Religion and Politics at the Court of Elizabeth I: The Habsburg Marriage Negotiations of 1559-1567

Religion and Politics at the Court of Elizabeth I: The Habsburg Marriage Negotiations of 1559-1567Author(s): Susan DoranSource: The English Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 413 (Oct., 1989), pp. 908-926Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/572787 .

Accessed: 13/08/2013 22:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The EnglishHistorical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 146.229.56.102 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 22:12:15 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/572787?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


English Historical Review

(C i989 Longman Group UK Limited 0013-8266/89/2052/0908/$03.00

Religion and Politics at the Court of Elizabeth I: the Habsburg marriage

negotiations of I559-I567'

THE royal marriage negotiations of Elizabeth's reign are a relatively neglected area of historical research. While the Habsburg marriage of Mary Tudor and the Spanish marriage negotiations under James I have attracted scholarly interest, little has been published recently on the various attempts to arrange a marriage between Elizabeth and her suitors from abroad.1 The reason for this omission is not difficult to find. Historians do not usually treat the Elizabethan marriage negotiations seriously. Instead they are seen as an elaborate charade devised by Elizabeth to deceive either her councillors or foreign rulers or both, in order to gain a certain freedom of action. Furthermore each scheme is anachronistically doomed to failure because of the religious differences between Elizabeth and her Catholic royal suitors. Consequently, little reason is found to dwell on the details of the negotiations. Indeed so much emphasis is placed on the difficulties, not to say the hopeless- ness, of achieving a religious compromise that it is hard to appreciate how anyone took the discussions seriously at the time. Yet they did.

The Habsburg marriage negotiations, in particular, were taken very seriously by contemporaries, Divisions at Court developed over the issue and threatened at times to lead to open violence. On the one side stood Norfolk, Sussex and Cecil, and on the other was Leicester with a steadily growing number of supporters. Leicester's public stance on the marriage varied according to the circumstances and the person to whom he was talking at the time, but the pro-Habsburg group felt sure that he was secretly working to scuttle the project. Fuelled by personal grievances against the Earl, neither Norfolk nor Sussex accepted lightly his opposition to a scheme which they believed to be in the best interests of their Queen and country. Consequently, on several occasions violence nearly broke out at Court. In June I 56 , both Sussex and Leicester, with their followers, carried arms to Court 'as if it were to try their utmost'. When Elizabeth ordered each 'not to medle with' the other, Sussex complied but Leicester continued to assemble 'great bandes of men with swords and buckels' to waylay

A draft of this article was read at the Early Modern History seminar at the Institute of Historical Research. I should like to thank Professor Conrad Russell for his comments at each stage of writing it. His influence and suggestions have been too numerous to footnote separately but any errors are mine alone.

i. The exception is W. T. MacCaffrey, 'The Anjou Match and the Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy', in Peter Clark, Alan G. T. Smith and Nicholas Tyacke (eds), The English Commonwealth 1547-1640 (Leicester, I979), pp. 59-75.



I989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 909

his enemy.1 In January I 566 all the Howard adherents at Court were wearing yellow ribbons while Leicester's friends wore purple.2 Five months later 'hard words and challenges to fight were exchanged' between Sussex and Leicester. On this occasion at least their dispute was thought so public and violent that their show of reconciliation had to be prominently displayed. Hence they rode together through the streets of the city 'in order that the people who had become excited about their dispute might be reassured'.3 Soon after his abortive trip to Vienna to arrange the marriage, Sussex warned Leicester that he would publish the names of those who had stood in the way of the match if the Earl did not now speak out in its favour.4 Further trouble was probably only averted by Sussex's appointment as Lord President of the Council of the North. His attainment of high office successfully neutralized him after the disappointing mission and sent him away from Court.

There has been a tendency recently to underplay these political tensions, because they do not fall within the category of 'faction' as defined by Eric Ives and Simon Adams. Both historians seem to be suggesting that there was no faction at Elizabeth's Court before the 1590S and, given their definitions (which are in fact not exactly the same), they are right to do so.5 Nonetheless, the political divisions and tensions at Court in the I56os were serious. They were important enough to draw the attention of observers, to necessitate Elizabeth's personal intervention to keep the peace, and to influence the proceedings of the I 566 Parliament. Thus whether or not we call their disputes factional, we must not underestimate their intensity nor their political importance. Furthermore, we need to modify Adams's general analysis of Court politics, which he sees as less the product of divisions amongst courtiers than of disputes between 'an able, charming yet imperious and idiosyncratic queen and councillors and intimates who generally shared a high degree of social, political and cultural homogeneity'.6 While it is beyond doubt that Sussex and Leicester shared a common social background and outlook, it is questionable whether they were at one in their 'cultural' (i.e. religious) and political views. Sussex, from the following account, emerges as a conservative Protestant, while Leicester was the heir to his father's radical Protestant following. In

I. P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice]. S[tate] P[apers], I2/36 fo. I52; C[alendar] [of] S[tate] P[apers] Span/ish], 1558-1567, pp. 445-6; W. Camden, The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, late Queen of England (London, i688), p. 79.

2. CSP Span. i558-i s67, p. 5 1 I .

3. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp- 56o-i; Historical Manuscripts Commission 7th Report, p. 6I9.

4. CSP Span. 1568-1579, p. 14.

5- E. W. Ives, Faction in Tudor England (Appreciations in History, 6, I979), pp. I-2. S. Adams, 'Faction, Clientage and Party. English Politics 550-1603', History Today, XXXii (I982), 34. Ives defines factional disputes as conflicts over patronage whereas Adams argues that their 'essence was a personal rivalry that over-rode all other considerations'.

6. S. Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?. The Court and its Politics', in Christopher Haigh (ed.), The Reign of Elizabeth I (London, I984), p. 56.



9IO RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October

I 5 66 when Sussex was urging religious conformity, Leicester was show- ing 'his colours as the non-conformists' friend'.'

The Habsburg negotiations contributed to religious, as well as political, tension in England. Amidst Protestants they exacerbated fears of a return to Catholicism, fears particularly justified in an England where Catholic survivalism was strong.2 Yet also from the radical Protestant standpoint, the negotiations created the danger that the marriage would shift the Elizabethan Church in a more Lutheran direction. As the Austrians tolerated Lutheranism but not Calvinism, some feared that the marriage would lead to Elizabeth's acceptance of the Augsburg Confession rather than the Helvetic Confession of the Reformed Churches. It could not have gone unnoticed that some of those keenest on the match were Lutheran sympathizers or religious conservatives. Furthermore, the Lutheran Bishop Guest, as the Queen's Almoner, had influence at Court and seems also to have backed the scheme.3 Nor were these fears unjustified, for Elizabeth told Sussex to visit the German Lutheran princes on his way to Vienna in I 567 and assure them of her intention to abide by the Augsburg Confession.4 The marriage project therefore provided an ingredient of uncertainty about the future of the Elizabethan Church in the 156os, just because many people believed it might well take place.

The first phase of the Habsburg marriage negotiations opened in early I 59. The initiative for a matrimonial alliance between England and Austria came from the Emperor Ferdinand, who sent his ambassador, Count Helffenstein, to the English Court in February I 55 to see how the land lay in matters of religion and marriage. In his reports home, Helffenstein was optimistic. Religion seemed to him no bar to a marriage since he had found that 'throughout England the form of the Catholic religion is preserved' and 'there is great hope that if they get a Catholic King all religious questions may easily be settled by authority of the Sovereign.'5 His view was deliberately fostered by Elizabeth, who was trying throughout I559 to represent her new religious settlement in a conservative light. Thus her Chapel Royal, which stood as an example to the whole Church, contained a silver cross and two burning candles 'standing altar-wise'. Likewise, in April 1559, she told the Spanish ambassador, De Feria, that 'she differed

i. P. Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (London, i967), pp. 92-3. 2. C. Haigh, 'The Continuity of Catholicism in the English Reformation', Past and Present,

xciii (I981), 37-69. 3. J. Strype, The History of the Life and Acts of Archbishop Grindal (Oxford, 1821), p. i66.

The hostile references to Lutheranism in the Zurich Letters in the mid- I56os are also suggestive. Hastings Robinson (ed.), Zurich Letters 1558-1602 (Second Series, Parker Society, Cambridge, I 845),

pp. I25, 143, 157. R. Dixon, History of the Church of England (Oxford, 1902), vi. I34. J. Strype, Grindal, p. 146. I would like to thank Dr Tyacke for this point.

4. PRO SP70/9I fo. 85S S. V. Von Klarwill, Queen Elizabeth and Some Foreigners (London, 1928), pp. 26-9, 38, 45,

46, 47.



I989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 9II

very little from [Roman Catholics] as she believed that God was in the sacrament of the Eucharist and only dissented from two or three things in the Mass.'1

Heartened by his ambassador's reports, Ferdinand sent over another envoy, Baron Breuner, to England in May, to open formal negotiations on behalf of his younger son, Charles. Elizabeth, however, immediately rejected the marriage offer and explained that she intended to remain single for the foreseeable future.2 Unconvinced, Breuner decided to remain in England to wait on events, but throughout the summer months the Imperial suit made little headway. Only in the autumn were there signs that Elizabeth might be wavering, and Breuner quickly responded by urging Ferdinand to send over Charles to press his suit. Ferdinand, however, refused to permit his son to leave Austria on so uncertain a mission and ordered Breuner home early in I 6o when Elizabeth's attitude had once again cooled.3

Apart from the Spanish and Imperial ambassadors, few in England mourned the failure of these early negotiations. The project lacked support in the Council and at Court. Sir Thomas Parry and the Earl of Bedford were thought to favour the suit of Sir William Pickering. The Earl of Arundel entertained hopes of marrying the Queen himself, and Sir Robert Dudley did not want her to marry at all while he was still tied to Amy Robsart. There is no evidence that Sir William Cecil supported a Habsburg match in I 5 59; certainly the Spanish and Imperial ambassadors thought him hostile to it. The Duke of Norfolk was the most ardent, and probably the lone, voice at Court in favour of the Archduke's suit.4

This lack of enthusiasm for the Habsburg marriage was more the result of political concerns and the experiences of the previous reign than of anxieties about Charles's Catholicism. Thus, it was political not religious considerations which dominated Sir Thomas Smith's arguments against a foreign match in a short book, written in I 6o.5 His arguments articulated deep-seated fears about the political repercus- sions of a foreign match. A foreign husband might 'favour his country and countrymen', try to introduce his own laws and customs into

i. CSP Span. 1558-1567, p. 62; Collinson, p. 3 5. 2. Von Klarwill, pp. 67, 76, 86; CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 53-4. 3. Patrick Forbes, A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign ofQueen Elizabeth (London,

I74I), i. 176; Von Klarwill, pp. I23-4, i5i; CSPSpan. 1558- 567, pp. 58-67, 97-I04, I06-7.

4. Von Klarwill, pp. 5 1, I2-I3, I23; CSP Span. i558-1567, p. I20. The Earl of Sussex went to Ireland in August 1 59 and his views on Breuner's proposal are unrecorded, but there is a letter from him to Cecil, written in October i56o, which makes it clear that he did not then oppose a Dudley marriage: PRO SP 63/2 fos. 82-3.

S Smith's Dialogue on the Queen's Marriage was widely copied and appears in various manuscript collections including B[ritish] L[ibrary], Additional Manuscripts 48047, fOs. 97-I35 . It is printed in J. Strype, The Life of the Learned Sir Thomas Smith, Appendix (Oxford, i86o), pp. I84-259.

According to M. Dewar, Sir Thomas Smith, A Tudor Intellectual in Office (London, 1964), p.

85, the pamphlet was 'no academic exercise; it was intended to serve Dudley's cause' and to win back the Queen's favour.



912 RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October

England, and use the country's resources to finance his own territory's defence and wars. The son and heir of such a marriage would naturally show affection to his father's country and, even worse, might one day be required to rule it. To those who claimed that a foreign match would bring wealth, power and prestige to England, he replied that it could well weaken and impoverish her, as Mary's recent marriage to Philip amply demonstrated. Smith made no direct reference to problems that might arise from a foreign prince's Catholicism but merely alluded to them. Thus, when he pointed out the natural wish of a foreign prince to bring his own laws and institutions to England, he warned: 'And do you not think that if King Philip had been long here, he would not have brought some piece from Spain? If nothing else at least the Inquisition, as they call it, as he did to Naples.' Religion was thus a side-issue; the arguments used in these early Elizabethan years against a foreign match were similar to those which had been raised by opponents of the Spanish marriage in I153, but markedly different from the Protestant polemics of John Stubbs and Sir Philip Sidney at the time of the Alencon matrimonial negotiations.

Nonetheless, it was clear to all observers that Elizabeth could not marry a rigid, uncompromising Roman Catholic. Consequently, during his stay in England Breuner had thought it advisable to portray Charles as a moderate in religion and even to dissemble about the extent of his commitment to Catholicism. As he explained to the Emperor:

Had I expressly averred that my gracious master, the Archduke Charles, was still devoted to the Catholic religion and would ever remain so, the whole affair would have been abruptly terminated and all hopes cut off. 1

He had considered such tactics necessary and worthwhile as a means of promoting a marriage which would in time restore Elizabeth to the Catholic Church and preserve Habsburg interests in England. This subterfuge was only possible in the conditions of the early 156os and led to misunderstandings later on.

The main impetus behind the first phase of the marriage negotiations thus came from the Austrians and Spaniards. Elizabeth's councillors did not seek the match nor even take it seriously, while the Queen herself consistently and openly rejected the idea of marriage. The brief flicker of interest in it during the autumn months was a mere diplomatic ploy intended to keep the friendship of Spain during a time of confrontation with France.

In contrast, the impulse behind the second phase of the negotiations came from England. In I 563 Sir William Cecil, who had been unenthu-

i. Von Klarwill, p. I I9.



I989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 9I3

siastic about the scheme in I 5 S9 used his agent in Germany, Christo- pher Mundt, to revive the match.1 At Elizabeth's Court the project was attracting considerable and influential support. Norfolk, a privy councillor from I 562, was working with both Cecil and his kinsman, Sussex, on the latter's return from Ireland in May I 564, to promote the marriage scheme. By I S6S other identified supporters included the Earls of Derby and Huntingdon, Lords Hunsdon, Clinton, and How- ard of Effingham, and Sir Nicholas Bacon. Shrewsbury and Pembroke may also have spoken in its favour. These men represented a wide spectrum of religious opinion in England. At one end stood Bacon and Huntingdon, both godly Protestants, at the other were Norfolk and Derby, both noted conservatives. This pro-Habsburg grouping represented so formidable a force at Court that the Earl of Leicester was loth to express publicly his hostility to the project; instead he chose to negotiate secretly with the French ambassador to sabotage it by putting forward first Charles IX's candidature and then his own.2 Elizabeth herself had to bow before the pressure. As the Imperial envoy, Zwetkovich, accurately observed in June I 56 : 'she had formerly pur- posed by all means to remain single but in consequence of the insistent pressure that was brought upon her by the Estates of her realm, she was now resolved to marry.'3

The new alignment in favour of the Habsburg match, which overrode religious differences, arose partly in response to an increased concern about the succession. Catherine Grey's disgrace, Mary Stuart's marriage and the later birth of her son all made the succession problem particularly acute in the mid-I 56os. The only way to avoid a disputed succession was for the Queen to marry or name a successor. A royal marriage was the preferred option for many, but there was a dearth of suitable candidates. Those who had previously wanted Elizabeth to marry an Englishman now, on the whole, had second thoughts. As Cecil explained in I 5 64:

Although the magnates of the realm at one time thought that they would have to force the Queen to marry one of themselves, they have now changed their opinion and would prefer that she marry a foreigner, fearing that the novus homo who rose to kingship from their midst would favour his own

i. Von Klarwill, pp. I72-7, i8o-i; S. Haynes, Collection of State Papers ... Left by William Cecil (London, I740), pp. 407-8.

2. Von Klarwill, p. 232; CSP Span. iy58-i567, pp. 407, 5 I7; Haynes, pp. 409-I0; PRO, Baschet Transcripts, 3 I/3/25, 26, fos. I, 20-I. T. Wright, Queen Elizabeth and Her Times (London, I838), i. I98. Breuner included Pembroke and Shrewsbury amongst the match's supporters but De Foix, who is a more reliable source, thought that Pembroke, Shrewsbury and Bedford were not keen on the Habsburg match. For Derby's conservatism see C. Haigh, Reformation and resistance in Tudor Lancashire (Cambridge, I975), p. 2I9; for Norfolk's see D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors (Oxford, I 986), pp. 84-5.

3. Von Klarwill, p. 225.




family and oppress the others, and therefore it is that they now desire to have a foreigner.1

Cecil's 'novus homo' was Robert Dudley. As a married man Dudley had been ineligible as a candidate in 1 5 59, but in 1 564 he was a widower and Elizabeth's clear favourite as an English husband. It was a choice that Cecil and others strongly opposed. The Secretary had even threatened to resign in late I56o when it looked as if Dudley might marry Elizabeth, and he still believed in I 566 that a Dudley marriage would ruin her honour, reputation, happiness and interests.2 Sussex, though not averse to this marriage in I56o, also opposed it strongly by I566, thanks to Leicester's support of his enemies in Ireland.3 Many at Court therefore preferred to see the Queen look abroad for a husband, but of the foreign suitors only the Archduke was suitable. Of the Prot- estants, the German Lutheran princes had neither the status nor political weight to be attractive candidates whilst the King of Sweden would not live in England and in any event was thought 'too rude'. Of the eligible Catholics, the French King was too young and his brothers still younger. The Archduke Charles alone seemed compatible on grounds of age, dignity and descent.4 Although he would not bring with him the extensive territories promised in the earlier Habsburg match of I 5 5 3-4, he offered prestige and political security. A Habsburg marriage would open the way to an alliance with Spain which could provide protection from France and the Papacy. Furthermore it would preserve the Burgundian connection, which despite the trade embargo of I 564 many still thought essential to England's commercial and political interests.5

The promoters of the match were of course aware that the Archduke's religion stood in the way of its success. Yet Cecil for one ignored rather than wrestled with the problem. He seems to have persuaded himself that the Archduke would eventually agree to total conformity with English practices.6 Sussex, on the other hand, referred more openly to the religious obstacle but hoped for a compromise whereby Charles would attend English church services with Elizabeth but hear the Catholic Mass in private.7 Both men believed that the Habsburgs were more flexible about their religion than was the case. Ferdinand's decision not to enforce all the Tridentine reforms, Charles's known

I. Von Klarwill, pp. I 89-9o. This reference to Dudley was particularly offensive as it drew attention to the attainder of his father and grandfather. It was their tainted blood as traitors that made Dudley a new man and the earldom a new line. My thanks are due to Professor Russell for this point.

2. Haynes, p. 444. 3. PRO SP 63/2 fos. 82-3.

4. Von Klarwill, pp. I 74, 230.

S. Haynes, 444; Von Klarwill, p. 22 5; PRO SP 70/94 fos. I 72-6. 6. Wright, i. 206-7; CSP Span. 1558-i367, p. 58o. Cecil made no mention of the Archduke's

religion when listing the disadvantages of the match in a memorandum of I 566. Haynes, p. 444. 7. CSPSpan. I558-I567, pp. 46i, 487.




toleration of Lutherans within his territories, and Breuner's deliberate misrepresentations in 5 59 were the cause of their complacency. Had there been awareness of the Archduke's true feelings it is unlikely that the match would have commanded so much support from I 564 to I S 6S . Certainly it lost much of its popularity once the uncompromising nature of his religion was revealed in late I 567.1

Despite the strong support for the marriage at Elizabeth's Court, the initial negotiations were slow to get under way. Nearly two years elapsed from the time the project was first revived until the arrival of the Imperial envoy, Adam Zwetkovich, in England to discuss terms, a slow pace of events which owed much to the absence of permanent ambassadorial representation in England and Vienna.2 Once Zwetko- vich arrived in London in May I565, serious negotiations began. Although he had come officially on other business, Elizabeth did not fob him off with evasive diplomatic niceties but permitted him to talk about the terms of a marriage alliance with her inner ring of councillors, Cecil, Norfolk, and Leicester.3 Her positive attitude was largely the result of the political pressure applied by supporters of the match as well as her own recognition that relations with the Habsburgs needed repair after the Burgundian trade embargo of I 564.4

The negotiations with Zwetkowich exposed for the first time the three main areas of disagreement between the two sides. The most important concerned religion. While the Emperor Maximilian insisted that his brother and household should be allowed 'the free exercise of their religion', by which he meant open and public worship, Eliza- beth insisted that 'no-one in this realm shall publicly or privately practise or confess religious rites that are contrary to the laws of this land'. The second difficulty concerned the Archduke's future status. Maximi- lian wanted Charles to have a share in government, a royal title and right of succession should the Queen predecease him childless. Eliza- beth, on the other hand, proposed that he should possess the same limited powers and title as Philip II when married to her sister Mary. The third disagreement was over who should bear the cost of the Arch- duke's household expenses in England.5 Elizabeth and the English negotiators considered the Imperial position on these three questions - especially religion - so extreme that there was a danger the match would have to be called off. In late July Elizabeth bluntly told Zwet-

i. Von Klarwill, pp. I74-5; BL Cotton MSS Nero B ix fo. I04. The funeral oration for Ferdinand preached by Grindal on 3 October I 564, interestingly declared 'he was not so adduced to the Roman religion as appeared . ..'. Strype, Grindal, p. 148. I would like to thank Dr Nicholas Tyacke for this reference.

2. Von Klarwill, p. I85-7.

3. Von Klarwill, pp. 208-I2.

4. G. Ramsay, The Queen's Merchants and the Revolt of the Netherlands (Manchester, I986), pp. I2-I 5.

5. Von Klarwill, pp. 239-4 I, 248, 25 I-2.



9I6 RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October

kowich that 'owing to the religion everything would be in vain' and 'therefore it was useless to speak about it [the marriage]'. 1

Elizabeth's hard-line demand on religion throughout the negotiations of i165 is not difficult to understand. Whatever her personal feelings it was politically impossible for her to grant any future husband private access to a Mass at that time. Since the spring, Archbishop Parker had been engaged in disciplining the Protestants, Humphrey and Samp- son, at the University of Oxford for refusing to obey the laws on ceremonies and clerical dress. Sampson, indeed, was deprived of his deanery in May at the Queen's command. Elizabeth then could hardly grant an exemption from the law to Catholics when she was demanding total conformity from committed Protestants. It might well raise a political storm, especially as the Oxford divines had important friends - Leicester, for one.2

By the end of August i165 the negotiations had ground to a halt. Zwetkowich had returned to Vienna with Elizabeth's uncompromising conditions and the Habsburgs had decided that 'there was nothing to be done but to abandon the matter'.3 It was Elizabeth who kept the negotiations open by sending Thomas Danett to Vienna in May i166 to persuade Maximilian to reconsider his position.4 Her reasons for this overture are not clear, but it is possible that she hoped thereby to avoid a confrontation with her next - and imminent - Parliament on the issues of marriage and the succession. Perhaps too the re-opening of the conference at Bruges in May I 566 to settle outstanding grievances between England and the Netherlands influenced her decision. Eliza- beth was very anxious that the talks should succeed. She had already made a personal appeal to Philip II and may have thought that Spanish goodwill could be encouraged by positive action on the marriage front.5 The mission was, however, a failure, for Maximilian would not shift his ground.6 Moreover, Danett's impression of the Archduke dampened any remaining hopes that Charles might with time convert to Protestantism; to his surprise Danett discovered that Charles attended Mass every day and was devoted to the Catholic faith.7

Yet, even when they heard this news, Norfolk, Sussex and Cecil

I. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 452-4.

2. C. Dent, Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford (Oxford, I983), pp. 34-7. 3. Von Klarwill, p. 255; J. H. Pollen (ed.), 'Papal Negotiations with Mary, Queen of Scots,

I 56i-i 567', Scottish HistoricalSociety, XXVii (I901), 469. 4. There had been some communication by letter after Zwetkovich's return to Austria, and in

February i 66 it was decided to send Thomas Sackville to Maximilian on the same mission. This was postponed for unclear reasons and Danett was then sent with similar instructions. Hist. MSS Comm. 70, Pepys MSS at Magdalene College, Cambridge, 1485-1703 (I9I I), pp. 78-9; BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 228-32, 23 8-9, 244-6.

S. G. Ramsay, pp. I7-29. 6. Von Klarwill, pp. 259-64. 7. C[alendar][of] S/tate] P[apers] Fore eign] I566-I568, p. 99.




continued to work for the marriage. The Parliament which opened on 30 September I566 provided them with an opportunity to exert pressure on Elizabeth to continue negotiations. From both the Spanish ambassador's dispatches and the parliamentary proceedings it appears that the pro-Habsburg group used this Parliament as a lever on Eliza- beth to send a formal embassy to Vienna.1 Their tactics worked. She promised a joint delegation from both Houses: 'I say again, I will marry as soon as I can conveniently, if God take not him away with whom I mind to marry.' At the same time the attempts of Leicester to stall the marriage by encouraging the Parliament to take up the question of the succession failed.2

Soon after Parliament's dissolution, the Council drew up instructions for an embassy led by Sussex to go to Austria; but the Earl did not leave until the end of June I567, as Elizabeth kept on postponing his departure.3 Inevitably the supporters of the match, including Sussex, despaired of his ever going on the mission at all and, even when reassured that he would depart, some feared that the embassy was a mere public relations device intended to silence demands that the Queen marry or settle the succession.

On 20 June 1567 Elizabeth gave Sussex his final instructions. She offered no new compromise to break the deadlock over religion, but merely reiterated her demand that the Archduke should observe the laws of the country by attending Divine Service with her. She refused to use her dispensing power and allow any exception to the law, as it might encourage others to expect changes in religion and set an example of disobedience.5 It seems that she and some of her Council still thought that the Archduke might conform if he knew the true nature of the English Church, but feared that he had been given a false account of it.6 Sussex too was concerned that the Austrians might have an unfavourable impression of the religion practised in England, but thought the responsibility for this lay elsewhere. According to the Spanish ambassador, Sussex said:

although he was a native-born Englishmen [sic], and knew as well as others what was passing in the country, he was at a loss to state what was the religion that really was observed here. He believed that her Majesty and the rest of them held by the Augsburg Confession, but he saw nevertheless that Calvinism was being preached and being taught nearly everywhere, and he therefore wished the Council to decide about this as it was a point of the highest importance, those who adopted the Augsburg Confession being

i. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 59 1-2.

2. PRO SP I2/4I fo. 7; CSPSpan. 1558-I567, p. 577. 3. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 240-2.

4. CSPSpan. 1558-1567, pp. 6i i, 614, 6i6, 63I, 640.

S. PRO SP 70/9 I fos. 77-9 I .

6. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 240-2.



9I8 RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October

further removed from the Calvinists than from those who professed the ancient religion.'

It was necessary, thought Sussex, that the Queen make explicit to the Austrians exactly what form of Protestantism was practised in Eng- land, for they could tolerate Lutheranism but not Calvinism. The Privy Council therefore advised Sussex to assure the Emperor that the Church in England was such:

as in dede no quyet Catholick may neede to forebeare to resorte to our churches and common prayers, for that ther is nothing redd or spoken other in praiers, or in ministration of the sacramente but only the very wordes of the scripture.

He was to explain that, where the Church departed from the scriptures, the prayers said had once been used in the Catholic or primitive Church; the only difference was that the prayers were now usually in English, though in some colleges and churches of the realm where the company was learned, the prayers were still spoken in Latin.2 Elizabeth's instructions to Sussex made the same point but with less good grace. The Archduke, she said, was not being asked to act against his conscience as, unlike the service of the Church of Rome, 'there is nothing in our law which is contrary to the scriptures' - besides as long as he obeyed the laws he could hold whatever opinions he liked on religious matters.3 Elizabeth also offered no compromise on either the question of the title and status of the Archduke or the payment of Charles's household expenses.4

Sussex left England on 29 June and reached Vienna on S August.5 At first the negotiations made little progress as Sussex had brought with him no new compromise from the Queen. On 23 October, however, Maximilian and Sussex hammered out their own compromise arrangement.6 This was based on the principle that Charles should be allowed to follow his conscience in religious practices but must also accept that the exercise of his conscience had to be restricted in order to provide for the safety of the English realm. Sussex then suggested five conditions which Charles would have to accept as limitations on his freedom of worship. Firstly, the Mass and other sacraments would be celebrated only in a private chamber, not in a public place, and Englishmen would be excluded from it. Secondly, he would accom-

I. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 236-7. Sussex's thoughts on the religion of England in the mid-i 56os fits in well with Peter Lake's analysis in P. Lake, 'Calvinism and the English Church I570-i635', Past and Present, cxiv (1987), pp. 32-76.

2. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 240-2. Indeed, a Latin prayerbook was printed in i56o for use in the Universities and the schools of Winchester and Eton. The English defence of the Prayer Book rested on this argument; it appears again during the Anjou marriage negotiations.

3. PRO SP 70/9 I fos. 82, 83. 4. PRO SP 70/9 I fos. 86-8. S. For the diary of Sussex's journey, see Bodleian Library, Tanner MSS 50 fos. I90-200; for his

letters, see PRO SP 70/92 fos. 16-19, 78, 81-2.

6. Von Klarwill, p. 280; PRO SP 70/94 fo. i6i.



1989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 919

pany the Queen to English services. Thirdly, the Austrians would refrain from criticizing English religious practices and discussing religion with any Englishman. Fourthly, Charles would suspend holding his services for a period of time if any disturbances arose from this toleration. Finally, he would agree to accept the advice of the Council on all matters relating to religion. 1

Sussex expressed confidence that this arrangement would resolve the religious problem. Maximilian, he told the Queen, had secretly agreed to four of the proposed restrictions and was prepared to reconsider the fifth, once he knew her attitude to the compromise. As for the difficulties concerning the title and status of the Queen's future husband, Maximilian, he wrote, now accepted her terms: 'yf ye wyll satisfye the Archduke's request for his conscyence, they wyll bothe accorde to eny thing you wyll requyre in eny other matter. '2

In fact not all the difficulties had been cleared up. Charles had not reached any final decision on the first two proposals, which were the most important, and considered the fifth, the suspension of the Mass in the event of any disturbances, 'too exorbitant and exacting'. Further- more, while Sussex believed that he was requesting the Archduke to attend English services at all times, Maximilian thought the request was for attendance 'from time to time'.3 Nonetheless, Maximilian was prepared to concede more than either the Duke of Anjou in I 57I

or Heni-ietta Maria when she married Charles 1.4 It was the Earl's interpretation of the agreement that was sent for Elizabeth's approval, by way of his messenger, Henry Cobham. Meanwhile, Sussex remained in Vienna to await her answer.

Cobham arrived in England on 7 November I 567. His first interview with Elizabeth went well, but she would not make a decision before consulting her Council. Unfortunately for the supporters of the marriage, Norfolk had been absent from Court since September on account of an illness brought on by the death of his wife, and felt too sick to obey the Queen's summons to a Council meeting called to discuss the marriage.5 Despite Sussex's entreaties that he attend, Norfolk could only write her a letter in favour of the marriage. At the meeting, therefore, the opponents of the match took advantage of his absence to press home their case. According to Sir George Stanley, a friend of Sussex, the opposition came from Leicester, the Lord Steward (Pem- broke), Northampton and the Vice-Chamberlain (Knollys); whilst its

I. Von Klarwill, pp. 280-2; BL Cott. MSS Julius F vi. fo. 6i. 2. PRO SP 70/94fos. I6I-2.

3. Von Klarwill, pp. 8o-i. 4. Anjou demanded a public Mass, while Henrietta Maria refused to attend any Protestant service,

even the coronation. Cal. SP For. I572-74, p. 9; Hist. MSS Comm., Eleventh Report, App. I, SkrineMSS, i625-1628(I887), p. 44.

S. CSP Span. I558-1567, p. 684; PRO SP I2/44 fos. go-i; Hist. MSS Comm., 58, Marquess of Bath at Longleat, II: Harley Papers, I5I5-1772 (I907), pp. I7-I9; BL Cott. MSS Titus B ii. fo. 308.




supporters were Cecil, Lord Admiral Clinton, the Lord Chamberlain (Howard of Effingham) and the Comptroller (Rogers).1

Although the Council's deliberations were unrecorded, the kinds of arguments presented before it appear in an anonymous document dated November 1567 and entitled 'An Inquisition to gather what is metest to be done in the marriage between Queen Elizabeth and the Archduke Charles touching his request on that behalf'.2 Its author clearly supported the marriage and weighted his arguments accordingly, but, nonetheless, he did justice to his opponents' point of view. Their case, he declared, rested on two presumptions: that the use of the Mass was against the law of God and that it was dangerous to the state of the realm. The danger came from the possibility of religious unrest created by both 'the malice of the papists' and the fear of the zealous multitude that this limited toleration might lead to religious change. There was the additional risk, in their view, that the Archduke might seek to honour God by restoring England to the obedience of Rome.

The author found these objections unwarranted. Concerning the first presumption, he agreed that the Mass was against the scriptures but argued that the issue was not whether it was evil, but whether a good Christian might let it be used by another Christian who was in error. Precedent and practice suggested to him that it was acceptable. Toler- ation of papists existed in many parts of Germany, while even in England the ambassadors of France and Spain heard their Masses in private. Nor did he believe that the hearing of a Catholic Mass was thought to be such a heinous crime in England, for it was not severely punished; those found guilty of it were merely fined one hundred marks, whilst English merchants who had traded the goods of an alien suffered the loss of all their goods 'of what value so ever they be'. Moreover, Elizabeth would not be the first to marry someone of a different faith on similar terms. He pointed out that when the Prince of Orange had married the Lutheran sister of the Duke of Saxony, he had permitted her and her household to retain their religion. Evi- dence from the scriptures led to the same conclusion: good Christians might allow their marriage partners some toleration in religion. Lastly, since papistry was erroneous and blind, it was evident, to him at least, that it would not survive in the presence of the true faith.3

As for the dangers to the state, they had been exaggerated, thought

I. PRO SP I 2/44 fo. 11 2.

2. There are several copies of this manuscript including BL Addit. MSS 4I49 fos. 88-97 and BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 282-94. The handwriting provides no clue to its author's identity but I suspect that he was Sussex; the writer was apparently absent from Court, and was certainly knowledgeable about European politics and religious practices.

3. The evidence from scripture was from St Paul, e.g. Corinthians io. The texts, argued the author, demonstrated that Paul allowed toleration of practices abolished by the New Testament to those who denied Christ, so it was wrong for them to deny the Mass to those who erroneously believed it was in his honour.




the author, by the opponents of the match. There was no possibility of England returning to Rome, he argued. Elizabeth would not be converted by her husband, for she had demonstrated during her sister's reign the strength of her conscience. The people dreaded a return to popery because of the experience of burnings and exiles during Mary's reign, and religion could only be changed with the consent of Parlia- ment. It was far more likely in his opinion that the Archduke, once in England, would see the light and become a Protestant. In any event, any problems which might possibly arise from the marriage were nothing like as great as those which were certain to come from the Queen staying single. The dangers of a disputed succession, the bloodshed and threat to property from a civil war, isolation in Europe and the prospect of war, to his mind, far outweighed the fears expressed about this marriage.

Elizabeth was not to agree with him. On io December 1567 she announced to Sussex her decision to deny the Archduke the right to celebrate the Mass in private. Her conscience, she said, balked at the idea of it, while the laws of the country forbade the practice and she herself disliked the idea of allowing exceptions to the law. Nor was the time right, she continued, to consent to a compromise on religion, for if she disliked the Archduke on meeting him she would be unable to give religion as the excuse for breaking off the negotiations. Thus, Sussex was instructed to measure his words carefully in his reply to Charles, neither to grant nor refuse him the right to hold the Mass in his chamber. Elizabeth explained that she was still anxious that the negotiations should continue and hoped that Charles would visit her in England.1

Two days later Elizabeth took a more negative line. Perhaps after further consultations with her advisers she saw no point in pursuing the negotiations. She therefore told Sussex that it was unwise for the Archduke to come to England with the hope of persuading her to grant him toleration, in case 'upon conference to be had by us in this matter, we cannot accord to his request'.2 This letter dealt the death- blow to the Habsburg marriage scheme, despite Sussex's attempts to salvage the negotiations. In February I 568 he returned home empty- handed.3

What motivated Elizabeth to reject the Archduke's request to hear the Mass privately (which effectively wrecked the negotiations) cannot be ascertained with complete assurance. Nonetheless the arguments contained in the letter of io December have the ring of truth. Besides, the opposition expressed in her Council and the fears aroused at Court

i. PRO SP 70/9 5 fos. I 29-3 I .

2. PRO SP 70/95 fo. 1 33.

3. PRO SP 70/96 fos. 13-14; Von Klarwill, pp. 284-9.




made it unwise to risk political instability by embarking on an unpopu- lar marriage. It was, moreover, especially difficult to justify granting Charles the private use of the Mass while non-conforming London clergy remained in prison and the pamphlet 'warfare' on the so-called vestiarian issue was still raging.1 No doubt Elizabeth's own prefer- ences coincided here with political expediency but it would be a mistake to conclude from this that she had at no point taken the negotiations seriously and had throughout been playing with the Emperor as part of 'the diplomatic game.' Her utterances are rarely taken at face-value, yet there seems no reason why they should not be, as they are open, frank and consistent. By her own admission, she had reluctantly agreed in I 564 to abandon the single life, for the good of her realm, if a suitable candidate could be found. She made it clear, however, from the first, that she would only marry a man who would practise the same religion as her own. Thereafter in response to the demands of her councillors and Parliament, she allowed negotiations to go ahead, but only on her original terms. Sussex's compromise certainly had its attractions, but the foreign threat was not sufficient to warrant a risk to internal stability for the sake of finding allies abroad. Only after the deterioration of relations with Spain, when there were more serious fears of a Catholic league against England, was Elizabeth ready to make any religious concessions to a prospective husband - the Duke of Anjou in I571. Yet, even then, she was unwilling to grant the use of a private Mass; instead, she would only allow him 'other ceremonies than ours' which were 'not repugnant to the church of God' - and these were to be held in secret for only a limited period of time.2

Sussex was bitterly disappointed at the failure of his mission. To him the case for the marriage seemed so strong that he could only believe that its opponents were swayed by self-interest and not by religion, as they claimed.3 He was mistaken. While self-interest may have partially influenced Leicester in his hostility to the Habsburg marriage scheme, religious considerations were keenly felt and dominated the arguments against it in the late I 56os. Moreover, the concur- rence of Sussex's embassy with the Duke of Alba's arrival in the Netherlands to suppress the Calvinists must have raised questions about the advisability of forging a matrimonial alliance with another branch of the Habsburg family. Although no mention of events in the Nether- lands was made in connection with opposition to the marriage, fears were expressed about the formation of a Catholic league under the

i. Dixon, Church History, vi. 170-I, 176-8. P. Milward, Religious Controversies of the Eliza- bethan Age (Leeds, 1977), pp. 2 5-9.

2. D. Digges, The Compleat Ambassador ... (London, i655), p. I30; Hist. MSS Comm., 9, Salisbury (Cecil) MSS at Hatfield House, II, Addenda 1553-71 (I 888), p. 5 S?; BL Cott. MSS Julius F vi. fo. i 68.

3. PRO SP 70/95fo. i6i.




Pope and Emperor. 1 Finally, while the prospect of a Catholic marriage did not arouse anything like the same degree of anti-papist ballads, pamphlet literature and popular displays of hostility as the later Alenqon proposal, its opponents tried in the winter of I567 to kindle public opinion against it by creating an anti-Catholic scare. Bishop Jewel preached a sermon at St Paul's Cross based on the text, 'Cursed be he that goeth about to build the walls of Jericho', meaning by the walls the Catholic Church. The biblical passage both immediately before and following the text provided a chilling warning to English Protestants of the consequences of ignoring or side-stepping God's curse on the Catholic Church by allowing the limited use of the Mass in England; for, in the bible God punished the children of Israel with military defeat merely because one family had 'committed a trespass in the accursed thing' and taken into their home spoil from Jericho.2 Steps were also taken to remove suspected papists from the Queen's household. The Spanish ambassador's chamber, where he held the Mass, was raided and the Englishmen found there were thrown into prison. Judges were called before Star Chamber and ordered to enforce the laws against the possessors of Catholic books, while the Lord Keeper in Star Chamber denounced papists who denied the Royal Supremacy. 3

Despite their failure, the marriage negotiations had an important influence on Elizabeth's religious and foreign policy. The 'half- reformed' Church which emerged from the I 5 59 settlement well suited her diplomatic purposes, in keeping open the possibility of marriage and alliances with a Catholic power. It may well have been deliberately designed that way for that reason. During the early I56os, to allay the threat from abroad, Elizabeth tried to portray her Church as conservative.4 This became more urgent during the course of the marriage negotiations, as their outcome depended on the Austrians believing that England was basically Lutheran rather than Calvinist. Realizing this, Elizabeth sent them the Book of Common Prayer and formula of Divine Service to peruse as a means of reassurance; the prayerbook, of course, unlike the Thirty-nine Articles, owed much to Lutheran influences and contained few traces of Calvinism.' At the same time and for the same reason, she refused to allow the Thirty-nine Articles to be published and confirmed by the I566 Parliament.6 Moreover, the timing of the drive for conformity on clerical dress after I S6S seems

i. BL Cott. MSS Galba B xi. fos. 300-302. 2. The sermon itself has not survived. Reference is made to it in a letter. PRO SP 12/44 fo. I I2.

The biblical text comes from Joshua 6.26. 3. PRO SP 12/44 fos. I09-IO; CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 685-7. The manuscript refers to the

Lord Speaker, but this is clearly a mistake. 4. J. Bruce (ed.), Correspondence of Matthew Parker (Parker Society, Cambridge, 18 3), p. 2 I .

S. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 228-32. 6. Claire Cross, The Royal Supremacy in the Elizabethan Church (London, 1969), pp. 75-6.




to be connected with the progress of the negotiations. Elizabeth's letter to Parker urging him to impose uniformity was but a few months before the expected arrival of Zwetkovich. And surely it is significant that Cecil, later a protector of 'zealous Protestants', was behind this attack on diversity in religion. It was he who drafted Elizabeth's letter to Parker of 25 January and contemporary rumours held him respon- sible for the Lambeth proceedings which attempted to force the London clergy to conform.1 Sussex, as shown, was alarmed that Calvinist preaching and practice put at risk the negotiations. It is understandable that Cecil, sharing his anxieties, would take action. In the event, however, Elizabeth found herself in a double bind. On the one hand she had to impose conformity on radical Protestants in order to keep alive the marriage negotiations with the Austrians; on the other, this refusal to tolerate non-conformity amidst Protestants made it politically difficult, not to say impossible, to permit the Archduke to celebrate the Mass even in private.

In the sphere of external relations, the marriage negotiations had a double significance. Firstly, they were an instrument of foreign policy, and need to be given their due weight for a proper understanding of Elizabeth's dealings with her fellow monarchs. Secondly, their outcome brought about considerable re-adjustment in the position and behaviour of all involved.

There are two approaches to foreign policy during the i16os. The first argues that England's relations with Spain were on the whole amicable until Alba's arrival in the Netherlands to suppress the I 566 revolt. Elizabeth, according to this approach, continued to follow Eng- land's traditional friendship with the House of Burgundy for the first decade of her reign, despite the change in England's religion.2 The second approach, as proposed by Malcolm Thorp, disagrees with this, on the grounds that 'religious considerations have been neglected and demoted to a position of only peripheral importance in the shaping of policy'. Instead, he emphasizes the underlying religious tensions between England and the Habsburgs during the i56os, which were expressed in fears of a Catholic conspiracy against Protestantism. To his mind, these fears, common amongst men like Cecil, Throckmorton, Challoner and Mundt, resulted in the emergence of the image of Philip II of Spain as the arch-enemy of English Protestantism.3

The research presented here suggests that Thorp's argument is mis-

i. Parker Correspondence, pp. 223-7; J. H. Primus, The Vestments Controversy (Amsterdam, 1960), p. 93-

2. R. B. Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy (California, I980); G. D. Ramsay, 'The Foreign Policy of Elizabeth I' in Christopher Haigh (ed.), The Reign of Elizabeth I (London, I984), pp. I47-68.

3. M. Thorp, 'Catholic Conspiracy in Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy', Sixteenth CenturyJour- nal, xv (1984), 43 I-44.




leading. While it is true that there were rumours of an Imperial league against Protestants - Sussex even raised the issue with the Emperor - the fears were not sufficiently strong to influence policy. Thorp's quotations are taken out of context and he nowhere mentions that, at the same time as fears of an Imperial league were being expressed, the Archduke marriage negotiations were in progress. Nor does he seem to realize that, with the exception of Throckmorton, whose influence on the Queen was negligible, the very men he identifies as believers in the Catholic bogey initiated and supported an alliance with the Habsburgs. Fear of a Catholic league was a leitmotif running through the thinking of many Elizabethans in the I 56os, but it did not dominate policy as Thorp suggests. Indeed for men like Mundt and Cecil the best way to deal with the danger was to arrange a marriage alliance with the Austrians which would also neutralize Spain.

The first approach to foreign policy in the I 56os is thus the more convincing. In the past, however, its proponents have tended to neglect the role of the Habsburg marriage in the policy of maintaining good relations with Spain. Yet Cecil hoped that the marriage would protect England against France and help to secure the return of Calais; and it was the neutralization of Spain as a by-product of the marriage that made it attractive (or should we say less obnoxious?) to Elizabeth, despite the warnings of Throckmorton that Philip II was her real enemy. The possibility of the marriage also encouraged Philip to ward off the threats of a papal excommunication and look unfavourably at the claims of Mary Stuart. Furthermore, the marriage negotiations affected Eliza- beth's relations with the German Protestants. While she kept on cordial terms with some of the Lutheran princes, such as the Duke of Wiirttem- burg, who were on friendly terms with the Emperor, they created something of a rift with the Calvinist Elector Palatine, who opposed the scheme, and the Duke of Saxony who had offered his own hand to Elizabeth. 1

The coincidence of the collapse of the negotiations and Alba's sup- pression of the Netherlands revolt reversed the previous trends. Anglo- Spanish relations cooled. Philip and Maximilian felt betrayed and humi- liated by Elizabeth's rebuff. Both believed that her heresy was the cause of the fiasco of Sussex's embassy and was thus more deep-rooted and dangerous than they had previously supposed. In England, more was heard of an anti-Protestant league, and in a memorandum of I 569 Cecil wrote of the advantages of forming a defensive alliance with Denmark, Sweden and the Protestant states of Germany. In Protestant Germany, and particularly in the Palatinate, the cooling of Anglo-Habsburg relations gave rise to new hopes of a general Protestant alliance under Elizabeth's presidency. In early I 568 Elector Palatine Frederick III

i. Von Klarwill, p. 247.




sent Immanuelo Tremellius to England for this purpose with some success. 1

In conclusion, while it is true that the Archduke's demand for a private Mass caused the failure of the Habsburg marriage project, it would be wrong to assume that religious differences doomed the negotiations from the outset. For a time it looked to contemporaries as if the negotiations might succeed - and with good reason. The religious divide between England and the Church of Rome was not as clear-cut in the I 56os as it was to be in the I 80s, nor did everyone believe that it would be permanent. A mixed marriage in these circumstances was acceptable to many and there was considerable support for it at the English Court, which Elizabeth found difficult to resist. Only as it became apparent that toleration of a private Mass in the royal household was a prerequisite of a Catholic marriage did support begin to die away. Some, like Elizabeth herself, disliked the constitutional impli- cations and feared the political consequences of such a toleration. Others were alarmed that a practising Catholic husband would lead Elizabeth and her Church in a still more conservative direction.

The religious difficulties which emerged during these negotiations helped to harden attitudes and define, or at least publicize, the differences between England and the Church of Rome. These difficulties were to recur each time plans were made to arrange a royal marriage with a Catholic: in 157I, 1578-81 and the I620S; and as time went on they were debated with an ideological fervour barely noticeable in the I 56os. There was then no anti-Catholic outburst to match Stubbs' 'Gaping Gulf' or William Perkins' 'A warning against the idolatry of the last times'. A study of royal marriage negotiations in early modern England can therefore help to chart the development and temperature of anti-Catholicism.2

St Mary's College, Strawberry Hill SUSAN DO RAN

I. Haynes, pp. 579-88; Parker Correspondence, pp. 3i7-i8; E. I. Kouri, 'England and the Attempts to form a Protestant Alliance in the late I560s, a Case Study in European Diplomacy' (Unpublished Ph.D, thesis, University of Cambridge, I978).

2. I intend to examine the religious and political contexts of Elizabeth's marriage negotiations in a book, now in preparation: 'Monarchy and Matrimony, a study of Elizabeth I's marriage negotiations'.



Religion and Politics at the Court of Elizabeth I: The Habsburg Marriage Negotiations of 1559-1567

Documents

Transcript of Religion and Politics at the Court of Elizabeth I: The Habsburg Marriage Negotiations of 1559-1567