Religious Intolerance Among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia

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Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in RussiaVyacheslav Karpov; Elena Lisovskaya

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Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims

in Russia1

VYACHESLAV KARPOV & ELENA LISOVSKAYA

ABSTRACT

Religious intolerance (the unwillingness to grant religious liberties to other faiths) among Russias

Orthodox Christians and Muslims is widespread, as our 2005 national survey data (2972

interviews) show. The intolerance is strongest among the Orthodox in the largely non-Muslimareas of Russia and among both faith groups in the conflict-torn Caucasus. Mutual tolerance is

highest in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The intolerance has more to do with reactionary

ideological influences and regional socio-political conditions than with Orthodox and Muslim core

religious beliefs and practices. Orthodox-Muslim intolerance reflects a broader popular hostility to

religious freedom in Russia. Fuelled by Russias current undemocratic tendencies, this hostility

poses a threat to Eurasian stability and calls for efforts to lessen ethno-religious tensions. Such

efforts need to include systematic sociological monitoring of religious intolerance, and this study is

a first step in this direction.

The Problem

Recently there have been numerous reports about incidents of OrthodoxMuslim

intolerance in various parts of Russia. In some cities, groups acting in the name of

Orthodoxy have initiated successful bans on building mosques. In other places (such

as Yaroslavl, Sergiyev Posad and Vladimir) mosques have been attacked. At the same

time, Islamic radicals in the North Caucasus have referred to Orthodox Christians as

enemies of Chechens and other Muslim peoples. Symptomatically, on 20 October

2005, in a statement on the website Kavkaz-Center, Chechen separatist leaders

accused the Russian Orthodox Church of participation in a genocidal war against

Muslims and declared a ban on all of the churchs activities in the Caucasus

(Zayavleniye, 2005). In November 2006 the leader of the Islamists in Kabardino-

Balkaria, Amir Seifulla (Astemirov), declared a war against the infidels throughout

Russia (Organizator, 2006). In recent years serious tensions among Orthodox and

Muslim leaders have surrounded debates on religion in state schools and other aspects

of churchstate relations.

The spread and intensity of such incidents point to the importance and timeliness of

research on religious intolerance among Muslims and Christians in Russia and its

regions. In particular, survey research could show how widespread and strong

ChristianMuslim intolerance is, and to what extent it reflects the nature of Christian

and Islamic religiosity rather than ethnic, social and political influences. This would

Religion, State & Society, Vol. 36, No. 4, December 2008

ISSN 0963-7494 print; ISSN 1465-3974 online/08/040361-17 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09637490802442975


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clarify, with obvious policy implications, the prospects for reducing religious tensions.

Yet systematic sociological research on MuslimChristian religious intolerance is

remarkably rare worldwide. Researchers know little about the extent to which

Christians and Muslims in various parts of the world are unwilling to put up with each

other and why.

Our paper addresses these timely but understudied issues. Prior to our study, a

handful of publications addressed the resurgence of religious intolerance in Russia

(Filatov and Lunkin, 1999; Krasikov and Tokareva, 2006). However, they did not

provide systematic empirical evidence showing the spread, intensity and determinants

of intolerance among the Orthodox and Muslims. Meanwhile, Russia is one of the

largest lands where Muslims and Christians have coexisted in peace and conflict for

over a thousand years, which makes it an excellent case for understanding the

dynamics of MuslimChristian conflict and coexistence.

Using representative survey data, we show that OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is

widespread in Russia. Orthodox Christians strongly oppose granting religious liberties

to Muslims. Similarly, in some Muslim areas there is strong intolerance of the

Orthodox. Thus popular support for religious freedom in Russia is very weak even forits traditional and historically predominant faiths. Next we find that the intolerance

among Russias Christians and Muslims varies greatly by region, and regional

differences shed light on its causes. Importantly, some of the highest intolerance levels

are found among Russian Christians who live in the areas with negligibly small

Muslim populations. Mutual tolerance is much greater in Tatarstan and Bashkorto-

stan, the two regions where large Orthodox and Muslim populations have long

coexisted peacefully. The war-torn North Caucasus shows strong ChristianMuslim

intolerance. Finally, we find that mutual intolerance has relatively little to do with the

core religious beliefs and practices of Orthodox and Muslims. It is more closely related

to peoples beliefs about religions than to religious beliefs as such. Thus ethnocentricviews of ones own and other faiths, opposition to granting religions equal rights and

negative stereotypes about Christianity and Islam increase mutual intolerance. The

intolerance is further aggravated by secular influences, including ethnic prejudice,

reactionary political orientations and an unwillingness to put up with dissent and

nonconformity. However, while these phenomena may be alien to religion

normatively (that is, theologically and traditionally) defined, they appear absorbed

by the popular religious culture of ordinary Orthodox and Muslims in contemporary

Russia. Thus we suggest that greater commitment to the fundamentals of Orthodoxy

and Islam hardly makes Russians more intolerant. At the same time, reducing

intolerance may be impossible without serious changes in popular interpretations of

Orthodoxy and Islam that have absorbed ethnocentric, prejudicial and illiberal beliefs

so common in the political, ideological and psychological environments in which

Christians and Muslims currently practise their faiths in Russia.

Religious Intolerance: Conceptualisation and Measurement

Social scientists have conducted much research on tolerance of such groups as

communists, atheists or homosexuals, but have done little empirical exploration of

religious tolerance. Moreover, although the latter term is broadly used, its

interpretations are often vague and hard to implement in research and policy

analysis. Against this background, we have introduced a conceptualisation of religioustolerance as the willingness to grant religious freedom to people and groups of other

faiths. Accordingly, religious intolerance means the refusal to grant such freedom to

362 Vyacheslav Karpov & Elena Lisovskaya


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these people and groups. As we have explained elsewhere (Karpov and Lisovskaya,

2006, 2007a, b) this conceptualisation builds on historical and philosophical studies of

religious toleration (Zagorin, 2003) as well as on sociological research on support for

civil liberties (for example, Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1982; McClosky and Brill,

1983; Gibson, 1992; Gibson and Duch, 1993). It is also consistent with the notion of

religious freedom as a fundamental human right (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2006).

This approach distinguishes between religious intolerance and prejudice. For

example, negative attitudes towards Islam may or may not translate into the

unwillingness to grant Muslims the right to worship freely. At the same time, those

supporting Muslims rights do not necessarily view Islam positively. Furthermore, we

differentiate between abstract support for religious freedom, which by itself is a

dubious indicator of tolerance, and concrete attitudes in concrete situations. For

instance, those who abstractly support the idea of religious freedom for all may be

reluctant to grant it to specific religious minorities in their home towns. For this

reason, our conceptualisation of religious intolerance focuses on the extent to which

people in a given social context are unwilling to grant specific religious liberties to

outgroups. What specific religious liberties do we mean? Since interfaith tensionstypically build around negative reactions to public rather than private expressions of

faith, our survey indicators deal with the former. They include peoples unwillingness

to allow religious outgroups to build places of worship, preach publicly, establish

confessional schools, publish and engage in other activities of this kind.

In line with this approach, we asked Orthodox Christians if, in their home towns,

they would allow Muslims to build mosques, open Islamic schools, preach on

television, do charitable work and so on. Similarly, we asked Muslims if they would

support the same activities by Orthodox Christians (see the full list of questions in the

Appendix). This questionnaire allowed us to determine whether or not, and how

strongly, Christians and Muslims opposed granting specific religious freedoms to eachother. Orthodox and Muslim respondents were asked eight questions. Thus, we

obtained eight indicators of intolerance, which were analysed separately as well as part

of cumulative indices of religious intolerance among Christians and Muslims.

Theoretically, opposition to public expressions of faith can reflect peoples

commitment to a secular public space devoid of open manifestations of any religion,

including their own. However, there are two reasons to believe that what we measure

in this study is indeed religious intolerance of other faiths rather than such a secularist

opposition to public expressions of all faiths. First, the data show that most of

Russias Orthodox and Muslims are accepting of public expressions of their respective

faiths but not of their neighbours. For instance, in our survey 30 per cent of the

Orthodox said that foundations of Orthodoxy should be taught as a required course in

state-run schools, and 60 per cent said that such a course should be offered as an

option. Thus, 90 per cent of the Orthodox would accept teaching foundations of their

faith in state-run schools in some form. Yet only 13 per cent would grant Muslims the

right to teach the foundations of Islam. Similarly, 90 per cent of Muslims said that

foundations of Islam should be taught in state-run schools (23 per cent saying it

should be compulsory and 67 per cent saying it should be optional), but only 29 per

cent would allow the Orthodox to teach their faith. Second, multivariate statistical

analyses that we are preparing to publish elsewhere show that the eight indicators we

use are closely interrelated (for example, those who do not want Muslims to fundraise

are likely also to oppose their right to preach or teach). To use a statistical term, theseanalyses point to an underlying latent variable with which our eight indicators are

closely associated, and of which they all are manifest expressions. This underlying

Religious Intolerance in Russia 363


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variable can legitimately be called religious intolerance. In other words, manifest

opposition to building mosques or teaching Islam in schools in most cases expresses

an underlying generalised religious intolerance towards Muslims rather than a

commitment to a secular public square.

How was the Evidence Collected?

This paper is based primarily on evidence from our international collaborative study

Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia: How

Strong is it and Why?. The study involved a representative national survey conducted

in Russia in June 2005 using a national probability area sample of the adult household

population. In order better to represent Russias Muslims (as well as the Orthodox

residing in majority Islamic areas) the survey included four oversamples from the

predominantly Muslim regions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria and

Dagestan. Overall, 2972 in-person interviews lasting on average slightly more than one

hour were conducted. Of the 2972 interviews, 1651 were part of Russias national

sample, and 1321 more were from oversamples in Muslim regions. The response rate(measured as the ratio of completed interviews to the total number of attempted

contacts) was 64 per cent.

Findings

Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia: Basic Facts

The problem of religious intolerance we discuss in this paper potentially involves

millions and millions of people and thousands of religious organisations in Russia.

Indeed, Orthodoxy and Islam together account for the vast majority of traditionalreligious affiliations and organisations. The press service chief of the Moscow

Patriarchate Fr Vladimir Vigilyansky sarcastically notes that sociological estimates of

the number of Orthodox Christians in Russia vary from 1 to 90 per cent (Vigilyansky,

2007). This sarcasm, however, seems misplaced. Simply, low estimates are based on

strict criteria of religious adherence (consistency of belief and practice), while high

ones reflect self-identifications. In our survey over 80 per cent of all Russians

(which would mean nearly 116 out of 143 million) and close to 90 per cent of ethnic

Russians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians. Percentages of those who

share basic Orthodox beliefs and regularly practise their faith are dramatically

smaller. Even using rather soft criteria of religiosity (including relatively consistent

core beliefs and relatively active practice), in our study we estimated that only 10 per

cent of self-identified Orthodox could be considered religious in a traditional sense.

When stricter criteria are applied, proportions of traditional believers drop to single

digits.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) enjoys a remarkable public trust which in

our survey was surpassed only by Russians confidence in their president. According

to the Moscow Patriarchate of the ROC, in 2005 there were 12,665 Orthodox parishes

and 433 monasteries in Russia (Statisticheskiye, 2005).

The number of Muslims in Russia is a hotly debated and politically contested issue.

In our survey 3.1 per cent of Russian citizens identified themselves as Muslims, and

this is consistent with other reliable surveys conducted in Russia in the last 15 years.However, probability sample surveys may underrepresent minorities concentrated in

small towns and villages. We therefore used a different way to estimate the number of



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Muslims. Using the 2002 Russian census data, we calculated that the traditionally

Islamic ethnic groups account for 9.4 per cent of Russias population (roughly 14

million people). In our survey, in these ethnic groups up to 80 per cent identified

themselves as Muslims. If the census data are reliable, then no more than 78 per cent

of Russias population will be self-identified Muslims. As was the case with the

Orthodox, traditional beliefs and practices among self-identified Muslims are not so

common. No more than 20 per cent in this group combine relatively consistent

monotheist beliefs with relatively active practice. This is close to the estimate of 2.8

million practising Muslims provided by Walters (2006).

Several regions have an especially high concentration of Muslims. Among them,

Tatarstan and Bashkortostan also have large Orthodox populations. By contrast, in

the North Caucasus recent hostilities have resulted in the emigration of non-Muslims,

leaving Muslim populations in overwhelming majorities (for example 92 per cent in

Dagestan). According to Russias Justice Ministry in 2006 there were nearly 3700

officially registered Islamic organisations in Russia (Svedeniya, 2006). However, the

actual number may be much greater because many Muslim groups (for example

radical jamaats2

in the Caucasus) are opposed to the Spiritual Boards (official regionalMuslim governing bodies) and avoid registration.

Although Orthodoxy and Islam are legally considered traditional religions with

formally equal rights, our data show that there is a strong opposition among ordinary

Russian to granting equal rights to these religions in practice. Moreover, the

aforementioned relatively low traditional religiosity does not preclude widespread

religious intolerance.

How Widespread is OrthodoxMuslim Religious Intolerance?

OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is widespread, and Russias Orthodox are overall lesstolerant of Muslims than the latter are of the former. Levels of mutual tolerance by

specific religious activity are shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that only 57 per cent of

the Orthodox would allow Muslims to build a mosque in their home town, while 72

per cent of Muslims would permit the building of an Orthodox church. About

30 per cent of the Orthodox would allow the public preaching of Islam, compared to

44 per cent of Muslims who would allow the public preaching of Orthodoxy. Both

Orthodox and Muslims are especially opposed to the teaching of their neighbours

faith in state-run schools: only 13 per cent of the Orthodox and 29 per cent of

Muslims would be in favour. This is a divisive and potentially explosive issue

considering the recent introduction of courses on Orthodoxy in state schools in some

regions.

Generally, with the exception of building mosques and doing charitable work, less

than half of the Orthodox would grant Muslims religious liberties. Meanwhile five out

of eight religious activities of the Orthodox would be allowed by more than half of all

Muslims.

Muslims greater tolerance of the Orthodox does not by itself suggest that they are

generally more willing to put up with other faiths. The Orthodox are Russias

dominant majority, and it would be impracticable for its Muslim or other minorities

to question the majoritys right to practise its faith. As shown below, in regions where

Islam is predominant, differences in tolerance among Orthodox Christians and

Muslims are much smaller. Furthermore, religious intolerance towards the Jews andwestern churches is slightly stronger among Muslims than among the Orthodox

(Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007a).



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The Importance of Regional and Local Differences

Russia is known for the tremendous ethno-cultural and religious diversity of its

regions. Regional differences prove crucial for understanding the state and origins of

tolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia. We compared levels of

OrthodoxMuslim tolerance in four traditionally Islamic regions. We also compared

tolerance in these regions with that in Russia in general. In addition, we looked at the

variation of tolerance in some of Russias other regions and in selected cities.

To provide a salient illustration of regional differences we computed average levels

(also known as mean values) of tolerance by area. These averages, which may range

from 8.0 to78.0, reflect regional populations tolerance of all eight religious activities

we asked about, from mosque or church building to fundraising. The higher thenumbers, the more tolerance they show (an eight-point level would indicate a full

tolerance of all religious activities, which is hard to find in Russia). The lower the

Figure 1. Religious tolerance among the Orthodox (N 1331) and Muslims (N833) in Russia

by religious activity. (Numbers indicate the percentage of those who would allow a particular

activity.)



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averages, the less tolerance they reflect. When numbers drop to near or below zero,

they mean strong intolerance.

Figure 2 compares tolerance averages in the four traditionally Islamic regions with

the general Russian sample (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a detailed comparison of

tolerance by region and activity). The comparison yields three facts reflecting a

consistent pattern. First, the strongest religious intolerance is among the Orthodox in

Russia outside the traditionally Islamic regions, which accounts for a vast majority of

the countrys Christians. Mutual intolerance is strong in two majority conflict-torn

Muslim regions of the North Caucasus (Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria). Yet it is

slightly less than the intolerance shown by the Orthodox majority outside Islamic

regions. Finally mutual tolerance is greatest in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan where

sizeable Orthodox and Muslim populations have coexisted in peace and relative

stability since the Soviet collapse.

Russia (excluding oversamples from Islamic regions) is 80 per cent Orthodox and

has only 3 per cent of Muslims. Thus most Russian Christians have few if any Muslim

neighbours. Yet precisely in this population we see the strongest intolerance towards

Muslims. As shown in Figure 2, tolerance of Muslims drops there to a sub-zero level.Remarkably, within Russia, intolerance of Muslims is strongest in some areas with

very small Islamic minorities. Indeed, the tolerance average is at Russias absolute low

of72.4 in the Central-Chernozem region, which is not known for a sizeable Islamic

presence. In this heartland region Russian Christians are even less tolerant of Muslims

than they are in the North Caucasus areas neighbouring traditionally Islamic lands

(72.1). In western nations, the largest and most cosmopolitan cities usually show

more tolerance. This is not the case in Russia. In Moscow and St Petersburg, the

countrys wealthiest and best educated cities, there is less tolerance of Muslims (71.1)

than in Russia generally (70.3). Counterintuitive as it may seem, this finding is

consistent with what some other studies of prejudice and intolerance in Russia haverecently shown. For instance, a 2006 study by the Moscow-based Public Opinion

Foundation shows that Muscovites and megacity-dwellers in general (which includes

both Moscow and St Petersburg), as well as younger people with higher education and

income, show higher than average levels of ethnic intolerance. They tend to be slightly

Figure 2. Average levels of Orthodox-Muslim tolerance by region. (Numbers indicate average

tolerance by region on a scale where 8.0 is the highest and 78.0 the lowest tolerance level

possible.)



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more often irritated by people of other ethnicities, and more willing to support

banning and deporting certain nationalities from their cities (Kertman, 2006). As

shown below, ethnic prejudice is associated with religious intolerance. Therefore it is

unsurprising that the wealthy and educated megacities show high levels of both.

The population of Tatarstan is 48 per cent Muslim and 42 per cent Orthodox, while

in Bashkortostan the ratio is the reverse: 50 per cent Orthodox to 40 per cent Muslim.

As shown above in Figure 2, both republics have relatively high levels of Orthodox

Muslim tolerance (four to almost five points out of eight possible). This contradicts

Starks theoretical prediction that two particularistic religious groups to the extent

that they perceive one another as equally matched . . . will be reluctant to risk violent

conflict, but relations will always be shaped by barely concealed hatred and contempt

(Stark, 2001, p. 233). Both regions have sustained political stability since the Soviet

collapse, and ethno-religious tensions have never escalated there into large-scale

violence. This relatively peaceful atmosphere was reinforced by the regional

authorities suppression of separatism and their policies of balancing Tatar and

Bashkir ethno-nationalism with loyalty to the Russian state. Similarly, the authorities

in both regions have been known for their efforts to curb the spread of radical Islam incollaboration with established and politically loyal Muslim leaders.

The situation is dramatically different in Dagestan, which is 92 per cent Muslim and

only 7 per cent Orthodox, and in Kabardino-Balkaria, which is 75 per cent Muslim

and 22 per cent Orthodox. As shown in Figure 2 above, both regions have some of the

lowest levels of interfaith tolerance. Tolerance does not rise in either region above a

one-point mark on our eight-point scale. Perhaps to some extent the overwhelming

Islamic majorities account for a strong intolerance towards Orthodox minorities. This

appears similar to the predominant sentiment in non-Muslim Russia towards its small

Islamic minority. Even so, tolerance towards the Orthodox in both regions is higher

than tolerance towards Muslims in heartland Russia. However, the logic of numbersdoes not explain why Orthodox minorities in the two regions show so little tolerance

to their Muslim majorities (by contrast, we have seen that in non-Islamic Russia the

Muslim minority is remarkably tolerant towards the Orthodox). More plausible

explanations of mutual intolerance may have to do with the political, socio-economic

and demographic environment of the regions.

Mutual negativity has multiple causes. Let us consider some of them. The spread of

radical Islam in the North Caucasus was likely to result in greater intolerance towards

non-Muslims. In turn, the reactions of Moscow and local authorities to Islamist and

separatist movements have been marked by intolerance towards free expression of

Islamic religiosity. In recent years the authorities in the Caucasus have often portrayed

any opposition they have encountered as part of a Wahhabi underground, thus

feeding suspicion and intolerance, which only exacerbate Muslim radicalism. The

vicious cycle of hostility has peaked in armed conflicts. In Dagestan fierce battles with

Islamist groups took place in 1999. Since then small-scale clashes and terrorist attacks

have been routine in the republic. In Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, over

130 people were killed in street battles with Muslim rebels (reportedly affiliated with

the jamaat Yarmuk) in October 2005. In addition, and in contrast to the situation in

relatively wealthy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, these conflicts take place amid socio-

economic hardships that can only worsen inter-group tensions. Rising ethnic tensions

have driven many ethnic Russians, most of whom are Orthodox by tradition, away

from the Caucasus (census data suggest that the population of Dagestan is now nomore than 6 per cent Russian). In this atmosphere of conflicts, hardships and tensions

mutual religious intolerance appears a natural outcome.



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Overall, there seems to be no single explanation for regional variation in tolerance.

The ethno-religious makeup, economic conditions, radical Islam and reactions to it,

and a history of violence and instability along with the quality of policies meant to

deal with them all appear important. The relative importance of each factor varies by

region. At the same time, we show below that some factors are universal.

What makes Orthodox and Muslims Intolerant of Each Other?

We have seen above that, with the remarkable exceptions of Tatarstan and

Bashkortostan, OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is widespread in Russia. A crucial

question of this study is if and to what extent this widespread mutual intolerance is a

product of adherence to Orthodox and Muslim beliefs and practices. Do religious

commitment and devotion to Orthodoxy and Islam make their adherents more

intolerant of each other? If so, we may be dealing with tensions between two

religiously defined civilisations, which would confirm Huntingtons (1996) grim

outlook for the future of stability along ChristianMuslim borders. Alternatively, if

the main causes of intolerance are not religious in nature, if they rather reflect thecircumstances in which Orthodoxy and Islam have been practised, then there may be

policies to remedy such circumstances. Thus the question of the religious roots of

ChristianMuslim intolerance is of crucial importance.

Religious determinants of interfaith intolerance are even less researched than the

intolerance itself. However, there has been a line of studies of the influence of religion on

political intolerance (of such groups as atheists, communists, homosexuals and others).

Focusing primarily on the USA, some of these studies show considerable effects of

attendance, personal piety and traditional denominational affiliations on political

tolerance (see, for example, Stouffer, 1955; Fislinger, 1976; Nunn et al., 1978). However,

more complex analyses suggest that these influences may be mediated by such factors astheocratic political orientations, illiberal views and other factors extrinsic to religious

beliefs and practices proper (Smidt and Penning, 1982; McFarland, 1989; Ellison and

Musick, 1993; Jelen and Wilcox, 1990; Karpov, 1999, 2002). As shown below, our

analyses of OrthodoxMuslim intolerance in Russia yield similar patterns.

Specifically, we looked at how OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is related to: (1) core

beliefs of ones faith and main religious practices (church or mosque attendance,

frequency of prayer, and frequency of reading the Bible or the Quran); (2) near-religious

ideology, which is not the core beliefs of the religions, but rather peoples beliefs about

their and other religions: for instance, these may include peoples beliefs about various

religions as good or bad, or ethnically native or alien, and about the treatment they

deserve in society; and (3) non-religious ideology: peoples secular beliefs and sentiments:

in our study, these include ethnic attitudes, pro-democracy and pro-western

orientations, and willingness to put up with dissidents (usually defined as political

tolerance). The influence of these three groups of factors on intolerance is summarised

below. Pertinent statistical details may be found in Table 2 in the Appendix.

Core religious beliefs and practices. To measure the former, we relied upon

commonly used survey indicators of monotheistic beliefs (for example, in God, the

devil, life after death, heaven and hell), and, for the Orthodox, of specific Christian

beliefs (for example, in Jesus Christ and his resurrection). These indicators were

aggregated into cumulative indices of religious belief. Religious practices weremeasured in terms of how often Orthodox and Muslims attended churches or

mosques, prayed and read the Bible or the Quran.



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Table 2 shows partial correlations of religious beliefs and practices with Orthodox

Muslim tolerance, controlling for the effects of the respondents age and education

and the size of the cities where interviews were collected. Since younger, better

educated people living in larger cities in our analyses (and in previous research) are

usually more tolerant than others, it was important to separate the effects of religiosity

from these background factors. Negative correlations mean that predictors decrease

tolerance. All coefficients reported below are statistically significant.

First, we found that religious beliefs per se do not make Russians more intolerant.

On the contrary, among the Orthodox, those who more fully share monotheistic and

Christian beliefs tend to be slightly more tolerant of Muslims than those who do not

(partial correlations are 0.09 and 0.08 respectively).

Next, religious practices are differently associated with tolerance among the two

groups. As Table 2 shows, among Muslims, those who more often go to the mosque,

pray and read the Quran appear less tolerant towards the Orthodox (correlations

range from 70.18 to 70.11). Among the Orthodox, only church attendance is

negatively and slightly associated with tolerance towards Muslims (70.07). In other

words, praying and reading the Bible more often do not make the Orthodox moreintolerant, while mosque attendance, praying and reading the Quran more often make

Muslims somewhat more intolerant of the Orthodox. Although these effects are

statistically significant, they are small in magnitude.

Near-religious ideology. While core religious beliefs do not make Orthodox and

Muslims more intolerant of each other, their beliefs about religions do. In particular, a

negative view of Islam (as militant, reactionary, inhumane, anti-democratic and so on)

makes Orthodox strongly intolerant of Muslims (0.41). Similarly, a negative view of

Orthodoxy predisposes Muslims for intolerance (0.23). As data show, negativism

towards Islam more strongly predicts intolerance of Muslims than negativism toOrthodoxy predicts intolerance of the Orthodox. An important predictor of tolerance

is the acceptance of the view that all religions should have equal rights in Russia: those

who do not share it are more intolerant. Among the Orthodox, opposition to equal

rights for religions predicts intolerance more strongly (0.30 compared to 0.12).

Another predictor of intolerance is a phenomenon we define as ethnodoxy, that is, a

belief system that rigidly links peoples ethnic identity to their dominant religion and that

views other faiths as alien. This belief system creates an explosive fusion of religious

and ethnic identity and leads to intolerance. We designed a questionnaire that

measured peoples adherence to such ethno-religious beliefs. The survey data show

that such beliefs are very common in Russia. For instance, 85 per cent of ethnic

Russians believe that they are Orthodox in their heart even if they were not baptised

and do not go to church. Nearly half believe that only ethnic Russians can be true

Orthodox, and more than one third see converts to non-Orthodox faiths as no longer

truly Russian. As partial correlations in Table 2 show, this ideology noticeably

decreases tolerance towards Muslims (70.20). Although religious ethnodoxy is also

common among Muslims (85 per cent of Tatars, Bashkirs, Avars and other

historically Islamic ethnics say they are Muslims in their heart regardless of actual

religiosity), it is significantly but weakly (0.08) associated with their intolerance

towards the Orthodox.

Non-religious ideology. We found that religious intolerance is also linked to beliefsand attitudes that have nothing to do with religion (see Table 2). Particularly

important is the link between religious intolerance and ethnic prejudice. Those



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Russian Orthodox who have negative attitudes to ethnic non-Russians from the

Caucasus and Asia are markedly less tolerant of Muslims (70.28). Similarly,

prejudice against ethnic Russians makes Muslims markedly less tolerant of the

Orthodox (70.26).

Pro-democratic and pro-western views make both Muslims and Orthodox more

tolerant of each other. Interfaith tolerance is also linked to support for civil liberties

for political and social out-groups (for example, fascists, atheists and homosexuals).

Those Muslims or Orthodox who are more willing to put up with such groups are also

more tolerant of each other. The link between political and religious tolerance is

stronger among Muslims than among the Orthodox (0.30 compared with 0.12).

Conclusion

Although most Russians calling themselves Orthodox Christians or Muslims do not

actively practise or fully accept the tenets of their faiths, religious intolerance among

them is widespread and strong. A majority of self-identified Orthodox would curtail

Muslims basic religious freedoms. In the regions where Muslims are in an absoluteminority and where Orthodox Russians have hardly any immediate contact with

Islam, the intolerance towards Muslims is stronger. Strikingly, in Moscow and St

Petersburg, Russias two wealthiest and most cosmopolitan cities with highly educated

populations, intolerance towards Muslims is stronger than the countrys average.

Russias Muslim minority appears on average more willing to grant religious liberties

to the Orthodox majority. Yet, in strategically important areas, such as the North

Caucasus, Muslims intolerance of Christian minorities is remarkably strong.

In this atmosphere, reports about religious hate crime and violations of religious

freedom in Russia reflect more than isolated incidents. Acts of hate and intolerance

seem to have deep roots in popular hostility to religious freedom. The problem ofChristianMuslim intolerance in Russia is not confined to actions of extremists and

illiberal officials. It is a societal problem that reflects the ordinary Russians

unwillingness to put up with minorities.

OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is not an isolated interfaith issue in Russia. As we

have written elsewhere, both groups unwillingness to put up with the Jews and

western churches is much stronger than their mutual intolerance (Karpov and

Lisovskaya, 2007a). Thus OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is only a part of a much

broader culture of religious intolerance that has taken root in Russia in just 15 years

since the collapse of official Soviet atheism.

Importantly, this widespread culture of religious intolerance is, at most, weakly

associated with core beliefs and practices of Orthodoxy and Islam. Consistency of

religious belief is positively, and church attendance negatively but weakly, correlated

with tolerance among the Orthodox. Among Muslims, active engagement in religious

practices is more noticeably yet weakly correlated with intolerance.

Overall, the culture of religious intolerance is shaped not so much by core religious

beliefs as by ideological beliefs about religions. Such are prejudices against Islam

among the Orthodox, and against Orthodoxy among Muslims. Such are also beliefs

that ethnic Russians are Orthodox by birth or definition, just as Tatars and Chechens

are Muslims, and that any other religion is alien and harmful to these peoples.

Conflating religious and ethnic animosities, this popular ideology of religious

ethnocentrism breeds intolerance and poses a threat to the unity and stability of themultiethnic and multireligious Russia. Finally, opposition to the idea of equality of all

faiths under the law correlates with intolerance. Let us note that this popular



13/18

sentiment is congruent with Russias official ideology that has treated some religions

as more equal than others since the enactment of the 1997 Law on Freedom of

Conscience and Religious Associations.

The climate of intolerance is further worsened by non-religious ideological

influences. Racial prejudice against the ethnicities of the Caucasus and Asia

(pejoratively referred to in Russian street slang as chernyye, meaning blacks)

increases intolerance towards Muslims, just as prejudice against ethnic Russians

increases intolerance towards the Orthodox. Not surprisingly, people who hold

antidemocratic and antiwestern views and oppose granting liberties to dissidents are

also more intolerant of their neighbours religion.

What do our data on the relative importance of religious, near-religious and non-

religious factors of intolerance suggest about the influence of religiosity on

intolerance? In our view, these findings mean that inquiries into religiosityintolerance

links should not be limited to core religious beliefs and practices. While the

phenomena we called near-religious may be viewed as alien to Orthodox and Muslim

religiosity normatively defined, they may be an integral part of Orthodoxy and Islam

as they are interpreted and practiced by ordinary Russians in their everyday lives. Forinstance, although the ethnoreligionist belief about presumed innate Orthodoxy of an

ethnic Russian may normatively be considered heretical (Nikita Struve once likened

ethnodoxy (etnoslaviye) to the heresy of phyletism: Struve, [1982] 2000, p. 94), for

most Russians it seems to be an important part of their mundane interpretation of

what Orthodoxy means. Similarly, the beliefs we analytically defined as non-religious

may be firmly established as part of popular religiosity. For instance, ordinary

Orthodox and Muslims may think that democracy and acceptance of ethnic diversity

and political dissent are alien to their religions. For such people, ethnic, political, and

religious intolerance will be natural and logical consequences of their religiosity.

Remarkably, both ethnocentric and antidemocratic views are congruent with publicstatements by many of Russias past and present religious leaders.

To summarise, our findings suggest that religiosity normatively understood (as

adherence to core beliefs and practices of Orthodoxy and Islam) has limited influence

on intolerance. However, popular religiosity (interpretations of Orthodoxy and Islam

by ordinary Russians in their everyday life) may predispose people to intolerance

more strongly than their core beliefs and practices.

This means both good and bad news for the prospects for reduction of mutual

intolerance. The good news is that greater commitment to the fundamentals of

Orthodoxy and Islam normatively understood is unlikely to make Russians more

intolerant. Conversely, achieving greater tolerance does not require compromises on

the fundamental tenets of both faiths (contrary to what zealots on both sides often

say). However, the bad news is that reducing intolerance may be impossible without

serious changes in popular interpretations of Orthodoxy and Islam that have

absorbed ethnocentric, prejudicial and illiberal beliefs. Ridding mass religious cultures

of such orientations may take generations and would require consistent systematic

effort on the part of religious leaders and educators. However, so far little seems to be

done in this direction and much in the opposite.

Yet our study also shows that even in this societal atmosphere a much greater

mutual tolerance among Russias Orthodox and Muslims can be achieved and does

exist in some places. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, where nearly equal populations of

Muslims and Christians live side by side, and where peace among them is supportedby the local authorities resistance to separatism and encouragement of interfaith

contacts, show tolerance levels markedly higher than elsewhere in the country. This



14/18

sharply contrasts with the situation in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, republics of

the war-torn North Caucasus, where ethno-religious tensions are worsened by

economic hardship, the emergence of radical Islam and failed attempts to eradicate it

through violence and suppression of religious freedom.

Given the spread of OrthodoxMuslim intolerance and its roots in a more general

popular hostility to religious freedom and minority rights, this problem is unlikely to

be resolved any time soon. If anything, it is likely to worsen amid Russias current

undemocratic tendencies, which cannot but fuel popular anti-libertarian sentiment. In

turn, escalating intolerance may trigger conflicts with ramifications for Eurasian and

global security (just as the conflict in Chechnya has already done). In this context,

trends in OrthodoxMuslim intolerance in Russia need regular sociological

monitoring, and we see our study as a first step towards this end.

Notes

1 This research was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and

East European Research (NCEEER) under authority of a Title VIII grant from the USDepartment of State. Neither NCEEER nor the US government is responsible for the views

expressed in this paper.

2 A jamaat is a community of Muslims. Jamaats may be formed territorially, ethnically or on

the basis of a certain interpretation of Islam, and are sometimes headed by imams. In

Dagestan, for instance, jamaats appeared in the thirteenth century headed by councils of

elders representing various clans. Other jamaats recently emerged as religio-political

formations and some of them have embraced Islamist and Wahhabi ideas (see Yemelianova,

2003).

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Append

ix

Table1.

Orthodox

Muslimtoleranceby

region

Percenta

gesof

Builda

m

osque/

church

Publicly

preach

Publish

religious

mater

ials

Open

religious

schools

Teach

theirfaith

instate

schools

Preachon

television

Docharitable

work

Fundraise

Russia:

Orthodo

x*allowingMuslimsto

57

30

44

44

13

34

63

48

Muslims**allowingOrthodoxto

94

72

80

80

41

74

87

80

Tatarsta

n:

Orthodo

xallowingMuslimsto

94

64

87

86

25

62

95

81

MuslimsallowingOrthodoxto

88

56

76

75

27

62

92

78

Bashkor

tostan:

Orthodo

xallowingMuslimsto

88

67

78

80

34

62

79

74


85

69

75

66

41

62

78

71

Dagestan:

Orthodo

xallowingMuslimsto

67

33

52

52

19

33

76

48


61

37

48

47

24

44

63

52

Kabardino-Balkaria:

Orthodo

xallowingMuslimsto

74

32

44

47

25

35

70

70


64

26

35

34

27

36

60

68

*Orthod

oxfromthesampleofthewholeofRussia(N

1331).

**Muslimsfromnon-Muslimregionsof

Russiaonly(N

48).



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Table 2. Determinants of OrthodoxMuslim tolerance (partial correlations, controlling for the

influence of age, education and city size)

Determinants

Tolerance among

Orthodox towards

Muslims

Tolerance among

Muslims towards

Orthodox

Core religious beliefs and practices:Monotheistic beliefs 0.09**

Christian beliefs 0.08** N/A

Church/mosque attendance 70.07* 70.18***

Prayer frequency 70.16***

Frequency of reading Bible/Quran 70.11**

Near-religious ideology (beliefs about and

attitudes to ones own and other religions):

Belief that all religions should have equal rights 0.30*** 0.12**

Negative views of Islam/Orthodoxy 70.41*** 70.23***

Religious ethnodoxy 70.20*** 70.08*

Non-religious ideology (secular beliefs and attitudes):

Pro-democratic and pro-western views 0.13** 0.11**

Political tolerance 0.12*** 0.30***

Prejudice against ethnic non-Russians/Russians 70.28*** 70.26***

No significant association; *p50.05; **p50.001; ***p50.0001, two-tailed test.



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Religious Intolerance Questionnaire

The questions are translated from the original Russian

Questions to Orthodox Christians Questions to Muslims

In Russia, there are followers of various

religions, including Muslims (the

followers of Islam):

I will read to you some statements about

the Orthodox. Would you say that the

Orthodox should be allowed to do thefollowing or prohibited from doing so:

1. Suppose Muslims wanted to build a

new mosque in our town. Do you

think they should be allowed to do so

or prohibited from doing so?

1. Suppose Orthodox wanted to build a

new church in our town. Do you think

they should be allowed to do so or

prohibited from doing so?

2. And now suppose Muslims started

publicly preaching Islam in our town.

Should they be allowed to do so or

prohibited from doing so?

2. And now suppose Orthodox started

publicly preaching their faith in our

town. Should they be allowed to do so

or prohibited from doing so?

3. What if Muslims wanted to publish

and distribute Islamic newspapers andmagazines in our town?

3. What if Orthodox wanted to publish

and distribute their religious news-papers and magazines in our town?

4. And if Muslims wanted to open an

Islamic school in our town?

4. And if Orthodox wanted to open an

Orthodox school in our town?

5. Now suppose Muslims wanted to

teach the foundations of Islam in state

schools in our town. Should this be

allowed or prohibited to them?

5. Now suppose Orthodox wanted to

teach the foundations of the Orthodox

faith in state schools in our town.

Should this be allowed or prohibited

to them?

6. And if Muslims wanted to preach their

religious views on television?

6. And if Orthodox wanted to preach

their religious views on television?

7. If Muslims wanted to engage incharitable work in our town?

7. If Orthodox wanted to engage incharitable work in our town?

8. And if Muslims in our town started

collecting money and donations for

their religious needs, should they be

allowed to do so or prohibited from

doing so?

8. And if Orthodox in our town started

collecting money and donations for

their religious needs, should they be

allowed to do so or prohibited from

doing so?


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