Reimagining Secularism

8/13/2019 Reimagining Secularism

1/14

REVISITING SECULARISATION

Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 14, 2013 vol xlviii no 50 79

The comments of an anonymous reviewer are gratefully acknowledged.

Rajeev Bhargava ( [email protected] ) is a political theorist anddirector of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi.

Reimagining SecularismRespect, Domination and Principled Distance

Rajeev Bhargava

It is widely recognised that political secularism,virtually everywhere in the world, is in crisis. It is alsoacknowledged that to overcome this crisis, secularismneeds to be reimagined and reconceptualised. Thisarticle takes the first few steps towards doing so. Itargues, first, that we need to move away from thestandard church-state models of secularism and beginto focus instead on secularism as a response to deepreligious diversity. Second, it claims that diversitymust be understood as enmeshed in power relations,and therefore the hidden potential of religion-relateddomination must be explicitly acknowledged. Third,these two moves enable us to view secularism as aresponse to two forms of institutionalised religiousdomination, inter- and intra-religious.This way of conceiving secularism rebukes the chargethat secularism is intrinsically anti-religious. Secularismis not against religion; it opposes institutionalisedreligious domination. Finally, the article argues that thisconception entails that a secular state shows criticalrespect to all religious and philosophical world views,possible only when it adopts a policy of principleddistance towards all of them.

In Giving Secularism Its Due, written in 1991, which even-tually appeared in a special edition of EPW (Bhargava1994), I introduced a distinction between ethical and po-litical secularism. Ethical secularism refers to a comprehen-sive normative perspective by which to lead an individual orcollective life, or both. It is a well-reasoned but partly specu-lative perspective on how best to lead ones life, here and now,in this-world, on the assumption that all ends pursued by

humans pertain only to this-world and this time. Politico-moral secularism or political secularism is a perspective onearthly restraints, coercive or non-coercive, that can beplaced in the pursuit of the good life, regardless of whether ornot one is an ethical secularist something on which both thesecularist and the religious might agree. Indeed, it might bean object of consensus among different kinds of secular andreligious believers. One objective of the 1991 paper was toshow that political secularism neither entails nor presupposesethical secularism. It is simply false to believe that in order tobe a political secularist, one had to be an ethical secularist.

The paper also claried the distinction between the processof secularisation and political secularism, so far largely neglected

by political theorists. I argued that political secularism is fre-quently needed precisely in those societies where people belong-ing to multiple religions or religious believers and philosophicalsecularists all coexist, or are in prolonged conict. A fully sec-ularised society would not need a secular state because, in someform, it already has it. Political secularism, I argued, is neededprecisely in conditions where complete secularisation is impos-sible, unavailable as an option, or undesirable. My focus, then,

was not on secularisation. Therefore, I did not specify its mean-ing. But I implied that it refers to a social process that gets under-

way and remains in motion largely, but not wholly, independentof intentional human action. Secularisation was not launchedas a programme of collective action. It has occurred if, whereand when it has because of the unintended consequences ofhuman action. Indeed, in Europe, it appears to have happenedas a result of changes within religion, induced by religiouspeople out of very religious motives. Secularism, on the otherhand, is a collective normative project. It sets out a plan of de-sirable collective action. It is probable that the more successfulits realisation, the more secularisation there is. However, tosome extent secularisation may occur even without secular-ism, perhaps despite its failure. I also implied that secularisa-tion had a certain negative relation with religions the more oneis present, the less available the other will be, and vice versa.


2/14


december 14, 2013 vol xlviii no 50 EPW Economic & Political Weekly80

The theory of secularisation is currently in crisis. The crisisfacing secular states and secularism is graver. My 1994 articlespoke of the challenge faced by secularism in India. But wellbefore its crisis in India, secular states and the doctrine under-pinning them had begun to come under strain elsewhere. Inshort, Western conceptions of political secularism do not appearto have travelled well in other societies. More importantly, suchconceptions and the secular states they underpin are comingunder strain even in Europe, where, until recently, they werebelieved to be secure and rmly entrenched. Why is this so? Itis true that the substantive secularisation of European societiesbrought about the extensive secularisation of European states;regardless of their religious afliation, citizens have a large bas-ket of civil and political rights unheard of in religion-centredstates, past or present. Nevertheless, two problems remain.

First, migration from former colonies and intensied globali-sation have thrown together in Western public spaces Christian,Islamic, and pre-Christian faiths such as Hinduism (Turner2001). The cumulative result is unprecedented religious diver-

sity, the weakening of the public monopoly of single religions,and the generation of mutual suspicion, distrust, hostility, andconict. This is evident in Germany and Britain, but was dra-matically highlighted by the headscarf issue in France, theCartoon affair in Denmark, and the murder of lm-maker Theo

Van Gogh in the Netherlands shortly after the release of hiscontroversial lm about Islamic culture (Barker 2004; Bowen2007; Buruma 2006; Freedman 2004; Modood et al 2006).

Second, despite substantial secularisation, in some Euro-pean states inequities resulting from the formal establishmentof the dominant religion have done little to bolster better inter-community relations or reduce religious discrimination. Withthe deepening of religious diversity, the religious biases of

European states have become increasingly visible. Europeanstates have continued to privilege Christianity in one form oranother. They publicly fund religious schools, maintain cleri-cal salaries and real-estate holdings of Christian churches,facilitate the control by churches of cemeteries, and train theclergy. In short, there has been no impartiality within the do-main of religion, and despite formal equality, this privileg-ing of Christianity continues to have a far-reaching impact onthe rest of society (Klausen 2005). Even the widespread beliefregarding the existence of a secular European public sphere isbased largely on a myth. As a result, the formal or informalestablishment of a single religion, even the weaker variety ofestablishment, continues to be part of the problem.

Non-Western Secularism

This challenge to secularism has come not only from politi-cians, civil society groups and clerics, but also from academics.Critics argue that the conceptual and normative structure ofsecularism is itself terribly defective, that there is something

wrong with the ideal itself. Secularism has been linked to aawed modernisation, the repressive structures of the nationstate, to an indefensible conception of science and rationality,and to an excessive individualism. It has been charged fortrivialising faith and being insensitive to religious believers.

Its failure to be impartial and universal is linked to itsChristian biases.

I agree that secular states are in crisis, that the problems ofsecularism are real and go deep. However, it is the contentionof this article that secularism is not irredeemable, that whilemany of its conceptions are awed, one can still reimagine,redene, and rescue it. This is crucial because there is still noalternative to secularism. Under present conditions, it contin-ues to be badly needed.

The criticism of secularism, I argue, looks indefeasible onlybecause it has focused on a few doctrinal versions of Westernsecularism. I argue that it is time the focus is shifted awayfrom doctrines and to the constitutional provisions and nor-mative practices of a wide variety of states, including the bestpractices of non-Western states such as India. Once this isdone, we will begin to see secularism differently, and mightrealise that what is needed is not an alternative to secularism,but rather an alternative conception of secularism.

Identifying a defensible alternative conception is not always

easy. It can be done only if we make two crucial moves: First, jet-tison the standard church-state models and focus instead onsecularism as a response to religious diversity. Second, as alreadymentioned, pay more attention to normative practices than to ex-isting doctrinal formulations. Allow me to elaborate these points.

Today, most societies are characterised by religious diversity.The pressing question before us, then, is how to handle thisdiversity and the problems that accompany it. What does reli-gious diversity mean? To begin with, it means both diversity ofreligion and diversity within religion. Diversity of religion ex-ists in a society when it has a populace professing faith in, say,Christian, Jewish, or Islamic ideals. A society has a deep diver-sity of religion when its people adhere to faiths with very di-

verse ethos, origins, and civilisational backgrounds. This hap-pens, for example, when a society has Hindus and Muslims, orHindus and Jews, or Buddhists and Muslims, and so on. Thesecond kind of diversity exists within religion, and is of twokinds. The rst, horizontal diversity, exists when a religion isinternally differentiated. For example, different confessions,denominations, and sects exist within Christianity, and Mus-lims are divided into Shia, Sunni, Ismaili, Ahmedi, and so on.Likewise, Hindus could be seen to be differentiated into

Vaishnavite and Shaivite, and so on.Religions are characterised, however, by yet another kind of

diversity, which may be called vertical diversity. Here, peopleof the same religion may engage in diverse practices that arehierarchically arranged. A religion might mandate that onlysome may engage in certain kinds of practices, which other co-religionists are excluded from. For example, caste-ridden Hindu-ism makes a distinction between pure and impure practices.Practices performed by certain castes are pure, and membersof other castes are excluded from them. For instance, women ordalits may not be allowed entry into the inner sanctum of temples,and in many cases even within the precincts of an upper-castetemple. This example brings home a point I ought to have made atthe very outset of this discussion. Every form of diversity, includingreligious, is enmeshed in power relations. If so, endemic to


3/14



every religiously diverse society is an illegitimate use of power, whereby the basic interests of one group are threatened by theactions of another. It further follows that inherent in religiouslydiverse societies is the possibility of both inter- and intra-religiousdomination a broad term that encompasses discrimination,marginalisation, oppression, exclusions, and the reproductionof hierarchy. (Two other forms of domination are also possible:the domination by the religious of the non-religious and thedomination of the religious by the non-religious.)

This shift allows me to conceive secularism as a response toa deeply distorted form of sociability within the domain of reli-gion, as a normative stance that seeks to faci litate better socialrelations within and across religious groups. Secularism inthis view is not against religiosity per se, but is opposed to in-stitutionalised religious domination. Allow me to draw ananalogy with one of Karl Marxs better known ideas. Marx hadclaimed that in order for production of material goods to takeplace, humans must enter into relations with one another production relations. He further claimed that such production

frequently takes place within structures of exploitation anddominance. His entire project might be viewed as an attemptto emancipate the production process from distorted humanrelations. Likewise, one might view the production of symbolicgoods as requiring certain relations of production. However,the production of most symbolic goods, including religiousgoods, almost always takes place under conditions of domina-tion within and between religions. Secularism might then be

viewed as an attempt to emancipate the production of sym-bolic goods, values and services from inter- and intra-religiousdomination. That is what I mean when I say that secularism isnot against religiosity, but ercely opposes institutionalisedreligious domination. To rescue secularism requires a pro-

found reconceptualisation of what secularism means. A second, equally crucial, move to reimagine secularism is

this: a set of distinctions must be drawn and kept in mind toretrieve a defensible secularism. First, we need to distinguishbetween the entire complex of practices and institutionalarrangements that either connect religion to, or disconnectreligion from, the state, and a subset of these practices andarrangements that embody norms that is, an implicit sense ofhow states and religions should relate to one another. Whereasthe former includes the normative and the non-normative andoperates at the practical level, the latter operates only at thenormative level. Second, these norms are then articulated inrepresentations and ad hoc, unstable reections found instatements of politicians, laws enacted by legislators, execu-tive decisions, judicial pronouncements, and constitutionalarticles. These articulations operate at the discursive level.Finally, the normative conceptions implicit in these practicesand either subtly or explicitly articulated in legal and politicaldiscourse are then posited as a normative ideal that is some-times expressed as ideology and doctrine, and that occasion-ally becomes an object of theoretical enquiry, thus operatingat both the doctrinal and the theoretical levels. The distinctionbetween a comprehensive practical and the exclusively norma-tive level is important, because identifying secularism with

any particular practice or institutional arrangement that re-lates religion and the state will not do. True, secularism needsto be institutionally grounded, but to distinguish secular fromreligion-centred states and, even more important, to articulatea critical, normative secularism, the distinction between thenormative and the non-normative is crucial.

More to the point, I argue that secular norms conceived atthe doctrinal and theoretical levels are by now highly restrictedand inadequate. This has happened because these levels havebeen colonised by mainstream, Western doctrines and theo-ries of secularism. Reimagining secularism is virtually impos-sible unless we reduce our reliance on these formulations.These doctrines and theories have become part of the prob-lem, hurdles to properly examining the issues at stake. Witt-gensteins warning that the hold of a particular picture is sostrong that it prevents, even occludes, awareness of other con-ceptions of reality is apt here. We are so seized by one or twoconceptions that we simply cannot notice other conceptions thathave been pushed into the background. Once we shift away

from currently dominant models and focus on the normativepractices of a broader range of Western states beyond the morefamiliar ones, indeed also on non-Western states, we shall seethat better forms of secular states and much more defensible

versions of secularisms are available. And a lthough in somecontexts minimally decent religion-centred states may be ade-quate, by and large they will not do, because they, too, are asmuch a part of the problem as are some secular states.

So we need to move away from these doctrinal formulationsof political secularism and unearth different versions found inthe best practices of many states in their judicial pronounce-ments and constitutional articles. Another reason to go to thesepractices and reections is that norms implicit in practices keep

shifting, but these shifts are largely hidden from public view.When practices that do not match doctrinal formulations cometo light, two options are available: rst, to withdraw the practicebecause it falls short of the ideal; second, to withdraw the doctri-nal ideal and rearticulate the norms and build another concep-tion of secularism. When it comes to the crunch, many Westernstates take the rst easy option. They withdraw ethically sensi-tive, democratically negotiated arrangements and practices andtake refuge in the entrenched ideals. This is frequently a retro-gressive step. Focusing on normative practices and constitution-al articles and refashioning secularism will help us displace a

worn-out ideal and shift the norm, bringing it closer to how peo-ple wish to lead their lives, rather than how they should leadtheir lives in accordance with a more or less redundant ideal.

Models of Secularism

Which existing models am I talking about? Mainly, there aretwo: the French and the American. In addition, there is a thirdfound in the rest of Western Europe. Let me critically examineeach of these models.

The Idealised French Model

The idealised French conception holds that the state must beseparate from religion while retaining the power to interfere


4/14



in it. However, religion is divested of any power to intervene inmatters of the state. In short, separation here means one-sidedexclusion. Thus, in March 2004 the French Assembly and theSenate introduced a new law banning headscarves in schools.This one-sided exclusionary attitude continues a long-stand-ing move in France, af ter Catholic dominance in French publicschools was replaced with a philosophically secular outlook.Since then, religious instruction has been abandoned. Organ-ised prayer is forbidden and students cannot make a pledgethat refers to god. The French exclude religious symbols anddiscourses from the public sphere. French public institutionhas no prayer or reference to god (Klausen 2005; Bowen 2007;Freedman 2004). France hopes to deal with institutionalisedreligious domination by taming and marginalising religion andactively promoting secularisation in each of its three senses:differentiation, privatisation, and decline of religious beliefs andpractices. Over time, states that follow this conception developa hierarchy between the secular and the religious, and mayperpetuate the non-religious domination of the religious. This

happens even more so when, to promote more rigorous non-religious conceptions of positive freedoms and substantiveequalities, states cross minimal thresholds of morality, formalequality, and decency.

States governed by this conception typically have a single,robust conception of the good life that translates into deepscepticism about the truth claims and value of religion, andabout its public role and capacity to ever prevent forms of op-pression and domination. Typically, this secularism does notunderstand the believers life as it is lived from the inside. Itmisses out on perhaps the central feature of most religions:that they encourage their members to choose to live a disciplined,restricted, rule-bound, and desire-abnegating life. To be sure,

even such an anti-religious stance may help states to deal withcases of intra-religious domination, where some members of areligious community dominate members of their own religion,as occurs with anti-clericalism in France. But often their rela-tive blindness to religion makes states driven by such concep-tions insensitive to religious freedoms, particularly to the reli-gious freedom of minorities. As a result, states may, wittinglyor unwittingly, perpetuate inter-religious domination.

Many segments in virtually every society, on the right butparticularly on the left, are tempted to follow the anti-pluralistFrench model, largely because they have bought into the viewthat religion in Europe, more specically Islam is a prob-lem, and that its solution requires the coercive power of thestate. Such an approach is detrimental to inter-faith relations,particularly because, while strongly interfering with non-Christian faiths, it leaves the formal or informal establishmentof a single Christian religion untouched. A striking example isthe accommodation of majority Catholics in public schools.School cafeterias serve sh for those Catholics who abstainfrom meat, but no such provision exists for those students whoeat only halal meat. The French state and local governmentown and fund the maintenance of the grand majority of the45,000 Catholic churches, half the Protestant churches, andabout 10% of synagogues (Bhargava 1994: 109). The French

state also pays about 80% of the budget, including the salaryof teachers, in Catholic schools that follow the national curric-ulum and are open to students of all faiths (ibid). JocelyneCesari stresses that the collective dimension of Islam wasconned to the intimate space of the residences, the hearths, theprovided places at hotels, or the backs of the shops (2010: 12).

The Idealised American Model

The idealised version of American self-understanding inter-prets separation to mean mutual exclusion. Neither the statenor religion is to interfere in the domain of the other. This mu-tual exclusion is held to be necessary to resolve conicts be-tween different Christian denominations, to grant a measureof equality between them, and most crucially to provideindividuals the freedom to set up and maintain their own reli-gious associations. The protection of religious liberties moregenerally is viewed as the raison dtre of this model. Thisstrict or perfect separation, as James Madison terms it, musttake place at each of the three distinct levels of ends, institu-

tions and personnel, and law and public policy. The rst twolevels make the state non-theocratic and disestablish religion.The third level ensures that the state has neither a positive nora negative relationship with religion. On the positive side, forexample, there should be no policy of granting aid, even non-preferentially, to religious institutions. On the negative side, itis not within the scope of state activity to interfere in religiousmatters, even when some of the values professed by the state,such as equality, are violated within the religious domain(consider President Barack Obamas helplessness in the face ofthe threat in America to publicly burn the Quran). As LeonardW Levy (1994) puts it, Congress simply has no power tolegislate on any matter pertaining to religion (also see Ham-

burger 2002).This non-interference is justied on the grounds that religion

is a privileged, private (that is, non-state) matter, and if some-thing is amiss within this private domain, it can be rectiedonly by those who have a right to do so within this sphere. This

view, according to its proponents, is what religious freedommeans. Thus, the freedom that justies mutual exclusion isnegative liberty, and is closely enmeshed with the privatisationof religion. However, privatisation here means non-ofcialisation.

American political secularism does not promote secularisationin two of three senses mentioned above. It encourages a vibrantpresence of religion in the non-state, public domain, and doeslittle to discourage religious beliefs or practices.

This model of secularism encourages the state to passivelyrespect religion. Since any intervention is tantamount to con-trol, the only way to respect religion is to leave it alone. Ide-alised American secularism, then, has some resources to ghtinter-religious domination (for example, it necessitates the dis-establishment of the dominant religion), but few resources to

wage a struggle against deeper, more structural aspects of thisdomination. The states hands-off approach binds it to notfacilitate freedoms or equality within religions. The Americanstate may have worked out other strategies to minimise suchdominations. However, states that lack its more conciliatory


5/14



history, or that possess religions that do not easily allow theexit option, would perpetuate religion-related domination infollowing the American model. Moreover, by interpreting sep-aration as exclusion, this model of secularism betrays its sec-tarianism; it can live comfortably with liberal, Protestantised,individualised and privatised religions, but has fewer resourcesto cope with religions that mandate greater public or politicalpresence, or that have a strong communal orientation. Thisgroup insensitivity makes it impossible to accommodate com-munity-specic rights, such as the right of religious communi-ties to set up and maintain their own educational institutions,and therefore virtually impossible to more robustly protect therights of religious minorities.

Furthermore, as a product of the Protestant ethic, Americansecularisms greatest drawback is its universal pretension. Itpresupposes a Christian civilisation, something easily forgot-ten because over time this civ ilisation has silently slid into thebackground. Christianity allows this self-limitation, and muchof the world innocently mistakes this somewhat cunning self-

denial for Christianitys disappearance (Connolly 1999: 24).But if this is so, this inherently dogmatic secularism cannotcoexist innocently with other religions (Keane 2000: 14; Madan1998: 298). Given the enormous power of the state, it must tryto shape and transform other religions a clear instance ofillegitimate inuence. Thus, despite all its claims of leavingreligions alone and granting religions liberty, this secularismis inhospitable to non-liberal, non-Protestant believers (Ham-burger 2002: 193-251). It can become inhospitable to non-believers as well, under God. Indeed, an excessive focus onreligious freedom from the state may enhance inter-religiousdomination. I am conscious that this is not an empirical claimabout American society or politics. Instead, I am suggesting

that if such a model is followed elsewhere, it may neither pro-tect people from some forms of inter-religious domination, norfrom intra-religious domination.

The current theoretical formulations of this model repre-sented, for example, by philosophical liberalism only aggra-

vate these problems. Thus, liberal secularist theories enjointhe citizen to support only those coercive state laws for whichthere is public justication. If others are expected to follow alaw based on terms they do not understand, and for reasonsthey cannot endorse, the principle of equal respect is violated so the reasoning goes (Audi 1993: 701; Macedo 1990: 249;Rawls 1971: 337-38; Solum 1990: 1047-81; Weithman 1997: 6).Coercive principles must be as justiable to others as they areto us, and therefore must be based on terms that all citizenscan accept on the grounds of their common reason (Larmore1996: 137).

Since a religious rationale is a paradigmatic case of a basisfor conduct that other citizens have good reasons to reject, itdoes not count as public justication; thus, a law groundedsolely in a religious rationale must never be enacted. In short,purely religious convictions or commitments have no role toplay in democratic and pluralist polities. This requirement that religious reasons be excluded from liberal-democraticpolitics is offensive to religious persons who, like others,

wish to support their favoured political commitments accord-ing to their conscience (Sandel 1993). If people believe thattheir politics must be consistent with their morality as derivedfrom religion, why should they be discouraged or stigmatisedfor grounding their politics in religious convictions? By askingthe religious to exercise restraint and exclude theological rea-sons from their justication for a coercive law, liberal secular-ism forces them to act against their conscience and, in so do-ing, violates its own principle of equal respect. Indeed, the de-mand that restraint be exercised is counterproductive becauseexclusion from the larger public sphere forces the religious toform their own narrow public, where resentment and preju-dice ourish (Spinner-Halev 2000: 150-56). This responseleads not only to the freezing of identities, but also to thebuilding of unbreachable walls between religious and non-religious citizens. Therefore, engagement with religiouspeople is typically better than shunning them (ibid: 155).

Furthermore, the model of moral reasoning typical of suchsecularisms is context-insensitive, theoreticist, and absolutist

(or non-comparative), enjoining us to think in terms of this orthat since it is too heavi ly reliant on monolithic ideas or valuesconsidered true, superior, or wholly non-negotiable (on this,see Connolly 1999: 27).

In sum, both the French and American versions developedin the context of a single-religion society and as a way to solvethe problems of one religion, namely, Christianity. They werenot designed to deal with deep religious diversity.

Western Secularism in European Societies

Neither of these two models adequately captures the models ofsecularism really at play in European societies. Most Europeanstates follow neither the French nor the American model.

Virtually all European states have a stable regime of individualrights, which includes the right to religious liberty. None couldhave managed to install this regime without having attackedthe power and privilege of their churches in the past, astridency that would not have been possible without some de-gree of state-church separation. Yet, unlike in France, there isno lingering hostility towards religion in other Europeanstate structures.

In Europe, initial hostility was followed by active support.Nearly all European states have developed an institutionalarrangement that grants some privilege or public recognitionto their church. Indeed, some still have an established church,a privileged arrangement that goes well beyond recognition.Tariq Modood (2011) nds the combination of separation ofchurch and state and support for religion compatible withsecularism; he calls it moderate secularism.

Such is the context in which non-Christian migrants toEurope, the majority of whom are Muslims, have been arriv-ing, settling, and making claims that relate to the place of reli-gious identity in the public sphere. But it is precisely here thata sense of a crisis of secularism is found. Modood (2011) hopesthat this challenge can be met by extending the historical com-promises between church and state to other religions, parti-cularly to Islam. However, the multiculturalisation of this


6/14



secularism is neither easy nor sufcient. It is not easy becauseit presupposes a massive change in the cultural background.Institutional adjustment is bound to be difcult because an in-ternal link exists between the collective secular self-under-standing of European societies and the deeply problematic in-stitutional arrangements. Quite plainly, current European in-stitutions are deeply biased. They have accommodated Chris-tians, but will not be able to accommodate Muslims. They arenot sufcient because simple accommodation without someaccompanying hostility or critical questioning may not workfor all Muslim citizens. For instance, many Muslim womenmight welcome hostility to some customs that have come to beassociated with their religion.

Why are institutional adjustments difcult to achieve?Using a broad brush, we might say that European secularismsarose in predominantly single-religion societies. Issues of radi-cal individual freedom and citizenship equality arose in Euro-pean societies after religious homogenisation. The birth ofconfessional states was accompanied by the massive expulsion

of subject communities whose faith differed from the religionof the ruler. Such states eventually found some place for toler-ation in their moral space, but as is well known, toleration wasconsistent with deep inequalities and with a humiliating, mar-ginalised, and virtually invisible existence. For instance, thechurch buildings of minority religious groups could not looklike churches, and had to be tucked away in lanes far from thechurch of the dominant group.

The liberal democratisation and consequent secularisationof many European states have helped citizens from non-Chris-tian faiths to acquire most formal rights. But such a scheme ofrights neither embodies a regime of inter-religious equality,nor effectively prevents religion-based discrimination and ex-

clusion. Indeed, it masks majoritarian, ethno-religious biases.The new reality of deepening religious diversity has brought

the religious biases of European states into increasingly sharperrelief (Klausen 2005). Despite all changes, European stateshave continued to privilege Christianity in one form or another.These biases are evident in the different kinds of difcultiesfaced by Muslims. For example, in Britain, one-third of all pri-mary school students are educated by religious communities,

yet applications for state funding by Muslims are frequentlyturned down. Veit Bader (2007) informs us that there are cur-rently only ve Muslim schools, compared to 2,000 run byRoman Catholics and 4,700 run by the Church of England. Thisbias is also manifest in the failure of many Western Europeanstates to heed demands by Muslims to build mosques, andtherefore to properly practise their own faith (Germany and Italy),in discrimination against ritual slaughter (Germany), and inunheeded demands by Muslims for proper burial grounds oftheir own (Denmark, among others). Given that in recent timesIslamophobia has gripped the imagination of several Westernsocieties as exemplied by the cartoon controversy in Den-mark and by the minarets issue in Switzerland it is very likelythat their Muslim citizens will continue to face disadvantages.

Removing the biases of European states will not be easy be-cause of resistance from the right, institutional resilience, and

differences between Christianity and Islam, not to mentionbetween Christianity and non-Semitic religions such as Hin-duism. Moderate secularism will be severely tested. Indeed,the test has already begun, which is why talk of strain or evencrisis is justied.

So far, I have been talking as though the initiative liessquarely with only one agent, the European state (and its sup-porters), and as though Muslims will respond enthusiasticallyto any initiative from this reformed (that is, multiculturalised)state. But this view is too sanguine about the self-understand-ing of Muslims and about their current condition in Europe. Itunderestimates their alienation and ghettoisation. Only with abetter and deeper understanding of Muslims in different partsof Europe can we learn about what should and should not beaccommodated, and about what can and cannot be accommo-dated. Indeed, only in a more relaxed atmosphere can a pluralityof voices the more vulnerable voices emerge and be betterheard, a change that will have a huge bearing on our collective

judgment of what should and should not be accommodated.

(As of now, we hear two dominant voices: that of the ultra-or-thodox Muslim and that of the lapsed Muslim, a convert toradical secularism.)

These voices may necessitate not just accommodation, but alsomore active state intervention, either to foster or to suppresssome hitherto unnoticed beliefs and practices of Muslims. It isentirely possible that the state may not only have to support somereligious practices, but will also have to inhibit others. Europeanstates may be only too happy to abort some Muslim practices, butsuch intervention would entail a massive shift in their conceptionof secularism from rst separate, and then only support religionto rst separate, and then sometimes support, sometimes inhibitreligion what I call principled distance. In short, they may have

to set aside their moderate stance of accommodating, ratherthan being hostile to, religion. Currently, the practice of mostEuropean states is to offer little ofcial support, to provide noaccommodation, and, with few exceptions, to stay indifferentto massive societal intolerance. What might be required ismore support of some religions, less support of others, andactive interference in societal intolerance that is, an attempt bythe state to tackle both inter- and intra-religious domination.

This, in part, entails abandoning moderate secularism. Torespond to the challenge of deep diversity, Europe might bebetter off with an altogether different conception of secularism.

Indeed, moderate secularism stands in the way of nurturingthe norms of principled distance embedded in the informalpolitics of state and non-state actors.

Restricted and Inadequate Formulations

I believe, then, that the doctrinal, ideological, and theoreticalformulations of Western secularism have become highlyrestricted and inadequate, as have the formal politics and lawsinspired by these doctrines and ideologies. A reimagination ofsecularism is impossible unless we reduce our reliance onthese formal practices and formulations, including the Frenchand the American models of exclusionary separation of churchand state, as well as the formal, institutional political practices


7/14



of most European states. Once we shift away from these alter-nate perspectives and start to focus on the normative informalpractices of a broader range of Western and non-Westernstates, we shall see that better forms of secular states andmuch more defensible versions of secularism are available.

The Indian Model of Secularism

Can a version of secularism be found that is sensitive simulta-neously to the moral integrity of both liberal and non-liberalreligious ways of living, as well as able to address religious orreligion-based oppression and exclusions one that goes be-

yond liberal, libertarian, and republican theories? Anothermodel of secularism exists, although theoretically less devel-oped and not generated exclusively in the West, that meets theneeds of societies with deep religious diversity and also com-plies with the principles of freedom and equality. This modelmeets the secularist objection to non-secular states, and thereligious objection to some forms of secular state (see alsoBhargava 2011, 2012, 2013). To identify it, we must consider the

normative and discursive levels and look at some of the devel-oping normative practices of the French, British, and even American states. However, the best place to nd this version ofsecularism is within the best inter-communal practice in thesubcontinent of India, and in its appropriately interpretedConstitution. In India, the existence of deep religious diversityhas ensured a conceptual response to problems not only withinreligions, but also between them. Without taking it as a blue-print, other societies might examine the Indian conception.

Several features of Indian secularism can be identied thatdistinguish it from other variants. First, multiple religions arenot mere extras added on as an afterthought, but were presentat the starting point as part of the foundation of Indian secu-

larism. Deep religious diversity is an integral part of Indiassocial and cultural landscape. Second, this form of secularismhas a commitment to multiple values, namely, liberty, equalityand fraternity not conceived narrowly as pertaining to indi-

viduals, but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomyof religious communities and their equality of status in society as well as other, more basic values such as peace, toleration,and mutual respect between communities.

The acceptance of community-specic rights brings me to thethird feature of Indian secularism. Since it was born in a deeplymulti-religious society, it is concerned as much with inter-religiousdomination as it is with intra-religious domination in the after-math of the horrors of Partition. Whereas the two Westernconceptions of secularism have provided benets to minoritiesonly incidentally (Jews beneted in some European countriessuch as France not because their special needs and demands

were met, but because of a change in the general climate ofthe society), under the Indian conception even community-specic political rights (through political reservations forreligious minorities) were almost granted during the draftingof the Constitution, but were withheld in the last instanceonly for contextual reasons. In fact, it is arguable that aconceptual space is still available for these rights within theIndian Constitution.

Fourth, Indian secularism does not erect a wall of separa-tion between religion and state. There are boundaries, ofcourse, but they are porous. This situation allows the state tointervene in religions in order to help or hinder them withoutthe impulse to control or destroy them. This intervention caninclude granting aid to educational institutions of religiouscommunities on a non-preferential basis, and interfering insocio-religious institutions that deny equal dignity and statusto members of their own religion or to those of others forexample, the ban on untouchability and the obligation toallow everyone, irrespective of their caste or gender, toenter Hindu temples. In short, Indian secularism interpretsseparation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality,but what I call principled distance, which is completelyfrom one-sided exclusion, mutual exclusion, strict neutrality,and equidistance.

Fifth, Indian secularism is not entirely averse to the publiccharacter of religions. Although the state is not identied witha particular religion or with religion more generally, ofcial,

and therefore public, recognition is granted to religious com-munities. The model admits a distinction between de-publici-sation and de-politicisation, as well as between different kindsof de-politicisation. As it is not hostile to the public presence ofreligion, it does not aim to de-publicise it. It accepts the impor-tance of one form of de-politicisation of religion. Sixth, thismodel shows that in responding to religion, we do not have tochoose between active hostility and passive indifference, orbetween disrespectful hostility and respectful indifference.We can combine the two, permitting the necessary hostility aslong as there is also active respect. The state may intervene toinhibit some practices as long as it shows respect for otherpractices of the religious community, and does so by publicly

lending support to them.Seventh, by not xing its commitment from the start exclu-

sively to individual or community values, and by not markingrigid boundaries between the public and the private, Indiasconstitutional secularism allows decisions on these matters tobe made either within the open dynamics of democratic poli-tics or by contextual reasoning in the courts. Eighth, one mightsay that Indian political secularism shows a marked prefer-ence for morally grounded secularisation in each of the sensesmentioned above. There is no process out there which cannotbe brought partially under human (democratic) control. Normust an attempt be made for a blanket, morally insensitiverestriction, privatisation, or decline of religion. Ninth, it opensup the possibility of different societies working out their ownsecularisms. In short, it opens out the possibility of multiplesecularisms. Tenth, it breaks out of the rigid interpretative gridthat divides our social world into the Western modern and thetraditional, indigenous non-Western. Indian secularism ismodern, but departs signicantly from mainstream concep-tions of Western secularism. Finally, the commitment to mul-tiple values and principled distance means that the state triesto balance different, ambiguous, but equally important values.This makes its secular ideal more like a contextual, ethicallysensitive, politically negotiated arrangement which it really


8/14



is rather than a scientic doctrine conjured up by ideologuesand implemented by political agents.

A somewhat forced, formulaic articulation of Indian secu-larism goes something like this. The state must keep a principleddistance from all public or private and individual-oriented orcommunity-oriented religious institutions for the sake of theequally signicant and sometimes conicting values of peace,

worldly goods, dignity, liberty, equality and fraternity in all ofits complicated individualistic and non-individualistic versions.Indian secularism, then, is an ethically sensitive, negotiatedsettlement between diverse groups and divergent values. Thismodel thus embodies what I call contextual secular ism.

Allow me to elaborate on two features of the Indian model:principled distance and contextual secularism.

Principled Distance

The idea of principled distance unpacks the metaphor of sepa-ration differently from mainstream Western secularisms. It ac-cepts a disconnection between state and religion at the level of

ends and institutions, but does not make a fetish of it at thelevel of policy and law; this distinguishes it from all othermodels of secularism, moral and amoral, that disconnect stateand religion at this level.

The policy of principled distance entai ls a exible approachto the issue of the states inclusion or exclusion of religion, andto the issue of its engagement with or disengagement fromreligion, which at the level of law and policy depends on thecontext, nature, and current state of relevant religions. Inclu-sion or engagement must be governed by principles undergird-ing a secular state, which ow from a commitment to the val-ues mentioned above. This requirement means that religionmay be included in the affairs of the state if such inclusion pro-

motes freedom, equality, or any other value integral to secu-larism, and thereby reduces inter- or intra-religious domina-tion. For example, citizens may support a coercive state law byincluding a purely religious rationale as gound if this law iscompatible with freedom, fraternity or equality. Principleddistance rejects the standard liberal idea that the principle ofequal respect is best realised only when people come into thepublic domain by leaving their religious reasoning behind.

Engaging positively or negatively, depending entirely on whether the above-mentioned values are promoted or under-mined, is one constitutive idea of principled distance. A secondidea distinguishes it from strict neutrality, which dictates thatthe state must help or hinder all religions to an equal degreeand in the same manner; if it intervenes in one religion, it mustalso do so in others. This makes principled distance rest upon adistinction explicitly drawn by the American philosopher Ron-ald Dworkin (1978: 125), between equal treatment and treatingeveryone as an equal. The principle of equal treatment in therelevant political sense requires that the state treat all citizensequally in the relevant respect for example, in the distributionof a resource of opportunity. In contrast, the principle of treatingpeople as equals entails that every person or group is treated

with equal concern and respect. This second principle maysometimes require equal treatment say, equal distribution

of resources but it may also occasionally dictate unequalpreferential treatment. Treating people or groups as equals isentirely consistent with differential treatment. This idea is thesecond ingredient in what I have called principled distance.

When I say that principled distance allows for both engage-ment with, or disengagement from, and does so by allowingdifferential treatment, what kind of treatment do I have inmind? First, religious groups have sought exemptions whenstates have intervened in religious practices by promulgatinglaws designed to apply neutrally across society. This demandfor non-interference is made on the grounds that the law re-quires them to do things not permitted by their religion, orthat it prevents them from doing things mandated by their reli-gion. For example, Sikhs demand exemptions from mandatoryhelmet laws and police dress codes to accommodate their reli-giously required turbans. Muslim women and girls demandthat the state not interfere in the religious requirement thatthey wear the chador. Rightly or wrongly, religiously groundedpersonal laws may be exempted. Elsewhere, Jews and Mus-

lims seek exemptions from Sunday closing laws on the groundsthat such closing is not required by their religion. Principleddistance allows a practice that is banned or regulated in themajority culture to be permitted in the minority culturebecause of the distinctive status and meaning it holds for theminority cultures members.

For the mainstream conception of secularism, this variabili-ty is a problem because of a simple and somewhat absolutistmorality that attributes overwhelming importance to one

value particularly to equal treatment, equal liberty, or equalityof individual citizenship. Religious groups may demand thatthe state refrain from interference in their practices, but theymay equally demand that the state interfere in such a way as

to give them special assistance so they are able to secure whatother groups are routinely able to acquire by virtue of theirsocial dominance in the political community. The state maygrant authority to religious ofcials to perform legally bindingmarriages, or to have their own rules for, or methods of, ob-taining a divorce. Principled distance allows the possibility ofsuch policies on the grounds that holding people accountableto a law to which they have not consented might be unfair.Furthermore, it does not discourage public justication thatis, justication based on reasons endorsable by all. Indeed, itencourages people to pursue public justication. However, ifthe attempt to arrive at public justication fai ls, it enjoins reli-giously minded citizens to support coercive laws that, al-though based purely on religious reasons, are consistent withfreedom and equality (Eberle 2002).

However, principled distance is not just a recipe for differen-tial treatment in the form of special exemptions. It may evenrequire state intervention and, moreover (in some religionsmore than in others), considering the historical and social con-dition of all relevant religions. To take the rst examples ofpositive engagement, some holidays of all majority and minorityreligions are granted national status. Subsidies are provided toschools run by all religious communities. Minority religionsare granted a constitutional right to establish and maintain


9/14



their educational institutions. Limited funding is available toMuslims for hajj . But state engagement can also take a nega-tive interventionist form. For the promotion of a particular

value constitutive of secularism, some religions, relative toothers, may require more interference from the state. Forexample, suppose that the value to be advanced is socialequality. This requires, in part, undermining caste and genderhierarchies. Thus, there is a constitutional ban on untouch-ability and Hindu temples were thrown open to all, particu-larly to former untouchables, should they choose to enterthem. Child marriage was banned among Hindus and a rightto divorce was introduced.

Consider once again laws that interfere with Hinduism forevaluating these. The relevant consideration is not whetherthey immediately encompass all groups, but whether or not theyare just and consistent with the values of secularism. Threereasons exist for why all social groups need not be covered bythese laws: rst, they may be relevant only to one group, forexample, the abolition of devadasi dedication was relevant

only to Hindus. Second, laws in liberal democracies requirelegitimacy; the consent of at least the representatives of com-munities is vital. If consent has indeed been obtained from therepresentatives of only one community, it is sometimes prudentto enact community-specic laws. It is wise to apply the gen-eral principle in stages, rather than not have it at all. Finally,

it is perfectly with in the competence of the legislature to take accountof the degree of evil which is prevalent under various circumstancesand the legislature is not bound to legislate for all evils at the sametime. Therefore, an act passed by the legislature cannot be attackedmerely because it tackles only some of the evils in society and does nottackle other evils of the same or worse kind which may be prevalent( AIR 1952, Bom 84, The State of Bambay vs Narasu Appa ).

Thus, if the legislature acting on these considerations wantedto enact a special provision with regard to, say, bigamous mar-riages among Hindus, it cannot be said that the legislature wasdiscriminating against Hindus only on the ground of religion( AIR 1952, Bom 84, The State of Bambay vs NarasuAppa ). Indi-an courts have frequently followed this line of reasoning. Theyhave defended a policy if they found that its purpose is theeradication of a social evil traceable to religious practices,even if the policy was targeted at specic communities.

Contextual Secularism

A context-sensitive secularism, one based on the idea of princi-pled distance, is what I term contextual secularism. It is con-textual not only because the precise form and content of secu-larism varies from one context to another and from place toplace, but also because it embodies a cer tain model of contex-tual moral reasoning. It is a multi-value doctrine. To accept itsmulti-value nature is to acknowledge that its constitutive val-ues do not always sit easily with one another. In fact, these arefrequently in conict.

Some degree of internal discord, and therefore a fair amountof instability, is an integral part of contextual secularism. Forthis reason, it forever requires fresh interpretations, contextual

judgments, and attempts at reconciliation and compromise.

No general a priori rule of resolving these conicts exists, noeasy lexical order, no pre-existing hierarchy among values orlaws that enable us to decide that, no matter what the context,a particular value must override everything else. Almost every-thing, then, is a matter of situational thinking and contextualreasoning. Whether one value will override or be reconcilable

with another cannot be decided beforehand. Each time thematter will present itself differently and will be differentlyresolved. If this is true, the practice of secularism requires adifferent model of moral reasoning than the one that strait-

jackets our moral understanding in the form of well-delineat-ed and explicitly stated rules (Taylor 1994). This contextualsecularism recognises that conicts between individual rightsand group rights, or between equality and liberty, or betweenliberty and the satisfaction of basic needs cannot always beadjudicated by recourse to some general and abstract princi-ple. Rather, they can be settled only case by case, and may re-quire a ne balancing of competing claims. The eventual out-come may not be wholly satisfactory to either claimant, but

may still be reasonably satisfactory to both. Multi-value doc-trines such as secularism encourage accommodation not thegiving up of one value for the sake of another, but their recon-ciliation and possible harmonisation so that apparently incom-patible concepts and values may operate without changes totheir basic content.

This endeavour to make concepts, viewpoints and values work simultaneously does not amount to a morally objection-able compromise. This is so because nothing of importance isbeing given up for the sake of something less signicant, some-thing without value, or even with negative value. Rather, whatis pursued is a mutually agreed upon middle way that com-bines elements from two or more equally valuable entities. The

roots of such attempts at reconciliation and accommodationlie in a lack of dogmatism, in a willingness to experiment tothink at different levels and in separate spheres and in areadiness to make and accept decisions on a provisional basis.The pursuit of this middle way captures a way of thinkingcharacterised by the following dictum: Why look at things interms of this or that, why not try to have both this and that?(Austin 1972: 318). This way of thinking recognises that, al-though we may currently be unable to secure the best of both

values and may therefore be forced to settle for a watered-down version of each, we must continue to have an abidingcommitment to searching for a transcendence of this second-best condition.

It is frequently argued that Indian secularism is contradic-tory because it tries to bring together individual and commu-nity rights, and that those articles in the Indian Constitutionthat have a bearing on the secular nature of the Indian stateare deeply conictual, and at best ambiguous (Tambiah 1998:445-53). This characterisation, however, misrecognises a

virtue as a vice. In my view, the attempt to bring togetherseemingly incompatible values is a great strength of Indiansecularism, and indeed, the Indian Constitution. Indian secu-larism is an ethically sensitive negotiated settlement betweendiverse groups and divergent values. When it is not treated as


10/14



such, it turns either into a dead formula or into a facade forpolitical manoeuvres.

Possible Objections

Two other serious objections are frequently raised against thismodel. First, it assumes that the state has the capacity toimpartially arbitrate among conicting religious groups. But isany state ever impartial towards all religions or between thereligious and the secular? Are not structural biases present inevery state? Second, the notion of principled distance is foundto be problematic. Here, two possible criticisms can be antici-pated straight away; one, that it is strongly reliant on Kantianliberalism and has all the problems endemic to the latter. How-ever, a critique comes from the opposite direction too. It isclaimed that it is far too pragmatic in the crude opportunisticsense, the assumption here being that any negotiation or com-promise is morally wrong. In what follows, I shall try to coun-ter these objections.

It is not my claim that the state has no biases. Indeed, a com-

mitment to certain goals makes the state bend in the directionof those objectives. Only those who have a gods-eye view ofimpartiality or neutrality expect the state not to have anybiases! Since I believe that all humans and human-made entitiesare laden with some interest or values, I reject a gods-eye viewof impartiality, an absolutist impartiality from nowhere (seeBhargava 1994). Yet, the state can embody a set of minimal

values that all citizens, if they were to use their powers of rea-son and empathy, can agree on, and without which a decent,egalitarian social life is impossible. For instance, they can allagree not to subordinate themselves to each other and to livetheir lives in accordance with conceptions of the good theyhave worked out with each others help, although without un-

due inuence. More importantly, a state not only embodies aset of professed values, but also reects the overall culturalethos within which it is located. This ethos may or may not bemade of multicultural strands of equal weight or strength. Forexample, if a state is situated within a lively Christian tradi-tion, it is, if examined close enough, likely to reect the char-acter of that tradition. The more important issue, then, is whatthe state does once it begins to recognise its own cultural andreligious leanings those which are not stated and have evenbeen disavowed, but are nonetheless present in its institutionsand practices.

An example would help. In India, a very large and signi-cant number of people either call themselves Hindu or aretaken to be so. Though not entirely, the ethos of many ofIndias social and political institutions is saturated, it might bereasonably claimed, by one or the other strand of Hinduism.So, regardless of our evaluative judgment, it would not be en-tirely incorrect to say that these institutions are somewhatHinduised or wear a Hindu look. Yet, India also has Muslims,Christians, Parsees, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, atheists, and peo-ple with many other not so easily denable outlooks. Sectionsof Hindus may nd their practices disagreeable, morally dis-comforting, or just downright strange, but they tolerate them.They may collectively have the power to interfere in them,

even banish them, but they refrain from doing so. Of course,legally they have no other option. These religious communitieshave rights not to be interfered with in their religious andcultural practices. But the minorities will not be able to effec-tively exercise their rights, if Hindus do not possess the capac-ity for other-related self-restraint. Most Hindus do, as a matterof fact, exercise such restraint. But is this sufcient for a mor-ally justied coexistence between Hindus and minority com-munities? Suppose, then, that community-specic rights ofminorities are respected, but Hindu self-assertion becomesmore pronounced. Let us say they build new temples aroundevery corner, ensure that these are mightier in size thanmosques and churches, fund new radio and television chan-nels that stream Hindu teachings and no other, introduce text-books that speak largely of and glorify Hindu gods and god-desses, change national and state symbols in order to makethem explicitly and exclusively Hindu, and so on. What wouldits impact be on the psyche of the minorities? Most likely, it

will increase their sense of social and cultural alienation. It

will force them to feel left out of many public domains. It mighteven lower their self-esteem. Alternatively, Hindus can showsome self-related self-restraint, so as not to show off, to notalways wear their own religion and culture on their sleeves, tonot always advertise their wares, as it were. Indeed, to persist-ently announce in public that you are the boss in your owncountry might be a denitive sign of deep-rooted insecuritiesand anxieties, one that is both potentially damaging to othersand to oneself. Abandoning this self-related self-restraint mightthen adversely affect everyone, and destroy the very fabric ofcontemporary Indian society.

A second, related objection can be answered by spelling out what kind of state I have in mind when I speak of the state. I

am certainly not talking here about an authoritarian, central-ised state. I take it for granted that the state is democratic, notonly in the sense that its own institutions are so, but also in theother sense that it is continually nourished by a democraticethos. A state with democratic institutions can be impartial tosome degree, if at least some politicians behave as statesper-sons, some judges scrupulously make decisions that are legallysound and wise, and so on. But for its biases to be revealed andrectied, in short, for a state to act in a properly secular anddemocratic manner, it is imperative that there be a free and

vibrant press, committed social activists, and an alert citizenry. An impartial and secular state is dependent on multiple agentsboth within its structure and outside it. There is no way to en-sure that the rst act of the state on a relevant issue be properlyand unmistakably secular. However, if the state is understoodas multiple agent-dependent, then over time it can shed mostof its signicant biases for one religion and emerge instead assecular and impartial. A frequently asked question is: Who decides

what is right and properly secular? My answer always is: Arelatively correct and endorsable decision cannot be taken

without the involvement of all relevant agents, including those who are directly and adversely affected by the decision. Alldecisions in a democratic state are taken over a time, and in-

variably involve a large number and different kinds of agents.


11/14


12/14



ghting this election for the protection of Hinduism. There-fore, we do not care for the votes of the Muslims. This countrybelongs to Hindus and will remain so. Again:

You will nd Hindu temples underneath if a ll the Mosques are dugout. Anybody who stands against the Hindus should be showed or

worshipped with shoes. Prabhoo should be lead to victory in the nameof Hindu. Though this country belongs to Hindus, Ram and Krishnaare insulted. We do not want Muslim votes. A snake like Shahabuddinis sitting in the Janata Party. So, the voters should bury this par ty.

The election of Prabhoo, an independent candidate sup-ported by Shiv Sena, was declared void by the Bombay HighCourt on the grounds that he and his agent Bal Thackeray hadappealed for votes on the basis of the returned candidates re-ligion, and also that Thackerays election speeches promotedfeelings of enmity and hatred among citizens of India ongrounds of religion and community. Both Thackeray andPrabhoo contested this judgment and appealed to the SupremeCourt, claiming that their acts did not constitute a violation ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, which prohibits

only a direct appeal for votes on the ground of the religion ofthe candidate. (They also argued that their public speechesdid not amount to an appeal for votes on the ground of theirreligion, because Hindutva means the Indian culture and notmerely the Hindu religion. Shockingly, the Court acceptedthis view. Thus, we have a judgment which exemplies acombination of the best and worst practices of the Indian judi-ciary.) Their counsel argued that, because they violate thefunda mental right to free speech given by Article 19 (I) (a) ofthe Constitution, subsections 3 and 3 A of Section 123 of the

Act are unconstitutional.

Practical, Public Reasoning

The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the appellants,particularly their contention that subsection 3 of Section 123 is

violated only when an election speech makes a direct appeal for votes on the ground of the candidates religion. In the view of theCourt, the nature of the speech is determined by its substance as

well as by the manner in which it is meant to be understood bythe audience within a particular social setting, and if a reason-able interpretation of the speech leads to the same conclusionas a direct appeal, then the speech violates the relevant sub-section of the Act. The purpose of enacting the provision, theCourt argued, was to ensure that no candidate at an electiongets or is denied votes only because of his religion.

Is this judgment of the Court consistent with secularism?More specically, which version of secularism does it endorse?

According to the judgment, it is part of the meaning of secu-larism that the state has no religion. The judgment claimsthat a secular state guarantees all its citizens the right tofollow their religion according to their own convictions. Itfurther claries that secularism is one facet of the right toequality, for it means equality in matters of religion to allindividuals and groups. In several passages, the Court alsoendorses the equality of citizenship. However, in the opinionof the Court, secularism cannot a llow the mixing of religionand politics. Its professed goal is violated when a candidate

appeals for votes on the ground of his religion. Does it meanthat the Court understands separation to mean the exclusionof religion from politics? If so, its understanding of secularismis very different indeed from the principled distance versionoutlined above.

Fortunately, the Court claries that this secular principlemust not be understood simplistically. The mere mention ofreligion in an election speech is not forbidden by the Act.Religion may gure in an election speech as long as itsintroduction does not amount to an appeal to vote on theground of the candidates religion, or an appeal to not vote for theopponent on the ground of his religion. For example, an elec-tion speech made in conformity with the fundamental right tofreedom of religion guaranteed under Articles 25-30 of theConstitution cannot be treated as anti-secular. Similarly, if aspeech refers to discriminatory acts against any particularreligion and promises a removal of this imbalance, then, becauseits objective is the promotion rather than the denial of equalityand justice, the speech is entirely consistent with secularism.

This means that the Court endorses Articles 25-30, where everygroup is protected from discrimination on grounds of religion,and is granted the right to obtain funds from the state foreducational purposes on a non-preferential basis. Thus, whenthe use of religion in political or electoral speeches createsalienation among citizens instead of encouraging solidarity,

when it violates the principle of equal citizenship, only then issecularism violated. It was to uphold the principle of equal citi-zenship or political fraternity and to prevent political aliena-tion among citizens that, according to the court, the makers ofthe Constitution rejected separate electorates. Forbidding theuse of religion for gaining votes is of a piece with the rejectionof separate electorates, as both mix religion and politics in an

inappropriate manner. This distinction between appropriateand inappropriate mixing of religion and politics is at the heart ofthe idea of principled distance. Since this distinction is acceptedor presupposed by the judgment, it follows unambiguouslythat separation is understood not as exclusion of religion, butin terms of the idea of principled distance.

Thus, the decision arrived at by a defensible secularstate must be viewed as a practical judgment, a result of anelaborate public reasoning with citizens over a long periodof time. By its very nature it is not nal, but provisionaland revisable. It just happens to be the best possible answerto a problem, under the circumstances, at that point intime, which retrospectively may even be understood as partof a long, continuing series of similar morally sensitivepractical judgments.

Two further objections might still be raised. First, it mightbe said: look at the state of the subcontinent! Look at India!How deeply divided it remains! What about the violenceagainst Muslims in Gujarat and against Christians in Odisha?How can success be claimed for the Indian version of secular-ism? I do not underestimate the force of this objection. Thesecular ideal in India is in periodic crisis and is deeply contest-ed. Besides, at the best of times, it generates as many problemsas it solves. But this account must not be read as an apologia


13/14



for the Indian state, but as a reasonable and sympatheticarticulation of a conception that the Indian state frequentlyfails to realise. My discussion is meant to focus on the compar-ative value of this conception and its potential for the future,and not on how, in fact, it has fared in India. And why shouldthe fate of ideal conceptions with transcultural potential bedecided purely on the basis of what happens to them in theirplace of origin?

Second, it might be objected that I do not focus on the bestpractices of Western states and emphasise the more vocalarticulations of Western secular conceptions. But this criticismis unfair. A part of my point throughout is that a gap hasopened up everywhere between the dominant doctrinal for-mulations and practice, even in the West. My point is not thatprincipled distance is absent from French or American prac-tice, but rather that it exists informally and when it enters theformal sphere, it remains unacknowledged, making no dif-ference to existing doctrinal formulations. These doctrinalconceptions, on the other hand (a) obstruct an understanding

of alternative conceptions worked out on the ground by mor-ally sensitive political agents; (b) by inuencing politiciansand citizens alike, frequently distort the practice of manyWestern and non-Western states; and (c) mask the many waysin which inter- or intra-religious domination persists in manyWestern societies. Moreover, it is this conception that hastravelled to all parts of the world, and is a continuing sourceof misunderstanding of the value of secular states. My objec-tive is to displace these conceptions, or at least put them intheir place.

I hope to have demonstrated that the principled distancemodel is the best among available versions. I do not wish tosuggest that this alternative model is found only in India. The

Indian case is meant to show that such an alternative exists. Itis not meant to resurrect a dichotomy between the West andthe East. As I have mentioned, I am quite certain that thisalternative version is embedded in the best practices of manystates, including those Western states that are deeply enam-oured of mainstream conceptions of political secularism. Myobjective here is to draw attention to the point that politicaltheorists do not see the normative potential in the secularpractices of these different states because they are obsessed

with the normativity of just one variant, the mainstream modelof secularism. Western states need to improve their under-standing of their own secular practices, just as Western secu-larism needs a better theoretical self-understanding. Ratherthan get stuck on models they developed at a particular timein their history, they would do well to more carefully examinethe normative potential in their own political practices, or tolearn from the original Indian variant.

This problem of misunderstanding secularism aficts India,too. Both the self-proclaimed supporters of secularism andsome of its misguided opponents in India could learn from ex-amining the original Indian variant of constitutional secular-ism. Indeed, it is my conviction that many critics of Indiansecularism will embrace it once they better understand itsnature and point, something that can be done only when we

loosen the grip of dominant models of secularism and recog-nise the existence of multiple secularisms, including the prin-cipled distance variant.

In Conclusion

Political secularism must be viewed as part of critical socialsecularism, indeed, as a self-critical social perspective againstnot religion or faith, but against institutionalised religiousdomination. It is part of a family of perspectives against fourtypes of domination: inter-religious, intra-religious, domina-tion of the religious by the secular, and domination of thesecular by the religious. We also need to give up the binaryopposition between the secular and the religious. A new, re-fashioned conception of secularism must not see a necessaryopposition between the secular and the religious. On the con-trary, it must encourage a way of conceiving a world inhabitedby both religious and non-religious people. Second, we should

jettison seeing political secularism as a mere strategy, even asan institutional strategy. Third, secularism should sever its

ties with amoral secular states. This means coming to realisethat, somewhat paradoxically, secularism is against some sec-ular states. Fourth, the state cannot avoid having or endors-ing a policy towards religion or religious organisations. Reli-gion plays an important part in the lives of many people, andreligious institutions function in this world like purely secularinstitutions. So, separation cannot mean the exclusion of reli-gion from the domain of the state. Separation of church andstate should also not be interpreted as absolute or strict neu-trality. No state can possibly help or hinder all religions in thesame manner and to the same degree. The state may interfere

with religion and refrain from such interference, dependingentirely on which of these promotes the values of freedom

and equality, or undermines inter-religious and intra-reli-gious dominations. Thus, we must rethink disconnection orseparation talk in terms of principled distance. Furthermore,

values of f reedom and equality must be interpreted both asrights of individuals and, wherever required, as rights of com-munities. Community rights are particularly important ifreligious groups are vulnerable or, because of their smallnumber, have relatively little power to inuence the processof decision-making.

Secularism must be neither servile nor hostile to religion. Itmust manifest an attitude of neither blind deference nor in-difference, but of critical respect towards all religions. Secu-larism that professes principled distance and is sensitive tomultiple values cannot avoid making contextual judgments.Contextual judgments allow for ethically sensitive balancingand compromise.

If secularism is to survive as a transcultural normative per-spective, it must be de-Christianised, de-Westernised, de-pri-

vatised, and de-individualised. In saying so, I do not mean thatit must wholly sever its links with Christianity or the West, butits ties with them must be loosened. It should be able to accom-modate norms derived from civilisations other than the West.Only with such forms of secularisms and a state nourished bythem can deep religious diversity be managed.


14/14


References

Austin, G (1972): The Indian Constitution: Corner- stone of a Nation (New Delhi: Oxford UniversityPress).

Audi, R (1993): The Place of Rrelig ious Argumentin a Free and Democratic Society, San Diego

Law Review, 30: 677-701.Bader, V (2007): Secularism or Democracy? Associ-

ational Governance of Religious Diversity

(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam P ress).Barker, Christine R (2004): Church and State:

Lessons from Germany, The Political Quarter-ly , 75(2): 168-76.

Bhargava, Rajeev (1994): Giving Secularism ItsDue, Economic & Political Weekly , 29(28):1784-91.

(2011): Rehabilitating Secularism in CraigCalhoun et al (ed.), Rethinking Secular ism(New York: Oxford University Press), 92-113.

(2012): How Should States Deal with DeepReligious Diversity? Can Anyth ing Be Learnedfrom the Indian Model of Secularism? inTimothy Samuel Shah et al (ed.), Rethinking

Relig ion and World Af fairs (New York: OxfordUniversity Press), 73-84.

(2013): Multiple Secularisms and MultipleSecular States in Anders Berg-Sorensen (ed.),Contesting Secularism Comparative Perspec-tives (Farnham: Ashgate), 17-42.

Bowen, J (2007): Why the French Dont Like Headscarves. Islam, the State and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Buruma, Ian (2006): Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits ofTolerance (New York: Atlantic Books).

Cesari, Jocelyne (2010): Muslims in the West af ter9/11 (London: Routledge).

Connolly, W E (1999): Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Dworkin, R (1978): Liberalism in S Hampshire(ed.), Public and Pr ivate Morali ty (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).

Eberle, C J (2002): Religious Conviction in Liberal Polities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Freedman, J (2004): Secularism as a Barrier toIntegration? The French Dilemma, Inter-national Migration , 42: 5-27.

Hamburger, P (2002): Separation of Church andState (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Keane, J (2000): Secularism, The Political Quar-terly , 71: 5-19.

Klausen, J (2005): The Islamic Challenge: Politicsand Religion in Western Europe (Oxford andNew York: Oxford University Press).

Larmore, C (1996): The Morals of Modernity (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press).

Levy, L W (1994): The Establishment Clause: Reli- gion and the First Amendment (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press).Macedo, S (1990): Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtueand Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Madan, T N (1998): Secularism in Its Place inBhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics (NewDelhi: Oxford University Press), 297-320.

Modood, T, A Triandafyllidou and R Zapata-Barrero,ed. (2006): Multiculturali sm, Muslims and Citi-

zenship: A European Approach (London:Routledge).

Modood, T (2011): On Moderate Secualri sm: A Eu-ropean Conception, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/tariq-modood/moderate-secularism-european-conception

Rawls, J (1971): A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,MA: Belknap P ress).

Sandel, M J (1993): Freedom of Conscienceor Freedom of Choice in T Eastland (ed.),

Relig ious Libert y in the Supreme Court: TheCases that Dene the Debate over Church andState (Lanham, MD: National Book Network),483-96.

Spinner-Halev, J (2000): Surviving Diversity: Religionand Democratic Citizenship (Baltimore: JohnHopkins University Press).

Solum, L (1990): Faith and Justice, DePaul Law Review, 39: 1083-1096.

Tambiah, S J (1998): Crisi s of Secularism in Indiain Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), 418-53.

Taylor, C (1994): Justice after Virtue in J Hortonand S Mendus (ed.), After Macintyre (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 16-43.

Turner, B S (2001): Cosmopolitan Virtue: On Reli-gion in a Global Age, European Journal ofSocial Theory , 4: 131-52.

Weithman, P J (1997): Relig ion and Contemporary Liberalism (Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press).

Decentralisation and Local GovernmentsEdited by

T R R AGHUNANDAN

The idea of devolving power to local governments was part of the larger political debate during the Indian nationalmovement. With strong advocates for it, like Gandhi, it resulted in constitutional changes and policy decisions in thedecades following Independence, to make governance more accountable to and accessible for the common man.

The introduction discusses the milestones in the evolution of local governments post-Independence, while providing anoverview of the panchayat system, its evolution and its powers under the British, and the stand of various leaders ofthe Indian national movement on decentralisation.

This volume discusses the constitutional amendments that gave autonomy to institutions of local governance, both ruraland urban, along with the various facets of establishing and strengthening these local self-governments.

Authors:

V M Sirsikar Nirmal Mukarji C H Hanumantha Rao B K Chandrashekar Norma Alvares Poornima Vyasulu, Vinod Vyasulu Niraja Gopa Mani Shankar Aiyar Benjamin Powis Amitabh Behar, Yamini Aiyar Pranab Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee Amitabh Behar Ahalya S Bhat, SuKolhar, Aarathi Chellappa, H Anand Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo Nirmala Buch Ramesh Ramanathan M A Oommen IndRajaraman, Darshy Sinha Stphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal M Govinda Rao, U A Vasanth Rao Mary E John Pratap Ranjan Jena, Manish GupPranab Bardhan, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Abhirup Sarkar M A Oommen J Devika, Binitha V Thampi

Pp xii + 432 ISBN 978-81-250-4883-1 2012 Rs 695

Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltdwww.orientblackswan.com

Mumbai Chennai New Delhi Kolkata Bangalore Bhubaneshwar Ernakulam Guwahati Jaipur Lucknow Patna Chandigarh HyderabadContact: [email protected]

Reimagining Secularism

Documents

Transcript of Reimagining Secularism