Thesis Lit ReviewChris O’kane

Thesis introduction

prefaceThe current economic social crisis can be well described by the Marxian

theory of fetishism. Volatile world markets and the sovereign debts crises have acted like autonomous entities with their social repercussions possessing the character of inverted forms of domination. These circumstances are well reflected in Marx’s statement that ‘magnitudes of value vary continually, independently of the foreknowledge and action of exchangers. Their own movement within society has for them the form of a movement made by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them.’1 Yet contemporary critical social theory has moved away from employing Marx’s theory of fetishism while also finding itself ill suited to describe or understand the socio-economic crisis.

However, a strand a critical social theory does exist that can be said to have grappled with similar issues. Marx’s theory of fetishism served a fundamental role for these thinker’s theories of ideological mystification and their theories of the constitution and constituents of social domination. In this thesis I focus on the bringing the later to the fore with an eye to the contemporary relevance of these theories of fetishism and social domination for critical theory.

This thesis is therefore concerned with a comparative history of fetishism’s role in Marx, Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre’s theories of the constitution and constituents of social domination.2 I critically examine how Marx, Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre use fetishism in their respective theories of the constitution3 and constituents4 of social domination. I also track how these thinker’s respective conceptions of fetishism and social domination differ from each other. Finally, I consider the coherence of these theories and their contemporary relevance.

1 (Marx 2004) 1762 I define a theory of social domination as a theory that asserts an integral link between the way a society is structured and the type of domination characteristic of this society. The definition is intended to be vague and to bypass terms typically associated with the Marxian conception of social domination such as alienation or reification. 3 By Constitution I refer to how the theory of fetishism as a social relation between people becoming a social relation between things constitutes these theories of social domination.4 By Constituents I refer to how the properties of these conceptions of fetishism are used to convey how fetishism structures and is indicative of social domination.

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My approach is theoretical, comparative and broadly historical; Theoretical in the sense that I focus on providing what I think is an accurate and critical account of each thinker’s conception of fetishism and the role that fetishism plays in their theories of the social constitution and constituents of social domination; Comparative in the sense that this account compares each respective theorists conception of fetishism and the role it plays in their theory of the constitution and constituents of social domination; Historical in the sense that I am providing a history or map of how each thinkers conceives of fetishism and utilizes it in their theory of social domination.5

The following comparative study of fetishism and social domination in Karl Marx, Georg Lukacs, Theodor Adorno and Henri Lefebvre therefore provides a substantial original contribution in the following manner: (1) orienting my comparative study on the question of fetishism and social domination which is concerned with how each thinker conceives of fetishism and how this conception of fetishism is used as a basis for their theories of the constitution and constituents of social domination. (2) My criticism of each thinker’s conception of fetishism, how it fits into their theories and their theories of the constitution and constituents of social domination. (3) My selection of Marx, Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre who have never been studied in a comparative manner from this perspective. (4) My concluding considerations on the coherence these theories hold for models of fetishism and social domination and the relevance of these theories for a contemporary critical social theory of fetishism and social domination.

1 Literature ReviewThe focus of this thesis is therefore different than the voluminous and

disparate writings on fetishism that either: (a) use the term in manner that differs from its Marxian origins6 or (b) treat fetishism as constitutive of a

5 Despite fetishism’s importance to ‘Western Marxism,’ there is no work in English that examines the development of fetishism in ‘Western Marxism.’ Merlau Ponty, who coined the phrase ‘Western Marxism,’ focuses on The Adventures of the Dialectics, Martin Jay focuses on totality, Russell Jacoby on The Dialectic of Defeat and Perry Anderson levelled a number of criticisms at the tradition in Considerations on Western Marxism. This thesis takes inspiration from these approaches. However, my focus differs in two respects: (1) I begin with a substantive chapter on Marx and trace the concept of fetishism from Marx through Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre’s interpretations. (2) I narrow my field of examination from the rather broad category of ‘Western Marxism’, to focus on thinkers who share a similar Hegelian interpretation of Marx and use fetishism as a central part of their social theory. The history of fetishism I trace consequently maps a concept that hasn’t been utilized in any in depth histories or studies on Marx and Western Marxism.6 Many accounts of commodity fetishism say more about the particular disciplines they are written in than the phenomenon itself. This is particularly true in disciplines such as literary theory or cultural studies where despite the fact that the Marxian term is used the concept is often applied in a way that has little to do with the Marxian conception of fetishism. Several examples suffice: Coffee and Commodity Fetishism, From Hegel to Madonna: Toward a General Economy of

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different concept such as false consciousness, ideology or reification in studies that survey these respective concepts.7 In what follows I outline a conceptual typology of how these different constitutive interpretations construe fetishism.8 I then discuss how historical and conceptual accounts in these types address the development of the concept in Marx and Western Marxism.

2 Conceptual Typologies of Fetishism

Norman Geras’s classic article on fetishism: Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx’s Capital9, provides a convenient distinction to frame different conceptions of fetishism. Geras distinguishes between two distinct aspects of fetishism: mystification and domination. The different interpretations I will now outline follow Geras’s distinction with fetishism primarily conceived as constitutive of a type of mystification, domination or a combination of the two.

2.2 Fetishism as False Consciousness

The interpretation of Fetishism as False Consciousness has a long history and can be seen as far back as Karl Kautsky’s highly influential The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx.10 This conception is now prevalent among Anglophone and analytic philosophical accounts of fetishism. 11 The most prominent examples of this interpretation include the important analytic Marxists G.A. Cohen and Jon Elster. We can therefore see two prevalent explanations of why fetishism is false consciousness in Cohen and Elster’s work. For Cohen fetishism is a form of false consciousness because of the illusory independence fetishized commodities

Commodity Fetishism and Yoga and Fetishism: Reflections on Marxist Social Theory. These approaches are not relevant to this study.

7 See (Rosen 1996) (Vandenberghe 2009) 8 My typology does not address Lacanian interpretations of Marx. To my knowledge this interpretation does not engage with conceptual accounts of fetishism in Marx, Lukacs Adorno and Lefebvre. Zizek’s scattered remarks are an exception to this, however they are too scattered to warrant their own typology.9 (Geras 1971)

10 "Characteristics which had appeared mysterious because they were not explained on the basis of the relations of producers with each other were assigned to the natural essence of commodities. Just as the fetishist assigns characteristics to his fetish which do not grow out of its nature, so the bourgeois economist grasps the commodity as a sensual thing which possesses pretersensual properties.” (Stenning 1936) From www.Marxists.org. This interpretation can also be seen in the canonical Marxist accounts of Sweezy. For a further discussion of these accounts see (Geras 1971) and (Rubin 2007)11 See also (Eyerman1981), (Pines 1993), (Gabel 1975) And (Rosen 1996)

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possess. 12 Elster describes this illusion in a similar fashion with recourse to a naturalization and embodied fallacy. 13 In Fetishism as False Consciousness, fetishism is therefore seen a mystified type of ideological false consciousness that veils domination in capitalist society. Fetishism is thus conceived as an epistemological error or what Elster calls a ‘cognitive illusion’14 that is generated by the complex appearance of the capitalist mode of production, which also leads to these appearances being naturalized. In this account fetishism consists in a category mistake concerning what Michael Rosen terms a “theoretical illusion about the economy”15 that conceives of the exchange value commodities posses as intrinsic to commodities, rather than seeing it as something produced by exploited human labour. In some accounts once this mistake is corrected the fetishism of commodities is dispelled and de-naturalized. In others, this illusion is objectively generated by capitalist production.16 In both cases fetishism is an illusion about conceptions of capitalist social production generated by the mystified appearance of the capitalist circulation process. It is not something inherent to capitalist social production or the social domination that is constitutive and constituted by capitalist social production

2.3 Althusserian Conceptions of fetishism

As the name implies the Althusserian conception of fetishism was developed by Louis Althusser in the 1960s.17 Althusser argued that the aspect of alienation in Marx’s conception of fetishism was a vestige of the Hegelian legacy of the Young Marx’s thought and was separate from Marx’s scientific critique of political economy. Fetishism was consequently seen as irrelevant to Marx’s critique of political economy to the point where Althusser even argued that the first chapter of Capital could be skipped. Althusser later amended his view that there was an epistemological break between the young Marx and the mature Marx. Never the less, in his interpretation fetishism is a trans-historical form of mystification that veils production that is of secondary importance to the later analysis in Capital. Marx’s criticism of the fetishism of commodities therefore “replaces the false conception of this ‘economy’ as a relation between things by its true definition as a system of social relations.”18 This unveils fetishism because: “A social (‘human’) relation cannot therefore be found among ‘things’ in 12 “Commodities possess exchange-value, and capital is productive. But these powers belong to them only by grace of the material process. Yet they appear to inhere in them independently of it. That appearance is fetishism….The illusion is that it has… power independently, whereas in fact it is delegated by material production.” (Cohen 2001)11613 As Elster lucidly states: by this [fetishism] Marx means that the social relations of men come to appear as the (natural) properties of objects.” Thus, “Commodity fetishism is the belief that goods possess value just as they have weight, as an inherent property.” (Elster 1985) 95. 14 Elster 1985) 9915 (Rosen 1996) 29416 For a discussion of both sides see (Rosen 1996) 200-21917 (Althusser 2005; Althusser and Balibar 2009; Balibar 2007) 18 (Althusser 2005) 216

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general, but only behind the thing of this capitalist relation.19” In contrast to the conceptions of fetishism in Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre, Althusserian Marxists also treat fetishism as concept that is specific to Marx’s account of labour.20

These interpretations of Fetishism as False Consciousness and the Althusserian interpretation of fetishism differ from the other prevalent strands of commentary on fetishism; Fetishism as Alienation, Fetishism as Reification and Fetishism as value.21 In these types fetishism is conceived as a central aspect of Marx’s critique of political economy and integral to his theory of social domination. However, these typologies also treat fetishism as constitutive of the concepts they use to characterize this theory of social domination

2.4 Fetishism as Reification

Fetishism as Reification was first conceived in what many consider to be the founding document of Western Marxism; History and Class Consciousness.22

In this typology the influence of Lukacs’ theory of reification leads to the term ‘fetishism’ being used interchangeably with ‘reification.’ In these conceptions fetishism and reification are treated as: (a) synonymous terms to describe the transformation of social processes into things that dominate and deceive people as a form of mystified false consciousness23 or fetishism is treated as (b) half of the basis for Lukacs’ and the Frankfurt schools Weberian Marxist theory of reification. 24 In all of these instances reification is said to be

19 (Althusser 2005) 21720 In this view Marx’s conception of fetishism ‘does not consist of a general reification of all relationships, as some humanist interpretations of Marx argue, but only of this particular relationship.” (Althusser 2005) 313 21 As G Petrovic points out in A Dictionary of Marxist Thought there is often an overlap between conceptions of alienation, reification and fetishism. Reification and fetishism are often treated as types of alienation, fetishism is treated as synonymous with reification or they are all treated interchangeably. Sometimes all of these overlaps occur in the course of one article. There are, however, grounds for distinguishing these types of interpretations of fetishism.

22 (Lukács 1972) The concept is also used by leading Western Marxists such as Karl Korsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jurgen Habermas in their respective social theories to signify objective and subjective types of social domination. The ways these uses differ from Lukacs deserve a study of their won. 23 See (Cook 1996)24 Prominent examples include Axel Honneth. (Honneth 2008) 97, Ralf Wiggershaus (Wiggershaus 1995) pg 80, (Jay 1986; Jay 1996) 189-90 (Cook 2004) and L Dupree “object and the rise of cultural alienation” in Lukas Today J Grondin “Reification from Lukacs to Habermas in Lukacs Today. For Lukacs and the Frankfurt School as Weberian Marxists see (Löwy 1996)and (Dahms 2011) Some of these works complicate the issue to some degree by treating fetishism as part of the basis for theories of reification that encompass Marx, Weber and other theories.

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synonymous or continuous with the aspects of fetishism it draws from Marx and constitutive of a theory of social domination and mystified false consciousness.25 Some people who can be grouped into this strand of interpretation also contend that Lukacs’s theory of reification somehow discovered or at least anticipated Marx’s theory of alienation prior to the discovery of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.26

Thus, despite (a) its literal meaning-- which is usually traced to the Latin term res and is defined as the transformation of human processes into things or the confusion of human processes with things—or (b) its general use which includes describing society as thingified-- signifying that social relations between people are mediated by things— or fragmented, accounts of fetishism as reification adopt Lukacs’ widespread use of the term and apply it to other thinkers entire theories of social domination. This leads to confusing the part with the whole in analyses of other thinkers where the transformation of human processes into things, the mediation of social relations between things or social fragmentation forms an aspect, but not the entirety, of the majority of these thinkers’ social theories of domination. As a result, the term that designates what mediates social relationships—reification-- is often conflated with how and why social relationships are mediated in this manner.

2.5 Fetishism as Alienation.

The interpretation of Fetishism as Alienation was triggered by the discovery of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts following the publication of History and Class Consciousness. The place that alienation has in Marx’s later writings became a matter of contention during the debates between Humanist and Althusserian interpretations of Marx. There now seems to be a general acknowledgement that fetishism relates to alienation. However there are a number of different conceptions of how they relate that depends on how alienation is conceived.

What I will term the classic Marxist Humanist conception of Fetishism as Alienation was initially formulated by Western Hegelian Marxists.27 In this

25 These conceptions of Fetishism as Reification are particularly prominent in work that is conceived from within or that focuses on the Frankfurt School.26CF Harry Dahms statement that “At the time, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts with their emphasis on the category of alienation had not been discovered yet, and when Lukacs wrote History and Class Consciousness, he was not familiar with Marx’s earlier critique of political economy in terms of alienation. Yet he was able to reconstruct Marx’s critique of alienation as the foundation for the critique of commodity fetishism.” 102. See also Vandenberghe 147 A Reassessment of Alienation in Karl Marx C. E. Grimes and Charles E. P. Simmons, The Question of Alienation in Marx Nishad Patnaik as well as (Arato 1979)

27 This account can be seen in the classic Marxist humanist works of Henri Lefebvre, Herbert Marcuse, and Eric Fromm. For a similar interpretation from this era from a non-Hegelian Marxist standpoint see Lucien Goldmann and Daniel Bell.

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interpretation alienation is seen as the core problematic of Marx’s thought. Marx’s formulation of the theory of alienation in the Manuscripts is thus seen as the key formulation of this problematic. While Marx’s later focus on political economy is seen as the less expansive, ‘economist’ conception of alienation. In these accounts the classic formulation of alienation is said to underlie Marx’s entire critique of political economy. Fetishism is therefore interpreted as the economic type of alienation. This analysis is concisely summarized in Henri Lefebvre’s statement that “fetishism is the economic form of alienation.”28 In this interpretation alienation is an objective and subjective state generated by capitalist production in which humans are alienated from their products and cut off from their human essence.29

A viewpoint similar to this classic Marxist humanist viewpoint was also taken up as a counterpart to Althusser. This viewpoint emphasizes a strong continuity between Marx’s theory of alienation and fetishism. Fetishism is designated as a sub-specie of alienation. Thus like the classical Marxist Humanist interpretation, in this interpretation, fetishism consists in alienation and underlies Marx’s critique of political economy. This can be seen among other places in Bertell Olmann’s work on alienation.30 which follows the classical humanist view that Marx’s theory of alienation is the core problematic of his thought.31 What Olmann terms fetishism and reification merely represent Marx’s later formulations of alienation.

A thinner conception of Fetishism as Alienation can also be found in works on Marx. These works argue for a continuity between the young and later Marx, but in contrast to the other accounts of Fetishism as Alienation, they also emphasize important developments that give fetishism a conceptual and explanatory complexity that is lacking in The Manuscripts. In this strand Marx’s theory of alienation might not include or emphasis the alienation of human essence and consist solely in the way that labour becomes an alien form of domination that is external to the human social relations that constitute it.32 Prominent examples of this strand include the work of Lucio Colletti33, Norman Geras34 and Fredy Perlman.35

For the majority of these views Fetishism as Alienation overlaps with Fetishism as Reification on one of two points. Unlike Fetishism as Reification these accounts often treat mystification as a separate but related to fetishism. Like Fetishism as Reification, Fetishism as Alienation, provides a constitutive account of fetishism in which human social relations constitute external and

28 (Lefebvre 2008).29 Fromm shares this view with the additional contention, as evident in one of his more popular books Beyond the Chains of Illusion, that the alienation of humans from their products is illusory. See (Fromm 2006)30 (Ollman 1977),31 Other examples from this period include (Meszaros 2005), (Wilde 1998)

(Avineri 1968) And (Eagleton 2007) For a recent example see (Sayers 2011)32 See (Geras 1971).33 (Colletti 1973), (Colletti 1989)34 (Geras 1971).35 Fredy Perlman, “Introduction: Commodity Fetishism” in (Rubin 2007)

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alien entities that dominate society. However, these accounts often refrain from an explanation of how or why these characteristics and their constitution differ from Marx’s theory of alienation, 36 let alone providing a comparative account of fetishism and social domination in Marx, Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre.

2.6 Fetishism as Value.

The interpretation of fetishism as value is exemplary of value-form theory. Value form theories founding documents are generally attributed to Soviet Scholars in the 1920s, who were later purged by Stalin.37 The Japanese Ono school also began working on Marx’s theory of value following World War II. However, value form theory did not receive much attention until the 1960s in the context of the formation of the Neu Marx Lekture, which apart from singular exceptions like Coletti, can be said have popularized value-form theory.

Many of the foremost pioneers of the Neu Marx Lekture were students of Adorno including Alfred Schmidt, H.G. Backhaus, Helmut Reichelt and Hans-Jurgen Krahl. These students seized on the Marxian concepts Adorno used in his work as a basis for their studies of Marx. To study Marx they used philological methods that utilized previously neglected documents from Marx’s later works such as The Grundrisse and the first edition of Capital.

In this interpretation fetishism is conceived as a central component of Marx’s monetary theory of value.38 This relationship is well summarized in Kuruma’s concise formulation that Marx’s section on the value form provides an analysis of how money develops and the theory of fetishism describes why money develops. Fetishism is thus conceived as ‘real’ or ‘practical’ abstraction generated by the social form of capitalist production that reifies people and personifies things culminating in the abstract social domination of capital.

The value-form interpretation can be seen to further distinguish itself from the other two typologies that conceive of Marx’s theory of fetishism as a central component of his theory of domination. In contrast to the classic Marxist Humanist conception of Fetishism as Alienation, value form theorists have emphasized the shifting and developing nature of Marx’s thought. Along with the thin conceptions of Fetishism as Alienation this strand therefore emphasizes the differences in development and explication between the young and mature Marx.39 In contrast to Fetishism as Reification value form theorists also make a

36 (Colletti 1973) and Perlman’s writings on Marx are an exception. How they differentiate Marx’s account of alienation in The Manuscripts and Capital is discussed in my chapter on Marx.

37 Foremost among these works is (Rubin 2007) and (Pashukanis 1987) Ryzanov’s MEGA were also influential to the methodology and philological approach taken up by value-form theory.

38 Other figures who can be grouped into this school include Michael Heinrich, Dieter Wolf, Ricardo Belofiore, Patrick Murray, Fred Moseley, Moishe Postone, Chris Arthur, Gert Reuten and Werner Bonefeld and Capital and Class /the Open Marxist school39 Much of the work in this typology is based on emphasizes the differences between different editions of Capital.

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distinction between fetishism, reification and mystification in recent studies.40 Yet, as I will show in the next section, this interpretation predominantly focuses on Marx with little comparative work on Marx and his interpreters.

As can be seen all of these all these types treat fetishism as constitutive of a larger conception of mystification or domination. This is reflected in historical or comparative accounts of fetishism.

3 Conceptual Histories

Despite the lack of a study of the development of fetishism from Marx through Western Marxism, a number of the foremost studies of these thinkers assert similarities or differences between Marx and his interpreters in their respective conceptions of fetishism. There are also studies that provide continuous and discontinuous conceptual histories in these conceptual types that account for fetishism.

3.1 conceptual continuity

A conceptual continuity between Marx and Western Marxists can be seen in each of these types. Thus histories of ideology such as Michael Rosen trace their conception of Fetishism as False Consciousness through Marx, Adorno and Benjamin.41 While other studies assert a continuity in Fetishism as Reification in studies on Marx, Lukacs and Adorno.42 Other studies on Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre describe the continuity of their theory with Marx’s theory of alienation or estrangement.43 Finally, some value-form theorists stress similarities in themes between Marx, Lukacs and Adorno.44 In many instances these characterizations are hampered by the lack of an in depth discussion of what the conceptions of fetishism, reification or alienation and estrangement consist in. Instead the usual procedure is to assert continuity by presupposing a definition,

40 Examples include: Chris Arthur, Riccardo Belliofiore, Michael Heinrich, John Clegg, Guido Schulz and Nick Gray’s distinction between the fetish character of commodities, the fetishism of political economists and reification. This distinction is also similar to Jameson’s conception of reification and fetishism as chiasmus in Valences of the Dialectic. 41 For an opposing view see (McCarney 1980) And Social Theory and The Crisis of Marxism. Available at www.josephmccarny.com42 See (Arato 1979; Wiggershaus 1995; Cook 2004; Cook 1996)43 For Lukacs see (Arato 1979) For Adorno see (Benzer 2011) And Cook. For Lefebvre see (Elden 2004) and (Jay 1986)44 Studies in this strand focus primarily on philogical studies of Marx. So they have not provided any in depth studies of other figures theory of fetishism. The closest that comes to comparative accounts can be seen in Backhaus and Reichelt’s frequent use of Adorno for their exegesis of Marx’s theory of value. For a similar contemporary comparison see two recent articles by Bonefeld on Adorno. In (Holloway, Matamoros, and Tischler 2008) And Bonefeld (2012). For a comparison between Marx and Lukacs see Postone in (R. Albritton and J. Simoulidi 2003)

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by offering an expansive thematic definition based on themes or conceptions these theories hold in common, or by taking the respective theorist’s claim that they are faithfully using the concept.45

All three of these types of continuity can be seen in Federic Vandenberghe’s A Philosophical History of German Sociology. In this ‘philosophical history’ Vandenberghe maps the concept of reification from Marx through Simmel, Weber, Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas.46 To map the concept Vandenberghe offers an expansive thematic definition of reification that incorporates the differences in each respective thinker’s conceptions of social domination into his conception of reification. Part of this expansive thematic definition includes grouping alienation and fetishism under reification. In the course of the study Vandenberghe also makes frequent conceptual missteps that undermine how he defines concepts and the relations between concepts.

Vandenberghe’s expansive thematic definition of reification and his conceptual missteps can first be seen in his discussion of Marx in the introduction. Vandenberghe begins by following Gillian Rose in pointing out that Marx only used the German word for reification (verdinglichung) twice. By the next page, without an explanation of why, he has moved to defining Marx’s social theory of domination solely in terms of reification. Vandenberghe then adds more unwarranted attributes to this definition of reification by amalgamating the related phenomenon of ‘personalization’ into this nebulous and unfounded definition.47 This culminates in Vandenberghe’s development of a conception of reification expansive enough to include a methodological and social conception, each of which feature several subtypes.48

Like his discussion of reification in the introduction, Vandenberghe’s studies of individual thinkers are also baggy. Following his definition of Marx’s social theory in terms of reification in the introduction, his chapter on Marx begins by defining all of Marx’s work through the core theme of alienation.49 From there Vandenberghe moves to a discussion of Marx’s development where

45 This may be one of the reasons that Lukacs or classic Marxist Humanist conceptions of fetishism have become popular conceptions of fetishism.46 The English translation is a truncated version of his longer two-volume study. 47 “Reification is the opposite of personalization and is therefore conceptually related. While reification transforms something which is not a thing into a thing, personification transforms that which is not a person into a person…Reification in Marx’s sense, can also be seen as personification: social or pseudo-natural forces are perceived and understood as quasi-human forces that rule the world.” Vandenberghe. 948 Methodological reifications subtypes are the critique of reism and naturalism. Social reifications are the social critique, the critique of false consciousness and the critique of science. 49 “All Marx’s work can be systematically reconstructed through the single, central concept of alienation.” The theory of alienation, as Marx first developed it in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, is the core of his thought…one might say that most, if not all of Marx’s thought, as well as the critical categories of Capital, are already discernable in their early form in this text…the Manuscripts anatomy in effects provides a key to the ‘anatomy’ of Capital. Vandenberghe 33.

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he argues that Marx’s thought moved from a philosophical anthropological approach to a historical structuralist one that was still based on Marx’s under riding humanism and his conception of alienation. Along the way the terms alienation, reification and fetishism are treated interchangeably. The term ‘fetishist-reification’ is eventually coined to describe the fetishism of commodities. Yet despite this terminological fusion Vandenberghe’s able exposition of five aspects of fetishism, which include domination and mystification, does not discuss how his characterization of the different aspects of fetishism relate to reification or alienation, nor is it clear how fetishism is constituted or how it constitutive or relates to other aspects of Capital. We are left to assume they are somehow synonymous and stand at the core of it.

Vandenberghe concludes with his reconstruction of Marx’s thought. This reconstruction is based on the theme of inversion that runs through Marx’s work and what he defines as the three aspects of Marx’s theory of reification; alienation, exploitation and fetishism. Vandenberghe places these aspects together in a synoptic table. In this table alienation is defined as social reification and is confined to the production process. Commodity fetishism is termed the reification of consciousness and is treated as a mystified veil that is generated by the production process. This goes against his earlier account of fetishism that included mystification and domination.50 In the end we are left with a rather vacuous summary of Marx social theory where “reification, defined as the imposition of social order through the external constraint of material forces, that results from and leads to the reduction of action to its solely strategic dimension, is not histories last word.”51

Moving to Lukacs Vandenberghe makes a strong claim for continuity between Lukacs, Marx and other Western Marxists. In Vandenberghe’s view there is continuity between Lukacs’s theory of reification and Marx’s theory of fetishism.52 At the same time Lukacs’s theory of reification forms the Kuhnian

50 Compare Vandenberghe’s earlier definition of three of the facets of commodity fetishism on page 62 that social relations between people are mediated by economic relations between things, and become confused with them; that commodities exist independently as pseudo persons; that things, commodities and their movement lead, dominate and direct men, not vice versa with his later definition of commodity fetishism in the synoptic table on page 66 as ‘commodity fetishism, defined as a well-founded distortion of perception induced by the structure of the market economy, makes practical processes and social relations disappear behind a veil of naturalness and materiality. In the first discussion fetishism would seem to include alienation and domination. In the second it seems to solely consist in false consciousness. Yet Vandenberghe provides no discussion or grounds for this change. 51 Vandenberghe. 68.52 In the first part of the essay, entitled “The Phenomenon of Reification”, Lukacs develops his concept of reification on the basis of the Marxist analysis of commodity fetishism. As we saw in Chapter 1, the central idea of this analysis is that in an economic system that is totally oriented around market production of exchange values, human actions are coordinated by the market, with the result that human social relations take the form of an abstract and pseudo-natural objectivity, which disguises the trace of its origins and social determinants behind a rigorous system of autonomous and oppressive laws. 146. Note that

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paradigm of western Marxism.53 For Vandenberghe Lukacs’s theory of reification therefore “generalizes the theory of commodity fetishism beyond the field of economics.”54 In Vandenberghe’s view this is done in an objective and subjective manner. Objectively “reification is related to the autonomous functioning of market pseudo-things as ‘second nature.’”55 Subjectively, reification, refers to alienation, the objectifying attitude that humans adopt towards the products of work that confront them as foreign objects.”56 Thus, in a passage that synthesizes his theoretical conflations and missteps Vandenberghe makes the following claim:

“inspired by Simmel, Lukacs deduces and rediscovers the theory of alienation of labour from the theory of commodity fetishism. Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 were only published in 1937, Lukacs could not have known them any more than Simmel. However, in this instance, it is less through a synthesis of Marx and Simmel- as was the case in Towards the Sociology of Modern Drama-- than through a fusion of the Marxist category of 'abstract work' and Weber's category of formal rationality that Lukacs reconstructs the theory of economic alienation”57

In Vandenberghe’s view this fusion of the Marxist category of abstract labour and Weberian formal rationality is achieved through what he terms Lukacs’ theory of the ‘cash nexus.’58 Vandenberghe argues that Lukacs follows Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism—and the theory of alienation that Lukacs discovers in it—in holding that the “coordination of action….is imposed from outside by the autonomous movement of things on the market. (cash nexus).59 This leads “actors” to “adopt the objectifying attitude of instrumental-strategic action towards themselves and others” and for “thingness” to become the determining modality of thought.” It is also where the Weberian conception of formal rationality is fused with Marx.

Vandenberghe’s account of Lukacs theory of reification therefore posits a strong continuity between Lukacs and Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism and alienation as subtypes of their theories of reification. No consideration is given to how Lukacs’s conception of reification may differ from Marx conception of commodity fetishism. Furthermore, as with his account of Marx, no space is devoted to how Lukacs conceives of the social constitution of reification nor to the interrelated constitution of its many different facets.

this definition of fetishism possesses some of the characteristics of Vandenberghe’s original definition in which fetishism possesses the attributes of autonomous domination, rather than his second definition which treated fetishism solely as a form of mystification. 53 Ibid.140.54 Ibid.14655 Vandenberghe 14656 Vandenberghe 14657 Vandenberghe 14758 The fact that Lukacs never discusses explicitly discusses money doesn’t seem to bother Vandenberghe.59 Vandenberghe 148

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The same is the case for Vandenberghe’s study of Adorno. Vandenberghe makes a strong claim for continuity between Lukacs and Adorno. He holds that Lukacs’ theory of reification “is the paradigmatic kernel of critical theory.” Critical theory modifies this kernel in two ways: on one hand, it “abandons” Lukacs’ theory of ‘class consciousness,” on the other hand “it radicalizes the Weberian-Marxist theory of reification.”60

According to Vandenberghe, this radicalization starts from the premises that “every aspect of Adorno’s sociology is so centred on reification that it becomes a virtually ontological category.”61 Ironically, the same is true for Vandenberghe’s treatment of the different aspects of Adorno’s thought, which in Vandenberghe’s view are all part of Adorno’s theory of reification. Thus, Adorno’s criticism of reification in Negative Dialectics does not “imply” that he “rejects the category of reification as such.” Nor is it is even a “rejection of Lukacs’ category of reification.”62 Instead, Adorno “simply strips Lukacs category of its humanist and optimistic connotations, inflecting it in a proto-structuralist direction that is closer to the older than the younger Marx, and more fatalist than revolutionary in its implications.”63 Unfortunately, since: (a) Vandenberghe’s prior discussions of Marx do little to distinguish between the young and old Marx and (b) he doesn’t define what Adorno’s proto-structuralism consists in we are left to guess why what seems like a discrepancy between Adorno and Lukacs’ conception of reification is not a rejection of or at least discontinuous with it.

Vandenberghe’s treatment of Adorno’s social theory as tantamount to his theory of reification can be seen in his discussion of the exchange principle. In Vandenberghe’s view the exchange principles “importance cannot be underestimated.” This is because—in another curious misstep that seems to separate Lukacs from Marxism leaving Marxism untreated—it “enables both the articulation of the negative dialectics and Marxism and the conjunction of Lukacs’ and Nietzsche’s categories of reification.”64 But little consideration is given to how these forms are derived from exchange. Instead we get a characterization of the Nietzsche strand of reification as equivalent to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, while the Lukasian strand is concerned with modern capitalist societies and the cash ‘nexus.’ In so doing Vandenberghe furthers the claim of continuity between Marx, Lukacs and Adorno’s conception of commodity fetishism and continuity between Lukacs and Adorno’s conceptions of reification.

As a consequence Vandenberghe’s philosophical history of German sociology can really be said to be a sociologist’s account of German social philosophy. This is because Vandenberghe’s philosophical history is generally concerned with summarizing each specific thinkers social theory under the thematic of reification. There is little or no discussion of how each thinker conceives of the constitution of these social forms of domination, nor is there any focus on how each thinker conceives of the different aspects of their theories relating to each other. Finally, there is no discussion of how the conceptual bases of reification differ in each respective thinker.

60 Vandenberghe. 15861 Ibid. 19162 Ibid. 18963 Ibid. 18964 Ibid. 190

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3.2 constitutive differences

In contrast to accounts of fetishism that stress continuity there are also a number of studies that stress discontinuity. By discontinuity I mean that these studies stress important conceptual differences between thinkers conceptions of fetishism. In the majority of these accounts Lukacs, Adorno and other theorists are characterized as forming an inferior discontinuity with Marx’s theory. This can be seen in the account of Fetishism as False Consciousness in the work of Joe Mccarney.65 It can also be seen in the account Athusserian accounts of fetishism in Althusser and Balibar66 and in Fetishism as Alienation in Lucio Colletti’s criticism of Lukacs and Hegelian Marxism.67 Finally, a great many of these accounts of discontinuity can be found in the value-form interpretations of fetishism.68 From the other side, accounts of the superiority of discontinuity can also be seen in accounts of Fetishism as Reification that are based on a traditional and economist conception of Marx. These accounts primarily credit Adorno and Lefebvre for conceiving of non-productivist and non-economist conceptions of reification.

A prime example of discontinuous comparisons of Fetishism as Reification can be found in Gillian Rose’s influential treatment on reification in Marx, Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno.69 Rose’s work is exceptional in three respects: (1) it emphasizes the conceptual differences between Marx, Lukacs, Benjamin Adorno’s theories (2) it bases these conceptual differences on the different aspects of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism that Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno drew on. (3) it also points out some areas of weakness in how reification has been used by neo-Marxism.

Rose’s work is also indicative of the type of reification as fetishism. This is because Rose draws an unsatisfactory distinction between Marx’s theory and Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno’s. Rose designates Marx theory ‘commodity fetishism’ and Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno’s ‘reification.’ This distinction is unsatisfactory on one hand because of Rose’s weak contention that Marx didn’t

65 Mccarney argues that the inferior discontinuity Lukacs and the Frankfurt School possess is conceiving of a theory of ideological false consciousness. See Joe Mccarney The Real World of Ideology and Social Theory and the Crises of Marxism.66 See (Althusser 2005) (Althusser and Balibar 2009) And (Balibar 2007)67 See (Colletti 1973) And (Colletti 1989) For another account discontinuities see (Frisby 1992) and (Geras 1971)68 CF Postone’s criticism of Lukacs and The Frankfurt School in (Postone 1996) Reichelt’s criticism of Adorno in Helmut Reichelt Marx's Critique of Economic Categories: Reflections on the Problem of Validity in the Dialectical Method of Presentation in Capital, in: Historical Materialism, Volume 15, Number 4, 2007, pp. 3–52(50, This emphasis on discontinuity over looks parallels, continuities and potential ways that Marx, Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre can compliment each other.

69 The Lament over Reification--which was originally published as journal article and later amended as a chapter in her seminal work on Adorno--(Rose 1979)

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have a theory of reification on the basis that Marx only used verdinglichung twice.70 It is unsatisfactory on the other hand because Rose gives no grounds for why she designates Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno’s social theories of domination as theories of reification. The later is in contradiction to her philological treatment of Marx because Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno use the terms fetishism and reification for what Rose defines solely as fetishism.71 This leads Rose to treat characteristics that Marx, Lukacs and Adorno attribute to fetishism such as the autonomous personification of things as cases of reification.

In addition Rose’s basis for her distinction between the different bases of Lukacs and Adorno’s utilization of Marx’s theory of fetishism is problematic. This is because she draws an erroneous distinction between Marx’s theory of the labour process and his theory of value. This distinction leads Rose to argue that Lukacs’ theory of reification is based on the former while Adorno’s theory of reification is based on the later. Yet, as I will show Marx’s theory of value incorporates the labour process as well as the forms of value such as exchange value and use-value. 72 This undermines the bases for Rose’s distinction.

Finally, Rose makes some prescient criticisms of how neo-Marxists have used the concept of reification to generalize Marx’s theory of value to social institutions and culture without providing an account of surplus vale, the state or power. However, she does not apply these criticisms to Lukacs and Adorno’s particular theories apart from noting that their theories fail to make the distinction between concrete and abstract labour or provide an account of surplus value. While this is true, as I will show, it is not clear how the inclusion of these categories would solve the problems in Lukacs and Adorno’s theories.

Despite these problems Rose’s work is highly influential and is used as the basis for defining or distinguishing Marx, Lukacs and Adorno’s conception of Fetishism as Reification in the work of prominent scholars such as Martin Jay and Deborah Cook.73 It is also a sophisticated and compact study of reification that comes closest to my aims in this thesis.

4. Conclusion

70 This ignores: (a) the fact that Lukacs uses several words other than vergdinglichung to describe his theory of reification. (b) that Marx uses phrases such as veraslichung and dinglich to describe the process of social constitution that results fetishization and reification or what Ehrbar translates as “personification of things and reification of persons.”71 This distinction is especially egregious in Benjamin who used the term fetishism far more than he used the term reification. 72 One of these points of disagreement will be that Lukacs and Adorno use Marx’s theory of value not for an explanation of how value is socially constituted but for social critique. The problem is contra rose not they don’t use surplus value but that they don’t provide a substitute for the role surplus value plays in their social theories.

73 See also recent examples in (Jarvis 1998) Harry F. Dahms “Beyond the Carousel of Reification.” And Timothy Hall article on reification in lukacs and Adorno in(Bewes and Hall 2011)

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As this literature review has shown there is large amount of literature on fetishism. I have offered an overview of this literature by placing it in a typology. These types differ in conceiving of fetishism as constitutive of a type of domination, mystification or as a combination of the two. They also differ over the matter of whether these conceptions have continuity or discontinuity between Marx and Western Hegelian Marxists. Those who argue for continuity usually do so in comparative or historical analyses that stress continuity between their expansive thematic conceptions, while those who stress discontinuity usually do so in terms of an inferior comparison.

What these accounts do not provide is an accurate and in depth explanation of how each respective thinkers conceptions of fetishism differ from each other and how these different conceptions of fetishism factor into their respective theories of the constitution and constituents of social domination. In contrast to these accounts, this thesis orients itself by focusing on fetishism as a distinct concept and providing a comparative account of how this distinct conception is conceived and deployed in theories of the constitution and constituents of social domination. To do so my chapters on Marx, Lukacs Adorno and Lefebvre focus on: (1) how each particular thinker conceives of fetishism. (2) how these particular conceptions of fetishism fit into each particular thinkers theories of the constitution and constituents of theories of social domination. (3) the problems with these theories conception of fetishism and social domination.

In Chapter 1 I focus on how Marx conceives of fetishism in the constitution and constituents of his theory of social domination. Since Marx is also the foundation for typological accounts of fetishism and Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre’s interpretation of fetishism I begin by distinguishing Marx’s theory of fetishism from his theory of alienation. I then examine how Marx conceives of fetishism and the role it plays in the constitution and constituents of his theory of social domination. I argue that Marx’s concept of what I term fetish characteristic forms is central to his theory of value. This theory conceives of value as a real or practical abstraction that is constituted by the social form of capitalist production. The term fetish characteristic forms is used to describe the abstract and autonomous property of these forms. It is deployed in Marx’s discussion of how the fetish characteristic forms of commodities, money and capital invert to dominate and compel individual actions through the objectification and the personification of things culminating in Marx’s analysis of fetishism’s role in the constitution and constituent of social domination in the trinity formula. I criticize Marx’s theory by pointing out how its ambiguities, contradictions and unfinished status undermine its coherence. I also point out how Capital’s analysis of capitalism at its ideal average raises the problem of relating its theories to empirically complex social reality.

In chapter 2 I turn to the role that Lukacs’ conception of fetishism plays in his theory of the social constitution and constituents of the social domination of reified society. I argue that Lukacs’ conception of fetishism as reification fuses his Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian-Simmelian conceptions of domination. I begin by arguing that Lukacs’ theory of the constitution of reification is based on Lukacs’ Hegelian interpretation of Marx. I then show how his conception of the phenomena of reification is based on his interpretation of commodity fetishism

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as reification. This conception conflates objectification with alienation leading him to treat reification as the false objectivity of things that veil their content causing them to possess the rationalized alien powers that fuse his Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian-Simmerlian conceptions of domination. I then show how Lukacs conceives of the constituents of this conception of fetishism as reification by generalizing it to a myriad of social and cultural forms of capitalist totality. I close by criticizing Lukacs’ conception of fetishism as reification and his insufficient account of how it is socially constituted and constitutive of social domination, which ultimately undermines his account of domination.

In Chapter 3 I argue that Adorno’s conception of fetishism and social domination consists in two phases. The first phase utilizes commodity fetishism in conjunction with his Lukacs, Benjamin, Freud and Marx in his micrological studies of domination in mass culture. The later phase utilizes his conception of the fetishism form of the exchange abstraction as an abstract, autonomous objective abstraction to conceive of the social constitution of objective and subjective forms of domination. These forms of domination are conceived as constitutive of the exchange abstraction by interpreting elements of Hegel, Weber, Freud, Kant, and Heidegger’s theory in conjunction with it. I close by criticizing Adorno’s theory for its insufficient account of the genesis of the exchange abstraction and for his insufficient account of how it is constitutive of society. This ultimately undermines his critical theory as a critical theory of society.

In Chapter 4 I argue that Lefebvre conceives of fetishism as a ‘concrete abstraction’ that is generated by social praxis but never entirely determinate of it. I further argue that this conception forms the basis for three phases in which Lefebvre attempts to theorize how social domination is socially embedded. I begin with an examination of Lefebvre’s classical humanist conception of socially embedded domination in his Critique of Everyday Life which uitilizes fetishism as the basis of his proposed study of analagous form of objective and corresponding subjective alienation in everyday life. In phase two I show that Lefebvre’s revision of the critique of everyday life abandons this classic Marxist humanist model in favour of a study of objective terrorist forms of domination modelled on his conception of concrete abstraction coupled with a fragmented conception of alienation no longer based on his classic Marxist humanist notion of total man. In phase three I show how Lefebvre writings on cities and space transpose his theory of concrete abstraction to the urban form and the production of space while jettisoning the explanatory power of the alienation. I close by criticizing the unsystematic nature of Lefebvre’s theory and his reliance on a simplistic dualistic opposition, which like Lukacs and Adorno, leads to Lefebvre undermining his theory of social domination by lacking a coherent account of it constitution and constituents.

I conclude in three parts. In the first part I draw together and compare my analysis of fetishism and social domination in Marx, Lukacs, Adorno and Lefebvre. In part two I draw out my criticisms of each thinker and consider whether these respective theories provide a coherent and cohesive critical social theory of fetishism and the constitution and constituents of social domination. I conclude that each of these theories ultimately fail to provide one. I argue that in order for a critical theory of society to have a more cohesive standpoint the question of genesis must be addressed. Failing to do leaves criticism reliant on

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the potted account of fetishism; disclosing that social relations underlie social forms of domination. While this criticism has some traction it does little to distinguish itself from other accounts of social constructivism, undermining its critical potential. I close in part three by considering how elements of these theories might be integrated into a contemporary critical theory that provides an account of the genesis and interrelation of aspects of each of these theories.

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