Rehfeld - Goodin Response 2010
Transcript of Rehfeld - Goodin Response 2010
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Andrew Rehfeld
Comments on Robert Goodins Paper Epistemic Aspects of
Representative Government
Washington University Political Theory Workshop, Spring 2010
Despite its value in legitimizing rule, democracy has been derided
as a bad form of government on various bases throughout history. The
central critique is related to a general distrust of voter judgment due to
their ignorance, venality, partiality, or lack of a sufficient stake in society.
Historically 3 kinds of solutions have been offered: education, to raise the
value of citizen judgment; qualifications for office, to limit a voters choice
set and thus the potential harm their choice might cause; and finally,
institutional designs that structured both voter choice and the decisional
context of representatives. Despite our modern sensibilities, all of these
interventions were defended in terms of enhancements to democracy
rather than contrary to them, even high property qualifications for the
vote: to those who lack the means, as Guizot put it in the 1840s,
enrichez vous!
One institutional solution to the problem of voter judgment was
supposedly built into the structure of representative government. By
contrast to pure democracy, republican forms, as the founders would put
it, was seen as a way to combine the sovereignty of the people, with the
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epistemic value of an elite class making good decisions for all. There
have traditionally been two kinds of arguments about why representatives
are likely to be better decision makers than citizens generally. First, there
are selection effects of the election that, it is claimed, make it more likely
that representatives will be good decision makers than ordinary voters.
Second, there are deliberative effects that purportedly come to
representatives from being in a relatively small, deliberative legislature;
these lead to better decisions than a voter could make standing outside of
that deliberative body. Putting the two together we get a form of what
Bob Goodin and Kai Spiekermann in their paper Epistemic Aspects of
Representative Government term the federalist conjecture: having a
larger group of voters choose a smaller group of representatives for the
purpose of choosing a president, the result might be better than allowing
voters to decide themselves.
The problem with the federalist conjecture is that it presses up
against the well-developed Condorcet Jury Theorem. The Theorem
demonstrates that under certain conditions, larger groups are more likely
to arrive at an epistemically correct judgment than smaller groups would.
So on the face of it these two effectsselection and deliberationactually
may cut against each other: selection shrinks the size of the pool of
Condorcet Jurors thus threatening the epistemic gains of deliberation. As
Goodin discusses, in modern democracies this tradeoff would appear
enormous: In the US for example, we have roughly 112,000,000 voters
compared to 535 representatives. Even more troubling is the fact that the
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Jury Theorm proves that voters in the larger group can be individually
epistemically worse than their elected representatives and still produce
better decisions because of their enormous size difference Because of
this, the deliberative benefits of representative government better
outweigh its epistemic costs owing to size.
As Goodin puts it, it is simply not the case that a smaller group of
more competent people will always be epistemically superior to a larger
group of less competent ones. (3) And Condorcets Jury Theorem in fact
suggests that opposite: so long as individuals are better than random
(note 3, p. 3) as decision makers, the more of them there are, the more
likely they will arrive at the right answer. The task of Bob Goodins paper
is to define the parameters within which, and the reason for which the
federalist conjecture is true. In other words, how much more likely must
representatives be than their constituents to make good decisions? How
much additional epistemic value must deliberation add for representatives
to have an edge over voters generally?
The Jury theorem depends on four conditions (the following from pp.
3-4):
1. The number of people in each group, large and small
2. The independence and individual competence of people in
each group
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3. How the agenda is set and voting is structured in each
group.
4. How much deliberation contributes to the collective
competence of each group.
The argument precedes over five sections section one each of which
spells out the different levels of deliberative effects needed to over come
the problem of size. Ill summarize briefly in a moment before offering a
critique.
In section 1 Goodin notes the key conditions of the Jury theorem:
Voters must have a better than random probability of getting
the right answer
Voters are independent, that is not influenced by each others
vote
Voters vote truthfully for the option they really think is
correct
Presuming these presumptions hold, and even if voters were only slightly
better than average, members of the Electoral college would have to be
individually .976 competent to recommend them for this decision, a
result Goodin terms inconceivable. (8) Thus, we hope that deliberation
among the representatives might make improve this epistemic deficit.
Section 2 specifies the benefits of deliberation and calibrates how
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much theyd have to add to make them worthwhile. Deliberation might
alter the epistemic picture in three ways: it might allow representatives
to uncover new information; it might add new alternatives to the voting
agenda; and it might enhance reasoning among representatives.
Presuming that deliberation makes it 1% more likely that representatives
reach the correct decision than the electorate as a whole, then voters
who are p=.51 individually competent only have to choose
representatives who are p=.551 competent for the electoral college to
have exceeded the collective competence of the whole. Therefore,
Goodin argues, the Fed conjecture is plausible.
In section three, Bob moves to consider Epistemic bottlenecks,
where a bill or other decision must first run through a smaller decisional
body (12) before being enacted. Think of the Senates veto power over
House legislation (or presumably the Presidents veto itself over
legislation, though you dont take that up in the paper). Here Goodin
considers a number of examples including strong bicarmeralims (like the
Senate and House) and Parliaments with small pivotal partiessmall
parties whose support is needed for anylegislation to pass. Not
surprisingly, these all have serious epistemic costs, so much so that
subjecting legislative decisions to an even smaller groupwhether a
Senate or a pivotal partyproduces worse epistemic consequences than
simply letting direct democracy play its course.
In section 4, Goodin takes up the epistemic consequences of so
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called delegate and trustee style representation. As Ive written about
elsewhere (Rehfeld 2009) what Goodin describes is not whether they act
as trustees or delegatesbut simply and no more than the degree to
which a representatives judgment is independent of a constituencys on
any particular question. Framing it that way further emphasizes what
matters to the Jury Theorem as well. Dependent representatives depend
on voters being divided up into electoral constituencies, so there might be
a worry that this would minimize their epistemic value. But the
calculations show otherwise: as Goodin concludes that there is virtually
no epistemic cost in dividing votesr up into constituencies, so long as they
are represented by delegate-style representatives. (20) I would add,
critically, that we are only considering the epistemic value of the voters,
and not whether there are no costs if voters are doing something else, like
voting as partisans or following Sarah Palin. In other words, Goodins
results hold just so long as we divide them in ways that do not
compromise their epistemic independence, an issue Ill return to in a
moment.
By contrast, and consistent with the rest, independent representatives
are worse off because and in such a case deliberation would have to do
more work. However, a mix of dependent and independent
representatives, even a body with only a small number of dependent
representativessay 20- in a 99 person bodywould actually raise the
collective competence of that body to near 1.
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Finally, in section 5, Gooding considers the case where voters are
epistemically incompetent, i.e., are less than 50% likely to decide a
question correctly. Not surprisingly, in such cases the Jury Theorem
indicates that independent representatives would be better than
dependent representatives. In such a case, the Federalist conjecture will
be vindicated if an donly if the electorate is better at choosing people
than policies in a very precise way. Individual voters must be individually
significantly less competent than p=.5 at choosing policies but
significantly more competent than p=.5 at choosing people. And as
Gooding puts it, that seems unlikely to be the case with any generality,
which is what would be required for the Fedearlists conjecture to be
vindicated with any generality. (25)
I want to start my comments on this paper with a small note about
this last claim: that the Fed conjecture must be right only ifvoters are less
than .5 reliable in policies but more than .5 in representatives. I dont
think thats quite right comparison. Instead I believe the Federalist
conjecture would be true if either
i. Voters as a whole were more reliable in choosing
representatives than some other group or individuals. (Would
it still have to be p> .5 for voters or simply p(v) > p (any
group)?
ii. voters were simply more reliable in choosing representatives
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without being unreliable in either, say p=.55 than they were
in choosing policies, say p=.51.
But thats just a small point.
As a general matter, I think it would be easy both to admire the
precision with which Goodin and Spiekermann develop the epistemic costs
of representation and yet to dismiss Goodins paper for its seeming
irrelevance to politics. After all, in what conditions does it make sense
that any of the conditions are true?
But I think the paper is problematic not in what it sayspresuming
the math is right, it demonstrates a well established result in the literature
(the Jury Theorem really works) applying it to particular institutional
arrangements, and demonstrating how much deliberation has to add to
representative bodies to make them worth the epistemic costs. My
difficulty with the analysis is that even if all that is right, it leaves too
much out of the epistemic picture. I can think of no operating democracy
in which the voters views are independent of the party or partisan
dictates. So as a stylized aspirational exercise it may work, but again the
application seems hard. Even in the terms you set, it seems to leave out
too much, and thats what I want to turn to.
There were (at least) two other mechanisms that were involved in
the federalist conjecture, other than deliberative and selection effects,
that would raise the epistemic value of representative government. First it
is the question changing effects on voters of large constituencies;
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second is the independence-creating effects on representatives of large
constituencies. I dont mean this merely in an historical way, Ooo look
you got the history incomplete but rather the epistemic core of the
Federalist conjecture is more complicated than you describe here, and I
think it would only strengthen your analysis to develop it. Because these
institutional constraints on voter judgment that would lead quite quickly
to a vindication of the ability of voters to decide on the rightness of policy
by minimizing the kinds of epistemic errors that you identify towards the
end of the paper. In particular by paying attention to the role that the
make up of a constituency plays in structuring voter choice, and
subsequently in the role of incentives itself to get representatives to act
more like trustees in certain cases.
1. Large constituencies force voters to choose second best
candidates; second-best based on their own individual
preferences;
2. Heterogeneous constituencies allow representatives to act as
trustees in cases where there is disagreement.
So first, on the question changing effects of the conjecture. The
Jury Theorem presumes that we are all providing an answer to the same
question, and that does not seem to be the right description of whats
going on. Lets consider an easy case of health care reform. Lets say it
emerges as so much sausage from committees and we could either have
independent representatives vote on it, or we could have voters vote
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directly on it. What does a vote for that bill signify in this case, what is
the passing of the bill or its rejection a correct answer to? Is it,
Is this best bill available?
Is this the best bill we can hope for
Would this lead to better outcomes than our current system
would?
Is this a good bill with respect to health care outcomes, but bad
with respect to costs?
Etc.
In each of these cases I have no reason to think the voters are either
answering the same question, let alone even if they would actually know
what the right answer were to any of them. It seems on the face of it that
the deliberative benefits would be far greater than you model and thus far
more likely to vindicate the conjecture.
Just to be clear, this first objection is notthat there are no right
answers to these questions. Rather it is that the Jury theorem needs a
narrow question that we all are answering that has epistemic content, and
I just cannot really think of a case in politics where we are all answering
that one question, or realistically would. Even in the case of up or down
votes on a referendum the same set of issues arises. More probably,
voters are better than random at answering this question: Do I like the
bill? But why do we think that is the question for which we are seeking
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the answer? By contrast the vote for a representativeat least as the
Founders had conjectured itwould involved precisely that kind of
judgment: is so and so a good guy, respectable, and yes, do I like him.
So that would be a good reason to rely on voter judgment about
representatives: they are answering the same question is that a good
guy and they are all likely to know the answer.
Returning, then, to the conjecture, the relevant federalist conjecture
that you spend most of the paper modeling is not that of Hamilton
concerning the electoral college, but more akin to the situation of the
election of representatives to the House, as Madison wrote in Fed 10.
Whats curious here is how Madison thought size would solve the problem
of democratic ignorance. It was not simply that larger districts would
allow better candidates to be chosen (more objects of a fit choice as
Madison would put it). Rather, larger districts would make it less likely
that voters could vote for their partial interests and would lead them more
likely to vote for someone who would be a good deliberator and decider
for the public good. National districts were on average 10 times the size
of state districts, and this meant, again in Madisons words, that voters
would be less likely to communicate and coordinate to get a
representative to do their bidding in office. Largeness would not simply
make possible a Condorcet result; rather the largeness of the district
would force voters to ask a different question than on their they were apt
to: not who would be best for me but instead, who would be best for
all.
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(Because of this, it might be worth noting that the pure federalist
conjecturein which size operates purely epistemically and without
question shifting influenced,is probably best seen in Harringtons Oceana
and Humes essay on a perfect commonwealth in which tiered groups
make decisions)
Second, largeness not only made coordination and communication
difficulty, it increased the heterogeneity of electoral constituencies. This
again would not have an epistemic effect on voter judgment so much as it
was thought to have a question changing affect on the process in exactly
the same way as the sheer largeness would, by ensuring that voters could
not succeed even if they thought there vote was an answer to the
question who would be best for me? But the heterogeneity of electoral
districts would actually make it more likely that representatives could be
trustees more often because they were more likely to be voting on a bill
that was supported or opposed by an equally large number of
constituents. So the heterogeneity of districts enables the independence
of the representatives from their voters.
Third, and finally, the applicability of the examples ignores the work
of agenda setting throughout. It might be worth speaking to that issue.
And to the issue of a range of alternatives.
(Mills commission on legislation seems to be what is necessary.)
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