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Strengthening bilateral relations and support in multilateral forums: Brazil-Africa
relations (1995-2010)1
PhD. Juliana J. Costa2
The research problem of this article is investigate the mechanisms employed by a
country to win the votes and support of other countries in multilateral forums. States
deepen their bilateral relations to win support at the multilateral level to increase their
weight and prestige in international system.
Cooperation at international organizations is an important topic, because these
institutions are important to diffuse information and as an arena of power to states.
Therefore, countries with lower relative power or limited resources use multilateral
forums as an instrument to achieve their demands in the current international system.
Despite advanced research does not deal with emerging countries, leaving open some
questions: How a country with limited economic and political power can win allies at
multilateral organizations? What are the benefits offered by an emerging country for this
purpose? The strengthening of bilateral relations generates multilateral support?
Through Brazil-Africa relations between 1995 and 2010, this article aims to verify
whether the increase of bilateral relations generates vote convergence among countries at
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
This study also has the following secondary hypotheses:
- Brazil, to win the multilateral support of other states, used bilateral strategies, such
as trade and technical cooperation with African countries;
- African countries increased their support to Brazil at UNGA during the period.
To achieve this goal, this research has three sections. First, studies on the "exchange"
of bilateral benefits for support in multilateral forums.
The second section presents general African foreign policy in FHC and Lula
governments. In addition, shows the variables chosen as indicative of Brazilian strategy
to win allies in Africa - bilateral trade and technical cooperation projects between Brazil
and Africa.
The last section has four parts. At first, the choice of UNGA as a parameter of
international alignment. The second presents the methodology and the model used to
verify the main hypothesis. In the third, the data, descriptive statistics and their possible
results. In the last part, the results and the proof or not of the hypothesis.
Finally, in conclusion, it will be possible to answer the research problem that is the
strengthening of bilateral relationship increased the support of beneficiary countries at
multilateral forums.
This article, thus, contributes to the study of emerging countries in the international
system, complementing existing research on the strategies used by countries to win allies
at international organizations.
1. BILATERAL STRATEGIES AND THE SUPPORT AT INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
1 This article is part of PhD thesis presented in March 2015 at International Relations Institute at the University of São Paulo (IRI /USP). 2 International PhD Relations at International Relations Institute at University of Sao Paulo and professor at School of
Commerce Foundation Alvares Penteado and University Anhembi Morumbi.
Some International Relations researchers examines the factors that influences
cooperation between States, such as alliances, external assistance or commitment to
international institutions.
Some states, at international organizations, such as UNGA are more susceptible to
bilateral pressures. Thus, the more a state is dependent in terms of trade, aid or protection,
is more vulnerable to pressure from the most powerful states. (KEOHANE, 1966, p. 19).
From these considerations, in the 60s an extensive literature began to study voting
patterns in UNGA (Alker, 1964; Russett, 1966; Kim; Russett, 1996; Voeten, 2000). In
the same decade, there were studies investigating the use of foreign aid by United States
to influence the votes at UN (Wilcox, 1962; Mason, 1964; Westwood, 1966; Kaplan,
1967; Plan; Riggs 1967, Black, 1968).
Andrew Westwood (1966, p. 105) concluded that efforts to make translate aid in
ideological support by the beneficiaries would probably not be necessary because the use
of foreign aid to promote cooperation has become more important than the ideological
issue1.
In the 80s, these studies identified how and when major powers "buy" votes though
foreign aid to achieve their expected results (Wittkopf, 1973; Rai, 1980; Kegley and
Hook, 1991; Wang, 1999). Besides traditional motivations for development assistance to
the least developed countries, donor governments also consider, in their foreign aid
allocations, its own national interests, such as political and security interests, investment
and trade (Maizels; Nissanke, 1984 p. 879), with political or security interests dominating
the results2.
In the 70s and 80s, researchers concluded that bilateral donors pursue their own
interests when allocate aid, and there is a strong empirical evidence demonstrating the
association between foreign aid and voting behavior at UNGA, focusing on the developed
countries, major donors in the world.
In recent years, research on cooperation with the US at UN has two sides: first, based
on the fact that divisions at UN reflects the wider international cleavages, and states
creates preferences similar to US (Kim; Russett 1996; Voeten, 2000).
The second highlights the strategic voting and policies made by the United States to
create common preferences and to influence to vote with US, known as vote buying. In
this case, cooperation is induced by state policies and foreign aid, which would influence
the recipient nations. Thus, more dependent a state is from US aid, closer will be their
votes convergence with US (Wang, 1999; Lai; Morey, 2006, p 388.).
Foreign aid would serve not only to the economic interests of donors, but also to buy
political support of receivers3 (Langhammer, 2004), since US government gives some
weight to votes at UNGA.
For Alesina and Dollar (2000), the correlation between friendship variables at UN
and aid flows can be interpreted in two ways: to help buy votes at UN in favor of the
donor; or UN votes are a reliable indicator of political alliances between countries and
these alliances defines aid flows (Alesina, Dollar, 2000).
According to the authors, the second interpretation is more plausible, as many votes
at UN are significant from the point of view of foreign policy. However, it would not be
clear why donor countries are concerned to buy these votes, as the voting patterns are
strongly correlated with alliances and similarities of political, economic and geopolitical
interests.
The best interpretation is that donors favors your friends with foreign aid, and an
observable proof of friendship would be UN votes, suggesting that an exogenous change
in voting patterns indicates a change in geopolitical alliances patterns that would bring a
change in aid (Alesina, Dollar, 2000, p. 46)
However, the two interpretations are consistent with the view that aid is used for
strategic purposes and is not easy disaggregate, econometrically, the two interpretations,
or aid causes UN votes or votes at UN causes aid? (Alesina, Dollar, 2000, p. 46)
Other studies found evidence that US foreign aid and other developed countries
would be offered to members of UNGA to shape their voting patterns (Lay; Morey, 2006).
Therefore, the hypothesis that UN voting affects foreign aid is plausible, at least in key
voting, for donors. However, political donors’ agendas are critical and could take aid
allocations away from the needs questions (Boone, 1996; Alesina, Dollar, 2000; Collier,
Dollar, 2002).
The aid distribution, therefore, is strongly related to donors’ geopolitical interests and
foreign policy preferences (Maizels; Nissanke, 1984; Boone, 1996; Cashel-Greement;
Schraeder et al, 1998; Svensson, 1999; Alesina, Dollar, 2000; Alesina; Weder, 2002;
Neumayer, 2003).
The few studies that propose to bring evidence of vote-buying show a connection
between changes in aid flows to a US receiver and vote convergence (Wang, 1999).
However, these correlations can be explained in two different ways. On the one hand, UN
vote would be associated with foreign aid, since this allocation would be used to reward
or punish countries to vote in certain ways. On the other hand, UN vote could not be
important for donors, but rather a reflection of sincere political preferences between UN
members. Thus, any relationship between UN voting and aid flows could be interpreted
as an evidence that donors prefer to contribute to regimes with the same view and with
similar foreign policy goals.
Thus, variable "regime" began to be used to explain the link between UN votes and
foreign aid allocation (Lay; Morey, 2006). Democratic governments would be more likely
to vote according to their own preferences and a reduction in foreign aid allocation would
not influence their vote, because they have the winning coalitions and the electorate
support (Bueno Mesquita Et Al., 2003). For autocratic leaders, the lack of popular
legitimacy would cause government dependence on supply private goods to elite groups
(Bueno Mesquita Et Al., 2003).
Other variables are relevant. Carter and Stone (2011, p. 3) believe US punishes or
rewards receptors differently depending on their regime type, the government's political
orientation, level of development and alliance relationship, would explain the
effectiveness US attempts to influence votes at UNGA.
The UNGA votes are also used in studies to establish an association between UN
votes and aid by many donors and multilateral institutions (Clay; Lee, 2005; Oatley,
Thacker, 1999).
The most robust study on International Monetary Fund programs (IMF) shows that
the loan fund would be significantly shaped by geopolitical preferences of major
shareholders, particularly US.
In these studies, UN vote is a control variable (Steinwand, Stone, 2008). Thacker
(1999) and Barro and Lee (2005) conclude that the increasing vote convergence with US
could be associated with a higher probability of IMF loan.
Other recent researches emphasizes votes designated as important by United States
to study vote buying. Andersen et al. (2006) assumes alignment to US in important
UNGA polls as a concession, and use these votes to build a measure of political
concessions from the country to US, to then estimate the probability of a country to get
an IMF loan.
Other studies also attempt to establish a relationship between being a temporary
member of Security Council (SC) and the granting of loans by IMF (Kuziemko; Werker,
2006; Dreher et al, 2009.).
To Dreher et al. (2009), IMF loans would be a mechanism of major shareholders to
gain favors from UNSC members. Some developing countries would give more value to
loans than their votes at UNSC, and developed countries would value UNSC votes more
than loans. Therefore, some developing countries would be willing to sell their votes in
UNSC for IMF loans.
The studies on relationship between foreign aid and UNGA voting, although
emphasize developed countries, it is important because demonstrates that States are
willing to use different tools to influence voting behavior of other countries in multilateral
forums. However, this literature does not address support among developing countries at
international organizations and tools used by them to form alliances.
Therefore, this article, assuming the argument that countries "buys" support in
multilateral organizations polls, seeks to prove if it occurs between developing countries
which, in recent years, increased their power in international system and its presence at
international organizations.
As developing countries have a limited capacity of foreign aid, one way to win such
support would be bilateral cooperation projects, since money invested would be smaller
and would also promote the development of recipient countries.
Another one would be trade, because it guarantees, such as cooperation or foreign
aid, development and economic growth of the largest commercial attention receptor. The
similarity of positions at multilateral level would increase between countries with
increasing trade flows.
This study therefore aims to investigate vote buying, basically dedicated to developed
countries, it may be applied to the analysis of multilateral support among developing
countries.
2. BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS (1995-2010):
2.1. Regions of interest in FHC and Lula foreign policies in numbers:
In Lula government, there was a direction to South-South relations, especially Latin
America and Africa, by extending or reactivating contacts with non-traditional partners
in these regions.
Lula's foreign policy creators believed intensifying contacts with the South, Brazil
could win allies and their support for their demands at international level - development
and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
This change can be seen in bilateral presidential trips. While FHC made 48 trips to
North (41.7% of total) and 67 to South (58.2%), Lula traveled 47 times to North (26.1%
of total) and 123 to South (68 3% of total), especially African countries (Source: MRE,
2010, p.9).
This diversification also occurs in trade, with an increase in Brazilian exports, which
increases from US$ 61.68 billion in FHC government, to US$ 133.92 billion in the next
government, increasing 117%.
In the period, exports to South surpassed those for North, and the exports volume to
South along Lula government, exceeding exports to North, increasing 276% for the
former and 76% for the second.
Chart 1 – Brazilian Exports Destination Evolution
Self elaboration. Source: MDIC
However, change is still slow because the South share in Brazilian exports in Lula
government is similar to North participation, and has not grown so much from the
previous government, from 39.10% to 49 49%. The change, is marginal, and European
and North American markets remain relevant.
Chart 2 - Brazilian Exports Destinies by Government
Self elaboration. Source: MDIC
In imports, the movement is similar, but slower. Brazilian imports grew 62%, from
US$ 63.26 billion during Cardoso government, to US$ 102.45 in Lula government.
A change occurred in the origins of Brazilian imports, with an increase in South
imports and a decrease of those coming from North. South imports grew from US$ 173.9
billion to US$ 386.95 billion, an increase of 123% between the two governments. Imports
from North pass from US$ 333.39 billion to US$ 437.45 billion in the Lula government,
an increase of 31%.
40,50
71,20
25,19
100,34
-
20,00
40,00
60,00
80,00
100,00
120,00
2002 2010
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS DESTINATION
EVOLUTION (US$ BILLION -YEAR BASE
2005)
North
South
0,00
50,00
100,00
150,00
200,00
250,00
300,00
FHC LULAUS
$ b
illi
on
FO
B (
yea
r b
ase
20
05
)
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS DESTINIES BY
GOVERNMENT
Africa
Latin America
European Union
Middle East
Asia (-China)
China
USA
Asia
Graph 3 - Brazilian imports origins evolution
Source: AliceWeb. Self elaboration.
Noticed an increase in almost all markets, except United States and Middle East. The
imports that increases faster are from Asia, largely due to China.
Graph 4 – Imports origins by market and government
Source: AliceWeb. Self elaboration.
Between two governments occurred a fall in almost all markets, except Asia and
Africa, which would explain the increase in imports from South.
The data collected, until now, confirms the relative change in Brazilian foreign policy
hypothesis, with the intensification of contacts with South, which could be a strategy to
increase the Brazilian bargaining power in the international system.
2.2. The lines of African politics in comparative perspective
The two governments had different strategies of relationship with Africa. In FHC,
the approach was selective, especially the relations with South Africa, Angola, countries
of South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS, in portuguese) and the
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP, in portuguese) and greater
participation in UN peace missions4, most of it in Africa and the conclusion of Mercosur
South Africa Framework Agreement.
333,4
437,4
173,9
386,9
0
100
200
300
400
500
FHC LULA
BRAZILIAN IMPORTS ORIGINS
EVOLUTION (US$ BILLION - YEAR-BASE
2005)
North
South
0,0
50,0
100,0
150,0
200,0
250,0
300,0
FHC LULAUS
$ b
illi
on
FO
B (
yea
r b
ase
20
05
)
IMPORTS ORIGINS BY MARKET AND
GOVERNMENT
Africa
Latin America
European Union
Middle East
Asia (-china)
China
USA
Asia
In Lula government, the approach was more diversified due to the emphasis in
foreign policy to the relations with South, based on strategic and economic interests,
which one is Brazilian global projection.
Presidential trips to Africa shows these characteristics. While FHC visited in his 4
trips to continent, only two countries (Angola and South Africa), Lula, in his 34 trips,
visited 29 countries. Lula was also present in regional African summits.
FHC closed Brazilian embassies at Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo and
Tanzania. In Lula government, the number of Brazilian embassies in Africa doubled, to
34, highlighting the reopening of three closed embassies in the previous government.
Figure 1 - Re-opened embassies in Africa
Source: MRE, 2010, p. 2.
Despite embassies opening in relevant countries for bilateral trade, such as Benin and
Ivory Coast, in important countries in region, such Cameroon, and for commercial
interests, such Mauritania and Tanzania, with the establishment of Brazilian companies
after embassies opening. Also the opening in countries with which Brazil had few
contacts and little relevance in the international and African scene, as Botswana and
Burkina Faso, featuring a little pragmatic strategy, more focused on speech.
Another important action was the debt forgiveness to African countries, according to
the Millennium Development Goals, indicating the attempt of Lula government to deepen
and diversify its relationship with African.
2.3. Brazil-Africa Trade flow between 1995 and 2010:
The trade also presents market diversification the increase of Brazilian exports to
Africa, however, African participation in Brazilian exports varies very little, despite the
growth in total exports volume of Brazil.
Africa's share in exports was 3.1% in FHC, while Lula was 4.9%, an increase of 1.8%
(Source: MDIC), confirming the markets diversification. However, Africa's share of total
Brazilian exports is still modest, taking, on both governments, the fifth place.
Graph 5 - Africa's participation in Brazilian exports by government
Self elaboration. Source: MDIC.
Between 1995 and 2002, exports to Africa grew US$ 500 million, a 26% increase
compared to 159% between 2003 and 2010, from US$ 3.03 billion in 2003 to US$ 7.66
billion in 2010 (SOURCE: MDIC). In the exports volume, the difference between two
governments is much higher, indicating that the exports growth to Africa region was part
of a general increase of movement of Brazilian exports and not a phenomenon of
emphasis in Brazilian trade relations with African countries.
Chart 6 - Exports to Africa by government
Self elaboration. Source: MDIC.
In Exports by African region, there is an equilibrium, except for Central and Eastern
Africa, whose exports do not exceed 5% of total exports to the continent. In FHC
government which, according to literature favored Portuguese-speaking countries, these
countries have a minimum share of Brazilian total exports to Africa, about 6.6% (Source:
AliceWeb).
Therefore, the selectivity in FHC government is not proven by Brazilian exports
share by African region. Moreover, in Lula government, exports increased, especially to
Portuguese-speaking countries, with an increase of 111% (Source: AliceWeb), while the
share of other regions does not show a significant change.
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
TOTAL 1º MANDATO 2º MANDATO
AFRICA'S SHARE IN BRAZILIAN
EXPORTS BY GOVERNMENTS
FHC LULA
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
TOTAL 1º TERM 2º TERM
US
$ B
ILL
ION
(Y
EA
R B
AS
E 2
005)
EXPORTS TO AFRICA BY GOVERNMENT
FHC LULA
Chart 7 - African regions shares in Brazilian exports to Africa
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb.
There was no diversification in African markets buyers because their participation
has not changed from one government to another. There has been a change of position,
especially Angola and Algeria, whose exports increased, respectively, 124% and 78%.
Chart 8 - Major buyers in Africa
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb
There were no major changes in the products exported to Africa, with no change in
position of the top ten export products, reflecting low diversification, different from
intentions and efforts of Lula government.
0,0%5,0%
10,0%15,0%20,0%25,0%30,0%35,0%40,0%45,0%
FHC LULA
AFRICAN REGIONS SHARES
IN EXPORTS TO AFRICA
Central Africa North Africa South Africa
Western Africa Eastern Africa CPLP
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Co
un
try
Shar
e in
Bra
zilia
n
Exp
ort
s
MAJOR AFRICAN BUYERS
FHC
LULA
Chart 9 - Products exported to Africa
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb.
There was an increased African participation in Brazilian imports, which passed from
4.16% in FHC government to 8.09% in Lula government, a growth of 95% (Source:
MDIC). However, this increment was due to an expansion in total imports, not changing
the position of African countries in imports, continuing to be the sixth market of Brazilian
purchases abroad.
Graph 10 - African share in Brazilian Imports by government
Source: AliceWeb. Self elaboration.
Between 1995 and 2002, imports from Africa increased 127%, while in the next
government grew 243% (Source: MDIC). This volume grew from US$ 17.8 billion during
Cardoso government to US$ 71.1 billion in Lula government, an increase of 299%, much
higher than the growth in total imports volume was 105%. This increase was due to the
purchase of oil, because Brazil reduced its Middle East imports and started to import it
from Africa, through the Brazilian Petrobrás activities.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
SUGAR
REACTORS
ORE
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS
FATS AND OILS
Share in exports to Africa
Prod
cts
MAJOR PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO AFRICA BY GOVERNMENT
LULA
FHC
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
TOTAL 1º MANDATO 2º MANDATO
AFRICAN SHARE IN BRAZILIAN
IMPORTS BY GOVERNMENT
FHC LULA
Graph 11 – Imports Volume from Africa by government
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb.
There were no major changes in African regions of Brazilian imports, with little
attention to Central Africa and East Africa, with less than 1.5% together. This is because
there are, in these regions, major oil exporters, main product imported by Brazil.
The regions with the highest growth were West Africa and CPLP, whose increases
were, respectively, 36% and 124%, again due to oil imports originated from Nigeria, in
the first region, and Angola, in the second group. There were declines in imports from
North Africa and Southern Africa, especially in this last area, the decrease of a traditional
Brazilian partner, South Africa.
These data demonstrate that was not diversification in imports. On the contrary, there
was a concentration in Portuguese-speaking countries and Nigeria.
Graph 12 – Imports share by African Region
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb.
The analysis of supplier markets confirm the concentration in oil producers since,
except Nigeria and Angola - major oil producers - and Morocco - with a discrete high,
other markets decreased their share in Brazilian imports.
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
TOTAL 1º MANDATO 2º MANDATO
US
$ B
ILL
ION
(Y
EA
R-B
AS
E 2
005)
IMPORTS VOLUME FROM AFRICA BY
GOVERNMENT
FHC LULA
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%
FHC LULA
IMPORTS SHARE BY AFRICAN
REGION
Central Africa
North Africa
South Africa
Western Africa
Eastern Africa
Graph 13 - Markets Suppliers by government
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb.
There is a concentration of imported products from Africa, and oil and oil products
are the main products, a permanent fact in two governments, changing only the
participation of these products in imports. Total imports of oil increased from US$ 16.9
billion during Cardoso government to US $ 61.9 billion, growth of 60.9% (Source:
AliceWeb). Further, Brazilian imports from Africa remained concentrated on oil, from
78.2% to 87.05%.
Brazil-Africa trade balance, between two governments, is in deficit due to high
imports of African oil. As well as in imports, the deficit is much higher in Lula
government, largely by the increase in oil imports.
Between the two governments, flow trade with Africa grew 44%, while trade flow
between Brazil and the world in the period increased 84.33% (Source: MDIC). The
Brazilian trade with the world has increased almost twice, indicating that exchange with
region did not follow the exchange with the world.
Chart 14 - Trade Flow with Africa by government
Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb.
The Brazil-Africa trade relations has shown little change, with a low participation of
Africa in Brazilian trade flow and growth below increase in Brazilian total trade.
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%55%
FHC LULA
Sh
are i
n B
razil
ian
Im
ports
from
Afr
ica
MAJOR AFRICAN SUPPLIERS
BY GOVERNMENT
Algeria
Nigeria
South Africa
Morocco
Angola
Benin
-16,00
-14,00
-12,00
-10,00
-8,00
-6,00
-4,00
-2,00
-
TOTAL 1º TERM 2º TERM
US
$ B
illi
on
(ye
ar-b
ase
20
05
)
TRADE FLOW WITH AFRICA BY
GOVERNMENT
FHC
LULA
2.4. Technical cooperation between Brazil and Africa:
Another important element in Brazil-Africa relations strengthening between FHC
and Lula was technical cooperation in areas such as agriculture, health, education,
environment and professional training.
The basic guideline of Brazilian Technical Cooperation for Development (TCDC) is
the transfer of knowledge and technologies to developing countries, human resources and
training. The TCDC projects during the period were concentrated in areas considered
priorities for foreign policy. - Africa and South America What has changed is the position
of these regions. In FHC government, South America ranked first, with 30% and Africa
second place with 26%, the next government, the positions are reversed, Africa ranks first
36% of while South America goes to the second place with a 27% (PUENTE, 2008, p.
173).
There was a significant growth of technical cooperation with Africa, with
diversification in recipient countries and areas of these projects. The FHC government,
were 13 African countries benefited in 16 areas and Lula were 38 beneficiaries in 30
different areas (Source: DAI-MRE).
Chart 12 - Comparative Table of Beneficiaries and TCDC areas by government
Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE.
Occurred a greater diversification in African regions, with growth in four of the
regions, except for South Africa, with a drop of 27.7 percentage points. In FHC
government, the projects were for South Africa, specifically South Africa, CPLP and
Western Africa, composed of three Portuguese-speaking countries. In the next
government, there was a significant change in regions benefited from cooperation
projects, except for the increasing participation of North Africa.
0
10
20
30
40
BENEFICIARIES AREAS
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF
BENEFICIARIES OF TCDC AND
AREAS BY GOVERNMENT
FHC
LULA
Graph 13 - African regions shares in TCDC for Africa
Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE.
Despite diversification of countries benefited by Lula government, there is a
centralization in the Portuguese-speaking countries in both governments. In government
FHC, these countries account for 52.9% while the next government that number drops to
49.6% (Source: DAI-MRE).
Graph 14 - Country share in TCDC for Africa- FHC
Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
FHC LULA
AFRICAN REGIONS SHARES
IN TCDC FOR AFRICA
North Africa
Central Africa
Western Africa
Eastern Africa
South Africa
CPLP
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
COUNTRY SHARE - FHC
Graph 15 - Country share in TCDC for Africa – Lula
Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE.
The predominant areas are similar, health, education, culture and agriculture. Lula
government was responsible for signing of a number of general cooperation agreements
- 16 agreements - as its predecessor just signed two agreements5 (Source: DAI-MRE).
Graph 16 - Cooperation projects with Africa by Area and Government
Source: DAI-MRE. Self elaboration.
There was cooperation a greater diversification in regions and countries and in areas
which these instruments are signed.
The FHC government commercial, diplomatic and technical relationship with Africa
was restricted to traditional partners, especially those of Portuguese and South Africa,
and the oil-producing countries in the variable trade, keeping the selectivity.
With the emphasis on South-South relations, on Lula government there was a revival
of African politics through the expansion of African partners not only in trade but in
several areas, such as TCDC.
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%
COUNTRY SHARE - LULA
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
LULA FHC
Nu
mb
er o
f p
roje
cts
Area
PROJECTS BY AREA AND
GOVERNMENT
Health
Education
Agriculture
Culture
Sports
General Agreement
Science & Technology
Thecnical Cooperation
Joint Comission
In contrast to the strengthening relations with Africa, Brazil has gained, in Lula
government, the support of the CPLP countries in several Brazilian candidacies for
positions in international organizations such as UN Security Geral and the Directorate-
General of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). These achievements show the
"exchange" favors between Brazil and Africa, as pointed out by the literature of
developed countries.
3. CONVERGENCE BETWEEN BRAZIL AND AFRICA IN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UNGA)
3.1. UNGA vote as a measure for foreign policies guidelines:
There are few tools available to measure quantitatively the guidelines and alignments
in international system. One is UNGA votes, where almost every state is present and main
issues on international agenda are discussed.
However, opinions about this methodology are not consensual. For Dixon (1981)
UNGA would be only a passive arena related to States interaction while for Kennedy
(2006) that vote would be just symbolic, not a demonstration of countries alignments.
Furthermore, there is no way to know precisely whether the UNGA votes are a simple
expression of States preferences - which would make the vote a reliable measure of
convergence between states and of general foreign policies guidelines - or a reflection of
economic incentives between states, something discussed previously.
Individual members affect UNGA political processes, in other words, the internal
policy could determine what is voted and focus only on voting patterns would be ignore
the larger picture of international politics and the UN itself (KEOHANE, 1967).
Despite these empirical inconsistencies, many researchers use these data to determine
States behavior and to understand the broader elements of international politics, because
in the international system, there is no other organization or forum in which all States
vote on a regular basis about different international issues.
Therefore, the study of these polls in a long period of time and over different areas
can reveal possible changes in states behavior (Voeten, 2000, p. 151-2) and national
foreign policies.
UNGA voting is used to evaluate countries position only regional alignments in
international issues (Lijphart, 1963; Marin-Bosch, 1998; Selcher, 1978) and as indicators
of states foreign policies orientations (Thacker, 1999; Tomlin, 1985; Voeten, 2000).
These works support the use of UNGA as a parameter to analyze alignments between
the countries in international system and the general direction of national foreign policies.
3.2. Methodology:
To prove the research hypothesis - bilateral relations strengthening strategies
generate more multilateral support of recipient countries to donors - will be used panel
data analysis.
The advantage of this model related to cross-sectional models, according Hsio
(1986), is the ability to control heterogeneity among individuals and increase estimates
accuracy (Cameron; Travedi, 2005).
To check the effect of the interest variables were made three separate estimates. First,
through the pooled regression model (POLS). After using the random effects model (RA).
Finally, using the fixed effects model (FE), which allows consistent estimators in the
presence of heterogeneity observed correlated with other covariates.
Subsequently, tests were conducted to choose the most appropriate model to
maximize the efficiency, given that coefficients are consistent.
In POLS model, the estimator considers all information as transversal units, ignoring
the element time, that is, we have in the database N x T units. Although frequently used,
there is a problem to hypothesis validity that there is no information about idiosyncratic
error correlated with explanatory variables. Therefore, disregarding database temporality,
the model does not allow the control of specific heterogeneity (ci), causing inconsistency
and bias in the estimates if the heterogeneity is correlated with some of the regressors, ie
if there is some endogenous regressor. Furthermore, POLS requires exogenous weak, ie
that regressor and composes error vit are not correlated in the same period6.
It also requires full rank to avoid perfect multicolinearity, as well as the other two
models presented below.
POLS model
Yit= α + Xit β + εit
E(εit / x) = 0; εit ~ IID (0, σ2) (1)
The POLS estimation allows the control of annual effects through the use of year
dummies (ds), as well as dummies for specific groups of individuals (dj). Thus, the POLS
model becomes:
POLS model with year and specific groups dummies
Yit= α + Xit β + γ ds + λ dj +εit (2)
E(εit / x) = 0; εit ~ IID (0, σ2)
The random-effects model (RA) deal with the specific unobserved heterogeneity (ci)
as a random variable, distributed independently of covariates and with homocedastic
variance. In this model, the specific effect becomes part of the error and therefore can not
be correlated with any regressor in all periods, otherwise all the estimators will be
inconsistent violating one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions of estimation by OLS. Since
the exogenous strict hypothesis uit error should not be correlated with the regressors nor
specific effect in any time.
The random effects model is estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) when the
matrix of variance-covariance matrix is known. The estimation of feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS) is used when this matrix is unknown.
Random effects model:
Yit= α + Xit β + vit = α + Xit β + (ci + εit) (3)
where vit is the composite error give by ci + εit
E(vit / Xis) = 0; to i s
vit ~ IID (0, σ2)
The fixed effects analysis (FE) examines different intercepts for individuals,
assuming that the slopes are constant, as well as variance. The specific effect ci is not
treated more like a random variable as in random effects model, but as a parameter to be
estimated. Unlike RA, the FE model allows that the specific effect ci be correlated with
Xit covariates. The FE estimation requires strict exogeneity, in other words, that all
regressors are uncorrelated with ui error for all periods.
By making FE estimation, is necessary to use one of the processing techniques to
eliminate heterogeneity. The most common are the first differences and the within
transformation.
Fixed Effects Model:
Yit= α + ci + Xit β + εit (4)
Transformation to eliminate ci: Yit - Ym = (Xit - Xm) β + (εit – εm)
E(εit / Xis, ci) = 0; for i s
εit ~ IID (0, σ2)
After these estimations, tests will be done needed to confirm what are the most
consistent estimators and, among these, the most efficient. If there is unobserved
heterogeneity not correlated with any regressor, the estimators of fixed and random
effects are consistent, the latter being more efficient. If heterogeneity is correlated with a
regressor, the first is the only consistent. At the end, I will perform the Breusch- Pagan
tests for the presence of specific heterogeneity and Hausman to verify the correlation
between this and the covariates7.
An important limitation of fixed effect method is the inability to estimate the effect
of constant variables in time. Therefore, if the Hausman test (1978) indicates no
difference between the estimators FE and RA, besides the last is the most efficient, it also
allows the inclusion of constant variables in time.
Votes Convergence Model
The sample covers 1158 UNGA resolutions between 1995 and 2010. The database
has information beyond these four types of variables: political, commercial, economic
and geographical, some of them used as a control in the estimates. The model can be
explained by the following table:
Figure 3 – Votes Convergence Model
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INTERVENING VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The basic equation to be estimated can be summarized as follows:
𝑽𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝒄𝒐𝒐𝒑)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐(𝒆𝒙𝒑 𝒐𝒖 𝒊𝒎𝒑)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑(𝑷𝒊𝒃𝒑𝒆)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒(𝑼𝑺𝑨𝟐)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓(𝑪𝑷𝑳𝑷)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔(𝑳𝒖𝒍𝒂)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕(𝒄𝒐𝒍)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (5)
where i is the African country, t the year and α e εit are respectively constant and
idiosyncratic error, coop and exp or imp are independent variables and voting is the
dependent variable.
The variable voting indicates the percentage of convergence vote between Brazil and
each of African countries between 1995 and 2010, excluding abstentions8.
Brazilian share in
each african country
exports.
Brazilian share in
each african country
imports.
Number brazilian cooperation projects
with each african
country.
PIB per capita of
each african country
Vote convergence
between USA and
african country.
CPLP
Colonizing Country
Vote Convergence
between Brazil and
each african country..
The bilateral relations strengthening will be measured by three independent
variables:
- Number of cooperation projects between Brazil and Africa between 1995 and 2010,
called COOP;
- Brazil's share in total exports of each African country between 1995 and 2010,
called EXP;
- Brazilian share in total imports of each African country between 1995 and 2010,
called IMP.
These variables were chosen because they are the way of an emerging country with
limited resources to provide cash assistance to "buy" votes in the UNGA.
3.3. Data:
To calculate the dependent variable, were used data collected by Anton Strezhnev
and Erik Voeten (2009), with the voting records at UNGA between 1946-2012. After
collecting similar votes at UNGA between Brazil and each of the African countries
between 1995 and 2010, was calculated the convergence percentage between two
countries from the total voting they participated9.
The variables related to bilateral trade (EXP and IMP) were calculated from the
exports and imports percentage of each African country on Brazilian total exports and
imports of these states in each of the years of the staudy.
The variable cooperation was calculated from the amount of bilateral cooperation
projects signed between Brazil and each African country between 1995 and 2010.
The per capita GDP of each African country - PIBpercapita (base year 2005) - was
chosen to control the influence of development level on voting decisions, taken from data
provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
It was also used the vote convergence among African countries and US in the period,
excluding abstentions, due to the same reason explained to Brazil - calculated in the same
way that vote - to remove the possible effect of convergence between African and USA -
major international power – from the results.
The variable CPLP was designed because, according to trade and cooperation data,
this community has an important role in policy towards Africa. This variable is a dummy
call CPLP, and the non-members will be number 0 and members number 1.
The following intervening variable is related to colonization. As most of the African
countries were colonized, we chose a dummy that takes into account the colonizing
country. Countries that were not colonized is zero, the former British colonies the number
1, the former French colonies number 2, the Belgian former colonies the number 3, the
former Spanish colonies number 4, the ex- Italian colony number 5, the former German
colonies the number 6 and the former colonies Portuguese number 7.
The last intervening variable, called Lula, was a dummy to see the behavior of the
data from the Lula entry. The data for the years 1995 to 2002 was number 0, while data
for 2003 to 2010 was received number 1.
Below variables description (Table 1) and their descriptive statistics (Table 2).
Table 1 - Description of variables
Voting Vote percentage between Brazil and
African countries
coop Número of cooperation projects
Brasil-African countries
exp ou imp Percentage of brazilian share in
African country trade
logpibpercapita log percapita pib of each African
country by year
eua Porcentagem similar votes beyween
USA and African country
cplp Dummy related to CPLP
col Dummy related to colonization
year Year of the data
ccode Dummy related to each country
Continuous
Variables
Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Mínimum Maximum
Vot2 84.665 85.938 7.689 21.428 100
Coop 0.469 0.000 1.501 0 14
Exp 0.817 0.035 2.975 0 54.558
Imp 1.550 0.659 2.571 0 28.446
Logpibpercapita 6.644 6.265 1.122 4.443 9.907
USA2 78.550 78.947 7.948 21.428 100
Dummies
Variables
Frequency 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
cplp 752 96
col 32 288 320 48 16 32 32 80
The relationship between chosen variables indicates that vote convergence between
a country and a country/region at UNGA can be explained from the share of this country
in region/country trade and the number of cooperation projects between one country and
this region/country. However, this relationship may be affected by factors such as per
capita GDP, convergence with the United States, CPLP membership and fidelity to the
colonizing country.
3.4. Data Presentation:
After reviewing Brazil-Africa exports, was discovered that Brazilian share in African
trade is very low, only 1.76% of African imports. Despite growing from year 2000, it
falled from 2006.
Graph 17 - Brazilian share in African imports
Source: Unctad. Self elaboration.
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
2002
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10Bra
zili
an s
har
e in
Afr
ican
Import
s
Anos
EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN SHARE
IN AFRICAN IMPORTS
Between governments, the Brazilian share in African imports increased, a growth of
110.18%, from 1.01% to 2.12%.
Graph 18 - Brazilian share in African imports by government
Source: Unctad. Self elaboration.
Brazilian share in African exports is 2.024% during the period. Unlike the
predominantly upward trend in imports, Brazilian share in African exports was not
constantly growing, with down in certain years and growth from 2000.
Graph 19 – Brazilian share in African exports
Source: Unctad. Self elaboration.
The Brazilian share in African exports between the two governments increased,
growing 35.73%, from 1.75% to 2.38%.
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
TOTAL 1º TERM 2º TERM
Bra
zili
an s
har
e in
Afr
ican
im
port
s
BRAZILIAN SHARE EVOLUTION IN
AFRICAN IMPORTS BY GOVERNMENT
FHC LULA
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
3,5%
Bra
zili
an S
har
e in
Afr
ican
Ex
port
s
YEARS
BRAZILIAN SHARE EVOLUTION IN
AFRICAN EXPORTS
Graph 20 - Brazilian share in African exports by government
Source: Unctad. Self elaboration.
These data show that, despite the increase of Brazilian share in African imports and
exports, Brazil is not a relevant partner for Africa, which would not justify an increasing
vote convergence at UNGA, as other countries are more relevant and therefore, deserve
more support in the Assembly.
In bilateral cooperation, the evolution between 1995 and 2010 was significant, from
only 2 projects to 78 projects, despite having suffered some setbacks.
Graph 20 - Brazil-Africa bilateral cooperation evolution
Source: DAI-MRE. Self elaboration.
The significant increase in bilateral cooperation projects is important as it would
contribute to grow convergence between Brazil and Africa at UNGA.
The voting at UNGA, there was a high degree of convergence between Brazil and
Africa, especially when abstentions where considered (VOT1), coming in one of the years
to 100% convergence.
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
1º TERM 2ª TERM TOTAL
Brazil
ian
Sh
are in
Afr
ican
Exp
orts
BRAZILIAN SHARE EVOLUTION IN
AFRICAN EXPORTS BY
GOVERNMENT
FHC LULA
020406080
100
Nu
mb
er o
f C
oop
era
tion
Proje
cts
Year
BRAZIL-AFRICA
COOPERATION PROJECTS
EVOLUTION
Graph 21 - Brazil-Africa convergence of developments in UNGA per year
Source: UN Strezhnev; Voeten, 2012. Self Elaboration
The high degree of convergence between Africa and Brazil at UNGA apparently
could harm hypothesis proof, since its increase would not point significant changes in the
general direction of African countries at UNGA, because there is previous strong
convergence, and is not necessary for Brazil "buy" African votes. So, it will only be used
convergence excluding abstentions.
However, as pointed out in the literature, one reason to "buy" votes would also reward
or punish allies.
There was no significant change in voting pattern between Africa and Brazil at
UNGA between two governments, with a slight setback in vote convergence, including
abstentions (VOT1), from 99.4% in FHC to 98.6% in Lula. Without abstentions (VOT2),
there is a reverse movement, from 83.7% to 85.6% in.
Graph 22 - Brazil-Africa Convergence at UNGA by government
Source: UN Strezhnev; Voeten, 2012. Self Elaboration.
In both governments, main allies were not countries with Brazil has strong or old
bilateral relations. The country with the highest convergence is Seychelles islands, while
Angola – traditional Brazilian partner - appears among the countries with less
convergence. This information is interesting, but not as significant, since convergence is
high with all African countries.
0,0%20,0%40,0%60,0%80,0%
100,0%120,0%
Con
ver
gen
ce p
erce
nta
ge
at U
NG
A
YEARS
BRAZIL AFRICA CONVERGENCE AT
UNGA
VOT1 VOT2
70,0%
75,0%
80,0%
85,0%
90,0%
95,0%
100,0%
105,0%
FHC LULA FHC LULA FHC LULA
1º TERM 2º TERM TOTAL
Bra
zil-
Afr
ica
con
ver
gen
ce
per
cen
tag
e at
UN
GA
BRAZIL-AFRICA CONVERGENCE AT
UNGA BY GOVERNMENT
VOT1 VOT2
This evolution shows apparently that efforts to strengthen bilateral relations by Lula
government did not change significantly Brazil-Africa convergence at UNGA. It is
because this convergence was already high at the beginning of Lula administration, not
justifying the government strategies to reinforce relations with Africa to gain their support
in multilateral forums, and should therefore have another logic, to be explored by future
researches.
The descriptive analysis showed that the independent variables did not cause
significant changes in Africa's voting patterns related to Brazil, contradicting the
hypothesis that these strategies could modify voting patterns in multilateral forums.
3.5. Results:
After tests to find the most consistent estimation model, the results of the coefficients
were similar for all variables in all models tested.
From the results was noticed, in all models, a positive relationship between the
variables cooperation and import and vote convergence, the growth on cooperation and
Brazilian share in African imports increased Brazil-Africa similar votes. In export and
Lula variables, we found a negative relationship with vote convergence, the increase in
Brazil's share of African exports and from the Lula government reduced vote convergence
at UNGA between the two partners.
As all models showed similar relationships between variables, the best method to
choose the model would be significance degree and, from the numbers, the most
significant model was the random effects (RE), because it was which were found the
greatest significance for the chosen variables.
After choose the model, variables calculations were made, finding the following
correlation coefficients with vote convergence at UNGA.
Table 3 - Correlation Coefficients Import
vot200 Coeficiente coop .3774865
imp100 .2609045
lula -2.155566
logpibperc~a 1.215576
eua200 .5778057
cplp -1.730221
col
1 -1.48046
2 -.7673221
3 -3.462226
4 -4.006992
5 -1.465307
6 -1.821095
7 (omitted)
When considered imports, it can be said that there is a positive relationship between
cooperation and vote convergence at UNGA, so a cooperation agreement generates an
increase of 0.37 percentage point in vote similarity between the two partners. This
relationship is also found in the import, which an increase of 1% in imports generates an
increase 0.26 percentage point in vote convergence.
The logpibpercapita and USA2 control variables also have positive relationship with
vote convergence, with higher values than independent variables, showing that exogenous
factors to bilateral strengthening strategies influences vote convergence. Since the cplp
and col variables has a negative relationship, which there is a decrease in convergence
when considered these elements.
The fact that took our attention was Lula variable, with a negative coefficient, ie be
Lula government decreases by 2.15 percentage points convergence vote. It was expected
an increase in vote convergence if it were found a positive relationship between
cooperation and voting, due to the significant increase in cooperation projects in Lula
government. However, this expectation was frustrated.
One possible explanation is that in previous government the number of projects was
very small, ie, the sample was very limited, which meant that the standard error was too
high, increasing the range for prediction, becoming impossible, therefore, to find a
reliable statistical relationship between variables cooperation and Lula.
Figure 2 - Prediction margins with Lula variable
In export variable, the results are similar, except for the variable export, with
negative value.
Table 4 - Correlation Coefficients export
vot200 Coefficient
coop .3905596
exp100 -.0234868
lula -1.875475
logpibperc~a 1.171761
eua200 .5788757
cplp -1.406769
col
1 -1.287292
2 -.7272931
3 -3.775539
4 -4.441501
5 -1.405062
70
75
80
85
90
95
Lin
ea
r P
redic
tion
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14COOP
lula=0 lula=1
Predictive Margins of lula with 95% CIs
6 -2.051337
7 (omitted)
When considered exports, the correlation between voting and cooperation is positive,
increasing to 0.39, which means that 1 cooperation agreement generates increased 0.39
percentage point in vote convergence between the two partners. The export variable has
a negative relationship, which means an increase of 1% in Brazilian share in African
exports generates a decrease of 0.023 percentage point.
This fact is interesting, as usually we believed that countries give more importance
to their sales and thus converge at UNGA voting with countries that import their products.
The logpibpercapita and USA2 control variables have a positive relationship with the
dependent variable, with values higher than independent variables, confirming the
importance of exogenous factors to bilateral relationship strengthening in vote
convergence at UNGA. The control variables related to CPLP and colonization have a
negative relationship with the vote variable, having a negative effect on them.
Lula variable continued with a negative effect, helping to confirm the argument that
was not found a statistical relationship between Lula and cooperation and vote
convergence between Brazil and African countries.
Until now, were found a relationship between the chosen independent variables -
cooperation and export/import - and vote convergence, although relatively low, which
means that there is possible evidence "purchase" of African votes by Brazil. However,
not possible to determine the influence of government on this strategy.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several authors sought to understand alliances at international organizations, leading
to an extensive literature on the vote “buying” of its allies to achieve a favorable position
of these organizations on their interests.
These studies deal with votes “buying” by great powers, especially the US, seeking
to prove that these countries use international aid to gain the support of recipient countries
in multilateral organs, and there is there is no studies that seek to verify the presence of
this dynamic in the case of emerging countries.
This article aimed to evaluate this phenomenon among emerging countries. For this,
was selected Brazil that, in recent years, went through a process of international ascension
and sought to increase their ability to influence, particularly at international organizations.
For this, Brazil-Africa relationship was chosen as Lula administration, have
undertaken strategies to strengthen relations with this region. One of the reasons was to
gain the South support to Brazilian multilateral demands. Thus, the general assumption
is that countries strengthen their bilateral relationship to gain the recipient countries
support at multilateral level.
However, the independent variable of literature could not be used in our case because
the capacity and amount of international aid provided by developing countries is low. To
solve this problem, we used the study of African politics that show, between FHC and
Lula government, a significant increase in bilateral trade and cooperation projects with
Africa. Thus, the independent variables were bilateral trade and cooperation with African
countries.
In data analysis, it was clear that between the two governments, there were no major
changes in Brazil-Africa relations, focused on traditional partners such as Portuguese-
speaking countries, South Africa and oil exporters such as Nigeria and Algeria. However,
there was a significant increase in bilateral cooperation projects, despite the concentration
of recipient countries.
Trade was analyzed from the Brazilian Share African imports and exports, to check
how bilateral trade could conquer a country in multilateral forums. However, the
Brazilian weight in African trade is still relatively low, occurring little change between
two governments, which apparently does not justify a possible increase on vote
convergence.
After, in the dependent variable – Brazil-African countries vote convergence at
UNGA, there is a high convergence degree between partners, particularly when
considered abstentions.
Through the random effects model, we tested the hypothesis, proving that
cooperation and trade influence vote convergence between Africa and Brazil at UNGA,
with some limits.
In trade, there was a different influence between imports and exports. The first have
positive influence on votes, ie its increase causes an increase in convergence, while the
latter have a negative effect on convergence, that is, its increase leads to decrease in
similar votes. This result is interesting because at first look we are led to imagine that
countries give more importance to partners who buy their products, since this increases
the government's ability to invest in the country and accumulate international reserves, in
addition to maintain its power.
In government variable, despite the increase in bilateral cooperation projects in Lula
government, vote convergence between Brazil and African countries decreased. This does
not mean that Lula government had no influence on cooperation, because this is not
measured by the proposed model.
Despite the relationships found between dependent and independent variables were
also found stronger links between control variables and Brazil-Africa vote convergence,
ie exogenous factors to strengthen bilateral relationship influence countries votes. This
prove some literature discussions that is very difficult isolate, empirically, all bilateral
variables from systemic variables to find evidence of vote “buying”.
Therefore, this study confirmed the hypothesis that bilateral relations strengthening
increases recipient countries support at multilateral level in the case of an emerging
country. However, for this statement have greater empirical validity more studies are
necessary with a larger number of emerging countries and allies and more variables,
opening to researchers an interesting research field.
NOTES
1 With least developed countries entry in the UN, the majority required for resolutions approval depended more and more of their votes and must meet their demands that are not so concerned with the ideological cleavage, as were concerned with development, rising some alliances between them, such as Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77. 2The study conducted in Cold War, in which great powers interests were strongly influenced by issues related to international security and maintenance of spheres of influence. 3 There are indications that US and the G7 countries keep records of UN Member States votes and that their behavior influence bilateral relations, including aid (BARNEBECK ET AL., 2006). 4 The more active participation in UN peacekeeping missions is related to Brazilian campaign to UNSC permanent member, an important goal of FHC multilateral foreign policy. 5 General agreements are relevant because is the first diplomatic step towards conciliation objectives related to cooperation. 6 The fixed effects models and random effects consider the presence of specific heterogeneity, which are considered part of the intercept and first part of the error in the second, and require, unlike the POLS model, strict exogeneity. This
implies that error term should be uncorrelated with any of the covariates in any period of time, assuming that error has conditional mean zero values in the past, present and future of covariates (CAMERON; TRAVEDI, 2005). 7 The Hausman test (1978) is used to compare the RE and FE models under the null hypothesis that observed heterogeneity is not correlated with the regressors model. If Ho is true, RE estimators are consistent, efficient and FE are consistent. If the correct hypothesis is the alternative, then RE model generates inconsistent estimators and
consistent FE. So if the null hypothesis is true, it is better to use the RA model as estimates fewer parameters relative to FE. If the alternative hypothesis is true, it is preferred the EF model, which is the only one to produce consistent estimates. 8 The abstentions were excluded because when considered the abstentions, it was noticed a high convergence rate in most cases, with 100% convergence for some countries in some years. Thus, there would not be a high degree of variation so to perceive the relationship between chosen variables. 9 This was necessary because African countries do not always vote in all resolutions due to debt issues of its annual contribution to UN - which means that the debtor country is prohibited from voting - and a lack of personnel to be present in all voting or internal conflicts in their countries.
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