RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOFSTEDEâ€™S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS AND

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOFSTEDE’S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS AND NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES

Negotiations between Danish and Russian companies by

Daniel Solomonov

BA, Aarhus University, 2007

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE at

School of Economics and Management

Business Administration and Russian

AARHUS UNIVERSITY

September 2009

Supervised by Mikael Søndergaard

© Daniel Solomonov, 2009

Master’s thesis By Daniel Solomonov Spring 2009 Student number 20040664

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Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................. 5

Preface ............................................................................................................................................................... 6

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 7

1.1. Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................................................ 7

2. Review of theory on negotiation strategies and cultural dimensions........................................................... 8

2.1. Negotiation strategies ............................................................................................................................ 8

2.1.1. Demarcation .................................................................................................................................... 9

2.1.2. Distributive strategy compared to integrative strategy ................................................................ 10

2.2. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions ............................................................................................................ 10

2.2.1. Definition of culture ...................................................................................................................... 11

2.2.2. Masculinity versus femininity ........................................................................................................ 13

2.2.3. Individualism versus collectivism .................................................................................................. 13

2.2.4. Uncertainty avoidance................................................................................................................... 13

2.2.5. Power distance .............................................................................................................................. 14

2.3. Danish culture ....................................................................................................................................... 15

2.4. Russian culture ..................................................................................................................................... 15

2.5. Comparison of Denmark and Russia..................................................................................................... 17

3. State of research on international negotiation ........................................................................................... 17

3.1. Approaches and perspectives ............................................................................................................... 18

3.2. Integrative and distributive strategies in international negotiation .................................................... 20

3.3. Culture’s influence on negotiation ....................................................................................................... 20

3.3.1. Masculinity‐femininity and negotiation ........................................................................................ 21

3.3.2. Individualism‐collectivism and negotiation ................................................................................... 21

3.3.3. Uncertainty avoidance and negotiation ........................................................................................ 23

3.3.4. Power distance and negotiation .................................................................................................... 25

3.4. Descriptions of Danish negotiators ...................................................................................................... 25

3.5. Descriptions of Russian negotiators ..................................................................................................... 26

3.6. Negotiations between Danes and Russians ......................................................................................... 28

3.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 29

4. Research question ....................................................................................................................................... 31

4.1. Research objectives .............................................................................................................................. 31

4.2. Conceptual significance ........................................................................................................................ 31


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4.3. Potential practical application .............................................................................................................. 32

5. Hypotheses .................................................................................................................................................. 32

5.1. The masculinity‐femininity dimension and negotiation strategies ...................................................... 32

5.2. The individualism‐collectivism dimension and negotiation strategies ................................................ 33

5.3. The uncertainty avoidance dimension and negotiation strategies ...................................................... 34

5.4. The power distance dimension and negotiation strategies ................................................................. 34

5.5. General hypotheses on negotiation strategies .................................................................................... 35

6. Method ........................................................................................................................................................ 36

6.1. Perceptions ........................................................................................................................................... 36

6.2. Research fieldwork ............................................................................................................................... 37

6.3. Translation ............................................................................................................................................ 38

7. Empirical research ....................................................................................................................................... 39

7.1. Questionnaire design ............................................................................................................................ 39

7.2. Sample characteristics .......................................................................................................................... 40

7.3. Operationalization of study variables ................................................................................................... 40

7.4. Analysis of means ................................................................................................................................. 41

7.5. Statistical procedures for hypothesis testing ....................................................................................... 46

7.5.1. Pearson coefficients of correlation ............................................................................................... 47

7.5.2. Regression analysis ........................................................................................................................ 47

7.5.3. Factor analysis ............................................................................................................................... 48

7.6. Statistical analysis of the Russian sample ............................................................................................. 49

7.6.1. Hypothesis 9: Are Danes integrative negotiators? ........................................................................ 49

7.6.2. Hypothesis 1: Relationship between femininity and integrative negotiation ............................... 51

7.6.3. Hypothesis 3: Relationship between individualism and distributive negotiation ......................... 52

7.6.4. Hypothesis 5: Relationship between low uncertainty avoidance and integrative negotiation .... 54

7.6.5. Hypothesis 7: Relationship between low power distance and integrative negotiation ............... 56

7.7. Statistical analysis of the Danish sample .............................................................................................. 58

7.7.1. Hypothesis 10: Are Russians distributive negotiators? ................................................................. 59

7.7.2. Hypothesis 2: Relationship between masculinity and distributive negotiation ............................ 60

7.7.3. Hypothesis 4: Relationship between individualism and distributive negotiation ......................... 62

7.7.4. Hypothesis 6: Relationship between high uncertainty avoidance and distributive negotiation .. 64

7.7.5. Hypothesis 8: Relationship between power distance and distributive negotiation ..................... 66

7.8. Compilation of findings on Denmark and Russia .................................................................................. 68

7.9. Reliability .............................................................................................................................................. 71


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7.10. Validity ................................................................................................................................................ 71

7.11. Generalization .................................................................................................................................... 73

7.12. Limitations .......................................................................................................................................... 73

8. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................. 75

8.1. Summary of contributions .................................................................................................................... 76

8.2. Suggestions for further research .......................................................................................................... 76

8.3. Practical applicability ............................................................................................................................ 77

9. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 78

10. List of libraries and searching engines ....................................................................................................... 81

11. List of figures ............................................................................................................................................. 81

12. List of tables ............................................................................................................................................... 81

13. Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 83

13.1. Descriptive statistics on Danish culture as perceived by Russians ..................................................... 83

13.2. Descriptive statistics on Russian culture as perceived by Danes ....................................................... 84

13.3. Correlation analysis of Danish culture and negotiation (Russian sample) ......................................... 86

13.4. Correlation analysis of Russian culture and negotiation (Danish sample) ......................................... 88

13.5. Regression analysis ............................................................................................................................. 90

13.5.1. Example of bivariate regression .................................................................................................. 90

13.5.2. Example of multiple regression ................................................................................................... 91

13.6. Sample characteristics: descriptives and frequencies ........................................................................ 92

13.6.1. Russian sample ............................................................................................................................ 92

13.6.2. Danish sample ............................................................................................................................. 93

13.7. Reliability analysis ............................................................................................................................... 95

13.7.1. Russian sample ............................................................................................................................ 95

13.7.2. Danish sample ............................................................................................................................. 95

13.8. Factor analysis .................................................................................................................................... 96

13.8.1. Russian sample ............................................................................................................................ 96

13.8.2. Danish sample ........................................................................................................................... 104

13.9. Questionnaire in Danish sent to Danish respondents ...................................................................... 115

13.10. Questionnaire in Russian sent to Russian respondents ................................................................. 118

Honor statement ........................................................................................................................................... 121


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Abstract

Many authors have assumed that culture influences negotiation, and much has been published on the subject of international negotiation. Surprisingly however, it is hard to find studies that purposely explain the relationships between culture and international negotiation through the findings of one of the most comprehensive studies on culture – Geert Hofstede’s dimensions of culture. In fact, only one published study by John Graham et al. has been found that addresses this, and it does not have this issue as its primary objective. This research studies Danish‐Russian intercultural negotiation – a niche where no published studies in Danish, Russian, or English could be found.

This study attempts to find and describe relationships between masculinity‐femininity, individualism‐collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance and integrative and distributive negotiation strategies in the field of Danish‐Russian intercultural negotiations. Simultaneously, this study seeks to describe differences in Danish and Russian negotiating behavior and find tendencies in use of negotiation strategies.

This research is carried out by quantitative survey method. A questionnaire in two languages has been distributed to managers from Danish and Russian companies, asking them to assess the opposite party’s behavior on a Likert scale based on past experience with negotiating with the respective cultures. The data from the two samples was collected and analyzed using Pearson coefficients of correlation and factor analysis with the Varimax rotation method.

This study has found positive relationships between femininity and integrative negotiation strategy, masculinity and distributive negotiation strategy, low power distance and integrative negotiation strategy, high power distance and distributive negotiation strategy, and uncertainty avoidance and integrative strategy. This study has also found evidence that Danes tend to employ integrative negotiation strategy, and Russians tend to employ distributive negotiation strategy.

The results of this study add to theoretical knowledge about the relationships between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies. The results of this study also contribute to knowledge about particular behavioral variables’ relations to each other in Danish‐Russian negotiations. The findings are applicable to Danish‐Russian negotiations and potentially generalizable to all negotiations.


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Preface

I emigrated to Denmark from Russia in 1999. This life experience has lead to a curiosity in the subject of culture. My education in business administration has lead to an interest in negotiation.

My personal motivation for undertaking this particular research project is, on one hand, rooted in a professional interest in Danish‐Russian intercultural relations. On the other hand, I am also profoundly interested in the subject of negotiation.

These two interests combined lead to a wish to research whether there are connections between particular cultural factors and use of negotiation strategy in Danish‐Russian negotiations. Because the main subject of my education is business administration, I am only interested in business negotiations between Danish and Russian representatives.

As a side remark, but nonetheless and important one, I would like to state that this paper will be consis‐tently using nationality terms. To maintain this consistency throughout the paper, I will be mentioning “Danish” first and “Russian” second. I would like to emphasize that this is not done to offend anybody, but purely as an attempt to maintain the aforementioned consistency in use of terms.

As part of the agreement on questionnaire response, the participants have been assured of total anonymi‐ty. Therefore, in this paper there will be no mention of the participants’ personal names, company names, trademarks or the like.

After careful consideration, I have decided that this paper will refer to myself as “this author” or “this researcher”, and use a first person, plural, editorial “we”. It is my comprehension that an editorial “we” is a milder and less self‐centered way of making a presentation. It is also my perception that it facilitates better involvement by the reader than “I” does.

I would like to thank my professor, Mikael Søndergaard, for providing insight and support throughout the duration of this project.

I would also like to thank all the people who have helped me obtain the data for this research and shall remain anonymous – the secretaries and the managers at numerous Danish and Russian companies, both the ones who participated and the ones who declined.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends, who helped immensely with their support, testing, suggestions, and proofing.

Daniel Solomonov.


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1. Introduction Russia is widely described as a growing market in the media and by Danish companies. The Confederation of Danish Industry has recently published a report on the Russian market, where they state that the Russian economy has been experiencing growth rates between 6% and 8% during the past few years (DI, 2009). The current global economic crisis has negatively affected the growth of the Russian economy in 2009, but Danish exports grew in 2008 by 5,4% in 2008, from 10,5 billion DKK to 11,1 billion DKK (DI, 2009).

Negotiations are essential for coming to agreements and facilitating this growth. International negotiation may be affected by a variety of environmental contexts – legal pluralism, political pluralism, currency fluctuations and foreign exchange, foreign government control and bureaucracy, instability and change, ideological differences, cultural differences, and external stakeholders (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.408).

This study attempts to describe relationships between cultural differences and negotiation strategies in negotiations between Danish and Russian companies. We hope that better understanding of these relationships can facilitate more agreements, less disagreements, and ultimately more growth for both the Danish and the Russian companies.

1.1. Structure of the thesis This thesis is presented in seven main chapters. Here we outline their structure for easier navigation.

Chapter 2, “Review of theory on negotiation strategies and cultural dimensions”, p.8, presents the relevant theory that forms the foundation of what we know about negotiation strategies and cultural dimensions.

Chapter 3, “State of research on international negotiation”, p.17, presents the findings on the relationships between culture and negotiation, which constitutes a deeper level of theoretical knowledge.

Chapter 4, “Research question”, p.31, presents the research question that this study attempts to answer, the research objectives, and answers the questions of conceptual significance and potential practical application.

Chapter 5, “Hypotheses”, p.32, presents the hypotheses that this study attempts to confirm.

Chapter 6, “Method”, p.36, presents the method that this study employs to achieve its objectives.

Chapter 7, “Empirical research”, p.39, presents all information about how this study has been carried out, including all findings and assessments.

Chapter 8, “Conclusions”, p.75, presents the main conclusions of this study, suggestions for further research, and an assessment of how the results could be used in practice.

The bibliography can be found on page 78, followed by the list of libraries and searching engines (p.81), list of figures (p.81), and list of tables (p.81). The results of all statistical analyses can be found in Appendices (section 13, p.83).


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2. Review of theory on negotiation strategies and cultural dimensions This work spans two fields – culture and negotiation strategy. Therefore, a brief review of theories on these two subjects is in order. The review should help the reader to better understand the background for this research project, the hypotheses behind it and the subsequent analysis.

The fundamental theory on negotiation strategies used in this work comes from the book entitled “Negoti‐ation” by Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (Lewicki et al., 2006).

The theoretical framework on cultural dimensions used in this work was first published in 1980 by the influential Dutch professor Geert Hofstede. The book was entitled “Culture’s consequences: International differences in work‐related values.” (Hofstede, 1980). For the sake of being as current as possible, this work will mainly reference a more recent edition, “Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations” (Hofstede, 2001), as well as other published articles by the professor.

This chapter presents theory on negotiation strategies, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, findings and descriptions on Danish culture and Russian culture, and a comparison of the two cultures.

2.1. Negotiation strategies Negotiation can be broadly defined as the means by which people settle their differences (Luecke, 2003, p.xi). There are several common characteristics in negotiation situations (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.6‐8):

• There are two or more parties – that is, two or more individuals, groups, or organizations. • There is a conflict of needs and desires between two or more parties – that is, what one wants is not

necessarily what the other wants – and the parties must search for a way to resolve conflict. • The parties negotiate by choice. That is, they negotiate because they think they can get a better deal by

negotiating than by simply accepting the other party’s offer. • There is an expectation that both sides will modify or move away from their opening statements,

requests or demands. • Negotiation occurs when the parties prefer to invent their own solution for resolving the conflict, when

there is no fixed or established set of rules or procedures for how to resolve the conflict, or when they choose to bypass those rules.

• Successful negotiation involves the management of tangibles (price or terms of agreements) and intangibles (underlying psychological motivations that may influence parties during a negotiation). For example, some of the intangibles can be: the need to win or avoid losing, the need to look good and competent to the people one represents, the need to defend an important principle, the need to pro‐tect one’s reputation, etc.

• One of the key characteristics of a negotiation situation is that the parties need each other in order to achieve their preferred objectives or outcomes. That is, either they must coordinate with each other to achieve own objectives, or they choose to work together because the possible outcome is better than they can achieve on their own.

In negotiation theory there are two main strategies: distributive and integrative negotiation. They are most conveniently illustrated by means of the dual concerns model.


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Figure 1. The Dual concerns model

Substantive outcome important?

Yes No

Relational outcome

important?

Yes Collaboration

(Integrative negotiation) Accommodation

No Competition

(Distributive negotiation) Avoidance

Adopted from Lewicki et al., (2006, p.107).

The dual concerns model is a contingency model of two variables – importance of substantive outcome and importance of relational outcome (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.107). That is, negotiation strategy is employed based on relative importance of these two factors to the individual negotiator. The substantive outcome of a negotiation is defined as any economic or material result, expressed in terms of money, assets, time, convenience, logistics, etc. The relational outcome is simply this: the value of continuance and quality of relationship with the other party. The assumption here is that a long‐term trusting relationship will yield better substantive outcome, if the parties are interested in the relationship. The specific situation dictates the relative importance of these two variable factors.

Integrative strategy is appropriate when both substantive and relational outcomes are important. That is, the topic of negotiation is valuable, and results can be gained by managing the relationship. The suitable path is thus collaboration.

Distributive strategy is appropriate when substantive outcome carries more significance than the relation‐ship between parties. It is then pertinent to compete for substantive goals with less attention to the relationship.

2.1.1. Demarcation

The question of why this work omits the two other strategies, namely accommodation and avoidance, should be explained. First of all, the chosen focus of research in this project is business negotiations on the subject of price. We assume that substantive outcome, relationships or both are always important in these negotiations, otherwise it would not make sense to meet for the purpose of negotiation. To further emphasize this point, this research will be focusing on business negotiations on the subject of price. Because settling the price is a substantive outcome, there is no reason for this work to pay further attention to accommodation and avoidance strategies.

It is now necessary to elaborate on the points of difference between distributive and integrative strategy, because these carry great importance to the construct of this research.


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2.1.2. Distributive strategy compared to integrative strategy

Table 1. Characteristics of main negotiation strategies

Aspect Distributive strategy Integrative strategy Economic reasoning

Fixed amount of resources to be divided between parties (fixed‐pie errors).

Variable amount of resources to be divided between parties.

Competitiveness Pursuit of own goals an expense those of others. Pursuit of joint goals. Relationships Short‐term. No expectation of future work

together. Long‐term. Expectation of future collaboration.

Motivation Maximization of own outcome. Maximization of joint outcome. Trust and openness Secrecy and defensiveness. Low trust in other

party. Trust and openness. Active listening, exploration of alternatives for agreement.

Needs and interests

Concealing needs so as to not reveal weak points. Pursuing own interests.

Describing needs to meet each other’s interests.

Predictability Unpredictable to surprise and force other side into unfavored situation.

Predictable and flexible to avoid souring of relation‐ship.

Aggressiveness Use of threats, bluffs and other hard bargaining tactics (distributive tactics).

Honest sharing of information, promotion of respect.

Solution search Commitment to bargaining position, use of argumentation and manipulation.

Commitment to interests, finding mutually satisfying solutions through logic and creativity.

Success measurement

By own gain compared to other’s loss. Enhanced by bad image of the other.

By joint gain. Enhanced by positive attitude and consideration of ideas.

Key attitude I win, you lose. What’s the best way to meet everybody’s needs. Adopted from (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.109).

The two strategies represent theoretical extremes, as arguably no negotiation is purely integrative or distributive in practice. The difference between the two strategies is so great in theory that some authors distinguish between them by using different terms to describe them. Distributive strategy is often called distributive bargaining or just bargaining, which underlines the competitive or win‐lose nature of the approach (Nieuwmeijer, 1992). Conversely, integrative strategy is sometimes simply called negotiation or integrative negotiation, which emphasizes the cooperative or win‐win essence of the approach(Lewicki et al., 2006).

Throughout this study, we deliberately choose to use the neutral wording “the other party or side”, instead of the more competitively charged “the opposite or opposing side”, to avoid inclination towards distributive strategy.

2.2. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions Professor Geert Hofstede conducted one of the most comprehensive studies of how values in the workplace are influenced by culture (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, 2001). Geert Hofstede analyzed a large data base of employee values scores collected by IBM between 1967 and 1973 covering more than 70 countries, from which he first used the 40 largest only and afterwards extended the analysis to 50 countries and 3 regions (Hofstede, 2001). Russia was not part of the original IBM survey (Hofstede, 1980).

From the initial results, and later additions, Hofstede (1980) developed a model that identifies four cultural dimensions to assist in differentiating cultures: masculinity‐femininity (MAS), individualism‐collectivism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), and power distance (PDI). Geert Hofstede later added a fifth dimension after conducting an additional international study with a survey instrument developed with Chinese employees and managers. That dimension, based on Confucian dynamism, is Long‐Term Orientation ‐ LTO and was applied to 23 countries (Hofstede, 2001).


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This research project chooses to omit LTO for several reasons. First, it is heavily based on a survey of Chinese values, which are very much different from Danish and Russian values (Hofstede, 2001). Second, neither Denmark nor Russia is included in the Index Values for the 23 countries that LTO has been applied to (Hofstede, 2001, p.356). Third, some of the connotations of LTO differences can be found in other cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001, p.360). For instance, “protection of one’s face” is also mentioned as an indicator for high collectivism, while “quick results expected” could be attributed to high uncertainty avoidance. These are the reasons as to why this work will focus on the four original dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980).

Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been selected for use in this research primarily because some similarities and possible connections were noticed between the dimensions and the two negotiation strategies that will be described later. Other arguments for using Hofstede’s framework is the large scope of his research, the large quantity of data collected and analyzed, and the large amount of citations that his work has entailed. Hofstede’s original framework has also been validated in many other studies.

Among other theories on cultural differences, Fons Trompenaars has developed five dimensions: universal‐ism‐particularism, individualism‐collectivism, neutral‐emotional, specific‐diffuse and achievement‐ascription (Buelens et al., 2006, p. 608). It is not the purpose of this work to describe these dimensions. However, it would be appropriate to notice that many aspects of Trompenaars’ dimensions are similar to those of Hofstede. In fact, Hofstede himself criticized Trompenaars model for lack of content validity, lack of support for concepts by the database, and thus methodology and conclusions. (Hofstede, 1996).

Another interesting cultural dimension is high‐context versus low‐context cultures, which in essence refers to indirect versus direct communication (Buelens et al., 2006, p. 605). For the purposes of this research, however, the IDV dimension by Hofstede will suffice, as he himself agrees that the high‐context versus low‐context dimension is an aspect of collectivism versus individualism (Hofstede, 2001, p.212).

The final argument for solely using Hofstede’s framework in this research project is that this work attempts to find relationships between two theoretical frameworks and analyze them. It thus seems proper to exclude all other theories to maintain focus.

2.2.1. Definition of culture

There are numerous definitions of culture (Salacuse, 1998, p.222):

”Some scholars would confine the concept of culture to the realm of ideas, feelings, and thoughts. For example, one working definition offered by two experts is that "Culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, and other groups and orient their behavior" (Faure and Sjostedt 1993, p.3). Others would have culture also encompass behavior patterns and institutions common to a given group or community. E. Adamson Hoebel, a noted anthropologist, defined culture as "the integrated system of learned behavior patterns which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not the result of biological inherit‐ance". (Hoebel 1972, p.7). While the essence of culture may reside in the mind, it must be pointed out that persons gain their understanding of their and others’ cultures primarily, if not exclusively, from observing the behavior and institutions of a particular group.”

Hofstede (2001, pp.1‐5) derives his working definition of culture from the concept of mental programming, or “software of the mind”. He argues that social systems can exist not only because human behavior is not random, but to some extent predictable. He further argues that for each prediction of behavior, we take both the person and the situation into account, and that we assume that each person carries a certain


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amount of mental programming that is stable over time and leads to the same person’s showing more or less the same behavior in similar situations. He also identifies three levels of human mental programming – universal, collective, and individual. The universal mental programming is shared by all humankind and includes expressive, associative, aggressive behaviors. The collective level of mental programming is shared by some but not all. The individual level is unique, as no two people are programmed exactly alike. Hofstede argues that in empirical research we look for measurable constructs that describe mental programs, i.e. we operationalize them. The key constructs measured by Hofstede are values and culture – values are held by individuals and collectivities; culture presupposes collectivity. Values are “broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (Hofstede, 2001, p.5).

Hofstede (2001, p.9) defines culture as:

”Collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.”

The “category of people” can be a nation, region, or ethnic group, women versus men (gender culture), old versus young (age group and generation culture), a social class, a profession or occupation (occupational culture), a type of business, a work organization or part of it (organizational culture), or even a family (Hofstede, 1994).

Figure 2. The ”Onion Diagram”: Manifestations of culture on different levels of depth

The reasons for including behavior patterns are illustrated in Figure 2 (Hofstede, 2001, p.11). At the core of mental programming lie the values that individuals and collectivities hold. Hofstede (2001, p.10) states:

“The values are invisible until they become evidenced in behavior, but culture manifests itself in visible elements too. … Symbols are words, gestures, pictures and objects that carry often complex meanings recognized as such only by those who share the culture. … Heroes are persons, alive or dead, who possess characteris‐tics that are highly prized in a culture and thus serve as models for behavior. … Rituals are collective activities that are technically unneces‐sary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of collectivity. … (In Figure 2) symbols, heroes and rituals are subsumed under the term practices. As such, they are visible to an outside observer; their cultural meanings, however, are invisible and lie precisely and only in the ways these practices are interpreted by insiders.”

Reproduced from (Hofstede, 2001, p.11)

For the purpose of this study we define culture as “values, beliefs, and learned behavior patterns, held and exhibited by members of a society”. This is because we would like to examine perceived behavior and


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values as manifestations of culture and compare them to perceived negotiation behavior. We assume that values, beliefs, and behaviors are measurable constructs that can help predict future behavior.

We now proceed to describe the four cultural dimensions that are used in this study.

2.2.2. Masculinity versus femininity

Masculinity versus its opposite, femininity, refers to the distribution of roles between the sexes, which is a fundamental issue for any society (Hofstede, 2001, p.279). The issue is what implications the biological differences between the sexes have for the social gender roles. Hofstede’s studies on the importance of work goals show that women attach more importance to social goals such as relationships, helping others, and the physical environment, and that men attach more importance to ego goals such as career and money (Hofstede, 2001, p.279). These differences were found to differ across countries as well as occupa‐tions. Every society recognizes many behaviors as more suitable to females or males, which is mediated by cultural norms and traditions (Hofstede, 2001, p.280).

Hofstede (1994, p.3), summarizes the main findings on this dimension. Women’s values differ less among societies than men’s values; men’s values from one country to another contain a dimension from very assertive and competitive and maximally different from women’s values on the one side, to modest and caring and similar to women’s values on the other. The assertive side has been called “masculine” and the modest, caring side “feminine”. The women in feminine countries have the same modest, caring values as the men; in the masculine countries they are somewhat assertive and competitive, but not as much as the men.

Japan, Austria, Venezuela, Italy, and Switzerland show the highest scores on the masculinity, while Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, and Costa Rica exhibit the highest scores on femininity (i.e. low on masculinity) (Hofstede, 2001, p.286).

2.2.3. Individualism versus collectivism

The individual versus collectivism dimension describes the relationship between the individual and the collectivity in a given society (Hofstede, 2001, p.209). This dimension refers to the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups (Hofstede, 1994).

The individualist societies are the ones where individuals are supposed to look after themselves and their immediate family. The collectivist societies are the ones where people are integrated in cohesive groups that protect them. In the individualist societies, the “me‐first” attitude prevails, and sacrifices for the good of the group are not common. In the collectivist societies people identify with the group, and thus the “group‐first” attitude is most common, as are sacrifices for the group. Hofstede (1994) cautions that “collectivism” in this cultural dimension sense has no political meaning, and that it refers to the group, not to the state. The issue addressed by this dimension is, again, a fundamental one, regarding all societies in the world (Hofstede, 1994).

According to the individualism index values exhibit (Hofstede, 2001, p.215), United States, Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and Netherlands are the most individualistic cultures, while Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia are the most collectivistic (i.e. low individualism).

2.2.4. Uncertainty avoidance

The uncertainty avoidance dimension deals with the way cultures deal with uncertainty (Hofstede, 1994). Uncertainty about the future is a fundamental issue in life, and people learn to cope with it by various


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means. This dimension deals with a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, and indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations (Hofstede, 1994).

Hofstede (1994) summarizes the differences of unstructured versus structured situations. Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising and different from usual. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute truth: “there can only be one truth and we have it”. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions.

The highest scores on the uncertainty avoidance dimensions are shown by Greece, Portugal, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Belgium, while Singapore, Jamaica, Denmark, Sweden, and Hong Kong score the lowest (Hofstede, 2001, p.151).

2.2.5. Power distance

The power distance dimension of culture refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations, institutions and society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 1994). The power distance index measures the relative degree of inequality in cultures. This degree of inequality is measured as seen from below, not from above. This suggests that a society’s level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. The definition of power distance used by Hofstede (2001, p.83) is:

“The power distance between a boss B and a subordinate S in a hierarchy is the difference between the extent to which B can determine the behavior of S and the extent to which S can determine the behavior of B.”.

Power and inequality are fundamental facts of any society, which influence many aspects of life. National elites in high power distance cultures hold relatively authoritarian values, while in low power distance cultures they show relatively unauthoritarian values (Hofstede, 2001, p.96). Between high and low power distance culture there are considerable differences with regard to norms on power, status, hierarchy, equality of people and their rights (Hofstede, 2001, p.98). Hofstede (1994) states that people’s behavior in the work situation is strongly affected by their previous experiences in the family and in school: the fears of the boss are projections of the experiences with the father, or mother, and the teachers. Thus, the power distance dimension influences life on different societal levels: in the family, at school, in the work organiza‐tion (Hofstede, 2001, p.107). In order to understand power distance between superiors, colleagues and subordinates in a culture, we have to understand the nature of power distance in families and schools in that culture.

The highest power distance cultures are Malaysia, Guatemala, Panama, Philippines, and Mexico, and the lowest scores are shown by Austria, Israel, Denmark, New Zealand, and Ireland (Hofstede, 2001, p.87).


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2.3. Danish culture Assessment of cultural differences of countries in Hofstede’s study is done by ranking countries on an index. There are two sets of values in the index tables – actual values and values controlling for average age of respondents. For simplicity, this work will use the actual values.

Table 2. Index value scores for Denmark.

Index value Rank Masculinity/Femininity 8 50 Individualism/Collectivism 74 9 Uncertainty Avoidance 23 51 Power Distance 18 51

Adopted from (Hofstede, 2001).

Ranking is based on the total of 50 countries and 3 regions. The scores are generally between 0 and 100, low values being closest to 0, and high values being closest to 100. Hofstede’s findings show that Denmark scores very low on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity, and scores very high on individualism. It is very interesting to note that the Danish scores are extremely polarizing, which makes Danish culture a very intriguing culture for the purpose of this research.

We now present a description of Danish culture according to the descriptions of the cultural dimensions by Hofstede – taken from the tables with summaries of societal norms (2001, pp.98, 161, 227, 299).

The low power distance means, according to Hofstede, that Danish society norms are egalitarian and unaccepting of inequality. People are supposed to have equal rights, while hierarchy means an inequality of roles, not people. The low uncertainty avoidance should mean, according to Hofstede, that Danish culture is accepting of uncertainty and ambiguity. It also should mean that the Danish people are open to change, innovation and risk‐taking. Individualism should result in people believing in their own ability to influence their life, their superiors and the world. The individualism society norm is to expect each individual to take care of him‐ or herself, emphasizing individual initiative and achievement. Individuals are self‐oriented and value the importance of private life. Low power distance should result in the societal norms of importance of quality of life and people, relationships, and gender equality. People should work in order to live, not live in order to work. People also value cooperation at work and relationships with superiors.

We have not been able to find studies that validate Hofstede’s findings on Danish culture, so we do not have a more comprehensive description of Danish culture to present here. We have, however, found a description of Danish negotiation behavior (section 3.4, p.25).

2.4. Russian culture Russia was not part of the original IBM survey (Hofstede, 1980). However, values for Russia and some other countries were estimated by Hofstede and presented in a table named “Index score estimates for countries not in the IBM set” (Hofstede, 2001, p.502), which are included in Table 3, p.16. It should be noted that these estimates were calculated based on data collected before the year 1993 (Hofstede, 1993). This may be historically significant because of the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the installment of the democratic system. This work will therefore present index scores for Russia calculated by other research‐ers.

In 1994, A small‐scale study using Hofstede's methodology for 55 experienced participants from the Moscow Advanced Commercial School was published by a French management consultant (Bollinger,


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1994). Although the sample size of the study makes it hard to use for making assumptions, it is very useful to highlight the development of cultural change in Russia.

In the year 2000, professor Naumov from Moscow State University published results of an empirical study entitled “Measuring Russian culture using Hofstede’s dimensions” (Naumov, 2000). In the study, he measured Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on 250 Russians using Hofstede’s methodology. Data was collected between October 1995 and June 1996. The respondents included managers and professionals, as well as students and faculty members of several business schools.

In 2008, a new study by Naumov using data collected in 2006, was published on the website of the Economic Faculty of Moscow State University on the occasion of the IX International Conference on the history of management thought and business (Naumov & Petrovskaja, 2008). This study compared results from 1996 to results from 2006 and presents analysis from the historical perspective. The data sample of this study was 321 respondents. The demographic characteristics of both Naumov samples showed fairly even distribution across factors such as age, job tenure, occupation, region, number of subordinates. The actual measured index values were markedly different than Hofstede’s estimates.

Table 3. Index value scores for Russia

Researcher, reference, year of data collection

Hofstede’s estimates (2001, p.502)*

Bollinger (1994), 1989

Naumov (2000), 1996**

Naumov & Petrovskaja (2008), 2006***

Masculinity/Femininity 36 28 55 (18) 48 (2) Individualism/Collectivism 39 26 41 (20) 36 (2) Uncertainty Avoidance 95 92 68 (15) 70 (2) Power Distance 93 76 40 (17) 33 (2)

*Based on the description of data sources (Hofstede, 2001, p.502), the estimates were made using data from 1988 or earlier to 1998. **Numbers in parentheses are data to compute the confidence interval in which 50% of respondents’ answers fall. For example, the 50% confidence interval for uncertainty avoidance is 53 to 83 (68+ or ‐15) (Naumov, 2000). ***Data in parentheses shows the confidence interval in which 95% of respondents’ answers fall. (Naumov & Petrovskaja, 2008).

The asterisk notes show that the level of confidence in Naumov’s 1996 results is quite uncertain. However, combined with his 2006 results, which were claimed to possess a higher confidence interval, his work gives rise to some very interesting thought on the dynamics of evolvement of national culture in Russia.

In the first Naumov study (2000), the index values showed little difference across demographic categories. The only difference was that younger and less experienced people reported the highest levels of masculini‐ty. Naumov (2000) explains that this group had limited experience in the welfare system and collectivist ideology promoted by the former communist regime, and had been exposed from an early age to Western market‐oriented and social values.

Because this study measures perceptions, it is worthy to note two interesting findings based on the difference in individualism‐collectivism and power distance scores between Hofstede’s estimate and Naumov’s actual values (Naumov & Petrovskaja, 2008).

Russia is often characterized as a collectivistic country, as evidenced by Hofstede’s (2001, p.502) estimates. In Naumov’s study, respondents mostly agreed with the statement that it is important for an individual to be accepted by the members of his or her group. At the same time there was consensus that the individual does not have to give up his or her own interests and goals for the success of the group. Naumov argued that when the value of collectivism is estimated, one has to take into account how the group and its value are perceived in the culture. The Russian perception of the value of the group lies in the group’s ability to provide protection to the members of the group. Naumov & Petrovskaja (2008, p.6) argued that Russian collectivism is primarily directed at receiving protection through the group and not at achieving collective


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goals. Furthermore, the members of the group may hold individualistic values, not being ready to sacrifice own interests for the interests of the group, but ready to comply with the norms of group behavior (Naumov & Petrovskaja, 2008, p.6).

The fall in UAI and PDI is explained by Naumov & Petrovskaja (2008, pp.6‐7) through the fact of increasing implementation of Western management theory within organizations. However, it has to be noted that respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the manager needs to be powerful and authoritarian. The fall in PDI may be interpreted as the change in manifestation of culture on the surface, while the deeper layers of culture change more slowly, in this case the perception of the ideal manager.

The main point of this extensive description and analysis of the evolution of Russian cultural values is that we should take into account the recent changes in Russian values when we make assumptions and hypotheses.

2.5. Comparison of Denmark and Russia We finalize Chapter 2 on negotiation strategies and cultural differences by comparing the scores for the two countries that this study focuses on. As Table 4 illustrates, Russia is a more masculine and more collectivistic culture than Denmark. Russia scores much higher on uncertainty avoidance than Denmark does. Also, even though our review of cultural change in Russia has shown that power distance has fallen, we assume that power distance in Russia is still higher than in Denmark.

Table 4. Comparison of country scores for Denmark and Russia

Denmark Russia Russia Researcher Hofstede (2001) Hofstede’s estimates (2001) Naumov & Petrovskaja(2008) Masculinity/Femininity 8 36 48 Individualism/Collectivism 74 39 36 Uncertainty Avoidance 23 95 70 Power Distance 18 93 33

The next chapter presents relevant findings on a deeper level – combining knowledge about negotiation and culture – that is, knowledge about how people from different cultures negotiate, which role culture plays in international negotiation, and how Danes and Russians negotiate.

3. State of research on international negotiation This chapter presents an overview of the state of research in the field of international negotiation. The main focus is the interaction between culture and negotiation. For the purpose defining this study’s approach and method, it is necessary to highlight the existing approaches to international negotiation research and the methods employed. Also, it is necessary to describe the research perspectives on international negotiation. Furthermore, because this project focuses on connecting the Hofstede dimen‐sions to negotiation behavior, an overview of studies on the subject will be presented. Because it is imperative for this particular research project to focus on the context of Danish‐Russian negotiations, we will describe the findings on Denmark, Russia, and the interaction between the two cultures. Moreover, this chapter presents relevant findings on other aspects of international negotiation.


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3.1. Approaches and perspectives Culture is one of several factors in environmental context that may influence international negotiation (Phatak & Habib, 1996). The other factors, as identified by Salacuse (1988), are international economics, political and legal pluralism, foreign governments and bureaucracies, instability and ideology. Because this paper is focusing on culture in negotiations, we will not go deeper into the other factors.

This research uses studies that could be found using the libraries and searching engines listed on page 81 in the List of libraries and searching engines. We mention this here, because the reader should know on which basis we make statements in the following text about scarcity of available research.

Given the popularity of Hofstede’s findings, it is surprising to notice that few studies have research the relationships between the dimensions and international negotiation. No studies could be found testing the applicability of all of the dimensions to negotiation in either intracultural or intercultural context. As mentioned in the abstract, only one study addressing these issues has been found – “Explorations of negotiation behaviors in ten foreign cultures using a model developed in the United States” by John Graham et al. (1994), and their primary objective was to test the universality of a problem‐solving model of business negotiations, i.e. the theory on negotiation strategies (2.1, p.8). This understanding has been formed by own exploration and search for knowledge, and a summary by Jean‐Claude Usunier (Hofstede & Usunier, 2003, p.153).

We are therefore forced to base this research on the few findings available, Hofstede’s untested sugges‐tions to how the cultural dimensions might influence negotiation (Hofstede, 2001, pp.435‐36), and use related research.

There is general consensus among scholars about making the assumption that culture does influence negotiating behavior (Graham, 1985; Salacuse, 1998; Hofstede & Usunier, 2003). Some authors, however, argue that other factors, like buyer‐seller roles and norms of negotiation can moderate effects of culture (Cai et al., 2000). Some authors, for instance, Brett et al. (1998) do not find any particular link between cultural values or norms and negotiation outcome (in the case of their research, joint gains). In any case, we should avoid making the assumption that any factor, that is important in negotiation and shows diversity across cultures, is determined by culture. Although we do not elaborate on the other factors that may influence international negotiation, we should keep them in mind.

Much of the research in the field focuses on intracultural negotiations, i.e. negotiations within cultures and makes country‐by‐country comparisons (Graham et al., 1994; Adair et al., 2004; Graham et al., 1992; Roemer et al., 1999; Salacuse, 1988). These studies are useful to understand how different cultures negotiate, because they are able to use relatively large samples, which allows for generalization. The other approach to international negotiation research is to focus on intercultural negotiations – that is, negotia‐tions between cultures (Cai et al., 2000; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999). These studies use small sample sizes due to practical difficulties of conducting such studies, their findings are limited in scope, and the number of intercultural studies relative to the intracultural is low.

Drake (2001, p.317), describes the state of research on intercultural negotiation:

“Theoretical understanding of intercultural negotiation remains limited (Cai & Drake 1997), because it is extrapolated from intracultural, country‐by‐country comparisons (e.g. Graham & Sano, 1989; Harris & Moran, 1991). Cross‐cultural comparisons carry two related assumptions: Culture directly affects negotiating behavior (Graham 1985; Pye 1982; Rubin & Sander 1991) and domestic nego‐


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tiating behaviors correspond with those used internationally, so that success is achieved through adapting to a host (e.g. Brett et al., 1998).”

Cai, Wilson & Drake (2000) conducted a simulation study with 80 international students negotiating a previously designed task and completing a questionnaire that measured individualism. They state (Cai et al., 2000, p.592):

“To complicate matters, scholars have historically assumed that culture influences negotiating be‐havior (Graham 1985; Pye 1982), recent research suggests that buyer‐seller roles and norms of negotiation can moderate effects of culture (Cai, 1998; Drake, 1995) and that intercultural contexts bring about significantly different negotiation processes than intracultural contexts (Adler & Gra‐ham, 1989). Thus, our challenge is to isolate the effects of culture from those of structure or context when assessing integrative outcomes.”

Both intracultural and intercultural studies work with the two main perspectives on negotiation, which can be defined as outcome and process perspectives (Lewicki et al., 2006). The outcome perspective deals mostly with the gains achieved by the parties in negotiation. A common measure of negotiation outcome is profits or gains. Studies choose to focus either on joint gains (Adair et al., 2004; Brett et al., 1998) or individual gains and partner satisfaction (Graham et al., 1994; Graham et al., 1992). The outcome perspec‐tive allows to measure outcomes and simultaneously make a connection to negotiation strategies. In theory, high joint gains mean integrative strategy, while low joint gains mean distributive strategy (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.109). The process perspective deals with behavioral factors in negotiation, such as relation‐ship management, information exchange, distributive tactics, communication patterns, etc. (Adair et al., 2004; Brett et al., 1998; Salacuse, 1988). Some studies use both perspectives (Adair et al., 2004).

The most common methods of conducting studies on culture’s influence on negotiation are: simulation of pre‐designed negotiation activity (Graham et al., 1994) and questionnaire to measure attitudes and perceptions (Salacuse, 1998) or both (Cai et al., 2000).

An interesting question here is the degree of applicability of intracultural findings to intercultural negotia‐tions. Rather, the question is whether negotiating behavior changes in intercultural negotiations as opposed to intracultural. The advice by many theorists has been to “When in Rome, act as the Romans do” and modify one’s strategy to be consistent with behavior that occurs in that culture (Lewicki et al., 2006). The thought is that understanding how other cultures negotiate should help negotiators to adjust to each other’s strategies (Brett et al., 1998). However, Lewicki et al. (2006) point out that negotiators may not be able to modify their approach effectively, and even if they do that does not necessarily mean better outcome. Furthermore, there is possibility of overuse of theoretical assumptions about the other party, and therefore risk of confusion.

Some research does suggest that negotiators may negotiate differently interculturally than intraculturally (Adler & Graham, 1989). Adair et al. (2001) found that it is more difficult to negotiate high joint gains in intercultural negotiation (U.S. – Japan) than in intracultural (within U.S. and within Japan). Some research finds that thorough understanding of how the other party negotiates intraculturally might not help in negotiating with that party interculturally (Drake, 1995).

Further complicating matters, the quantity of studies on intercultural compared to intracultural negotiation is quite low, their scope is quite narrow, and the findings are limited, while the subject is very complex.


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3.2. Integrative and distributive strategies in international negotiation As described in the previous section, one of the directions that research on international negotiation has taken is studying integrative outcomes and processes, which is usually done by assessing profits.

Graham et al. (1994) reasoned that negotiation theory emphasizing a PSA‐approach (problem‐solving approach, i.e. integrative strategy) versus a distributive approach had been thoroughly based on American practice. They conducted a simulation intracultural study of negotiating behavior within 11 cultural groups (American and 10 other cultures). There were 700 participants from executive education programs or graduate business courses with minimum 2 years of business experience.

They tested several hypotheses relating negotiators’ roles (buyer/seller), partners’ problem‐solving approach, negotiator’s PSA, and negotiator attractiveness to negotiation outcomes – partners’ satisfaction and negotiators’ individual profits. Regarding the universality of the American model, which also is used in this work, they found that it works well in one aspect – negotiators' attractiveness positively influences partners' satisfaction in all eleven cultures. In seven cases, relationships worked in the opposite way than hypothesized based upon American theories and previous findings. All in all, of the 60 relationships studied (6 hypotheses multiplied by 10 foreign cultures), 36 were proved to be consistent with the American findings, 7 were different, and in 17 cases, no relationships were found. In the American group, however, relationships were found. The conclusions were that the American model is not universal, and one should take culture into account.

Regarding Hofstede’s dimensions, Graham et al. (1994) found that participants from high‐PDI cultures were more likely to make higher profits as buyers than sellers. Participants from high‐IDV cultures made higher individual profits and behaved more individualistically (stated to be the opposite of problem‐solving). Participants from high‐MAS cultures experienced higher satisfaction than others. These findings seem to be in line with the cultural dimension characteristics provided by Hofstede (2001).

While Graham et al. (1994) provide some insight into the differences between how different cultures negotiate, they do not examine how different cultures negotiate with each other. Their findings, however, are useful for this research, because they suggest that culture and negotiation should be studied simulta‐neously, and also because they support some aspects of Hofstede’s framework.

Adair et al. (2004) and Brett et al. (1998) used simulations of buyer‐seller negotiations for their research and measured cultural values, norms and joint gains in a negotiation situation involving people from 6 cultures (France, Russia, Japan, Hong Kong, Brazil, and USA). They found that hierarchical cultures in comparison to egalitarian cultures were more likely to accept norms for distributive tactics.

They also reported that U.S. and Japanese negotiators achieved highest joint gains, while Russian and Hong Kong negotiators achieved lowest joint gains. The authors attribute this to a direct relationship between sharing and exchange of information and joint gains. U.S. and Japanese negotiators were more likely to share information (U.S. used direct exchange, while Japanese indirect) than Russian and Hong Kong negotiators. Russians were focused on power and positioning, while Hong Kong negotiators were not sharing enough information to achieve joint gains.

3.3. Culture’s influence on negotiation Salacuse (1998) conducted a study in which 197 respondents with various occupations from the USA (41); the UK (17); France (10); Germany (11); Spain (19); Mexico (12); Argentina (26); Brazil (9); Nigeria (15); India (9); China (11); and Japan (11) were asked to assess their own negotiating behavior in 10 categories. This


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section provides an overview of Salacuse’s identified aspects of culture’s influence on negotiation, contrasts them with Hofstede’s cultural index scores, and supplements them with other findings. Salacuse’s study is chosen for this, because it is probably the most comprehensive exploratory study relating culture and negotiation that we could find. The results of this study may be biased to some degree, because the respondents answered questions about themselves (Paulhus & John, 1998). Also, the sample size was quite small considering the number of countries surveyed. Nonetheless, the patterns in responses to each question may be connected to Hofstede’s findings, and the relative percentages may be useful to this research. Salacuse (1998), however, did not present such an analysis, which is why we will attempt to perform it and then compare it to other findings on Hofstede’s dimensions in international negotiation. Therefore, throughout this section, tables are presented. These tables contrast the findings by Salacuse (1998) in percentages to findings by Hofstede (2001) in index values. The percentages for Nigeria and China by Salacuse are compared to index values for West Africa and Hong Kong by Hofstede respectively.

3.3.1. Masculinityfemininity and negotiation

According to Hofstede (2001), masculinity affects the need for ego‐boosting behavior and the sympathy for the strong and the tendency to resolve conflicts by use of authority. He reasoned that feminine cultures are more inclined to resolve conflicts through compromise and cooperation.

This researcher could not find much research relating the importance of the masculinity‐femininity dimension to negotiations. However, much has been written on gender roles in negotiation (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.376). According to Lewicki et al. (2006, p.377), Kolb and Coolidge have concluded that women are more aware of the complete relationship among the negotiating parties and are more likely to perceive negotiation as part of the larger context, rather than focus only on the issues at hand. Also, Kolb and Coolidge argue that women tend not to draw strict boundaries between negotiating and other aspects of their relationships to other people, but rather see negotiation as part of the relationships. Furthermore, Lewicki et al. (2006, p.378) mention that Kolb and Coolidge have found that women are more likely to seek empowerment where there is “interaction among all parties in the relationship to build connection and enhance everyone’s power”, while men use power to achieve own goals or to force the other party to capitulate to their point of view. Lewicki et al. (2006, p.378) assert that women’s conceptualization of power may make them more comfortable than men with integrative negotiation, although the fit is not perfect. Also, Lewicki et al. (2006, p.378) write that women are more likely to use dialogue for problem solving, while men use dialogue to convince the other party that their position is the correct one, or to support various tactics to win points during the discussion.

These accounts are in line with the masculine, assertive, competitive nature and the feminine, caring, collaborating nature, upon which the concept of the masculinity‐femininity dimension is built. As we also recall, the assertive and competitive behavior is associated with distributive strategy, while collaborating and relationship‐oriented behavior is associated with integrative strategy. Although Lewicki et al. (2006) do not explicitly state that men are inclined to negotiate distributively, while women are more inclined to use integrative strategy, we use this inference to construct hypotheses later.

3.3.2. Individualismcollectivism and negotiation

This section examines studies on the influence of individualism‐collectivism on negotiation. We also present a table that compiles several possibly related factors that have been identified by Salacuse (1998) and contrast them to index values calculated by Hofstede (2001).


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Table 5. Aspects of culture’s influence on negotiations and Hofstede’s index values

Negotiating goals: contract or relationship?

Contract (%) Spain France Brazil Japan USA Germany UK Nigeria Argentina China Mexico India

74 70 67 55 54 54 47 47 46 45 42 33

IDV 51 71 38 46 91 67 89 20 46 25 30 48

Negotiating attitude: win‐win or win‐lose?

Win‐win (%) Japan China Argentina France India USA UK Mexico Germany Nigeria Brazil Spain

100 82 81 80 78 71 59 50 55 47 44 37

IDV 46 25 46 71 48 91 89 30 67 20 38 51

Communication style: direct or indirect?

Indirect (%) Japan France China UK Brazil India Germany USA Argentina Spain Mexico Nigeria

27 20 18 12 11 11 9 5 4 0 0 0

IDV 46 71 25 89 38 48 57 91 46 51 30 20

Adopted from Salacuse (1988) and Hofstede (2001).

Negotiation goals of contract or relationship may relate to the individualism‐collectivism dimension (Hofstede, 2001, p.215). The distribution of percentages suggests that the relatively more individualistic countries generally prefer the contract to the relationship, while the relatively collectivistic countries prefer relationships. The contract is associated with the substantive goals, which are relatively more important to distributive negotiators, while the relative importance of the relationship is a sign of integrative strategy.

The negotiating attitude question (win‐win or win‐lose) is fundamental to the negotiation strategy and the basis for choice between integrative and distributive negotiation. It is a very complex issue, and the comparison illustrates that, across cultures, it is difficult to make assumptions using the individualism dimension. However, some studies have found that collectivistic cultures tend to negotiate integratively (win‐win) (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Cai et al., 2000).

The question about the difference in direct or indirect communication, also described as high‐context and low‐context communication, is attributed by Hofstede (2001, p.227) to the individualism dimension, asserting that high individualists tend to communicate more directly than high collectivists. The quick comparison of study results in the table does not seem to support that notion.

Hofstede (2001) predicted the following possible effects of the IDV dimension on intercultural negotiation. Collectivism should affect the need for stable relationship between negotiators, and replacement of a person could therefore take time. Hofstede also expected mediators to have an important role in maintain‐ing relationships. Relationships, according to Figure 1. The Dual concerns model, p. 9, are the key compo‐nent in integrative negotiation.

Cai, Wilson & Drake (2000) conducted a simulation study with 80 international students. The students negotiated a previously designed task in pairs (dyads) and completed a questionnaire that measured individualism. They found that the dyads’ summed collectivism was associated significantly with joint profits (r=.38, p<.01). Particularly, they found that seller, and not buyer, collectivism was significantly related to joint profits. Seller collectivism had a positive relationship with the degree of asking for informa‐tion and making multiple offers by the seller. Seller collectivism also had a negative relationship with using distributive tactics. Buyer collectivism displayed no significant correlations in these aspects. To sum up, the degree to which the sellers were collectivistic was correlated with integrative negotiation.


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Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) examined the question of “fixed pie errors” (these factor in distribu‐tive negotiation, preventing the negotiator from understanding the other party’s interests, seeing alterna‐tive opportunities and leading to leaving value on the table (Lewicki et al., 2006)). They researched the possibility that fixed pie errors would be more prevalent at the end of negotiations in the U.S. (individualis‐tic), as compared to Greece (collectivistic). Their study was based on a simulation of intercultural negotia‐tion between American and Greek students by e‐mail. Their findings supported the notion that individual‐ists were more likely to focus on own interests and neglect the others’ (distributive), while the collectivists were more inclined to pay attention to the other party’s needs (integrative). As a result of this cultural clash, Greeks were found to have been less satisfied with the negotiation, although they achieved similar results as the Americans.

On the basis of the above review, we assume that high collectivism may mean likelihood of integrative strategy, while high individualism may be connected to distributive strategy.

3.3.3. Uncertainty avoidance and negotiation

The effect of uncertainty avoidance on negotiation seems to be somewhat unexamined in literature. This section presents some of the cultural factors that have been identified by Salacuse (1988), and may or may not be related to uncertainty avoidance.


Personal style: formal or informal?

Formal (%) Nigeria Spain China Mexico UK Argentina Germany Japan India Brazil France USA

53 47 46 42 35 35 27 27 22 22 20 17

UAI 54 86 29 82 35 86 65 92 40 76 86 46

PDI 77 57 68 81 35 49 35 54 77 69 68 40

Emotionalism: high or low?

High (%)

Brazil Argentina Mexico Spain China USA Nigeria France India Japan UK Germany

89 85 83 79 73 74 60 60 56 55 47 36

UAI 76 86 82 86 29 46 54 86 40 92 35 65

Risk‐taking: high or low?

High (%)

France India UK China USA Nigeria Argentina Germany Brazil Mexico Spain Japan

90 89 88 82 78 73 73 72 56 50 47 18

UAI 86 40 35 29 46 54 86 65 76 82 86 92

Agreement form: general or specific?

General (%) Japan Germany India France China Argentina Brazil USA Nigeria Mexico Spain UK

46 45 44 30 27 27 22 22 20 17 16 11

UAI 92 65 40 86 29 86 76 46 54 82 86 35

Time sensitivity: high or low?

Low (%)

India France Germany Mexico Spain Argentina USA Japan China Nigeria UK Brazil

44 40 36 33 21 15 15 9 9 7 6 0

MAS 56 43 66 69 42 56 62 96 57 46 66 49

UAI 40 86 65 82 86 86 46 92 29 54 35 76



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Based on his descriptions of national culture, Hofstede (2001, p.436) predicted that uncertainty avoidance should affect (in)tolerance of ambiguity and (dis)trust in opponents who show unfamiliar behaviors and need for structure and ritual in negotiation.

Formality of style could be a result of high uncertainty avoidance, high power distance or both. It may address the need for structure in negotiations, which is a product of uncertainty avoidance. It may also be a product of the need for showing status, which is associated with high power distance (Hofstede, 2001, p.435). The comparison of results seems to show more conformity between power distance and preference for formal style. Formality of style may lead to distributive strategy, because it creates distance between negotiators as people and highlights status differences. In a clash between informal and formal styles, informality may be considered insulting (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.421), and inhibit negotiator attractiveness, and thus relationship building.

Hofstede (2001, p.160) asserts that expression of emotions is normal in high uncertainty avoidance cultures, while emotions should be controlled in low UAI cultures. The comparison in Table 6 seems to generally support this notion. Expression of emotions may be common in some countries, but considered aggressive, inappropriate, and insulting in others, which could lead to distributive negotiation.

Uncertainty avoidance is not the same as risk avoidance (Hofstede, 2001, p.148). However, the tendency to avoid risks could be a mechanism for coping with uncertainty, and therefore could be reflected by the uncertainty avoidance dimension (Hofstede, 2001, p.161). Indeed, the comparison in Table 6 generally supports the notion that cultures with lower uncertainty avoidance tend to take more risks than the ones with high UAI. Risk avoidance may inhibit creative solutions and alternative ways of creating value, which are essential to integrative negotiation. It may also affect relationships, because it may lead to unwilling‐ness to share information and distrust, because of concerns about being exploited by the other party (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.288‐89). Information sharing and trust are vital to effective relationships and integrative negotiation (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.43, 291).

Agreement form (general or specific) is an interesting factor found by Salacuse (1998), which may be connected to uncertainty avoidance, trust in relationships, or other factors. Our short comparison in Table 6 suggests that there might be a connection with UAI.

By sensitivity to time, Salacuse (1998) means the relative importance that different cultures assign to time. As a function of achievement, the coined phrase “time is money” could be attributed to masculinity. A comparison of percentages and values, however, may or may not support the notion. It is conceivable that high uncertainty avoidance cultures may be sensitive to time, because of high probability of rapid and unknown changes in the uncertain environment. We note that, in Table 6, most countries assign great importance to time, and while the comparison to UAI values may not show indicative evidence of this connection, it is possible that the relationship between high UAI and high time sensitivity may exist.

We conclude this section with the inference that high uncertainty avoidance may be connected to distributive negotiation because of formality of style, risk avoidance, and possibly emotionalism and time sensitivity.


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3.3.4. Power distance and negotiation


Team organization: one leader or group consensus?

One leader (%) Brazil China Mexico UK USA Spain Argentina Germany Japan India Nigeria France

100 91 91 65 63 58 58 55 55 44 40 40

PDI 69 68 81 35 40 57 49 35 54 77 77 68

IDV 38 25 30 89 91 51 46 57 46 48 20 71


Team organization refers to the decision‐making preference – either by a leader or group consensus. This may refer to both power distance and individualism‐collectivism. The power distance dimension is applicable, because decision‐making may be a question of authority in some cultures, but a question of agreement between competent professionals in other cultures. On the other hand, the individualism‐collectivism holds that individual decision‐making is preferable to group decision‐making (Hofstede, 2001, p.226). The comparison of Salacuse and Hofstede suggests that there might be some truth to both arguments.

On the importance of power distance in intercultural negotiations, Hofstede (2001, p.435) anticipated that power distance should affect the degree of centralization of control and decision‐making power, and the importance of status of the negotiators.

Brett et al. (1998) found that hierarchical cultures in comparison to egalitarian cultures were more likely to espouse norms for distributive tactics, which is also the inference that we end this section with and use later for formulation of hypotheses.

3.4. Descriptions of Danish negotiators Many studies have attempted to describe differences in behavior of negotiators from different cultures. For this study, a description of Danes and Russians as negotiators seems necessary to help construct hypothes‐es and later validate the findings. We have found very few studies describing the style Danish negotiators in relation to culture.

Hendon et al. (1996, p.44) mention a study comparing Spanish and Danish negotiation styles that describes Danish negotiators as being task‐oriented. They state that Danish negotiators prefer conversational topics that do not explicitly concern persons, and where persons and problems are separated from each other. When Danes want to address topics within the other party’s domain, they ask implicit questions, and seldom comment on the person’s behavior. Danes prefer a low degree of verbal immediacy, which refers to the degree of associating oneself verbally with the interaction, the topics of communication, with the listener’s or own utterances (Hendon et al., 1996, p.44). Danes proceed in a tentative, linear, compromise‐seeking fashion. Compared to Spaniards, whose opening move was made explicitly, while the closing move was made implicitly, Danes took the opposite sequence. Their opening move was tentative and unconfron‐tational, while the closing move was made explicitly upon agreement. As a result of the above described differences, Spaniards interpreted Danes as being emotionally uninvolved and impersonal, afraid of intimacy, and too concerned with doing business. Danish negotiators interpreted Spanish negotiators as self‐assertive, confrontational, and uncooperative, consuming more time and energy in negotiations than necessary. It is hard to infer from this description, whether Danes are inclined to negotiate integratively or


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distributively. Separating people from the problem is an integrative tactic, but it seems that in the case of this particular study, it may have prevented from relationship building.

Lothar Katz (2007a; 2007b), an international advisor in the field of cross‐cultural negotiation, is the only published work that we could find that included descriptions of both Danish and Russian negotiating style. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to locate a copy of his book “Negotiating International Business”. This means that we are unable to assess the method that Katz has used in his descriptions. The website that this book is advertised on is a product of collaboration between Katz, Requejo, and Graham (whom this paper frequently cites). It is also a book that has been published in 2 editions, so it is a legitimate and credible source. We use the country sections that are published on the website (2007a; 2007b).

The description of Danes as people and negotiators by Katz (2007a) features these points:

• Strong individualists, but may be concerned about group interests more than individuals’ desires • Business relationships moderately important • Egalitarian, treating someone preferentially strongly discouraged, autocratic behavior disapproved of • Bosses expected to be team leaders rather than solitary decision‐makers • Use direct communication and believe in sharing information as a way to build trust • Regard business as serious matter, prefer formal style, and swift negotiations • Believe that negotiation is a problem‐solving process • Believe in cooperation and the concept of win‐win • Use a monochronic work style, tackling one issue at a time, may be reluctant to go back to discuss

issues already agreed upon • Are not fond of bargaining and do not appreciate aggressive sales techniques • Believe in the importance of fairness • Corruption and bribery are very rare • Moderate risk takers • Signing a contract is important not only legally, but also as a strong confirmation of commitment

We hope that this section on the description of Danish negotiators is satisfactory and can be used to formulate hypothesis and to compare the findings. We proceed to the descriptive studies on Russian negotiators.

3.5. Descriptions of Russian negotiators This section compiles the findings on Soviet and Russian negotiators’ behavior. We take both into account, but keep in mind the post‐Soviet cultural changes.

A recent description of Russians as people and negotiators by Katz (2007b) features these points:

• Vast cultural differences within Russia, which is a culturally pluralistic country • Culture expects its members to have a sense of belonging to their group, but also leaves room for

individual preferences • Relationship building a slow, personal process, people dislike being rushed into the fast‐paced western

approach, patience is a virtue • Praising or rewarding someone in public may raise suspicion about motives • In Russia’s business culture, the respect a person enjoys depends primarily on his or her rank and status • Communicating with Russians can be anything from very direct to indirect


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• Prefer formality in being addressed by title, Mr. or Ms., and full name, business cards important, conservative attire

• The primary approach to negotiating is distributive, competitive, view negotiating as a zero‐sum game in which one side’s gain equals the other side’s loss

• Because of the country’s relatively unstable political and economic situation, negotiators may focus on near‐term benefits

• Information is rarely shared freely, since Russians believe that privileged information creates bargaining advantages

• Prefer slow negotiations • Use a polychronic work style, pursue multiple actions and goals in parallel, may jump back and forth

between topics, which monochronic cultures may find confusing and irritating • Use bargaining, make small concessions, ask for large ones in return; may use deceptive, pressure,

emotional techniques • Negotiators may be aggressive, adversarial, confrontational • Companies and decision‐making hierarchical, authority important, subordinates may be reluctant to

accept responsibility • Signed contracts are viewed as confirmation of commitment

Having presented Katz’ descriptions (2007b), we now turn our attention to studies that have specifically researched the effects of culture on negotiation with Soviets or Russians.

Graham et al. (1992) conducted a simulation study of intracultural buyer‐seller negotiations with 56 Soviet and 160 American businesspeople. Their study was conducted during the transitional period in Soviet Union ‐ Russia of early 90’s. Data were collected in Moscow in 1989. Graham et al. (1992) stated that some of the key Soviet problems were a general lack of understanding regarding the business process of buyer‐seller negotiations, and lack of experience with Western style commercial negotiations. Graham et al. (1992) found that the Soviets were more inclined to generate high individual profits while negotiating distributively. For the Soviet group, there was an inverse relationship between the negotiator’s problem‐solving approach and his or her profits. Conversely, for the American group, there was a positive relation‐ship between negotiator's profits and partner's problem solving approach (Graham et al., 1992). For both the Soviet and American bargainers, the majority of verbal behaviors were problem‐solving/information exchange oriented. However, the Soviets used a higher percentage of problem‐solving behaviors than their American counterparts: 67% versus 56%, respectively. Also, the Soviets used less instrumental behaviors (threats, promises, commitments, rewards and punishments) – 23% compared to 30% for the Americans. Graham et al. (1994), in their intracultural study of 11 cultural groups, found that among the Soviet negotiators, attractiveness dramatically enhanced partners' satisfaction. Moreover, the problem‐solving strategies worked in the Soviet group in a similar way to the American.

A more recent study by Roemer et al. (1999), compared American and Russian patterns of conversational behaviors in the context of a simulated buyer‐seller negotiation involving 60 American and 52 Russian businesspeople participating in intracultural, face‐to‐face bargaining sessions. They found that Russian sellers used a lower percentage of presumptive information about buyers (p<0.05) and showed higher percentages of “listener is inconsistent with previous statements, behaviors, or agreements”. They also found that Russians used a higher percentage of commands and requests (p<0.05). Additionally, Russian sellers were found to make fewer statements than American sellers (p<0.10), and they achieved lower joint profits in the negotiation simulations (p<0.05).


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Adair et al. (2004) state that most descriptive accounts place Russia as a high‐context culture, describe Russian communication as indirect and holistic (Berdiaev, 1990), even secretive (Rajan & Graham, 1991). Adair et al. (2004) write:

“Russians process information subjectively and associatively, characteristics that are also typical of high‐context communication norms (Morrison et al., 1994).These accounts suggest that Russian negotiators will use indirect communication strategies. In descriptive accounts, power and hierarchy frame Russian social norms (Lefebvre & Lefebvre, 1986; Smith, 1991), and norms for distributive tactics govern interactions with an out‐group (Roemer et al., 1997).”

Brett et al. (1998) found that Russian negotiators identify hierarchy as a guiding cultural value, distributive tactics as normative in negotiation, and negotiator role as a source of power in negotiation. The consistent descriptive and empirical evidence suggests that Russian negotiators are likely to use more power strate‐gies in negotiation.

Roemer et al. (1999) include an overview of descriptive findings by Western researchers on Soviet/Russian negotiators. They acknowledge the existence of literature on Soviet negotiation styles, but state that it is based primarily on intercultural political negotiations rather than business negotiations. Roemer et al. (1999) clearly state that Russians have often followed a distributive, rather than a cooperative, approach to negotiations, which reflects the Russian belief that one person’s profits are always at the expense of another’s. Roemer et al. (1999) describe two existing explanations to this. One is that bureaucratic and organizational constraints lead to a more distributive approach, and the other one is that government bureaucracies confronts foreign investors and contributes to the Russian economy’s inherent inflexibility. We believe that underlying the bureaucracy there are centralized decision‐making, hierarchical structure, and therefore, in our terminology, high power distance.

Graham et al. (1992) writes that there is agreement among authors that Russians tend to engage in manipulating behavior. Graham et al. (1992) also states that most authors describe the Soviets as informa‐tion hungry and detail‐oriented, and that while asking for much information, the Soviets are often described as secretive. According to Graham et al. (1992), the majority of the authors stress the importance of cultivating personal relationships based on mutual respect and understanding as a crucial condition for successful negotiations and transactions with the Soviets and that such efforts are said to be rewarded with trust and loyalty.

We assume that there still is some truth to the descriptive accounts on Soviet negotiators in the current climate, because of their consistency with the more recent accounts of Russian negotiators by Roemer et al. (1999) and Katz (2007b). On this basis, we conclude that Russian negotiators are described as distribu‐tive negotiators, who reservedly share information, and use power tactics. Most of this is explained in the literature through the bureaucracy of the system. Because the power distance dimension refers to the inequality and hierarchy in society, we use this cultural dimension to explain these tendencies.

3.6. Negotiations between Danes and Russians This author failed to find studies on negotiations between Danes and Russians. However, some findings from one observational study of organizational culture might prove useful.

Michailova and Anisimova (2003) conducted a case study in a Danish subsidiary in Russia using observa‐tional and questionnaire techniques. They found that Russians describe themselves as individualists at work and do not like group decision‐making by consensus. Michailova and Anisimova elaborate (2003): Russian


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middle managers and specialists feel like they possess specialized operational knowledge, especially local knowledge, much of which is tacit. They feel they have to be included in making operational decisions because of the instability of the market and their personal expertise, and feel offended and mistrusted when their opinions are not taken into account. On the other hand, they feel uncomfortable taking part in the group decision‐making on the strategic level, because they feel that it is the responsibility of the strong authoritative leader. This particular study did not compare the findings to Hofstede’s dimensions, but one can suggest that this example illustrates the effects that collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance may have on decision‐making.

Eylon and Au (1999) researched the process of empowerment across cultures. They found that, as a result of the empowerment process, participants from both high and low power distance cultures were more satisfied with their job in the empowered condition and less satisfied in the disempowered condition. Individuals from high power distance cultures did not perform as well when empowered as when disem‐powered. This supports the notion that Russian employees perform better at operational level, when disempowered (Michailova & Anisimova, 2003). Also, this might support the presumption that high power distance cultures might elect high‐level authoritative figures as representatives in negotiations not only because of their power, but also because of their efficiency in matters of importance.

3.7. Conclusion On the basis of our review of theory using the libraries listed on page 81, we conclude that the field of Danish‐Russian intercultural negotiations lacks published knowledge on several levels.

In its widest focus, namely culture’s influence on negotiations, there is much research on intracultural negotiations. While such research helps us understand how different cultures negotiate within themselves, it does less to facilitate better understanding of how different cultures negotiate with each other. This is because of the complexity of issues involved – for instance, the unknown degree to which negotiators adapt to each other when negotiating interculturally.

There are fewer findings on intercultural negotiation than the intracultural because of the difficulties involved in organizing such studies relative to data collection, methodology, and complexity of issues. These studies are usually bilateral in construct and rarely multilateral. This means that we may use their findings to understand interactions between two cultures, and rarely more than two, which limits our holistic understanding of intercultural negotiation dynamics, because one cannot assume that these findings are applicable to other cultures.

The studies relating Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to negotiation behavior are few and usually do not take into account all of the dimensions (Cai et al., 2000).

In the narrower, more specific focus of Danish‐Russian negotiations, this researcher failed to find any studies in the libraries and searching engines listed in this paper. Some studies compare American and Russian (or Soviet) negotiating behavior (Graham et al., 1992; Beliaev et al., 1985; Roemer et al., 1999; Anderson & Shikhirev, 1994), or entrepreneurial behavior and ethics (Hisrich & Gratchev, 2000), etc. Some compare negotiators from different cultures, including Russia, and attempt to characterize behavior (Adler, 2002, p.209).

Meanwhile, this researcher has not been able to find any studies describing Danish negotiators, or relating Hofstede’s dimensions to Danish negotiators. This research thus has to use Hofstede’s initial findings on Danish culture and the connotations following thereof (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, 2001).


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All research on international negotiations is limited in several ways. First, there is the problem of compre‐hensiveness, because of the quantity, diversity and uniqueness of the cultures of the world. Thus, re‐searchers limit their work to take into account just a few selected cultures. This makes it hard to generalize knowledge into conceptual frameworks. Second, all research in the field is limited in scope because of the difficulty of obtaining sample sizes that are large enough. Third, the complexity of issues involved in international negotiation may not allow for development of a theoretical framework even if it were possible to collect data samples that were comprehensive and large enough.

Some of the practical problems concerning studies on international negotiation are the difficulty of collecting data and the question of applicability of methodology. It is difficult to collect data in the field because of low degree of availability of experienced participants. Indeed, many studies use simulations of pre‐designed negotiations, with participants from MBA programmes, who may not have the desired level of negotiating experience. Survey techniques are usually used in a supporting role or as secondary data to the observation and simulation techniques. Also, most of the surveys in the studies reviewed asked the respondents to answer questions about themselves, which may produce biased results to some degree (Salacuse, 1998).


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4. Research question The main research question of this work is whether, in intercultural Danish‐Russian negotiations, relation‐ships exist between masculinity‐femininity, individualism‐collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance and use of distributive strategy or integrative strategy.

The main purpose of this study is to discover, describe, and explain these connections using the quantita‐tive survey method. The survey is based on responses by a selection of Danish and Russian managers with experience in Danish‐Russian intercultural negotiations.

The chosen field of study is the Danish‐Russian intercultural negotiations. The field is chosen because of substantial personal interest of this researcher, lack of published research, recent emergence of the Russian market, and growth in Danish business activity in Russia.

Theory and recent research described in Chapters 2 & 3 suggest that culture influences negotiation behavior. In fact, many of the studies reviewed in Chapter 3 assume so (Graham et al., 1994; Lewicki et al., 2006; Hofstede, 2001). This research will make the same assumption, and simultaneously assume that the theory described in Chapter 2 holds true. After making these important assumptions, we can proceed to formulate the research objectives.

4.1. Research objectives First, the review of the state of research suggests that at least some of the cultural dimensions, individual‐ism versus collectivism, power distance, masculinity versus femininity, and uncertainty avoidance, might influence the use of distributive or integrative negotiation strategy. The main objective of this study is to find out if there are statistically significant relationships between each of the four described dimensions of culture and the tendencies to negotiate integratively or distributively.

The second objective of this study is to determine, which negotiation strategies the Danes and the Russians tend to employ.

4.2. Conceptual significance The review of the state of research concludes that there is a lack of knowledge in the field of study defined for this work. No studies were found relating culture to negotiation in the context of Danish‐Russian negotiations. Moreover, this researcher could not find any studies on Danish‐Russian negotiations.

On a theoretical level, researching connections between Hofstede’s dimensions and negotiation strategies may add valuable knowledge on relationships between these two established theoretical frameworks.

On an empirical level, finding relations between singular dimensions of culture and negotiation strategies may help explain how particular cultural factors relate to particular aspects of negotiation behavior.

Researching the intercultural Danish‐Russian negotiations may help understand how the differences in culture relate to negotiating behavior in the Danish‐Russian context.

Better understanding of recent tendencies in intercultural negotiations between Danes and Russians may help disprove stereotypes, biases and wrong assumptions. Comparing the findings to the historical change in values may provide current knowledge that is useful in modern turbulent environment.


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4.3. Potential practical application The empirical findings of this research may be directly applied by Danish and Russian negotiators to better understand culture’s relationships with their work. They could be used both for preparation and during the negotiations. Also, understanding of these relations may be extended to other phases of life, because negotiation is a phenomenon occurring in other phases of life than just the negotiating table. Although such an extension would not be valid or reliable, it could help Danes and Russians to understand each other better beyond the construct of a negotiation situation.

Better understanding can be used in practice, and could lead to better results, outcomes and higher value. Looking ahead to the description of methodology, it is appropriate to note here that this study attempts to measure negotiators’ perceptions of the other side and not of themselves. Thus, as a side effect to the main objective, this study measures how each side perceives the other. This is expected to be valuable in itself, because if both Danes and Russians were to know how each side perceives the other, they might be able to understand each other better. Comparing these perceptions of the other party to other studies describing cultural differences and negotiating behavior of these two cultures may help find how behavior changes from the intracultural to the intercultural setting. This knowledge may be useful to negotiators as a tool for monitoring their own behavior and understanding the other party’s behavior.

5. Hypotheses Based on Chapters 2 & 3, the following hypotheses have been constructed. We attempt to formulate statements based on the review of cultural dimension scores in Chapter 2, Hofstede’s tables of connota‐tions of the dimensions, and the theory on negotiation strategies. We assume that we know the cultural dimension scores, and that they adequately depict cultural values in both Denmark and Russia. We take into account recent developments in Russia described in Chapter 2, and keep an eye on the differences between the two cultures. When we say “score high/low on…”, we mean that in a relative sense to all other cultures that have been examined by Hofstede (2001). What we do not know is whether there are connections between the dimensions of culture and negotiation strategies, and whether Danes are Russians are inclined to negotiate integratively or distributively when negotiating with each other. In sections 3.4 and 3.5 on the descriptive accounts of Danes and Russians in negotiation, we concluded that while Danes’ tendency to employ a certain strategy is uncertain, Russians have been described as distribu‐tive negotiators.

5.1. The masculinityfemininity dimension and negotiation strategies According to Hofstede (2001, p.286), Danes have one of the highest femininity scores in the world. Russians, on the other hand, have had a moderately high masculinity score (Table 3. Index value scores for Russia). Russians have a higher masculinity score than Danes (This section compiles the findings ).

Using Hofstede’s findings (2001, pp.281, 298‐299) on the masculinity‐femininity dimension, we therefore assume that Danes:

• Are relationship‐oriented • Believe in group decisions • Value cooperation • Value friendly atmosphere and exhibit caring behavior


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Integrative strategy emphasizes the importance of relationships, collaboration, group decisions, and taking into account the needs and interests of all parties (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.71‐101).We thus hypothesize:

H1. Danes score high on femininity, which is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively.

Using the same findings, we assume that Russians:

• Are ego‐oriented • Believe in individual decisions • Value challenge, advancement, recognition • Exhibit assertive behavior

Distributive strategy focuses on own gains, self‐interest, fixed‐pie assumptions, competition (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.32‐70). We hypothesize that these cultural values and traits of negotiation behavior are similar, thus:

H2. Russians score moderately high on masculinity, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributive‐ly.

5.2. The individualismcollectivism dimension and negotiation strategies Hofstede (2001, p.215) ranks Denmark as a highly individualistic culture. Russia has been assumed to be a collectivistic country (Roemer et al., 1999; Brett et al., 1998), but research has shown moderately individua‐listic scores (Chapter 2; Table 3. Index value scores for Russia). Denmark is a more individualistic country than Russia (Chapter 3). A few studies have shown that collectivism is connected to integrative strategy, and individualism is connected to distributive strategy (Cai et al., 2000; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999).

According to Hofstede’s (2001, pp.226‐27) tables of value connotations and societal norms for individual‐ism, Danes hold these values and norms:

• Self‐orientation and “I” consciousness • Everyone is supposed to take care of him‐ or herself • Prefer individual decisions • Identity is based on the individual

Distributive strategy focuses on own gains, self‐interest, no interest in relationship with the other party. (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.32‐70). We hypothesize that individualistic values and traits of distributive strategy are similar, thus:

H3. Danes score high on individualism, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributively.

We have examined the findings on Russian individualism‐collectivism in Chapter 3. We must keep in mind the differing opinions and findings on this subject. Because of differing findings and opinions on the state of Russian individualism‐collectivism, we must assume the truth of the several studies that rank Russia as moderately high on individualism (Table 3. Index value scores for Russia). We thus hypothesize similarly to H3:

H4. Russians score moderately high on individualism, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distribu‐tively.


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5.3. The uncertainty avoidance dimension and negotiation strategies Hofstede (2001, p.151) shows that Denmark scores low on the uncertainty avoidance dimension. Russia scores high on uncertainty avoidance (Table 3. Index value scores for Russia). According to Hofstede (2001, pp.160‐61), low uncertainty avoidance means:

• Acceptance of uncertainty in life • Openness to change and innovation • Willingness to take unknown risks • Comfort with ambiguity and chaos • Suppression of emotions – not expressing embarrassment, anger, guilt

We hypothesize that these factors have a positive effect on the tendency to negotiate integratively, because integrative strategy emphasizes willingness to share information openly and to trust the other party, which carries a risk of being exploited by the other party. We hypothesize that if one accepts uncertainty, is open to change and is willing to take risks, one will also be more open to alternative ways of creating value and expanding the pie.

H5. Danes score low on uncertainty avoidance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively.

High uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001, pp.160‐61) means these values and norms in society:

• Uncertainty in life is felt as a continuous threat that must be fought • Conservatism, law and order • Only known risks are taken • Need for clarity and structure • Expression of emotions – expressing embarrassment, anger, guilt

We hypothesize that fighting uncertainty and being unwilling to take risks may result in people being distrustful, suspicious and unwilling to share information. Combined with the need for clarity and structure and conservatism, these factors may result in being rigid in stances, uncompromising and change averse. Russians have been described to exhibit some of these traits (Chapter 3). We hypothesize:

H6. Russians score high on uncertainty avoidance, which is related to a tendency negotiate distributively.

5.4. The power distance dimension and negotiation strategies Hofstede (2001, p.81) shows that Denmark scores low on the power distance dimension. Chapter 2 elaborates on the power distance dimension in Russia and shows considerable change (60 index points) through the past 20 years (Table 3. Index value scores for Russia, p.16). It is not a goal of this study to examine why PDI has fallen, or if it has fallen so markedly. We know that Denmark has a lower power distance score than Russia (This section compiles the findings ). For the purpose of this study, we must assume that Russian power distance has fallen from the extremely high estimate by Hofstede (2001, p.502), but keep in mind that the fall in PDI is explained by Naumov & Petrovskaja (2008) through the fact of increasing implementation of Western management theory within organizations. We also take into account that respondents in their study strongly agreed with the statement that the manager needs to be powerful and authoritarian. We thus assume that Russians are moderately high on power distance.

Hofstede (2001, pp.96‐98) lists these values and norms for low power distance cultures:

• All should be interdependent


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• Inequality in society should be minimized • Hierarchy means inequality of roles, established for convenience • Subordinates and superiors are people like me • All should have equal rights

We hypothesize that egalitarian values of low power distance cultures are related to integrative strategy, because values of equality should mean preference for equal opportunity in negotiations, less exercise of power to achieve better position, exert pressure on the other party, and less use of hard bargaining. We hypothesize:

H7. Danes score low on power distance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively.

For high power distance cultures, following norms and values apply (Hofstede, 2001, pp.96‐98):

• Few should be independent, most should be dependent • There should be an order of inequality where everyone has his/her rightful place • Hierarchy means existential inequality • Subordinates and superiors consider each other to be of different kind • Power holders are entitled to privileges

We hypothesize that authoritarian values of high power distance cultures are connected to distributive strategy, because values of inequality should result in preference for unequal opportunities, solutions and agreements, more use of power for positioning, pressuring, and more use of hard bargaining tactics. Thus:

H8. Russians score high on power distance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributively.

5.5. General hypotheses on negotiation strategies Based on H1‐H8 and Chapter 3, we propose the following general hypotheses:

H9. Danes are inclined to use integrative negotiation strategy.

H10. Russians are inclined to use distributive negotiation strategy.

We realize that a contradictory statement occurs in H3, concerning the Danish tendency to negotiate distributively based on the culture’s high individualism. However, we view culture as a complex collection of values, and so understand that contradictory values exist. We attempt to find relationships, and accept that some cultural dimensions might influence negotiations more than others.


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6. Method This study attempts conclusive research into the relationships between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies. We attempt to test 8 hypotheses and examine specific relationships between the two theoretical constructs. We do not attempt to prove causality of culture’s influence on negotiation behavior. Causal research primarily employs experimental designs (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.258), for which this project does not have the necessary resources. Rather, we attempt to find and describe relationships between the two theories, which classifies our project as descriptive research in a field that lacks published knowledge. Malhotra & Birks (2003, p.65) define descriptive research as a type of conclu‐sive research that has as its major objective the description of something.

The data analysis method chosen is therefore quantitative (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.63). This study attempts to acquire representative samples by means of the survey method, perform statistical analysis on the collected data, and compare the findings to secondary data (the studies described in the Reviews of theory and State of research sections).

The target populations of this research are defined as Danish managers with experience in business negotiations with Russians and Russian managers with experience in business negotiations with Danes. The sampling technique that we use is therefore non‐probability sampling (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.363). This is because locating these experienced managers requires the use of the researcher’s personal judgement (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.364). Malhotra & Birks (2003, p.364) state that judgemental sampling does not allow direct generalizations to a specific population. Nonetheless, we perceive judgemental sampling as the only way of conducting this study and address the issue of generalization in section (7.11, p.73).

6.1. Perceptions As noted in Chapter 3, the common methods of research in international negotiation have been simulations and surveys (Brett et al., 1998; Graham et al., 1994; Cai et al., 2000; Roemer et al., 1999). The surveys have measured the respondent’s assessment of own behavior or values (Salacuse, 1988; Brett et al., 1998; Adair et al., 2004).

This study chooses to focus on Danish and Russian managers’ perceptions of the behavior of the other party. We understand perception as a cognitive process that enables us to interpret and understand our environment (Buelens et al., 2006, p.128). Specifically, we are interested in social perceptions, which Buelens et al. (2006, p.128) define as the process by which people come to understand each other.

This is a fundamentally different approach, which this researcher has not seen in other studies on intercul‐tural negotiation. The reasons for this may be the following:

• This is a very approximate way to measure cultural dimensions, and very different from Hofstede’s approach.

• The participants in an intercultural negotiation study have to be experienced negotiators, because they have to understand exhibited behavior patterns in negotiation situations.

• If the participants are inexperienced, the only method is simulation, which also seems to be the prevalent method in the field.

• Whether the method employed is simulation, survey, or both, it is difficult to locate and secure participation of qualified respondents.

• It is difficult to conduct intercultural negotiation simulations, because it is hard to place a large number of participants in the same location. Cai et al. (2000) conducted their study at an American university with 80 participants from 21 countries. 36 of the participants were American. The sample was both small and not representative. Gelfand & Christakopoulou (1999) conducted their intercultural negotia‐tion study using a simulation of negotiations between Americans and Greeks by e‐mail.


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The main disadvantage of our approach is, probably, that using surveys to measure the participants’ perceptions of others may be biased by stereotypes and other filters (Buelens et al., 2006, p.147). However, perception of self and own behavior may be influenced by egoistic and moralistic biases, causing to portray oneself in positive light (Paulhus & John, 1998).

This researcher believes that the survey method measuring the participants’ perceptions of the other party has several advantages over the usually employed simulation and self‐perception survey method. These reasons may be:

• Because our approach is to measure perceptions of others in past experiences with negotiation encounters with representatives from a specific culture, it is possible that one may more accurately remember and assess behavior of others than one’s own.

• Conversely, we think that one may be unable to accurately perceive and remember changes in one’s own behavior when negotiating with a specific culture, compared to negotiating with other cultures.

• Our approach allows to compare the sides’ perceptions of each other, which is interesting in itself and adds another level of analysis.

• This approach may solve the potential problem of ethnocentric bias. This author thinks that answering questions about others should reduce the self‐interest in ethnocentrism, i.e. portraying one’s country and culture as superior (Buelens et al., 2006, p.604)

• It is difficult to locate qualified participants, but easier than in the case of simulation.

Consequently, the survey respondents in this project are Danish managers with experience in negotiating with Russians, and Russian managers with experience in negotiating with Danes.

6.2. Research fieldwork The respondents were assumed to be employed in firms where business is conducted between Danish and Russian companies. The location of the respondent’s residence or his/her affiliation with either side were deemed to be irrelevant. The most important factor in the search for respondents was experience with negotiating with the other side. The firms that employed the respondents were found using internet searching engines Google.dk and Yandex.ru (section 10, p.81). Also, a list of Danish subsidiary companies in Russia by the Danish embassy in Moscow was obtained through an acquaintance. The site Danishexpor‐ters.dk proved useful to find Danish firms with export to Russia. Russian firms were mainly found using the internet searching engines. The firms were contacted by e‐mail and phone, and the questionnaires were distributed by e‐mail. The e‐mails contained invitations to participate in the study, a description of the study, and the requirement that the respondents had to have experience in negotiating with the corres‐ponding side. The e‐mails contained the questionnaires in Word file format, and the respondents were instructed to fill them out, save them, and e‐mail them back to this author (Sections 13.9. & 13.10., p.115 & p.118).

During the process of data collection, several complications arose. After the first e‐mail was sent out, contacting 50 Danish and 50 Russian firms, only few responses were obtained. It became evident that personal contact by phone was needed to obtain enough responses. After going through the data collection by phone, it is this researcher’s opinion that Danish firms were more cooperative than the Russian firms. No Danish firms declined after the initial invitation to participate, while refusals were quite common among Russian firms. Furthermore, the Danish firms were much easier to find using internet databases such as Danishexporters.dk, than were the Russian firms, which often did not have websites. In fact, about half of the Russian responses used in this study were submitted by Russian employees from Danish subsidiary companies in Russia. Some employees (both Danes and Russians) from large Danish companies declined participation on the grounds of their relationship with the other side being a collegiate one. They reasoned


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that they worked together with their colleagues from the other country, and therefore did not have experience in negotiating with them.

The respondents were asked to fill in the number of employees and turnover in their firm (13.6. Sample characteristics: descriptives and frequencies). The mean results show a big difference. The Danish respon‐dents worked in firms with, on average, 474 employees, and 117,6 million € in yearly turnover. The Russian respondents had, on average, 58 colleagues, and 5,6 million € in turnover. Although these results cannot be indicative of the Danish‐Russian business, they support this author’s impression that there are many more Danish firms with subsidiaries in Russia, than Russian firms with subsidiaries in Denmark.

All in all, about 80 Danish and 80 Russian firms are estimated to have been contacted, which has yielded 33 Danish and 14 Russian responses. The target had been set at 30 responses from each country, but despite all the efforts, we were not able to attain that number for the Russian sample.

6.3. Translation The original questionnaire was composed in English to maintain consistency in use of terms throughout the document. After the final version of the questionnaire was completed, it was translated by this author to Danish and Russian. This translation was afterwards verified by a bilingual colleague with expertise in all three languages to ensure correctness, precision and consistency with the English version as the bench‐mark.


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7. Empirical research This chapter is a presentation of the empirical research that we have conducted for the purpose of achieving the research objectives. Here we outline the structure of this chapter.

In section 7.1 we describe the principles behind the design of the questionnaire that we have distributed. Section 7.2 then presents a description of sample characteristics and the respondents that have partici‐pated. Then we describe how the theoretical constructs of the cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies were operationalized into variables in section 7.3. Section 7.4 presents an analysis of mean values for all the variables of the questionnaire to initially describe the levels of agreement or disagreement with the statements (variables). In section 7.5 we present a description of the statistical techniques that have been employed to make inferences on the basis of the collected data. Sections 7.6 and 7.7 are the largest sections in this chapter, because they present statistical analyses that have been performed. In section 7.8 we make a compilation of the conclusions from the analyses and compare the findings on Danes and Russians. Sections 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12 discuss the questions of reliability, validity, generalization and limitations.

All statistical analysis in this study is performed using SPSS Statistics 17.0 by SPSS Inc. (2008). All future reference to the program in this paper is done by the name SPSS.

7.1. Questionnaire design The questionnaire was constructed using the 5‐point Likert scale and consisted of 32 statements with which respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.304). The scale was balanced and had a neutral point of “neither agree nor disagree”. The scale was chosen because of its ease of construction, administration, understanding by the participants, and common application for measure‐ment of attitudes (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, pp.303‐05).

This study examines 10 hypotheses on 4 cultural dimensions. Initially, each of the 4 cultural dimensions was supposed to be represented by 4 factors which had 4 supposed opposing factors on negotiation strategy. The number “4” was chosen because it was the number of distinctive traits per cultural dimension that this author was able to identify. These traits were intended to provide adequate measurements of factors that were identified through theory.

Ultimately, this structure prevailed, but there were 5 statements on uncertainty avoidance. We present all statements later and discuss their construct validity (Malhotra & Birks, 2003), because, predictably, not all variables measured exactly what they were supposed to. In the distributed questionnaire, there were 17 statements on the cultural dimensions, and 15 statements on negotiation strategies. There were thus 32 statements in total.

To ensure that the respondents had adequate experience, the main question of the questionnaire narrowed the field to price negotiations. The questionnaire began by: “Danish (or Russian) negotiators in intercultural price negotiations”, followed by the 32 statements. This was also done to make sure that the negotiations that the respondents based their answers on negotiations that had been important to both parties, which should ensure the relevance of the responses. The statements about the subject of price were also presented first. This was done to direct the respondent’s attention to the significance of the subject. The statements were otherwise presented in the order they were constructed – statements on masculinity‐femininity, individualism‐collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance, with the corresponding statements on distributive and integrative strategy in between.


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7.2. Sample characteristics All respondents and their companies have been promised total anonymity. However, it is necessary to document the experience level of the respondents, because it is an important factor that describes validity.

The sample characteristics are presented in the Appendices section (13.6, p.92) and show descriptive statistics on the participating firms’ industry, number of employees, and recent turnover figures expressed in million EUR. Additionally, there are frequency distributions of the respondents’ individual characteristics. These are gender and occupied position (the latter was not a question in the questionnaire, but was easy to find as additional information in the e‐mails and the company web‐sites).

Most of the respondents from both samples hold high positions within their companies – managing directors, directors, heads of representation, export managers, sales managers, key account managers, etc. From this information we infer that the participants in this study met the experience requirement.

The firms that have been represented in this study work in a variety of fields, which represents good diversity across occupations. That should be a positive factor regarding the reliability and the generalizabili‐ty of the results.

Generally, the Danish firms that have participated are much larger and wealthier than the Russian firms. This information is purely descriptive – we cannot use it in any analysis.

In the Danish sample, 7 missing values were found, while there were none in the Russian sample. To avoid exclusion of a whole response from any analysis, the missing values were replaced. A frequencies proce‐dure was performed, and the most frequent values for each variable were found. These values were then used to replace the missing values.

As mentioned earlier, there are 33 responses from Danish managers about the Russians’ behavior, and 14 responses from Russian managers about the Danes’ behavior.

Because of the small sample sizes, it is necessary to note now that all subsequent analysis makes inferences about the samples. The question of whether these inferences may be generalized to the level of Danes and Russians as populations is addressed after the analysis in section (7.11, p.73).

7.3. Operationalization of study variables The following section is a presentation of the 32 statements of the questionnaire. This presentation also explains the intended theoretical meaning behind the statements. All 32 statements were constructed on the basis of theory to serve as indicators of one of the dimensions or one of the strategies. Fundamentally, the scores for all 4 cultural dimensions have been presented by Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001, pp.87, 151, 215, 286) as continuums, and are used as such here. That is, agreement with a statement on masculinity is simultaneously assumed to mean the opposite – disagreement with femininity, and vice versa. This logic is applicable to all the examined cultural dimensions.

Integrative strategy and distributive strategy are not exact opposites of each other – both value substantial goals, but differ on the importance of relationships. The same logic as with the cultural dimensions can therefore not be applied here. Instead, we assume that agreement with a statement on distributive strategy means disagreement with the opposite statement on distributive strategy. So, if we have a statement “Treat negotiation as competition” and see agreement in the data, we simultaneously interpret it as disagreement with the potential statement “Do not treat negotiation as competition”. In some cases, this may allow for a richer analysis than otherwise.


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The difference in these approaches to inference is that with cultural dimensions we can directly assume the opposite of the answers to the statement, because our theory allows us to do so. However, in some cases with the negotiation strategies, we can indirectly assume the opposite based on the interpretation of the particular statement.

The descriptive statistics, including the means, standard deviations, variances, lowest and highest points, etc, are included in the Appendices section (13.1, p.83 & 13.2, p.84). In the following, we present the statements, mean value scores for the questions, indicating agreement or disagreement, explanations of the origin of the statements, and simple inferences about the mean values of the statements. Because the Danes were asked to indicate the degree of agreement on statements about the Russians and vice versa, we need to avoid confusion in the presentation of the results. However, we must keep in mind that we are analyzing the perceptions by the other side.

Therefore, the data is presented based on scores about the culture in question, not based on who ans‐wered the questionnaires. Thus, the sample mean values in parentheses should be read as “DK: x =4,2857” means “the Russians perceive the Danes to…”, and “RU: x =3,9394” means “the Danes perceive the Russians to…”.

7.4. Analysis of means The results on the Likert scale have been converted to numerical values. “Completely disagree” was assigned the value “1”, “Disagree” – “2”, “Neither agree nor disagree” – “3”, “Agree” – “4”, and “Complete‐ly agree” received the value “5”. Consequently, mean scores above 3 indicate agreement with the state‐ment, while mean scores below 3 indicate disagreement. Some of the variables have not functioned as intended – the question of construct validity is addressed later (7.10, p.71).

The 32 variables were technically statements and not questions, and are referred to as statements throughout the paper. However, we prefer to use the letter Q to denote the statement numbers.

Q1. Value importance of economic goals (DK: x =4,2857; RU: x =3,9394).

This statement was meant to indicate distributive strategy, because it originated from the dual concerns model and originally meant “substantive” goals. However, the statement did not reflect the relative nature of the construct, and probably should have read “Value economic goals more than relationships”. This researcher wanted to avoid such double‐barrelled statements (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.331), because of concerns about how they may lead the respondent in a particular direction, or yield ambiguous responses. Also, problems with translation to Danish and Russian rendered the statement to the near synonym “economic” goals. The answers have shown agreement with the statements by both sides, reflecting the fact that economic goals are important to any business negotiation, especially to those on the subject of price.

Q2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed (DK: x =3,1429; RU: x =3,3939).

This statement should indicate distributive strategy, because it relates to fixed‐pie assumptions, which are described as a key barrier to integrative negotiation (Lewicki et al., 2006, pp.144‐45). These assumptions inhibit creation of alternative solutions and expansion of agreements, and lead to bargaining over positions and splitting the pie. This should have been an important indicator, and does show some interesting results. However, a relatively high number of missing values (2) and agreement with the statement by both sides may indicate that this statement was hard to understand and assess.

Q3. Focus primarily on the price (DK: x =2,9286; x =RU: 3,6061).


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This statement is an indicator of distributive strategy, because the word “primarily” puts emphasis on the priority of price. If price is of primary importance, then less value is placed on relationship. The results show that Danes prioritize price less than the Russians do.

Q4. Focus on alternative options for value creation (DK: x =3,3571; RU: x =2,5758).

Alternative solutions are an indicator of integrative strategy, because they allow expanding agreements to satisfy the interests of both sides, thereby enhancing joint profits. The results show that Danes are more likely to focus on these, than the Russians are.

Q5. Are concerned with the other party’s well‐being (DK: x =3,5000; RU: x =2,8385).

This statement refers to the feminine tendency to care about the well‐being of others, and thus is an indicator of the masculinity‐femininity dimension. The mean results are consistent with the index scores (Table 4, p.17) and the first parts of H1 and H2.

Q6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere (DK: x =4,2857; RU: x =3,4545).

Creation of a friendly atmosphere is considered a feminine behavioral trait (See 5.1. Hypotheses, p.32). The means reflect consistency with H1 and H2 – Danes value this higher than Russians, from which we infer higher femininity in Danes than in Russians.

Q7. Value making joint decisions (DK: x =3,9286; RU: x =2,6364).

Individual or joint decision‐making is a factor that can be related to masculinity‐femininity, individualism‐collectivism, and even to distributive‐integrative strategy. The deciding factor is the context (assertiveness or caring, solo or group, competition or cooperation), which we do not know, because it was not specified to the respondent. Because the statements surrounding this one were about femininity, masculinity, and integrative negotiation, we interpret this statement as intended. That is, as an indicator of femininity. The means suggest that Danes value joint decisions (femininity, integrative), while Russians do not (masculinity, distributive). The results are the opposite of what the individualism‐collectivism dimension suggests. We can explain this, because collectivism relates to preference for group decisions on the basis of affiliation with the group. In intercultural negotiation, there is no connection between the groups – there are two sides, which are foreign to each other.

Q8. Value importance of collaboration (DK: x =4,3571; RU: x =2,8788).

Collaboration is vital to integrative strategy, which emphasizes working together to achieve joint goals. In fact, Figure 1. The Dual concerns model (p.9) specifically uses this word to describe this. The mean results show that Danes value collaboration very highly, while Russians tend to value it much less. This statement should be a strong indicator of integrative strategy, because it directly addresses the integrative nature of exhibited behavior.

Q9. Treat negotiation as competition (DK: x =3,0000; RU: x =3,8182).

To explain this statement, we look at Figure 1. The Dual concerns model (p.9) again. Competition is the word that it uses to describe the distributive strategy, and this statement is viewed as a strong indicator to negotiate distributively. The results show that the Russian assessment of Danes is at the neutral level (with a standard deviation of 1,17670, which shows that both high agreement and disagreement have been present in the sample). The mean of statements on the Russians is moderately high. From this we infer that Russians are more likely to negotiate distributively than Danes are.

Q10. Tend to behave assertively (DK: x =2,6429; RU: x =3,0606).


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Assertive behavior is an indicator of masculinity. However, it was very hard to accurately translate into Danish and Russian, and the true meaning might have been blurred. The English word for assertiveness seems less negatively laden than the Danish and Russian words for it. Nonetheless, the results show that Danes are less assertive, and therefore less masculine, than the Russians. This is consistent with H1 and H2.

Q11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions (DK: x =3,5000; RU: x =3,6364).

Consultation with own colleagues on decision‐making refers to the relationship between the negotiator and his or her in‐group. This statement is derived from theory on the collectivism dimension, which emphasizes group decision‐making. However, this could also have been interpreted by the respondents as something related to empowerment or power to make important decisions. The means show agreement by both groups of respondents.

Q12. Value establishing relationship before doing business (DK: x =3,9286; RU: x =4,0303).

This statement refers to integrative strategy, which values relationships between parties, and therefore seeks to build a relationship before the discussion of business. Some connotations of value differences and analysis by Hofstede (2001, pp.226, 436) suggest that collectivism affects the need for relationships between negotiators. The mean results are unclear on which explanation should be used. Perhaps, both explanations are equally applicable – both Danes and Russians value relationship‐building.

Q13. Have a need for not losing face (DK: x =3,9286; RU: x =4,3636).

Losing face was a concept used in the questionnaire to indicate collectivism (Hofstede, 2001, pp.230, 235‐237). However, the results from both samples show high levels of agreement, which indicates that there might be different reasons for this need. Losing face can be understood in the context of the relationships between: the individual and his or her in‐group (collectivism), the negotiators on each side (professional‐ism, competence, trust), the individual and his or her superior (power distance), the negotiators on each side and the difference in status (power distance), and maybe others. The correlation analysis may be helpful to explain the relationships behind this interesting factor.

Q14. Pursue personal interests (DK: x =2,5000; RU: x =3,5455).

This statement refers to the individualism dimension. It is assumed that individualists may be inclined to pursue individual or personal interests in negotiations. This assumption may or may not be true – it is made on the basis of the connotations of value differences by Hofstede (2001, p.227). It seemed interesting to pose this question and test its association with the other factors, because it is a controversial subject that may be connected to ethics. If there were a connection to ethics, this statement may be related to distributive strategy, which may employ hard bargaining tactics and behavior that may be interpreted as unethical. The means show opposite results for the two cultures.

Q15. Prefer making important decisions on their own (DK: x =2,7857; RU: x =3,2727).

This statement was meant to refer to individual decision‐making as a function of individualism. However, it may also be interpreted as being related to power or empowerment. The means show that Russians are more likely to make important decisions individually than Danes.

Q16. Use a problem‐solving approach (DK: x =3,6429; RU: x =2,6061).

The problem‐solving approach is an indicator of the integrative strategy, and has been used as such by some researchers in the field, most notably Graham (1992; 1994). What is meant by problem‐solving approach is not clearly defined in the statement, but it is a term that working professionals are familiar with


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in both languages, which the mean results seem to reflect. According to the means, the Danes are more likely to use this approach than the Russians, which we interpret as a greater propensity to negotiate integratively.

Q17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions (DK: x =3,5714; RU: x =2,3636).

Mutually beneficial goals and solutions are some of the main objectives of integrative strategy. The mean results serve to confirm the main hypotheses H9 and H10 (5.5, p.35), and are interpreted in the same way as the means of statement 16.

Q18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains (DK: x =2,8571; RU: x =4,1212).

Maximization of own gains (here meant as the party’s own gains, not personal gains) is an indicator of distributive strategy. If one party tries to maximize their own profits, they tend to neglect the needs and interests of the other party, thereby diminishing the possibility of integrative agreement. The means show that Danes are much less likely than Russians to strive for such solutions.

Q19. Prefer following rules and procedures (DK: x =3,7857; RU: x =3,0000).

This and the next three statements refer to the uncertainty avoidance dimension. According to Hofstede (2001, pp.145‐50), the preference for rules and procedures should stem from the desire to reduce uncertainty, and is present in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance. The mean results, however, show a higher preference for rules among Danes. This contradicts the index value scores (Hofstede, 2001, p.151), which show Denmark as a culture with one of the lowest uncertainty avoidance scores in the world.

Q20. Aim to avoid risks (DK: x =4,0000; RU: x =3,2727).

Risk avoidance is not the same as uncertainty avoidance, which Hofstede (2001, p.148) explicitly under‐lines. In fact, he states that people in uncertainty avoiding cultures are often prepared to engage in risky behavior in order to reduce ambiguities (2001, p.148). Nonetheless, this statement was written in the questionnaire to explore the relationships that risk may have with the other factors. The means show that Danes are more likely to avoid risks than Russians, which seems to be in line with the reference above.

Q21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements (DK: x =4,1429; RU: x =3,4545).

This statement should highlight the stability factor, but may have been understood as placing more weight on relationships. Stability, according to Hofstede, (2001, pp.150, 161) is an important factor in high uncertainty avoiding cultures, because it means reducing ambiguity. The results show that Danes are more concerned with stability than Russians are, which should indicate high uncertainty avoidance in Danes. However, we know that Danes are low on uncertainty avoidance. We will later present an analysis of why the results contradict theory on this dimension.

Q22. Tend to resist change (DK: x =3,0000; RU: x =3,1818).

Being resistant to change is another way for high uncertainty avoidance to manifest itself (Hofstede, 2001, pp.160‐61). The mean results for this statement show little difference between the two cultures.

Q23. Are open to sharing information (DK: x =2,7143; RU: x =2,5455).

Sharing of information is important to integrative agreements, because it is the only way to uncover the other party’s interests and to expand agreements. Withholding information, on the other hand, serves the distributive strategy. The mean results show that in Danish‐Russian negotiations, both parties are likely to be reluctant to share information. In section (3.5, p.26), we have cited some descriptions of Russians as


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information hungry yet secretive. However, the results of this statement contradict the results of the other statements on integrative strategy in this study. Also, this contradicts the description of Danish negotiators by Katz (2007a, p.3), who states that Danes are open to information sharing and do not like the other side to hide information. Katz (2007b, p.4) offers a description that Russians prefer not to share information, because it creates bargaining advantages.

Q24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements (DK: x =3,2143; RU: x =3,5758).

A preference for rigid contractual agreements may reflect uncertainty avoidance, because specific clauses are put in to reduce risk. We use this statement in the questionnaire, because contracts are often the result of business negotiations. Also, Salacuse (1998) found the specificity/generality of agreements to be a factor that varies across cultures. Katz (2007a, p.4; 2007b, p.6) writes that in both cultures, contracts serve as a way to verify or confirm commitment. The means show little difference between the two cultures.

Q25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings (DK: x =2,4286; RU: x =3,1212).

The need for clarity and structure may be an indicator of high uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001, pp.160‐61), or power distance (See Table 6, p.23). The preference to negotiate in a formal setting may also indicate the desire to separate business from pleasure, and is a factor that varies across cultures Salacuse (1998). The mean results show that Danes prefer more formal negotiation than Russians. Katz, however, describes both cultures as quite formal in their approach to negotiation (Katz, 2007a, p.2; Katz, 2007b, p.7).

Q26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision‐making (DK: x =3,8571; RU: x =4,0000).

Consulting with superiors was meant to serve as an indicator of power distance. However, it may be interpreted in two ways – related to the degree of empowerment and to high power distance. Both cultures show high mean results for this statement. In the Danish case, we know that power distance is low, and so interpret this as a function of empowerment and preference for joint decision‐making (which fits in with the results of statements 7, 11, 15). In the Russian case, this may be related to high power distance, because the high mean score is also present in statement 28 on the hierarchical status. We will touch upon this issue in subsequent analyses.

Q27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves (DK: x =3,0000; RU: x =3,1515).

This statement was meant to serve as an indicator of high power distance and/or distributive strategy. Buelens et. al (2006, p.501) present a model of five conflict‐handling styles by M.A. Rahim. This model is very similar to the dual concerns model (Figure 1, p.9), because negotiation is a process for handling conflict (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.6). This statement refers to the dominating/forcing style of handling conflict (Buelens et al., 2006, p.502), which is similar to distributive strategy (high concern for self, low concern for others; “I win, you lose” tactics; relies on formal authority). The means show little difference between cultures, which may probably be attributed to the difficulty of imposing formal authority on conflicts in intercultural negotiation.

Q28. Usually hold a high position within their company (DK: x =3,3571; RU: x =4,2727).

The high position of the company representative should be a strong indicator of high power distance, because of its emphasis on authority and hierarchy. Indeed, while both samples show agreement with this statement, Russians show a higher propensity to be represented by top‐management. This is consistent with the scores on power distance.

Q29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties (DK: x =3,3571; RU: x =2,6061).


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This statement was conceived as an indicator for low power distance, because it refers to the degree of equality in a society. It was interesting to examine, whether (in)equality in society could translate to (in)equality between parties in intercultural negotiation. This may have been an incorrect way of putting the idea, because the statement refers to the relationship between the parties in negotiation, instead of societal equality. However, this statement may be useful as an indicator for fairness, addressing the interests and needs of both parties, and striving for joint gains. When interpreted as an indicator for integrative strategy, the mean results fit with the other results on negotiation strategies. Danes are more likely to focus on equal opportunities than Russians are.

Q30. Use hard bargaining tactics (DK: x =2,8571; RU: x =3,6364).

Hard bargaining tactics are indicative of distributive strategy. The means show that Danes are less likely to use these tactics than the Russians.

Q31. Aim to achieve competitive power position (DK: x =3,3571; RU: x =4,0606).

This statement should indicate high power distance, because it refers to use of power in negotiation to influence the counterpart. The use of power should be more common in high power distance cultures than in low PDI cultures (Hofstede, 2001, p.98). The means show that both sides may go after achieving a powerful position relative to their counterpart, but Russians are more likely to do so.

Q32. Value long‐lasting relationships (DK: x =4,3571; RU: x =3,6061).

This relationship question relates to their longevity. It is used to indicate preference for integrative strategy, which prefers long‐term relationships to short‐term ones (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.109). The mean results show that both cultures value long‐term relationship, but Danes do so more than Russians. For the Russian side, it is interesting to compare this mean to other relationship statements. This will be done in later analysis.

It should be noted that this author spent a considerable amount of time formulating the statements, so that they were precise, short, and easy to relate to. Some of the wording could have undoubtedly been improved, but the final version seemed to satisfy the above mentioned criteria. Some of the statements relate to multiple issues, which was hard to avoid, because cultural factors may be related to each other, and culture may influence negotiations in different ways.

7.5. Statistical procedures for hypothesis testing First of all, we acknowledge the fact that we cannot infer the causality of relationships between culture and negotiation in this paper. The techniques that we are able to use in this research project are inadequate for determining a cause‐and‐effect relationship (Keller & Warrack, 2003, p.625).

A conscious decision has been made to treat the Likert scale as interval data, because the answer options show even intervals between them. We rely on the respondent’s ability to assess his or her perception on the interval scale.

The use of the interval scale allows us to employ statistical procedures like Pearson coefficients of correla‐tion, simple regression, and factor analysis (Keller & Warrack, 2003, p.807; Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.572).

Using these techniques, we can examine the existence of hypothesized linear relationships between the variables in the samples, provide descriptive statistics about the samples, and describe the differences between the samples.


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To accomplish the objectives of this research project, we use a sequence of techniques for each hypothesis. First, we use Pearson coefficients of correlation to determine which relationships exist in the samples. Second, we use factor analysis to reduce the data, identify underlying factors, and enable holistic under‐standing and presentation. These techniques should be sufficient for the purpose of this paper.

7.5.1. Pearson coefficients of correlation

The Pearson coefficients of correlation (referred to mostly as “correlations” in this paper) are descriptive statistics that are defined as the covariance divided by the product of standard deviations of two variables. The sample coefficient of correlation, r, indicates the existence of association (relationship) between two variables (Keller & Warrack, 2003, p.118). We are able to produce a 32x32 variable correlation matrix for each sample, select the significant correlations, rewrite them in a simple table format, and analyze them. From this analysis we are able to infer that some variables are positively or negatively related to other variables. We group these variables by our hypotheses and explain the relationships using the correlation values and the mean values.

The analysis of the coefficients of correlation is performed in the following way:

1) Determine statistically significant correlations. 2) Assess the nature of the relationship – linear positive or linear negative. 3) If positive, then when variable 1 increases, variable 2 increases also, and vice versa. 4) If negative, then when variable 1 increases, variable 2 decreases, and vice versa. 5) Assess the mean scores in each relationship. Mean below 3 indicates disagreement, mean above 3

indicates agreement. Assess strength of agreement or disagreement. 6) Take strength and significance level of the coefficient of correlation into account. 7) The significance level is indicated by asterisks. 8) One * means that correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2‐tailed). 9) Two ** mean that correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2‐tailed).

7.5.2. Regression analysis

This author has also attempted to produce more meaningful statistics than the Pearson coefficients of correlation by using simple bivariate and multiple regression techniques. Regression analysis allows to assess strength and significance levels on a more advanced level. For instance, the R2 and adjusted R2 statistics that regression analysis computes allow to explain how much of the variation in the dependent variable is determined by the independent variable(s) (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.519; Keller & Warrack, 2003, p.624). There are two issues with that. First, we need to define the criteria for determining the dependency of variables. We may assert that we assume that culture influences negotiation. Then, the negotiation variables will be the dependent variables, and the culture variables will be the independent variables. Regression analysis cannot prove causality (Keller & Warrack, 2003, p.625) – it explains variation.

This brings us to the second issue – what is the practical value of being able to explain a percentage of variation in the dependent variable in our case? We have measured perception of people from one culture about people from another culture. What can we gain from being able to explain that 42% of variation in the Russians’ valuing of importance of collaboration is explained by their valuing of creation of friendly atmosphere (all as perceived by the Danes that have negotiated with Russians)? See Appendices (13.5.1, p.90) for this example.


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This author has also attempted some multiple regression analyses to see if a dependent variable could be explained by several independent variables. An example of one of these analyses is in the Appendices (13.5.2, p.91). Multiple regression has the same issues as the bivariate regression, and also this: the individual coefficients lose their significance levels compared to bivariate regression. We interpret this as a reminder that intercultural negotiation is a complex phenomenon and its intricacies may not fit a linear model.

It seems that, although regression is a powerful method, its results are of very limited value here, because we measure subjective opinions. We think that it would be scarcely useful for a human to know that a rise in his or her efforts to create a friendly working environment (expressed in a percentage) may result in a corresponding positive change in collaboration (also expressed in a percentage). The most important word of the previous sentence is “positive”. We want to know whether the variables are related to each other positively or negatively. For this, the Pearson correlations are adequate measures that show the directions, the strength levels, and the significance levels of relationships between two variables.

The correlations are then collected, grouped together in a table, analyzed, and a preliminary conclusion is made. To support this conclusion we decide to use factor analysis.

7.5.3. Factor analysis

Factor analysis is a technique for identifying underlying dimensions (factors, or, in SPSS terms, “compo‐nents”) that explain the correlations in a set of variables (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.573). Compared to regression, it is an interdependence technique, which allows to put in variables without concern for the right assumptions about dependence. Factor analysis produces a smaller set of uncorrelated factors and shows their positive or negative loadings on each variable. A simple interpretation in accordance with theory is then done to explain the components. The factor can be interpreted in terms of the variables that load high on it. (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.583). We use the factor analysis for a better, more holistic understanding of the correlation analysis, and make conclusions based on both. The full results are presented in the Appendices section (13.8, p. 96).

We use a method that rotates the factors, which allows for easier explanation than otherwise. This method is called the Varimax procedure (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.582). The Varimax procedure minimizes the number of variables with high loadings on the factor, and that makes the factors easier to interpret. We also omit loadings lower than (0,4), because it cleans up the presentation and frees the analysis from unimportant variables. We use two measures to find out if the factor analysis is appropriate to use: the Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser‐Meyer‐Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. We deem the analysis usable, if the Bartlett’s test shows significance and the KMO shows a value over 0,5 (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.574).

The results of the factor analysis are used solely for the purpose of confirming the existence of the hypothesized theoretical relationships. It is not used for determining how the people tend to behave – we use the correlation analysis for that.

For example, the factor analysis on Hypothesis 10 for integrative and distributive variables on Russian culture (7.7.1.1, p. 60) shows that integrative variables load positively on the extracted factor, but the distributive variables load negatively on it. It does not mean that Russians negotiate integratively. It only confirms that integrative and distributive strategies are very different.


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7.6. Statistical analysis of the Russian sample This section presents an analysis of Pearson coefficients of correlation (Keller & Warrack, 2003, pp.118, 634) that have been found in the data using SPSS. Numerous correlations have been found in the samples. This section attempts to accomplish the first and second objectives of this study (4.1, p.31), namely find the relationships between the cultural dimensions and the negotiation strategies, and determine which negotiation strategy each culture is likely to use. The correlations are enclosed in the Appendices section of this paper (Sections 13.3, p. 86 & 13.4, p.88).

Fourteen Russian managers responded to the questionnaire on Danish behavior and 73 statistically significant correlations between variables have been found. These correlations exhibit very high levels of strength compared to the Russian sample. We do not know exactly why that is, but it may be because of the small number of respondents. We tested this supposed effect by tripling the number of responses using copies of existing variables. The levels of strength did go down, but not by much. We organize the findings by the hypotheses.

We begin by analyzing the general Hypothesis 9, because it the question of whether Danes are integrative negotiators is an integral part of all other analyses.

7.6.1. Hypothesis 9: Are Danes integrative negotiators?

We start the analysis of Danish tendencies by presenting the coefficients of correlation that show the existence of relationships between the statements that indicate integrative strategy in Danes.

H9. Danes are inclined to use integrative negotiation strategy.

Table 8. Correlations between variables about negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 3 2,9286 18 2,8571 9. 0,778** DISTR+DISTR BOTH LO INTEG 3 2,9286 30 2,8571 11. 0,558* DISTR+DISTR BOTH LO INTEG 9 3,0000 18 2,8571 38. 0,636* DISTR+DISTR BOTH LO INTEG 9 3,0000 30 2,8571 42. 0,551* DISTR+DISTR BOTH LO INTEG 8 4,3571 17 3,5714 31. 0,733** INTEG+INTEG 9 3,0000 17 3,5714 37. ‐0,844** DISTR÷INTEG 12 3,9286 16 3,6429 44. 0,609* INTEG/COLL+INTEG

Correlation 9 shows a strong relationship (statistically significant at the 0,01 level) between focusing primarily on price and aiming for solutions that maximize own gains. Both these statements indicate distributive strategy. Correlations 11, 38, 42 in Table 8 also show positive relationships between variables that describe distributive strategy. Because the means show low scores, we infer the opposite, i.e. the tendency to negotiate integratively.

Correlations 31 and 37 show strong associations that confirm that Danes negotiate integratively. Impor‐tance of collaboration ( x =4,3571) is related positively (31) to aiming to achieve mutually positive solutions ( x =3,5714). Treating negotiation as competition ( x =3,0000) shows one of the strongest correlations (37) in the sample (r=‐0,844**) with preference for mutually positive solutions ( x =3,5714). Correlation 37 thus both proves construct validity of the questions, and shows that Danes have a preference for integrative strategy. Correlation 44 supports this conclusion, because it relates high preference for establishing relationships before doing business and using a problem‐solving approach.

We must conclude that there is evidence to conclude that Danes tend to negotiate integratively, which confirms our Hypothesis 9.


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7.6.1.1. Factor analysis

Table 9. Hypothesis 9. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component

1 2

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ,905

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. ,903

DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. ,795

DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ‐,789 ,521

DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ,662

DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. ‐,545 ,475

DANES 16. Use a problem‐solving approach. ,857

DANES 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. ,843

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

This table shows the results of the rotated Varimax factor analysis that has been performed using the variables identified by the coefficients of correlation (See Appendices for all results, 13.8.1.1, p.96). The KMO test shows that the sampling adequacy value is (,585), which indicates the appropriateness of this analysis. The Bartlett's test shows that the test is significant (,001). Component 1 explains 46% of total variance, and component 2 explains 25% (Appendices, 13.8.1.1, p.96). We interpret the first component as distributive strategy, because the loadings on the component are positively related to the distributive variables, but negatively related to the integrative. The second factor is interpreted as integrative strategy, because the values are positively related to the integrative variables.

We cannot use this analysis to infer that Danes are integrative negotiators, but we can use it to confirm our model. The final conclusion is that Danes tend to negotiate integratively, because the correlation analysis shows relationships that support this notion.


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7.6.2. Hypothesis 1: Relationship between femininity and integrative negotiation

H1. Danes score high on femininity, which is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively.

Table 10. Correlations between variables about femininity and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 5 3,5000 6 4,2857 12. 0,535* FEM+FEM FEM 5 3,5000 7 3,9286 13. 0,728** FEM+FEM FEM 5 3,5000 10 2,6429 16. ‐0,567* FEM÷MAS FEM HI+MAS LO FEM 7 3,9286 10 2,6429 27. ‐0,619* FEM÷MAS FEM HI+MAS LO FEM 5 3,5000 8 4,3571 14. 0,710** FEM+INTEG BOTH HI FEM+INTEG 5 3,5000 17 3,5714 17. 0,768** FEM+INTEG BOTH HI FEM+INTEG 6 4,2857 12 3,9286 21. 0,667** FEM+INTEG BOTH HI FEM+INTEG 6 4,2857 17 3,5714 23. 0,549* FEM+INTEG BOTH HI FEM+INTEG 7 3,9286 8 4,3571 25. 0,725** FEM+INTEG BOTH HI FEM+INTEG 7 3,9286 17 3,5714 29. 0,689* FEM+INTEG BOTH HI FEM+INTEG 3 2,9286 5 3,5000 6. ‐0,538* DISTR÷FEM DISTR LO+FEM HI INTEG+FEM 5 3,5000 9 3,0000 15. ‐0,626* FEM÷DISTR FEM HI+DISTR LO FEM+INTEG 5 3,5000 18 2,8571 18. ‐0,637* FEM÷DISTR FEM HI+DISTR LO FEM+INTEG 7 3,9286 9 3,0000 26. ‐0,627* FEM÷DISTR FEM HI+DISTR LO FEM+INTEG 9 3,0000 10 2,6429 35. 0,725** DISTR+MAS DISTR LO+MAS LO FEM+INTEG

Correlations 12, 13, 16, and 27 show relationships between variables describing femininity and masculinity. We infer femininity from all these correlations. There is also very strong agreement with the 3 statements on femininity (Q6, Q7, Q8), and disagreement with the statement on masculinity (Q10). This confirms what we know about Denmark from Hofstede’s results (Table 2, p.15).

There are positive and negative correlations that show the existence of the hypothesized relationship between femininity and integrative strategy, which confirms H1. The 6 positive correlations (14, 17, 21, 23, 25, 29) indicate this relationship directly.

The 4 negative correlations (6, 15, 18, 26) indicate relationships between opposing factors, from which we infer the positive relationship between femininity and integrative strategy. Correlation 35 is positive, but shows low mean scores, from which we infer disagreement, which in turn means the opposite – FEM and INTEG. From these 4 negative correlations we also infer that masculinity and distributive negotiation are related linearly.


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Component

1 2

DANES 7. Value making joint decisions. ,884

DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,860

DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,762 ‐,539

DANES 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well‐being. ,744 ‐,481

DANES 10. Tend to behave assertively. ‐,563 ,544

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. ,912

DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. ,838

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ‐,515 ,722

DANES 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ‐,484


This table shows the results of the rotated Varimax factor analysis that features the variables on the femininity‐masculinity dimension, and both negotiation strategies (See Appendices for all results, 13.8.1.2, p.98). The KMO test shows that the sampling adequacy value is (,705), which indicates the high appro‐priateness of this analysis. The Bartlett's test shows that the test is significant (,000). Component 1 explains 38% of total variance, and component 2 explains 33% (Appendices, 13.8.1.2, p.98). We interpret the first component as integrative strategy, and the second component as distributive strategy.

The loadings clearly confirm the conclusion that integrative strategy is related to femininity, and that distributive strategy is related to masculinity.

7.6.3. Hypothesis 3: Relationship between individualism and distributive negotiation

H3. Danes score high on individualism, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributively.

Table 12. Correlations between variables about individualism‐collectivism and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 1 4,2857 13 3,9286 2. 0,760** ECON GOALS+SAVING FACE 13 3,9286 31 3,3571 48. 0,669** SAVING FACE+DISTR(POWER POSITION) 8 4,3571 14 2,5000 30. ‐0,710** INTEG÷IDV INTEG HI+IDV LO 7 3,9286 14 2,5000 28. ‐0,616* FEM÷IDV (OWN INTERESTS) 6 4,2857 15 2,7857 22. 0,545* FEM+IDV/PDI (OWN DECISIONS) 6 4,2857 27 3,0000 24. 0,535* FEM+PDI HI/IDV (CONFLICT RES) 9 3,0000 15 2,7857 36. 0,583* DISTR+IDV/PDI (OWN DECISIONS) 15 2,7857 16 3,6429 49. 0,564* IDV/PDI+INTEG 15 2,7857 17 3,5714 50. 0,541* IDV/PDI+INTEG

The coefficients of correlation between statements on individualism‐collectivism and negotiation strategies have produced ambiguous and unclear results. All of these coefficients are presented in Table 12.

Correlation 2 shows a strong and statistically significant (p<0,01) relationship between importance of economic goals and the need for saving face. This probably relates to the fact that responsibility and pressure to succeed rise along with the magnitude of economic decisions. Correlation 48 shows a strong and significant positive relationship between saving face (Q13) and negotiating for competitive power


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position (Q31), which may be explained as the need to succeed in pressure situations. We cannot infer the relationship “collective‐distributive” from this.

Most of the other correlations that have been found relate to Q14 (pursue personal interests) and Q15 (making important decisions on their own). Previously, we have discussed why these statements may be equivocal – Q14 may be related to both IDV and ethics, and Q15 may be related to IDV and PDI. To ease the presentation and the analysis, we initially assume that these statements indicate IDV. We will address this issue in the validity section.

Correlation 30 shows a strong and highly significant negative relationship between importance of collabo‐ration and pursuing personal interests. The means show high integrative and low individualism. This relationship (integrative and low IDV, i.e. collectivism) is the foundation of H3 and H4 (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Cai et al., 2000). The results are the opposite of H3 and, in combination with previously presented evidence for integrative strategy in Danes, serve to disprove H3.

Correlation 28 shows a moderately strong negative correlation between creation making joint decisions and pursuing own interests. We can infer from correlations 30 and 28 that pursuing personal interests, whether it is related to IDV or not, negatively relates to integrative strategy.

Correlations 22, 36, 49 and 50 are moderate and significant, but problematic as far as theory is concerned. All of them involve Q15 (Prefer making important decisions on their own), which is an ambiguous state‐ment that may relate to IDV and PDI. Q15 has been disagreed with ( x =2,7857), from which we infer that Danes are less than likely to make important decisions by themselves. However, 22, 36, 49 and 50 correlate the statement positively with creation of friendly atmosphere (22), competition (36), problem‐solving approach (49), and mutually beneficial solutions (50). The only possible explanation for this is through empowerment – that is, the Russians may believe that if the Danes are able to make own decisions, then these factors may rise. However, competition and problem‐solving approach are theoretically mutually exclusive. Because we cannot explain these relationships, and the correlations are relatively weak (com‐pared to other correlations found in the sample), we cannot use them to make sound inferences. Correla‐tion 24 shows a relatively weak relationship between creation of friendly atmosphere (6) and preference to resolve conflicts by oneself (27), which is as hard to explain as the previously covered correlations.

The thought process behind the conclusion on Hypothesis 3 is the following. First, we did not find proof that Danes are individualists, which we know is the case (Hofstede, 2001, p.215). Therefore, we conclude that our proposed IDV indicator statements are flawed. Second, our evidence strongly suggests that Danes are integrative negotiators, which is in line with the other hypotheses about Danes. Third, because we now conclude that our IDV statements are flawed, we cannot use correlations 28 and 30 to infer the relation‐ships “individualism‐distributive” and “collectivism‐integrative”. Therefore, the conclusion is that Hypothe‐sis 3 must be rejected.


This researcher attempted to perform the factor analysis, but the KMO test showed a less than satisfactory level of sampling adequacy. Coupled with concerns about construct validity and the conclusion to reject H3 on the basis of correlation analysis, the decision has been made not to present the factor analysis for this hypothesis.


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7.6.4. Hypothesis 5: Relationship between low uncertainty avoidance and integrative negotiation

H5. Danes score low on uncertainty avoidance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively.

Table 13. Correlations between variables about uncertainty avoidance and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 1 4,2857 19 3,7857 3. 0,821** ECON GOALS + UAI (RULES) 1 4,2857 21 4,1429 4. 0,651* ECON GOALS +UAI (STABLE RELATIONSHIPS) 1 4,2857 24 3,2143 5. 0,718** ECON GOALS + UAI (RIGID CONTRACTS) 5 3,5000 21 4,1429 19. 0,617* FEM (WELL‐BEING)+UAI (STABLE RELATIONSHIPS) 8 4,3571 19 3,7857 32. 0,586* INTEG+UAI (RULES) 8 4,3571 24 3,2143 33. 0,672** INTEG+UAI/DISTR (RIGID CONTRACTS) 13 3,9286 19 3,7857 45. 0,715** SAVING FACE+UAI (RULES) 13 3,9286 20 4,0000 46. 0,690* SAVING FACE +UAI (RISK AVOIDANCE) 13 3,9286 24 3,2143 47. 0,622* SAVING FACE +UAI (RIGID CONTRACTS) 19 3,7857 24 3,2143 59. 0,857** UAI (RULES)+UAI (RIGID CONTRACTS) 20 4,0000 24 3,2143 60. 0,554* UAI (RISK AVOIDANCE)+UAI (RIGID CONTRACTS) 20 4,0000 29 3,3571 61. 0,584* UAI (RISK AVOIDANCE)+PDI LO (EQUAL OPPORTUNITY) 21 4,1429 23 2,7143 62. 0,571* UAI/INTEG (STABLE REL‐S)+INTEG (INFO SHARING) 21 4,1429 24 3,2143 63. 0,609* UAI/INTEG (STABLE REL‐S)+UAI (RIGID CONTRACTS) 21 4,1429 32 4,3571 64. 0,602* UAI/INTEG (STABLE REL‐S)+INTEG (LONG REL‐S) 22 3,0000 28 3,3571 65. 0,559* UAI (RESIST CHANGE)+PDI HI (POSITION) 23 2,7143 24 3,2143 66. 0,580* INTEG+UAI/DISTR (RIGID CONTRACTS)

A series of strong and statistically significant correlations has been found between the importance of economic goals and preferences for rules and procedures (3), stability of relationships and agreements (4), and rigidity of contracts (5). These correlations reflect the fact that Danes regard negotiations as serious matters, which is why securing the economic rewards of a negotiation is important. Particularly rules ( x=3,7857) and stability of relationships and agreements ( x =4,1429) are important to the Danes.

The correlations 45, 46, 47 between saving face and uncertainty avoidance statements may be interpreted along the same lines of importance of negotiations. Saving face is found to correlate positively with preference for rules, rigid contracts, and risk avoidance. We conclude that, in our sample, the Danes need for saving face is correlated positively with uncertainty avoidance.

Correlations 5, 47, 60 and 63 seem to relate the statement about rigidity of contracts to uncertainty avoidance. Preference for rigid contracts is associated with risk avoidance (60), stability of relationships and agreements (63), saving face (47), and economic goals (5).

Correlations 59, 60, 63 show relationships between the uncertainty avoidance variables. These serve to confirm the construct validity of this questionnaire. Preference for rules and procedures is correlated with the preference for rigidity of contracts, risk avoidance is correlated with rigid contracts, and concern for stability of relationships is also correlated with rigid contracts. However, these correlations also show Danes as high uncertainty avoidance people, which is the opposite of what we know (Hofstede, 2001, p.151). This could be interpreted as Danes adapting to Russian conditions, but we do not have a way of proving it.

An interesting tendency contradicting H5 has been found. Correlations 32, 33 62, 63, 66, albeit relatively weak, show relationships between uncertainty avoidance and integrative strategy. Concern for stability of relationships and agreements is found to associate with information sharing (62) and longevity of relation‐ships (64). Information sharing is also correlated with rigidity of contracts (66). In addition, concern for the other party’s well‐being is correlated with the need for stability of relationships and agreements (19).


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Correlations 62, 64 and 19 are best explained through integrative thinking – stability of relationships and longevity of relationships are quite synonymic concepts, which information sharing affects, because it is necessary to build relationships. This author is unable to explain how information sharing may be related to rigidity of contracts. Another weak correlation (65) shows a positive relationship between resistance to change and high position of the negotiator within his or her company. This relationship reflects the theory on effects of hierarchy on the process of change, but is not indicative here. This is because the means show little difference, and the mean of the statement on resistance to change is exactly 3,0000.

Based on these correlations and inferences, we have to reject H5. Instead, we have to conclude that we have found relationships that relate high uncertainty avoidance to integrative negotiation strategy.


Table 14. Uncertainty avoidance variables. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component

1 2 3

DANES 23. Are open to sharing information. ,882

DANES 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. ,720

DANES 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. ‐,718 ,446

DANES 20. Aim to avoid risks. ,916

DANES 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. ,765 ,426

DANES 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements. ,601 ,707

DANES 22. Tend to resist change. ,844


This table shows the results of the rotated Varimax factor analysis of the uncertainty avoidance variables (See Appendices for all results, 13.8.1.3, p.100). The KMO test shows that the sampling adequacy value is (,632), which means that this analysis is appropriate. The Bartlett's test shows that the test is significant (,006). Component 1 explains 32% of total variance, component 2 explains 30%, and component 3 explains 19% (Appendices, 13.8.1.3, p.100).

Component 1 is a factor that affects the Danes tendencies to be open to sharing information, concerned with stability of relationships, prefer formal negotiation, and rigid contractual agreements. This description fits very well with the description of Danish negotiators by Katz (2007a), but it is hard to understand what factor it could be. Component 2, which is positively related to Q20, Q19, and Q24, may be interpreted as uncertainty avoidance, as may component 3. This analysis shows that Danes show a high degree of uncertainty avoidance in Danish‐Russian negotiations.


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7.6.5. Hypothesis 7: Relationship between low power distance and integrative negotiation

H7. Danes score low on power distance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively.

Table 15. Correlations between variables about power distance and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 3 2,9286 29 3,3571 10. ‐0,627* PRICE÷EQUAL OPP DISTR÷PDI LO/INTEG INTEG+PDI LO 5 3,5000 29 3,3571 20. 0,572* WELL‐BEING+EQUAL OPP FEM+PDI LO/INTEG 8 4,3571 29 3,3571 34. 0,682** COLLABORATION+EQUAL OPP INTEG+PDI LO/INTEG 9 3,0000 29 3,3571 41. ‐0,744** COMPETITION÷EQUAL OPP DISTR÷PDI LO 23 2,7143 29 3,3571 69. 0,619* INFO SHARING+EQUAL OPP INTEG+PDI LO 9 3,0000 15 2,7857 36. 0,583* COMPETITION+OWN DECISIONS DISTR LO+PDI LO INTEG+PDI LO 9 3,0000 27 3,0000 39. ‐0,556* COMPETITION÷OWN CONFLICT RES 6 4,2857 27 3,0000 24. 0,535* FRIENDLY ATM+OWN CONFLICT RES 17 3,5714 27 3,0000 57. 0,614* INTEG+PDI (OWN CONFL RES) 23 2,7143 27 3,0000 67. 0,540* INTEG+PDI (OWN CONFL RES) 15 2,7857 26 3,8571 51. ‐0,669** OWN DECISIONS÷CONSULT SUPERIORS 15 2,7857 27 3,0000 52. 0,874** OWN DECISIONS+OWN CONFLICT RES PDI LO+PDI LO 26 3,8571 27 3,0000 71. 0,681** CONSULT SUPERIORS+OWN CONFLICT RES 16 3,6429 27 3,0000 54. 0,699** PSA+OWN CONFLICT RES INTEG+PDI HI/EMPOWERMENT 16 3,6429 28 3,3571 55. 0,628* PSA+HI POSITION INTEG+PDI HI/EMPOWERMENT 23 2,7143 28 3,3571 68. 0,557* INTEG+PDI HI (POSITION) 9 3,0000 28 3,3571 40. ‐0,544* COMPETITION÷HI POSITION DISTR LO÷PDI HI 26 3,8571 30 2,8571 72. 0,629* CONSULT SUPERIORS+HARD BARGAINING 28 3,3571 29 3,3571 73. 0,611* HIGH POSITION+EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

7.6.5.1. Support for Hypothesis 7

Correlations 10, 20, 34, 41 show positive relationships between equality of opportunity for both parties and integrative negotiation. For instance, treatment of negotiation as competition is negatively related to equality of opportunity (41) at p<0,01 level. We choose to interpret the preference for equality of opportu‐nity as an indicator for preference for equality, which is the concept that low power distance is based on. Therefore, we infer that these four correlations support H7.

Competition is positively correlated to preference for making important decisions on one’s own (correlation 36). We assume that making important decisions requires authority, but the Russians have disagreed with statement 15 about the Danes. Because the mean for competition is ( x =3,0000), we infer the opposite, which is that integrative strategy is related to low power distance. This confirms H7, but we also take into account the weakness of the correlation relative to the sample (r=0,583 at p<0,05 level).

Furthermore, information sharing is positively correlated with equality of opportunity (69), which supports H7, because it shows the existence of a relationship between an integrative indicator (23) and a low power distance indicator (29).

7.6.5.2. Empowerment

This section is about the correlations in Table 15 that, with their polarity, indicate relationships between integrative strategy and high power distance. These relationships are peculiar, because we know that Denmark is a low power distance country (Hofstede, 2001, p.87).

Statement 27 on the degree of preference for resolving conflicts by oneself yielded a mean of 3,0000. However, it shows 4 correlations on the p<0,05 level. The three positive ones relate statement 27 to creation of friendly atmosphere (24, FEM), achievement of mutually beneficial solutions (57, INTEG), and openness to sharing information (67, INTEG). The negative one (39) shows an inverse relationship between


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treating negotiation as competition and resolving conflicts by oneself. There are two ways to explain these relationships, and they depend on the nature of the tendency to resolve conflicts by oneself. First, as described before, this style of conflict resolution demands a dominating approach, which is rooted in authority. The problem here is that, realistically, one should have little authority over the counterpart in intercultural negotiation. This brings us to the second possibility, which is empowerment, i.e. the delega‐tion of formal authority and power to lower levels of organization. The comparison of means on Q28 (high position) shows a big difference in agreement between the samples (DK: x =3,3571; RU: x =4,2727), which confirms our knowledge of the index scores on power distance. From this we infer that Danes are, on average, represented by managers with lower positions than the Russians. However, we cannot infer that Danish negotiators exercise less power than Russians do. Theoretically, empowerment is a possible explanation to the results from the sample. Several strong and statistically significant (p<0,01) correlations suggest this: 51, 52, 71, 54, 55.

Correlation 51 shows a strong negative relationship between making important decisions oneself and consulting superiors about decision‐making. This is a natural relationship, because the two concepts are mutually exclusive. What makes this relationship interesting is the mean results – Danes are described as not making important decisions by themselves, but consulting superiors. This relationship can be descrip‐tive of both high and low power distance. In the case of high power distance, the cause of this relationship would be hierarchy, while the only way to explain this for low power distance is empowerment.

Correlation 52 is strong and highly significant (r=0,874**; p<0,01), and shows that decision‐making on important issues by oneself is related to resolving conflicts by oneself. Both means are quite low, so we interpret this correlation as being indicative of low power distance in Danes.

Another correlation pointing towards empowerment is 71, which shows a positive, strong, and statistically significant relationship between consulting with superiors ( x =3,8571) and resolving conflicts by oneself ( x =3,0000). The means show strong agreement with consulting with superiors, but a neutral value for conflict resolution, which indicates low power distance. The only possible way to explain this connection is through empowerment.

Correlations 54 and 55 show positive relationships between problem‐solving approach, an integrative measure, and conflict resolution by oneself and high position in company. At first glance, these correlations seem to relate integrative strategy with high power distance, and reject H7. However, when compared with the correlations that support H7 (10, 20, 34, 36, 41), these correlations are not enough to reject H7. We apply the same logic of explanation to correlation 68, which shows a moderately strong correlation between sharing information (integrative) and high position (high PDI).

Correlations 40, 71, 73, show relationships that do not fit the hypothesized relationship, but may exist and support the notion of empowerment.

We conclude that the results of the correlation analysis partially confirm H7, and partially point to a different way of using power in Danes. We elaborate further on this issue in the factor analysis section.


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Component

1 2 3


DANES 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ,865

DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,759 ,413

DANES 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,690

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ‐,678 ‐,403 ,545

DANES 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,941

DANES 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. ,921

DANES 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,866

DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ‐,414 ,821

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. ‐,552 ,693


This table shows the results of the rotated Varimax factor analysis of the variables on power distance, integrative strategy, and distributive strategy (See Appendices for all results, 13.8.1.4, p.102). The KMO test shows that the sampling adequacy value is (,559), which is adequate. However, it is interesting that when the same analysis was performed without Q28, the KMO value was (,712). The test is significant (,000). Component 1 explains 25% of total variance, component 2 explains 25%, and component 3 explains 24% (Appendices, 13.8.1.4, p.102).

We interpret component 1 as integrative strategy, because it shows positive loadings from the variables that indicate it, and negative loadings on competition and price as primary focus. It is interesting to note, that Q28 (high position within company, x =3,3571) shows a positive loading here, which means that it may be a positive factor for integrative strategy in Danes.

Component 2 shows positive loadings from the power issues and mutually beneficial solutions, but negative from competition and hard bargaining. This also shows that Danes may use power for integrative solutions.

Component 3 relates positively with the distributive variables, which shows that 24% of the variation is explained through distributive strategy.

Because the analysis of Hypothesis 7 has yielded some evidence that supports H7, some evidence that has triggered a discussion about empowerment, and some evidence that high power distance in Danes is related to integrative strategy (which contradicts H7), we leave this hypothesis unanswered. The reason for this is a presentational one – we want to contrast the findings from both samples, and this is done in the section called Compilation of findings on Denmark and Russia (7.8, p.68).

7.7. Statistical analysis of the Danish sample The Danish sample had 33 responses from Danish managers, who answered the questionnaire about Russian negotiators. 99 Pearson coefficients of correlation have been found, but the strength of these correlations is generally lower than those of the Russian sample. A conscious decision to discard correla‐tions below the 0,4 level (r<0,4; p<0,05) has been made. A test was performed, where fictional responses


59

were inserted in the sample. This test showed that these correlations were volatile to changes in the number of responses. Some of them lost their strength and significance level, which is why we choose to base the inferences on the stronger and more significant coefficients. However, we assume that the size of the sample allows us to use these correlations (r<0,4) as supporting arguments.

As with the Russian sample, we begin by analyzing the general Hypothesis 10 to determine whether Russians tend to negotiate distributively, because it a recurring question in all analyses on the relationships between culture and negotiation.

7.7.1. Hypothesis 10: Are Russians distributive negotiators?

H10. Russians are inclined to use distributive negotiation strategy.

Table 17. Correlations between variables about negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 1 3,9394 18 4,1212 1. 0,438* ECON GOALS+DISTR BOTH HI DISTR 2 3,3939 4 2,5758 4. ‐0,438* DISTR÷INTEG DISTR 2 3,3939 17 2,3636 7. ‐0,435* DISTR÷INTEG DISTR 2 3,3939 31 4,0606 9. 0,451** DISTR+DISTR(PDI) DISTR; DISTR+PDI 9 3,8182 31 4,0606 61. 0,404* DISTR+DISTR(PDI) DISTR; DISTR+PDI 4 2,5758 8 2,8788 19. 0,498* INTEG+INTEG BOTH LO DISTR 4 2,5758 16 2,6061 21. 0,503** INTEG+INTEG BOTH LO DISTR 4 2,5758 17 2,3636 22. 0,587** INTEG+INTEG BOTH LO DISTR 8 2,8788 16 2,6061 50. 0,487** INTEG+INTEG BOTH LO DISTR 8 2,8788 17 2,3636 51. 0,509** INTEG+INTEG BOTH LO DISTR 8 2,8788 30 3,6364 55. ‐0,440* INTEG÷DISTR DISTR 16 2,6061 17 2,3636 74. 0,726** INTEG+INTEG DISTR 16 2,6061 23 2,5455 77. 0,432* INTEG+INTEG DISTR 17 2,3636 30 3,6364 83. ‐0,559** INTEG÷DISTR DISTR 17 2,3636 31 4,0606 84. ‐0,405* INTEG÷DISTR DISTR 18 4,1212 31 4,0606 87. 0,572** DISTR+DISTR

This is an extensive list of correlations that point towards Russians being inclined to use distributive negotiation strategy. Not included in this list are correlations that have been sorted out (r<0,4). These can be seen in the Appendices, section 13.4, p.88 (Nos. 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 14, 26, 79, 80, 86).

Correlation 1 shows a positive relationship between importance of economic goals ( x =3,9394) and aiming for solutions that maximize own gains ( x =4,1212). Because economic goals are important for both integrative and distributive strategy, we make the inference that Russians prefer distributive negotiation.

Correlations 19, 21, 22 show positive relationships between focusing on alternative options for value creation (Q4, x =2,5758) and importance of collaboration (Q8, x =2,8788), problem‐solving approach (Q16, x =2,6061), and achievement of mutually beneficial solutions (Q17, x =2,3636). Because the means are below 3, we treat Q4, Q8, Q16 and Q17 as agreements with reverse statements (not valuing collabora‐tion and so on). From this we make an inverse inference – that Russians are distributive negotiators.

There are many correlations that point toward distributive strategy in Russians, and none that oppose this notion. It is therefore unnecessary to go through them all. We conclude that Russians are inclined to negotiate distributively, which confirms H10.


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Table 18. Hypothesis 10. Component Matrixa

Component

1

RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,862

RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem‐solving approach. ,767

RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. ,728

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,712

RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ‐,691

RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ‐,626

RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. ‐,615

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 1 components extracted.

This table shows the results of the rotated Varimax factor analysis. The variables in the table are distribu‐tive and integrative indicators. All results of this analysis are included in the Appendices section (13.8.2.1, p.104). The KMO test shows that the sampling adequacy value is (,782). The Bartlett's test shows that the test is significant (,000). There is only one component, which is why there is no rotation. Component 1 explains 52% of total variance (13.8.2.1, p.104). The component can only be interpreted as integrative strategy, because it shows positive loadings from the integrative variables, and negative ones from the distributive variables. As with the factor analysis on Hypothesis 9 about Danes, we cannot use this analysis to infer that Russians are distributive negotiators. We can, however, use it to confirm our model again.

The final conclusion on Hypothesis 10 is that Russians tend to negotiate distributively, because the correlation analysis shows relationships that support this notion.

7.7.2. Hypothesis 2: Relationship between masculinity and distributive negotiation

H2. Russians score moderately high on masculinity, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributive‐ly.

Table 19. Correlations between variables about masculinity‐femininity and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 3 3,6061 5 2,8485 12. ‐0,453** DISTR÷FEM DISTR HI+FEM LO DISTR+MAS 4 2,5758 10 3,0606 20. ‐0,561** INTEG÷MAS INTEG LO+MAS MID DISTR+MAS 4 2,5758 5 2,8485 17. 0,476** INTEG+FEM BOTH LO DISTR+MAS 5 2,8485 8 2,8788 28. 0,534** FEM+INTEG BOTH LO MAS+DISTR 7 2,6364 8 2,8788 42. 0,540** FEM+INTEG BOTH LO MAS+DISTR 7 2,6364 16 2,6061 44. 0,566** FEM+INTEG BOTH LO MAS+DISTR 7 2,6364 17 2,3636 45. 0,537** FEM+INTEG BOTH LO MAS+DISTR 4 2,5758 6 3,4545 18. 0,450** INTEG+FEM INTEG LO+FEM HI 5 2,8485 32 3,6061 32. 0,474** FEM+INTEG FEM LO+INTEG HI 6 3,4545 8 2,8788 34. 0,665** FEM+INTEG FEM HI+INTEG LO 6 3,4545 16 2,6061 35. 0,418* FEM+INTEG FEM HI+INTEG LO 6 3,4545 23 2,5455 38. 0,632** FEM+INTEG FEM HI+INTEG LO 6 3,4545 30 3,6364 40. ‐0,426* FEM÷DISTR FEM HI÷DISTR HI FEM÷DISTR 6 3,4545 32 3,6061 41. 0,548** FEM+INTEG FEM HI+INTEG HI CONTRADICTS H2

H2 proposes that Russians score moderately high on masculinity, which the results in the table support. The means of statements Q5, Q7, and Q10 confirm the index value scores (Table 3. Index value scores for


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Russia, p.16). The interesting aberration is Q6, which measures the Russians’ tendency to value creation of friendly atmosphere, a feminine value, as moderately high ( x =3,4545). It is noteworthy that most of the correlations in Table 19 are statistically significant at the 0,01 level, but not particularly strong. The strength question is applicable to the whole sample, and is addressed later.

The most important fact that can be extracted from Table 19 is that the hypothesized relationships (masculinity related to distributive strategy & femininity related to integrative strategy) are indicated by the positivity/negativity of the correlations to be true. The high mean scores of Q6 (friendly atmosphere), and the relationship‐related questions Q12 ( x =4,0404), Q21 ( x =3,4545), and Q32 ( x =3,6061) indicate some integrative tendencies in Russian negotiators (correlations 18, 32, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41). These tenden‐cies, however, are not enough to disprove the main evidence (correlations) of masculinity and distributive strategy.

Correlation 12 shows a negative relationship between focusing primarily on price and being concerned with the other party’s well‐being, which confirms H2. Correlation 20 is negative, and relates focusing on alternative options for value creation and assertiveness, which also confirms H2.

Correlations 17, 28, 42, 44, and 45 all show moderately strong positive relationships between statements that indicate femininity and integrative strategy. The means for all those statements indicate disagreement with femininity and with integrative strategy, which is why we interpret these correlations as evidence that supports H2.

Correlations 18, 32, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41 are very interesting, because they all feature either Q6, Q32, or both (see above). All of them (except 41) support the hypothesized positive relationship between femininity and integrative negotiation. The interesting part is that correlations 18, 32, 34, 35, 38 show positive relation‐ships between statements with completely different means. For instance, correlation 34 positively relates Q6 (creation of friendly atmosphere, x =3,4545) and Q8 (importance of cooperation, x =2,8788). Theoreti‐cally, this is precisely the hypothesized relationship (see H1), but empirically we see contradiction between the statements. This is a very useful finding that we will cover later. We conclude that these correlations to confirm our hypothesis about the connection between femininity and integrative strategy. However, we cannot state that Russians are feminine and integrative.

Correlation 40 describes a negative relationship between friendly atmosphere and hard bargaining, which is very logical. However, the means show that both are valuable to Russians, which is interesting. This is, however, in line with the descriptions by Katz (2007b) in section 2.4, p.15. It is also in line with the other correlations that show the importance of relationships to Russians.

Correlation 41 shows a positive relationship between two statements that are valuable to Russians – friendly atmosphere and long‐lasting relationships. This relationship shows an integrative tendency, which contradicts H2.

On the basis of the above presentation we must conclude that there is evidence that confirms H2. We must also acknowledge the simultaneous existence of integrative tendencies in Russian negotiating style. These tendencies are mostly related to the statements about the importance of relationships to the Russians.


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Component

1 2



RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions. ,786

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,686 ,445

RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ,674

RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well‐being. ,575

RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price. ‐,436

RUSSIANS 10. Tend to behave assertively. ‐,833

RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ‐,696

RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. ,535 ,627


This table shows the results of the rotated components factor analysis of some of the variables that show correlations between femininity‐masculinity and negotiation. The output from SPSS is included in the Appendices section (13.8.2.2, p.106). The KMO value is (,789), indicating good sampling adequacy, and the Bartlett's test shows significance (,000). Component 1 explains 37% of total variance, while component 2 explains 21% (13.8.2.2, p.106).

We interpret components 1 and 2 as some combination of femininity and integrative factors. Both components show positive loadings from on both femininity and integrative variables, and negative ones from masculinity and distributive variables (Q3, Q10, Q9).

We conclude that the factor analysis confirms our findings about the existence of relationships between femininity and integrative strategy, and between masculinity and distributive strategy.

7.7.3. Hypothesis 4: Relationship between individualism and distributive negotiation

H4. Russians score moderately high on individualism, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distribu‐tively.

Table 21. Correlations between variables about individualism‐collectivism and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 8 2,8788 14 3,5455 49. ‐0,411** INTEG÷IDV(PERSONAL INTERESTS) INTEG LO+IDV HI DISTR+IDV 11 3,6364 16 2,6061 63. 0,499** COLL+INTEG CONSULT COLLEAGUES+PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH 11 3,6364 17 2,3636 64. 0,384*a COLL+INTEG CONSULT COLLEAGUES+MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL

SOLUTIONS BUT COLL HI AND INTEG LO 11 3,6364 32 3,6061 66. 0,433* COLL+INTEG CONSULT COLLEAGUES+LONG REL‐S 14 3,5455 29 2,6061 73. ‐0,556** IDV÷PDI LO PERSONAL INTERESTS HI÷EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LO aAn exception to the rule about discarding correlations below 0,4 level. The correlation helps to explain Q11.

The same problems with construct validity of the statements as in section 7.6.3 apply here. It is unknown whether pursuing personal interests (Q14) and consulting with colleagues about important decisions (Q11) are certain indicators of the individualism‐collectivism dimension. Nonetheless, an analysis of the findings is in order, because it may help to better understand some relationships on the practical level.


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Correlation 49 shows a negative relationship between importance of collaboration ( x =2,8788) and pursuing personal interests ( x =3,5455), which shows that with more collaboration the pursuit of personal interests should go down, and vice versa. A positive relationship between treating negotiation as competi‐tion ( x =3,8182) and preference to make important decisions on their own ( x =3,2727) has been found in Russians.

Correlations 63 and 64 positively relate consulting with their colleagues (Q11, x =3,6364) to integrative indicators, which are problem‐solving approach (Q16, x =2,6061) and longevity of relationships (Q32, x=3,6061). From this we infer that for Russians, a rise in collective decision‐making within their group means a rise managing long relationships, and a rise in integrative approach. A weak supporting correlation (64, r=0,384*) shows the same relationship for mutually beneficial solutions (Q17, x =2,3636).

Correlation 73 shows a negative relationship (r=‐0,556**) between pursuing personal interests (Q14, x=3,5455) and valuing equality of opportunity (Q29, x =2,6061). We regard this as a natural tendency, and note that if personal interests were to go down, then the value of equal opportunity would go up.

On the basis of this analysis we conclude that we cannot prove the existence of H4. However, we cannot disprove H4 either. There is not enough evidence to do either, and we know that this relationship has been found by other researchers (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Cai et al., 2000). We, however, have been unable to find it.



Component

1 2


RUSSIANS 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions. ,793


RUSSIANS 32. Value long‐lasting relationships. ,587

RUSSIANS 14. Pursue personal interests. ‐,842

RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ,832



Table 22 shows the results of the rotated Varimax factor analysis that gives a picture of how Q11, Q14, and Q29 relate to integrative variables. Q11, Q14, and Q29 are variables that were supposed to indicate the individualism‐collectivism dimension, but did not produce the hypothesized results. As with the other factor analyses, the full version of the output can be found in the Appendices section (13.8.2.3, p.108).

The KMO test shows adequate sampling (,746), and the Bartlett's test shows significance (,000). Compo‐nent 1 explains 35% of total variance, while component 2 explains 29% (13.8.2.3, p.108).

We want to understand what factors these components represent, because they may help explain our correlation analysis. Component 1 shows positive loadings from all variables in the analysis, except pursuit of personal interests and valuing of equal opportunity. We interpret component 1 as the effects that integrative strategy has on negotiation. Further, because Q11 is positively loaded on component 1, we infer


64

that if Russians consult with their colleagues about making important decisions, they may be more inclined to negotiate integratively. This confirms the relationship that we found in the correlation analysis.

An important prerequisite for this conclusion is the word “their” in Q11. By consulting with “their” colleagues, the questionnaire meant the Russians’ Russian colleagues, and not their counterparts, the Danes. We infer from the means of the responses that the respondents have understood the statement correctly. Here is why: Q7 (value making joint decisions, x =2,6364) shows disagreement, Q15 (making important decisions on their own, x =3,2727) shows agreement. If the Russians do not value making joint decisions (value individual decisions instead), it does not make sense to interpret Q11 to include the counterparts.

Q8 and Q29 show positive loadings on component 2, but Q14 shows a negative one. We may interpret this component as integrative strategy, because collaboration and equal opportunity show positive loadings on component 2, but personal interests are loaded negatively on it. It may also be a question of ethics. In fact, one of the few commentaries that accompanied this quantitative study was on the personal interests statement, and it read “pocket money is still an issue”. This is a delicate issue, upon which we will not elaborate further, because it is not possible to address with our data. We must conclude, however, that this is a question that is correlated negatively with integrative strategy.

We also conclude that the results of this factor analysis do little to help us confirm or reject Hypothesis 4, because the data is insufficient and the statements may not indicate what they should have.

7.7.4. Hypothesis 6: Relationship between high uncertainty avoidance and distributive negotiation

H6. Russians score high on uncertainty avoidance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributively.

Table 23. Correlations between variables about uncertainty avoidance and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 4 2,5758 20 3,2727 23. 0,416* INTEG+UAI INTEG LO+UAI (RISK AVOIDANCE) 8 2,8788 21 3,4545 53. 0,428* INTEG+UAI COLLABORATION LO+STABILITY OF REL HI 16 2,6061 20 3,2727 75. 0,422* INTEG+UAI PROBLEM SOLVING LO+RISK AVOIDANCE HI 21 3,4545 23 2,5455 91. 0,619** UAI/INTEG+INTEG UAI/INTEG HI+INTEG LO 9 3,8182 19 3,0000 60. ‐0,455* DISTR÷UAI COMPETITION HI+ RULES LO 6 3,4545 21 3,4545 37. 0,702** FEM+UAI(INTEG) FEM+INTEG (RELATIONSHIP) 19 3,0000 20 3,2727 88. 0,533** UAI+UAI CONSTRUCT VAL 21 3,4545 26 4,0000 92. 0,408* UAI+PDI RUSSIAN CONDITIONS 14 3,5455 19 3,0000 71. ‐0,464** IDV÷UAI PERSONAL INTERESTS HI, RULES NEUTRAL

The first 4 correlations of Table 23 describe positive relationships between statements that indicate integrative strategy and high uncertainty avoidance. These reject H6, because they point to the other negotiation strategy than hypothesized. This is precisely what happened with H5 about Danes (See section 7.6.4, p. 54). Integrative statements (Q4, Q8, Q16, Q23), the means of which show agreement levels below the neutral value 3, are correlated positively (23, 8, 16, 91) with high risk avoidance (Q20, x=3,2727), and concern with stability of relationships and agreements (Q21, x =3,4545) – statements that indicate uncertainty avoidance. The expectation was that integrative statements would correlate negatively with the uncertainty avoidance statements. Additionally, correlation 60 shows a negative relationship between competition (Q9, x =3,8182) and preference for rules and procedures (Q19, x =3,0000), which also disproves H6.


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Correlation 37 shows a strong association at the 0,01 level between valuing creation of a friendly atmos‐phere (Q6, x =3,4545) and concern for stability of relationships (Q21, x =3,4545). We interpret this as a confirmation of the other findings that show connections between uncertainty avoidance and integrative strategy.

Correlations 88, 92, and 71 show relationships between indicators of cultural dimensions, which confirm our knowledge about Russian culture, thus supporting construct validity.

We see that the mean values of the uncertainty avoidance variables confirm the index value scores on Russian culture (Table 3, p.16). We also see that the UAI variables are correlated positively with integrative variables, and that these integrative variables show low mean values.

On this basis, we must conclude that H6 needs to be rejected, because a different relationship has been found. We conclude that high uncertainty avoidance has several connections to integrative strategy.



Component

1 2

RUSSIANS 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. ,778


RUSSIANS 23. Are open to sharing information. ,762



RUSSIANS 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. ,820

RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ‐,796

RUSSIANS 20. Aim to avoid risks. ,432 ,641


The full results of this factor analysis are included in Appendices (13.8.2.4, p.110). The test is adequate (KMO value=,669) and significant (Bartlett’s significance value=,000). Component 1 explains 34% of total variance, while component 2 explains 26% (13.8.2.4, p.110).

Both extracted components point toward the same direction as the correlation analysis in the previous section. We interpret the first component as integrative strategy, and the second component as uncertain‐ty avoidance. The integrative variables and the variables that show risk and uncertainty avoidance load positively on the factors. Q9, competition, a distributive variable, loads negatively on component 2, while rules and procedures, risk avoidance, and collaboration load positively on it.

We must conclude that our analysis techniques indicate that risk avoidance, preference for rules and procedures, and information sharing all relate positively with integrative negotiation. This means that we reject our hypothesis that high uncertainty avoidance is positively related to a tendency to negotiate distributively. It seems, instead, that uncertainty itself may be associated with distributive strategy. Uncertainty avoidance, on the other hand, is found to correlate positively with integrative strategy.


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7.7.5. Hypothesis 8: Relationship between power distance and distributive negotiation

H8. Russians score high on power distance, which is related to a tendency to negotiate distributively.

Table 25. Correlations between variables about power distance and negotiation strategies.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 No. Corr. Inference 2 3,3939 31 4,0606 9. 0,451** DISTR+PDI/DISTR BOTH HI DISTR+PDI 4 2,5758 29 2,6061 25. 0,473* INTEG+PDI LO BOTH LO DISTR+PDI HI 8 2,8788 29 2,6061 54. 0,489** INTEG+PDI LO BOTH LO DISTR+PDI HI 8 2,8788 31 4,0606 56. ‐0,419* INTEG÷PDI/DISTR INTEG LO+PDI/DISTR HI DISTR+PDI 9 3,8182 15 3,2727 59. 0,411* DISTR+PDI/IDV (OWN DECISIONS) DISTR+PDI 28 4,2727 29 2,6061 97. ‐0,407* PDI HI÷PDI LO POSITION HI÷EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LO 28 4,2727 30 3,6364 98. 0,411* PDI HI+DISTR POSITION HI+HARD BARGAINING HI 30 3,6364 31 4,0606 99. 0,430* DISTR+PDI HI HARD BARGAINING+POWERFUL POSITION 10 3,0606 27 3,1515 62. 0,504** MAS+PDI HI ASSERTIVE+OWN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 4,0000 32 3,6061 96. 0,484** PDI HI+INTEG CONSULT SUPERIORS+LONG RELS 11 3,6364 26 4,0000 65. 0,598** COLL+PDI CONSULT COLLEAGUES+CONSULT SUPERIORS 14 3,5455 29 2,6061 73. ‐0,556** IDV÷PDI LO PERSONAL INTERESTS HI÷EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LO

Correlations 9, 25, 54, 56, 59, 97, 98, 99 serve to confirm H8. They all point to the existence of a positive relationship between power distance and distributive strategy. We illustrate with the examples that are statistically significant at the 0,01 level: correlations 9 and 54. We also support these findings with other correlations that are less significant.

Correlation 9 (r=0,451**) points out a positive relationship between fixed‐sum assumptions (Q3, x=3,3939) and aiming to achieve competitive power positions (Q31, x =4,0606), which shows the distribu‐tive tendency for fixed‐pie errors and exercising power to bargain over positions. We understand that exercising power in negotiations may be a different concept than power distance within a culture. However, we suspect that the use of power to pressure the counterpart implies inequality, which is the key concept in power distance. An interesting correlation that support this view is 98, which shows a positive association between achievement of competitive power position and high hierarchical status, a strong power distance indicator. Correlation 99 shows a positive association between hard bargaining tactics (Q30, µ=3,6364) and achievement of a competitive power position.

Importance of collaboration (Q8, x =2,8788) is found to correlate positively (54) with valuing equal opportunity (Q29, x =2,6061). Because of the low mean values, we infer from this correlation that the Russians tend to value the opposite statements, which supports the hypothesized relationship between distributive strategy and power distance.

Correlation 62 supports our knowledge about masculinity and power distance in Russian culture (Table 3, p.16), because it shows a positive relationship between assertiveness ( x =3,0606) and conflict resolution by oneself ( x =3,1515).

Correlation 65 ( x =0,598**) shows that Russians have a tendency to both consult with colleagues and with superiors about decision‐making. This is interesting, because Q15 ( x =3,2727) shows the Russians’ preference for decision‐making on their own, and Q28 ( x =4,2727) indicates that Russian negotiators typically hold a high position in their company. This is why we understand Q15 on individual decision‐making as a function of high power distance.

Correlation 73 shows that the high level of personal interests (Q14, x =3,5455) is negatively related to valuing importance of equal opportunity for both parties (Q29, x =2,6061), which points to the Russians’


67

tendency to value own individual interests above equality in negotiation. This correlation supports the index value scores on Russian culture (Table 3, p.16).

On the basis of the above analysis of the coefficients of correlation we conclude that H8 is confirmed.



Component

1 2 3 (4)b

RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,779 ,598

RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ‐,768 ‐,572

RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ,581 ,416

RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. ‐,541

RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ,801

RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,707

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ‐,467 ‐,635

RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. ,760 ,786

RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision‐making. ‐,730 ‐,547

RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,626 ,519

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. b. Results inserted from an additional factor analysis (See 13.8.2.6, p.114)

The full results of this factor analysis are included in Appendices (13.8.2.5, p.112). The test is adequate (KMO value=,606) and significant (Bartlett’s significance value=,000). Component 1 explains 22% of total variance, component 2 explains 22%, and component 3 explains 17% (13.8.2.5, p.112).

The first factor seems to be describing the impact that high power distance may have on a negotiation. Q28 (high position) loads heavily and positively on component 1, and Q29 (valuing equal opportunity) loads negatively. In addition, there are negative loadings by alternative options for value creation and collabora‐tion (integrative variables), and a positive loading by hard bargaining tactics. These results support H8 and thus suggest that high power distance is related to distributive negotiation.

We interpret the second component as distributive strategy. We infer this from the positive loadings that hard bargaining, competition, and competitive power position have on component 2, and the negative loading on it that collaboration shows.

We interpret the third component is a function of power distance. In fact, although the third factor only explains 17% of total variance, it was so interesting that this author performed an additional factor analysis (See 13.8.2.6, p.114). That analysis included only the variables that it shows results for, and was asked to extract only 1 factor. The test has a smaller sampling adequacy value (KMO=,547) and significance value (,048), which is still usable. The results of that analysis are presented in the table as component (4).

Component 3 shows positive loadings by fixed‐sum errors, conflict resolution by oneself, and a negative loading by consulting with superiors about decision‐making. It is this negative loading that this author wanted to explain with the additional analysis – are they consulting superiors because they are subordi‐nates, or because they are superiors themselves, and therefore do not need to? Component (4) supports the idea that they are superiors themselves, because it also shows a negative loading by equal opportunity.


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We infer that there is enough evidence from the correlation analysis and the factor analyses to support H8, and therefore conclude that high power distance is related to a tendency to negotiate distributively.

7.8. Compilation of findings on Denmark and Russia First of all, we realize that we have found relationships between variables that indicate relationships between cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies. We also realize that the generalization from these particular relationships between variables to relationships between theoretical constructs is made using theoretical knowledge and relying on the assumptions of good validity, reliability, and generalizability (See sections 7.9, 7.10, 7.11 below). We have allowed ourselves to present the findings throughout this paper as relationships between the cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies to simplify the presentation and aggregate the findings.

We have concluded that there is evidence that Danes tend to negotiate integratively (7.6.1, p.49), and that Russians tend to negotiate distributively (7.7.1, p.59). The mean analysis, the correlation analysis, and the factor analysis have all yielded results that confirm H9 and H10. These results are in line with the descrip‐tions of Danes and Russians as negotiators (3.4, p.25 & 3.5, p.26).

We have found evidence in both samples that there are positive relationships between femininity and integrative strategy, and between masculinity and distributive strategy (7.6.2, p.51 & 7.7.2, p.60) We have also found that Danes tend to exhibit the elements of femininity and integrative strategy, while Russians tend to show the elements of masculinity and distributive strategy (7.6.2, p.51 & 7.7.2, p.60). The results correspond to the cultural index scores from Table 4. Comparison of country scores for Denmark and Russia, p. 17 and the descriptions of Danish and Russian negotiators (3.4, p.25 & 3.5, p.26).

The analyses of the relationships between individualism and distributive strategy failed because of problems with inadequate construct validity (See section on validity, 7.10, p.71).

In both samples, we have found evidence that high uncertainty avoidance is related to a tendency to negotiate integratively, which is the opposite of the hypothesized relationships H5 and H6 (7.6.4, p.54 & 7.7.4, p.64). We explain this through the high scores on uncertainty avoidance variables and relationship variables for both samples. It is plausible that integrative strategy is perceived as less uncertain than distributive strategy because both cultures value relationships, and distributive strategy carries with it the risk of losing the relationships. Actually, negotiation theory tells us that distributive strategy does not value relationships (2.1.2, p.10).

It is also plausible that this relationship is related to the possibility of the Danes adjusting to Russian conditions. We remember that Denmark scores very low on uncertainty avoidance in Hofstede’s findings (Table 2, p.15), but our evidence shows that in the Danish‐Russian negotiation context, Danes avoid uncertainty (7.6.4, p.54). It seems doubtful, however, that this difference in results and theory is due to construct validity, because the uncertainty avoidance variables are fairly simple and direct.

We cannot allow ourselves to infer the opposite relationship – that low uncertainty avoidance is related to distributive strategy – because we do not have enough direct evidence of that. Only correlation 60 (7.7.4, p.64) of the Danish sample shows a negative relationship between competition (Q9, x =3,8182) and preference for rules and procedures (Q19, x =3,0000) and thus suggests it. The factor analysis also supports this notion with the negative loading of competition (Q9) on component 2 (interpreted as uncertainty avoidance) (7.7.4.1, p.65).


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Both samples have shown relationships between the variables on power and power distance as hypothe‐sized by H7 and H8. There were, however, some results that suggest that power is perceived and used differently in Denmark and Russia. We know from our theory on culture that Denmark is a country with low power distance, where equality is valued highly, hierarchies are flat and status differences are not pronounced. We also know that, although there is evidence that power distance has fallen considerably since the Soviet era, Russian power distance is still quite high, which means a relatively high degree of inequality in society, tall hierarchies, and importance of status is high (2.4, p.15).

Table 27. Comparison of findings from both samples on power distance variables

Components from factor analysis on H7 (About Danes)

Mean value DK

Components from factor analysis on H8 (About Russians)

Mean value RU

D1 D2 D3 x R1 R2 R3 R(4)b x

DANES/RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,895 4,3571 ‐,467 ‐,635 2,8788

DANES/RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ‐,678 ‐,403 ,545 3,0000 ,801 3,8182

DANES/RUSSIANS 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own.

,921 2,7857 3,2727

DANES/RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,759 ,413 3,5714 2,3636

DANES/RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision‐making.

3,8571 ‐,730 ‐,547 4,0000

DANES/RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,941 3,0000 ,626 ,519 3,1515

DANES/RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company.

,690 3,3571 ,779 ,598 4,2727

DANES/RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties.

,865 3,3571 ‐,768 ‐,572 2,6061

DANES/RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ‐,414 ,821 2,8571 ,581 ,416 3,6364

DANES/RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,866 3,3571 ,707 4,0606

DANES/RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price. ‐,552 ,693 2,9286 3,6061

DANES/RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed.

3,1429 ,760 ,786 3,3939

DANES/RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. 3,3571 ‐,541 2,8385

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. (Information about converged iterations is included in the original tables (7.6.5.3, p. 58 & 7.7.5.1, p.67)) b. Results inserted from an additional factor analysis (See 13.8.2.6, p.114) This table is a compilation of results from the Factor analysis sections on H7 and H8 (7.6.5.3, p. 58 & 7.7.5.1, p.67).

We would like to present a more comprehensive overview of why our findings may support H7 and H8 despite concerns about construct validity (7.10, p.71). The table above compiles the results from our factor analyses (7.6.5.3, p. 58 & 7.7.5.1, p.67). The components are assigned letters – D1, D2, D3, and R1, R2, R3, and r(4) for easy differentiation between them. The mean results are added to support the overview, because not all of these statements were included in both factor analyses. Inclusion in factor analysis was determined by the correlation analysis. We have interpreted the components in the following way: D1 – integrative, D2 – integrative, D3 – distributive; R1 – high power distance, R2 – distributive, R3 – power distance (7.6.5.3, p. 58 & 7.7.5.1, p.67). The D’s stand for Danes, and the R’s stand for Russians. To ease the presentation of this analysis, we will use simpler wording – positive loadings “do”, negative loadings “do not”. Some of the important loadings for the analysis are highlighted in the table.


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Let us examine D1 and R1. D1 is interpreted as integrative strategy and proposes that Danes value collaboration, do not treat negotiation as competition, aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions, value equal opportunity, do not focus primarily on price, and hold a high position within their company. This is in accordance with theory, and the analysis of means. R1 is interpreted as high power distance and suggests that Russians do not value importance of collaboration, do not value equal opportunity, do not value alternative options for value creation, but value hard bargaining tactics, and hold a high position within their company. The only common point in these two very different descriptions is the statement on position within company, which shows agreement (mean values) from both samples with the Russians scoring much higher than Danes. This suggests that hierarchical position of the negotiators plays different roles in the two cultures. In the Danish case it is positively related to integrative variables. In the Russian case it is positively related to distributive variables. Another point that we extract from D1 and R1 is the question of valuing equal opportunity – the analysis suggests that the Danes value it, and the Russians do not.

D2 is interpreted as integrative strategy, and R2 is interpreted as distributive strategy, and show loadings that confirm the Danes as integrative negotiators and Russians as distributive negotiators. D2 and R2 show oppositely loaded scores on competition and hard bargaining, and D2 shows heavy loadings by preference for making decisions on their own and resolving conflicts by themselves. These loadings could be signs of both individualism and having power to make such decisions, which, combined with our knowledge of low power distance in Denmark (Table 2, p.15) is why we have suggested that empowerment may be a way in which Danes use power. Incidentally, the relationships that we have just described above confirm a passage by Hofstede & Usunier (2003, p.150), who describe some findings by Leung and Gudykunst & Ting‐Toomey:

Leung (1998: 650‐653) shows that power distance is systematically related to conflict behaviour: in low PD societies, subordinates (e.g. negotiators who have to report to a constituency) will have a stronger tendency to resolve disputes on their own or to rely on their peers for conflict handling, than in high power distance societies. Moreover, high power distance results in greater tolerance for unjust events, unfair treatment, and promotes the acceptance of higher differentials in negotia‐tors’ roles, to the extent of even tolerating insulting remarks if it comes from a high status person belonging to the same ingroup (Gudykunst & Ting‐Toomey 1988).

D3 serves to confirm the connections between distributive factors. D3 and D4 suggest that the Russians do not prefer to consult with superiors, but prefer to resolve conflict by themselves, hold a high position within their company, do not value equal opportunity, and make fixed‐sum errors. D3 and D4 serve to confirm the hypothesized relationship between high power distance and distributive negotiation in Russian culture.

We also remember that the correlation analyses for both samples mostly confirm H7 and H8 (7.6.5, p.56 & 7.7.5, p.66).

We understand that some of these inferences are indirect and probably inconclusive, but think that the data and the analyses are enough to suggest that we may have proved H7 and H8 correct. We would also like to suggest this interesting subject for further research.

We conclude that the results on power distance and negotiation strategies are inconclusive, but enough to suggest that there may be a relationship between low power distance and integrative negotiation in Danes, and a relationship between high power distance and distributive negotiation in Russians.


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This concludes our compilation of findings and we move on to the questions of reliability, validity, and generalizability.

7.9. Reliability A reliability analysis has been performed in SPSS, showing satisfactory internal consistency for both samples (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.314). For the Russian questionnaire, the Cronbach alpha statistic is (α=,732), but the number of respondents is low (14). The Cronbach alpha in the Danish questionnaire is (α=,618), but the number of respondents is relatively high (33). The results of the reliability analysis can be seen in Appendic‐es (13.7, p.95). Since we are not able to assess test‐re‐test reliability (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.313), because we have only measured the perceptions once, we use the reliability analysis to assume that our data is reliable. The fact that we measured perceptions means that all our findings are “as perceived by the other party”. Because the perceptions have been consistent with theory, we may use the final inferences.

We may be able to argue for the reliability of our scale logically. We have, in a way, re‐tested our scale, because we have two samples of respondents from different countries. So, in a sense, because our analysis of both samples has yielded results that are mostly consistent with theory, we may conclude that our study has good reliability.

7.10. Validity This section discusses the questions of validity in this study. As defined by Malhotra & Birks (2003, p.314), who also list the different types of validity, it is the extent to which a measurement represents the characteristics that exist in the phenomenon under investigation.

We believe that our study exhibits a good level of validity, and present our assessment of content validity, criterion validity, and construct validity.

Concerning content validity, which evaluates how well the content of a scale represents the measurement task at hand, we conclude that it is adequate. We believe that our method has allowed us to measure the perceptions that we wanted to measure, and to make inferences about the constructs that we wanted to examine. We believe that our findings are consistent with the theory, which is an argument for good content validity.

Criterion validity examines whether the measurement scale performs as expected in relation to other selected variables as meaningful criteria. It seems that this question is best evaluated through the compari‐son of the results produced by the two samples. We have found that the results of both samples hold true in relation to theory, hypotheses, and complement each other. A deeper analysis of the relationships between the two samples is presented in the section (7.11, p.73).

Construct validity is the type of validity that addresses the question of what construct or characteristic the scale is measuring (Malhotra & Birks, 2003, p.315). This is the type of validity that this study has had problems with. Particularly the variables that were supposed to express the individualism‐collectivism and power distance factors failed to do so.


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Table 28. Statements with construct validity problems

Question Perceived problem Q1. Value importance of economic goals. Mistake. Refers to both negotiation strategies. Q11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions.

Because of collectivism or low power distance?

Q12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. Because of integrative strategy or collectivism? Q13. Have a need for not losing face. Because of individualism, collectivism, importance of task, or

status? Q14. Pursue personal interests. Because of individualism, distributive strategy or ethics? Q15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. Because of individualism or high power distance? Q25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. Because of low uncertainty avoidance or power distance? Q26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision‐making. Because of low power distance, empowerment, high power

distance, superiors themselves? Q27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. Because of high power distance or else? Q29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. Because of low power distance or integrative strategy? Q31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. Double‐barreled question mistake – competitive or powerful

position. Distributive strategy or high power distance?

Our assessment of the reasons for these construct validity problems begins with the nature of the individualism‐collectivism and power distance dimensions as opposed to the masculinity‐femininity and uncertainty avoidance. The first two refer to the relationships between people within a culture, which may be substantially different from relationships between people across cultures. It is the latter that we are studying in intercultural negotiations. The statements on individualism‐collectivism and power distance were very hard to formulate, because of the questions about their applicability to interaction between cultures and, particularly, negotiations. Some of these questions were, as discussed in the statistical analyses: “How does hierarchy impact interactions between people that are not bound by hierarchy between them?” and “How do people’s relationships with their in‐groups within their culture impact their interactions with people from an out‐group and another culture?”. The data hints at some of these questions, but complicates the making of inferences.

The hypotheses on the individualism‐collectivism have been rejected because of inadequate evidence, and this was the one of the relationships that had been documented by other researchers (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Cai et al., 2000). The hypotheses on the power distance dimension, on the other hand, point toward accepting the possibility of a relationship when the two samples are compared. Even with questions about what exact meanings the variables indicate, they still point toward power issues and can be interpreted. The variables on individualism‐collectivism are unsatisfactory and inconclusive.

In contrast to the individualism‐collectivism and power distance dimensions, the other two (masculinity‐femininity and uncertainty avoidance) refer people’s values in relation to their environment and not each other. It is our opinion that this difference has allowed for a much easier interpretation and less ambiguity.

The negotiation strategy factors have, of course, been the easiest to assess and interpret, because of their direct applicability. We admit the mistake in Q1, which points toward both negotiation strategies, and is therefore inconclusive.

Overall, however, in spite of concerns about construct validity, we conclude that this study shows good levels of validity, because the measurements mostly represent the conditions that we know from theory, and because we are able to cross‐check the results from the two samples and show their fit. We are able to use the data to interpret the relationships and make conclusions. Therefore, we believe that the scale measures the characteristics that exist in the investigated phenomena.


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7.11. Generalization Our ability to generalize our findings from inference about the sample to inference about population hinges on our sample sizes and sampling technique. First of all, we would like to point out that in our case it was very hard to determine appropriate sample sizes. We do not know how many Danes negotiate with how many Russians in total. We do not even know how many Danish companies have relations with Russians, or vice versa. We cannot assume that the sources that we have used contain full information about the number of Danish companies in Russia (Danishexporters.dk and the list of companies from the Danish embassy). Second, the judgemental sampling technique that we used is the only way, that we know of, that could have accomplished the objectives of this project.

Because the population sizes were unknown, we tackled this issue through practical data collection, and contacted as many companies as we could find (approximately 80 companies from each country).

We realize that the sample sizes are small (33 Danish responses versus 14 Russian responses). After the collection of data it seemed that the size of the Russian sample would not be enough for making sound inferences. In fact, most of our analyses fit our theories. This brings us to the question of generalizability – we believe that in spite of the small size of the samples, our research may be applicable to the populations, because it fits our theory. This should, of course, be done cautiously and in a relative sense, not an absolute sense.

The findings of this research generally show conformity with theory on all levels of analysis. Some factors, however, deviate from the expected results. The inferences from the Russian sample show that Danes have tendencies toward femininity, moderate collectivism, quite high levels of uncertainty avoidance, and low levels of power distance, and integrative negotiation strategy. With the exceptions of moderate collectiv‐ism and high uncertainty avoidance, these inferences are in accordance with the index value scores on Denmark (Table 2, 15) and the description of Danish negotiators in section (3.4, p.25).

From the Danish sample we infer that the Russians have tendencies toward masculinity, moderate collectivism, high uncertainty avoidance, high power distance, and distributive negotiation strategy. These inferences are in line with the index value scores on Russia (Table 3, p.16), and the descriptions of Russian (and Soviet) negotiators that we compiled in section (3.5, p.26).

Furthermore, our analysis of the proposed hypotheses mostly yielded results that were expected, with the notable exception of the found relationship between uncertainty avoidance and integrative strategy.

We conclude this section by suggesting that the results of this study may be generalized to apply to negotiations between Danes and Russians. To be able to apply these results to all negotiations, however, the discovered relationships would have to be validated by larger scale studies.

7.12. Limitations Other than the above described generalizability and validity concerns, this study has several other limitations that must be taken into account for the level of applicability of the results to be interpreted correctly.

The fact that the respondents were specifically asked about price negotiations could have worked in favor of objectivity in terms of screening the potential inexperienced respondents. It could also have moved the focus to the distributive variables, resulting in some sort of a bias. We cannot determine that, however, and the results do not show apparent deviations.


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The decision to measure perceptions of the other side has made this particular study possible, but could have resulted in biased responses. This is because the answers were given from memory, which has a tendency to fade. This is also because any perception can be influenced by different forms of distortion (Lewicki et al., 2006, p.133). We hope, however, that the quantity of responses has been large enough to offset such distortions by aggregation.

The perceptions might have also been influenced by the large cultural differences between the two cultures (Table 4, p.17). That is, a contrast to one’s own culture might have influenced the responses (overstate‐ment or understatement). The findings that we have been able to achieve are very much due to these large cultural differences. This is why we think that the discovered relationships should be tested on other cultures.

The results of this study should not be interpreted as definite, absolute, or universal. We should remember that culture has great diversity within a culture itself. If we assume that culture does influence negotiation behavior, like we have done (as have many other researchers), we should remember that people also determine their negotiation behavior consciously, purposely, situationally, etc. We use the term negotia‐tion “strategy” throughout this paper because of this.

The descriptive statistics on both samples show a great deal of variation in both samples (Descriptive statistics, sections 13.1, p.83 & 13.2, p.84). This means that the responses, and hence the results, are not equivocal – some Russians in our sample have experienced distributively negotiating Danes, and some Danes have experienced integratively negotiating Russians.

Concerning the masculinity‐femininity dimension we have to note that the results may be biased by gender. (Hofstede & Usunier, 2003, p.152). Indeed, there were many more male than female respondents in the Danish sample (4 females, 25 males, 4 unknown). In the Russian sample the distribution was almost even (6 females, 7 males).

We assume that some of the meaning of the questionnaire statements may have been lost in translation, but also state that we did not find any apparent evidence of impact by this. This research would probably not have yielded the same results without the translation, because we could not have been sure of fluency in English in both groups. Also, the translation should have simultaneously helped to further the participa‐tion of ethnic Danes and Russians. Of course, some respondents might have been bilingual. By and large, however, this author knows that their cultural “affiliation” satisfied the conditions for participating in this study. We cannot elaborate further because of the anonymity clause.

Last but not least, we remind ourselves again that this research does not prove causality of the culture‐negotiation relationships. We can only infer the direction of these relationships, which is valuable know‐ledge in itself, and which achieves the research objectives.


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8. Conclusions This research has identified several positive relationships between factors that may be attributed to individualism‐collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance and the negotiation strategies. We have also found evidence of tendencies to employ particular negotiation strategies by Danes and by Russians.

Figure 3. The findings

Substantive outcome important?

Yes

Relational outcome

important?

Yes Collaboration or Integrative negotiation

• Femininity • Low power distance

No Competition or Distributive negotiation

• Masculinity • High power distance

Adopted from Lewicki et al., (2006, p.107) and expanded to include the findings of this study.

An important aberration here is that this model refers to theoretical extremes. We have not been able to accurately assess the strengths of these relationships, but have found the existence and the directions of the relationships.

We cannot add the nationalities to Figure 3, because the question of relational outcome would not fit. It is simply not true that the Russians do not value the relational outcome, although we have found that they are inclined to negotiate distributively. In fact, the variables measuring importance of relationships showed agreement from both sides.

We have found a relationship that is the opposite of the one hypothesized, namely that high uncertainty avoidance is related positively to integrative strategy. However, we do not have enough evidence to conclude a positive relationship between low uncertainty avoidance and distributive strategy. We also have reasons to think that this relationship may be situational, although found in both samples. We therefore choose to omit it from the above model and suggest it for future research.

We make the following final conclusions.

We have found that Danes tend to employ integrative negotiation, and that Russians tend to employ distributive negotiation.

We have found conclusive evidence in our data that femininity is related positively to integrative strategy. We have also found evidence that suggests that low power distance is related positively to integrative strategy.

We have found conclusive evidence our samples that masculinity is related positively to distributive strategy. We have also found evidence that suggests that high power distance is related positively to distributive strategy.

This section has attempted to answer the question of whether this study has achieved its objectives. The next section offers an assessment of conceptual significance.


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8.1. Summary of contributions The article “A comment on the use of Hofstede’s cultural Dimensions in the academic literature on international business negotiations” by Jean‐Claude Usunier is the most recent and credible summary of research on Hofstede’s dimensions and international negotiation that we have been able to find (Hofstede & Usunier, 2003, pp.149‐54). The article mainly references Graham et al. (1994) as a study that has tested the relevance of Hofstede’s dimensions for international business negotiations. We have referenced Graham et al. (1994) and summarized their contributions in chapter 3 (p.17). Usunier mentions some findings on power distance, which we have cited in section (7.8, p.68) to support our findings on power distance (Hofstede & Usunier, 2003, p.149). There is also a passage about individualism‐collectivism in the article, and a short discussion about masculinity, long‐term orientation, and uncertainty avoidance. Usunier also mentions that Graham et al. (1994) expect higher masculinity to lead to less nurturing attitudes and to lower satisfaction levels, but find a contrary result: masculinity leads to higher satisfaction levels. The article concludes (Hofstede & Usunier, 2003, p.153):

“Some of the hypothesised influence of cultural dimensions on international business negotiations still remain to be tested, especially the influence of high power distance on a more centralised con‐trol exerted over negotiators, final decisions having to be made by top authority. However, the relevance of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for international business negotiations seems now clearly established, even if they do not work as isolated predictors of the negotiation process and outcomes, but rather in conjunction with key aspects of the structure and the context of negotia‐tion.”

We hope that our findings can help expand the theoretical knowledge of how Hofstede’s dimensions relate to international negotiation. We think that our findings are consistent with theory and are a useful contribution to knowledge in the field of international negotiation. It is conceivable that our findings may be applied to all negotiations, but we stress that the relationships that we have investigated should be tested further on a larger scale.

We have not been able to find any studies on Danish‐Russian negotiations. In fact, it was hard to find studies on Danish‐Russian business, and we succeeded in finding only one (Michailova & Anisimova, 2003).

Therefore we conclude that this study fills a theoretical and an empirical knowledge gap in the field of Danish‐Russian negotiations and business. Theoretically, this study contributes the findings on the relationships between Hofstede’s dimensions and negotiation strategies, which we think may be applied in a Danish‐Russian context. Empirically, this study shows how particular behavioral variables relate to each other in Danish‐Russian negotiations, and provides descriptions and characteristics of these relationships.

8.2. Suggestions for further research As we have stated before, we believe that our findings should be validated in a larger scale study including more cultures.

Specifically, the relationship between high uncertainty avoidance and integrative strategy is very interesting to address, because there are many intricacies, like, for instance, risk and change aversion. It is especially interesting to validate on other cultures.

As we have mentioned, we suggest that the relationship between low uncertainty avoidance and distribu‐tive strategy should be researched further.


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We also have to agree with Jean‐Claude Usunier and his conclusion about power distance (Hofstede & Usunier, 2003, p.153) and add to it. We also think that the relationship between low power distance and integrative negotiation should be researched further. It would be interesting to research how empower‐ment, status, and hierarchy may impact negotiations. This is especially interesting when high‐PDI and low‐PDI cultures collide, like in our study.

We now move on to the Practical applicability section.

8.3. Practical applicability First of all, we would like to state that all respondents have been promised a copy of a report on this study, which will be a shorter version of this master’s thesis. In the following we discuss how these experienced negotiators may be able to use the findings from this study in their work.

On the practical level, the descriptive statistics themselves may be interesting and useful, because they measure perceptions of the other party (13.1, p.83 & 13.2, p.84). These perceptions may be valuable to the Danish and Russian negotiators, because they show to the negotiator how the other side may perceive him or her. This information may be used in a variety of ways – for instance, strategically.

Moreover, the knowledge of the particular correlations between behavioral variables may enable the negotiator to knowingly adapt his or her behavior. For instance, we have concluded that, although Russians tend to negotiate distributively, they value relationships. We have also concluded that Russians do not particularly like to share information (Q23 of the Danish sample, x =2,5455). We have, however, found a positive relationship between sharing information and concern for stability of relationships and agreements (correlation 91, Table 23, p. 64). We have also found that stability of relationships is correlated positively with collaboration (correlation 53, Table 23, p. 64). Therefore, a possible course of action for a Danish negotiator would be to work on relationship management and assure his or her counterpart that the interest in stability is mutual, which may enhance information sharing and collaboration.

We hope that our findings from the correlation and factor analyses will be helpful to the participants of this study in assisting their work, because these analyses provide an overview of possible relationships between behavioral factors.

The knowledge about the theoretical relationships between cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies may also be useful to the negotiators, because it may assist them in preparation for and during negotia‐tions.


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24. Hofstede, G., 1993. Cultural constraints in management theories. Academy of Management Executive, 7(1), pp.81‐94.

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26. Hofstede, G., 1996. Riding the waves of commerce: A test of Trompenaars' “model” of national culture differences. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20(2), pp.189‐98.

27. Hofstede, G., 2001. Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications.

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40. Nieuwmeijer, L., 1992. Negotiation: Methodology and training. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

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10. List of libraries and searching engines 1. ScienceDirect [Online] Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/ 2. EBSCOHost [Online] Available at: http://search.ebscohost.com/ 3. Google Scholar [Online] Available at: http://scholar.google.com/ 4. Google Books [Online] Available at: http://books.google.com/ 5. Statsbiblioteket, Universitetsparken, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark 6. Google [Online] Available at: http://www.google.com/; http://www.google.dk/; http://www.google.ru/ 7. Yandex [Online] Available at: http://www.yandex.ru/ 8. Danish Exporters [Online] Available at: http://www.danishexporters.dk/

11. List of figures Figure 1. The Dual concerns model ................................................................................................................... 9

Figure 2. The ”Onion Diagram”: Manifestations of culture on different levels of depth................................ 12

Figure 3. The findings ...................................................................................................................................... 75

12. List of tables Table 1. Characteristics of main negotiation strategies .................................................................................. 10

Table 2. Index value scores for Denmark. ....................................................................................................... 15

Table 3. Index value scores for Russia ............................................................................................................. 16

Table 4. Comparison of country scores for Denmark and Russia .................................................................... 17

Table 5. Aspects of culture’s influence on negotiations and Hofstede’s index values ................................... 22



Table 8. Correlations between variables about negotiation strategies. ......................................................... 49

Table 9. Hypothesis 9. Rotated Component Matrixa ....................................................................................... 50

Table 10. Correlations between variables about femininity and negotiation strategies. ............................... 51

Table 11. Hypothesis 1. Rotated Component Matrixa ..................................................................................... 52

Table 12. Correlations between variables about individualism‐collectivism and negotiation strategies. ...... 52

Table 13. Correlations between variables about uncertainty avoidance and negotiation strategies. ........... 54

Table 14. Uncertainty avoidance variables. Rotated Component Matrixa ...................................................... 55

Table 15. Correlations between variables about power distance and negotiation strategies. ...................... 56


Table 17. Correlations between variables about negotiation strategies. ....................................................... 59

Table 18. Hypothesis 10. Component Matrixa ................................................................................................. 60

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82

Table 19. Correlations between variables about masculinity‐femininity and negotiation strategies. ........... 60


Table 21. Correlations between variables about individualism‐collectivism and negotiation strategies. ...... 62


Table 23. Correlations between variables about uncertainty avoidance and negotiation strategies. ........... 64


Table 25. Correlations between variables about power distance and negotiation strategies. ...................... 66


Table 27. Comparison of findings from both samples on power distance variables ...................................... 69

Table 28. Statements with construct validity problems .................................................................................. 72


83

13. Appendices

13.1. Descriptive statistics on Danish culture as perceived by Russians Descriptive Statistics

N Range Minimum Maximum Sum Mean

Std. Deviation Variance

Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic

Std. Error Statistic Statistic

DANES 1. Value importance of economic goals.

14 2,00 3,00 5,00 60,00 4,2857 ,16336 ,61125 ,374

DANES 2. Assume that the sum of negotiation outcome is fixed.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 44,00 3,1429 ,23103 ,86444 ,747

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 41,00 2,9286 ,30498 1,14114 1,302

DANES 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 47,00 3,3571 ,24823 ,92878 ,863

DANES 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 49,00 3,5000 ,25137 ,94054 ,885

DANES 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere.

14 2,00 3,00 5,00 60,00 4,2857 ,16336 ,61125 ,374

DANES 7. Value making joint decisions.

14 2,00 3,00 5,00 55,00 3,9286 ,19511 ,73005 ,533

DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration.

14 2,00 3,00 5,00 61,00 4,3571 ,16926 ,63332 ,401

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 42,00 3,0000 ,31449 1,17670 1,385

DANES 10. Tend to behave assertively.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 37,00 2,6429 ,28913 1,08182 1,170

DANES 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions.

14 2,00 2,00 4,00 49,00 3,5000 ,22847 ,85485 ,731

DANES 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 55,00 3,9286 ,26653 ,99725 ,995

DANES 13. Have a need for not losing face.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 55,00 3,9286 ,32250 1,20667 1,456

DANES 14. Pursue personal interests.

14 3,00 1,00 4,00 35,00 2,5000 ,25137 ,94054 ,885

DANES 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 39,00 2,7857 ,29979 1,12171 1,258

DANES 16. Use a problem-solving approach.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 51,00 3,6429 ,22501 ,84190 ,709

DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 50,00 3,5714 ,22761 ,85163 ,725

DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains.

14 3,00 1,00 4,00 40,00 2,8571 ,27451 1,02711 1,055

DANES 19. Prefer following rules and procedures.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 53,00 3,7857 ,28087 1,05090 1,104

DANES 20. Aim to avoid risks. 14 2,00 3,00 5,00 56,00 4,0000 ,14825 ,55470 ,308 DANES 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements.

14 2,00 3,00 5,00 58,00 4,1429 ,17719 ,66299 ,440

DANES 22. Tend to resist change. 14 3,00 1,00 4,00 42,00 3,0000 ,27735 1,03775 1,077 DANES 23. Are open to sharing information.

14 3,00 1,00 4,00 38,00 2,7143 ,19410 ,72627 ,527


84

DANES 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 45,00 3,2143 ,33444 1,25137 1,566

DANES 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings.

14 3,00 1,00 4,00 34,00 2,4286 ,27163 1,01635 1,033

DANES 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 54,00 3,8571 ,23103 ,86444 ,747

DANES 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 42,00 3,0000 ,31449 1,17670 1,385

DANES 28. Usually hold a high position within their company.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 47,00 3,3571 ,22501 ,84190 ,709

DANES 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 47,00 3,3571 ,24823 ,92878 ,863

DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics.

14 3,00 2,00 5,00 40,00 2,8571 ,25370 ,94926 ,901

DANES 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position.

14 4,00 1,00 5,00 47,00 3,3571 ,28913 1,08182 1,170

DANES 32. Value long-lasting relationships.

14 2,00 3,00 5,00 61,00 4,3571 ,16926 ,63332 ,401

Valid N (listwise) 14

13.2. Descriptive statistics on Russian culture as perceived by Danes Descriptive Statistics

N Range Minimum Maximum Sum Mean

Std. Deviation Variance

Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic

Std. Error Statistic Statistic

RUSSIANS 1. Value importance of economic goals.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 130,00 3,9394 ,15655 ,89928 ,809

RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 112,00 3,3939 ,15037 ,86384 ,746

RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 119,00 3,6061 ,18939 1,08799 1,184

RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation.

33 3,00 1,00 4,00 85,00 2,5758 ,17959 1,03169 1,064

RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 94,00 2,8485 ,20926 1,20211 1,445

RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 114,00 3,4545 ,17991 1,03353 1,068

RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 87,00 2,6364 ,19857 1,14067 1,301

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 95,00 2,8788 ,17275 ,99240 ,985

RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 126,00 3,8182 ,17108 ,98281 ,966

RUSSIANS 10. Tend to behave assertively.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 101,00 3,0606 ,18939 1,08799 1,184

RUSSIANS 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 120,00 3,6364 ,17847 1,02525 1,051

RUSSIANS 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 133,00 4,0303 ,15377 ,88335 ,780


85

RUSSIANS 13. Have a need for not losing face.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 144,00 4,3636 ,13636 ,78335 ,614

RUSSIANS 14. Pursue personal interests.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 117,00 3,5455 ,15746 ,90453 ,818

RUSSIANS 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 108,00 3,2727 ,17008 ,97701 ,955

RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach.

33 3,00 1,00 4,00 86,00 2,6061 ,16248 ,93339 ,871

RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 78,00 2,3636 ,19857 1,14067 1,301

RUSSIANS 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 136,00 4,1212 ,15544 ,89294 ,797

RUSSIANS 19. Prefer following rules and procedures.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 99,00 3,0000 ,19462 1,11803 1,250

RUSSIANS 20. Aim to avoid risks. 33 4,00 1,00 5,00 108,00 3,2727 ,20072 1,15306 1,330 RUSSIANS 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 114,00 3,4545 ,15133 ,86930 ,756

RUSSIANS 22. Tend to resist change.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 105,00 3,1818 ,15358 ,88227 ,778

RUSSIANS 23. Are open to sharing information.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 84,00 2,5455 ,19015 1,09233 1,193

RUSSIANS 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 118,00 3,5758 ,19957 1,14647 1,314

RUSSIANS 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 103,00 3,1212 ,21212 1,21854 1,485

RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 132,00 4,0000 ,16855 ,96825 ,938

RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 104,00 3,1515 ,19521 1,12142 1,258

RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company.

33 2,00 3,00 5,00 141,00 4,2727 ,09993 ,57406 ,330

RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties.

33 3,00 1,00 4,00 86,00 2,6061 ,15037 ,86384 ,746

RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics.

33 3,00 2,00 5,00 120,00 3,6364 ,16753 ,96236 ,926

RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position.

33 2,00 3,00 5,00 134,00 4,0606 ,11464 ,65857 ,434

RUSSIANS 32. Value long-lasting relationships.

33 4,00 1,00 5,00 119,00 3,6061 ,16248 ,93339 ,871

Valid N (listwise) 33


86

13.3. Correlation analysis of Danish culture and negotiation (Russian sample) Rewritten from SPSS results expressed as a matrix.

Q1 MEAN Q2 MEAN r № CORRDANES 1. Value importance of economic goals. 4,2857 5 3,5000 1. 0,535* 1 4,2857 13 3,9286 2. 0,760** 1 4,2857 19 3,7857 3. 0,821** 1 4,2857 21 4,1429 4. 0,651* 1 4,2857 24 3,2143 5. 0,718** DANES 2. Assume that the sum of negotiation outcome is fixed. 3,1429 DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. 2,9286 5 3,5000 6. -0,538* 3 2,9286 9 3,0000 7. 0,745** 3 2,9286 17 3,5714 8. -0,588* 3 2,9286 18 2,8571 9. 0,778** 3 2,9286 29 3,3571 10. -0,627* 3 2,9286 30 2,8571 11. 0,558* DANES 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. 3,3571 DANES 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. 3,5000 6 4,2857 12. 0,535* 5 3,5000 7 3,9286 13. 0,728** 5 3,5000 8 4,3571 14. 0,710** 5 3,5000 9 3,0000 15. -0,626* 5 3,5000 10 2,6429 16. -0,567* 5 3,5000 17 3,5714 17. 0,768** 5 3,5000 18 2,8571 18. -0,637* 5 3,5000 21 4,1429 19. 0,617* 5 3,5000 29 3,3571 20. 0,572* DANES 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. 4,2857 12 3,9286 21. 0,667** 6 4,2857 15 2,7857 22. 0,545* 6 4,2857 17 3,5714 23. 0,549* 6 4,2857 27 3,0000 24. 0,535* DANES 7. Value making joint decisions. 3,9286 8 4,3571 25. 0,725** 7 3,9286 9 3,0000 26. -0,627* 7 3,9286 10 2,6429 27. -0,619* 7 3,9286 14 2,5000 28. -0,616* 7 3,9286 17 3,5714 29. 0,689* DANES 8. Value importance of cooperation. 4,3571 14 2,5000 30. -0,710**8 4,3571 17 3,5714 31. 0,733** 8 4,3571 19 3,7857 32. 0,586* 8 4,3571 24 3,2143 33. 0,672** 8 4,3571 29 3,3571 34. 0,682** DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 3,0000 10 2,6429 35. 0,725** 9 3,0000 15 2,7857 36. 0,583* 9 3,0000 17 3,5714 37. -0,844**9 3,0000 18 2,8571 38. 0,636* 9 3,0000 27 3,0000 39. -0,556* 9 3,0000 28 3,3571 40. -0,544* 9 3,0000 29 3,3571 41. -0,744**9 3,0000 30 2,8571 42. 0,551* DANES 10. Tend to behave assertively. 2,6429 17 3,5714 43. -0,763**DANES 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions. 3,5000 DANES 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. 3,9286 16 3,6429 44. 0,609* DANES 13. Have a need for not losing face. 3,9286 19 3,7857 45. 0,715** 13 3,9286 20 4,0000 46. 0,690* 13 3,9286 24 3,2143 47. 0,622* 13 3,9286 31 3,3571 48. 0,669** DANES 14. Pursue personal interests. 2,5000 DANES 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. 2,7857 16 3,6429 49. 0,564* 15 2,7857 17 3,5714 50. 0,541* 15 2,7857 26 3,8571 51. -0,669**15 2,7857 27 3,0000 52. 0,874**


87

DANES 16. Use a problem-solving approach. 3,6429 23 2,7143 53. 0,575* 16 3,6429 27 3,0000 54. 0,699** 16 3,6429 28 3,3571 55. 0,628* DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 3,5714 23 2,7143 56. 0,533* 17 3,5714 27 3,0000 57. 0,614* 17 3,5714 29 3,3571 58. 0,792** DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. 2,8571 DANES 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. 3,7857 24 3,2143 59. 0,857** DANES 20. Aim to avoid risks. 4,0000 24 3,2143 60. 0,554* 20 4,0000 29 3,3571 61. 0,584* DANES 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. 4,1429 23 2,7143 62. 0,571* 21 4,1429 24 3,2143 63. 0,609* 21 4,1429 32 4,3571 64. 0,602* DANES 22. Tend to resist change. 3,0000 28 3,3571 65. 0,559* DANES 23. Are open to sharing information. 2,7143 24 3,2143 66. 0,580* 23 2,7143 27 3,0000 67. 0,540* 23 2,7143 28 3,3571 68. 0,557* 23 2,7143 29 3,3571 69. 0,619* DANES 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements. 3,2143 29 3,3571 70. 0,591* DANES 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. 2,4286 DANES 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. 3,8571 27 3,0000 71. 0,681** 26 3,8571 30 2,8571 72. 0,629* DANES 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. 3,0000 DANES 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. 3,3571 29 3,3571 73. 0,611* DANES 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. 3,3571 DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. 2,8571 DANES 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. 3,3571 DANES 32. Value long-lasting relationships. 4,3571 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


88

13.4. Correlation analysis of Russian culture and negotiation (Danish sample) Rewritten from SPSS results expressed as a matrix.

Q1 Mean1 Q2 Mean2 Corr No.

Corr.

RUSSIANS 1. Value importance of economic goals. 3,9394 18 4,1212 1. 0,438* 1 3,9394 30 3,6364 2. 0,371* 1 3,9394 31 4,0606 3. 0,376* RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of negotiation outcome is fixed. 3,3939 4 2,5758 4. -0,438* 2 3,3939 15 3,2727 5. 0,350* 2 3,3939 16 2,6061 6. -0,344* 2 3,3939 17 2,3636 7. -0,435* 2 3,3939 26 4,0000 8. -0,448** 2 3,3939 31 4,0606 9. 0,451** 2 3,3939 32 3,6061 10. -0,344* RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price. 3,6061 4 2,5758 11. -0,376* 3 3,6061 5 2,8485 12. -0,453** 3 3,6061 6 3,4545 13. -0,364* 3 3,6061 17 2,3636 14. -0,359* 3 3,6061 21 3,4545 15. -0,366* 3 3,6061 29 2,6061 16. -0,370* RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. 2,5758 5 2,8485 17. 0,476** 4 2,5758 6 3,4545 18. 0,450** 4 2,5758 8 2,8788 19. 0,498* 4 2,5758 10 3,0606 20. -0,561** 4 2,5758 16 2,6061 21. 0,503** 4 2,5758 17 2,3636 22. 0,587** 4 2,5758 20 3,2727 23. 0,416* 4 2,5758 21 3,4545 24. 0,396* 4 2,5758 29 2,6061 25. 0,473* 4 2,5758 30 3,6364 26. -0,349* RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. 2,8485 6 3,4545 27. 0,585** 5 2,8485 8 2,8788 28. 0,534** 5 2,8485 17 2,3636 29. 0,360* 5 2,8485 21 3,4545 30. 0,367* 5 2,8485 29 2,6061 31. 0,392* 5 2,8485 32 3,6061 32. 0,474** RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. 3,4545 7 2,6364 33. 0,436* 6 3,4545 8 2,8788 34. 0,665** 6 3,4545 16 2,6061 35. 0,418* 6 3,4545 17 2,3636 36. 0,359* 6 3,4545 21 3,4545 37. 0,702** 6 3,4545 23 2,455 38. 0,632** 6 3,4545 26 4,0000 39. 0,375* 6 3,4545 30 3,6364 40. -0,426* 6 3,4545 32 3,6061 41. 0,548** RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions. 2,6364 8 2,8788 42. 0,540** 7 2,6364 11 3,6364 43. 0,391* 7 2,6364 16 2,6061 44. 0,566** 7 2,6364 17 2,3636 45. 0,537** 7 2,6364 24 3,5758 46. -0,361* RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. 2,8788 9 3,8182 47. -0,376* 8 2,8788 10 3,0606 48. -0,369* 8 2,8788 14 3,5455 49. -0,411** 8 2,8788 16 2,6061 50. 0,487** 8 2,8788 17 2,3636 51. 0,509** 8 2,8788 20 3,2727 52. 0,358* 8 2,8788 21 3,4545 53. 0,428* 8 2,8788 29 2,6061 54. 0,489** 8 2,8788 30 3,6364 55. -0,440*


89

8 2,8788 31 4,0606 56. -0,419* 8 2,8788 32 3,6061 57. 0,419* RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 3,8182 10 3,0606 58. 0,361* 9 3,8182 15 3,2727 59. 0,411* 9 3,8182 19 3,0000 60. -0,455* 9 3,8182 31 4,0606 61. 0,404* RUSSIANS 10. Tend to behave assertively. 3,0606 27 3,1515 62. 0,504** RUSSIANS 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions. 3,6364 16 2,6061 63. 0,499** 11 3,6364 17 2,3636 64. 0,384* 11 3,6364 26 4,0000 65. 0,598** 11 3,6364 32 3,6061 66. 0,433* RUSSIANS 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. 4,0303 13 4,3636 67. 0,390* 12 4,0303 21 3,4545 68. 0,388* 12 4,0303 26 4,0000 69. 0,512** RUSSIANS 13. Have a need for not losing face. 4,3636 28 4,2727 70. 0,398* RUSSIANS 14. Pursue personal interests. 3,5455 19 3,0000 71. -0,464** 14 3,5455 20 3,2727 72. -0,357* 14 3,5455 29 2,6061 73. -0,556** RUSSIANS 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. 3,2727 RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. 2,6061 17 2,3636 74. 0,726** 16 2,6061 20 3,2727 75. 0,422* 16 2,6061 21 3,4545 76. 0,382* 16 2,6061 23 2,5455 77. 0,432* 16 2,6061 26 4,0000 78. 0,484** 16 2,6061 29 2,6061 79. 0,344* 16 2,6061 30 3,6364 80. -0,373* 16 2,6061 32 3,6062 81. 0,395* RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 2,3636 28 3,6364 82. -0,347* 17 2,3636 30 3,6364 83. -0,559** 17 2,3636 31 4,0606 84. -0,405* RUSSIANS 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. 4,1212 21 3,4545 85. -0,395* 18 4,1212 30 3,6364 86. 0,380* 18 4,1212 31 4,0606 87. 0,572** RUSSIANS 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. 3,0000 20 3,2727 88. 0,533** RUSSIANS 20. Aim to avoid risks. 3,2727 21 3,4545 89. 0,371* 20 3,2727 24 3,5758 90. 0,350* RUSSIANS 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. 3,4545 23 2,5455 91. 0,619** 21 3,4545 26 4,0000 92. 0,408* 21 3,4545 32 3,6061 93. 0,382* RUSSIANS 22. Tend to resist change. 3,1818 27 3,1515 94. -0,345* 22 3,1818 32 3,6061 95. 0,393* RUSSIANS 23. Are open to sharing information. 2,5455 RUSSIANS 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements. 3,5758 RUSSIANS 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. 3,1212 RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. 4,0000 32 3,6061 96. 0,484** RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. 3,1515 RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. 4,2727 29 2,6061 97. -0,407* 28 4,2727 30 3,6364 98. 0,411* RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. 2,6061 RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. 3,6364 31 4,0606 99. 0,430* RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. 4,0606 RUSSIANS 32. Value long-lasting relationships. 3,6061 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


90

13.5. Regression analysis

13.5.1. Example of bivariate regression Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 ,665a ,442 ,424 ,75324 a. Predictors: (Constant), RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ANOVAb Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression 13,926 1 13,926 24,545 ,000a

Residual 17,589 31 ,567

Total 31,515 32 a. Predictors: (Constant), RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere.b. Dependent Variable: RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized Coeffi-cients

Standardized Coeffi-cients

t Sig.B Std. Error Beta

1 (Constant) ,674 ,464 1,452 ,157

RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere.

,638 ,129 ,665 4,954 ,000

a. Dependent Variable: RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration.


91

13.5.2. Example of multiple regression Variables Entered/Removed

Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method

1 RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions., RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being., RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere.a

. Enter

a. All requested variables entered. Model Summary

Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 ,738a ,545 ,498 ,70307 a. Predictors: (Constant), RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions., RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being., RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ANOVAb

Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression 17,180 3 5,727 11,585 ,000a

Residual 14,335 29 ,494

Total 31,515 32 a. Predictors: (Constant), RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions., RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being., RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. b. Dependent Variable: RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

t Sig.B Std. Error Beta

1 (Constant) ,340 ,452 ,752 ,458

RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being.

,165 ,128 ,200 1,295 ,206

RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ,401 ,158 ,418 2,547 ,016

RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions. ,258 ,121 ,297 2,131 ,042a. Dependent Variable: RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration.


92

13.6. Sample characteristics: descriptives and frequencies

13.6.1. Russian sample

Descriptive Statistics on Russian firms. Number of employees and turnover, million EUR. N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

SMEAN(RUEMPLOY) 14 4,00 300,00 57,5000 77,36154 SMEAN(RUTURNOVER) 14 ,15 22,00 5,6667 5,13494 Valid N (listwise) 14 Missing values replaced by the mean values.

RU GENDER

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid 1 7,1 7,1 7,1

F 6 42,9 42,9 50,0

M 7 50,0 50,0 100,0

Total 14 100,0 100,0 RU POSITION Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid 2 14,3 14,3 14,3

BRAND MANAGER 1 7,1 7,1 21,4

DIRECTOR 6 42,9 42,9 64,3

GENERAL DIRECTOR 1 7,1 7,1 71,4

HR AND ADM MANAGER 1 7,1 7,1 78,6

Obt. thru secretary 1 7,1 7,1 85,7

PURCHASER 1 7,1 7,1 92,9

SALES MANAGER CIS 1 7,1 7,1 100,0

Total 14 100,0 100,0 RU INDUSTRY Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid AIR SYSTEMS 1 7,1 7,1 7,1

CLOTHING 1 7,1 7,1 14,3

CONSTRUCTION 2 14,3 14,3 28,6

DISTRIBUTING TRADE 2 14,3 14,3 42,9

DOMESTIC ANIMALS FOODS 1 7,1 7,1 50,0

ENERGY METERING 1 7,1 7,1 57,1

ENGINEERING 1 7,1 7,1 64,3

FISH BREEDING 1 7,1 7,1 71,4

FOODS 2 14,3 14,3 85,7

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT 1 7,1 7,1 92,9

TRANSPORT SERVICES 1 7,1 7,1 100,0

Total 14 100,0 100,0


93

13.6.2. Danish sample

Descriptive Statistics. Number of employees and turnover, million EUR.

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

SMEAN(DKEMPLOY) 33 5,00 4000,00 474,4231 773,18773 SMEAN(DKTURNOVER) 33 1,00 538,00 117,5810 128,81209 Valid N (listwise) 33 Missing values are replaced by the mean values. DK GENDER Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid 4 12,1 12,1 12,1

F 4 12,1 12,1 24,2

M 25 75,8 75,8 100,0

Total 33 100,0 100,0 DK POSITION Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid AREA MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 3,0

AREA SALES MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 6,1

COMM OFFICER 1 3,0 3,0 9,1

COMMERCIAL MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 12,1

DEPT DIRECTOR 1 3,0 3,0 15,2

EXPORT DIRECTOR 1 3,0 3,0 18,2

EXPORT MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 21,2

FINANCE DIRECTOR 1 3,0 3,0 24,2

FINANCIAL DIRECTOR 1 3,0 3,0 27,3

GEN. SALES MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 30,3

HEAD OF REP 2 6,1 6,1 36,4

INT BUSINESS MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 39,4

INT PROJECT MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 42,4

KEY ACCOUNT MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 45,5

MANAGING DIRECTOR 5 15,2 15,2 60,6

Obt. thru secretary 4 12,1 12,1 72,7

PROJECT MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 75,8

REGIONAL MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 78,8

SALES DIRECTOR 2 6,1 6,1 84,8

SALES MANAGER 3 9,1 9,1 93,9

TRAFFIC MANAGER 1 3,0 3,0 97,0

VP 1 3,0 3,0 100,0

Total 33 100,0 100,0


94

DK INDUSTRY Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Valid 3 9,1 9,1 9,1

AGRO 5 15,2 15,2 24,2

AGRO TECHNOLOGY 1 3,0 3,0 27,3

AUTOMOTIVE 1 3,0 3,0 30,3

AVIATION 1 3,0 3,0 33,3

BUILDING MATERIALS 1 3,0 3,0 36,4

CLOTHING 1 3,0 3,0 39,4

CONSTRUCTION 2 6,1 6,1 45,5

CONSULTING 1 3,0 3,0 48,5

ENGINEERING 2 6,1 6,1 54,5

FCMG 1 3,0 3,0 57,6

FINANCE 1 3,0 3,0 60,6

FOODS 3 9,1 9,1 69,7

HEATING 1 3,0 3,0 72,7

INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY 1 3,0 3,0 75,8

MANAGEMENT CONSULT 2 6,1 6,1 81,8

MARINE 1 3,0 3,0 84,8

PHARMACEUTICALS 1 3,0 3,0 87,9

PROCESS AUTOMATION 1 3,0 3,0 90,9

SHIPPING 2 6,1 6,1 97,0

SUPPLEM. FOR ANIMAL PRODUCTION 1 3,0 3,0 100,0

Total 33 100,0 100,0


95

13.7. Reliability analysis

13.7.1. Russian sample Case Processing Summary

N %

Cases Valid 14 100,0

Excludeda 0 ,0

Total 14 100,0 a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha N of Items

,732 32 ANOVA

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig

Between People 39,232 13 3,018 Within People Between Items 142,420 31 4,594 5,683 ,000

Residual 325,768 403 ,808 Total 468,188 434 1,079

Total 507,420 447 1,135 Grand Mean = 3,4241

13.7.2. Danish sample Case Processing Summary

N %

Cases Valid 33 100,0

Excludeda 0 ,0

Total 33 100,0 a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha N of Items

,618 32 ANOVA

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig

Between People 78,676 32 2,459 Within People Between Items 312,848 31 10,092 10,755 ,000

Residual 930,839 992 ,938 Total 1243,688 1023 1,216

Total 1322,364 1055 1,253 Grand Mean = 3,3636


96

13.8. Factor analysis

13.8.1. Russian sample

13.8.1.1. Hypothesis 9

KMO and Bartlett's Test Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,585 Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 58,851

df 28 Sig. ,001

Communalities

Initial Extraction

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. 1,000 ,818 DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,523 DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 1,000 ,854 DANES 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. 1,000 ,726 DANES 16. Use a problem-solving approach. 1,000 ,739 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 1,000 ,893 DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. 1,000 ,633 DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. 1,000 ,486 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component

Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings

Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings

Total % of Variance

Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total

% of Variance Cumulative %

1 3,839 47,993 47,993 3,839 47,993 47,993 3,645 45,561 45,561 2 1,832 22,901 70,894 1,832 22,901 70,894 2,027 25,333 70,894 3 ,879 10,983 81,876 4 ,648 8,094 89,970 5 ,408 5,106 95,076 6 ,226 2,822 97,898 7 ,123 1,542 99,440 8 ,045 ,560 100,000 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.


97

Component Matrixa

Component

1 2

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ,918 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. -,911 DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. ,844 DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. ,755 DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. -,666 DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ,561 ,414DANES 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. ,840

DANES 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,796

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 2 components extracted. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component

1 2

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ,905 DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. ,903 DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. ,795 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. -,789 ,521DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ,662 DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. -,545 ,475DANES 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,857

DANES 12. Value establishing relationship before doing business. ,843

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2

1 ,950 -,311 2 ,311 ,950 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


98

13.8.1.2. Hypothesis 1 KMO and Bartlett's Test Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,705 Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 88,021

df 36 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. 1,000 ,846 DANES 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. 1,000 ,784 DANES 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. 1,000 ,343 DANES 7. Value making joint decisions. 1,000 ,823 DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,765 DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 1,000 ,787 DANES 10. Tend to behave assertively. 1,000 ,613 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 1,000 ,871 DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. 1,000 ,768 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 5,555 61,717 61,717 5,555 61,717 61,717 3,425 38,055 38,055 2 1,045 11,606 73,324 1,045 11,606 73,324 3,174 35,268 73,324 3 ,885 9,835 83,159

4 ,658 7,310 90,469

5 ,461 5,120 95,589

6 ,193 2,147 97,735

7 ,115 1,278 99,013

8 ,049 ,542 99,555

9 ,040 ,445 100,000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.


99

Component Matrixa

Component 1 2

DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,924

DANES 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. ,871

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,870

DANES 7. Value making joint decisions. ,783 ,458DANES 10. Tend to behave assertively. -,783

DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. -,763 ,431DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,735 ,474DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. -,715 ,579DANES 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ,572


Component 1 2

DANES 7. Value making joint decisions. ,884


DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,762 -,539DANES 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. ,744 -,481DANES 10. Tend to behave assertively. -,563 ,544DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. ,912DANES 18. Aim for solutions that maximize own gains. ,838DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,515 ,722DANES 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. -,484Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2

1 ,727 -,687 2 ,687 ,727 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


100


df 21 Sig. ,006

Communalities

Initial Extraction

DANES 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. 1,000 ,828 DANES 20. Aim to avoid risks. 1,000 ,844 DANES 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. 1,000 ,648 DANES 22. Tend to resist change. 1,000 ,778 DANES 23. Are open to sharing information. 1,000 ,825 DANES 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements. 1,000 ,936 DANES 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. 1,000 ,808 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 3,411 48,724 48,724 3,411 48,724 48,724 2,274 32,486 32,486 2 1,201 17,156 65,881 1,201 17,156 65,881 2,078 29,693 62,178 3 1,056 15,081 80,961 1,056 15,081 80,961 1,315 18,783 80,961 4 ,525 7,494 88,455

5 ,467 6,664 95,119

6 ,292 4,170 99,290

7 ,050 ,710 100,000



101

Component Matrixa

Component 1 2 3

DANES 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements. ,959

DANES 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. ,799 ,415


DANES 23. Are open to sharing information. ,675 -,606

DANES 20. Aim to avoid risks. ,549 ,654

DANES 22. Tend to resist change. ,522 ,709DANES 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. -,549 ,636Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 3 components extracted. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component 1 2 3

DANES 23. Are open to sharing information. ,882


DANES 25. Prefer to negotiate in unstructured and informal settings. -,718 ,446DANES 20. Aim to avoid risks. ,916

DANES 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. ,765 ,426DANES 24. Prefer rigid contractual agreements. ,601 ,707

DANES 22. Tend to resist change. ,844Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2 3

1 ,698 ,635 ,331 2 -,694 ,714 ,095 3 -,176 -,296 ,939 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


102


df 45 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction

DANES 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. 1,000 ,849 DANES 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. 1,000 ,918 DANES 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. 1,000 ,942 DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. 1,000 ,793 DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,810 DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 1,000 ,919 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 1,000 ,848 DANES 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. 1,000 ,620 DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. 1,000 ,846 DANES 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. 1,000 ,817 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 5,058 50,580 50,580 5,058 50,580 50,580 3,497 34,971 34,971 2 1,956 19,556 70,136 1,956 19,556 70,136 2,471 24,710 59,680 3 1,347 13,474 83,610 1,347 13,474 83,610 2,393 23,930 83,610 4 ,752 7,521 91,131 5 ,336 3,356 94,486 6 ,214 2,142 96,628 7 ,147 1,473 98,101 8 ,119 1,187 99,288 9 ,049 ,491 99,779 10 ,022 ,221 100,000 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.


103

Component Matrixa

Component

1 2 3

DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,933 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,914 DANES 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ,858 DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. -,723 ,459 DANES 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. ,714 ,590

DANES 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,702 ,624

DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,641 -,527

DANES 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,623 ,459 DANES 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,887 DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. -,527 ,666 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 3 components extracted. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component

1 2 3

DANES 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,895 DANES 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ,865 DANES 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,759 ,413 DANES 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,690 DANES 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,678 -,403 ,545DANES 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,941 DANES 15. Prefer making important decisions on their own. ,921 DANES 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,866

DANES 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. -,414 ,821

DANES 3. Focus primarily on the price. -,552 ,693

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2 3

1 ,752 ,542 -,376 2 ,294 ,235 ,927 3 -,590 ,807 -,017 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


104

13.8.2. Danish sample


df 21 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction


1,000 ,378


1,000 ,530


1,000 ,507


1,000 ,588


1,000 ,743


1,000 ,477


1,000 ,392

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component


Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %

1 3,615 51,640 51,640 3,615 51,640 51,640 2 ,913 13,045 64,686

3 ,796 11,376 76,061

4 ,588 8,399 84,460

5 ,545 7,787 92,248

6 ,319 4,550 96,798

7 ,224 3,202 100,000



105

Component Matrixa

Component 1


,862


,767


,728


,712


-,691


-,626


-,615


a. Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.


106


df 45 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction

RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price. 1,000 ,252 RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. 1,000 ,680 RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. 1,000 ,477 RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. 1,000 ,542 RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions. 1,000 ,624 RUSSIANS 10. Tend to behave assertively. 1,000 ,694 RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 1,000 ,493 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,669 RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. 1,000 ,650 RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 1,000 ,664 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 4,410 44,105 44,105 4,410 44,105 44,105 3,660 36,603 36,603 2 1,334 13,341 57,446 1,334 13,341 57,446 2,084 20,843 57,446 3 1,106 11,063 68,508

4 ,822 8,218 76,726

5 ,777 7,775 84,501

6 ,421 4,211 88,712

7 ,372 3,720 92,432

8 ,311 3,106 95,537

9 ,265 2,654 98,191

10 ,181 1,809 100,000



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Component Matrixa

Component 1 2

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,817



RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ,733

RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,719

RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. ,689

RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions. ,648 ,451RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price. -,502

RUSSIANS 10. Tend to behave assertively. -,431 ,712RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,425 ,558Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 2 components extracted. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component 1 2


RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,805

RUSSIANS 7. Value making joint decisions. ,786

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,686 ,445RUSSIANS 6. Value creation of a friendly atmosphere. ,674

RUSSIANS 5. Are concerned with the other party’s well-being. ,575

RUSSIANS 3. Focus primarily on the price. -,436

RUSSIANS 10. Tend to behave assertively. -,833RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,696RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. ,535 ,627Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2

1 ,870 ,494 2 ,494 -,870 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


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df 21 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction

RUSSIANS 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions. 1,000 ,641 RUSSIANS 14. Pursue personal interests. 1,000 ,710 RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. 1,000 ,743 RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. 1,000 ,654 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,630 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. 1,000 ,717 RUSSIANS 32. Value long-lasting relationships. 1,000 ,418 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 3,219 45,987 45,987 3,219 45,987 45,987 2,481 35,439 35,439 2 1,294 18,482 64,469 1,294 18,482 64,469 2,032 29,030 64,469 3 ,824 11,769 76,238 4 ,597 8,530 84,768 5 ,450 6,427 91,196 6 ,374 5,345 96,541 7 ,242 3,459 100,000 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Component Matrixa

Component 1 2

RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,790 RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,772 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,763 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ,640 -,554 RUSSIANS 32. Value long-lasting relationships. ,629 RUSSIANS 14. Pursue personal interests. -,550 ,638 RUSSIANS 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions. ,557 ,575 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 2 components extracted.


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Rotated Component Matrixa

Component 1 2

RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,834 RUSSIANS 11. Prefer to consult with their colleagues about important decisions. ,793 RUSSIANS 17. Aim to achieve mutually beneficial solutions. ,755 RUSSIANS 32. Value long-lasting relationships. ,587 RUSSIANS 14. Pursue personal interests. -,842 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. ,832 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,463 ,645 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2



110


df 28 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction

RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. 1,000 ,504 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,531 RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 1,000 ,638 RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. 1,000 ,612 RUSSIANS 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. 1,000 ,673 RUSSIANS 20. Aim to avoid risks. 1,000 ,597 RUSSIANS 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. 1,000 ,622 RUSSIANS 23. Are open to sharing information. 1,000 ,590 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 3,327 41,590 41,590 3,327 41,590 41,590 2,685 33,559 33,559 2 1,440 17,999 59,589 1,440 17,999 59,589 2,082 26,030 59,589 3 ,976 12,203 71,791 4 ,713 8,915 80,707 5 ,542 6,776 87,483 6 ,428 5,351 92,835 7 ,356 4,450 97,284 8 ,217 2,716 100,000 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.


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Component Matrixa

Component 1 2

RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,726 RUSSIANS 20. Aim to avoid risks. ,725 RUSSIANS 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. ,709 RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. ,701 RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,693 RUSSIANS 23. Are open to sharing information. ,564 ,522RUSSIANS 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. ,467 -,674RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,515 ,611Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 2 components extracted. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component 1 2

RUSSIANS 21. Are concerned with stability of relationships and agreements. ,778 RUSSIANS 16. Use a problem-solving approach. ,774 RUSSIANS 23. Are open to sharing information. ,762 RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. ,634 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. ,554 ,474 RUSSIANS 19. Prefer following rules and procedures. ,820 RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. -,796RUSSIANS 20. Aim to avoid risks. ,432 ,641 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2



112


df 45 Sig. ,000

Communalities

Initial Extraction

RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. 1,000 ,735 RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. 1,000 ,557 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. 1,000 ,622 RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. 1,000 ,647 RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. 1,000 ,576 RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. 1,000 ,516 RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. 1,000 ,677 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. 1,000 ,624 RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. 1,000 ,522 RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. 1,000 ,579 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component



Total % of Variance



1 3,379 33,787 33,787 3,379 33,787 33,787 2,181 21,813 21,813 2 1,410 14,102 47,888 1,410 14,102 47,888 2,163 21,630 43,443 3 1,267 12,672 60,560 1,267 12,672 60,560 1,712 17,117 60,560 4 ,932 9,318 69,877 5 ,916 9,163 79,041 6 ,661 6,607 85,648 7 ,532 5,323 90,971 8 ,378 3,777 94,748 9 ,332 3,319 98,066 10 ,193 1,934 100,000 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.


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Component Matrixa

Component 1 2 3

RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. -,739 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. -,697 RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. ,685 ,516RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ,677 RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,647 ,400 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. -,601 RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,427 -,679 RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ,471 ,646 RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. -,647RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. -,450 ,480Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 3 components extracted. Rotated Component Matrixa

Component 1 2 3

RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,779 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. -,768 RUSSIANS 30. Use hard bargaining tactics. ,581 ,416 RUSSIANS 4. Focus on alternative options for value creation. -,541 RUSSIANS 9. Treat negotiation as competition. ,801 RUSSIANS 31. Aim to achieve competitive power position. ,707 RUSSIANS 8. Value importance of collaboration. -,467 -,635 RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. ,760RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. -,730RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,626Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. Component Transformation Matrix

Component 1 2 3

1 ,638 ,620 ,457 2 -,624 ,764 -,167 3 -,452 -,179 ,874 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.


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13.8.2.6. Hypothesis 8: Supporting factor analysis KMO and Bartlett's Test Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,542 Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 19,653

df 10 Sig. ,033

Communalities

Initial Extraction

RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. 1,000 ,617 RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. 1,000 ,299 RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. 1,000 ,270 RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. 1,000 ,357 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. 1,000 ,328 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Total Variance Explained

Component


Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %

1 1,871 37,418 37,418 1,871 37,418 37,418 2 1,181 23,628 61,046 3 ,965 19,301 80,347 4 ,516 10,312 90,659 5 ,467 9,341 100,000 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Component Matrixa

Component 1

RUSSIANS 2. Assume that the sum of the negotiation outcome is fixed. ,786 RUSSIANS 28. Usually hold a high position within their company. ,598 RUSSIANS 29. Value importance of equal opportunity for both parties. -,572 RUSSIANS 26. Prefer consulting with superiors about decision-making. -,547 RUSSIANS 27. Prefer to resolve conflicts by themselves. ,519 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 1 components extracted.


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13.9. Questionnaire in Danish sent to Danish respondents Undersøgelse

Besvar venligst spørgeskemaet ved at angive Deres mening på baggrund af Deres erfaring med russiske forhandleres adfærd i prisforhandlinger. Angiv venligst svarene i forhold til følgende udsagn ved at sætte X i kassene på en skala fra “helt enig” til “helt uenig”.

Russiske forhandlere i interkulturelle prisforhandlinger:

Helt uenig Uenig Hverken

enig eller uenig

Enig Helt enig

1. Lægger vægt på økonomiske mål.

2. Antager, at summen af parternes resultater i forhandlingen er fast.

3. Fokuserer primært på prisen.

4. Fokuserer på alternative muligheder for skabelse af værdi.

5. Er interesseret i den anden sides velvære.

6. Lægger vægt på at skabe venlig atmosfære.

7. Lægger vægt på at tage fælles beslutninger.

8. Lægger vægt på at samarbejde.

9. Behandler forhandlingen som konkurrence.

10. Har tendens til at opføre sig pågående.

11. Foretrækker at rådføre sig med sine kollegaer om vigtige beslutninger.

12. Lægger vægt på at etablere forhold før påbegyndelse af forhandling.

13. Har behov for ikke at tabe ansigt.


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enig eller uenig

Enig Helt enig

14. Går efter personlige interesser.

15. Foretrækker at tage vigtige beslutninger selv.

16. Bruger en tilgang til forhandlingen baseret på problemløsning.

17. Går efter at opnå gensidigt gunstige løsninger.

18. Går efter løsninger, som maksimerer egne gevinster.

19. Foretrækker at følge regler og procedurer.

20. Går efter at undgå risici.

21. Er interesseret i stabilitet af forhold og aftaler.

22. Har tendens til at modstå ændringer.

23. Er åbne over for at dele infomation.

24. Foretrækker strenge kontraktaftaler.

25. Foretrækker at forhandle i ustrukturerede og uformelle forhold.

26. Foretrækker at konsultere sin ledelse om beslutningstagning.

27. Foretrækker at løse konflikter selv.

28. Har almindeligvis en højerestående stilling i sit firma.

29. Lægger vægt på lige muligheder for begge parter.

30. Bruger hårde forhandlingstaktikker.


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enig eller uenig

Enig Helt enig

31. Går efter at opnå konkurrencemæssigt magtfuld position.

32. Lægger vægt på langvarige forhold.

Angiv venligst også nogle få oplysninger om Deres virksomhed.

Antal ansatte (ca.):

Branche (hovedbranche):

Omsætning (ca.):

Besvarelsen indgår i en database og bruges til statistisk analyse. Jeg garanterer fuld anonymitet.

Mange tak for Deres deltagelse i undersøgelsen. Det vil glæde mig at sende resultaterne til Dem per email, når undersøgelsen er gennemført i oktober. Gem og send venligst dette Word-dokument til [email protected].

Med venlig hilsen,

Daniel Solomonov.

mailto:[email protected]�


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13.10. Questionnaire in Russian sent to Russian respondents Undersøgelse

Пожалуйста, заполните опросную анкету, указывая Ваше мнение исходя из Вашего опыта общения с представителями датской стороны в переговорах о ценовых вопросах. Пожалуйста, укажите Ваше мнение о следующих высказываниях по шкале от «полностью согласен» до «полностью несогласен», вставляя символ Х в рамки таблицы.

В переговорах о вопросах цены, датчане:

Полностью несогласен

Несогласен Не согласен, но и не

несогласен

Согласен Полностью согласен

1. Ценят важность экономических целей.

2. Полагают, что сумма результатов сторон в переговорах неизменна.

3. Концентрируют внимание на вопросе цены.

4. Концентрируют внимание на альтернативных возможностях создания выгоды.

5. Заинтересованы в благополучии другой стороны.

6. Ценят создание дружественной атмосферы.

7. Ценят принятие общих решений.

8. Ценят важность сотрудничества.

9. Подходят к переговорам как к соревнованию.

10. Имеют тенденцию вести себя самоуверенно.

11. Предпочитают советоваться со своими коллегами о принятии важных решений.

12. Ценят установление отношений перед началом переговоров.


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13. Имеют потребность в том, чтобы не потерять лицо.

14. Преследуют индивидуальные интересы.

15. Предпочитают принимать важные решения самостоятельно.

16. Имеют тенденцию использовать подход, ориентированный на решение задач.

17. Преследуют достижение взаимовыгодных решений.

18. Преследуют решения, максимально увеличивающие собственную выгоду.

19. Предпочитают следовать правилам и процедурам.

20. Стремятся уйти от риска.

21. Заинтересованы в стабильности отношений и договоров.

22. Имеют тенденцию противостоять изменениям.

23. Открыто делятся информацией.

24. Предпочитают строгие контрактные договоры.

25. Предпочитают неорганизованную и неформальную обстановку.

26. Предпочитают консультироваться с начальством о принятии решений.

27. Предпочитают решать конфликты самостоятельно.

28. Обычно занимают высокую должность в своей компании.


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29. Ценят важность равных возможностей для обеих сторон.

30. Используют жесткие тактические приемы в ведении переговоров.

31. Стремятся приобрести конкурентоспособное, влиятельное положение.

32. Ценят долгосрочные отношения.

Пожалуйста, ответьте на несколько дополнительных вопросов о Вашей компании.

Количество сотрудников (примерно):

Отрасль (основная):

Объем продаж (примерно):

Ответы будут использованы для создания базы данных и статистического анализа. Участие в исследовании полностью анонимно.

Большое спасибо за участие в исследовании. Буду рад выслать Вам результаты по электронной почте по завершению работы через 3 месяца. Пожалуйста, сохраните данный Word документ и вышлите его на [email protected].

С уважением,

Даниил Соломонов.

mailto:[email protected]�


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Honor statement

I pledge that this master’s thesis, entitled “Relationships between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and negotiation strategies: Negotiations between Danish and Russian companies” has not been submitted for academic credit in any other capacity, and that this master’s thesis has not yet been published. I further pledge that I have written this masters thesis myself, on my own. I have not employed any sources or aids other than those listed. I have appropriately identified and acknowledged all words and ideas taken from other works.

Aarhus, 14th of September 2009

Daniel Solomonov.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOFSTEDEâ€™S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS AND

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