Religion and social order
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Transcript of Religion and social order
Religion and social order
September 1, 2004
Many writers believe that religion sustains social order by inculcating morality
Exceptions
This is only true of most religions Most animistic and folk religions have no particular moral content
Greco-Roman gods were morally deficient – did terrible things to one another and to humans, merely for their own amusement
Hence: need for a more inclusive definition
Definition
Religion provides answers to questions of the meaning of life by positing the existence of the supernatural
The religions that contribute to social order Conceive of supernatural beings as deeply concerned about the behavior of humans toward one another
• Ex: Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism
How moralistic religions contribute to social order
By promulgating prosocial norms that induce people to ‘do the right thing’
Ex: the Ten Commandmen
By providing an “opiate for the masses”
Some empirical evidenceIn a comparative study of 27 Christian-dominated societies, the more importance people placed on God, the less they approved of buying stolen goods failing to report that they had accidentally damaged a car in a parking lot smoking marijuanaSimilar findings in Islamic- and Hindu-dominated societies
(Stark, “Gods, Rituals and the Moral Order, JSSR, 2001).
But some countries are more religious than others
What explains cross-national variations in religiosity?
The concept of ‘religious economies’ A market (the demand for religion) in which different religious organizations compete for the adherence of a clientele (market share)
A key issue: the degree to which a religious economy is regulated by the state
State regulation subsidy of state churches
Example: UK: Establishment of the Church of England
• Government subsidizes the C of E; this means that tax monies by non Anglicans help to support the Church
Why state subsidies matter
Since they are not so reliant on clients, state churches
Need not be very concerned about the quality of their goods
Can afford to be aloof from their clients• Ex: the C of E in Wales
Result Seekers of religious goods are likely to go elsewhere
• Ex: Wales becomes overwhelmingly Methodist
Religious monopolies
When a given church is granted a monopoly via state regulation, the situation is exacerbated
result: general religious disaffection (demand is unmet)
Competitive religious economies
Breed ‘sects’ in addition to ‘churches’Sects
• Have emotional services; tend toward mysticism• Fundamentalist• Have local social networks
Churches• Restrain emotionality in their services • Intellectualize religious teachings• Have intense local social networks
Theoretical expectation
Other things equal, competition results in more energetic and efficient firms
To the degree that religious economies are unregulated – and therefore competitive – overall levels of religious commitment will be higher
Empirical implications
H1: The more pluralistic the religious economy (e.g. the greater the # of independent religious organizations having a significant market share) and the least regulated the greater the religious commitment (e.g. church membership/attendance)
Supportive findings from studies of
942 towns in NY State in 1855 and 1865American cities in 1890, 1906, 1926Developed Protestant countries284 municipalities of SwedenEnglish and Welsh counties in 1851Contrasts between Germans and German-AmericansCountries having religious restrictions liftedCountries with large Muslim communities198 countries of the world (in 1993)
Source: Finke, R. and R. Stark 1998. “Religious Choice and Competition.” ASR 63 (5): 761-766.
H 2
The smaller the market share of a religious organization, the more energetic it is and the higher the religious commitment of its members
Supportive evidence in studies of
Catholic dioceses in the USA
All countries where the Catholic Church is active
European Protestants
American Jewish communities
Catholics in Ireland and Northern Ireland
Catholics in Italy
Implications for Catholicism in Italy
Since the religious economy of Italy is relatively regulated and monopolistic, this theory suggests that religious commitment in Italy should be low
Some Italian data
Attendance at Sunday Mass (Ginsborg 133)19.1% of adult population in Milan15.2% in Rome and Naples7.9% in Florence 4% in Bologna
Additional explanation (as in Ginsborg) secularization or religious economies: how can we tell?
Implications for non-Catholics in Italy
If the theory of religious economies holds, then
Religious commitment among non-Catholic immigrants should be higher than among Catholic immigrants
• (although we haven’t seen any data to this effect)
Catholic Church in Italy
Catholic Church in Italy plays a role in social order as a:
Political institution
Religious institution
Political institution
Organization based on geographical units (dioceses)
Connected through network of bishops
Pope isBishop of Rome
Sovereign ruler of Vatican
Head of College of Bishops
Examples of Vatican’s direct rule
Every prayer approved in Rome
Decisions about who leads parishes (e.g., not married clergy or women priests)
Rules for annulments
Selection of bishops
Rules for birth control and abortion
Organization
Central legislative bodies:Nine congregations w/jurisdictional authority
Eleven councils with promotional authority
Bureaucratic structure
Extensive bureaucracy (Roman curia)
Occupational structure and ladder
Concept: institutional isomorphism
Finances
History: unification of Italy meant the end of papal states, and therefore loss of tax revenue and church properties.
Italy agreed, in return, to subsidize the Catholic Church. Last direct payment was in 1988.
Financial relationship between Church and State
System of voluntary tax deductions and credits
Voluntary designation of income tax payment up to 0.8%
Vatican salaries are exempt from Italian income tax
Religious organization
From Ginsborg
In relation to civil society –
Encourages democratic participation
Reifies the relationship between families and societies
Contributes to social and charitable work
Participates in debates
Conclusions
The long shadow of the Church in Rome in particular and Italy in general would seem to suggest its overwhelming importance in social and individual lives. It appears to be less than one might expect.
Although religion might seem to unambiguously contribute to social order, in numerous instances there are conflicts between Church and State