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Wells, Karen. 2007. “Narratives of Liberation and Narratives of InnocentSuffering: The Rhetorical Uses of Images of Iraqi Children in the BritishPress.” Visual Communication 6 (1): 55–71.

Wendt, Alexander. 1998. “On Constitution and Causation in InternationalRelations.” Review of International Studies 24 (5): 101–118.

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Index

AAbizaid, John, 71, 97able-bodied, 89abolition of slavery, 88absence of reason, 56Abu Ali al-Harithi, 1, 131Abu Ghraib Prison, 116academic, 18, 70, 72academics, 8, 21, 116academics in foxholes, 115. See also

Human Terrain SystemAccetta, David, 39act of combat, 152act of violence, 56

actor, in relation to political actors,60, 79, 103

actors, 3, 8, 18, 33, 35, 38–40, 42,45, 48–53, 60–68, 73, 89, 92,96, 99, 106, 107, 141, 158,171, 204–207

actuarial fairness, 171add women, 19. See also feminism,

feminist methods

Administration, 9, 13, 21, 24, 55,59, 68, 81, 84, 86, 88, 92, 95,103, 105, 107, 158, 169, 177,195, 204, 205. See also Bush,George, Bush Administration;Obama Administration; TrumpAdministration

adolescence, 53, 160adolescent(s), 53

adult, 20, 32, 39, 55–58adulthood, 48, 160

Advanced Systems and TechnologyDirectorate of the NationalReconnaissance Office, 167

Advanced Targeting and LethalityAutomated System (ATLAS),177, 178

adversaries, 17, 68, 82, 88, 109, 115,120, 135, 140, 143, 145, 148,169, 182, 183, 199, 201

adversary, 99, 115, 140, 142,145–150

advocacy, 12, 36, 40, 181, 198, 204

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusivelicense to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021S. Shoker, Military-Age Males in Counterinsurgency and Drone Warfare,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52474-6

241

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242 INDEX

advocates, 15, 76, 77, 117, 153,202, 203, 205

aerial, 15–17, 38, 140–143, 145–149,158, 164

aerial combat, 141aerial dominance, 141, 146aerial surveillance, 15, 146aerial surveillance platforms, 15aerial technologies, 38, 148aerial warfare, 143

Afghanistan, 4, 5, 13, 21, 34–36, 38,39, 44, 47, 48, 53, 59, 67–74,90–98, 101–104, 108, 111–122,135, 140, 143, 147, 148, 156,158, 159, 163, 197

Afghanistan Civilian CasualtyPrevention Handbook, 108

Afghan Military Forces, 3Afghan(s), 3, 5, 36, 39, 51, 52, 57,

82, 95, 105, 117, 118, 162Afghan citizens, 3, 39Afghan civilians, 117, 118Afghan Pashtuns, 162Afghans, 51, 86, 105, 118, 158Afghan wedding party, 57Afghan women, 5, 36

Africa, 199African-owned slave ships, 89African(s), 88, 89

age, 2, 12, 20, 32, 34, 48, 50, 54–56,58, 59, 91, 93, 112, 118, 163,168, 180

ages, 1, 53aging, 48

agencies, 24, 37, 43, 79, 92, 134,137, 158, 202

agenda, 59, 79, 90, 92, 106, 138,168, 204

agendas, 45, 197agents, in relation to political actors,

48, 50, 167aid, 40, 69, 75, 92, 100, 112, 136

aid workers, 136air, 13–16, 43, 84, 118, 140, 141,

150, 154, 163, 201air bombing campaigns, 16airborne early warning and control,

154airfields, 15air power, 141airspace, 204airstrike, 13, 95, 139, 144, 149,

150, 162, 180air war, 14, 201

aircraft, 140–143, 148, 150, 154,164, 206

airframes, 150air force, 14, 15, 43, 140, 145–149,

154, 156, 164, 165, 181airport(s), 137, 152, 174, 199Airwars (organization), 78, 197al-Durrah, Mohammed, 39Algeria, 9, 84, 116Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional

Team, 169. See also ProjectMaven

algorithm(s), 132, 137, 167–180algorithmic, 22, 137, 139,

168–172, 181, 202algorithmic auditing, 169algorithmic bias, 170, 177, 202algorithmic decision-making, 139algorithmic discrimination, 22, 170,

171algorithmic injustice, 171algorithmic Jim Crow, 170

Al-Jazeera, 137allies, 32, 112, 118, 142, 150, 179al-Qaeda, 20, 32, 39, 44, 50, 60, 86,

88, 131, 134–138, 142, 148al-Shabaab, 198Amazon, 178amazon web services, 178

America, 4, 35. See also United States

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INDEX 243

American(s), 4, 31, 35, 43, 46, 57,92, 95, 100, 115, 119, 120,144–149, 155, 171, 197

American Anthropological Association(AAA), 115

American Civil Liberties Union(ACLU), 12, 36, 149, 178

American Psychology Association(APA), 115

ammunition, 69Amnesty International, 36analogy, 10, 172. See also legitimacy

claimanalysis, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 80, 107,

113, 132, 139, 154, 161–172,181

analyst, 22, 113, 154, 155, 161, 164,165, 169. See also geospatialanalyst; intelligence analyst(s)

analysts, 10, 22, 113, 135, 141,154, 156–168, 176, 201

analytics, 22, 139, 166, 180analytical framework, 24, 80. See also

method(s)ancestries of interest, 106anthropologist, 70anthropologists, 115–117

anthropology, 22, 93, 115, 116, 161anthropological, 9, 21, 70, 85, 99,

113, 121, 159, 161, 178, 183anthropological knowledge, 9, 21,

70, 121, 159, 161, 183bad anthropology, 22, 161

anti-aircraft missiles, 206anticipatory self-defense, 135anti-suffragettes, 89anti-terrorism, 46apolitical, 39appropriate, 5, 45, 48, 69, 73, 101,

174–178, 200appropriate behavior, 45

appropriate policies, 5. See alsonorms

Arab American Association of NewYork, 107

Arabic, 82, 100, 109, 161Arab Spring, 6architecture, 3, 23, 45–49, 77,

133, 139, 180–182. See alsocheckpoint(s); Tal Afar

areas of active hostilities, 12, 121,149, 158

ARGUS-IS, 164Argus, 148, 164

Arizona, 165Arkin, Ronald, 200armed, 31, 34, 51, 68, 111, 119, 120,

131, 133, 141, 144, 149, 163,181

armed conflict, 31, 34, 119, 131,149

armed force(s), 68, 108armed males, 51armed social work, 67, 111, 119, 140.

See also Killcullen, David3rd armored cavalry, 74arms program, 181arms race, 168army, 4, 36, 51, 55, 60, 67, 70, 75,

114, 116, 133, 148, 165, 177,181, 204

ArsTechnica, 137Article, 44, 97, 107. See also Geneva

Protocolsartificial intelligence (AI), 16, 23, 113,

114, 167–169, 201, 204AI-powered, 171artificial neural networks, 169artificial stupidity, 178

Asia, 35, 87, 199Asian, 48

asocial, 16, 154, 168assassination, 35, 162

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244 INDEX

assemblage, 81, 93, 99, 111, 157, 180assemblages, 179assemblies, 199

associated force, 136. See also al-QaedaAssociate White House Counsel, 44Asymmetrical power relationships, 91asymmetrical, in relation to public

outrage, 56technological asymmetry, 140

at-risk, 17, 50, 60, 113attack on the USS Navy Cole, 1attitudes, in relation to xenophobia

and racism, 84–87attorneys, 44attributes, 24, 169, 174attribute selection, 114atypical, behavior, 169, 178

audience, in relation to persuasion,36, 48, 49. See also metaphors

audiences, 3, 16, 33, 35, 48, 49,180, 197

audit, 161, 203auditable methodologies, 178audited, patterns of life, 23, 137,

161. See also patterns ofbehaviour, pattern of life;signature strikes

audited, ProPublica Investigation,170

Australia, 181Australian, 100

authority, moral and legal, 4, 34, 45,50, 56, 94, 103, 172

Authorization of Target andActioning, 134

authorization, targeted and signaturestrikes, 134, 143, 180

authorized, 133autobiography, 47, 120autocrats, 6automate, 17. See also artificial

intelligence (AI)

automated, 132, 154, 164, 167–169, 171–173, 175, 200,203

automating, 23, 132, 143, 165automation, 15, 22, 167, 168, 173,

179, 180, 200Automatic Target Recognition (ATR),

167autonomous, 14–17, 22, 23, 114,

139, 167, 168, 172, 175, 176,180, 200. See also artificialintelligence; lethal autonomousweapons

autonomy, 16, 23–25, 137, 168, 171,174, 176, 178, 199, 201, 203

autotracking, 148axiomatic principle, 95, 96. See also

deontological ethics; utilitarianismaxis of evil, 76

BBa’athist party, 72backlash, 53, 196bad guys, 119Baghdad, 98, 104bag of capital, 118. See also armed

social workBaker, Stewart, 152. See also NSA

Generalbarbarism, 35barbarity, 39

barbed wires, 97, 99. See alsoobject-oriented democracy

Barno, David W., Lieutenant General,72

baseball, 48, 134. See also audience inrelation to persuasion, audiences;Guantanamo Bay; Khar, Omar;metaphors

base, in relation to social support, 70,99, 100

baseline of norms, 169, 178

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INDEX 245

bases, US and foreign, 140, 155base, US in Djibouti, 1battalion, 47batteries, drone, 22, 132battery, 145

battle, 113, 140, 146, 183, 196, 199,204, 205

battlefield(s), 13, 146, 159battlespace, 1, 20–25, 82, 111, 115,

150, 158–160, 200, 204Bayesian methods, 113, 114behavioral economics, 76behavior, in relation to wartime

conduct, 3, 11, 23–25, 37, 39,45, 60, 76, 93, 99, 101, 131,136, 138, 152, 168, 169, 173,178–183, 199

behavioral, 17, 24, 76, 106, 114,137, 167–170, 181

behavioral anomalies, 169behavioral attributes, 174behavioral patterns, 106, 137, 167,

175behavioral signatures, 173pattern of life, 22, 132, 163patterns of behavior, 137, 168, 199predicting behavior, 111risky behavior, 183

belief, in relation to norms andideology, 10, 113, 143, 146, 203

beliefs, 113, 140, 175believe, 4, 35, 37, 49, 53, 69, 179,

204, 205believed, 16, 43, 53, 76, 105, 114,

196believe(s), 52, 114

beneficiaries of intervention, 85Berenson, Bradford, 44. See also

Associate White House CounselBerlin Wall, 6bias, 8, 11, 24, 132, 169, 170, 176,

178, 199, 201, 203

big data, 4, 14–17, 22, 23, 132, 138,151, 163–169, 170, 172–175,180, 181

big data analytics, 22, 166bin Laden, Osama, 133. See also

al-Qaedabiological, gender and childhood, 81,

92, 160biological, performance and gender,

24, 153biological limitation, 164, 200. See

also human-machine learning,human-machine teams; lethalautonomous weapons systems

biological weapons, 200biometric, 51, 96biometric-enabled, 70

biopolitics, 94black box, in relation to software, 138black, in relation to identity group,

47, 88, 89, 138, 161–164, 170,171

Blackwater, private securitycontractors, 96

blast, in relation to strike and range,145, 147, 151

blend, into civilian and urbanenvironments, 22, 31, 99, 145,182

blended, 97blood, 160, 197bloodthirsty, in relation to

nineteenth- century coun-terinsurgency, 85. See alsocolonial-era

blowback, 95Blue Books, 166. See also big datablue force [non-kinetic] actions, 113.

See also non-kineticBodies, 9, 10, 12, 14, 20, 48, 56, 57,

59, 60, 83, 111, 120, 144, 180,200

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246 INDEX

bodily capacities, 177bodily harm, 61bodily injury, 19, 155bodily risk, 4bodily security, 78bodily vulnerability, 200body counts, 74dead bodies, 10, 34, 59, 83male bodies, 50, 52, 60racialized bodies, 90risky bodies, 3

bomb, 3, 147, 195BLU-97 cluster bombs, 147bomb-drop, 150. See also World

War Twobombed, 3, 118, 131bomber(s), 20, 32, 39, 107, 109,

164. See also air Forcebombing, 7, 14, 16, 57, 118, 201bombing lists, 7bombs, 45, 131, 143, 147, 163. See

also F15car bombings, 98cluster bombs, 45, 147smart bombs, 13

boots-on-the-ground, 139. See alsocounterinsurgency

border(s), 39, 88, 107, 131, 151,182, 199

borderlands, 37boredom, 7. See also drone(s), drone

crewsboring practices, 7

Borkum Island, 172. See alsoEichmann, Adolf, Eichmann Trial

bottleneck, 15, 165. See also dataanalytics

boundaries, 5, 45, 93, 100, 102, 152,158, 176

Bourdieusian competition, 204boy, 132, 160, 161boyhood, 57, 160

Brennan, John, 134–138, 142. Seealso National security advisor

briefing, press and media, 44, 48, 142Britain, 67, 87Britain’s gulag in Kenya, 99British, 67, 70, 86–90, 99. See also

slavery, slave tradeBritish colonial practice and war, 75British counterinsurgency, 75, 90British Kenya, 9British occupation of Iraq, 67

brown, in relation to identity groupbrown men, 90brown women, 90

brutality against women and childrenin Afghanistan, 91

brutish life in Afghanistan, 106. Seealso lieutenant colonel; Petit,Brian

Bugsplat, in relation to bombmodeling software, 84, 97

bugsplats, in relation to drone deaths,84

bureau chief, 137. See also Al-Jazeerabureaucracy, 14, 156, 183bureaucracies, 45, 57, 74, 84, 166bureaucratic, 7, 9, 14, 17, 20, 32,

33, 42–47, 54, 59–61, 78, 84,134, 154, 172, 175, 180, 198,202

bureaucratic entrenchment, 33bureaucrats, 8

Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 12burka, 153burnout, in relation to drone crews,

154Bush, George, 1–4, 24, 33, 35, 40,

41, 44, 60, 68, 72, 73, 75–79,86, 88, 91, 92, 103, 133, 135,164, 177, 195–199, 204

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INDEX 247

Bush Administration, 2, 55, 71, 73,76–78, 81, 86, 92, 103, 133,135, 195, 196

Bush and Obama Administrations,3, 4, 15, 32, 33, 60, 68, 73,76, 88, 107, 109, 164, 195,197, 201

Bush-Cheney, 32Bush-era, 33

Bush, Laura, 35, 91bystanders, 198

Ccamel-jockey, 83. See also race, in the

context of identity, racismcamera, in relation to drones, 148,

164, 165campaign, in relation to military

campaigns, 16, 36, 43, 71, 74,81, 86, 104, 116, 119, 140, 144,147, 168

Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 168camps, in relation to detention, 97,

99, 116, 147Canada, 107, 181Canadian, 49, 50, 107, 181, 205

Canadian Security Intelligence Service(CSIS), 50. See also Khadr, Omar

canvassing, in relation to localpopulations, 119, 159. See alsonon-kinetic

capabilities, 13, 15, 17, 68, 139, 158,169, 178, 199

capitalism, 116capture, in relation to detention

during wartime, 3, 48–50, 98,106, 135, 136

Carney, Jay, 142Carr Center for Human Rights Policy,

36Carter Administration, 41, 59Cartesian mapping, 157

cartographic, 160cartography, 157

casualties, 13, 14, 24, 36, 38, 47,57, 68, 75, 84, 86, 94, 95, 98,108, 110, 118, 119, 141–144,147–149, 195–203

casualty, 42, 43, 108, 142, 202,204

casualty aversion norm, 42cataloging, in relation to data

visualization, 166. See also BlueBooks

cataloging, in relation to behavioralattributes, 136. See alsobehavior, in relation to wartimeconduct, behavioral attributes

category, 3–5, 9, 20–24, 31–34, 39,42, 45–61, 69, 71, 76, 89, 90,94, 98, 106, 108, 109, 114, 133,153, 159–164, 166, 167, 173,180, 202, 203

categories, 2, 9, 14, 31, 34, 35, 45,54, 60, 73, 79, 97, 108, 166,180, 182, 202

categorized, 150, 161categorize(s), 12, 114, 167, 175categorize threats, 175civilian and combatant categories,

36, 54legal category, 3, 203military-age male category, 1, 2,

109, 173social categories, 166technocratic and bureaucratic

categories, 9, 31, 42, 58, 180causal, in relation to methods, 10, 11cause(s), 4, 9–11, 33, 59, 81causes-of-effects, 10

Central Command (CENTCOM), 3,15

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248 INDEX

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),1, 12, 44, 45, 51, 53, 84, 95,131–135, 138, 162, 169

Centre for Army Lessons Learned(CALL), 108

Chain of Command, 7, 17, 121, 162,180

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,13, 161

characteristics, 9, 14, 81, 106, 114,152, 166, 174, 202

checkpoint(s), military, 22, 96–104,110

biometric-enabled checkpoints, 70,73, 96

chemical weapons, 174child, 20, 32, 39–41, 48, 50, 53, 89,

91, 109, 154, 179childcare, 92childhood development, 50, 92childhood(s), 33, 35, 38–40,

48–51, 53, 54, 57, 92, 161children, 1, 3, 12, 19, 20, 32–44,

46–61, 69, 71, 81–94, 100,106, 109, 118, 119, 132, 135,145, 151, 155, 159, 160, 172,179

child soldier, 48kids, 40

China, 24, 116, 141, 142, 167, 200Chinese, 99

choice(s), normative, 20, 37, 43, 45,93, 151, 156, 162

choose civilization, 105choose Hobbes, 105choose public life, 2, 52choose where to look, 165

Christian, 87, 195Christianity, 195, 196Evangelical Christian, 196

citadel, 78, 105. See also qalatcitizens, 169

citizenship, 18city, 74, 96, 119, 159, 165, 172civilian, 2–4, 12–16, 20–38, 41–47,

51, 54–83, 92–112, 132, 133,135, 138–153, 160–163, 166,169, 171, 172, 174, 175,177–180, 182–200

civilian clutter, 15, 20, 201civilian death, 12–14, 35, 36, 41,

58–61, 68, 69, 74, 87, 95–97,109, 118, 140, 143, 144, 147,150, 202, 205

civilian immunity, 32, 36, 38, 42,46, 54, 60, 75, 80, 87, 90, 96,97, 106, 120, 132, 144, 152,172, 180, 202

civilian immunity norm, 46civilians, 1–4, 17, 23, 31–41, 46,

50–57, 60, 68, 69, 74, 76, 81,82, 87, 90, 91, 96–98, 101,104, 106, 108, 109, 112, 113,115, 117, 118, 120, 121

civilian space, 70, 93, 162civilian status, 16, 32–35, 38, 44,

45, 57, 60, 97, 140, 150, 180,198

civilization, 35, 50, 60, 105, 195, 199civility, 37civilizational, 33, 35, 37, 49, 56,

57, 60, 195civilized, 3, 35, 39, 91

civil society, 23, 40, 97, 103, 104,175, 205

classificationclassification algorithms, 170, 176classification model, 177

Clausewitz, 104Clausewitzian, 146, 148

clear, hold, and build, 77, 78cleared, 77. See also COIN

Clinton Administration, 79Clinton, Hillary, 59, 91

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INDEX 249

coalition, in relation to coalitionforces, 3, 6, 9, 13, 14, 36, 68,70, 78, 92, 95, 98, 101, 109,110, 117, 118, 121, 141, 155,163, 171, 198

Coalition Provisional Authority inBaghdad, 104

code, in relation to social relations,16, 33, 35, 55, 105, 115, 117,153, 158

Code of Ethics, 115. See alsoAmerican AnthropologicalAssociation (AAA)

gender as governing and analyticalcode, 132, 138, 174, 178

legal codes, 33, 43, 45, 61, 134,152, 198

moral code, 153normative code, 20Pashtunwali code of honor, 162

cog in the machine, 172. See alsoEichmann, Adolf, Eichmann Trial

cognitive shortcut(s) and shorthand,25, 31, 49, 202

COIN, 12, 14, 34, 37, 68, 70, 72,74–88, 90, 91, 95, 98, 100, 104,105, 113, 116, 119, 121

COIN academy in Iraq, 72COIN doctrine, 85

Cold War, 6, 72, 86, 115, 148collateral damage (CDC), 1–3, 9–13,

20, 25, 32, 38, 41, 49, 51, 52,54, 58, 59, 61, 74, 84, 106, 120,121, 140, 144, 149, 152, 159,183, 197–199, 201, 202

collective referent objects, 89colonel, 2, 72, 74, 77, 105colonial counterinsurgency, 21, 70scorched earth tactics, 77

colonial-era, 86colonial, in relation to warfare, 73,

77, 82, 84–87, 99, 166

British colonials, 85colonialism, 197colonial policing, 9, 21, 71, 97, 99colonies, 141, 163, 183colonization, 85, 117Columbia Law School Human

Rights Clinic, 144combat, 14, 25, 39, 46, 47, 68, 101,

110, 136, 141, 145, 163, 182,199, 203

combatant(s), 1–3, 12–16, 22–24,31, 32, 34–36, 46, 47, 51, 54,56, 58, 60, 68, 73, 81, 97, 98,103, 108, 110, 111, 113, 115,120–122, 132, 135–138, 143,148–151, 163, 169, 173–177,181–183, 202, 203

combatant status, 1, 3, 110, 151,152

commander(s), military, 13, 38, 72,94, 96, 100, 159, 163, 171

commitment to international humani-tarian law and democratic norms,143

Committee(s)Committee on Un-American

Activities, 115congressional defense committees,

149Peace Committee, Waziristan, 179US House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence,138

US House Select Committee onHunger, 40

common law, 45reasonable people, 135

communications, 8, 48, 58, 59, 100,148, 181

global communications architecture,180. See also Distributed

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250 INDEX

Common Ground System(DCGS)

press and PR strategy, 6, 58technologies of communication, 48

communist supporters, 87communities, 75, 98, 99, 106, 147,

158, 172, 174, 179, 206community, 80, 87, 91, 107, 172,

195, 196community-building, 178community of nations, 197community of values, 87, 91epistemic communities, 181gated communities in Iraq, 98, 99in relation to host populations, 75intelligence and defense communi-

ties, 1, 7, 14, 57, 121, 151,157, 161, 162, 167, 179

international community, 172, 196natural science communities, 10

COMPAS, in relation to software,170, 174

competition, in relation to cate-gorization of threats, 204,205

complex irregular warfare, 115, 120compound, 1, 77, 78, 83, 131, 155,

163. See also citadelcomputer, 84, 167, 169, 173. See also

algorithm(s)concentration camp, 97, 172condemn, in relation to international

behavior, 3, 36, 96, 197condemnation, 4, 114, 197condemned, 20, 32, 38, 52, 82, 88,

91, 197condemning, 3

conduct, in relation to war, 3, 4, 7,13, 35, 38, 51, 96, 110, 142,153, 181

conduct-based targeting, 111

confidence level, 178. See also database, data science

confinement and arbitrary detention,97. See also Odierno, Ray

confirmation process, in relations todrone strikes, 143

Conflict Monitoring Centre ofIslamabad, 162

conflict(s), 11, 14, 16, 22–25, 31,34, 35, 38, 40, 47–51, 54,55, 72–77, 83, 89, 90, 103,104, 115, 119, 133, 140, 141,145–147, 155, 156, 175, 177,200, 202, 206, 207

conform, in relation to internationalnorms, 36, 91

confusion matrix, 177Congressional Research Service

(CRS), 97consensus, in relation to norms, 5,

174, 176conservative, in relation to political

ideology, 101, 102, 155constitutive, in relation to methods,

10, 11construct, in relation to social

constructivism theory, 40constructed, 48, 89, 160constructing, 7, 56construction, 45, 49, 54, 86, 89,

108, 139, 153, 206constructivist(s), 46, 72, 108, 181constructs, 71, 73

contemporary, 91, 98, 102, 151, 181contemporary battlespace, 82contemporary COIN, 82, 84, 85,

98contemporary counterinsurgency

and counterinsurgents, 60, 82,85, 86, 117

contemporary wars and warfare, 35,155

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INDEX 251

contraband, 101contractor, in relation to security

contractors, 16, 96, 139, 164,173

conventional aircraft, 140, 150Convention on Certain Conventional

Weapons (CCW), 205convoy, 110, 131. See also Abu Ali

Al-Harithicooperate, in relation to host

communities, 70, 104counterinsurgency, 3–10, 14–17,

20–23, 32, 33, 37, 47, 51,60–90, 93–95, 98–100, 102–107,111–114, 118–121, 139–141,145, 146, 148, 156–159, 166,179, 197–199

counterinsurgency and COINcampaign(s), 72, 73, 81, 90,93, 94, 103, 105, 106, 117,119–121, 140

counterinsurgency doctrine, 60, 70,85

counterinsurgency joint publicationJP 3-24, 4

counterinsurgents, 3, 4, 31, 68–71,77, 79, 81–85, 99, 100, 105,106, 108, 111, 112, 121, 140

global counterinsurgency, 21, 99JP 3-24, 78, 81, 82, 103, 104

counterterrorism, 141, 145, 199court martial, 43. See also My Lai

massacreCrew, in relation to drones, 7, 13, 57,

154, 162, 163, 169crewman, 201crew-member, 154

Crimea, 87, 88criminalize, 162criminalized, 88criminals, 71

crowdsourced data, 117. See alsoDARPA’s Nexus 7 program

crows and ravens, 82, 83. See also race,in the context of identity, racism

Crusade, 196Crusaders, 83

Cuba, 149cultural characterizations, 46, 60culture of violence, 85curfew, 86, 87. See also colonial

counterinsurgencycustomary rules of armed conflict,

131. See also internationalhumanitarian law (IHL)

cyberspace, 204cyborgs, 16

Ddata analytics, 166database, 134, 169, 174, 178data collection, 11, 14, 16, 21,

22, 70, 113, 114, 121, 161,166–171, 205

data-driven, 15, 24, 117data intelligence feeds, 117data science, 176, 177dataset, 170, 171, 174, 177data visualization, 166

data science, 176, 177Death TV, 165. See also boredomdecision loop, 167deep learning, 169. See also artificial

intelligence (AI)defense, 1, 2, 5–9, 19–24, 44, 45, 48,

52, 54, 57–59, 73, 74, 105, 115,117, 120, 121, 141, 142, 146,149, 151, 158, 162, 164, 165,169, 170, 175–179, 182–198

Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency (DARPA), 112, 117,162, 169

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252 INDEX

dehumanized, 87. See also race, in thecontext of identity, racism

dehumanizing, 82–84democracy, 86–88, 120, 197democracies, 90, 96, 141, 142, 181democratic, 2, 15–17, 21, 60, 73,

75, 84, 88, 140–143, 182,183. See 201‘, 205

liberal democracy(ies), 2, 24, 32,52, 69, 75, 78, 87, 90

object-oriented democracy, 205Democrats, political party, 162demographics unit, 106. See also Zone

Assessment Unitdeontological ethics, 96Department of Defense (DoD), 48,

84, 175–180, 200, 201DoD directive 3000.09, 176

Department of Homeland Security,107

Department of Justice, 44, 45Deptula, David, Lieutenant General,

157dereliction of duty, 171. See also USS

John S. McCaindetainees, 20, 44, 48, 49, 116. See

also torturedetention, 20, 33, 48, 50, 97, 109development, in relation to gender

and physiologybiological development, 153childhood development, 50, 92male development, 57

development, in relation to humani-tarianism, 35, 45, 76, 78–81, 87,90, 92, 94, 99, 100, 103, 117,120

development projects, 69, 94neoliberal development agenda, 90security-development nexus, 78social development, 21, 70

development, in relation to tech-nology, 100, 120, 142, 174, 176,182

digital algorithms, 179digital profile, 137

diplomacy, 68, 77directive, Department of Defense, 43,

47, 48, 94, 95, 101, 115, 176,177

Directive 5100, 43direct military action, 3, 98direct participation in hostilities

(DPH), 135, 203. See alsocombatant(s)

drone crews, 132, 145disability, 89Disarmament, Demobilization,

Reintegration (DDR), 103, 112disciplinary International Relations

(IR), 18, 81, 100, 105, 172discourse, 11, 15, 38–41, 46, 49, 50,

53, 58, 69, 75, 82, 86, 89, 92,139, 144, 145, 170, 195–198,206

discourse-object ecosystem, 206discursive, 24, 139, 143, 153, 197,

198, 203, 204discriminate, in relation to target

selection, 56, 110, 145, 200. Seealso civilian, civilian immunity;legitimate target

discriminating, 81discrimination, 22, 35, 169discriminatory, 23. See also

algorithm(s), algorithmicdiscrimination

disposition matrix, 134, 200disproportionate, in relation to civilian

death, 36Distributed Common Ground System

(DCGS), 23, 166, 181Djibouti, 1

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INDEX 253

doctrine, in relation to military andcounterinsurgency, 7, 22, 37, 52,60, 70, 72, 85, 91, 115, 119,120, 204

Doctrine Revision Workshop, 37doctrine of double effect, 97, 120. See

also international humanitarianlaw (IHL)

domestic politics, 88, 197domestic relationships, in relation

to home life, 21, 71. See alsosecuring the intimate

domestic work, 68, 111drone(s), 1, 12, 20–24, 31–35,

38, 51, 54, 57, 58, 70, 96,110, 146–156, 158–164, 166,174–177, 182–201

drone crews, 3, 22, 31, 57, 84,153–158, 169, 180, 183, 199

drone monitor, 20, 121drone operations, 6–9, 70, 181,

202drone program, 6, 8, 41, 53, 131,

133, 137, 138, 153, 162, 180drone sensors and batteries, 22, 132drone strike(s), 135–138, 140, 144,

149, 150, 154, 162, 179, 182,183, 198, 202, 203, 205

drone swarms, 206drone target, 1drone warfare, 8, 13–17, 32, 36,

38, 58, 70, 110, 111, 121,122, 137, 139–141, 146, 149,153–159, 161, 163, 177–183,198, 202, 205

laser turret, 133dystopian, 168

EEagleburger, Lawrence, 40economic development, 76economic sanctions, 75

effects of causes, 10. See alsomethod(s)

Egypt, 141Eichmann, Adolf, 172Eichmann Trial, 172. See also cog in

the machineElasticity, 101. See checkpoint(s),

militaryembodied, 111. See also feminism,

feminist geographersempirical puzzle, 4, 8, 11, 139end-to-end encryption, 6enemies, 35, 41, 72, 109, 152enemy, 3, 15, 35, 36, 47, 74, 81,

100enemy combatants, 47

enlightened self-interested, 81. SeeAfghan(s), Afghan citizens

epistemic communities, 181erosion, in relation to norms, 46, 73erosion of civilian immunity, 42, 60

escalation of force (EOF), 110ethical principles for artificial intelli-

gence, 204. See Department ofDefense (DoD), DoD Directive3000.09

ethnic groups, 106ethnic identities, 2ethnic identity, 52ethnicity, 163, 197ethnic minority, 88

ethnographic, 85ethos, 67, 76, 111, 112European, 88, 89, 104evidence based assessments, 174. See

also COMPAS, in relation tosoftware

executive branch, 134existential emergency, 20

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254 INDEX

Ffacial recognition software, 178. See

also artificial intelligence (AI)failed states, 38, 148failing state, 90

faith, in relation to religion, 196Fallujah, 2, 46, 96, 97. See also

Operation Al-Fajr; OperationVigilant Resolve

false negatives, 177false positive(s), 177, 178

falsified, 11. See also method(s)families, 92, 100, 101, 195. See also

securing the intimatefamily, 41, 80, 83, 99, 100, 105,

160, 179fangs-out, kill-kill-kill culture, 118father, 39, 41, 50, 179Federally Administrated Tribal

Authority (FATA), 162, 179female(s), in relation to gender, 19,

58, 101, 151, 159female combatants, 58female marines, 101female physiology, 19feminine, 56femininity, 18, 68, 153girl(s), 56–58, 79, 89, 92, 132

feminism, 17, 19feminist curiosity, 4, 5feminist geographers, 71feminist IR, 18, 24feminist methods, 17, 19feminist(s), 5, 8, 17–19, 80, 111,

158f-16 fighter aircraft, 156. See also

conventional aircraftfield work, 6. See also method(s)fighter aircraft, 140, 156. See also F-16fighting-age males, 52. See also

military-age males

film cartridges, 149. See also Vietnam,Vietnam War

firefight, 2, 50, 163FOB, 83fog and friction, 146. See also

Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA)

force protection norm, 43foreign policy agenda(s), 92, 197, 204France, 84freedom of information act lawsuit

(FOIA), 149French Algeria, 9Futures Markets Applied to Prediction,

162

Ggarbage in, garbage out, 176. See also

database, data scienceGates, Robert, 98gender, 2–6, 9, 14, 16–19, 22–33, 46,

52–60, 76, 78–81, 89–91, 94,100–102, 106, 108–112, 114,120–122, 137, 138, 150–163,166, 169, 170, 174, 177, 178,181–183, 199

gender-blind, 56gendered, 16, 24, 52, 54, 58, 61,

71, 81, 89, 94, 106, 109,111–116, 137, 139, 159, 166,169, 174, 181, 199

gendered space, 169gender equality, 159gender segregation, 78, 159, 161

General Atomics, 133Geneva, 3, 34–37, 44, 45, 56, 97,

174, 202Geneva Convention III, 34Geneva Protocols, 34, 202

geographic information system (GIS),121, 157

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INDEX 255

geospatial analysts, 159. See also dronecrew(s)

geospatial-intelligence, 169ghost work, 16, 176Gilgamesh pod, 83global arms trade, 181global governance, 175Global Hawk, 156, 164. See also

drone(s)global north, 40, 48, 49global positioning system (GPS), 147global south, 18, 19, 33, 37, 40, 47Google, 170, 176Gorgon Stare, 148, 154, 165, 179Graziani, Rodolofo, 97. See also

Italo-Sanusi Wargreater evil, 45Greek Civil War, 41Grotius, Hugo, 16, 56, 172Guantanamo Bay (GITMO), 20, 32,

33, 44, 47–50, 205guardianship, 56, 172guerrilla, 12, 69, 71, 114guerrilla type war, 97

Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in theUnited States, 115. See alsoCommittee(s), Committee onUn-American Activities

Gulf War, 23, 43, 68, 75, 107, 146,147

1991 Gulf War, 75, 147

Hhaji(s), 83. See also race, in the context

of identity, racismhandbooks, in relation to military

pedagogy, 75, 100, 105, 108,116

headscarves, 151hearts and minds, 36, 68, 75, 77–81,

87, 99, 119. See also non-kinetichegemonic, 48

Hellfire missile, 1, 131, 133, 150, 163helo, 47. See also Vietnam, Vietnam

Warhigh-contrast environment, 31Hobbes, ThomasHobbesian, 21, 71, 104–108

Holocaust, 172home front, 43homelife, 106, 174. See also securing

the intimateHoneywell Corporation, 45honorably discharged, 7hostile act(s), in relation to behavior

in war, 110, 121hostile intent, 47, 110, 111, 121

host nation, 41, 116host population, 104, 140

human intelligence (HUMINT), 15humanitarian development, 87, 103humanitarians, 201

human-machine teaming, 177human-machine teams, 175, 177human-machine warfare, 173

Human Rights Watch, 14, 36, 160,201

human shields, 3, 39, 195Human Terrain System (HTS), 70,

99, 114, 115, 121. See alsoacademic, academics in foxholes

HTS specialist, 116Human Terrain Specialist, 116

human-to-machine tools, 167Hussein, Sadaam, 41, 98, 101, 110,

147hypermanned, 155, 180. See also

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)hyper-surveillance, 23, 164hypervisibility, 136hypervisible, 108, 112, 120, 136

hypotheses, 10, 11, 59. See alsomethod(s)

hypothesis, 59

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256 INDEX

Iideational, 11. See also constructidentifier(s), 1, 2, 24, 68, 108,

202. See also military-age male;technocratic category

ideological, 85, 146, 164ideologically, 24, 69, 84, 85ideologies, 33, 106

illegitimate targets, 143immunity principle, 56, 87imperialistic, 116imperialists, 196

India, 181injury, 18, 19, 20, 39, 155. See also

feminism, feminist methodsinnocence, 38, 39, 50, 54, 177, 181.

See also child, childhood(s)innocent(s), 38, 39, 49, 57, 81, 87,

131, 142, 145, 151, 195input-output data, 176. See also

data base, data science; machinelearning

insecurity, 79, 80, 89, 101, 103, 113,119, 120, 132. See also construct

institutionalization, 46. See alsotechnocratic category

institutionalize/institutionalized, 2,3, 40, 42, 61, 72, 73, 83, 90,108, 114

institutionalizing, 31, 206Instructions for the Government of

Armies, 35. See also Lieber Codeinsurance, 54, 102, 171. See also

actuarial fairnessinsurgencies, 31, 50, 67, 120insurgency, 15, 31, 51, 55, 67, 69,

72, 81, 93, 95, 100, 101, 109,110, 112, 114, 121, 132, 147,156, 158, 164

insurgent, 15, 17, 21, 36, 41,68–71, 74, 81, 99, 100,111–116, 132, 136–138,

144–148, 152, 158, 162, 163,165, 166, 174, 182, 183, 199

intelligence analyst(s), 113, 135, 155,162, 164

intelligence video disseminator, 163intelligence, surveillance, and recon-

naissance (ISR), 14–16, 20, 22,67, 83, 137, 145, 146, 148, 149,156, 164, 165, 180, 181, 199

international actor, 103international development, 40international humanitarian law (IHL),

2, 15, 36–40, 80, 90, 96, 97,136, 143, 172

international laws of armed conflict,31, 119

laws of war, 20, 31, 39, 80, 93, 94,143, 182, 200

international periphery, 203International Security Assistance

Forces (ISAF), 38, 76, 84, 94,95, 104, 108, 121

international system, 19, 21, 91interned, 97, 99. See also detentioninterning, 75, 97. See also Kenyainternment camps, 99. See also

Britian, Britain’s gulag in Kenyainterpretive, 10. See also method(s)

interpretivist, 10, 11interrogation, 50–51. See also Khadr,

OmarIntervention, 6, 20–24, 32, 39, 40,

73, 77, 80–82, 85–99, 105, 106,111, 114, 116, 119, 120, 154,161, 162, 180, 197

interview, 6–9, 14, 34, 37, 41, 47,51, 53, 55, 72, 79, 83–85, 102,108, 109, 119, 131, 134–138,143, 144, 148, 151–160, 180,181, 206. See also method(s)

interviewed, 6–9, 34, 53, 82, 85,138, 153, 159

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INDEX 257

interviewing, 6, 8invade, 92invasion, 86, 88

2003 invasion of Iraq, 88Iran, 72, 76, 141, 198Iran Contra Scandal, 42Iranian, 41, 141

Iraq, 4, 13, 21, 23, 36, 39, 43, 44,46, 47, 67–114, 133, 135, 140,145, 148, 158–160, 197, 198

Iraqi culture, 82Iraqi(s), 67, 72, 74, 82, 83, 96, 98,

100–102, 109, 110, 147, 156Iraq Body Count Organization, 118irregular wars, 2, 3, 199Islam, 86, 160, 161, 196Islamic, 9, 91, 107, 138, 160, 161,

195, 196Islamic theology, 160, 161

Islamabad, 39, 137, 162Islamic extremism, 196Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

(ISIS), 3, 13, 119, 141, 195Islamist, 58jihadis, 41jihadist(s), 50, 53

Israeli, 39, 54Italo-Sanusi War, 97Italy, 181Italian, 97

JJalal, Malik, 179. See also Al-Jazeera;

IslamabadJapanese internment camps, 116joint attack air controller, 163joint chiefs of staff, 4, 43, 72, 76, 81,

136, 146, 161, 162, 165, 181Joint Special Operations Command

(JSOC) Task Force, 134. Seealso Authorization of Target andActioning

Judge Advocate General (JAG), 43Justice Department White Paper, 143just war, 2, 37, 52, 152jus in bello, 96

juveniles, 48. See also GuantanamoBay (GITMO)

KKenya, 9, 75, 86, 99Khadr, Omar, 32, 33, 44, 47–51, 53,

205Kilcullen, David, 21, 50, 67, 70, 99,

100, 111, 119, 140. See alsoarmed social work

kill and capture mindset, 98. See alsoOdierno, Ray

Killchain, 180. See also dispositionmatrix

killer robot, 168kinetic, 68, 76, 176Kosovo, 14, 201Kuwait, 107

LLahore, 137Laporto, Giovani, 136large-scale actors, 6lawfare, 43lawful targets, 149. See also legitimate

targetsLebanon, 41legality, 33, 43, 45, 60, 150, 205legitimacy, 13, 38, 41, 45, 48, 56, 60,

68, 87, 144, 179, 204legitimacy claim, 48. See also audience,

in relation to persuasionlegitimate, 17, 20, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43,

45, 49, 53, 72, 90, 91, 104, 106,108, 138, 143, 150, 172, 199,200, 203

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258 INDEX

legitimate targets, 17, 108, 138, 150,172, 199, 203

lesser powers, in relation to states ininternational system, 141

lethal autonomous weapons systems(LAWS), 23, 174, 175, 200

leviathan, 140–108. See also Hobbes,Thomas, Hobbesian

liberal internationalism, 88liberal democracies, 2, 69, 75, 90liberal democratic values, 205liberal development, 69, 81, 94liberal interventionism, 90liberals, 104, 195liberal subject, 89, 90liberal subjecthood, 21, 71, 82, 89,

90, 103, 104liberal universalism, 88, 89, 93liberal warriors, 68

liberian oil tanker, 171. See also USSJohn S. McCain

Libya, 12, 97, 121, 197, 198Lieber Code, 35. See also Instructions

for the Government of Armieslieutenant colonel, 39, 47, 77, 105lieutenant general, 67, 72life-mining, 166. See also database,

data scienceloiter, 22, 132, 145. See also drone(s)loitering, 13

long-range precision weaponry, 140.See also Revolution in MilitaryAffairs(RMA)

looters, 71low-contrast foe, 15low-intensity counterinsurgency

operations, 115. See also irregularwars

Mmachine learning, 22, 137, 167–174.

See also artificial intelligence (AI)

machine vision, 7, 16, 168madhab, 161. See also Islam, Islamic

theologyMalay, 75, 86, 87. See also Britian,

British counterinsurgencyMalaya, 99, 116

male-centric, in relation to biasin disciplinary InternationalRelations, 19

manhood, 51, 160manifest destiny, 196maps, 157, 159, 171. See also

Cartesian mappingmapped, 157

marginalized, 21, 80, 99, 169Martin, Trayvon, 197martyr (s), 12, 41masculinity, 2, 19, 20, 31–34, 45, 49,

55, 57, 68, 163male development, 57masculine, 89masculinist, 18masculinities, 18

mathematical, 54, 117, 200. See alsoalgorithm(s); proportionalityprinciple

McChrystal, Stanley, 76, 84, 94, 95,104, 105, 118, 143

Mcfate, Montgomery, 70, 114–116Mcmaster, H.R., 5, 74, 77Mcnamara, Robert, 120Memorandum of Notification, 135metadata, 137, 138, 152, 164, 167metaphors, 49method(s), 6, 7, 9–13, 17, 19, 117

IR’s methodological clash, 7methodological, 11, 13, 17, 84methodology, 19qualitative methods, 117

middle east, 35, 76, 79, 87middle eastern, 67, 160

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INDEX 259

military-age male, 1–5, 8–12, 16–18,20–34, 42, 45–47, 58–61, 68,69, 81, 90, 118, 149, 150,153–157, 174, 180, 182, 183,197, 202

MAMs, 2, 9, 31–34, 44–47, 51, 52,54, 57–61, 98, 108, 109, 114

men of non-military age, 2, 96military-age males, 1–3, 18, 22–24,

31–33, 38, 46, 47, 51, 52, 58,59, 61, 69–73, 80, 93, 97,106, 108, 109, 112–114, 118,121

mIRC chatroom, 163. See alsoscreener(s)

mobility patterns, 100, 137, 138, 169Morris, Layne, 50MQ-9 Reaper, 140. See also drone(s)multi-domain battle, 204Muslim culture, 9. See also IslamMy Lai massacre, 43. See also Vietnam

Nnational interest, 59nationalist, 197National security advisor, 5, 15, 74national security entry-exit registration

(NSEERS), 107National Transportation Safety Board,

171near-peer competitor, 24. See also

China; RussiaNew America Foundation, 12New Way Forward, 72, 73, 76, 77, 81.

See also turn to counterinsurgencyNew York Police Department

(NYPD), 106, 197New York Stock Exchange, 166New York Times, 1, 2, 13, 14, 58,

107, 131, 153, 198Nexus 7 Program, 1179/11, 46

nineteenth-century liberalism, 88nondisclosure agreements, 6non-kinetic, 4, 68, 71, 78, 109–111,

113, 114, 116nontraditional adversaries, 115,

120, 199. See also insurgencies,insurgent

normative, 5, 6, 16, 20, 23, 40, 46,47, 60, 69, 75, 87, 90, 93, 94,121, 142, 153, 156, 174

norm(s), 3, 14, 16, 17, 19–21, 23, 25normalisation, 203norm-violating actors, 3

Norse mythology, 83North Korea, 76. See also axis of EvilNorthpointe, 170, 171. See also

COMPAS, in relation to softwareno-strike list, 43. See also Operation

Just Causenot-civilian, 31. See also military-age

maleNSA General Counsel, 152Nuremberg Trial, 172. See also

Eichmann, Adolf, Trial,Eichmann

OObama Administration, 1, 9, 36, 38,

55, 58, 73, 78, 81, 95, 103, 119,132–135, 137, 140, 144, 146,158, 164, 197, 198, 201, 204,205

Obama, 3, 4, 35, 73, 81, 121, 142,179

objectivity, 132, 173object-oriented democracy, 205object-oriented analysis, 11

occupation, in relation to militaryoccupation, 7, 67

British occupation, 67occupying force(s), 82, 116. See also

host nation

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260 INDEX

US occupation, 73Odierno, Ray, 98, 145Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),55

Office of Legal Counsel in theDepartment of Justice, 44

operational environment (OE), 99,108, 157, 161, 164

Operation al-Fajr, 46. See also FallujahOperation Iraqi Freedom, 74, 109,

147Operation Just Cause, 43Operation Vigilant Resolve, 2, 96–98operator(s), in relation to military

operators, 132, 140, 154,171–173, 176, 180, 200, 201,203

Organization for EconomicCo-operation (OECD), 92

Ottoman Turks, 87Owens, William A., 146

PPachachi, Adnan, 96Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies,

12Panetta, Leon, 132paradigm, 10, 23, 156, 179, 204paradigmatic, 15, 24, 170

parole boards, 170participants, in relation to interview

participants, 6, 7, 34, 82, 83, 85,117, 133, 138, 143, 153, 155,158, 159, 183, 206

Pashtunwali code of honor, 162patriarchy, 49patriarchal, 105

pattern of behavior, 136, 182. See alsosignature strike

pattern of life, 22, 132, 163Peace Committee, 179

peacekeeping, 40peacekeeper, 68

pedagogical, 70, 116Pentagon, 3, 13, 43, 47, 73, 74, 120,

148performance, in relation to gender,

16, 18, 19, 152, 153Petit, Brian, 105Petraeus, David, 4, 38, 39, 69, 84,

95, 98, 104Petraeus Doctrine, 72, 119. See also

turn to counterinsurgencypolitical actor, 102positivist tradition, 11. See also

method(s)postcolonial subject, 104Powell, Colin, 47PR agenda, 59predictive analytics, 139, 166, 180.

See also big dataPresidential Policy Guidance, 198press secretary, 44, 143principle of distinction, 2, 3, 4, 15,

20, 21, 31, 34, 35, 56, 99, 135,142, 143, 150, 198–202. See alsointernational humanitarian law

prisoner of war, 3, 44Project Camelot, 116. See also

Vietnam, Vietnam WarProject Maven, 169. See also Algo-

rithmic Warfare Cross-FunctionalTeam

proportionality principle, 54, 61, 80,95, 96, 202

Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRTs), 77

Provisional Authority in Baghdad, 104public space, 159, 161, 178, 179Putin, Vladimir, 87

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INDEX 261

QQ-2 firebee, 148, 149. See also

intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR)

Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harithi, 131. Seealso USS Cole

qalat, 78, 105Quadrennial Diplomacy and Develop-

ment Review (QDDR), 78. Seealso security-development nexus

qualitative analysts, 10. See alsocausal, in relation to methods,causes-of-effects

Rrace, in the context of identity, 3, 9,

14, 83, 85, 90, 138, 168, 170,171, 179, 197, 202, 203

racial, 89, 121, 170, 197racialized, 18, 90, 137, 170, 171racism, 85racist, 83, 85, 91, 197

Radioplane company, 148Rand Corporation, 72, 165, 167Random Forest Algorithm, 173. See

also predictive analytics; SKYNET,in relation to NSA metadataprogram

rational, in relation to self-interestedindividuals, 21, 42, 60, 71, 76,81, 82, 105, 112

rational-legal authority, 45Raytheon, 165Reagan, Ronald, 42Reaper(s), 140, 150, 154, 181. See

also MQ-9 Reaperrecidivism score, 174. See also

COMPAS, in relation to softwarereconnaissance-strike complex, 139,

147recruitment, in relation to recruitment

of children, 60, 100

referent(s), in relation to security, 89,102, 145

remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), 142.See also drone(s)

research agenda, 168Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),

23, 112, 115, 139, 146Rice, Condoleeza, 74risk threshold, 22risk score, 174risk society, 199risky subject, 33

risky subjects, 33, 93, 106, 116robots, 145, 153, 168, 171, 200–204Roosevelt Institute, 13, 150, 151Royal Canadian Air Force, 181RQ-4 global hawk, 164. See also

drone(s)rule-based market economy, 104rules-based order, 88. See also liberal

internationalismrules of engagement (ROE), 47, 67,

68, 94, 100, 109, 110, 134ROE card, 110

Rumsfeld, Donald, 48, 50, 71, 72,98, 147

Russia, 24, 78, 87, 143, 167, 200Russian, 87, 88, 206

Ryan Aeronautical Company, 148

SSaint-Arnaud, Armand-Jacques

Leroy, 84. See also colonialcounterinsurgency

scorched earth tactics, 77Sarsour, Linda, 107satellites, 142Saudi Arabia, 141, 160, 161Schiff, Adam, congressman, 138school(s) of thought, 12, 161. See also

method(s)

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262 INDEX

science, in relation to natural science,10, 117, 167, 176, 179

scientific, 94, 173screener(s), 53, 54, 163. See also

drone crew(s)Secretary of Defense, 73, 132Secretary of State, 40, 59, 74, 120securing the intimate, 71security agenda, 79, 106, 138post-9/11 security culture, 1

security-development nexus, 78, 94security sector reform (SSR), 103security theater, 20, 31, 51, 93, 95,

113, 204security threat, 46segregation, 78, 102, 131, 138,

159–161. See also gendersegregation

self-defense, 110, 134, 135, 158, 182semi-automated, 164, 167. See also

lethal autonomous weaponssystems

semi-automation, 173, 180semi-autonomous, 23, 139, 176,

177Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, 45, 53sensor(s), 7, 15, 22, 121, 132, 145,

148, 151–154, 158, 161, 164,165, 175, 181. See also drone(s)

sensor-to-shooter, 17, 23sensor-to-shooter sequence, 15, 175

Sentient, in relation to machinelearning program, 167. See alsoAutomatic Target Recognition(ATR)

sex, in relation to biological category,57, 109, 138, 151

sexes, 160sexual assault, 116

Shock and Awe, 147. See also Iraq;occupation, in relation to militaryoccupation, US occupation

Signal application, 6signature(s), 51, 110, 133–138, 150,

160, 167–169, 173, 177, 182,183, 199, 203

signature strike, 134–136, 138, 149,182

SKYNET, in relation to NSA metadataprogram, 137, 152, 168, 174

slavery, 88, 89slaves, 89slave trade, 89

small-n. See method(s), qualitativemethods

Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide (SULGC),50, 72, 75, 76, 81, 100, 158

smart weapons, 13, 15, 16, 202laser-guided missiles, 133laser-guided munitions, 13smart bombs, 143

snowball method, 6, 7. See alsointerview

social construction, 45, 49, 54, 108,206

socially constructed, 48, 89social reality, 5, 92, 167

social contract theory, 2, 104social development, 18, 21, 70. See

also liberal internationalism,liberal development

social disorder, 17social incentives, 21, 76social science, 10, 114, 116, 117social-scientific data collection, 10social-scientific, in relation to facts

and knowledge, 10, 114, 116,117

sociology, 115

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INDEX 263

social sorting, 31, 136, 140, 145,151, 182, 183. See also riskysubjects

social values, 16, 20, 23sociocultural, 117, 121, 173socio-demographic, 113, 152socioeconomic, 174socio-geographic, 115sociological, 71, 73, 153, 183socio-material, 156, 183sociotechnical, 175

soft power, 68soldier-scholars, 70. See also Kilcullen,

David; Petraeus, DavidSomalia, 12, 13, 40, 121, 198

Somali, 40sovereign, 150, 158sovereignty, 5, 102, 107

Soviet, in relation to USSR, 41, 115,148

Soviets, 77space, 18–21, 37, 51, 68, 70, 71, 73,

80–83, 93, 95, 97, 100, 120,121, 139, 147, 164, 169, 178,179, 204

Special Operations Task Force South,105

speech-act, 48. See also legitimacyclaim

Speers, Christopher, 50spreadsheet(s), 134, 137, 180. See also

disposition matrixStanford Computer Science Lab, 170state-to-state warfare, 121statistics, 54, 113, 114, 177. See also

database, data collectionstatistical, 10, 13, 113, 114, 166,

169–172, 174, 177, 178, 203status-based, 110, 111. See also rules

of engagement (ROE)stereotypes, 14, 121, 202. See also biasSt. Petersburg Declaration, 35

strategic framing, 53, 56, 61. See alsodiscourse

suffrage, 89suicide attacks, 98suicide bombers, 20, 32, 39, 107,

109Sunni, 102, 161Sunni triangle, 98. See also Iraq

Surge, 77, 98, 145. See also turn tocounterinsurgency

surveillance, 14–17, 21, 22, 31, 33,61, 69, 77, 78, 81, 93, 96, 99,101, 106–109, 117, 120, 132,145, 152, 158, 161, 166, 168,173, 175, 199–202, 206

surveilling, 59, 199SWAT valley, 179symbolic, 46, 60, 77. See also

discursive languageSyria, 13, 119, 139, 141, 158, 197,

198, 206Syrian, 107

system of systems, 181. See alsoRevolution in Military Affairs(RMA)

TTactical Directive, 94. See also

McChrystal, StanleyTal Afar, 74. See also Operation Iraqi

FreedomTaliban, 3, 20, 32, 36, 38, 39, 44,

60, 82, 84, 88, 91, 95, 118, 133,148, 163, 179, 206

Taroke Kalacha, 77–80technical pipeline, 16, 176technocratic category, 9, 31technocratic, in relation to knowledge

production, 3, 9, 31, 42, 58, 202technology(ies), 4, 14–17, 20–25, 31,

38, 48, 54, 55, 61, 70, 71, 73,77, 84, 96, 99, 106, 112, 113,

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264 INDEX

115, 117, 120, 121, 139, 148,160, 167, 168, 171–174, 178,181, 183, 199, 201, 204

techno-scientific, 143Templer, Gerald, 86, 87. See also

Britian, British Counterinsurgencyterrorism, 2, 46, 52, 72, 88, 107,

179, 195, 196terrorist attacks, 138, 162terrorist(s), 2, 12, 36, 44, 48, 51,

52, 72, 75, 91, 98, 106, 107,138, 142, 145, 150, 174, 195,196

Terrorism Futures Market, 162Terrorist Attack Disruption Strike

(TADS), 135, 149textual analysis, 107. See also

method(s)The Arab Mind, 116The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

(TBIJ), 12, 144, 205theories, 11, 19, 153, 206theoretical, 5, 11, 12, 18, 20, 23,

56, 117theoretical pluralism, 5theorize, 163theorizing, 19, 89theory, 2, 11, 12, 55, 89, 104

threat assessment escalation of force(EOF), 110

Tomahawk cruise missile, 144torture, 32, 33, 44, 45, 53, 109, 115,

116tortured, 20, 44

towel-head, 83. See also race, in thecontext of identity, racism

Townsend, Stephen J., 13, 14training and doctrine command

(TRADOC), 112–114, 204training set, 176. See also database,

data sciencetraitors, 196

traits, 3, 9, 14, 56, 68, 114, 160transnational insurgency, 15, 55, 121,

132transparency, in relation to the drone

program, 12, 13, 137, 173, 204transparent, 137, 178

triangulation, in relation to data, 11tribal, 51, 99, 114Trudeau, Justin, 107Trump Administration, 24, 139, 169,

195–198Trump, Donald, 15, 84, 107, 197,

198Turkey, 141turn to counterinsurgency, 68–70, 75two-stage checkpoints, 100. See also

Elasticity

UU-2 reconnaissance jet, 148Ukraine, 87unconventional, in relation to warfare,

67, 120UNICEF, 47, 91uniform, 7, 31, 68, 81, 155unisex pseudonym, 7. See also

interviewUnited Nations, 43, 79, 88, 173United Nations Convention on

Certain Conventional Weapons,17, 174

United Nations Convention on theRights of the Child, 35

United Nations Development Fundfor Women, 92

UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs, 55

United States of America v. SalemAhmed Hamdan, 135

United States (US), 3, 4, 12, 20–24,31–35, 39–44, 52, 60, 79,85–89, 92, 96, 100, 107, 116,

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INDEX 265

120, 133, 151, 153, 158, 160,162, 164, 170, 171, 181, 183,196, 197, 199, 200, 204

universal, 19, 88–91, 104, 195unlawful combatants, 136unmanned, 16, 17, 132, 145, 146,

165, 183Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),

145–148, 155unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 146urban environment, 77, 100US Agency for International

Development (USAID), 40US air force, 14, 145US Army/Marine Corps Coun-

terinsurgency Field Manual,4

US Army Human Terrain Program,70

US Central Command, 3. See alsoCentral Command (CENTCOM)

US intervention, 4, 6, 20, 21, 32, 40,71, 87, 88, 92, 103, 114, 116

USS Cole, 131USS John S. McCain, 171, 178utilitarianism, 96utilitarian, 76, 94–96

Uzbekistan, 133

Vvalidity, 11value(s), 16, 20, 23, 37, 39, 40,

85–89, 92, 113, 121, 133, 142,164, 165, 173, 174, 177, 195,201, 205

variable(s), 9, 59, 69, 80, 95, 96, 113,157, 169, 174

veteran(s), 6, 7, 155, 168Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 146, 165, 181victimhood, 17, 39

video, 15, 22, 50, 145, 151, 155–164,201

Vietnam, 2, 9, 33, 42–47, 74, 75,112, 116, 120

Vietnamese, 9Vietnam War, 2, 33, 42–47, 74,

112, 149violence, 2, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 31–34,

37, 42, 45, 47, 51, 52, 55, 56,58, 60, 67, 71, 85, 97–99, 107,114–116, 136, 137, 142, 143,150, 152, 163, 172, 174–179,183, 200, 204, 206

violent, 14–16, 23–25, 34, 35, 47,49, 50, 54–56, 60, 68, 73,112, 114, 159, 160, 200, 202,206, 207

violent action, 15, 175violent conflict(s), 14, 16, 23–31,

35, 47, 49, 54, 175, 177, 200,202, 206, 207

virtual crewman, 201. See alsohuman-machine learning,human-machine teams

visual signifiers, 31. See also uniformvolume, velocity and variety, 166,

181. See also big data

Wwarfighting, 2, 115, 118, 138, 139,

152, 165warmaking, 21, 37, 41, 97, 109,

156warlords, 103War on Terror, 20, 21, 23, 32, 46,

47, 49, 55, 72, 89, 92, 133, 138,145, 146, 156, 196, 199, 202

warplane(s), 118, 172warrior, 67, 137, 154wars, 2, 3, 7, 35, 37–40, 52, 56, 60,

69, 75, 76, 80, 90, 92, 94, 133,142, 148, 149, 172, 201, 204

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266 INDEX

war theaters, 12wartime, 17, 23, 32, 38, 52, 60,

68, 114, 120, 153, 155, 163,200

warzone, 198Waziristan, 179Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDs), 41, 86wedding, in relation to drone strikes,

57, 179Western colonies, 2, 9Western customs, 92whistle-blowers, 6. See also interviewwhiteness, 195Women, 1, 5, 16–21, 35, 36, 39, 40,

45, 46, 54–60, 69, 71, 78–94,96, 100–102, 105, 106, 109,118, 119, 131, 132, 139, 145,151–160, 169, 172, 196

women’s equality, 88

womenandchildren, 140women of color, 89

World War Two, 116, 150

Xxenophobic, 85

YYemen, 1, 12, 13, 51, 121, 145, 163,

198Yemeni, 145

ZZaidan, Ahmad, 137, 138Zone Assessment Unit, 106. See also

New York Police Department(NYPD)