copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden (2005) NUMEN Vol 52

Also available online ndash wwwbrillnl

1 ICCrsquos website wwwqubacukicc Website for four-year project on ReligionCognition and Culture at University of Aarhus Denmark wwwteoaudkenresearchcurrentcognition Website for the IACSR httpwwwiacsrcom

RELIGION IN MIND A REVIEW ARTICLE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Introduction

In recent years the cognitive approach to the study of culture ingeneral and of religious phenomena in particular has gainedincreasing support in the academic study of religion From beingan approach championed by few though important scholars it nowhas its own dedicated journal (Journal of Cognition and Culture)a dedicated academic institute (Institute of Cognition and CultureQueenrsquos University Belfast) and soon we will see the emergenceof an International Association of the Cognitive Science of Reli-gion (to be inaugurated in Aarhus January 2006)1

But what is all the fuss about What is so attractive about thecognitive approach to religion Is it really a genuinely new ap-proach that can yield new results and solve persistent problems Oris it just the most recent academic fad taking over where semioticspost-structuralism and cultural studies have left off This paper willargue that cognitive science does in fact present a genuinely newand very promising approach to explaining religious phenomenaBy addressing both old and new problems by means of new theo-ries and methods cognitive science offers an opportunity for thescientific study of religion to break free of the inertia imposed by postmodernist solipsism Further the cognitive approach is nota fad Even though it is a newcomer to the scientific study of

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 465

466 Jesper Soslashrensen

2 Eg Bering (2005) Bering and Bjoumlrklund (2004) Bering and Shackelford (2004)Kelemen (1999 and 2004) Kelemen and DiYanna (2005) Rosengren et al (2000)

religion cognitive science is an established cross-disciplinary pro-gram with distinctive methodological and theoretical traditions

In what follows I will first address two basic problems and statesome meta-theoretical principles I will thereafter review workdone within two broad areas the nature of religious concepts andthe nature of religious behaviour Unfortunately (for a reviewer)the field of cognitive science of religion is already vast addressingnumerous problems through a growing number of methods Thismeans that much important and relevant work has to be omittedand other positions do not get the in-depth treatment they deserveA regrettable example of omission is the growing literature on thedevelopmental aspects of religion ie how childrenrsquos cognitivedevelopment affects the transmission of both religious concepts andreligious practice2 This field deserves its own thorough review asthe role of developmental factors has played a far too limited rolein traditional theories of religion

Two Problems and Five Principles

Many of the problems first addressed by the cognitive science ofreligion have long been recognised in the comparative study ofreligion Why do we find religion in all human cultures and whythe apparent recurrence of specific religious phenomena Whetherwe are going back in history by means of textual and archaeolog-ical evidence or roaming the farthest regions of the globe we findreligions and equivalent ideas and practices keep appearing theexistence of superhuman agents (eg gods spirits or ancestorswith knowledge about and power over human affairs) narratives ofhow the world was created by these superhuman agents evil spir-its or witches seeking to harm people by disease or misfortune thepower of religious specialists to deal with both benevolent and

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 466

Cognitive Science of Religion 467

3 For a discussion of the relation between interpretation and explanation seeBloch (1998) Jensen (2002) Lawson and McCauley (1990) Pyysiaumlinen (2004)Sperber (1996)

malevolent superhuman agents specific types of actions such assacrifice or spirit-possession involving superhuman agents ideasthat a part of a person lives on after the body is dead These arebut a small sample of a possible list of cross-cultural recurrencesof religious phenomena

The questions of (a) the universality of religion and (b) recur-rence of religious phenomena have been central to the study ofreligion ever since its origin in the 19th century and numerous attemptshave been made to answer them The methods and theories usedby the cognitive approach to tackle these questions are howeverrather different largely as a result of the meta-theoretical principlesunderlying the formation of specific theories These meta-theoreti-cal principles can be formulated in five points upon which there isbroad agreement in the cognitive science of religion

First in order to understand religion we need explanatory theo-ries Even if attempting to understand religious phenomena in theirlocalised cultural and historical context is a laudable endeavourthis cannot be the sole purpose of the scientific study of religionWe need to address the universal questions raised above and thiscannot be done by means of localised interpretations Further explana-tory theories not only enable us to address such general questionsbut also to fertilise local interpretations by supplying a more solidterminological grounding and presenting new potential lines of enquiryAll interpretations are theory-dependent and the more explicit thetheories are the better Thus the cognitive science of religion doesnot reject the role of interpretation in the academic study of reli-gion but merely attempts to right an unbalance by insisting on thenecessity of explanatory theories3

Second the concept of religion must be ldquorefractionedrdquo into itsconstitutive parts in order to be amenable to scientific investigation

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 467

468 Jesper Soslashrensen

4 For a discussion on the refractioned concept of religion see Atran (2002)Boyer (1996 2001) Hinde (1999) For critical assessment of older theories seeBoyer (1993a 2001) Lawson and McCauley (1990)

5 Atran (2002) Boyer (1994 2001) Lawson and McCauley (1990)

Earlier attempts to explain religion struggled to find a ldquomagic bul-letrdquo ie one theory that would explain all religious phenomenaWhether seeing religion substantively (eg as explaining the world)or functionally (eg as alleviating anxieties) it was never hard tofind empirical counterexamples (eg religious concepts that pro-duce more questions than they answer or religious actions thatgenerate anxiety) Instead we should recognise the historical andnon-scientific origin of the term ldquoreligionrdquo mdash not in order to getrid of it but in order to recognise that it is a synthetic categorythat covers a broad range of phenomena These must all beaddressed separately in order to construct explanatory theories andcan only subsequently be related in order to investigate their pos-sible mutual relations4

Third the refraction of religion into its constitutive parts meansthat religious phenomena can be studied by methods used to studynon-religious phenomena Thus religious concepts are a kind ofconcept ritual behaviour is a kind of behaviour religious groupformation is a kind of group formation etc In investigating what isspecial if anything about religious concepts we need to understandwhat characterises concepts in general how they are rememberedtransmitted produced systematised etc So in contrast to calls fora special methodology or hermeneutics of religious studies thecognitive science of religion places the study of religion within thebroader scientific community and emphasises that religious phenomenaare underpinned by the same cognitive mechanisms responsible forother types of human phenomena5

Fourth the cognitive science of religion is concerned withfinding the causal mechanisms or processes underlying visible man-ifestations of religion In order to prevent the cross-cultural and

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 468

Cognitive Science of Religion 469

6 Boyer (1992 1994 2001)

comparative study of religious phenomena from becoming a barrenand shallow list of observed phenomena classifications must begrounded in explanatory theories outlining underlying causal processesThis may solve the problem of universality (that some phenomenaeven though widespread are not found everywhere) Only theunderlying mechanisms and processes are universal whereas the emer-gence of a specific phenomenon at a particular time and placedepends on other contextual factors By analogy the possiblesound-patterns in human language can be explained by appealingto underlying neural cognitive and physiological mechanisms Butwhen appropriating the sounds of a specific language the individ-ual will manifest only some of these possibilities whereas otherswill become almost impossible to learn at a later stage Thus evenif mechanisms are universal phenomena need not be Further byaddressing the underlying causal mechanisms it becomes possibleto construct more refined and consistent scientific classificationsPhenomena now divided into different categories can be seen asproducts of the same mechanisms and phenomena groupedtogether based on superficial similarity will be understood as pro-duced by very different mechanisms6

Fifth all scholars involved in the cognitive science of religionagree not surprisingly that the human cognitive system is a goodplace to start in order to explain religion even if there is heateddebate concerning whether it is the only causally relevant factorReligion refers to certain types of behaviour and ideas entertainedby people and the human cognitive system is a necessary (if notsufficient) element in any explanation of religion As with anyother cultural phenomenon there is no religion without human cog-nition and it is therefore rather puzzling that the construction ofadequate theories of its role has been neglected for so long

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 469

470 Jesper Soslashrensen

The Cognitive Study of Religious Beliefs

Religious traditions are commonly defined by the beliefs that so-called ldquobelieversrdquo purportedly hold Even if this focus on theconceptual side of religion might represent a distortion and that behaviour is more important than recognised so far there is noquestion that specific types of ideas characterise religion Since Tylorrsquosfamous minimum definition of religion as ldquothe belief in supernatu-ral beingsrdquo most definitions have focused on the fact that religionscontain references to special beings that are not part of the naturalempirical world In line with its focus on underlying mechanismsthe cognitive science of religion has attempted to explain how reli-gious ideas are distinct from other ideas and how this distinctionmay affect memory and transmission

In a series of seminal articles in the 1980s and 1990s the Frenchanthropologist Dan Sperber framed an approach that focuses on thedifferential transmission of ideas This epidemiology of representa-tions follows three steps First we need to distinguish betweenpublic and mental representations in an act of communication Whereasmental representations are mental states entertained by personsinvolved in communication public representations are the exter-nally accessible part of the communication (sounds pictures inkon a paper) Sperber argues that no deterministic relation can befound between the public and the mental representation and there-fore the meaning of the message cannot be deduced from the pub-lic representation Instead meaning is constructed through acognitive process in which a receiver infers a maximum amount ofrelevant meaning based on minimal input Second this constructiveprocess takes place by activating a range of mental mechanismsthat produce specific types of inferences when triggered Thus suc-cessful communication uses public representations with the abilityto trigger the production of inferences in the receiverrsquos cognitivesystem that potentially lead to a mental state more or less similarto that of the sender Third as the role of public representations isto activate mental processes it is feasible to study the cultural suc-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 470

Cognitive Science of Religion 471

7 The essays on epidemiology of representations are collected in Sperber(1996) The importance of cognitive relevance in a theory of communication isargued in Sperber and Wilson (1995)

cess of individual representations as a function of their ability toproduce relevant inferences in individuals Thus representationscan be studied as an epidemiological phenomenon ie as the dif-ferential spread of specific representations through a populationRepresentations that trigger our cognitive system are more likely to be remembered and transmitted and will therefore be widely distributed7

Taking the epidemiological approach to the study of religiousconcepts anthropologist Pascal Boyer argues that only by under-standing our cognitive system will we be able to understand theorigin and recurrence of religious phenomena What traditionalscholars of religion are studying are the public representations involvedin transmission Failure to recognise the importance of underlyingcognitive processing has lead to an over-emphasis on the ldquoexoticrdquonature of religion Religions abound with witches acting from adistance omnipresent gods and listening statues but as in the caseof other public representation explicit religious ideas underdeter-mine the mental representations they give rise to Thus receiverswill enrich the information given through inferences supplied byspecific cognitive devices Boyer therefore argues that religiousrepresentations are a special case of representations that combineexplicit minimally counterintuitive aspects that are easy to remem-ber with implicit intuitive aspects that are good to reason with

This distinction between intuitive and counter-intuitive represen-tations is based on meticulous studies in developmental and cross-cultural psychology supporting the hypothesis that human cognitivearchitecture is ldquodomain-specificrdquo Thus instead of an all-purposemechanism that treats all types of information and problems bymeans of the same general methods human cognition is more real-istically described as a number of more or less separate mecha-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 471

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 467

3 For a discussion of the relation between interpretation and explanation seeBloch (1998) Jensen (2002) Lawson and McCauley (1990) Pyysiaumlinen (2004)Sperber (1996)

malevolent superhuman agents specific types of actions such assacrifice or spirit-possession involving superhuman agents ideasthat a part of a person lives on after the body is dead These arebut a small sample of a possible list of cross-cultural recurrencesof religious phenomena

The questions of (a) the universality of religion and (b) recur-rence of religious phenomena have been central to the study ofreligion ever since its origin in the 19th century and numerous attemptshave been made to answer them The methods and theories usedby the cognitive approach to tackle these questions are howeverrather different largely as a result of the meta-theoretical principlesunderlying the formation of specific theories These meta-theoreti-cal principles can be formulated in five points upon which there isbroad agreement in the cognitive science of religion

First in order to understand religion we need explanatory theo-ries Even if attempting to understand religious phenomena in theirlocalised cultural and historical context is a laudable endeavourthis cannot be the sole purpose of the scientific study of religionWe need to address the universal questions raised above and thiscannot be done by means of localised interpretations Further explana-tory theories not only enable us to address such general questionsbut also to fertilise local interpretations by supplying a more solidterminological grounding and presenting new potential lines of enquiryAll interpretations are theory-dependent and the more explicit thetheories are the better Thus the cognitive science of religion doesnot reject the role of interpretation in the academic study of reli-gion but merely attempts to right an unbalance by insisting on thenecessity of explanatory theories3

Second the concept of religion must be ldquorefractionedrdquo into itsconstitutive parts in order to be amenable to scientific investigation

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 467

468 Jesper Soslashrensen

4 For a discussion on the refractioned concept of religion see Atran (2002)Boyer (1996 2001) Hinde (1999) For critical assessment of older theories seeBoyer (1993a 2001) Lawson and McCauley (1990)

5 Atran (2002) Boyer (1994 2001) Lawson and McCauley (1990)

Earlier attempts to explain religion struggled to find a ldquomagic bul-letrdquo ie one theory that would explain all religious phenomenaWhether seeing religion substantively (eg as explaining the world)or functionally (eg as alleviating anxieties) it was never hard tofind empirical counterexamples (eg religious concepts that pro-duce more questions than they answer or religious actions thatgenerate anxiety) Instead we should recognise the historical andnon-scientific origin of the term ldquoreligionrdquo mdash not in order to getrid of it but in order to recognise that it is a synthetic categorythat covers a broad range of phenomena These must all beaddressed separately in order to construct explanatory theories andcan only subsequently be related in order to investigate their pos-sible mutual relations4

Third the refraction of religion into its constitutive parts meansthat religious phenomena can be studied by methods used to studynon-religious phenomena Thus religious concepts are a kind ofconcept ritual behaviour is a kind of behaviour religious groupformation is a kind of group formation etc In investigating what isspecial if anything about religious concepts we need to understandwhat characterises concepts in general how they are rememberedtransmitted produced systematised etc So in contrast to calls fora special methodology or hermeneutics of religious studies thecognitive science of religion places the study of religion within thebroader scientific community and emphasises that religious phenomenaare underpinned by the same cognitive mechanisms responsible forother types of human phenomena5

Fourth the cognitive science of religion is concerned withfinding the causal mechanisms or processes underlying visible man-ifestations of religion In order to prevent the cross-cultural and

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 468

Cognitive Science of Religion 469

6 Boyer (1992 1994 2001)

comparative study of religious phenomena from becoming a barrenand shallow list of observed phenomena classifications must begrounded in explanatory theories outlining underlying causal processesThis may solve the problem of universality (that some phenomenaeven though widespread are not found everywhere) Only theunderlying mechanisms and processes are universal whereas the emer-gence of a specific phenomenon at a particular time and placedepends on other contextual factors By analogy the possiblesound-patterns in human language can be explained by appealingto underlying neural cognitive and physiological mechanisms Butwhen appropriating the sounds of a specific language the individ-ual will manifest only some of these possibilities whereas otherswill become almost impossible to learn at a later stage Thus evenif mechanisms are universal phenomena need not be Further byaddressing the underlying causal mechanisms it becomes possibleto construct more refined and consistent scientific classificationsPhenomena now divided into different categories can be seen asproducts of the same mechanisms and phenomena groupedtogether based on superficial similarity will be understood as pro-duced by very different mechanisms6

Fifth all scholars involved in the cognitive science of religionagree not surprisingly that the human cognitive system is a goodplace to start in order to explain religion even if there is heateddebate concerning whether it is the only causally relevant factorReligion refers to certain types of behaviour and ideas entertainedby people and the human cognitive system is a necessary (if notsufficient) element in any explanation of religion As with anyother cultural phenomenon there is no religion without human cog-nition and it is therefore rather puzzling that the construction ofadequate theories of its role has been neglected for so long

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 469

470 Jesper Soslashrensen

The Cognitive Study of Religious Beliefs

Religious traditions are commonly defined by the beliefs that so-called ldquobelieversrdquo purportedly hold Even if this focus on theconceptual side of religion might represent a distortion and that behaviour is more important than recognised so far there is noquestion that specific types of ideas characterise religion Since Tylorrsquosfamous minimum definition of religion as ldquothe belief in supernatu-ral beingsrdquo most definitions have focused on the fact that religionscontain references to special beings that are not part of the naturalempirical world In line with its focus on underlying mechanismsthe cognitive science of religion has attempted to explain how reli-gious ideas are distinct from other ideas and how this distinctionmay affect memory and transmission

In a series of seminal articles in the 1980s and 1990s the Frenchanthropologist Dan Sperber framed an approach that focuses on thedifferential transmission of ideas This epidemiology of representa-tions follows three steps First we need to distinguish betweenpublic and mental representations in an act of communication Whereasmental representations are mental states entertained by personsinvolved in communication public representations are the exter-nally accessible part of the communication (sounds pictures inkon a paper) Sperber argues that no deterministic relation can befound between the public and the mental representation and there-fore the meaning of the message cannot be deduced from the pub-lic representation Instead meaning is constructed through acognitive process in which a receiver infers a maximum amount ofrelevant meaning based on minimal input Second this constructiveprocess takes place by activating a range of mental mechanismsthat produce specific types of inferences when triggered Thus suc-cessful communication uses public representations with the abilityto trigger the production of inferences in the receiverrsquos cognitivesystem that potentially lead to a mental state more or less similarto that of the sender Third as the role of public representations isto activate mental processes it is feasible to study the cultural suc-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 470

Cognitive Science of Religion 471

7 The essays on epidemiology of representations are collected in Sperber(1996) The importance of cognitive relevance in a theory of communication isargued in Sperber and Wilson (1995)

cess of individual representations as a function of their ability toproduce relevant inferences in individuals Thus representationscan be studied as an epidemiological phenomenon ie as the dif-ferential spread of specific representations through a populationRepresentations that trigger our cognitive system are more likely to be remembered and transmitted and will therefore be widely distributed7

Taking the epidemiological approach to the study of religiousconcepts anthropologist Pascal Boyer argues that only by under-standing our cognitive system will we be able to understand theorigin and recurrence of religious phenomena What traditionalscholars of religion are studying are the public representations involvedin transmission Failure to recognise the importance of underlyingcognitive processing has lead to an over-emphasis on the ldquoexoticrdquonature of religion Religions abound with witches acting from adistance omnipresent gods and listening statues but as in the caseof other public representation explicit religious ideas underdeter-mine the mental representations they give rise to Thus receiverswill enrich the information given through inferences supplied byspecific cognitive devices Boyer therefore argues that religiousrepresentations are a special case of representations that combineexplicit minimally counterintuitive aspects that are easy to remem-ber with implicit intuitive aspects that are good to reason with

This distinction between intuitive and counter-intuitive represen-tations is based on meticulous studies in developmental and cross-cultural psychology supporting the hypothesis that human cognitivearchitecture is ldquodomain-specificrdquo Thus instead of an all-purposemechanism that treats all types of information and problems bymeans of the same general methods human cognition is more real-istically described as a number of more or less separate mecha-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 471

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

468 Jesper Soslashrensen

4 For a discussion on the refractioned concept of religion see Atran (2002)Boyer (1996 2001) Hinde (1999) For critical assessment of older theories seeBoyer (1993a 2001) Lawson and McCauley (1990)

5 Atran (2002) Boyer (1994 2001) Lawson and McCauley (1990)

Earlier attempts to explain religion struggled to find a ldquomagic bul-letrdquo ie one theory that would explain all religious phenomenaWhether seeing religion substantively (eg as explaining the world)or functionally (eg as alleviating anxieties) it was never hard tofind empirical counterexamples (eg religious concepts that pro-duce more questions than they answer or religious actions thatgenerate anxiety) Instead we should recognise the historical andnon-scientific origin of the term ldquoreligionrdquo mdash not in order to getrid of it but in order to recognise that it is a synthetic categorythat covers a broad range of phenomena These must all beaddressed separately in order to construct explanatory theories andcan only subsequently be related in order to investigate their pos-sible mutual relations4

Third the refraction of religion into its constitutive parts meansthat religious phenomena can be studied by methods used to studynon-religious phenomena Thus religious concepts are a kind ofconcept ritual behaviour is a kind of behaviour religious groupformation is a kind of group formation etc In investigating what isspecial if anything about religious concepts we need to understandwhat characterises concepts in general how they are rememberedtransmitted produced systematised etc So in contrast to calls fora special methodology or hermeneutics of religious studies thecognitive science of religion places the study of religion within thebroader scientific community and emphasises that religious phenomenaare underpinned by the same cognitive mechanisms responsible forother types of human phenomena5

Fourth the cognitive science of religion is concerned withfinding the causal mechanisms or processes underlying visible man-ifestations of religion In order to prevent the cross-cultural and

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 468

Cognitive Science of Religion 469

6 Boyer (1992 1994 2001)

comparative study of religious phenomena from becoming a barrenand shallow list of observed phenomena classifications must begrounded in explanatory theories outlining underlying causal processesThis may solve the problem of universality (that some phenomenaeven though widespread are not found everywhere) Only theunderlying mechanisms and processes are universal whereas the emer-gence of a specific phenomenon at a particular time and placedepends on other contextual factors By analogy the possiblesound-patterns in human language can be explained by appealingto underlying neural cognitive and physiological mechanisms Butwhen appropriating the sounds of a specific language the individ-ual will manifest only some of these possibilities whereas otherswill become almost impossible to learn at a later stage Thus evenif mechanisms are universal phenomena need not be Further byaddressing the underlying causal mechanisms it becomes possibleto construct more refined and consistent scientific classificationsPhenomena now divided into different categories can be seen asproducts of the same mechanisms and phenomena groupedtogether based on superficial similarity will be understood as pro-duced by very different mechanisms6

Fifth all scholars involved in the cognitive science of religionagree not surprisingly that the human cognitive system is a goodplace to start in order to explain religion even if there is heateddebate concerning whether it is the only causally relevant factorReligion refers to certain types of behaviour and ideas entertainedby people and the human cognitive system is a necessary (if notsufficient) element in any explanation of religion As with anyother cultural phenomenon there is no religion without human cog-nition and it is therefore rather puzzling that the construction ofadequate theories of its role has been neglected for so long

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 469

470 Jesper Soslashrensen

The Cognitive Study of Religious Beliefs

Religious traditions are commonly defined by the beliefs that so-called ldquobelieversrdquo purportedly hold Even if this focus on theconceptual side of religion might represent a distortion and that behaviour is more important than recognised so far there is noquestion that specific types of ideas characterise religion Since Tylorrsquosfamous minimum definition of religion as ldquothe belief in supernatu-ral beingsrdquo most definitions have focused on the fact that religionscontain references to special beings that are not part of the naturalempirical world In line with its focus on underlying mechanismsthe cognitive science of religion has attempted to explain how reli-gious ideas are distinct from other ideas and how this distinctionmay affect memory and transmission

In a series of seminal articles in the 1980s and 1990s the Frenchanthropologist Dan Sperber framed an approach that focuses on thedifferential transmission of ideas This epidemiology of representa-tions follows three steps First we need to distinguish betweenpublic and mental representations in an act of communication Whereasmental representations are mental states entertained by personsinvolved in communication public representations are the exter-nally accessible part of the communication (sounds pictures inkon a paper) Sperber argues that no deterministic relation can befound between the public and the mental representation and there-fore the meaning of the message cannot be deduced from the pub-lic representation Instead meaning is constructed through acognitive process in which a receiver infers a maximum amount ofrelevant meaning based on minimal input Second this constructiveprocess takes place by activating a range of mental mechanismsthat produce specific types of inferences when triggered Thus suc-cessful communication uses public representations with the abilityto trigger the production of inferences in the receiverrsquos cognitivesystem that potentially lead to a mental state more or less similarto that of the sender Third as the role of public representations isto activate mental processes it is feasible to study the cultural suc-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 470

Cognitive Science of Religion 471

7 The essays on epidemiology of representations are collected in Sperber(1996) The importance of cognitive relevance in a theory of communication isargued in Sperber and Wilson (1995)

cess of individual representations as a function of their ability toproduce relevant inferences in individuals Thus representationscan be studied as an epidemiological phenomenon ie as the dif-ferential spread of specific representations through a populationRepresentations that trigger our cognitive system are more likely to be remembered and transmitted and will therefore be widely distributed7

Taking the epidemiological approach to the study of religiousconcepts anthropologist Pascal Boyer argues that only by under-standing our cognitive system will we be able to understand theorigin and recurrence of religious phenomena What traditionalscholars of religion are studying are the public representations involvedin transmission Failure to recognise the importance of underlyingcognitive processing has lead to an over-emphasis on the ldquoexoticrdquonature of religion Religions abound with witches acting from adistance omnipresent gods and listening statues but as in the caseof other public representation explicit religious ideas underdeter-mine the mental representations they give rise to Thus receiverswill enrich the information given through inferences supplied byspecific cognitive devices Boyer therefore argues that religiousrepresentations are a special case of representations that combineexplicit minimally counterintuitive aspects that are easy to remem-ber with implicit intuitive aspects that are good to reason with

This distinction between intuitive and counter-intuitive represen-tations is based on meticulous studies in developmental and cross-cultural psychology supporting the hypothesis that human cognitivearchitecture is ldquodomain-specificrdquo Thus instead of an all-purposemechanism that treats all types of information and problems bymeans of the same general methods human cognition is more real-istically described as a number of more or less separate mecha-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 471

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 469

6 Boyer (1992 1994 2001)

comparative study of religious phenomena from becoming a barrenand shallow list of observed phenomena classifications must begrounded in explanatory theories outlining underlying causal processesThis may solve the problem of universality (that some phenomenaeven though widespread are not found everywhere) Only theunderlying mechanisms and processes are universal whereas the emer-gence of a specific phenomenon at a particular time and placedepends on other contextual factors By analogy the possiblesound-patterns in human language can be explained by appealingto underlying neural cognitive and physiological mechanisms Butwhen appropriating the sounds of a specific language the individ-ual will manifest only some of these possibilities whereas otherswill become almost impossible to learn at a later stage Thus evenif mechanisms are universal phenomena need not be Further byaddressing the underlying causal mechanisms it becomes possibleto construct more refined and consistent scientific classificationsPhenomena now divided into different categories can be seen asproducts of the same mechanisms and phenomena groupedtogether based on superficial similarity will be understood as pro-duced by very different mechanisms6

Fifth all scholars involved in the cognitive science of religionagree not surprisingly that the human cognitive system is a goodplace to start in order to explain religion even if there is heateddebate concerning whether it is the only causally relevant factorReligion refers to certain types of behaviour and ideas entertainedby people and the human cognitive system is a necessary (if notsufficient) element in any explanation of religion As with anyother cultural phenomenon there is no religion without human cog-nition and it is therefore rather puzzling that the construction ofadequate theories of its role has been neglected for so long

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 469

470 Jesper Soslashrensen

The Cognitive Study of Religious Beliefs

Religious traditions are commonly defined by the beliefs that so-called ldquobelieversrdquo purportedly hold Even if this focus on theconceptual side of religion might represent a distortion and that behaviour is more important than recognised so far there is noquestion that specific types of ideas characterise religion Since Tylorrsquosfamous minimum definition of religion as ldquothe belief in supernatu-ral beingsrdquo most definitions have focused on the fact that religionscontain references to special beings that are not part of the naturalempirical world In line with its focus on underlying mechanismsthe cognitive science of religion has attempted to explain how reli-gious ideas are distinct from other ideas and how this distinctionmay affect memory and transmission

In a series of seminal articles in the 1980s and 1990s the Frenchanthropologist Dan Sperber framed an approach that focuses on thedifferential transmission of ideas This epidemiology of representa-tions follows three steps First we need to distinguish betweenpublic and mental representations in an act of communication Whereasmental representations are mental states entertained by personsinvolved in communication public representations are the exter-nally accessible part of the communication (sounds pictures inkon a paper) Sperber argues that no deterministic relation can befound between the public and the mental representation and there-fore the meaning of the message cannot be deduced from the pub-lic representation Instead meaning is constructed through acognitive process in which a receiver infers a maximum amount ofrelevant meaning based on minimal input Second this constructiveprocess takes place by activating a range of mental mechanismsthat produce specific types of inferences when triggered Thus suc-cessful communication uses public representations with the abilityto trigger the production of inferences in the receiverrsquos cognitivesystem that potentially lead to a mental state more or less similarto that of the sender Third as the role of public representations isto activate mental processes it is feasible to study the cultural suc-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 470

Cognitive Science of Religion 471

7 The essays on epidemiology of representations are collected in Sperber(1996) The importance of cognitive relevance in a theory of communication isargued in Sperber and Wilson (1995)

cess of individual representations as a function of their ability toproduce relevant inferences in individuals Thus representationscan be studied as an epidemiological phenomenon ie as the dif-ferential spread of specific representations through a populationRepresentations that trigger our cognitive system are more likely to be remembered and transmitted and will therefore be widely distributed7

Taking the epidemiological approach to the study of religiousconcepts anthropologist Pascal Boyer argues that only by under-standing our cognitive system will we be able to understand theorigin and recurrence of religious phenomena What traditionalscholars of religion are studying are the public representations involvedin transmission Failure to recognise the importance of underlyingcognitive processing has lead to an over-emphasis on the ldquoexoticrdquonature of religion Religions abound with witches acting from adistance omnipresent gods and listening statues but as in the caseof other public representation explicit religious ideas underdeter-mine the mental representations they give rise to Thus receiverswill enrich the information given through inferences supplied byspecific cognitive devices Boyer therefore argues that religiousrepresentations are a special case of representations that combineexplicit minimally counterintuitive aspects that are easy to remem-ber with implicit intuitive aspects that are good to reason with

This distinction between intuitive and counter-intuitive represen-tations is based on meticulous studies in developmental and cross-cultural psychology supporting the hypothesis that human cognitivearchitecture is ldquodomain-specificrdquo Thus instead of an all-purposemechanism that treats all types of information and problems bymeans of the same general methods human cognition is more real-istically described as a number of more or less separate mecha-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 471

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

470 Jesper Soslashrensen

The Cognitive Study of Religious Beliefs

Religious traditions are commonly defined by the beliefs that so-called ldquobelieversrdquo purportedly hold Even if this focus on theconceptual side of religion might represent a distortion and that behaviour is more important than recognised so far there is noquestion that specific types of ideas characterise religion Since Tylorrsquosfamous minimum definition of religion as ldquothe belief in supernatu-ral beingsrdquo most definitions have focused on the fact that religionscontain references to special beings that are not part of the naturalempirical world In line with its focus on underlying mechanismsthe cognitive science of religion has attempted to explain how reli-gious ideas are distinct from other ideas and how this distinctionmay affect memory and transmission

In a series of seminal articles in the 1980s and 1990s the Frenchanthropologist Dan Sperber framed an approach that focuses on thedifferential transmission of ideas This epidemiology of representa-tions follows three steps First we need to distinguish betweenpublic and mental representations in an act of communication Whereasmental representations are mental states entertained by personsinvolved in communication public representations are the exter-nally accessible part of the communication (sounds pictures inkon a paper) Sperber argues that no deterministic relation can befound between the public and the mental representation and there-fore the meaning of the message cannot be deduced from the pub-lic representation Instead meaning is constructed through acognitive process in which a receiver infers a maximum amount ofrelevant meaning based on minimal input Second this constructiveprocess takes place by activating a range of mental mechanismsthat produce specific types of inferences when triggered Thus suc-cessful communication uses public representations with the abilityto trigger the production of inferences in the receiverrsquos cognitivesystem that potentially lead to a mental state more or less similarto that of the sender Third as the role of public representations isto activate mental processes it is feasible to study the cultural suc-

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Cognitive Science of Religion 471

7 The essays on epidemiology of representations are collected in Sperber(1996) The importance of cognitive relevance in a theory of communication isargued in Sperber and Wilson (1995)

cess of individual representations as a function of their ability toproduce relevant inferences in individuals Thus representationscan be studied as an epidemiological phenomenon ie as the dif-ferential spread of specific representations through a populationRepresentations that trigger our cognitive system are more likely to be remembered and transmitted and will therefore be widely distributed7

Taking the epidemiological approach to the study of religiousconcepts anthropologist Pascal Boyer argues that only by under-standing our cognitive system will we be able to understand theorigin and recurrence of religious phenomena What traditionalscholars of religion are studying are the public representations involvedin transmission Failure to recognise the importance of underlyingcognitive processing has lead to an over-emphasis on the ldquoexoticrdquonature of religion Religions abound with witches acting from adistance omnipresent gods and listening statues but as in the caseof other public representation explicit religious ideas underdeter-mine the mental representations they give rise to Thus receiverswill enrich the information given through inferences supplied byspecific cognitive devices Boyer therefore argues that religiousrepresentations are a special case of representations that combineexplicit minimally counterintuitive aspects that are easy to remem-ber with implicit intuitive aspects that are good to reason with

This distinction between intuitive and counter-intuitive represen-tations is based on meticulous studies in developmental and cross-cultural psychology supporting the hypothesis that human cognitivearchitecture is ldquodomain-specificrdquo Thus instead of an all-purposemechanism that treats all types of information and problems bymeans of the same general methods human cognition is more real-istically described as a number of more or less separate mecha-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 471

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

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480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

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482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 471

7 The essays on epidemiology of representations are collected in Sperber(1996) The importance of cognitive relevance in a theory of communication isargued in Sperber and Wilson (1995)

cess of individual representations as a function of their ability toproduce relevant inferences in individuals Thus representationscan be studied as an epidemiological phenomenon ie as the dif-ferential spread of specific representations through a populationRepresentations that trigger our cognitive system are more likely to be remembered and transmitted and will therefore be widely distributed7

Taking the epidemiological approach to the study of religiousconcepts anthropologist Pascal Boyer argues that only by under-standing our cognitive system will we be able to understand theorigin and recurrence of religious phenomena What traditionalscholars of religion are studying are the public representations involvedin transmission Failure to recognise the importance of underlyingcognitive processing has lead to an over-emphasis on the ldquoexoticrdquonature of religion Religions abound with witches acting from adistance omnipresent gods and listening statues but as in the caseof other public representation explicit religious ideas underdeter-mine the mental representations they give rise to Thus receiverswill enrich the information given through inferences supplied byspecific cognitive devices Boyer therefore argues that religiousrepresentations are a special case of representations that combineexplicit minimally counterintuitive aspects that are easy to remem-ber with implicit intuitive aspects that are good to reason with

This distinction between intuitive and counter-intuitive represen-tations is based on meticulous studies in developmental and cross-cultural psychology supporting the hypothesis that human cognitivearchitecture is ldquodomain-specificrdquo Thus instead of an all-purposemechanism that treats all types of information and problems bymeans of the same general methods human cognition is more real-istically described as a number of more or less separate mecha-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 471

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

472 Jesper Soslashrensen

8 The literature on domain-specific cognition is vast but helpful anthologies includ-ing discussions of culture and religion are Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and SperberPremack and Premack (1995)

nisms dedicated to processing specific types of information Domain-specific accounts of human cognition support the argument that ourimplicit understanding of the world is divided into a number ofontological domains We have specific expectations for individualphenomena because we subsume them into broad ontological domainsWhen hearing that the invented word ldquohuchitrdquo is an ANIMAL oneautomatically has a number of expectations it has a physical bodyit is born from other ldquohuchitsrdquo it can move by itself it will growold and die etc None of this information needs to be madeexplicit In a similar way we have intuitive expectations about domainssuch as OBJECT ARTEFACT PLANT and PERSON as this makes oureveryday interaction with the world both faster and more pre-dictable Thus the intuitive ontology is not scientifically basedknowledge but a result of evolutionary developed heuristicdevices8

Boyer argues that successful religious concepts are characterisedby involving either a breach of domain-specific intuitive inferencesor a transfer of a restricted number of inferences from anotherontological domain Representations of ancestors ghosts and spir-its are examples of an ontological breach All violate the intuitiveexpectation that a PERSON has a physical body and this makes themattention grabbing if not downright uncanny All of them howeverretain a large number of intuitive properties They are expected toperceive the world to have beliefs and to act motivated by thesebeliefs Thus ancestors ghosts and spirits can be persuadedcoerced or tricked In short they can be interacted with in a man-ner that is strikingly similar to how we interact with other humanbeings Examples of transfer from another ontological domain arenumerous Just think of statues that hear what they are told or mag-ical medicines addressed vocally In these cases aspects of agencyis transferred to entities ordinarily categorised as not having agency

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 472

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 473

9 Besides Boyer (1994 2001 2002) Pyysiaumlinen (2001 2002 2004) placesgreat emphasis on the counterintuitive aspects of religious concepts For cross-cultural experimental studies confirming the positive selection of counterintuitiveconcepts see Boyer and Ramble (2001)

(OBJECT ARTEFACT and PLANT) In most cases however the breachor transfer is minimal and what guides our interactions is almostexclusively based on intuitive assumptions

This does not mean that people cannot come up with religiousconcepts not following these rules It merely means that conceptsthat are minimally counterintuitive are cognitively optimal andtherefore all else being equal more likely to be successfully trans-mitted The theory of minimally counterintuitive religious conceptsthus explains the recurrence of specific types of religious conceptsin all religious traditions as a result of a selective process Reli-gious traditions end up as they do because the transmission processeffectively weeds out or transforms concepts that are not cogni-tively optimal9

If being minimally counterintuitive is what characterises reli-gious concepts what distinguish them from concepts such asMickey Mouse Mickey Mouse combines intuitive elements withattention demanding breaches or transfers but even for the mostcasual observer Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent Why is thisso One hypothesis seeks the answer in the role of agents Humanshave a well-documented tendency to search for agents in the per-ceptible environment whether as faces in the clouds or traces inthe sand But not all agents are equally important We are espe-cially prone to imagine agents that are either anthropomorphic orhave a human-like mind Even if the gods spirits and ancestorsneed not look like us they always have a mind like us This is im-portant because representations of another human mind trigger a wealthof possible inferences due to the social nature of Homo sapiens Animportant part of such social cognition are the so-called ldquotheory ofmindrdquo mechanisms that make us see other people as a ldquomirrorimagerdquo of our own self as an agent with (limited) perceptual

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 473

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

474 Jesper Soslashrensen

10 A theory of religion based on the cognitive importance of animism andanthropomorphism was first developed by Guthrie (1993 2002) The importanceof agency detection for religion is further argued by Barrett (2000 2004) The the-ory of superhuman agents with unlimited access to strategic information is devel-oped by Boyer (2001)

access to the environment based on which it forms (potentially flawed)beliefs that motivate actions We constantly seek out informationthat will help us understand what other people have perceivedknow and believe because it helps us understand and predict theirbehaviour

Two things distinguish religious agents from Mickey MouseFirst ancestors spirits and gods are interested in socially relevantinformation The gods we interact with the most (the ldquopopulargodsrdquo) are those interested in what their ldquofollowersrdquo do and thinkSecond contrary to ordinary people superhuman agents have moreor less unrestricted access to social strategic information In con-trast to Mickey Mouse the gods know if we cheat on our spousesor steal from our neighbour even if no one else does Because ofthis they become highly relevant social partners and not just aes-thetic figures10

A second hypothesis argues that the difference between MickeyMouse and religious agents lies in their respective meta-represen-tational content Meta-representations are representations about rep-resentations or beliefs about beliefs Whereas Mickey Mouse hasthe meta-representation lsquoMickey Mouse is a cartoon figurersquo as abackground to all other representations superhuman agents have meta-representations that somehow indicate their reality Ancestorscan for instance be meta-represented in mythical narratives aslsquowhat we become when we diersquo which naturally gives them a dif-ferent status than Mickey Mouse But the status of a meta-repre-sentation is not self-evident When religious figures are transformedinto characters of cultural legend (as in the case of the Nordicgods) this can be explained as a transformation of the validatingmeta-representation from that of truth to that of legend This points

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 474

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 475

11 The role of meta-representations are emphasised by Pyysiaumlinen (2004) aswell as Atran (2002)

12 The importance of the role of superhuman agency in ritual action is empha-sised by Lawson and McCauley (1990) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) Theimportance of ritual performance in validating belief in specific superhumanagents is argued in Soslashrensen (2000b and forthcoming (a))

to the fact that meta-representations are intimately related to struc-tures of authority and in the case of religion to religious author-ity whether found in a holy book in a religious institution or in aspecific person11

A third hypothesis focuses on the role of actions in general andritual actions in particular in validating superhuman agents Inshort Mickey Mouse is not a religious agent because there are novalidating actions in which he is represented as interfering with theworld Accordingly the most efficient way of validating the exis-tence of a superhuman agent is creating social situations in whichhe or she is understood as acting or being acted upon Testingcases that illustrate this point are concepts such as Santa Claus orthe Tooth Fairy Based on the preceding argument it is predictedthat children whose family perform actions involving these agents(bringing presents etc) will be more likely to ascribe these a vali-dating meta-representation than children from families that do notengage in such practices12

These three hypotheses are potentially complementary Superhumanagents will typically be socially interested parties with unrestrictedaccess to knowledge they will be meta-represented as real andimportant agents and this meta-representation is most efficientlycreated through socially orchestrated actions with superhumanagents as either agents or patients

Religion Tradition and Conceptual Systems

Some readers might wonder to what extent the mechanismsdescribed above can explain the apparent systematicity of somereligions and the historical construction of elaborate theologies In

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 475

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

476 Jesper Soslashrensen

13 Tomasello (1999) uses the term ldquoratchet-effectrdquo to describe a cultural devel-opment that (a) cannot be undone without serious consequences and (b) leads tocumulative development

14 Barrett (1999 2004) Theological Incorrectness is also discussed in Boyer (2001)and Slone (2004) Boyer (2001) discusses the formation of religious guilds

short are religious traditions really nothing but more or less coin-cidental conglomerates of cognitively optimal concepts or do wefind a cultural ldquoratchet effectrdquo that ensures that religious innova-tions stabilise and enables the cumulative construction of a reli-gious tradition13

There is no agreement about this question Some argue that cul-ture in general and religion as a tradition is an epiphenomena thathas no causal effect Supporting this view psychologist JustinBarrett has demonstrated that when performing under pressurepeople tend to make inferences that are often in sharp contrast totheir explicitly held theological convictions and instead fall backon intuitive ideas This distinction between explicitly held theolog-ical ideas and implicit theological incorrectness highlights the ques-tion whether we can understand behaviour by reference to the teachingsof religious systems Alternatively the formation of religious tradi-tions can be understood as a result of the creation of a guild ofreligious specialists in specific historical circumstances In order tocreate a privileged position a priestly class must protect itself fromcompetition and ensure control By streamlining orthodoxy it becomespossible to control access to the group (only people with the righttraining will be admitted) to distinguish persons legitimatelywielding authority (ensuring religious authority) and to control theuniformity of teachings in different geographical areas (policing alarger social group) Accordingly the formation of religious doc-trines has more to do with the cognitive systems underlying theformation of social groups than with the semantic content of thedoctrines14

Still two objections can be raised to the argument presentedabove First is the intuitive character of inferences produced under

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 476

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 477

stress really an adequate indication of the importance of doctrinalsystems Second should we really contrast intuitive knowledgewith theologically elaborate systems or should we instead look forthe importance of religious traditions in less consistent and morewidely distributed cultural conceptual systems

Addressing the first concern anthropologist Harvey Whitehousehas emphasised the important role of explicit religious concepts in human behaviour in general and in the ability to acquire newconcepts in particular Even if humans tend to resort to intuitivereasoning when put under pressure most of the time humans donot reason under cognitive pressure In contrast they have time toruminate about religious ideas and think about future lines ofaction in light of these Further as most existing cultural knowl-edge is distributed between different kinds of people (some are nuclearphysicists others carpenters) people do not acquire new conceptswith equal readiness Even though minimally counterintuitive con-cepts may form part of the optimal bedrock of religious transmis-sion acquiring new religious concepts often requires a considerableamount of cognitive effort and a high level of motivation Basedon fieldwork experience in Papua New Guinea and theories ofhuman memory Whitehouse argues that the transmission of suchcognitively costly religious ideas will be likely to take one of twoforms In the ldquodoctrinal mode of religiosityrdquo complex religious rep-resentations are transmitted through a process of continual ritualrepetition that enables the teachings to become part of participantsrsquosemantic memory Semantic memory terms de-contextualised andexplicit schematic knowledge and Whitehouse argues that thetransmission of this kind of religious knowledge has several impli-cations (a) it is dependent on frequent reiteration and thereforeruns the risk of a ldquotedium-effectrdquo in which people lose motivationdue to redundancy and familiarity effects Methods must be foundto counter this tendency (b) successful transmission of explicit doc-trinal ideas is dependent on skilled orators which in turn strength-ens representations of religious leadership (c) the intimate relationbetween religious leadership and religious teaching necessitates

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 477

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

478 Jesper Soslashrensen

15 The mode of religiosity theory is most systematically explained in White-house (2000 2004a and 2004b)

frequent ldquoorthodoxy checksrdquo ensuring that believers are adhering tothe right doctrine and the creation of adequate centralised bodies topolice it (d) frequent repetition will render memory of ritual per-formance implicit which in turn enhances the survival potential forthe teaching by inhibiting individual interpretation (e) being basedon decontextualised semantic memory the doctrinal mode facili-tates the construction of anonymous religious communities and areeasily spread through proselytising

In the ldquoimagistic mode of religiosityrdquo transmission of religiousknowledge exploits more heavily the episodic memory systemEpisodic memory is highly context-dependent as it relates to thespecific experience of the subject Whitehouse argues that transmissionbased on this memory system results in an altogether different reli-gious morphology (a) episodic memory is activated by infrequentand emotionally arousing ritual performance (b) this encouragesparticipants to interpret the ritual actions through SpontaneousExegetical Reflection (SER) (c) no orthodoxy is formed since SERtends to be highly idiosyncratic (d) due to the emphasis on trans-mission via group action dynamic religious leadership based onverbally-transmitted revelatory knowledge is difficult to establishno orthodoxy checks are needed and there can be no proselytising(e) instead of widespread anonymous communities the high emo-tional arousal in infrequent rituals effect the creation of smallsocial groups with strong cohesion based on shared experience ofhighly arousing ritual ordeals15

It is important to recognise that Whitehouse does not argue thatindividual religions belong to either one or the other mode Ratherthe theory of modes of religiosity specifies two attractor positionsin cultural transmission each with specific consequences for socialmorphology A single religious tradition will most likely containboth but one or the other may be the prevalent mode of transmit-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 478

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 479

16 The theory of modes of religiosity has been subjected to criticisms and elab-orations in numerous publications in relation to anthropology Journal of RitualStudies 16(2) Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) in relation to history Alles (2004)Ketola (2004) Paden (2004) Vial (2004) Whitehouse and Martin (2004) Wiebe(2004) and in relation to cognitive science Whitehouse and McCauley (2005)

17 Soslashrensen (2004)

ting religious ideas The theory merits discussion by scholars ofreligion as it not only seeks to explain the transmission of lsquonon-optimalrsquo religious ideas and concepts but also because it makespredictions about the relation of religious ideas to both social mor-phology (group size type of leadership etc) and to likely histori-cal trajectories16

Addressing the question of the relation between intuitive repre-sentations and widely distributed concepts highlights the con-tentious role the concept of ldquoculturerdquo plays in studies of humancognition Whereas the agenda purported in the epidemiologicalapproach largely regards culture as an epiphenomenon without anycausal effect other writers have been less willing to discard thisexplanatory level and have instead focused on the intimate inter-action between stable conceptual semiotic and social structures on the one hand and universal cognitive abilities on the other Soslashrensenhas named this project an ldquoimmunology of cultural systemsrdquo sup-plementing the epidemiological project with an attempt to describehow pre-established conceptual models impose a selective pressureon the distribution of novel concepts Thus cognitive systems andpragmatic encounters are not sufficient to explain why some counter-intuitive representations are culturally successful (ie are widelydistributed) where others fail17

While the general discussion of the relation between culture andcognition is rather extensive mdash incorporating anthropology linguisticsand psychology mdash the application of this to the study of religiousconcepts has been more limited Taking inspiration from linguisticstudies of categorisation metaphor and conceptual blending somescholars have focused on the importance of underlying schematic

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 479

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

480 Jesper Soslashrensen

18 On the relation between cognition and culture defending the latter as anexplanatory level see Jensen (2002) On religious concepts forming an ecology ofrepresentations see Malley (1995 1997) On the understanding of religious con-cepts as complex concepts related to cosmological ideas see Keller and Lehman(1993) On the relation between Long Term Memory and narrative structure seeBloch (1998) On narratives mediating between culture and cognition see Jensen(2002) and Soslashrensen (2004)

structures in a cultural conceptual systems and how individualconcepts are ldquoembeddedrdquo in larger theory-like conceptual domainsIt is argued that the meaning of concepts is not only defined by theintuitive inferences it generates but also by its often hierarchicalrelationship to other concepts Thus the existing ecology of ideasin a given population will itself attain a degree of stability Norshould religious concepts only be seen in relation to other religiousconcepts or explicit theological systems Religious concepts formpart of much larger and relatively stable clusters of mutually rein-forcing concepts with basic schemata that inform a wide variety ofconcepts and behaviours Thus the concept of sin in the Westernworld is not only defined relative to a Christian theological doc-trine known to a select few but permeates other cultural domainssuch as theatre literature and the visual arts and forms part of ordi-nary everyday language Further specific concepts (eg sin repen-tance and redemption) are combined in stable narratives that notonly structure religious myths but also supply a skeleton structureto organising and giving meaning to individual experience Thuslong-term autobiographical memory will tend to be presentedthrough already existing narrative structures even though it is doubt-ful that memory itself is stored in a narrative format18

When relating religion to overall conceptual structures the roleof basic schemas and entrenched conceptual mappings becomes highlyrelevant Based on theories of conceptual metaphor developed byLakoff and Johnson some scholars have argued that it is possibleto extract the fundamental conceptual structures that inform reason-ing and religious innovation in a given cultural context Religious

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 480

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 481

19 On metaphor theory see Johnson (1987) Lakoff (1987) Lakoff and Johnson(1980) Application of metaphor and schema theory to the study of religionHanks (1990) Keesing (1993) Soslashrensen (2000a 2000b 2002) and forthcoming(a) The relation between the different cognitive approaches discussed is con-tentious See Geertz (2004) for a discussion

conceptualisation is creative in its frequent blending of differentontological and conceptual domains but the viability of newly con-structed concepts seems to be strongly dependent on the degree towhich it is adaptable to already entrenched conceptual metaphorsand widely spread cultural schemas Thus people understand newconcepts in light of already existing conceptual structure Thesebasic metaphors and schemas are sensitive to cultural differencesbut it should be emphasised that this is not a defence for culturalrelativism Our conceptual system is constrained by our bodilyinteraction with the surrounding environment Thus it is almostcertain that individuals in all cultures have a cognitive schema ofCONTAINMENT and it is very likely that such a basic schema is widelyused to represent spatial relations both literally and metaphoricallyThe extent of such use will however vary considerably While cul-tural conceptual systems vary they are formed on the same basisusing the same cognitive principles19

So even if most scholars in the cognitive science of religionagree that the transmission of religious ideas is subject to a processof selection based on cognitive mechanism there is disagreementabout (a) the role of more systematised structures of religious con-cepts in the transmission ideas (b) the impact on actual behaviourand (c) the formation of social structures One of the goals of thecognitive science of religion is to develop precise hypotheses thatcan be tested and thereby hopefully develop a more precise under-standing of the relation between individual cognitive processes theformation of cultural patterns of concepts and behaviour and socialstructure

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 481

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

482 Jesper Soslashrensen

20 See Bering (2004) for a discussion of the importance of religious conceptsin explaining behaviour

The Cognitive Study of Religious Behaviour

One might argue that the preceding argument has an intellectu-alist flavour Is religion really all about ideas and not about actionsand behaviour When considering religious behaviour one must askhow it is possible to distinguish religious from non-religious behav-iour Is it behaviour that is explicitly or implicitly motivated byreligious beliefs Is it behaviour that somehow involves religiousconcepts such as gods spirits or ancestors Or is there really nosuch thing as religious behaviour but only behaviour that some-times is coincidental with religious concepts20 These questionshave been far from answered by the cognitive science of religionand investigating these questions seems to be recalcitrant to tradi-tional experimental methods Further there is a growing realisationthat different types of behaviour have different cognitive under-pinnings and effects and therefore must be explained by differenttheories This work has barely begun but in order to restrict thediscussion I shall discuss only recent cognitive theories of ritualThis is because ritual is a prototypical case of what is traditionallyunderstood as religious behaviour and because several theorieshave been developed in order to explain this elusive phenomenon

One of the first and most influential theories of ritual is theRitual Form Hypothesis developed by Tom Lawson and RobertMcCauley Inspired by Chomskyrsquos transformational grammar Lawsonand McCauley argue that in order to understand the surface phe-nomena of actual ritual performance we need to unearth the ldquodeepstructuresrdquo that generate the rules on which performance is basedIn the same way as grammar unconsciously structures languageperformance (we all speak a language without conscious knowl-edge of the grammatical rules) so will unconscious rules structurethe performance of ritual action People have a tacit ldquoritual com-petencerdquo that guides the performance and evaluation of ritual per-

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 482

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 483

21 The Ritual Form Hypothesis is presented in Lawson and McCauley (19902002) McCauley (2001) McCauley and Lawson (2002)

formance This however is not a competence developed for thesake of performing ritual actions First Lawson and McCauleydefend a stipulative definition of religious rituals as actions involv-ing representations of more or less active participation of superhu-man agents Thus the theory does not say anything about thecategory of ritual in general Second the competence involved inperforming and evaluating religious rituals is not just concernedwith religious ritual but is based on cognitive structures used toguide the performance and evaluation of actions in general In linewith theories of religious concepts no special cognitive domain ispostulated to explain religious ritual Rather ordinary cognitivearchitecture (the Action Representation System) is mobilised andconstrains the form of religious ritual In short the Action Repre-sentation System ensures that humans have specific expectations toa number of structural roles whenever they understand an event orhappening as an action In its most simple form these roles includean agent and action and a patient When processing information asan action we will automatically look for who is acting how hesheis acting and on what or on whom the action is performed In reli-gious ritual a superhuman agent will in varying degrees of prox-imity fill the role of either agent or patient Either the ancestorsspirits or gods are seen as acting in the ritual (eg baptism) or theritual is enacting upon them (eg sacrifice)21

Ritual action faces the peculiar problem that its purported effectis often not perceptible Therefore participants will judge itsefficacy by its ldquowell-formednessrdquo ie the extent to which it con-forms to generative rules and by relating it to embedded ritualactions Thus a priest can perform the act of baptism only byvirtue of being ordained and the bread in communion can infuse astate of grace in the communicant only due to the preceding rite oftransubstantiation which in turn depends on being performed by

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 483

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

484 Jesper Soslashrensen

22 See McCauley and Lawson (2002) and Whitehouse (2004aCh 8)

an ordained priest In both cases some element in the ritual has aspecial quality due to its role as a patient in an embedded ritualThis embedded structure in which one ritual action is buttressedby another stops with a ritual presumably performed by the super-human agents themselves In this manner ritual performance isultimately related to conceptual structures that halt the potential infiniteregress involved in the search for legitimacy in prior ritual

By focussing on the role of superhuman agents in the structuraldescription of the ritual ie whether it is the agent or the patientof the ritual action it becomes possible to explain a number offacts Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals with a superhumanagent acting are not repeated can be reversed and involve rela-tively higher levels of sensory pageantry (more pomp and circum-stance) In contrast when the superhuman agent is the patient theritual can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve lesssensory pageantry So baptism is performed only once can be reversed(excommunication) and involves more sensory pageantry thanother rituals in the same tradition In contrast the act of commun-ion can be repeated cannot be reversed and will involve less sen-sory pageantry The Ritual Form Hypothesis aims to explain someof the same phenomena as Whitehousersquos Modes of Religiosity andthis has spurred a debate between the two parties22

Whereas the Lawson and McCauley argument is built on a min-imal difference between religious ritual action and ordinary actionother scholars are convinced that ritual behaviour has more distin-guishing characteristics Following ethological and anthropologicaltheories of ldquoritualisationrdquo several scholars argue that ritualisedbehaviour is distinct from ordinary behaviour on a number ofpoints First the actions performed in the ritual are stipulated ratherthan specified by the intentions of the participants The reason anagent performs a ritual does not determine the form of the ritualperformed The form of the ritual can instead be understood as

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 484

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 485

23 On how ritual actions provoke a search for meaning see Sperber (1975) Therelation between ritual actions and representations of intentionality is discussed inBoyer (1994) Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) and Whitehouse (2004a) On therelation between ritualisation and representations of ritual efficacy see Soslashrensen(forthcoming (b))

defined by the intentions of another possibly superhuman agentSecond there are no intuitive causal representations of how the actionsperformed in the ritual have their purported effect Instead focusgoes to either the perceptual features found in the ritual action (egrelations of similarity and contagion) or to established symbolicinterpretations establishing such a connection Again the presenceof superhuman agents solves a problem namely why the ritualworks Thus rituals are actions removed from their instrumentaldomain which result in specific cognitive responses aimed to relatethe actions to intentional agents and to represent their causalefficacy23

Boyer and Lienard make a further investigation into the cogni-tive mechanisms triggered by the performance of ritual Theyobserve that a number of common characteristics are present inpathological ritualisation found in patients suffering from ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder in childrenrsquos spontaneous ritualisation ofeveryday behaviour (eg bedtime rituals) in adultsrsquo preoccupationsand specific behaviours appearing at particular life-stages and incultural ritual including religious rituals These characteristics includea compulsion to perform the action an extreme focus on actiondetails and adherence to rigidity of script redundancy and iterationgoal-demotion where actions are devoid of any obvious instrumen-tal effect and a restricted number of recurrent themes such asintrusionprotection contaminationpurification and dangersecurity

To explain these commonalities they claim that ritualised actionsfound in all the domains are the result of an interaction of twoneuro-cognitive structures The first is a Precaution System whose evo-lutionary role is to infer potential threats to fitness from specific cues

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 485

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

486 Jesper Soslashrensen

24 Boyer and Lienhard (forthcoming) and Lienhard and Boyer (under review)See also Boyer (2001)

in the environment (eg smell indicates possible risk of contami-nation) and a repertoire of corresponding actions (eg avoidancecleansing) Humans are thus hardwired to detect specific cues inthe environment as a sign of potential danger and we have aninnate repertoire of atavistic action-sequences aimed at reducing poten-tial danger The second system deals with parsing of actions intomeaningful parts Ordinary actions are parsed into sequences towhich goals can be ascribed and where actions become more orless automatic (as in ordinary actions such as getting dressed)Ritualised actions by contrast parse actions at the lower level ofgesture (specific behavioural patterns) which entail that no directgoal can be ascribed and the action cannot be automatised Theperformance of long sequences of gestures swamps the workingmemory and this will for a time reduce access to obsessive orintrusive thoughts produced by the activation of the Precaution SystemAt such a psychological level ritualised action ldquoworksrdquo Ironicallyhowever in the longer perspective the very performance of suchritualised action will make the feeling of potential risks even moresalient and as such the short term remedy ritualised actions willmake future activation of the Precaution System more likely

Some might argue that even if this is a promising model toexplain pathological ritualisation found in patients suffering fromOCD it is a long way from explaining cultural rituals The modelhowever does not suggest that cultural rituals are pathological northat it is all there is to say about them It merely argues that suc-cessful cultural rituals ie rituals that are transmitted successfullyare scripted social action-sequences acquired through social exchangethat mimic the potential hazards and atavistic action-sequences trig-gering the Precaution System The existence of specific types ofcultural ritual is thus a result of a selection process in the sameway as religious concepts24

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 486

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 487

25 Boyer (2001) and Pyysiaumlinen (2004) both address the relation between theperformance of ritual action and change of social status

26 For a more thorough discussion see Martin (2004a 2004b) For the applica-tion of cognitive theories to explain historical phenomena see Lisdorf (2004) Sjoumlblom(2000) Whitehouse and Martin (2004)

Some of the outstanding questions about ritual that need to beaddressed by the cognitive science of religion is why certain typesof activities and not others are related to ritual actions and towhat extent the performance of ritual alters peoplersquos understandingof the these activities Even though there have been preliminaryattempts to answer these questions much more work has to bedone25

Concluding Remarks

When presenting cognitive theories and hypotheses to scholars(and students) of religion a common reaction is the reasonablequestion how can cognitive theories help me when dealing withconcrete historical data This is a complicated question that cannotbe adequately dealt with in these concluding remarks26 In a moreprogrammatic fashion however a few points arguing for the fun-damental relevance of cognitive science for historical studies canbe presented

bull Historical research is generally based on explicit public repre-sentations (text etc) Theories that persuasively argue that publicrepresentations are only one side of the coin must therefore betaken seriously Keeping universal cognitive mechanisms in mindcan help historians avoid historical exoticism in the same way asit helps anthropologists avoid cultural exoticism

bull Historical events involve acting subjects with cognitive systemsKnowledge of the constraints and mechanisms imposed by suchsystems can therefore help historians understand historical events

bull The cognitive science of religion attempts to construct universallyvalid explanatory theories of religious phenomena Understanding

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 487

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

488 Jesper Soslashrensen

what constitutes religious concepts and religious behaviour canhelp historians construct their object of study It is preferable thatthe construction of objects of study is performed by means ofexplicit rather than implicit theories

bull Cognitive theorising attempts to construct a precise scientificclassification based on underlying causal principles This willhelp creating more precise historical (and ethnographic) descrip-tions as well as facilitate comparative historiography

bull Precise and universally applicable theories of religious phenom-ena can help historians look for material that is not immediatelyaccessible Further it will make it possible to systematise histor-ical material in new ways

Finally it should also be emphasised that the scientific study ofreligion is much more than a historical study As a discipline itaddresses religion and religious phenomena wherever we find themand through numerous methods In all cases however humans areinvolved and knowledge of how human psychology constrains theformation of religious phenomena is therefore a necessity forunderstanding such phenomena Thus a conservative assessment ofthe role of the cognitive science of religion points to its role inresuscitating the psychology of religion and will result in adequateexplanations of the role of psychology in the generation of reli-gious phenomena A less conservative assessment will see the cognitivescience of religion as much more revolutionary by changing boththe questions we pose and the methods we use to answer them

Institute of Cognition and Culture JESPER SOslashRENSEN

Queenrsquos UniversityBelfast BT7 1NNNorthern Ireland UKjsorensenqubacuk

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 488

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

Cognitive Science of Religion 489

REFERENCES

Alles GD2004 ldquoSpeculating on the Eschaton Comments on Harvey Whitehousersquos

Inside the Cult and The Two Modes of Religiosity Theoryrdquo Method andTheory in the Study of Religion 16(3)266ndash291

Andresen Jensine2001 (ed) Religion in Mind Cognitive Perspectives On Religious Belief

Ritual and Experience Cambridge Cambridge University PressAtran S

2002 In Gods We Trust The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Barrett J1999 ldquoTheological Correctness Cognitive Constraints and the Study of

Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11325ndash3392000 ldquoExploring the Natural Foundations of Religionrdquo Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 429ndash342004 Why Would Anyone Believe in God Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Bering JM2004 ldquoNatural Selection is Nondenominational Why Evolutionary Models of

Religion Should be More Concerned with Behavior than ConceptsrdquoEvolution and Cognition 10(1)126ndash137

2005 ldquoThe evolutionary history of an illusion Religious causal beliefs inchildren and adultsrdquo In B Ellis and D Bjorklund (eds) Origins of theSocial Mind Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development New YorkNY Guilford Press 411ndash437

Bering JM and DF Bjoumlrklund2004 ldquoThe Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a

Developmental Regularityrdquo Developmental Psychology 40217ndash233Bering JM and TK Shackelford

2004 ldquoThe Causal Role of Consciousness A Conceptual Addendum toHuman Evolutionary Psychologyrdquo Review of General Psychology8227ndash248

Bloch MEF1998 How We Think They Think Anthropological Approaches to Cognition

Memory and Literacy Boulder CO Westview PressBoyer P

1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication A Cognitive Description ofTraditional Discourse Cambridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 489

490 Jesper Soslashrensen

1992 ldquoExplaining Religious Ideas Elements of a Cognitive ApproachrdquoNumen 3927ndash57

1993a (ed) Cognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolism CambridgeCambridge University Press

1993b ldquoCognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolismrdquo In Boyer 1993a4ndash47

1994 The Naturalness of Religious Ideas A Cognitive Theory ofReligion Berkeley University of California Press

1996 ldquoReligion as an Impure Object A Note on Cognitive Order inReligious Representations in Response to Brian Malleyrdquo Methodand Theory in the Study of Religion 8(2)201ndash214

2001 Religion Explained The Human Instincts that Fashion GodsSpirits and Ancestors London Vintage

2002 ldquoWhy do Gods and Spirits Matter at Allrdquo In Pyysiaumlinen and Anttonen200268ndash92

Boyer P and P Lienhardforthcoming ldquoWhy Ritualized Behaviour Precaution Systems and Action Parsing

in Developmental Pathological and Cultural Ritualsrdquo Brain andBehavioral Sciences

Boyer P and C Ramble2001 ldquoCognitive Templates for Religious Concepts Cross-cultural

Evidence for Recall of Counterintuitive Representationsrdquo CognitiveScience 25535ndash564

Geertz AW2004 ldquoCognitive Approaches to the Study of Religionrdquo In P Antes

AW Geertz and RR Warne (eds) New Approaches to theStudy of Religion vol 2 (Religion and Reason 43) Berlin Walterde Gruyter 347ndash399

Guthrie S1993 Faces in the Clouds A New Theory of Religion Oxford Oxford

University Press2002 ldquoAnimal Animism Evolutionary Roots of Religious Cognitionrdquo

In Pyysiaumlinen and Anttonen 200238ndash67Hanks W

1990 Referential Practice Language and Lived Space among theMaya London University of Chicago Press

Hinde R1999 Why Gods Persist A Scientific Approach to Religion London

Routledge

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 490

Cognitive Science of Religion 491

Hirschfeld LA and SA Gelman1994 (eds) Mapping the Mind Domain Specificity in Cognition and

Culture Cambridge Cambridge University PressHumphrey C and J Laidlaw

1994 The Archetypal Actions of Ritual A Theory of Ritual Illustratedby the Jain Rite of Worship Oxford Clarendon Press

Jensen JS2002 ldquoThe Complex Worlds of Religion Connecting Cultural and

Cognitive Analysisrdquo In Pyysiaumlinen and Anttonen 2002203ndash228Johnson M

1987 The Body in the Mind The Bodily Basis of Meaning Imagi-nation and Reason London University of Chicago Press

Keesing R1993 ldquolsquoEarthrsquo and lsquoPathrsquo as Complex Categories Semantics and

Symbolism in Kwaio Culturerdquo In Boyer 1993a93ndash110Kelemen D

1999 ldquoBeliefs about Purpose On the Origins of TeleologicalThoughtrdquo In M Corballis and S Lea (eds) The Descent ofMind Oxford Oxford University Press 278ndash294

2004 ldquoAre Children lsquoIntuitive Theistsrsquo Reasoning about Purpose andDesign in Naturerdquo Psychological Science 15295ndash301

Kelemen D and C DiYanni2005 ldquoIntuitions about Origins Purpose and Intelligent Design in

Childrenrsquos Reasoning about Naturerdquo Journal of Cognition andDevelopment 6(1)29ndash31

Keller JD and FK Lehman1993 ldquoComputational Complexity in the Cognitive Modeling of Cos-

mological Ideasrdquo In Boyer 1993a74ndash92Ketola K

2004 ldquoThe Hare Krishna and the Counterculture in the Light of theTheory of Divergent Modes of Religiosityrdquo Method and Theoryin the Study of Religion 16(3)301ndash320

Lakoff G1987 Women Fire and Dangerous Things What Categories Reveal

about the Mind London University of Chicago PressLakoff G and M Johnson

1980 Metaphors We Live By London University of Chicago PressLawson ET and RN McCauley

1990 Rethinking Religion Connecting Cognition and Culture Cam-bridge Cambridge University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 491

492 Jesper Soslashrensen

2002 ldquoThe Cognitive Representation of Religious Ritual Form ATheoryof Participantsrsquo Competence with Religious Ritual Systemsrdquo InPyysiaumlinen and Anttonen 2002153ndash176

Lienhard P and P Boyerunder review ldquoWhy cultural rituals A cultural selection model of ritualized

behaviourrdquoLisdorf A

2004 ldquoThe Spread of Non-natural Concepts Evidence from theRoman Prodigy Listsrdquo The Journal of Cognition and Culture4(1)151ndash173

Malley B1995 ldquoExplaining Order in Religious Systemsrdquo Method and Theory

in the Study of Religion (1)5ndash221997 ldquoCausal Holism in the Evolution of Religious Ideas A reply to

Pascal Boyerrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion9(4)389ndash99

Martin LH2004a ldquoTowards a Cognitive History of Religionsrdquo In C Kleine

M Schrimpf and K Triplett (eds) Unterwegs Neue Pfade inder ReligionswissenschaftFestschrift fuumlr Michael Pye zum 65Geburtstag Munich Biblion Verlag 75ndash82

2004b ldquoThe Cognitive Science of Religionrdquo Method and Theory in theStudy of Religion 16(3)201ndash204

McCauley RN2001 ldquoRitual Memory and Emotion Comparing Two Cognitive Hypo-

thesesrdquo In J Andresen (ed) Religion in Mind CognitivePerspectives on Religious Experience Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press 115ndash140

McCauley RN and ET Lawson2002 Bringing Ritual to Mind Psychological Foundations of Cultural

Forms Cambridge Cambridge University PressPaden WE

2004 ldquoComparative Religion and the Whitehouse Project Connectionsand Compatibilitiesrdquo Method and Theory in the Study ofReligion 16(3)256ndash265

Pyysiaumlinen I2001 How Religion Works Towards a New Cognitive Science of Religion

Leiden Brill2002 ldquoReligion and the Counter-Intuitiverdquo In I Pyysiaumlinen and

V Anttonen 2002111ndash133

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 492

Cognitive Science of Religion 493

2004 Magic Miracles and Religion A Scientistrsquos PerspectiveWalnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Pyysiaumlinen I and V Anttonen2002 (eds) Current Approaches in the Cognitive Study of Religion

London ContinuumRosengren KS CN Johnson and PL Harris

2000 Imagining the Impossible Magical Scientific and ReligiousThinking in Children Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Sjoumlblom T2000 Early Irish Taboos A Study in Cognitive History Helsinki

Comparative Religion 5 University of Helsinki Departmentof Comparative Religion

Slone J2004 Theological Incorrectness Why Religious People Believe

What They Shouldnrsquot Oxford Oxford University PressSoslashrensen J

2000a ldquoTheosophy Metaphors of the Subjectrdquo Temenos 35ndash36225ndash248

2000b ldquoEssence Schema and Ritual Actions Towards a CognitiveTheory of Magicrdquo PhD dissertation University of Aarhus

2002 ldquolsquoThe Morphology and Function of Magicrsquo Revisitedrdquo InPyysiaumlinen and Anttonen 2002177ndash202

2004 ldquoReligion Evolution and an Immunology of CulturalSystemsrdquo Evolution and Cognition 10(1)61ndash73

forthcoming (a) A Cognitive Theory of Magic Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Pressforthcoming (b) ldquoActs that work Cognitive aspects of ritual agencyrdquo Cogni-

tive Semiotics 18Sperber D

1975 Rethinking Symbolism Cambridge Cambridge University Press1996 Explaining Culture A Naturalistic Approach Oxford Blackwell

PublishingSperber D D Premack and AJ Premack

1995 (eds) Causal Cognition A Multidisciplinary Debate OxfordClarendon Press

Sperber D and D Wilson1995 Relevance Communication and Cognition 2nd ed Oxford

Blackwell PublishingTomasello M

1999 The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition Cambridge MAHarvard University Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 493

494 Jesper Soslashrensen

Vial T2004 ldquoThe Rubber Meets the Road The Cognitive Science of Religion and

Historical Ritualized Practicesrdquo Method and Theory in the Study ofReligion 16(3)292ndash300

Wiebe D2004 ldquoImplications of the lsquoModes Of Religiosity Theoryrsquo for The Scientific

Study of Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion16(3)234ndash240

Whitehouse H2000 Arguments and Icons Divergent Modes of Religiosity Oxford Oxford

University Press2004a Modes of Religiosity A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission

Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press2004b ldquoModes of Religiosity and the Cognitive Science of Religionrdquo Method

and Theory in the Study of Religion 16(3)321ndash335Whitehouse H and J Laidlaw

2004 (eds) Ritual and Memory Toward a Comparative Anthropology ofReligion Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Whitehouse H and LH Martin2004 (eds) Theorizing Religions Past Archaeology History and Cognition

Walnut Creek CA AltaMira PressWhitehouse H and RN McCauley

2005 (eds) Mind and Religion Psychological and Cognitive Foundations ofReligion Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 494

494 Jesper Soslashrensen

Vial T2004 ldquoThe Rubber Meets the Road The Cognitive Science of Religion and

Historical Ritualized Practicesrdquo Method and Theory in the Study ofReligion 16(3)292ndash300

Wiebe D2004 ldquoImplications of the lsquoModes Of Religiosity Theoryrsquo for The Scientific

Study of Religionrdquo Method and Theory in the Study of Religion16(3)234ndash240

Whitehouse H2000 Arguments and Icons Divergent Modes of Religiosity Oxford Oxford

University Press2004a Modes of Religiosity A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission

Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press2004b ldquoModes of Religiosity and the Cognitive Science of Religionrdquo Method

and Theory in the Study of Religion 16(3)321ndash335Whitehouse H and J Laidlaw

2004 (eds) Ritual and Memory Toward a Comparative Anthropology ofReligion Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

Whitehouse H and LH Martin2004 (eds) Theorizing Religions Past Archaeology History and Cognition

Walnut Creek CA AltaMira PressWhitehouse H and RN McCauley

2005 (eds) Mind and Religion Psychological and Cognitive Foundations ofReligion Walnut Creek CA AltaMira Press

NUMEN 524_f5_465-494II 112105 459 PM Page 494