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EFFECT OF SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION; RULE; NOT APPLICABLE INCASE AT BAR. also assert that the institution of the ejectment case resulted in the splitting of a single cause of actioninto two, one for the recovery of ownership and possession and the other for recovery of possession de facto. In Drilon v.Gaurana, (149 scra 342) this Court held: It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause ofaction (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a singlecause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court).However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action forreconveyance of title. What is involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of material possession or possession defacto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for

reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcibleentry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the onlyissue involved is material possession or possession de facto (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]).While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two actions, the issues involved and the reliefs prayed forare not the same. In the annulment suit, the issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure salewhereas the issue in the ejectment case is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the privaterespondents have the right to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for is recovery ofownership of the subject land while in the latter it is restoration of possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, themunicipal court had jurisdiction to try the ejectment case while the annulment suit was being litigated in the regional trialcourt. The contention that the petitioner was forum-shopping must also be rejected. As an injunction cannot be asubstitute for the other suits for recovery of possession, [PNB v. Adil, 118 SCRA 110; Pio v. Marcos, 56 SCRA 726;Devesa v. Arbos, 13 Phil. 273] such as an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and accion publiciana, denial of theinjunction did not bar the petitioner from availing herself of the more appropriate remedy, to wit, the action for forcibleentry. [Garen v. Pilar, 17 Phil. 138.]

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which she mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank ofthe Philippines. Upon the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties weresold at public auction to DBP as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated on the certificate of titleon November 17, 1982.


14/21

14

After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been made by the petitioner, DBP sold the subjectproperties to Roberto Paguia, one of the herein private respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17,1985. On January 30, 1986, Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative, Fernando Lasala, theother private Respondent.

Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City (raffledlater to Branch 55) for the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and the

private respondents. Later, when her application for preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodgedwith the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc a complaint against the private respondents for forcible entrywith a prayer for writ of mandatory injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 155.

In a decision dated May 14, 1986, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But on May 29, 1986, the petitioner fileda motion for reconsideration, which was granted. In a resolution dated July 11, 1986, 1 the private respondents wereordered to: 1) immediately restore and deliver possession of the subject properties to the petitioner; 2) render to thepetitioner an accounting of all the fruits and products gathered from said property from the time they took possessionthereof until they vacate the same; and 3) reimburse the petitioner the total cost of such accounting.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

This resolution was reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, 2 which held that the courta quo had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case because of the issue of ownership raised therein and that, assumingsuch jurisdiction, the decision had already become final and executory when the resolution dated July 11, 1986, wasrendered. The petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the assailed decision intoto. 3

She is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari, contending that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court hadjurisdiction over the ejectment case and that the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premisesfor occupying the same without judicial authorization.

The petition has merit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on theprincipal ground that a question of ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following observationsfrom Chief Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court: 4

It would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a question of title merely because the plaintiff may allege in hiscomplaint that he is the owner of the land. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to show thecharacter of his (sic) prior possession, so he may allege ownership in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case,and the insertion of such an allegation in the complaint cannot by any possibility place the cause beyond the jurisdiction ofthe magistrates court, provided it otherwise sufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the restoration ofpossession as against an intruder who has seized the property within the period of one year. Much less can the defendantin such an action defeat the jurisdiction of the magistrates court by setting up title in himself. In this co nnection it shouldbe borne in mind that the factor which defeats the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the necessity toadjudicate the question of title. The circumstance that proof of title is introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownershipis made by either or both of the parties is not material.

This ruling is embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests municipal courts with:chanrob1es virtual1aw library

Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; Provided, that when, in such cases, thedefendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved withoutdeciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership should be resolved only to determine the issue ofpossession.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc, the case for annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery ofownership, was already being litigated in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Even so, the municipal court could,pending final adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the right of possession (only) over the subjectproperties in the ejectment case.

The private respondents also contend that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the complaint forforcible entry because: a) under Section 19 par. (2) of BP 129, as amended, the Regional Trial Court has exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein;and b) under Section 1, par. A (1) of the Rule on Summary Procedure, cases of forcible entry and detainer involving thequestion of ownership are expressly excluded from the summary jurisdiction of the municipal court.

Curiously, however, they also insist that an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be governed by the Ruleon Summary Procedure pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129 and that the petitioner is now estopped from assailing theapplicability of that Rule.

There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the said Rule, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courtsand Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer except where thequestion of ownership is involved or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed


15/21

15

P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. **

However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership was involved in the ejectment case filed by the petitionersimply because she alleged in her complaint that she was the original owner of the subject properties. That the petitionerinstituted a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage is not a valid reason either for defeating the summaryremedy of ejectment. On the contrary, it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment case did not involve the questionof title as this was the subject of the annulment case before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The Rule on

Summary Procedure was clearly applicable because the ejectment case involved only the restoration of possession of thesubject land and not its ownership.

The respondent court also sustained the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that the motion for reconsideration filed by thepetitioner with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not stop the running of the reglementary period to appeal because suchmotion was a prohibited pleading under Section 15 (c) *** of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Its conclusion was that theMunicipal Circuit Trial Court had already lost jurisdiction to issue the resolution dated July 11, 1986, because the decisionsought to be reconsidered had then become already final and executory.

We do not agree. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in holding that the motion for reconsideration was notcovered by the prohibition under Section 15 (c). The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsiderationof the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case. 5 The decision dismissing the petitionersejectment case for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Review thereof could therefore be sought bythe petitioner through her motion for reconsideration and this motion, which was not pro forma, had the effect ofsuspending the running of the period to appeal.

Now, on the issue of possession:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provides that in case of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, thecourt **** may issue as a matter of course a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser even during the redemptionperiod, provided that a proper motion has been filed, a bond is approved, and no third person is involved.

Section 6 of the Act provides that where an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall be governed by the provisions ofsections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far asthese are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the

Rules of Court, which in turn were replaced by Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules ofCourt.cralawnad

Section 35 provides that "if no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or hisassignee, is entitled to a conveyance and the possession of property, . . . . The possession of the property shall be givento the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversel

Remedial Law Third Batch of Cases

Documents

Transcript of Remedial Law Third Batch of Cases